MICHAEL J. ZENZEN Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

THINKING

ABOUT

TECHNOLOGY:

A META-INQUIRY

This essay shall take the form of a meta-inquiry in that I intend to investigate some methodological problems which arise when developing a philosophy of technology. With respect to any such effort it would seem that a basic question would be: How can we thematize technology and against what background can this thematization take place ? Before articulating this further, a bit of a digression might help to show why a meta-philosophical approach is likely to be fruitful for philosophy of technology. Those of us who work in philosophy of science are in the comfortable position of having several rather dear and distinct models of the structure and growth of science. Thus, we have variations of positivistic models, the Popperian model, Kuhnian model, Lakatosian model etc., which can be appealed to in discussing complex issues both internal and external to science. In recent years, however, some philosophers of science have turned to the critical evaluation of philosophy of science itself. Interesting examples of rather different approaches to this are C.A. Hooker's "Philosophy and Meta-Philosophy of Science : Empiricism, Popperianism and Realism" and R.N. Giere's "The Structure, Growth and Application of Scientific Knowledge: Reflections on relevance and the future of philosophy of science. ''1 Part of the impetus for this new orientation has come from increased concern for the science-society interaction and the associated effort to establish or dispute the relations between the pure science / applied science, basic research / targeted research and science / technology. Now it seems to me that (and this is the point of digression) there is something to be learned from the conceptual development of science which has moved from a positivistic origin as handmaiden (or housekeeper) of science, to a relatively autonomous discipline in which the epistemological credentials of science were examined and models for its growth constructed, to a reflexive study which self-critically examines itself in relation to science and society. Philosophy of technology need not retrace this path. We need not take technology as autonomous although, as we shall see, some have; we need 336

THINKING ABOUT TECHNOLOGY not develop models of technology and feel backward v i s a vis philosophy of science because we lack its degree of articulation. I suggest that philosophy of technology begin where philosophy of science has laboriously arrived, i.e., begin with the project of making itself reflexive. The primary burden of this paper will be to show what this implies methodologically. Let me return now to the question with which I began : How can we thematize technology and against what background can this thematization take place ? The intent of this formulation is to focus attention on the amorphous character of "technology." Unlike philosophers of science, who were at least for a time able to take science as a relatively distinct body of knowledge and autonomous activity, philosophers of technology enjoy no such luxury. Clearly, philosophy of technology is an ellipsis for philosophy of technological society. In view of this, the question of thematization becomes: How can we thematize technological society and against what background can this thematization take place ? This formulation helps us to understand why philosophers of technology have a most difficult task. Where can one begin ? While struggling with this problem I happened to come across a very intriguing discussion in David Bloor's Knowledge and Social Imagery. 2 His basic problem is the justification of what he calls the strong program in sociology of knowledge but part of his analysis suggests a way of approaching our problem of thematization. Quoting Durkheim's analysis of religion, Before all, (religion) is a system of ideas with which the individuals represent to themselves the society of which they are members, and the obscure but intimate relations which they have with it. a Bloor goes on to hypothesize that when men think about the nature of knowledge they are indirectly reflecting on the principles according to which society is organized. We tacitly manipulate images of society structuring and guiding our thoughts according to a social model. This does not mean that the manipulation is conscious or clearly evident in every philosophical or epistemological investigation; the appeal to social models will emerge only in work of broad scope. Bloor's explores the fertility of his hypothesis by several case studies. For purposes of the present discussion, the importance of the hypothesis 337

MICHAEL J. ZENZEN is that it suggests a way of looking at the problem of thematization. Specifically, if the thematization of knowledge takes place against the background of an image of society then, perhaps, the thematization of technological society requires indirect reflection and tacit appeal to some model. But we cannot appeal to a model of society for that would mean fracturing that which we want to thematize in order to use part of it for a background; we would have to separate technology and society in order to thematize technological society. How can this be avoided ? Upon what background can technological society be thematized ? Rather than try to answer this directly I shall first consider how one variant of philosophy of technology has dealt with this problem. My claim is that much philosophical writing about technology "resolves" the problem of thematization by tacitly appealing to some inadequate background. Let me illustrate this by considering the approach of the anti-technologists. (i) Although it may be somewhat cavalier, I shall characterize the antitechnologists as those who handle the problem of thematization by asserting the autonomy of technology, its independence from man and from sodety. Representative of this group is Jacques Ellul. Thus we find Ellul saying : We have already seen that, at the present, neither economic or political evolution conditions technical progress. Its progress is likewise independent of the social situation. The converse is actually the case . . . Technique elicits and conditions social, political, and economic change. It is the prime mover of all the rest, in spite of any appearance to the contrary and in spite of human pride, which pretends that man's philosophical theories are still the determining influence and man's political regimes decisive factors in technical evolution. ~ It seems clear from these remarks that the problem of thinking about technological society is being handled by simply treating technology as an autonomous process which affects society, man, and nature while developing according to its own inner dynamic. Since technology is autonomous one does not need appeal to a background in order to thematize it. The reification of technology is justified by its transcendental nature--it conditions but is not itself conditioned. In Ellul's view, "technique has arrived at such a point in its evolution that it is being transformed and is progressing without decisive intervention by man. ''5 "There is no purpose or plan that is being progressively realized. There is not even a tendency toward human ends. TM 338

