Turkey on the European doorstep: British and German debates about Turkey in the European Communities Jochen Walter and Mathias Albert Faculty of Sociology, University of Bielefeld, P.O.-Box 100131, D-33501, Bielefeld, Germany. E-mails: [email protected]; [email protected]

This paper seeks to provide a historically informed analysis of Europe, understood as an ‘essentially contested concept’, whereby Turkey is interpreted as a critical point of reference that evokes different discursive constructions of Europe, either including or excluding Turkey. At first, the theoretical-methodological section of this paper will introduce a discourse analytical research programme which utilizes the radically constructivist notion of communication as formulated by Niklas Luhmann in order to analyze the processes of inclusion and exclusion built into various constructions of Europe. Then, the empirical section of this paper analyzes more than 40 years of British and German news coverage (1960–2004). One of the main empirical findings is that Turkey is neither seen as a stable European ‘Other’ nor as a European ‘Self’. Instead, Turkey is predominantly interpreted as ‘the thing on the (European) doorstep’, thereby stimulating various differing constructions of Europe. Journal of International Relations and Development (2009) 12, 223–250. doi:10.1057/jird.2009.13 Keywords: constructivist methodology; discourse analysis; European identity; inclusion/exclusion; Turkish EU accession

Introduction The relation between Turkey and Europe is not only a complex and sometimes difficult one in terms of contemporary political debates surrounding a possible Turkish accession to the European Union. It also remains complex and difficult analytically in that it is not only about the relations between Turkey and the EU as separate entities. Rather it is about constitutive aspects of these entities in the sense that both seek to define and — in an ongoing process — redefine what they ‘are’. In a general sense, this observation refers to the frequently discussed role and function which Turkey serves as (part of ) the ‘Other’ of the construction of a ‘European identity’, as well as the same process regarding the role of Europe in an ongoing reconstruction of Turkish national identity. Under this general heading, debates and studies can be found which Journal of International Relations and Development, 2009, 12, (223–250) r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan 1408-6980/09

www.palgrave-journals.com/jird/

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deal with this subject in terms of the difficult conceptual issues involved in tracing the processes of collective identity construction. Also, numerous studies concentrate on the relevant values which make Europe to be Europe, or Turkey to be Turkey in the first place. The present contribution starts with the observation that many of the academic debates on these issues, which notably involve contributions from a large variety of academic disciplines, rarely operate with a historically grounded analysis, that is, they do not attempt to cover time-frames greater than a couple of years (for example those preceding the current accession process). This is not to suggest that history does not play a prominent role in these debates. On the contrary, most of the debates about the Turkish–European relationship are deeply infused with the history of the European–Ottoman relationship. Rather, it is to suggest that next to analyzes of how, in this grand historical context, Turkey (or the Ottoman Empire) serves as Europe’s Other, and analyzes of how in contemporary political discourse Turkey is constructed as that Other, there is a relative scarcity of analyzes which build on detailed empirical studies with historical depth. Such studies would allow not only to assess how Turkey is partly constructed as Europe’s Other at certain points in time, but also how this construction changes over time. How is it possible, given the relative stability of constructions of collective identity, that over a relatively short period of little more than half a century, Turkey is constructed in and by Europe first in mainly geopolitical/strategic terms, then in economic terms, and only recently in cultural terms? While the present paper will describe in some detail the transition in how Turkey was framed in Europe since the early 1960s, it focuses at least as much on the conceptual and methodological issues behind such a description as it seeks to elucidate some of the mechanisms of semantic inclusion and exclusion which underlie the construction of collective identities. At the same time, the paper will inquire into how these mechanisms and strategies change over time. For this purpose, we argue that it is necessary to observe changes in the micro-foundations of the processes underlying the construction of collective identities. It is only by turning to the micro-level, that is, the individual utterances comprising discourses, that it becomes possible to better understand which discursive settings and events can lead to a change in ‘identity scripts’ and to improved descriptions of how such changes take place. Such an analytical move is however not without its pitfalls. There still is a gross mismatch between an abundance of discourse analyses on the one hand and a dearth of methodological conventions on how to actually ‘do’ empirical discourse analysis on the other hand. This paper thus seeks to not only contribute to a better understanding of both the dynamics and the contingencies of processes of identity-formation through mechanisms of semantic inclusion and exclusion, but also to methodologically engage with these issues. Before doing so, however, the

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following section will outline the thematic background of how the perception of Turkey in Europe has changed over time regarding its framing in geopolitical/strategic, economic, and cultural terms, and how this change interacts with the way in which Europe increasingly seeks to construct itself against a geographical, as opposed to a temporal, ‘Other’. Against this background, the following two sections will then analyze the micromechanisms of how this change in framings takes place. One section will elaborate a research programme particularly geared towards operationalizing observations of the constructedness of collective identities in order to make them more accessible for empirical analysis. For that, it will outline some of the underlying methodological assumptions and the analytical techniques developed in the present context. It will be argued here that an understanding of the notions of communication, communicative construction, Other/Othering, and discourse which draws on the radically constructivist formulation of these concepts in the work of German sociologist Niklas Luhmann provides a promising point of engaging with the micro-mechanisms of discursive constructions. Equipped with these analytical tools, the following section then provides a condensed empirical analysis of changing representations of Turkey in Europe. The guiding question here will be whether and under which conditions specific discursive events legitimize an adaptation of identity scripts and vice versa (i.e. how some events become relevant discursive events at all under the condition of the prevalence of specific scripts). For this purpose, we survey 9 years (1960–1963, December 1999–December 2004) of a number of reports in British and German newspapers and magazines.1 The final section will then summarize the findings.

