THE

SPINOZISTIC

ATTRIBUTES

t

THOMAS CARSON MARK

S p i n o z a ' s t h e o r y o f t h e a t t r i b u t e s has s e e m e d p r o b l e m a t i c to his r e a d e r s e v e r since t h e sevc~nteenth c e n t u r y . T h e p r o b l e m is u s u a ll y p r e s e n t e d " as a m a t t e r o f c h o o s i n g b e t w e e n two a l t e r n a t i v e s , t h e " o b j e c t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " a n d t h e " s u b j e c t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " , a n d it is n o t o r i o u s in S p i n o z a studies: F r a n c i s S. H a s e r o t calls it " T h e s c h i s m t h a t cuts d e e p e s t i n t o t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f S p i n o z a " . 2 0 b j e c t i v ists see t h e a t t r i b u t e s as" i n h e r e n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f subst an ce, r e v e a l i n g its real n a t u r e ; s u b j e c t i v i s t s see t h e m as t h e r e s u l t o f t h e way in w h i c h s u b s t a n c e is a p p r e h e n d e d , r e f l e c t i n g j u s t t h e a p p r e h e n d i n g i n t e l l e c t a n d n o t t h e real nature of substance. There are many different formulations o f b o t h positions. S o m e f o r m o f o b j e c t i v e view is n o w a d a y s a c c e p t e d by m o s t a u t h o r i t i e s , b u t I b e l i e v e t h a t n e i t h e r view is satisfactory, a l t h o u g h I shall n o t e x a m i n e t h e i r d e f i c i e n cies in d e t a i l h e r e ? I n s t e a d , I shall p o i n t o u t w h a t I t h i n k h a v e b e e n t h e g r e a t e s t obstacles to an a c c e p t a b l e i n t e r p r e t a tion (obstacles w h i c h a r e n o t o v e r c o m e by e i t h e r o f t h e u s u a l a c c o u n t s ) , a n d t h e n I shall s k e t c h a m o r e n e a r l y a d e q u a t e view. I n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e a t t r i b u t e s has b e e n m a d e difficult p a r t l y by a c o m m i t m e n t on t h e p a r t of c o m m e n t a t o r s to A r i s t o t e l i a n m e t a p h y s i c s . S p i n o z a asserts that t h e r e is ex act l y o n e s u b s t a n c e o r G o d , p o s s e s s i n g i n f i n i t e a t t r i b u t e s . E a c h a t t r i b u t e g iv e s a c o m p l e t e e x p r e s s i o n o f t h e b e i n g o r essence of God, and the expression of God's essence u n d e r ' In writing this paper 1 have profited from comments from Henry E. Allison, Ruth Mattern, Robert Pippin, and Zeno Vendler. "Spinuza's Definition of Attribute," Philosophical Review, LXII (1953). Also in S. Paul Kashap, ed., Studies in Spinoza (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 28 (subsequent references give page numbers in this edition). A lengthy account of some of the principal forms of the subjectivist view has been offered by Martial Guerouh: spinoza, Vol. I (Hildesheim: OIms, 1968), Appendix 3, pp. 428-461.

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T,C. MARK o n e a t t r i b u t e is logically i n d e p e n d e n t of its e x p r e s s i o n u n d e r a n y o t h e r . T h e s e claims are difficult to i n t e r p r e t a l o n g classical lines. A l a n D o n a g a n s u m s u p t h e p r o b l e m nicely: " S p i n o z a ' s p o s i t i o n is both that t h e d i v i n e a t t r i b u t e s are really d i s t i n c t and that they each e x p r e s s t h e s a m e d i v i n e essence. Classical m e t a p h y s i c s p u t s d o w n s u c h a c o n j u n c t i o n as i m p o s s i b l e , s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y " . 4 As we shall see, b o t h t h e o b j e c t i v e a n d t h e s u b j e c t i v e views a r e s t r o n g l y e n o u g h c o m m i t t e d to t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of classical m e t a p h y s i c s t h a t they are u n w i l l i n g to assert a c o n j u n c t i o n which is i n e x p l i c a b l e o n t h o s e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s , a n d so they fasten, each of t h e m , o n j u s t o n e p a r t of S p i n o z a ' s c o n j u n c t i o n . T h e s u b j e c t i v e view e m p h a s i z e s t h a t t h e n a t u r e of s u b s t a n c e m u s t be o n e a n d t h e s a m e e v e n t h o u g h the a t t r i b u t e s t h a t e x p r e s s it a r e d i s t i n c t ; t h e o b j e c t i v e view insists that it is t h e t r u e o r real n a t u r e of s u b s t a n c e w h i c h each a t t r i b u t e conveys. B u t n e i t h e r view gives t h e w h o l e story. W h a t we r e q u i r e is a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n with n o c o m m i t m e n t to classical m e t a p h y s i c s , which sets o u t to e l a b o r a t e a n d e x p l a i n what S p i n o z a actually says, n o t to r e c o n c i l e what h e says to t h e o r i e s that h e d i d n ' t h o l d . Merely to say t h a t s t a n d a r d a c c o u n t s b e t r a y a " c o m m i t m e n t to classical m e t a p h y s i c s " is v a g u e , a n d it will b e u s e f u l to b e m o r e precise. I b e l i e v e that we c a n d i s t i n g u i s h two m i s t a k e n p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s l h a t h a v e h a m p e r e d t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the a t t r i b u t e s . T h e first of t h e s e is a t e n d e n c y to r e g a r d t h e a t t r i b u t e s as p r o p e r t i e s of s u b s t a n c e . It is h e r e t h a t t h e i n f l u e n c e of classsical m e t a p h y s i c s is m o s t s t r o n g l y felt. T h e s e c o n d is a t e n d e n c y to r e g a r d t h e m as s o m e sort of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l entities. I take u p p r o p e r t i e s first.

I. Properties In traditional metaphysics, properties d e p e n d for their b e i n g o n t h e s u b s t a n c e s they a r e p r o p e r t i e s of. S u b s t a n c e s exist i n d e p e n d e n t l y , w h e r e a s p r o p e r t i e s exist o n l y " i n " ' "Essence and the Definition of Attribute," in Marjorie Grene, ed., Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays (New York: Doubleday, 1973), p. 177. 56

THE SPINOZIST1C ATTRIBUTES s u b s t a n c e . N o w , it is n o t difficult to see t h a t t h e S p i n o z i s t i c attributes do not exhibit the ontological dependence on substance which Aristotelian properties have on Aristotelian s u b s t a n c e . I n S p i n o z a t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n w h a t is i n d e p e n d e n t a n d w h a t is d e p e n d e n t c o r r e s p o n d s n o t to t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n s u b s t a n c e a n d a t t r i b u t e b u t to t h a t b e t w e e n s u b s t a n c e a n d m o d e . T o t r e a t t h e a t t r i b u t e s as p r o p e r t i e s , t h e r e f o r e , w o u l d b e to assign to t h e m t h e sort of d e p e n d e n c e o n s u b s t a n c e w h i c h S p i n o z a assi g n s to m o d e s . B u t w i t h r e s p e c t to this s o r t o f d e p e n d e n c e t h e a t t r i b u t e s a r e not d e p e n d e n t ; t h e y a r e i n d e p e n d e n t , a n d e q u i v a l e n t to s u b s t a n c e . F o r , like s u b s t a n c e , t h e y can s e r v e as that t h r o u g h w h i c h m o d e s a r e c o n c e i v e d a n d h a v e t h e i r b e i n g . T h e r e a r e s e v e r a l places w h e r e S p i n o z a t r e a t s " s u b s t a n c e " a n d " a t t r i b u t e " m o r e o r less s y n o n y m o u s l y . O n e s u c h is t h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n o f P r o p o s i t i o n 1 o f P a r t I I o f t h e Ethics, 5 w h i c h says t h a t T h o u g h t is an a t t r i b u t e o f G o d . In this d e m o n s t r a t i o n , S p i n o z a r e f e r s to E-I, d e f . 5, t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f m o d e , w h e r e b y a m o d e is in s o m e t h i n g else t h r o u g h w h i c h it is c o n c e i v e d . N o r m a l l y , t h a t " t h r o u g h w h i c h " a m o d e is c o n c e i v e d is s u b s t a n c e (as is b o r n e o u t in t h e r e f e r e n c e to this d e f i n i t i o n in E-I, 1), b u t h e r e in P a r t II m o d e s a r e d e s c r i b e d as c o n c e i v e d t h r o u g h o n e o r a n o t h e r attribute, n o t t h r o u g h s u b s t a n c e . T h u s , s u b s t a n c e a n d a t t r i b u t e a r e in this r e s p e c t g i v e n i d e n t i c a l roles. N e i t h e r o f t h e m is d e p e n d e n t in t h e way t h a t a m o d e is d e p e n d e n t ; in that s e n s e b o t h a r e i n d e p e n d e n t . 6 N o n e o f this is m e a n t to s u g g e s t t h a t m o d e s f u n c t i o n as p r o p e r t i e s f o r S p i n o z a . I d o n o t b e l i e v e that t h e y d o , e v e n t h o u g h they a r e o n t o l o g i c a l l y d e p e n d e n t on s u b s t a n c e . My p o i n t is s i m p l y that si n c e t h e k i n d o f o n t o l o g i c a l d e p e n d e n c e a s s i g n e d t r a d i t i o n a l l y to p r o p e r t i e s is a s s i g n e d in S p i n o z a ' s Subsequent references to the Ethics will give part and proposition numbers, abbreviated and placed in the text, thus: E-II, 1. 6 The equivalence is more explicit still in some of Spinoza's correspondence. See, for instance, Ep. 2 and Ep. 9, A. Wolf, ed., The Correspondence o[ Spinoza (London: Cass, 1966), p. 75, p. 108. Martial Guerouh argues for the equivalence of substance and attribute using various passages from the Ethics as well as other texts. Spinoza, I, op. cir., pp. 47--48.

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s y s t e m to m o d e s , a t t r i b u t e s c a n n o t play t h e r o l e in S p i n oza's metaphysics that properties p l a y e d in classical metaphysics. T h a t t h e S p i n o z i s t i c a t t r i b u t e s a r e n o t p r o p e r t i e s can be b r o u g h t o u t in a n o t h e r way, by a s k i n g w h e t h e r , if p r o p e r ties, t h e y a r e e s s e n t i a l o r a c c i d e n t a l . E s s e n t i a l p r o p e r t i e s a r e t h o s e w i t h o u t w h i c h a t h i n g w o u l d n o t b e t h e t h i n g it is. A n y p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e e s s e n c e o f a t h i n g m u s t t h e r e f o r e i n c l u d e its e s s e n t i a l p r o p e r t i e s . N o w , e a c h a t t r i b u t e o f f e r s an e x p r e s s i o n o f t h e e s s e n c e o f s u b s t a n c e , a n d this e x p r e s s i o n is said to be c o m p l e t e , w h i c h m u s t m e a n at t h e very least t h a t it gives all o f t h e e s s e n t i a l o r i n h e r e n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f s u b s t a n c e . B u t t h e a t t r i b u t e s d o not p r e s e n t (or "involve the c o n c e p t i o n of") o n e a n o t h e r (E-I, 10). T h e r e f o r e , n o n e o f t h e m is an e s s e n t i a l p r o p e r t y . So t h e y rnust be a c c i d e n t a l . B u t o f c o u r s e it just isn't t r u e t h a t the attributes are accidental for Spinoza: God or substance necessarily possesses i n f i n i t e a t t r i b u t e s , a n d w h a t a s u b s t a n c e possesses n e c e s s a r i l y can h a r d l y be an a c c i d e n t a l p r o p e r t y of it. T h e r e f o r e , if t h e a t t r i b u t e s a r e p r o p e r t i e s o r c h a r a c teristics, t h e y ca n be n e i t h e r e s s e n t i a l n o r a c c i d e n t a l . W h i c h is to say that t h e y m u s t n o t be p r o p e r t i e s at all. T h e c l a i m t h a t t h e a t t r i b u t e s a r e n o t p r o p e r t i e s is n o n o v e l t y in d i s c u s s i o n s o f S p i n o z a . S e v e r a l w r i t e r s h a v e a r g u e d f o r this c o n c l u s i o n . But w i t h o u t a p o s i t i v e i n t e p r e t a lion as an a l t e r n a t i v e o n e ' s t h i n k i n g can easily b e i n f l u e n c e d by t h e s u b j e c t - p r o p e r t y m o d e l , e v e n t h o u g h o n e m a y h a v e d e n i e d in w o r d s that t h e m o d e l a p p l i e s . T h i s can be s e e n in m a n y f o r m u l a t i o n s of t h e o b je c t iv is t p o s i t i o n . T h e o b j e c t i v e view is t a k e n to m e a n , f o r e x a m p l e , t h a t e a c h a t t r i b u t e is an " i n h e r e n t c h a r a c t e r o f s u b s t a n c e , ''7 o r else t h a t " T h e d i v e r s i t y o f a t t r i b u t e s r e f e c t s a real o r ' o b j e c t i v e ' d i v e r s i t y in t h e n a t u r e o f s u b s t a n c e . ''~ B o t h t h e s e f o r m u l a t i o n s a v o i d the word " p r o p e r t y . " But a "character" differs f r o m a 7 Haserot, "Spinoza's Definition of Auribute," 0p. cir., p. 28. Allison, Henry E., Benedict de Spinoza (Boston: Twayne, 1975), p. 59. Although I have used his formulation of the objectivist view as an example, I should point out that Allison does not regard the attributes as properties of substance hut as "perspectives."