T H I N K I N G ABOUT TECHNOLOGY Fascinating (and disturbing) as Ellul's views are we can not pursue them in depth here. I do, however, want to cite an interesting analysis of Ellul which appears in Technology and the Human Condition. 7 Gendron argues that in order to establish the autonomy of technological growth one must show that its pace and direction is independent of rational and "free" human choice. Presumably, the evidence for this would be something like the sustained, irreversible, and autonomous growth of R & D. But this does not rule out the possibility that R & D growth is generated and &Den by human decisions. We may decide to pursue science and technology as ends in themselves in order to achieve some purely technological goal such as maximum domination o,f nature. The crux of the issue is whether the human ac~s which are the driving force behind R & D growth are compulsive in the sense of be,~ng based .on choice and deliberation yet inexorably carried through in the face of impending disaster. Is it the case that no set of reasons or anticipation of impending disaster can move us from our commitment to technological growth ? If so, and if technological change is the primary cause of social change then technology is master. Framed in this way the thesis of technological autonomy becomes testable since what needs to be shown is that we are "choosing" technological growth even though we may be setting into motion irreversible processes whose consequences become increasingly unforeseeable and ominous. This is an important way of looking at Ellu!'s work but for purposes of the present essay I want to t ~ e a different tack. My claim is that Ellul's analysis involves a tacit appeal to a model of nature. Technology is thematized by indirect reflection on a model of nature as a "blind process" which progresses without decisive intervention by man, without purpose, plan or tendency toward human ends. This image of nature informs Ellul's and similar analysis of technology. Such a view implies that with the creation of technology man has broken free from primordial nature and, although in one sense he is still subject to nature, at least now it is in the form of his own creation. Thus, by virtue of a grand sdf-deception we can enjoy a feeling of powerlessness in face of technology ! Those familiar with Nietzsche will hear echoes of his voice here. Let me cast these notions in a different form by using the categories of sacred and profane. It seems to me that the anti-technology stance labors 339

MICHAEL J. ZENZEN under the burden of preserving some variation of the sacred/profane distinction. By that I mean that anti-technologists are in the Iast analysis people who are deeply concerned with demarcating some domain as a source of power and strength. They have fundamentally a religious orientation in the sense that the dualism of sacred and profane permeates their thinking. Perhaps the most striking illustration of this turn of mind is the effort to set pure science apart from its applications, the former, of course, seen as sacred, higher, fundamental, more creative and the latter as routine and derivative. Primordial Nature perceived as passive, feminine, and fragile cannot withstand the onslaught of "technology" and, thus, cannot fulfil the role of the sacred. Neither can man nor society in their everyday (i.e. profane) forms. Pure science has already been sullied by the sociologists, philosophers, and technologists; its sacredness is in doubt. What remains then, in view of the rise of technology, is to make technology sacred but diabolical. The anti-technologist unable to give up the dualism of sacred and profane modeled on the I - It relation and unable to accept the "melancholy of our existence that every I - thou is destined to become I - It," (Buber) must resort to a form of self-deception in which he simultaneously denies and accepts his own creation. Ultimately then, the form of anti-technological thinking which asserts the autonomy of technology is permeated by a dualism of man/nature which is a remnant of the Judeo-Christian world view. It is as if the God/man rdation has been re-formed such that technology takes over the role of independent but malevolent being. i must emphasize that the foregoing remarks are not an attempt at Freudian analysis which, indeed, is a kind of thematization requiring an analysis of its own. Rather, I am trying to show how the effort to carry over models of man, nature, and society into situations which have become too complex for the models result in distortions of the complex, socially constructed reality. A philosophy which thematizes "technological society" by indirect, irreflexive reflection on simplistic images or models may be called ideological. This contrasts with a kind of eideological thinking which is characterized by its holistic and reflexive approach. Later in the essay I will explicate this notion. Let me recapitulate our investigation: by asking the basic question of how we can think about technology I expected to gain some methodological 340

