Thinking about Community: Ten Theses Philip Selznick or this symposium I offer ten concisely stated guides to understanding community and communitarianism. They are developed at greater length and with much more intellectual background in The Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and the Promise of Community.
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Not Nostalgia The contemporary quest for community is neither antimodern nor antiurban. Sensible people do not long for a mythic past, do not ignore the miseries and brutalities of earlier ages, and would not give up the moral ideals and practical achievements of modern civilization, such as the rule of law, democratic government, equality of opportunity, and unprecedented material prosperity. However, although the gains of modernity are real, they are won at the cost of fragmented experience and weakened solidarity. A communitarian program seeks to offset these trends, which are morally unacceptable and which, if left unchecked, will produce authoritarian and fundamentalist backlash.
Not All-or-Nothing Groups can be more or less full-blown communities, and they can approximate community in different ways. Some arise from ties of kinship and locality; others from shared ideals and purposes. A group is a community insofar as it embraces a wide range of activities and interests and insofar as bonds of commitment and culture are shared.
Therefore it makes no sense to impose a single model or to suppose that community exists only in extreme or rigid forms. The values we associate with community can be sought wherever sustained human interaction takes place--work, education, politics, health care, urban design. In each sphere of life, we can seek to enhance responsible conduct and opportunities for fellowship. For this we need a variety of strategies, each tailored to specific circumstances.
A Unity of Unities The most familiar connotation of "community" is solidarity based on consciousness of kind. Not less important, however, is the idea that community is a framework for diverse activities and autonomous choices. Thus we readily distinguish communities from disciplined, special-purpose organizations. The "Catholic community" embraces much more than the church hierarchy; the "law school community" includes alumni, students, staff, and associated enterprises as well as faculty; the European Community is a loose federation of independent states. Moreover, the tight discipline that might make sense in a monastic community would distort and suffocate a more ordinary community whose well-being depends on initiative, variety, and plurality. As more or less coherent frameworks for the conduct of ordinary life, communities have this remarkable feature: They build upon and are nourished by other unities--persons, groups, practices, institu-
34 / SOCIETY s JULY/AUGUST 1995
tions--which characteristically claim respect and protection. As well as being interdependent, they are typically independent in important respects. They are usually granted a variable but irreducible autonomy. Hence what we prize in a community is not unity of any sort at any price but unity that preserves the integrity of the parts. It is, one might say, a federal unity. How much integration, how much solidarity, how much consciousness of kind should the community have? Where should it look for that integration? These questions cannot be settled by def'mitional fiat. They must be answered in the light of history and circumstance. World War II created (and required) a relatively tight national integration. Such demands are not relevant today. Instead, current debate turns on whether the U.S. community should be content with weak controls, especially in respect to property rights and lifestyle choices, or whether it should instead do more to protect public goods and the moral environment.
What we prize in a community is not unity of any sort at any price but unity that preserves the integrity of the parts.
Communitarians claim that today's problems call for more cooperation, more solidarity, more discipline, more responsibility. These virtues are wholly compatible with--indeed they require--a richly textured social fabric. We want people to be united in community, that is, in and through vigorous institutions of family, locality, occupation, ethnicity, religion, politics, and government. In a healthy community these institutions do not stand alone; they exhibit mutual respect and mutual aid. The alternative is fragmentation, or the pseudo-communities formed by uncommitted, detached individuals.
Individuals as Persons The liberal tradition is often criticized for being excessively individualistic in both theory and policy. In the liberal imagination, people are fundamentally separate, unencumbered by obligations they did not choose; they are responsible for their own fates, authors of their own opinions, makers of their own words; group membership is voluntary, and contract based on mutual consent is the preferred principle of social organization. This image of an autonomous, ahistorical, self-distancing individual has undeniable appeal, for it sus-
tains ideals of liberty, self-determination, and rational criticism. Yet it is radically incomplete as a convincing or attractive portrayal of what participation in a moral community should entail. Responsibility and authenticity are given short shrift. The alternative is a communitarian conception of the socially embedded person. Persons are not abstract or detached individuals. Each is a product of history, and each life is instinct with obligation. This does not mean, however, that individual persons are less important than groups, institutions, or communities. On the contrary, the well-being of particular human beings, as persons, is the touchstone of moral worth. It is the criterion by which we judge policies and practices. We should not be confused or distracted by the fact that in liberal doctrine, "individual" has special connotations of separateness and autonomy, even though in ordinary language "the individual" is a single human being, without such connotations. Indeed, there is nothing "individualistic" about concern for individuals as persons. They need not be thought of as detached or autonomous selves or as separate and independent agents; they may or may not be wholly free to make and remake their social arrangements. Nor is there anything "individualist" about protecting the basic liberties of individuals. However deeply implicated persons may be in the lives of others or in the requirements of institutional life, their well-being requires protected zones of privacy and security.