58

THE SPINOZISTIC ATTRIBUTES " p r o p e r t y " , s u r e l y , in n a m e o n l y , a n d t h e s e a r c h f o r a " r e a l " d i v e r s i t y to c o r r e s p o n d to t h e ( p r e s u m a b l y ) " a p p a r e n t " d i v e r s i t y o f t h e a t t r i b u t e s fares, as we shall see, n o better. ~ T h i s m i s t a k e o f t r e a t i n g t h e a t t r i b u t e s as p r o p e r t i e s ( e v e n w h i l e d e n y i n g t h a t t h e t r a d i t i o n a l t h e o r i e s a p p l y ) is n o t c o n f i n e d to d e f e n d e r s o f t h e o b j e c t i v e view. A s t a n d a r d d e f e n s e o f t h e s u b j e c t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n consists in p o i n t i n g o u t t h e difficulties in r e g a r d i n g a t t r i b u t e s as g e n u i n e p r o p e r t i e s o f s u b s t a n c e . T h e a t t r i b u t e s s e e m to p r e s e n t d i f f e r e n t e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of s u b s t a n c e . B u t , t h e a r g u m e n t g o es , s u b s t a n c e is u n i q u e , p o s s e s s i n g a s i n g l e n a t u r e , a n d if it s e e m s to h a v e d i f f e r e n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s this m u s t be m e r e s e e m i n g . ~o T h e r e f o r e , since t h e a t t r i b u t e s c a n n o t be g e n u i n e p r o p e r t i e s o f s u b s t a n c e , t h e y m u s t be p u r p o r t e d p r o p e r t i e s c r e a t e d by o u r m i n d s a l o n e . O r , if t h e a t t r i b u t e s a r e n o t d e s c r i b e d as p u r p o r t e d p r o p e r t i e s t h e y m a y be c a l l e d " w a y s of s e e i n g " o r " f o r m s o f c o g n i t i o n " w h i c h p r e s e n t s u b s t a n c e in such a way t h a t it s e e m s to h a v e p r o p e r t i e s t h a t it d o e s n ' t h a v e . B u t " p u r p o r t e d p r o p e r t i e s " a r e still thought of, at least, as p r o p e r t i e s , a n d oil t h e "w ay s o f s e e i n g " view s u b s t a n c e is still t r e a t e d as t h e sort of t h i n g that ,might h a v e p r o p e r t i e s . In e i t h e r case t h e s u b j e c t i v i s t t h e o r y is g u i d e d by t h e m o d e l o f A r i s t o t e l i a n m e t a p h y s i c s . II.

Representation

T h e s e c o n d f u n d a m e n t a l o b s t a c l e to a s a t i s f a c t o r y int e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e a t t r i b u t e s has b e e n t h e t e n d e n c y to r e g a r d t h e m as r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f s u b s t a n c e . S p i n o z a talks, It is not easy to decide whether the "sources of diversity" formulation suffers mainly from treating attributes as properties or from the other basic error, to be discussed presently, of treating them as representations. "~ Sometimes the subjectivist may go further, asserting not just the uniqueness of substance but its perfect simplicity and homogeneity. This is a mistake,' as Gueroult and others have argued (.Spinoza, I, pp. 446-47). Nevertheless, Alan Donagan is right to insist that it is still the same essence that is expressed under each attribute ("Essence and the Definition of Attribute," op. cit., p. 176).

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typically, o f s u b s t a n c e b e i n g " e x p r e s s e d " o r " c o n c e i v e d " u n d e r d i f f e r e n t a t t r i b u t e s , a l t h o u g h h e uses o t h e r w o r d s too. T h u s , h e says that " s u b s t a n c e t h i n k i n g a n d s u b s t a n c e e x t e n d e d a r e o n e a n d the s a m e s u b s t a n c e , w h i c h is n o w c o m p r e h e n d e d u n d e r this a t t r i b u t e a n d n o w u n d e r that." S u c h talk c a n a p p l y to i n d i v i d u a l m o d e s as well as to s u b s t a n c e , t h u s , "a m o d e of e x t e n s i o n a n d t h e i d e a of that m o d e a r e o n e a n d the s a m e t h i n g e x p r e s s e d i n two d i f f e r e n t ways," a n d a circle a n d its i d e a a r e " o n e a n d t h e s a m e t h i n g w h i c h is m a n i f e s t e d t h r o u g h d i f f e r e n t attrib u t e s " (all t h e s e p h r a s e s o c c u r i n E - I I , 7, n o t e ) . I n a n a t t e m p t to e x p l a i n w h a t is i n v o l v e d w h e n " o n e a n d t h e s a m e t h i n g " is " e x p r e s s e d " in d i f f e r e n t ways, it has o f t e n b e e n s u p p o s e d t h a t w h e r e we talk of " e x p r e s s i o n s " we m u s t look for s o m e t h i n g else that they a r e e x p r e s s i o n s "of." I n p r a c t i c e - - a n d this is t h e c r u c i a l p o i n t - - this u s u a l l y m e a n s that t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n a t t r i b u t e a n d s u b s t a n c e is t a k e n as s o m e sort of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e r e l a t i o n : a n i n t e n t i o n a l o r s e m a n t i c g a p is set u p b e t w e e n t h e m . T h a t is, a r e l a t i o n is set u p in w h i c h o n e t h i n g p u r p o r t s to " r e p r e s e n t " o r " d e s c r i b e " a n o t h e r , a n d it b e c o m e s a n i n t e l l i g i b l e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r it really does " r e p r e s e n t " o r " d e s c r i b e " it. F u r t h e r m o r e , this q u e s t i o n m u s t be settled e x t e r n a l l y - - it c a n n o t b e a n s w e r e d j u s t by i n s p e c t i n g t h e p u r p o r t e d r e p r e s e n t a tion. T h i s s e m a n t i c o r i n t e n t i o n a l m o d e l is f o u n d in m a n y e x p l a n a t i o n s of t h e a t t r i b u t e s , n o t a b l y in m o s t of t h o s e w h i c h talk of t h e a t t r i b u t e s as " p e r s p e c t i v e s " as well as in t h e o b j e c t i v e a n d s u b j e c t i v e views. I shall r e f e r to all of t h e m as " r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l " t h e o r i e s of t h e a t t r i b u t e s . A n d they all a r e w r o n g . T o see w h a t is w r o n g with t h e m , let us take a n e x a m p l e w h i c h m a y s e e m at first to b e q u i t e u n e x c e p t i o n a b l e . S u b s t a n c e a n d its m o d e s c o m p r i s e w h a t exists (by E-I, 1), a n d they a r e e x p r e s s e d by t h e a t t r i b u t e s . T h e r e l a t i o n of a n a t t r i b u t e to s u b s t a n c e , t h e n , is t h a t of e x p r e s s i o n : t h e a t t r i b u t e expresses s u b s t a n c e a n d two a t t r i b u t e s a r e r e l a t e d to o n e a n o t h e r as two e x p r e s s i o n s of o n e a n d t h e s a m e t h i n g . S i m i l a r l y , t h e t h e o r y goes, t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n c o r r e s p o n d i n g m o d e s of d i f f e r e n t a t t r i b u t e s c a n b e d e s c r i b e d by s a y i n g t h a t o n e of t h e m e x p r e s s e s u n d e r a t t r i b u t e S t h e s a m e 60

THE SPINOZISTIC ATTRIBUTES m o d e of substance that the o t h e r expresses u n d e r attribute T . S o m e s u c h e x p l a n a t i o n as this is in fact w i d e l y t a k e n f o r g r a n t e d , b u t its a c c e p t a b i l i t y d e p e n d s o n h o w we c o n s t r u e t h e n o t i o n o f " e x p r e s s i o n " w h i c h has so f a r b e e n left undefined. On the prevalent readings of "expression," I b e l i e v e that t h e t h e o r y is i n c o h e r e n t as an a c c o u n t o f S p i n o z a ' s a t t r i b u t e s . I shall call t h e t h e o r y " ' t r i a d i c " to e m p h a s i z e its u n d e s i r a b l e f e a t u r e s . The t r i a d i c view e x p l a i n s t h e r e l a t i o n o f a n y t w o a t t r i b u t e s to e a c h o t h e r by r e l a t i n g t h e m to a t h i r d t h i n g , n a m e l y s u b s t a n c e . T h u s , we h a v e tw o a t t r i b u t e s , w h i c h a r e e x p r e s s i o n s , a n d t h e n we h a v e s u b s t a n c e , w h i c h is w h a t t h e y a r e e x p r e s s i o n s of. S u b s t a n c e is h e r e t a k e n - - m u s t be t a k e n , if t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is to m a k e s e n s e at all - - as e x i s t i n g i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f its e x p r e s s i o n u n d e r a n y attrib u t e . B u t this, I s u b m i t is n o t c o n c e i v a b l e f o r S p i n o z a : " . . . t h e r e is n o t h i n g m o r e e v i d e n t to us t h a n t h e fact t h a t e v e r y e n t i t y (ens) is c o n c e i v e d by us u n d e r s o m e a t t r i b u t e . ''H T h e " t r i a d i c " r e l a t i o n o f a t t r i b u t e s t h u s i n v o l v e s a p p e a l to s o m e t h i n g - - s u b s t a n c e e x i s t i n g in itself w i t h o u t a n y a t t r i b u t e - - w h i c h we c a n n o t c o n c e i v e . T h e w o r d " e x i s t i n g " is c r u c i a l h e r e , b e c a u s e o f c o u r s e we c a n g r a s p t h e f o r m a l n a t u r e o f s u b s t a n c e - - we can u n d e r s t a n d t h e d e f i n i t i o n - w i t h o u t t h i n k i n g o f a n y a t t r i b u t e . F o r m a l l y , s u b s t a n c e is i n d e p e n d e n t b e i n g , it is d e f i n e d as t h a t w h i c h p o ssesses logical a n d c a u s a l i n d e p e n d e n c e . B u t w h e n we m o v e f r o m this f o r m a l level a n d i n s t e a d o f c o n t e m p l a t i n g t h e e s s e n c e o f s u b s t a n c e t u r n to t h i n k o f s u b s t a n c e e x i s t i n g , we f i n d t h a t we c a n n o t c o n c e i v e s u b s t a n c e a c t u a l l y to exist e x c e p t u n d e r s o m e attribute. T o use the t e r m i n o l o g y of the d e f i n i t i o n o f a t t r i b u t e ( a n d to a n t i c i p a t e s o m e s u b s e q u e n t c o n c l u s i o n s ) , e x i s t e n c e o f s u b s t a n c e r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e essence o f s u b s t a n c e be c o n s t i t u t e d by o n e o r a n o t h e r a t t r i b u t e . It m i g h t b e c l a i m e d t h a t a l t h o u g h it c a n n o t b e so c o n c e i v e d , s u b s t a n c e m i g h t , f o r all that, exist as a n u n a p p r e h e n d e d t h i n g in itself. A n d s o m e s u b j e c t i v i s t s h a v e b e e n so f a r m i s l e d by t h e i r o w n t h e o r i e s as to i g n o r e t h e t e x t a n d c l a i m t h a t s u b s t a n c e is in itself u n k n o w a b l e . B u t " Ep. 9, Wolf, ed., op. cit., p. 107. 61