THINKING ABOUT TECHNOLOGY insights. I was encouraged in this meta-philosophical endeavor by recent developments in philosophy of science, developments which constitute a heuristic argument in favor of the meta-philosophical mode of inquiry. Moreover, it seemed that philosophy of technology has as its proper object technological society. Introducing Bloor's hypothesis that thought about "knowledge" involves indirect reflection on a model of sodety, I suggested that much of the philosophical writing about technology can be seen as a surreptitious struggle with the problem of the indirect referent when "technological society" is thematized. To illustrate this a thematization which tries to. represent technology as autonomous was examined. I tried to show that the thematization depended upon a model of nature as purposeless and independent of human intervention. The categories of sacred and profane were introduced in order ~o cast a different light on the discussion. I asserted that this thematization was inadequate because it appealed to a model or image of nature which is inadequate, certainly too simple to thematize "technology" and afortiori "technological society." (ii) Having raised the issue of the adequacy of a particular thematization, lee us go on and discuss the general issue of adequate thematizatio,n. Let me contrast two situations, times in which there is a relatively stable society versus times of rapid and pervasive change :s The former case might be characterized by its coherent world-view, fixed pattern of labor and social organization. There is a general mirroring of macrocosm and microcosm. Society might be modeled on an image of Nature (e.g. hierarchical) which gains its legitimacy from God. Man, who is in the image of his creator, knows his place in a grand teleological scheme. Because of the stability and coherence of this situation thematization does not emerge as a problem; thinking can be done "all at once," can encompass God, man, nature, and society. Thinking does not need to be dialectical nor reflexive because there is no change to account for, no tension to motivate it. A foftiofJ, there is no need for or impulse toward meta-inquiry. All this is in marked contrast to times of pervasive and accelerative change where absence of coherent models and images of man, nature, and society sometimes lead to personal and cultural metanoia. Each effort to reach bottom, to find some conceptual island in the flux is ultimately frustrating. One goes "through the looking glass" of physics and formal 8

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MICHAEL J. ZENZEN logic and finds things like the principle of indeterminacy and Gadel's theorem. We find our fingerprints on things we thought were new discoveries and see our own reflections in the most unlikely places. In this milieu we turn to meta-inquiry for clarification. And this turning toward meta-inquiry is an expression of our efforts to find a relatively stable background, a place where thematization can begin. Because thematization is so acutely difficult in times of change, various sorts of inadequate responses are made. (a) Perhaps the most drastic response is to abandon the sort of thinking which thematization requires. "Thinking" becomes busy-work or calculation geared to practical reality, where the latter is the collective construction of all those who like to see themselves as "practical" men. It should be noted that this response, in effect, postulates a coherent world the practical world in order to dissolve the problem of thematization. One of the better historically-oriented studies of this is found in Karl Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia. Analyzing the rise of political ideology, he notes that the modern conception of ideology was born with Napoleon who contemptuously labeled the group of philosophers who opposed his political ambitions "ideologists." Thereby the word took on a derogatory meaning which like the word ,doctrinaire," it has retained to the present day. However, if the theoretical implications of this concept are examined, it will be found that the depreciative attitude involved is, at bottom, of an epistemological and ontological nature. What is depreciated is the validity of the adversary's thought because it is regarded as unrealistic. But if one asked further, unrealistic with reference to what ? the answer would be, unrealistic with reference to practice, unrealistic when contrasted with the affairs that transpire in the political arena. 9 Mannheim goes on to observe that, henceforth, all "ideological thought" is regarded as futile since the only reliable access to reality is to be sought in political activity. Mere thinking or reflection on a given situation is insignificant when compared to such activity. In Mannheim's view, modern t;hought has adopted a criterion of reality which is grounded in an ontology derived from political experience; for modern man pragmatism seems not only appropriate but inevitable. A different but complementary analysis of the abandonment of the problem of thematization is given by Heidegger in his "Memorial Address." In ~42