Cosmopolitan Diversity Liberals have encouraged cosmopolitan attitudes and universalist virtues. They have sought a "community of principle" based on abstract ideals of liberty and equality. They have disparaged localism as the breeding ground of ignorance and bigotry. In contrast, communitarians argue that, for most people, the experience of community is nurtured by and anchored in person-centered relationships. People live their lives in concrete settings. They grow up and thrive in particular families and localities. Abstract principles are only pale reflections of moral awareness, which is developed in and through caring and concern for "significant others." Therefore, community cannot be divorced from rootedness, that is, from history and culture. If we respect rootedness, we must also respect the diversity it creates. But diversity is far from an absolute good. It does indeed lead to deep divisions, limited horizons, and social fragmentation. To offset these evils, we must
THINKING ABOUT COMMUNITY: TEN THESES / 35
turn to a countervailing principle: the idea that community is fostered by looking outward as well as inward. P e o p l e can and do b e l o n g to multiple communities at the same time, and some are broader and more inclusive than others. For many purposes, both practical and moral, fidelity to a larger community is required. This necessarily limits parochial loyalties, but it does not extinguish them. Again, a spirit of federalism prevails.
Liberals have disparaged localism as the breeding ground of ignorance and bigotry.
Majorities and Cultural Identity If we prize cultural diversity and self-determination, we must answer some fundamental political questions: How much power should a majority have to invent or embrace a moral code and to demand confortuity to that code? On questions of moral ordering, what are the rights of political minorities? To answer these questions, we must remember that majorities do not usually speak for the community as a whole, that is, for everyone who matters. The sovereignty of "the people" is not the same as the sovereignty of a majority, which may be barely sufficient, clumsily cobbled, or transitory and precarious. "We the people" are defined in part by a constitutional history that limits what majorities can do about faith and morals. Furthermore, on questions of cultural identity, significant minorities should not be shut out by a mechanical or unresponsive majority. So long as they meet a threshold standard of morality, minorities should share in the process of cultural self-determination. A basic principle of "communal democracy" is the protection and integration of minorities. Majoritafian democracy trmds little support in communitarian doctrine. But majorities should be respected as well as limited. How much they should be respected depends on the size of the majority and on the extent to which fundamental rights are threatened. If a broad majority makes moderate claims, for example, with respect to restricting obscenity or endorsing religion, some deference to those claims is appropriate. Although minorities should not be asked to endure palpable harms, they should be willing to suffer--on some matters, at some times--a sense of exclusion and apartness.
Critical and Conventional Morality Closely related to the preceding issue is another that has divided communitarians and liberals: What, if any, deference should be given to conventional or received morality? What is the authority of critical morality, that is, of judgment based on reason? As champions of critical morality, liberals have been loath to recognize the moral worth of tradition and convention. Communitarians, more sensitive to tacit knowledge and funded experience, are skeptical of principles based on abstract premises or long chains of reasoning. Liberal thinkers, seduced by rationalism, too often display a lack of realism. On the other hand, communitarians are vulnerable to the conservative fallacy of treating the status quo as necessary, proper, and inevitable. We can reconcile these views, taking the best from each, if we understand the interplay of critical and conventional morality. A key move expands the concept of reason and, in doing so, avoids the mistakes of rationalism. Reason and reflection, properly understood, are empirical as well as theoretical. A genuinely empirical critical morality will readily recognize (without idealizing) the tacit knowledge in custom and social practice, whose conclusions may either confirm or amend conventional morality. Therefore critical morality is by no means alien to received ideas of right and wrong.
In contrast, communitarians argue that the experience of community is nurtured by and anchored in person-centered relationships.
Communitarians can and should accept the ultimate authority of critical morality. Parochial experience cannot be taken as morally final or treated as an unqualified good. Rather, we must be open to criticizing a distinctive heritage, both from within in the light of its own premises and from without in the light of other experiences and more comprehensive interests. As we do so, we bear in mind that critical morality is not to be equated with an abstract or universalist ethic. Critical morality can and does include appreciation--on grounds of reason--for the moral worth of particular attachments and traditions. It may also conclude, again on grounds of reason, that deference to conventional morality is frequently appropriate.