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such a s u g g e s t i o n is n o t o n e S p i n o z a w o u l d tolerate. N o p h i l o s o p h e r has e v e r b e l i e v e d m o r e firmly in t h e u l t i m a t e intelligibility of N a t u r e , o r i n s i s t e d m o r e clearly o n t h e possibility of a d e q u a t e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e r e c a n b e n o t h i n g w h i c h is i n p r i n c i p l e inaccessible to t h e i n t e l l e c t ; w h a t is n o t c o n c e i v a b l e is n o t possible. S i n c e t h e t r i a d i c t h e o r y a p p e a l s to w h a t for S p i n o z a is i n c o n c e i v a b l e , it c a n n o t c o u n t as a satisfactory a c c o u n t of his views. T h e t r i a d i c view b e g a n as a n a t t e m p t to e x p l a i n h o w d i f f e r e n t a t t r i b u t e s can " e x p r e s s " a s i n g l e s u b s t a n c e . B u t in d o i n g this it m a d e t h e a t t r i b u t e s i n t o r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , setting up a semantic gap between them and substance a n d a s s i m i l a t i n g t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n a t t r i b u t e a n d s u b s t a n c e to the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n a d e s c r i p t i o n a n d w h a t it d e s c r i b e s . T h e o b j e c t i v e t h e o r y , with its search for " i n h e r e n t c h a r a c teristics" to serve as objects for t h e a t t r i b u t e s to c o r r e s p o n d to also rests clearly o n this sort of c o n c e p t i o n of t h e a t t r i b u t e s . T h e s u b j e c t i v e view d e n i e s o r w e a k e n s t h e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n a t t r i b u t e s a n d s u b s t a n c e , b u t it r e t a i n s t h e c o n c e p t i o n of t h e a t t r i b u t e s as r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l entities. H o w e v e r , as s o o n as o n e t h i n k s of t h e a t t r i b u t e s this way, it b e c o m e s possible to ask w h e t h e r they a c c u r a t e l y o r t r u l y c h a r a c t e r i z e that which they r e p r e s e n t , a n d a n y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w h i c h leaves r o o m for this q u e s t i o n p u t s us back o n the s u b j e c t i v e / o b j e c t i v e m e r r y - g o - r o u n d : t h e objectivist says "yes," t h e subjectivist says "'no" o r " n o t n e c e s s a r i ly". T h e d e b a t e is e n d l e s s b e c a u s e t h e p r o b l e m c a n n o t be settled w i t h i n t h e i n t e r p r e t i v e f r a m e w o r k p r o v i d e d : it is t h e c o n c e p t i o n of t h e a t t t r i b u t e s as r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l which is the s o u r c e of i n a d e q u a c y in all of t h e s e t h e o r i e s . It is j u s t this c o n c e p t i o n w h i c h we m u s t avoid.

III. Expression B e f o r e t u r n i n g to t h e q u e s t i o n what, exactly, t h e a t t r i b u t e s are, it will be u s e f u l to s u g g e s t t h a t it is possible to talk of " o n e a n d t h e s a m e t h i n g e x p r e s s e d in d i f f e r e n t ways" w i t h o u t a p p e a l i n g to a n y sort of s e m a n t i c o r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n s u b s t a n c e a n d a t t r i b u t e . For, as we h a v e s e e n , s u c h a r e l a t i o n w o u l d i n v o l v e a n o t i o n of 62

THE SPINOZIST1C ATTRIBUTES s u b s t a n c e a c t u a l l y e x i s t i n g u n d e r n o a t t r i b u t e , a n d t h a t is u n i n t e l l i g i b l e f o r S p i n o z a . W h e n s u b s t a n c e o r o n e o f its m o d e s is e x p r e s s e d u n d e r this o r t h a t a t t r i b u t e t h e r e j u s t isn't a n y t h i n g f o r this e x p r e s s i o n to c o r r e s p o n d to in t h e s e m a n t i c way, n o r e a l i t y r e p r e s e n t e d w h i l e yet r e t a i n i n g s o m e b e i n g d i s t i n c t f r o m t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , w h i c h is p e r f e c t l y c o m p a t i b l e with t h e possibility o f s u b s t a n c e b e i n g expressed u n d e r some o t h e r attribute. This may s o u n d a bit p e c u l i a r , b u t it is n o t especially m y s t e r i o u s o n c e we f r e e o u r s e l v e s o f t h e i n a p p r o p r i a t e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f classical m e t a p h y s i c s a n d o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l i s m . It m a y well be a fact a b o u t s o m e t h i n g t h a t it l e n d s itself, tO e x p r e s s i o n in m o r e t h a n o n e way, b u t t h e r e is n o n e e d to s u p p o s e t h a t f o r e a c h e x p r e s s i o n t h e r e will be a d i s t i n c t p r o p e r t y o f t h e t h i n g u n d e r l y i n g o r m a k i n g possible t h a t e x p r e s s i o n . N o r n e e d we t h i n k o f t h e d i f f e r e n t e x p r e s s i o n s as r e p r e s e n t a tions. A m u s i c a l c o m p o s i t i o n , f o r e x a m p l e , can be t r a n s p o s e d i n t o d i f f e r e n t keys, b u t t h e r e is n o n e e d to look f o r " i n h e r e n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s " n o r f o r a " s o u r c e o f d i v e r s i t y " in t h e m u s i c t h a t p e r m i t s it to be p l a y e d first in B-flat t h e n in G m a j o r . N o r d o d i f f e r e n t t r a n s p o s i t i o n s o f a p i e c e c o u n t as r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f it. ~ D i s t i n c t n e s s o f a t t r i b u t e s d o e s n o t rest o n d i f f e r e n t p r o p e r t i e s o f s u b s t a n c e , e a c h p r o p e r t y being expressed t h r o u g h a different attribute. Distinctness o f a t t r i b u t e s m e a n s that o n e a t t r i b u t e can be c o n c e i v e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f t h e o t h e r s (E-I, I0, note). T o e x p l a i n S p i n o z a ' s d o c t r i n e o f a t t r i b u t e s as d i f f e r e n t e x p r e s s i o n s o f a s i n g l e reality in a way t h a t d o e s n o t t u r n t h e m i n t o r e p r e s e n t a t i v e entities, it will be c o n v e n i e n t to o f f e r an a n a l o g y with n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e s . T h e r e l a t i o n s h i p

'~ I am not here denying that something (call it the music) remains the same in each of the transpositions of a piece; the point is that there is no representational gap between the transposition and the music. It is meaningless to ask whether the transposition does or does not "correspond to" the music (assuming that it is a transposition - - that the mechanics of transposition have been correctly carried out). A transposition does not represent the music to us - - it just gives us the music. A similar remark applies to my discussion below of synonymous sentences and the "meanings" they express.

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b e t w e e n two n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e s is a n a l o g o u s in several i n t e r e s t i n g ways to the r e l a t i o n s h i p w h i c h I c l a i m h o l d s b e t w e e n t h e a t t r i b u t e s in S p i n o z a . T o f u r t h e r t h e a n a l o g y I shall s u p p o s e (1) that w h a t e v e r c a n b e said in o n e n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e c a n also be said i n a n y o t h e r , a n d (2) that w h a t e v e r c a n b e said at all c a n be said i n s o m e n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e . T h e s e two s u p p o s i t i o n s c o r r e s p o n d to S p i n o z a ' s d o c t r i n e s of t h e e q u i v a l e n c e a n d t h e c o m p l e t e n e s s of t h e a t t r i b u t e s . C o n s i d e r n o w t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n two lang u a g e s , say E n g l i s h a n d F r e n c h . A p e r s o n c a n u n d e r s t a n d E n g l i s h w i t h o u t u n d e r s t a n d i n g F r e n c h , a n d vice versa, w h i c h m e a n s that t h e two l a n g u a g e s are i n d e p e n d e n t in j u s t t h e way i n w h i c h S p i n o z a says t h e a t t r i b u t e s are i n d e p e n d e n t of o n e a n o t h e r : t h e c o n c e p t i o n of o n e d o e s n o t r e q u i r e t h e c o n c e p t i o n of t h e o t h e r . F u r t h e r m o r e , a n E n g l i s h s e n t e n c e a n d the F r e n c h s e n t e n c e t h a t is s y n o n y m o u s with it ( t h e r e is such a s e n t e n c e by (1) above) c o u l d b e d e s c r i b e d t h e way S p i n o z a d e s c r i b e s a m o d e of e x t e n s i o n a n d t h e idea of that m o d e : " o n e a n d t h e s a m e t h i n g e x p r e s s e d in two d i f f e r e n t ways" (E-II, 7, n o t e ) , for, by the m e a n i n g of " s y n o n y m o u s , " w h a t is said in o n e s e n t e n c e is t h e s a m e as what is said in t h e o t h e r . B u t in o r d e r to claim that t h e two s e n t e n c e s a r e d i f f e r e n t e x p r e s s i o n s of t h e s a m e t h i n g , we a r e n o t o b l i g e d to give a c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of what is said w h i c h is i n d e p e n d e n t of its e x p r e s s i o n in a n y l a n g u a g e : it is idiotic to ask s o m e o n e to e x p l a i n w h a t a s e n t e n c e says a n d to d e m a n d that t h e e x p l a n a t i o n b e g i v e n in n o l a n g u a g e at all. F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e r e is n o n e e d to s u p p o s e t h a t , a l t h o u g h we c a n n o t e x p r e s s it e x c e p t in l a n g u a g e , " w h a t is said" m i g h t n e v e r t h e l e s s exist u n e x p r e s s e d , "in itself." T h e r e is n o n e e d to give " w h a t is said" o r t h e " m e a n i n g " of a s e n t e n c e a n y d i s t i n c t o n t o l o g i c a l status. T o d o so w o u l d place a s e m a n t i c g a p b e t w e e n m e a n i n g s a n d t h e s e n t e n c e s that e x p r e s s t h e m , m a k i n g the s e n t e n c e s describe o r represent o r refer to t h e m e a n i n g s . A n d this is t h e e r r o r of t h e t r i a d i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which e x p l a i n s t h e r e l a t i o n of a m o d e of t h o u g h t to a m o d e of e x t e n s i o n by a p p e a l i n g to a " m o d e of s u b s t a n c e " w h i c h they b o t h e x p r e s s . T h e t r i a d i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s u p poses t h a t t h e m o d e s of d i f f e r e n t a t t r i b u t e s a r e r e l a t e d i n