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clarifying his claim that man today is in flight from thinking, Heidegger distinguishes calcutative from meditative thinking. The pecularity of the former "consists in the fact that whenever we plan, research, and organize, we always reckon with conditions that are given . . . Calculative thinking computes ever new, ever more promising and at the same time more economical possibilities. Calculative thinking races from one prospect to the next . . . never stops, never collects itself. ''1~ A remarkably similar but more radical assessment of contemporary thinking is offered by Jurgen Habermas in T o w a r d a Rational Society. = Following Weber, he defines rationalization as "the extension of the areas of society subject to the criteria of rational decision." Habermas notes that in Marcuse's view "rationality" is a gloss for a specific form of unacknowledged political domination. Thinking takes place within a framework which presupposes technical control whether of nature or society; "rationality" is bereft of its critical, growth-enhancing function and reduced to a corrective within the system. Thus, Habermas (and Marcuse) offer a political articulation of Heidegger's view of calculative thinking by specifying the technological and social roots of the "given conditions" from which, as Heidegger notes, calculative thinking always begins. These adumbrations of the thought of Mannheim, Heidegger, and Habermas on "practical" or "calculative" thinking are, of course, inadequate for serious comparative analysis. My point in no~ing them, aside from their intrinsic interest, is two-fold. First, to present different but complementary analyses of a certain inadequate kind of thematization and secondly, to provide a context for a question: If each author's account is accepted, then how can he be giving the analysis that he gives ? In another f o r m - What are the conditions of possibility for each author to be thinking as he is and are they compatible with his description of modern thought ? I shall not try to answer this in detail but will deal with the general problem of reflexiveness later in the essay. (b) A variation of the abandonment-response is one which appeals to some over-arching process which is supposed to give coherence to the flux. Historical materialism might serve as an illustration here. (c) Another possibl e response is reversion to earlier thematization. Ellul's work as discussed above is an example of this as is Roszak's advocacy of a return to gnosis. 343

MICHAEL J. ZENZEN In general then, thematization is inadequate when it appeals to inadequate models for background, tries to thematize everything (including itself) all at once, or dissolves itself by denying change while asserting and sustaining a coherent reality which is taken to be the only reality. Clearly, there are many ways to go wrong and it is useful to have some sense of these ways, but we are in need of something a bit more positive. The question still remains as to how we can adequately thematize technological society in times of flux (and I assume that ours is such a time.) I suggest the answer is that we can not, but that there are important implications to be drawn from this for philosophy of technology. If thematization either does not emerge as a problem (in a stable situation) or is so acutely problematic (in periods of great change) that no "adequate thematization" is possible, then it would seem that philosophy of technology is somewhat embarrassed for lack of an object of study. If its object of study is "technological society" and an object of study requires thematization, then without thematization there is no object of study. How is this embarrassment to be avoided without reverting to inadequate forms of thematization ? One answer, of course, would be that the proper work of philosophy of technology is the conceptual clarification, articulation, and evaluation of various "philosophies of technology." Thus, its role would be somewhat similar to the positive conception of philosophy v i s a vis science, except tiaat "philosophies of technology" would function in the place of science. While I agree that this is an important and necessary task, I think there is more to do. But what ? An answer to this emerges if we abandon that frame of mind, that way of thinking which ignores the ambiguity in the phrase "philosophy of technology" and acknovdedge that it is at once philosophy about technology (i.e. technological society) and an expression of that society. Thus, as complement to their critical function, philosophers of technology need to engage in reflexive study. With the recognition that we are not a "socially unattached intelligentsia" (Mannheim's term via Weber), that we do not stand above the flow of things, we need to understand how we, by our work, hinder or encourage the formation of relatively stable structures. Our thinking needs to be politically aware but not merely ideological in the sense of being rooted in and responding to simplistic or distorted images of social reality. 344