36 / SOCIETY 9 JULY/AUGUST 1995
Rights and Contextual Thinking
Integrative Strategies
A communitarian perspective recoils from treating abstract, unsituated principles or fights as direct guides to social policy, because a healthy community has diverse strands, multiple interests, and competing values. Communities are products of history, not of abstractions. There can be no pure "community of principle" because trade-offs are inevitable and mostly desirable. The ongoing life of a community provides contexts within which all abstractions--ideals, purposes, rights, and duties--find their limits as well as their opportunities. Therefore, every claim to an absolute right--to property or expression, for example--must be assessed by considering kinds and contexts. What kind of property or speech is at issue? And with what significance for other values and other interests? These questions situate the abstract right or premise. They tell us what limits must be accepted and what forms make sense. Indeed, the very idea of principle cannot be divorced from informing and constraining contexts. Principled conduct is not slavish adherence to a fixed rule or an ideological precept. Fidelity to principle requires fidelity to the situation as well as to a compelling purpose or ideal. If a principle is to be made good in responsible ways, there must be appropriate assessment of ends and means. There is nothing unprincipled about deciding, for example, that freedom of expression, however valuable in itself, must be governed by the requirements of orderly debate, academic purpose, or political equality. The interests of community are not well served by an acontextual, absolutist, rights-centered liberalism. In such an ethos, rights are divorced from discipline and duty, including the disciplines that make freedom possible. Claims of right are asserted without regard for multiple values and interests. People forget that, unlike duties, rights can and often should be waived. It is one thing to invoke rights for the sake of others, or for broader interests; it is something else to do so selfishly and irresponsibly. These concerns are wholly compatible with recognizing and defending a well-defined set of personal and institutional rights. Some of these rights, which we call "human" or "natural," are warranted by what we have learned about the abuse of power and human vulnerability to exploitation and oppression. More specific rights need more specific justification. It is always necessary to decide which are appropriate and how far each should be treated as inalienable. This is not a rejection of rights but a caution against rightscentered neglect of duty and context.
As indicated above, the thrust of communitarian policy and the chief benefit of community is the enhancement of responsibility. Responsibility is something more than a moral postulate. It is a virtue to be achieved through appropriate incentives, disciplines, and institutional design. Communitarian strategies emphasize participation, cooperation, and reconciliation. They assume that the capacity to be responsible and the likelihood that responsibility will be exercised are decisively affected by ways of relating and belonging. Without appropriate social s u p p o r t , moral d e v e l o p m e n t is f r u s t r a t e d and distorted. Thus, morality should be taught by multiplying opportunities for exercising responsibility. Inculcating beliefs about right and wrong is not the only way, nor is it always the most effective way, to teach right and wrong. Instead, we encourage participation that enhances self-esteem, self-discipline, cooperation, and respect for others. Therefore, we prefer work to welfare, in part because dependency is morally objectionable but also because decent jobs sustain families and bring people into the mainstream of society. We want to reform the safety net insofar as it creates a class of people who are in society but not of it.
Communitarians must be open to criticizing a distinctive heritage, both from within in the light of its own premises and from without in the light of other experiences and more comprehensive interest.
A preference for integrative strategies affects how we think about many practical problems, in many spheres of life: industry, education, race relations, government, and democracy. Community policing is an integrative strategy; so is the effort to coordinate services for children in school and to make schools centers of community life. These and other strategies enhance responsibility in many ways, especially by overcoming the isolation and self-centeredness of individuals, groups, agencies, and programs. Such strategies do not always work, nor do they make sense for every problem; their merits must be judged concretely, but there is good reason to give them prima facie credence and support.
THINKING ABOUT COMMUNITY: TEN THESES / 37
Personal and Collective Responsibility At bottom, community depends on personal virtues of commitment, caring, discipline, and self-transcendence. Therefore, it is tempting to slight or ignore collective responsibilities. Doing so, however, blurs the line between communitarians and contemporary conservatives. Conservatives extol personal responsibility, but only within limited spheres. We are not to ask investors and businessmen to exercise self-restraint as they seek maximum returns. Moreover, conservatives very reluctantly accept collective responsibility for the ills of the community, including poverty, crime, social division, and injustice. Insofar as such ills are recognized, they are said to be caused by the moral insufficiency of individuals, especially those who suffer most. The preferred strategy is blame and punishment, which is more likely to cast people out than to gather them in. The alternative is collective responsibility for public goods, including social integration and the moral
environment. We cannot suppose that these matters will take care of themselves. They require the exercise of collective intelligence and sacrifice on the part of affluent and high-status people. Therefore, it is wrong to counterpose personal and collective responsibility. We have a collective responsibility for nurturing personal virtue, which must include a willingness to serve the common good by limiting personal gain. The most relevant sacrifice, bitterly resisted by the affluent, is accepting a heavier burden of taxation. Until that resistance is overcome, the prospects for renewal of community in America are not good. Philip Selznick is Professor Emeritus of Law and Sociology, University of California, Berkeley. His books include TVA and the Grass Roots, The Organizational Weapon, Leadership in Administration, Law, Society, and Industrial Justice, and, most recently, The Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and the Promise of Community.
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