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THE SPINOZISTIC ATTRIBUTES the m a n n e r of h e t e r o n y m o u s w o r d s that r e f e r to t h e s a m e t h i n g . B u t in fact t h e m o d e s of d i f f e r e n t a t t r i b u t e s a r e b e t t e r seen as r e l a t e d in the m a n n e r of s e n t e n c e s w h i c h say the s a m e t h i n g in d i f f e r e n t l a n g u a g e s , a n d that r e l a t i o n s h i p r e q u i r e s n e i t h e r that they r e f e r to t h e s a m e t h i n g (or to a n y t h i n g at all) n o r t h a t t h e r e b e s o m e i n d e p e n d e n t l y e x i s t i n g m e a n i n g w h i c h b o t h c o n v e y . ~3 T o a v o i d m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , let m e p o i n t o u t t h a t l a n g u a g e also has a s e m a n t i c o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e d i m e n s i o n : L a n g u a g e c a n d e s c r i b e t h e world. B u t that is n o t t h e a s p e c t of l a n g u a g e that is r e l e v a n t h e r e . T h e p o i n t o f m y i l l u s t r a t i o n is that j u s t as o n e c a n t h i n k of l i n g u i s t i c expressions being synonymous without positing some " m e a n i n g " that they each r e p r e s e n t o r d e s c r i b e ( s t a n d in a s e m a n t i c r e l a t i o n to), so o n e c a n t h i n k of S p i n o z a ' s attributes expressing one a n d the same thing without m a k i n g t h e m i n t o r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of that t h i n g . T h e s e m a n t i c d i m e n s i o n of l a n g u a g e d o e s h a v e a n a n a l o g u e i n S p i n o z a ' s p h i l o s o p h y ; ideas d o s t a n d in a n i n t e n t i o n a l r e l a t i o n to t h e i r ideata. B u t the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n i d e a a n d ideatum m u s t n o t be c o n f u s e d with t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e attributes. T h e c o m p a r i s o n with l a n g u a g e s m a y p r o d u c e s o m e u n e a s i n e s s , for it a p p e a r s to e x p l a i n t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p 's T h e theory of l a n g u a g e invoked here, accordit~g xo which t h e r e is n o need to appeal to m e a n i n g s as entities, is not accepted by all philosophers. But that does not matter; it is not my p u r p o s e to d e f e n d a theory of l a n g u a g e b u t to explain the relation between t h e attributes in Spinoza. Nor d u e s the rejection of the triadic view as an interpretation of Spinoza d e p e n d on t h e analogy with l a n g u a g e : it follows f r o m t h e rejection of any r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l theory of t h e attributes, which we worked o u t in the previous section. T h e analogy wiih language is i n t e n d e d to m a k e the following point: if we do t h i n k that s y n o n y m y c a n ' b e e x p l a i n e d without appeal to m e a n i n g s as entities to which synonymous expressions s t a n d in semantic relations ( a n d m a n y people, I think, believe this o r at least find it intelligible), t h e n we have a m o d e l which can be u s e d to illustrate Spinoza's " o n e a n d t h e s a m e t h i n g e x p r e s s e d in two different ways" (where we also wish to avoid a semantic g a p between the e x p r e s s i o n s a n d w h a t e v e r it is that they express).

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T.C. MARK b e t w e e n t h e a t t r i b u t e s by a p p e a l i n g to t h e c o n c e p t of s y n o n y m y , a c o n c e p t that m a y s e e m as o b s c u r e as what we a r e t r y i n g to e x p l a i n . T o this o b j e c t i o n I h a v e n o reply; t h a t is, I h a v e n o t h e o r y to show t h a t s y n o n y m y is not a problematic concept. Nevertheless, m a n y people would a g r e e at least that s y n o n y m y c a n n o t b e a d e q u a t e l y exp l a i n e d in t e r m s of s a m e n e s s of r e f e r e n c e , a n d m y p o i n t c o u l d be p u t by s a y i n g that it is t h e c o n c e p t of s y n o n y m y , n o t s a m e n e s s of r e f e r e n c e , that e x p l a i n s t h e " d i f f e r e n t ways" in S p i n o z a ' s " o n e a n d t h e s a m e t h i n g e x p r e s s e d in d i f f e r e n t ways." T h e a n a l o g y with l a n g u a g e s has l i m i t a t i o n s . It is m o r e n e a r l y satisfactory in d e s c r i b i n g the r e l a t i o n of two m o d e s u n d e r d i f f e r e n t a t t r i b u t e s t h a n it is in d e s c r i b i n g t h e a t t r i b u t e s themselves. F o r t h e a t t r i b u t e s , as we shall e m p h a s i z e , also constitute s u b s t a n c e , a n d l a n g u a g e s h a v e n o a n a l o g o u s f e a t u r e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , I shall o c c a s i o n a l l y r e f e r to the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n a t t r i b u t e s a n d t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n c o r r e s p o n d i n g m o d e s of d i f f e r e n t a t t r i b u t e s as a sort of s y n o n y m y in o r d e r to stress the d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n my i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d the o n e s I h a v e called r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l . T h e r e will be n o h a r m in this, p r o v i d e d the r e l e v a n t q u a l i f i c a t i o n s a r e kept in m i n d ,

IV. What the Intellect P e r c e i v e s W i t h s o m e n o t i o n of how t h e r e can be a l t e r n a t e e x p r e s sions of a single t h i n g w i t h o u t these e x p r e s s i o n s b e i n g p r o p e r t i e s o r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of it, we m a y a p p r o a c h t h e q u e s t i o n what the a t t r i b u t e s are. Let us c o n s i d e r S p i n o z a ' s definition. l~y a t t r i b u t e I m e a n that w h i c h the i n t e l l e c t p e r c e i v e s of s u b s t a n c e as c o n s t i t u t i n g its essence. (E-I, def. 4) Per a t t r i b u t u m intelligo id, q u o d i n t e l l e c t u s d e subs t a n t i a p e r c i p i t , t a n q u a m e i u s d e m e s s e n t i a m constituens. T h e d e f i n i t i o n is r e m a r k a b l y explicit, a n d t h e r e w o u l d be only a little e x a g g e r a t i o n in s a y i n g t h a t a satisfactory i n t e r p r e t a t i o n c o u l d b e d e r i v e d j u s t f r o m a p e r f e c t l y literal r e a d i n g of it. But, as 17th c e n t u r y p h i l o s o p h e r s w e r e f o n d of i n s i s t i n g , such a r e a d i n g is possible o n l y a f t e r we h a v e 66

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rid o u r s e l v e s of v a r i o u s p r e j u d i c e s , a n d , in a d d i t i o n to t h e e r r o r s a l r e a d y t r e a t e d , these i n c l u d e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s surr o u n d i n g t h e c o n c e p t of p e r c e p t i o n . F o r n o t i c e that t h e d e f i n i t i o n talks of p e r c e p t i o n , n o t c o n c e p t i o n . By d e f i n i t i o n , s u b s t a n c e is conceived t h r o u g h itself, w h e r e a s , a g a i n by d e f i n i t i o n , the a t t r i b u t e s a r e what t h e intellect perceives of substance. Spinoza distinguishes conception from perception in E - I I , def. 3, a n d I t h i n k it is r e a s o n a b l e to s u p p o s e that t h e use of d i f f e r e n t w o r d s in the d e f i n i t i o n s of s u b s t a n c e a n d a t t r i b u t e is d e l i b e r a t e . C o n c e p t i o n , as S p i n oza c h a r a c t e r i z e s it, i~ active; p e r c e p t i o n is passive. B u t we m u s t be c a r e f u l n o t to a p p l y o u r n o t i o n s of p e r c e p t i o n u n c r i t i c a l l y to S p i n o z a ' s t h e o r y of t h e a t t r i b u t e s . F o r t h e p e r c e p t i o n i n v o l v e d h e r e is p e r c e p t i o n by the intellect, n o t by t h e bodily senses. S i n c e most t h e o r i e s of p e r c e p t i o n a r e d e s i g n e d to e x p l a i n p e r c e p t i o n by t h e bodily senses, n o t t h e intellect, it o u g h t n o t to be s u r p r i s i n g if s o m e of t h e c o n c e p t u a l a p p a r a t u s of s t a n d a r d t h e o r i e s has n o place in p e r c e p t i o n by the intellect. Z4 Now, the a t t r i b u t e s a r e d e f i n e d as "that which t h e intellect perceives," which is to say that they a r e objects of p e r c e p t i o n . A n d it is h e r e that p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g p e r c e p t i o n can be m i s l e a d i n g . F o r in m a n y t h e o r i e s of p e r c e p t i o n " w h a l is p e r c e i v e d " - - t h e object of p e r c e p t i o n t u r n s o u t to be a r a t h e r special sort of e n t i t y . T h i s is b e c a u s e m a n y p h i l o s o p h e r s in the s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y (as well as m a n y s u b s e q u e n t p h i l o s o p h e r s ) have s u p p o s e d that reality c a n n o t be directly p e r c e i v e d , b u t m u s t be g r a s p e d i n s t e a d by m e a n s of i n t e r m e d i a t e e n t i t i e s which s t a n d between the a p p r e h e n d i n g consciousness a n d the world. These e n t i t i e s are what is directly p e r c e i v e d . T h e y a r e -

,~ Perception as Spinoza characterizes it is usually something done by the mind; thus, the notion of intellectual perception developed in the text need not be taken as a deviant usage. When perception by the bodily senses is in question, Spinoza's word is "imagination," not "perception," although counter-examples can be found. We should note also that the distinction between conception and perception is not rigidly adhered to (e.g. in E-II, 38, "perception" occurs in the demonstratinn even though "conception" would seem to be the appropriate word). I do not think that these irregularities undermine the general claims made in the text. 67

T.C. MARK m i n d - d e p e n d e n t : t h e i r e x i s t e n c e is n o t in t h e w o r l d , it is i n t h e m i n d o r c o n s c i o u s n e s s . N o n e t h e l e s s , they p r o v i d e i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e w o r l d ; this c o m e s a b o u t by v i r t u e of t h e i r s t a n d i n g to t h e w o r l d in a s u i t a b l e - - typically a representing -- relation. But these familiar presuppositions n e e d not, a n d I think d o n o t , h o l d f o r p e r c e p t i o n by t h e i n t e l l e c t i n S p i n o z a ' s t h e o r y o f t h e a t t r i b u t e s . 15 F o r S p i n o z a , t h e i n t e l l e c t p e r ceives directly, n o t by m e a n s of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e entities. A n d it p e r c e i v e s reality, n o t s o m e special e n t i t y o n t o l o g i c a l l y d e p e n d e n t o n itself. N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s d e s c r i b e d a b o v e h a v e i n f l u e n c e d t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of S p i n o z a . F o r e x a m p l e , t h e p h r a s e , " t h a t w h i c h t h e intellect p e r c e i v e s " has b e e n t a k e n to s u p p o r t t h e s u b j e c t i v i s t view, o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t it shows a t t r i b u t e s to p e r t a i n to s u b s t a n c e n o t as s u b s t a n c e is in itself b u t as it is app r e h e n d e d . T h e r e f o r e , it is c l a i m e d , the o n t o l o g i c a l status of a t t r i b u t e s m u s t b e o n e of d e p e n d e n c e o n t h e intellect, a n d so they are " s u b j e c t i v e " . B u t this c o n c l u s i o n follows only if we take S p i n o z a to h o l d that w h a t is d i r e c t l y p e r c e i v e d d e p e n d s f o r its e x i s t e n c e o n t h e p e c e i v e r , w h i c h t h e r e is n o r e a s o n to g r a n t . A g a i n s t this a r g u m e n t for t h e s u b j e c t i v e view, s o m e w r i t e r s h a v e t h o u g h t it u s e f u l to ask w h e t h e r "intellect" in t h e d e f i n i t i o n r e f e r s to finite o r i n f i n i t e intellect, t h e s u p p o s i t i o n b e i n g t h a t if t h e i n t e l l e c t r e f e r r e d to is t h e i n f i n i t e intellect, t h e n t h e a t t r i b u t e s a r e o b j e c t i v e since surely the i n f i n i t e i n t e l l e c t c o u l d n o t app r e h e n d things wrongly or subjectively. I n this a r g u m e n t a n d c o u n t e r - a r g u m e n t two d i f f e r e n t q u e s t i o n s a r e c o n f u s e d , t h e first h a v i n g to d o with t h e o n t o l o g i c a l status of the a t t r i b u t e s a n d t h e s e c o n d h a v i n g to d o with w h e t h e r t h e a t t r i b u t e s a c c u r a t e l y p r e s e n t s u b s t a n c e . ~ Whether they hold for Spinoza's theory of perception by the senses 1 shall leave open. Spinoza is generally said to hold a representative theory of perception, but my own work on Spinoza's philosophy of mind has convinced me that this claim requires thorough examination, although I shall not pursue the point in this essay. In such an examination it is essential to distinguish representative theories of peception from representative theories of knowledge; that Spinoza did not hold the latter is, I believe, demonstrable. 68