THINKING ABOUT TECHNOLOGY A particularly important kind of distortion which we as philosophers are susceptible to is the belief that theoretical thought, "ideas", or Weltanschauungen have the degree of importance in society that they have for us. The fact is that while we all live in the world and thus participate in "thought" in one way or another, only a few of us are concerned with theoretical interpretation. In terms of the earlier discussion of sacred and profane, I think we as philosophers tend to treat "thought", i.e. philosophy, as sacred. This makes it difficult for us to engage in reflexive inquiry since that means entering into philosophy and profaning it by treating it as in and of this world. But reflexive inquiry requires acknowledgment of the reciprocity of philosophy and, in this case, technological sodety. Reflexivity entails trying to understand not only how ideas affect society but how society affects, inhibits, or nurtures ideas. As philosophers of technology we may have to admit that, in general, our ideas are less effective than our actions, that the sysematic connections which are the conditions of our having the time and liberty to think and to write papers such as this, are sustained by our actions. But if we admit this are we not acquiescing to the kind of pragmatism discussed above, are we not admitting that our thinking and reflection is insignificant when compared to our actions ? Ultimately, is all thought necessarily ideological and does reflexivity only serve to reveal its "unrealistic" character when compared to practice ? I think not. (iii) In explaining why, I shall fulfill the promise made earlier and articulate the notion of reflexive, holistic eideological thinking. The holistic approach means, among other things, the rejection of the pragmatic thematization which "legitimates" problems only if they can be handled in a piecemeal, detailed, empirical way. It means the rejection of what Alesdair Mac Intyre has called the Lipset-Bell vision of the world, a vision informed by a view of rationality which makes liberal, pragmatic man the paradigm of rationality. Holism is "pragmatic" to the extent that it recognizes the phenomena of power (a phenomenon which I will discuss in closing) and institutionalization but it denies that legitimacy belongs only to those within the institutions. Holism does not entail the "end of ideology" (the ideological character of which is convindngly argued by Maclntyre) but seeks to sustain the dialectical tension from which new forms of society may emerge. Holistic and reflexive eideology sees reality as a two-fold process: on 345

MICHAEL J. ZENZEN the one hand there is the synthesizing and integrating movement in which the concept of consciousness furnishes a unifying center in an infinitely fluid world; on the other hand, there is the movement which seeks to make this unifying concept less schematic, more fluid. Correlative with this is the concern with integrating "what is" with "what ought to be", reason with imagination. Reality, in holistic ideology, resides somewhere in the tension between these. A philosopher committed to this view of "reality" knows that his work, which is his thought, plus the systems in which he participates to disseminate it, takes place in a reality pragmatically defined in terms of institutions and power but he tries to point toward and hold open a reality which is grounded in something else. There is always the risk of being seduced by power and of becoming a social apologist rather than diagnostician. The holistic, reflexive way of thinking does not allow the philosopher to yield to power by using the insignificance of his thought as an excuse; it does not allow a self-deception which grants significance to thought in the service of power but insignificance to thinking which is "unrealistic." The problems of power and institutionalization are acute for philosophers of technology for, as I have argued above, their concern is ultimately technological society. I suggested above that we philosophers should desacralize philosophy but it should now be clear that I am not advocating that we yield to power and all become pragmatists. However, correlative to the de-sacralization of philosophy is the de-mystification of power and institutions in which it is embodied. We must concern ourselves with power and its emerging forms because technology in its present form is inextricably intertwined with power and decisions which increase or decrease the tension in which new forms emerge are continually being made? 2 In his effort to develop a theory of power, Kenneth Clark observes that "intellectual power manifests itself through the prestige and influence of educational institutions and through the expertise of technological scientists called upon by government and industry for consultation or "decision making or for respectability. The power of the "critical", "nonco-opted" intellectual is presently unclear. ''la I suggest that the power we have as "nonco-opted" intellectuals has both positive and negative components. In our role as diagnosticians and critics and in our efforts to understand our inter- and intra-institutional role we 346

THINKING ABOUT TECHNOLOGY need to accept reality as pragmatically defined. In this sense we inevitably participate in the negative power of that view, a view which achieves and sustains stable structures by a sort of "vector addition" of power vectors. But we need to oppose the sort of closure which the pragmatic world view seeks. And the way to oppose it is with the positive power of our visions. This means that eideological thinking must be utopian or visionary. Whitehead has remarked that the proper role of philosophy is the criticism of abstractions. Since we cannot think without abstractions we must critically revise our modes of abstraction. He continues, "A civilization which cannot burst through its current abstractions is doomed to sterility after a very limited period of progress. T M I suggest that utopian, visionary, or imaginative thinking is a necessary part of any critique which expects to "burst through" current abstractions. The importance of utopian thinking to social change has been explicitly noted by Russell : The construction of Utopias used to be despised as the foolish refuge of those who could not face the real world. But in our time social change has been so rapid, and largely inspired by utopian aspirations, that it is more necessary than it used to be to consider the wisdom of dominant aspirations, x~ These remarks are clearly relevant to the "utopian aspirations" which guide the plans for the global community mentioned in the above footnote. It is indeed necessary to consider the wisdom or unwisdom of this dominant aspiration. Yet this sort of concern remains in the merely critical mode unless we realize that the wisdom or unwisdom of a utopian aspiration can not be judged in vacuo. It is only against the background of alternative images of the future that such judgments can be made. Russell's remark that social change has so largely been inspired by utopian aspirations is an extremely important insight. For what it means is that images of the future are crucial elements in the matrix of social change. Thus, thinking which concentrates on the present, on the "reality" defined by pragmatics and negative power must inevitably forsake its role in social change and become a mere reflection of its social milieu. Participation in political activity carries with it the risk of being consumed by the self-sustaining activity which runs in circles because it no longer is in touch with anything vital. The image on which these activities depend has long since been used up in the partial realization of what were once 347