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The word "subjective" can have either connotation. Let us t a k e u p t h e s e c o n d q u e s t i o n first. T o a s k w h e t h e r the attributes accurately present substance involves the mistake o f t r e a t i n g t h e a t t r i b u t e s as r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , and this issue w e h a v e a l r e a d y d i s c u s s e d . B u t t h e r e is a f u r t h e r m i s t a k e i n s u p p o s i n g t h a t it is i m p o r t a n t t o c h o o s e h e r e b e t w e e n t h e finite and the infinite intellect. Only a moment's reflection is n e e d e d t o r e c o g n i z e t h a t it d o e s n ' t m a t t e r t o w h i c h i n t e l l e c t w e t a k e t h e d e f i n i t i o n t o r e f e r : w h a t is i m p o r t a n t is t h a t t h e w o r d u s e d is " i n t e l l e c t . " S p i n o z a b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e o r d e r o f t h e i n t e l l e c t is o n e a n d t h e s a m e , w h e t h e r i n G o d o r i n humans, and although the infinite intellect may comprehend more things than the finite intellect, those things t h a t are c o m p r e h e n d e d in the finite intellect are adequate and true in exactly the way they would be in the infinite intellect. The supposition that the reference to intellect in the definition supports a subjective interpretation amounts to assimilating intellect and imagination, since for Spinoza the claim that each individual has his own peculiar perception of substance, or that different individuals apprehend d i f f e r e n t " t r u t h s " is e n o u g h all b y i t s e l f t,o s h o w that the person who makes it c o n f u s e s intellect with imagination. He writes: " . . . everyone has heard the expressions: So many heads, so many ways of thinking; e v e r y o n e is s a t i s f i e d w i t h h i s o w n w a y o f t h i n k i n g ; d i f f e r e n c e s o f b r a i n s a r e n o t less c o m m o n than differences of t a s t e - - all o f w h i c h m a x i m s s h o w t h a t m e n d e c i d e u p o n matters according to the constitution of their brains, and imagine rather than understand things" (E-I, appendix). W h a t t h e i n t e l l e c t p e r c e i v e s as c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e e s s e n c e o f s u b s t a n c e does c o n s t i t u t e t h e e s s e n c e o f s u b s t a n c e . ~ ,s These considerations should be enough to rule out the notion that the attributes are somehow dependent on h u m a n apprehension, and with it those versions o[ the subjective view which talk of the attributes as "inventions of the h u m a n intellect." Nevertheless, there is one lesson to be drawn from this discussion. Although the attributes do not depend on h u m a n apprehension, they do, according to the definition, relate in some fashion to intellect, and this must figure in any acceptable interpretation. Hence my insistence in the text on perception by the intellect.

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W e c a n n o w c o m m e n t o n t h e first of t h e q u e s t i o n s d i s t i n g u i s h e d above, h a v i n g to d o with the o n t o l o g i c a l status of t h e a t t r i b u t e s . A n d it is n o w clear that t h e a t t r i b u t e s are n o t s u b j e c t i v e , o r d e p e n d e n t o n t h e intellect. F o r t h e intellect p e r c e i v e s t h i n g s as they a r e - - it is intellect, a n d n o t i m a g i n a t i o n . A n d s a y i n g t h a t it p e r c e i v e s t h i n g s as they a r e is n o t j u s t to say that it p e r c e i v e s s o m e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e e n t i t y which c o i n c i d e s - e v e n n e c e s s a r i l y with reality. T h e a t t r i b u t e s a r e n o t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e e n t i t i e s at all. T h e intellect perceives reality - - s u b s t a n c e - - directly, without any intermediary, a n d the attributes do not represent, they c o n s t i t u t e t h e e s s e n c e of s u b s t a n c e . T h e t r u t h o r falsity of t h e a t t r i b u t e s to s u b s t a n c e is a q u e s t i o n t h a t c a n n o t arise; t h e a t t r i b u t e s a r e s u b s t a n c e . W i t h this e c h o of t h e s u b j e c t i v e / o b j e c t i v e d e b a t e b e h i n d us, let us c o n s i d e r what is i n v o l v e d in p e r c e p t i o n by t h e intellect. T h e c o n c e p t m a y be difficult to w o r k out, s i n c e w h e n we talk of p e r c e p t i o n by t h e intellect, i n s t e a d of by the bodily senses, s o m e of o u r o r d i n a r y i n t u i t i o n s a b o u t p e r c e p t i o n m a y be i n a p p r o p r i a t e . B u t S p i n o z a d o e s n ' t w o r r y a b o u t e v e r y d a y i n t u i t i o n s . It d o e s n ' t m a t t e r for h i m w h e t h e r we c a n i m a g i n e s o m e t h i n g , what c o u n t s is u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a n d t h e line we a r e p u r s u i n g leads, I claim, to a b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of S p i n o z a ' s t h e o r y , w h a t e v e r v i o l e n c e it may d o to o u r i m a g i n a t i o n . T h a t it s h o u l d b e the i n t e l l e c t which perceives r u l e s o u t t h e p r o b l e m s of privacy a n d d i s t o r t i o n which may c o m e u p in d i s c u s s i o n s of o r d i n a r y p e r c e p t i o n a n d which are p e r h a p s seized o n by s u b j e c t i v ists. T h e o r d e r of t h e i n t e l l e c t is n o t s u b j e c t i v e o r p r i v a t e , n o r is it r e l a t e d in a n y special way to h u m a n a p p r e h e n s i o n . S o m e t h i n g of what is i n v o l v e d c a n p e r h a p s b e m a d e c l e a r e r by the f o l l o w i n g i l l u s t r a t i o n . Let us i m a g i n e two systems of p l a n e g e o m e t r y , o n e p r e s e n t e d in t h e m a n n e r of Euclid, in which circles, t r i a n g l e s , a n d t h e like, a r e t r e a t e d as objects o c c u r r i n g in space, a n d t h e o t h e r p r e s e n t e d e n t i r e l y in t e r m s of the a l g e b r a i c r e l a t i o n s of a n a l y t i c g e o m e t r y . T h i s i l l u s t r a t i o n is u s e f u l p a r t l y to give a n i n t u i t i v e c o n t e n t to the d o c t r i n e t h a t a s i n g l e reality c o u l d be a p p r e h e n d e d b o t h as T h o u g h t (analytic g e o m e t r y ) a n d as E x t e n s i o n (spatial g e o m e t r y ) . B u t I s h o u l d like to p u r s u e

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THE SP1NOZISTIC ATTRIBUTES a d i f f e r e n t f e a t u r e a n d to s u g g e s t that t h e i l l u s t r a t i o n m a y h e l p to give c o n t e n t to S p i n o z a ' s c l a i m that the a t t r i b u t e s c o r r e s p o n d to what t h e intellect perceives. F o r b o t h types of g e o m e t r y c a n b e said to be i n t e l l e c t u a l l y c o m p e l l i n g : t h e r e can b e p r o o f s in t h e m a n n e r of E u c l i d , in which we t a k e o u r s e l v e s to be t a l k i n g of spatial r e l a t i o n s , o r t h e r e can be a l g e b r a i c p r o o f s in w h i c h n o a p p e a l is m a d e to spatial c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s b u t o n l y to a l g e b r a i c o p e r a t i o n s . B o t h g e o m e t r i e s a r e p e r f e c t l y " o b j e c t i v e " a n d " t r u e ; " if we say that they show d i f f e r e n t ways in which the intellect c a n p e r c e i v e we will n o t be m a k i n g e i t h e r of t h e m " s u b j e c t i v e . " W e can say that we a r e d e a l i n g with " o n e a n d t h e s a m e t h i n g , e x p r e s s e d in d i f f e r e n t ways," b u t as in t h e c o m p a r i son b e t w e e n E n g l i s h a n d F r e n c h , it is silly to ask what this single t h i n g is "in itself," i n d e p e n d e n t of the p r e s e n t a t i o n s of e i t h e r g e o m e t r y . N o r is it a p p r o p r i a t e to ask what t h e real basis is for the two p r e s e n t a t i o n s - - the " s o u r c e of d i v e r s i t y " d i s c u s s e d earlier. T o ask this q u e s t i o n w o u l d be to m a k e g e o m e t r y i n t o a sort of " t h i n g in itself" a n d to t h i n k of t h e two p r e s e n t a t i o n s of g e o m e t r y as r e p r e s e n t a tions of it, r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s which, as r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , c o u l d fail to b e a c c u r a t e , a n d which w e r e b a s e d , each of t h e m , o n d i f f e r e n t p r o p e r t i e s of g e o m e t r y . W e m u s t aw)id t h e s u p p o s i t i o n that t h e r e is a n y t h i n g " b e h i n d " t h e p r e s e n t a tions, a n d t h i n k of t h e m i n s t e a d as p r e s e n t a t i o n s of g e o m e t r y itself: g e o m e t r y , we m i g h t say, can be k n o w n as spatial o r as a l g e b r a i c . Similarly, we m i g h t talk of s u b s t a n c e b e i n g " u n d e r s t o o d as" o r " k n o w n as" t h o u g h t o r e x t e n s i o n . T h i s n o t i o n of " k n o w i n g as" is u s e f u l for the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of S p i n o z a ' s a t t r i b u t e s , b u t it is n o t to b e t a k e n as a t h e o r y which m a k e s t h e a t t r i b u t e s i n t o " f o r m s of c o g n i t i o n . " T o m a k e this clear, yet a n o t h e r a n a l o g y will by h e l p f u l . If we talk of t h e a t t r i b u t e s as ways in which s u b s t a n c e c a n b e p e r c e i v e d , t h e " p e r c e i v i n g as" s h o u l d be t a k e n a n a l o g o u s l y to the " s e e i n g as" which has f i g u r e d in p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c u s s i o n s in r e c e n t years. I n this c o m p a r i s o n the a t t r i b u t e s a r e a n a l o g o u s to the d u c k a n d the r a b b i t of t h e " s e e i n g as" e x a m p l e . W h e n I look at a d u c k - r a b b i t , I c a n see it as a d u c k o r as a r a b b i t . B u t a l t h o u g h what is " s e e n as" is t h e d u c k - r a b b i t , what is

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T.C. MARK s e e n is a l w a y s a d u c k o r a r a b b i t ; I c a n n o t s e e a d u c k - r a b b i t e x c e p t as a d u c k o r as a r a b b i t . B u t t h e d u c k a n d t h e r a b b i t a r e n o t s e e n as a n y t h i n g , t h e y a r e j u s t s e e n . F u r t h e r m o r e , neither the duck or the rabbit represents the duck-rabbit:

e a c h o f t h e m j u s t is t h e d u c k - r a b b i t , s e e n in a p a r t i c u l a r w a y . S p i n o z a ' s s u b s t a n c e is a n a l o g o u s to t h e d u c k - r a b b i t , t h e a t t r i b u t e s to t h e d u c k a n d t h e r a b b i t . A n d t h i s is to b r i n g o u t t h a t a l t h o u g h t h e a t t r i b u t e s c a n b e d e s c r i b e d as w a y s as w a y s in w h i c h s u b s t a n c e is p e r c e i v e d t h e y a r e n o t thereby representations of substance, nor are they means of cognition or perspectives. They are objects of perception; t h a t is, by d e f i n i t i o n , t h e y a r e w h a t t h e i n t e l l e c t p e r c e i v e s ? 7

V. A s C o n s t i t u t i n g t h e E s s e n c e o f S u b s t a n c e Recognizing that the attributes are objects of intellectual perception does not explain what makes them attributes -something might be an object of intellectual perception w i t h o u t b e i n g a n a t t r i b u t e . T h e r e q u i s i t e q u a l i f i c a t i o n is p r o v i d e d by t h e last c l a u s e o f S p i n o z a ' s d e f i n i t i o n . T o r e c o g n i z e t h a t a n o b j e c t o f i n t e l l e c t u a l p e r c e p t i o n is a n attribute, the intellect must see that the object can actually constitute an independent or self-contained reality. An a t t r i b u t e is w h a t e v e r is " p e r c e i v e d as c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e e s s e n c e of substance". Thus, o n c e t h e i n t e l l e c t p e r c e i v e s , say, e x t e n s i o n , it c a n c o n c e i v e a n i n f i n i t e o r s e l f - s u b s i s t e n t b e i n g t o b e l i t e r a l l y c o n s t i t u t e d o f s p a c e o r e x t e n s i o n , a n d in t h i s way we conceive substance "through" extension. This c o n c e i v e i n g o f s u b s t a n c e is a c t i v e , a l t h o u g h t h e p e r c e i v i n g o f e x t e n s i o n is p a s s i v e . It is t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f t h i s c o n c e i v i n g

,7 The analogy can be pushed a bit further. Notice that the duck and the rabbit are independent in just Spinoza's sense that one does not involve the conception of the other: we cannot see the duck-rabbit simultaneously as a duck and as a rabbit, nor when we see it one way are we necessarily led to see it the other way. One might see it only as a duck or only as a rabbit, and be unable to see it any other way. Furthermore, there may, for all 1 know, be any number of additional ways to see it even though I can discern only two.

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THE SPINOZIST1C ATTRIBUTES that tells u s that e x t e n s i o n is a n a t t r i b u t e . S p i n o z a o f f e r s a n a r g u m e n t m u c h like this in t h e n o t e to E - I I , 1, w h e r e h e shows t h a t t h o u g h t is a n a t t r i b u t e : "Since, t h e r e f o r e , we c a n c o n c e i v e a n i n f i n i t e B e i n g by a t t e n d i n g to t h o u g h t a l o n e , t h o u g h t is o n e of t h e i n f i n i t e a t t r i b u t e s o f G o d . " W e c a n state n o w w h a t a n a t t r i b u t e i s : a n a t t r i b u t e is s o m e t h i n g p e r c e i v e d by t h e i n t e l l e c t with w h i c h - - o r o u t of w h i c h - - it is possible to c o n c e i v e a s e l f - s u b s i s t e n t b e i n g to be c o n s t i t u t e d . T h a t this c o n c e i v i n g is possible with r e g a r d to e x t e n s i o n a n d t h o u g h t shows t h a t they a r e a t t r i b u t e s a n d n o t j u s t m o d e s o r p r o d u c t s of i m a g i n a t i o n . T i m e , o n t h e other h a n d , c a n n o t be an attribute, for Spinoza thinks that it is n o t possible to c o n c e i v e a n i n f i n i t e b e i n g t h r o u g h t i m e s i n c e h e r e g a r d s t i m e as a m e r e series of successive i n s t a n t s , a n d a n e n d l e s s succession c a n n o t e x h i b i t t h e s e l f - c o n t a i n e d n a t u r e t h a t d e f i n e s s u b s t a n c e . T i m e is a p r o d u c t of t h e imagination. W e c a n u n d e r s t a n d also w h a t S p i n o z a m e a n s by " e x p r e s s i o n " w h e n h e talks of a t t r i b u t e s e x p r e s s i n g t h e e s s e n c e of s u b s t a n c e . A n a t t r i b u t e " e x p r e s s e s t h e e s s e n c e " of s u b s t a n c e by c o n s t i t u t i n g it - - by being s u b s t a n c e . A t t r i b u t e s d o n o t r e p r e s e n t s u b s t a n c e , o r d e p i c t o r d e s c r i b e it: a n a t t r i b u t e exhibits t h e e s s e n c e of s u b s t a n c e . It is s i g n i f i c a n t that in t h e passages q u o t e d a b o v e f r o m E - I I , 7, n o t e , S p i n o z a uses t h e w o r d " m a n i f e s t " as well as t h e w o r d " e x p r e s s . " Each a t t r i b u t e m a n i f e s t s o r is a n i n s t a n c e of i n d e p e n d e n t b e i n g . If o n e feels c o m p e l l e d to f i n d a n a l o g i e s in classical m e t a p h y s i c s , this n o t i o n of a t t r i b u t e s c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e e s s e n c e of s u b s t a n c e m a k e s t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n attrib u t e a n d s u b s t a n c e closer to the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n m a t t e r a n d f o r m t h a n to that b e t w e e n p r o p e r t i e s a n d s u b s t a n c e s . T o r e c o g n i z e s o m e t h i n g as a n a t t r i b u t e o n e m u s t possess t h e c o n c e p t of s u b s t a n c e ; n o t h i n g p e r c e i v e d by t h e i n t e l l e c t c a n be a n a t t r i b u t e u n l e s s s u b s t a n c e c a n b e c o n c e i v e d as c o n s t i t u t e d by it. B u t is it possible to possess t h e c o n c e p t of s u b s t a n c e w i t h o u t p e r c e i v i n g a n y a t t r i b u t e s , j u s t as it is possible to possess the c o n c e p t of a c h i l i a g o n w i t h o u t p e r c e i v i n g a n y actually e x i s t i n g c h i l i a g o n . T h i s possibility is a t t e s t e d by most of t h e first p a r t of t h e Ethics, w h e r e m u c h of t h e a r g u m e n t is c o n d u c t e d o n t h e basis of t h e p u r e

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c o n c e p t of s u b s t a n c e , u n d e t e r m i n e d by a n y a t t r i b u t e in p a r t i c u l a r . T h a t it b e p o s s i b l e to c o n c e i v e t h e e s s e n c e o f s u b s t a n c e in this way is i n d e e d r e q u i r e d by t h e v e r y d e f i n i t i o n o f s u b s t a n c e as t h a t w h i c h is c o n c e i v e d in itself. T h e s e r e m a r k s m a y h e l p to flesh o u t m y e a r l i e r c l a i m t h a t a l t h o u g h we ca n u n d e r s t a n d t h e c o n c e p t o f s u b s t a n c e a p a r t f r o m a n y a t t r i b u t e , s u b s t a n c e c a n n o t a c t u a l l y exist - - o r b e c o n c e i v e d a c t u a l l y to exist - - e x c e p t as c o n s t i t u t e d by s o m e a t t r i b u t e . It m a y b e h e l p f u l to p o i n t o u t t h a t p e r c e p t i o n is in s o m e r e s p e c t s like k n o w l e d g e by a c q u a i n t a n c e , c o n c e p tion like k n o w i n g that. O n e c a n k n o w t h a t s u b s t a n c e exists, a n d t h a t it possesses i n f i n i t e a t t r i b u t e s w i t h o u t b e i n g a c q u a i n t e d with t h o s e a t t r i b u t e s . O n e c a n e v e n k n o w t h a t s u b s t a n c e exists n e c e s s a r i l y a n d t h a t it c a n n o t b e c o n c e i v e d e x c e p t e x i s t i n g , w i t h o u t b e i n g a c q u a i n t e d with a n y p a r t i c u lar a t t r i b u t e s . C o n v e r s e l y , t h e o n l y way to b e a c q u a i n t e d with s u b s t a n c e - - to p e r c e i v e it - - is u n d e r o n e o r a n o t h e r a t t r i b u t e . T h e a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e o f s u b s t a n c e is a m a t t e r o f its b e i n g c o n s t i t u t e d by o n e o r m o r e a t t r i b u t e s ; t h u s s u b s t a n c e actually e x i s t i n g u n d e r n o a t t r i b u t e is i n c o n c e i v a b l e ( n o t just i m p e r c e p t i b l e ) , t h o u g h it is c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t o n e m i g h t k n o w t h a t s u b s t a n c e exists w i t h o u t b e i n g a c q u a i n t e d with t h e a t t r i b u t e s that c o n s t i t u t e it. .8 T h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f f e r e d h e r e is i n t e n d e d as an e x p l a nation of Spinoza's definition of "attribute", and I believe t h a t my i n t e r p r e t a t i o n d o e s fit t h e d e f i n i t i o n . B u t it also brings out the i m p o r t a n c e of stressing each part of the d e f i n i t i o n : a t t r i b u t e s a r e "what t h e i n t e l l e c t p e r c e i v e s " , t h a t is, t h e y a r e t h e o b j e c t a n d n o t t h e m e a n s o f p e r c e p t i o n . F u r t h e r m o r e , we a r e d e a l i n g with t h e i n t e l l e c t a n d n o t t h e i m a g i n a t i o n ; a n d we m u s t be c a r e f u l to d i s t i n g u i s h p e r c e p tion a n d c o n c e p t i o n . I n a d d i t i o n , w h a t is p e r c e i v e d m u s t b e s u c h as to constitute t h e e s s e n c e o f s u b s t a n c e , if it is to c o u n t as an a t t r i b u t e .

'" My distinction between the concept and the actual existence of substance is very close to Gueroult's separation between the concept of substance and the "realit~ de la chose" (Spinoza, I, p. 49).

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VI. D i s t i n c t i v e N a t u r e s o f the Attributes I h a v e g i v e n a n a c c o u n t of w h a t a n a t t r i b u t e is. B u t m y a c c o u n t has b e e n g e n e r a l , a n d it m a y s e e m that m o r e n e e d s to b e said a b o u t what exactly the a t t r i b u t e s are. T h i s is n o t just to raise t h e g e n e r a l q u e s t i o n " W h a t is it to be a n a t t r i b u t e ? " - - that, I t h i n k , has b e e n a n s w e r e d . I wish to a d d r e s s a q u e s t i o n of a d i f f e r e n t sort: n a m e l y , t h e d e m a n d for a f u l l e r e x p l a n a t i o n of what a g i v e n a t t r i b u t e is; " W h a t , exactly, is this a t t r i b u t e , e.g. t h o u g h t ? " H o w is o n e a t t r i b u t e distinguished from another? As we h a v e seen, the a t t r i b u t e s a r e o b j e c t s of p e r c e p t i o n . B u t n o t i c e t h a t p e r c e i v i n g , say, space, is n o t a m a t t e r of p e r c e i v i n g physical objects in space - - they are p e r c e i v e d by m e a n s of i m a g e s , not by the intellect. R a t h e r , the intellect a p p r e h e n d s space itself, w h o s e n a t u r e is n o t tied to a n y of 9the p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g s that h a p p e n to i m p o s e o n o u r senses. Space is, t h e r e f o r e , n o t a n o b j e c t to t h e senses b u t to t h e intellect. B u t what, exactly, is space? A n d w h a t is t h o u g h t ? I n a s k i n g f o r a positive a c c o u n t of t h e d i s t i n c t i v e n a t u r e of each a t t r i b u t e we are n o t just r a i s i n g a g a i n t h e q u e s t i o n that c a m e u p in t h e d i s c u s s i o n of o b j e c t i v i s m a n d its a t t e m p t to e x p l a i n the diversity of t h e a t t r i b u t e s . F o r t h e objectivists t h e issue was w h e t h e r t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n the a t t r i b u t e s d e r i v e d f r o m a n y i n h e r e n t " c h a r a c t e r i s t i c " o r "real p r o p e r t y " of s u b s t a n c e . T h a t issue t u r n e d o u t to be u n d e r m i n e d by t h e m i s t a k e n p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l i s m a n d p r o p e r t y - t a l k , b u t t h e objectivists p r e s u m e d that we k n e w what the d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e a t t r i b u t e s was. H e r e we a r e q u e s t i o n i n g t h a t p r e s u m p t i o n a n d we wish to d e s c r i b e the d i s t i n c t i v e n a t u r e of each a t t r i b u t e . W h a t is it that m a k e s t h o u g h t thought a n d e x t e n s i o n extension? All a t t r i b u t e s , of c o u r s e , h a v e f e a t u r e s in c o m m o n - - they all m a n i f e s t t h e c o m p l e t e n e s s a n d i n d e p e n d e n c e that are the e s s e n c e of s u b s t a n c e . I n o t h e r words, they all satisfy the d e f i n i t i o n of " a t t r i b u t e , " a c c o r d i n g to which a t t r i b u t e s a r e p e r c e i v e d as c o n s t i t u t i n g the e s s e n c e of s u b s t a n c e . B u t if t h o u g h t a n d e x t e n s i o n each p r e s e n t the e s s e n c e of s u b s t a n c e (as they do), a n d if t h e e s s e n c e of s u b s t a n c e is u n i q u e (as it is), t h e n in this r e g a r d they c a n ' t