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its ideals. As Buber has seen this is the melancholy of our fate. Images and visions to which we once related in the mode of "I-Thou", inevitably, through their partial realization, Iose their dynamical character and participate in the relation "I-It". It seems to me that the proper role of philosophy is to fulfil both its critical and visionary function. Just what this entails can not be worked out until we give serious consideration to things such as our attitude as philosophers towards visionary and utopian thinking. And that is indeed a great task. But while we are doing that there are some questions we might ask ourselves. In our eagarness to be relevant, to be pragmatic and sociallyinvolved, are we not risking the future of philosophy ? Is there some incompatibility between professionalism and the sort of view I have sketched of eideological thinking ?

NOTES 1 H o o k e r ' s article a p p e a r s in Synthese 32 (1975) pp. 177-231 and G i e r e ' s in Boston Studies in the Philosophy o] Science -r VIII. 2 Bloor, D . (1976), Knowledge and Social lmagery, R o u t l e d g e & K e g a n Paul, Boston. a Ibid., p. 44. 4 Ellul, J. (1964), Technological Society. V i n t a g e , N e w Y o r k , p. 133. 5 Ibid., p. 85. 6 Ibid., p. 97. r G e n d r o n , B. (197T), Technology and the Human Condition, St. M a r t i n ' s press, N e w Y o r k , pp. 152-156. s F o l l o w e r s of H e n r i de Saint-Simon (1760-1825) used the t e r m s " o r g a n i c " and "critical'" to describe such times. R o b e r t Flint in his History oJ the Philosophy o] History (1894), Scribner, N e w Y o r k , pp. 403-404, offers the following a c c o u n t : T h e critical periods are those in which the m i n d s of m e n are employed in investigating the principles of g o v e r n m e n t u n d e r which they live, in e n d e a v o r i n g to a m e n d old institutions and to invent n e w ones; in which no creed c o m m a n d s the assent of all, so that society is without principles, discontented, changeful. . . O r g a n i c periods, on the contrary, are those which ,possess an accepted doctrine, in w h i c h society is c e m e n t e d by the synthesis of a c o m m o n faith, in w h i c h t h e actual institutions give satisfaction to the world, and m e n ' s m i n d s are at rest. 9 M a n n h e i m , K. (1936), Ideology and Utopia, (trans. with an introduction by W i r t h and Shils), R o u t l e d g e & K e g a n Paul, Boston, p. 1,0 H e i d e g g e r , M. (1966), Discourse on Thinking, H a r p e r & R o w , p. 46. 11 H a b e r m a s , 1. (1970), Toward a Rational Society, B e a c o n Press, Boston, p. 81. I2 F o r a v e r y p r o v o c a t i v e study of an e m e r g i n g f o r m of " w o r l d o r d e r " see Global Reach, R. Barnet & R. Muller, (1974), S i m o n & Sahuster, N e w Y o r k , p. 13. The p r i m a r y thesis is that " T h e m e n w h o r u n the global c o r p o r a t i o n s are t h e first in history w i t h the organization, technology, m o n e y , and ideology to m a k e a credible try at m a n a g i n g the world as integrated u n i t . " ( m y emphasis) It seems to m e t h a t the b o o k leaves little doubt that at least s o m e practical m e n , m e n of p o w e r a n d action, h a v e already begun to b r i n g about w h a t will be the w o r l d ' s first

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T H I N K I N G ABOUT T E C H N O L O G Y global community. The crucial question is whether the model of man and nature, the model of technology on which it is based can be transformed into a viable society. Clearly, with the establishing of such a global community we will have reached an extremely fragile situation measured against some critorion of "adaptability." Philosophers of technology who aro looking for "practical issues" cou/d hardly do better than to offer diagnosis and prognosis for this development. lz Clark, K. (1974), Patho~ ol Power, Harper & Row, New York, p. 83. 14 Whitehead, A.N. (1925), Science and the Modern World, Free Press, New York, p. 59. 15 Russell, ]3. (1952), The Impact ~/ Science on Society, London, p. 85.

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