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T.C. MARK differ at all. So that i[ a t t r i b u t e s a r e essentially p r e s e n t a t i o n s of s u b s t a n c e , t h e n they m u s t all h a v e t h e s a m e essence. T h i s gets us n o closer to a g r a s p of t h e i r d i s t i n c t i v e c h a r a c t e r s . W e m u s t look e l s e w h e r e . I believe that the d i s t i n c t i v e c h a r a c t e r of each a t t r i b u t e is n o t s o m e t h i n g that c a n be d e s c r i b e d o r u n d e r s t o o d at all. A n d the r e a s o n for this s h o u l d be clear f r o m S p i n o z a ' s d e f i n i t i o n : the a t t r i b u t e s a r e o b j e c t s of p e r c e p t i o n ; they a r e k n o w n n o t by b e i n g u n d e r s t o o d b u t by b e i n g p e r c e i v e d . T h e d i s t i n c t i v e c h a r a c t e r of each a t t r i b u t e is like a b r u t e fact, it can o n l y be r e c o g n i z e d o r a p p r e h e n d e d . T o k n o w w h a t space is o n e m u s t be be a c q u a i n t e d with it, a n d in this s e n s e o n e m i g h t say that g r a s p i n g t h e c h a r a c t e r of a n a t t r i b u t e rests n o t o n u n d e r s t a n d i n g b u t o n e x p e r i e n c e . T h e a t t r i b u t e s are, as it were, given to t h e intellect, a n d it is passive in its a p p r e h e n s i o n of t h e m . For, o n c e a g a i n , p e r c e p t i o n as S p i n o z a c h a r a c t e r i z e s it in E - I I , def. 3, is passive: " . . . the n a m e p e r c e p t i o n s e e m s to i n d i c a t e that the m i n d is passive in its r e l a t i o n to t h e object." T o say t h a t t h e a t t r i b u t e s are p e r c e i v e d is n o t to d e n y that they a r e o b j e c t s of k n o w l e d g e ; t h e p e r c e p t i o n is, a f t e r all, p e r c e p tion by the intellect. R a t h e r , talk of p e r c e p t i o n a m o u n t s to i n s i s t i n g that the k n o w l e d g e of each i n d i v i d u a l a t t r i b u t e is k n o w l e d g e by a c q u a i n t a n c e o r d i r e c t a p p r e h e n s i o n , a n d not, say, u n d e r s t a n d i n g b a s e d o n s u b s u m i n g u n d e r g e n e r a l categories. T h e c o n c l u s i o n that the i n d i v i d u a l n a t u r e s of t h e attrib u t e s c a n n o t b e u n d e r s t o o d is c o n f i r m e d by S p i n o z a ' s g e n e r a l t h e o r i e s a b o u t u n d e r s t a n d i n g . U n d e r s t a n d i n g , for S p i n o z a , m u s t follow the o r d e r of t h e intellect, a n d that o r d e r p r o v i d e s n o basis for d i s t i n g u i s h i n g o n e a t t r i b u t e f r o m a n o t h e r . S p i n o z a f r e q u e n t l y insists that N a t u r e is t h e s a m e a n d e v e r y w h e r e o n e , f o l l o w i n g the s a m e o r d e r e v e r y w h e r e (e.g. E - I I I , preface). T h e o r d e r of n a t u r e is, in fact, the s a m e as t h a t of t h e intellect, a n d is i n v a r i a n t b e t w e e n a t t r i b u t e s . T h u s , w h a t e v e r c a n be u n d e r s t o o d p e r t a i n s to t h e o r d e r of N a t u r e o r s u b s t a n c e , a n d n o t to o n e a t t r i b u t e m o r e t h a n a n o t h e r . B u t t h a t j u s t a m o u n t s to r e p e a t i n g that w h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s each a t t r i b u t e is n o t s o m e t h i n g that c a n be u n d e r s t o o d at all. C o n v e r s e l y , 76

THE SPINOZIST1C ATTRIBUTES w h a t e v e r c a n be u n d e r s t o o d , that is, c o m p r e h e n d e d by m e a n s of a d e q u a t e ideas, can t h e r e b y be r e c o g n i z e d as t r u e as p e r t a i n i n g to t h e o r d e r of t h i n g s o r " e x i s t i n g in n a t u r e " (E-I, 30, d e m ) . If w h a t e v e r is u n d e r s t o o d is t h e r e b y s h o w n to p e r t a i n to the o n e systematic o r d e r of G o d o r N a t u r e , a n d if that systematic o r d e r is p r e s e n t e d i n d i f f e r e n t l y u n d e r a n y of t h e a t t r i b u t e s , it follows t h a t w h a t e v e r can b e u n d e r s t o o d at all c a n be u n d e r s t o o d u n d e r a n y a t t r i b u t e . T h e r e f o r e , w h a t e v e r p e r t a i n s to j u s t o n e single a t t r i b u t e will, necessarily, n o t p e r t a i n to the o r d e r of the intellect a n d will, t h e r e f o r e , a g a i n n e c e s s a r i l y , n o t be s o m e t h i n g that c a n be u n d e r s t o o d . As o b j e c t s of i n t e l l e c t u a l p e r c e p t i o n t h e a t t r i b u t e s c a n u s e f u l l y b e c o m p a r e d to t h e objects of d i f f e r e n t senses, t a k i n g for i l l u s t r a t i v e p u r p o s e s o n e of t h e t h e o r i e s of p e r c e p t i o n in which each sense is said to h a v e d i s t i n c t objects. T h e d i s t i n c t i v e n a t u r e of each sort of s e n s e o b j e c t is k n o w n by a c q u a i n t a n c e , a n d o n e c a n g r a s p it only if o n e has the s e n s e in q u e s t i o n . S o m e o n e l a c k i n g o n e of t h e senses m a y k n o w that t h e r e are m o d a l i t i e s which h e does n o t possess, b u t he c a n n o t b e c o m e a c q u a i n t e d with t h e i r o b j e c t s u n l e s s h e can s o m e h o w be g i v e n t h o s e o t h e r senses. I n S p i n o z a ' s p h i l o s o p h y , it is as if t h e r e were d i s t i n c t i v e m o d a l i t i e s of i n t e l l e c t u a l p e r c e p t i o n , each with a d i f f e r e n t a t t r i b u t e as its object. T h e a n a l o g y is s u g g e s t i v e r e g a r d i n g t h e l i m i t a t i o n of h u m a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g to j u s t two a t t r i b u t e s . I n the E t h i c s , t h e e s t a b l i s h i n g of t h o u g h t a n d e x t e n s i o n as t h e o n l y a t t r i b u t e s that h u m a n b e i n g s e n c o u n t e r , is, so far as it rests on a r g u m e n t , quite u n c o n v i n c i n g . We are given n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n t h e b a r e a s s e r t i o n s that m a n t h i n k s (E-II, ax.2), that h u m a n b e i n g s p e r c e i v e the m o d i f i c a t i o n s of a c e r t a i n b o d y (E-II, ax.4), a n d that we p e r c e i v e t h i n g s u n d e r n o o t h e r a t t r i b u t e (E-II, ax.5). T h e lack of c o n v i n c i n g a r g u m e n t has b e e n o n e of t h e oldest o b j e c t i o n s to S p i n o z a ' s t h e o r y . B u t , in line with t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f f e r e d h e r e , it is p l a u s i b l e to see these d o c t r i n e s as r e c o g n i t i o n s of b r u t e fact r a t h e r t h a n as d e p e n d i n g o n a r g u m e n t . T o d e m a n d a r g u m e n t s f o r t h e l i m i t a t i o n of h u m a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g to two a t t r i b u t e s m i g h t be u n r e a s o n a b l e . T h e p e r s o n w h o asks -

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why we perceive substance under thought and extension a n d n o t u n d e r a n y o t h e r a t t r i b u t e is l i k e t h e p e r s o n w h o asks why we don't have more senses than we do. No one c a n g i v e a reason w h y w e s h o u l d n ' t h a v e m o r e , n o r d e n y t h a t it is c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t t h e r e m i g h t b e s e n s e s o t h e r t h a n those we have, although no one can clearly imagine what a n a d d i t i o n a l s e n s e w o u l d b e like. B u t i n a b i l i t y t o p r o v i d e s u c h a r g u m e n t d o e s n o t m a k e it a n y less t h e c a s e t h a t w e do have just the senses we have, and no others. These considerations bear also on the question that frequently comes up about what the attributes other than thought and extension might be. We can have no answer whatever to t h a t q u e s t i o n : k n o w l e d g e o f s p e c i f i c a t t r i b u t e s is a m a t t e r o f acquaintance. To sum up, the attributes have a sort of dual nature. The distinctive character of each attribute is a n o b j e c t o f intellectual perception and knowing it is k n o w l e d g e by acquaintance: the passive encounter of the intellect with w h a t a c t u a l l y e x i s t s . B u t e a c h a t t r i b u t e is a l s o l i k e a s o r t o f matter or stuff out of which we can (actively) conceive substance to be constituted; t h i s f e a t u r e o f a t t r i b u t e s is generalizable, and forms the basis of the definition.

VII. Synonymy and Necessity We have so far discussed the general nature and definition of the attributes. I should like now to turn to questions that relate to the perspective of finite minds like o u r o w n , in p a r t i c u l a r t o t h e q u e s t i o n h o w h u m a n s go about recognizing that two attributes -- or two modes under different attributes -- are "one and the same thing e x p r e s s e d in t w o d i f f e r e n t w a y s . " T h a t t h e a t t r i b u t e s a r e " o n e a n d t h e s a m e t h i n g " is, o f c o u r s e , f o r S p i n o z a , a necessary and not a contingent truth. Which means that we must not only consider how humans learn that the attributes are one and the same thing; we must consider a l s o h o w t h e y k n o w t h e m t o h e necessarily t h e s a m e , a n d , further, w h a t t h e b a s i s is f o r t h i s n e c e s s i t y . T h e r e is a t r a d i t i o n in p h i l o s o p h y which links necessary truth with analyticity. On this view, a proposition which states a

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n e c e s s a r y t r u t h is (or c a n be r e v e a l e d by analysis to be) analytic. A n a l y t i c i t y in t u r n is r e l a t e d to t h e c o n c e p t o f s y n o n y m y . A n d it m a y a p p e a r , f r o m o u r e a r l i e r e x p l a n a tion o f S p i n o z a ' s " o n e a n d t h e s a m e t h i n g e x p r e s s e d in two d i f f e r e n t ways" that f o r S p i n o z a also, n e c e s s a r y t r u t h will d e r i v e f r o m analyticity. F o r we h a v e c l a i m e d t h a t i n s o f a r as t h e y a r e o n e a n d t h e slime t h i n g e x p r e s s e d in t w o d i f f e r e n t ways, m o d e s o f d i f f e r e n t a t t r i b u t e s a r e like s y n o n y m o u s s e n t e n c e s , a n d t h e a t t r i b u t e s t h e m s e l v e s like d i f f e r e n t l a n g u a g e s . T o say that two m o d e s o f d i f f e r e n t a t t r i b u t e s a r e i d e n t i c a l is like s a y i n g o f t w o s e n t e n c e s t h a t t h e y a r e s y n o n y m o u s . A n d to say o f two s y n o n y m o u s s e n t e n c e s that t h e y say t h e s a m e t h i n g is to e x p r e s s an a n a l y t i c a n d therefore necessary truth. N o w , I t h i n k that t h e a n a l o g y with l a n g u a g e is h e l p f u l in g r a s p i n g t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e a t t r i b u t e s , b u t it d o e s n o t a n s w e r t h e q u e s t i o n s r a i s e d at t h e b e g i n n i n g o f this section: it d o e s n o t e x p l a i n h o w w e c o m e to u n d e r s t a n d h o w t h e a t t r i b u t e s a r e r e l a t e d , n o r d o e s it g i v e us t h e f o u n d a t i o n o f S p i n o z a ' s claims to n e c e s s a r y t r u t h . I shall t u r n initially to t h e first o f t h e s e q u e s t i o n s . It is p e r f e c t l y t r u e , e v e n analytic, that two s y n o n y m o u s s e n t e n c e s say t h e s a m e t h i n g : this is just t h e c o n c e p t o f s y n o n y m y . B u t this d o e s n o t tell us h o w to r e c o g n i z e that t wo s e n t e n c e s a r e synonymous. Recognizing synonymy d e p e n d s on u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e s y n o n y m o u s e x p r e s s i o n s i n v o l v e d ; it r e q u i r e s , in t h e i l l u s t r a l i o n we h a v e b e e n u s i n g , t h a t a p e r s o n k n o w b o t h F r e n c h a n d E n g l i s h . A n d in S p i n o z a ' s p h i l o s o p h y , h u m a n b e i n g s d o n o t h a v e t h e sort o f a c q u a i n t a n c e with T h o u g h t a n d E x t e n s i o n that w o u l d c o u n t as " k n o w i n g t h e l a n g u a g e " . W e a r e a n a l o g o u s to s o m e o n e w h o k n o w s t w o l a n g u a g e s v e r y i m p e r f e c t l y . W e a r e a c q u a i n t e d with two a t t r i b u t e s , b u t we d o n o t p e r c e i v e s u b s t a n c e , u n d e r e i t h e r o n e o f t h e m , in all its c o n c r e t e d i v e r s i t y . W e h a v e s o m e a d e q u a t e ideas, b u t we h a v e m a n y m o r e i n a d e q u a t e o n es. T h u s , f o r us to c o n n e c t m o d e s o f o n e a t t r i b u t e with t h e i r c o r r e s p o n d i n g e x p r e s s i o n u n d e r t h e o t h e r a t t r i b u t e is an u n c e r t a i n a n d f r a g m e n t a r y p r o c e s s ; we a r e like t h e t r a n s l a t o r w h o m u s t rely on t h e d i c t i o n a r y , o r t h e p e r s o n w h o , n o t k n o w i n g t h e l a n g u a g e s , m u s t be told t h a t t w o s e n t e n c e s

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say t h e s a m e t h i n g i n s t e a d o f just u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e i r equivalence. U s i n g E n g l i s h as a n a l o g o u s to T h o u g h t a n d F r e n c h to E x t e n s i o n , o u r s i t u a t i o n c a n be d e s c r i b e d m e t a p h o r i c a l l y by m e a n s o f this i l l u s t r a t i o n . W e a r e like s o m e o n e w h o k n o w s a little bit o f E n g l i s h - - t h a t is, w h o k n o w s e n o u g h to be able to a c t u a l l y u s e it, in a l i m i t e d way, a n d to u n d e r s t a n d s o m e s e n t e n c e s o f it q u i t e well, a n d o t h e r s n o t so well. T h i s p e r s o n k n o w s , f u r t h e r m o r e , that t h e r e a r e i n d e f i n i t e l y m a n y o t h e r l a n g u a g e s , a n d t h a t in e a c h o f t h e m it is p o s s i b l e to say w h a t e v e r c a n be said in E n g l i s h . H o w e v e r , t h e o n l y o t h e r l a n g u a g e o f w h i c h h e k n o w s a n y t h i n g by a c q u a i n t a n c e is F r e n c h , a n d o f F r e n c h h e u n d e r s t a n d s j u s t o n e s e n t e n c e (albeit a P r o u s t i a n one). W h a t e v e r else o f F r e n c h h e k n o w s , h e k n o w s by m e a n s o f this o n e s e n t e n c e ; t h a t is: h e can u n d e r s t a n d s e n t e n c e s that o v e r l a p with this o n e in g r a m m a r o r v o c a b u l a r y , just to t h e e x t e n t o f t h e o v e r l a p ; s e n t e n c e s that h a v e o n l y a w o r d o r t w o in c o m m o n with this o n e h e c a n u n d e r s t a n d a l m o s t n o t at all; a n d s e n t e n c e s t h a t h a v e n o w ) c a b u l a r y o r g r a m m a r in c o m m o n a r e q u i t e u n i n t e l l i g i b l e ; i n d e e d t h e i r v e r y e x i s t e n c e , alt h o u g h it m i g h t be i n f e r r e d , c a n n o t be k n o w n d i r e c t l y . T h e c o n c l u s i o n to be d r a w n f r o m all this is t h a t a l t h o u g h t h e i d e n t i t y i n w ) l v e d in S p i n o z a ' s talk of " o n e a n d t h e s a m e t h i n g " is suitably d e s c r i b e d as a sort of s y n , ) n y m y , this s y n o n y m y d o e s n o t g i v e t h e m e a n s by w h i c h w e r e c o g n i z e t h e i d e n t i t y . T,) r e c o g n i z e t h e i d e n t i t y by j u s t g r a s p i n g t h e s y n o n y m y w o u l d r e q u i r e p e r f e c t a c q u a i n t a n c e with t h e l a n g u a g e s - - t h e sort o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g p o s s i b l e o n l y f o r an i n f i n i t e intellect. W e c a n n o t p r o c e e d in s u c h a way; we r e q u i r e d i s c u r s i v e a r g u m e n t . T h e a r g u m e n t we n e e d is p r o v i d e d by S p i n o z a ' s c l a i m t h a t t h e r e is o n l y o n e substance. S p i n o z a gives a g e n e r a l a r g u m e n t to t h e e f f e c t that t h e r e is only o n e s u b s t a n c e , a n d this h e b e l i e v e s to be a n e c e s s a r y t r u t h . F r o m this c o n c l u s i o n , it f o l l o w s t h a t an y s t a t e m e n t t h a t r e f e r s to m o r e t h a n o n e e n t i t y as a s u b s t a n c e m u s t be false, a n d that if a s t a t e m e n t a p p e a r s to r e f e r to m o r e t h a n o n e s u b s t a n c e a n d is yet t r u e , t h e n it m u s t n o t in fact be r e f e r r i n g to m o r e t h a n o n e s u b s t a n c e b u t to o n l y o n e . T h u s , S p i n o z a d o e s n o t a r g u e d i r e c t l y that t h o u g h t

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a n d e x t e n s i o n o r m i n d a n d b o d y a r e t h e s a m e ; this c o n c l u s i o n follows i n s t e a d f r o m t h e o b s e r v a t i o n that since t h e r e is o n l y o n e t h i n g t h e r e c a n ' t be two t h i n g s (this f o r m of a r g u m e n t is f o u n d , for e x a m p l e , in E-I, 14, with its corollaries). T h a t a m e t a p h y s i c a l a r g u m e n t of this sort is t h e only way that h u m a n s , at least, c a n l e a r n that t h e d i f f e r e n t a t t r i b u t e s p e r t a i n to o n e s u b s t a n c e follows f r o m t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e of the a t t r i b u t e s : o n e of t h e m does n o t i n v o l v e t h e c o n c e p t i o n of the o t h e r (E-I, 1.0) a n d n o m o d e of o n e is to b e e x p l a i n e d with r e f e r e n c e to a m o d e of the o t h e r ( E - I I , 6). K n o w l e d g e of t h e i d e n t i t y c o u l d n ' t be r e a c h e d by c o n s i d e r i n g j u s t t h e a t t r i b u t e s t h e m s e l v e s . F o r t h e a t t r i b u t e s masq u e r a d e as s u b s t a n c e s , e x p r e s s i n g t h e e s s e n c e of s u b s t a n c e a n d s t a n d i n g in logical i n d e p e n d e n c e of o n e a n o t h e r . I f we c o n s i d e r e d t h e a t t r i b u t e s only, we w o u l d a r r i v e n o t at t h e i d e n t i t y we a r e l o o k i n g for b u t at t h e false belief that t h e r e exists m o r e t h a n o n e s u b s t a n c e . My p o i n t , t h e n , is n o t j u s t that S p i n o z a a r g u e s this way, b n l that t h e r e is n o o t h e r way to establish that a t t r i b u t e s as he d e f i n e s t h e m p e r t a i n to a single s u b s t a n c e . A l t h o u g h we d o n o t r e c o g n i z e t h e t r u t h n o r ( t h e r e f o r e ) the necessity of the identi0y of t h e a t t r i b u t e s by m e a n s of analyticity o r s y n o n y m y , it m i g h t be that t h e necessity of t h e i r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n was b a s e d , n e v e r t h e l e s s , o n analyticity. 1 d o n o t t h i n k this is t h e case. But such c o n s i d e r a t i o n s as I h a v e so far o f f e r e d o n the p o i n t m a y s e e m a l t o g e t h e r u n c o n v i n c i n g . I h a v e said that the a r g u m e n t s for t h e n e c e s s a r y i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of m i n d a n d b o d y rely o n t h e a r g u m e n t s to show that t h e r e is really j u s t o n e s u b s t a n c e . But, it m a y be a r g u e d , surely those a r g u m e n t s a r e s i m p l y a m a t t e r of d r a w i n g o u t t h e c o n c l u s i o n s that follow a n a l y t i c a l ly f r o m S p i n o z a ' s c o n c e p t of s u b s t a n c e . A n d in that case, w e ' v e j u s t s u b s t i t u t e d o n e i n s t a n c e of a n a l y t i c i t y for a n o t h e r , N o w I c o n c e d e that m u c h of the a r g u m e n t a t i o n in Part I of t h e Ethics is a m a t t e r of m a k i n g explicit t h e c o n c l u s i o n s that are analytically c o n t a i n e d in t h e ccmcept of s u b s t a n c e ( m o r e a c c u r a t e l y , c o n c l u s i o n s that follow d e d u c tively f r o m t h e c o n c e p t of s u b s t a n c e , t o g e t h e r with v a r i o u s o t h e r d e f i n i t i o n s a n d p r e m i s e s , b o t h explicit a n d tacit). B u t

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I d o n o t b e l i e v e that this analyticity is t h e basis f o r S p i n o z a ' s c l a i m to be in possession of n e c e s s a r y t r u t h . M o r e g e n e r a l l y , I claim that it is a m i s t a k e in S p i n o z a to link n e c e s s a r y t r u t h with analyticity. I c o n t e n d t h a t S p i n o z a t h i n k s of necessity as b e l o n g i n g to the n a t u r e of t h i n g s ; we m i g h t call this a belief in a sort of " m e t a p h y s i c a l " o r " n o m i c " necessity. It is also the case, of c o u r s e , that d e d u c t i v e a r g u m e n t can reveal i m p o r t a n t t r u t h s a b o u t the n a t u r e of t h i n g s . B u t this does n o t yet m e a n t h a t necessity m u s t collapse o n t o analyticity; t h e facts a r e in S p i n o z a ' s m i n d r a t h e r t h a n the r e v e r s e . T h i n g s a r e n e c e s s a r i l y o r d e r e d in a c e r t a i n way, a n d the o r d e r of ideas, r e f l e c t i n g those t h i n g s , is also necessary. A full e x p l a n a t i o n w o u l d r e q u i r e a t h o r o u g h p r e s e n t a t i o n of the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n ideas a n d t h e i r objects, which I shall n o t a t t e m p t h e r e . F o r t h e m o m e n t I shall s i m p l y assert that necessity a n d analyticity a r e d i f f e r e n t for S p i n o z a . I n his c l a i m that t h o u g h t a n d extensitm, or m i n d a n d body, are identical, or " o n e a n d t h e s a m e , " the c o n c e p t of i d e n t i t y i n v o l v e d can be c o m p a r e d with s y n o n y m y , b u t e v e n so t h e necessity of t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n is n o t d e r i v e d f r o m s y n o n y m y o r analyticity. It is a claim of m e t a p h y s i c s , g r o u n d e d in t h e n e c e s s a r y n a t u r e of of t h i n g s . ~" U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a , San D i e g o l.a Jolla, C a l i f o r n i a 9 2 0 3 7 USA

'~ Spinoza's views are similar in interesting ways to the views of certain contemporary philosophers who have attacked the traditional explanation of necessity in terms of analyticity and a prioricity.

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