Turkey and Europe: strategy, economics, culture, and Europe’s different ‘Others’ The case of Turkey’s ‘belonging’ to Europe and processes of European ‘identity construction’ provide particularly apt examples of the possibility of short-term changes in politically relevant social semantics of inclusion and exclusion.2 Thus, even upon a rapid survey of the relevant literature and public debates, it seems that, today, while the question of Turkey’s accession to the EU is mainly about Turkey’s ‘European’ identity as well as about the very meaning of that identity, neither Turkey’s nor Europe’s identities were at stake during the debates over Turkey’s association to the EEC during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Of course, the construction of large-scale collective identities is not simply about explicit discussions about such identities or their underlying basic values and modes of self-understanding. Rather, they feed on a number of constantly

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evolving discourses in different subject areas such as politics, strategy, or economics (e.g. Delanty 1995; Christiansen et al., 2001). And in all of these subject areas, specific denotations of self/own as semantics of inclusion (e.g. market economy, Western democracy, or a Judeo-Christian value community) also require specific semantics of exclusion which allow for identification of what does not belong to the self/own.3 Despite the complexity of such semantic formations, successful constructions of stable identity formations require ongoing reductions of that complexity. Such reductions take place through the use of images and imaginations, metaphors (e.g. the European ‘house’), and express themselves through the emergence of what Thomas Diez has called ‘discursive nodal points’ (Diez 1999). In recent years, political debates about a possible Turkish EU-membership have led to the consolidation of such discursive nodal points around issues of cultural and religious identity, particularly on the part of those opposing Turkish accession (see prominently Giscard D’Estaing 2003). This is in contrast to earlier debates (from the 1950s to the 1980s) on the relation between Turkey and Europe which were characterized by an almost complete absence of explicit references to questions of identity. Both political and academic debates in Western Europe on the relations between Turkey and Europe during the 1950s and 1960s were dominated by a focus on the geopolitical and economic dimensions of that relationship (e.g. Bahceli 1980: 222; Kramer 1988). During the same time within Turkey, the question of belonging to Europe formed a major part of the debates between Western-oriented and traditionalist public discourse (Buzan and Diez 1999: 41–57). In Western European countries, however, such a shift only emerged in the late 1980s after the end of military rule in Turkey opened up the possibility of Turkey being a member of the European Community (e.g. Yurdusev 2000). These brief observations already suggest that, in a historical perspective, the discourse on the relation between Turkey and Europe and on the question of a possible Turkish accession to the EC/EU is not thematically stable. Yet it would seem wrong to ascribe thematic shifts to a ‘meshing of paradox discourses’ (Helvacioglu 1999: 18) on European identity. Rather, the discourse on the question of Turkey’s belonging to Europe, at least within Western European countries, was characterized by a plurality of different, thematically separated discursive fields. In the 1950s and 1960s, economic issues as well as the geopolitical aspects of the Cold War dominated discussions about the role of Turkey in and for Europe. Turkey’s strategically important position on the Soviet Empire’s southern flank secured it a vital role in NATO’s strategic calculations. Geopolitical interests also drove attempts to intensify economic ties between Turkey and Western European countries during that time. Although a relatively marginal trading partner despite being competitive in a few areas (textiles, fruit and vegetables), the EEC concluded an association

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agreement with Turkey in 1963.4 Political statements during that time and particularly article 28 of the association agreement provided the foundations of a still-ongoing dispute on whether the agreement of 1963 contained a promise of eventual full Turkish membership — and whether thus it already ‘certified’ that Turkey belonged in Europe. After the military coup in 1980, the democratic nature of Turkey (and other possible new member states) received increased attention as a necessary condition for joining the EC, but geopolitical arguments were not fully displaced during this phase of intensified East-West tensions during the ‘Second Cold War’. It was only with the end of military rule, the Turkish EC membership application in 1987, and the end of the Cold War, that Turkish membership began to look like a real, albeit still remote, possibility. Only then did discussions emerge which thematized Europeanness as a necessary condition for EC membership. Since then, discussion about Turkish accession to the EC/EU as a full member is increasingly has been framed as a question of cultural similarities and differences and thus as a question of (European) identity. It is particularly with a view to contemporary political discussions that such a rapid overview over the shifting points of discursive focus is instructive. What we will seek to demonstrate in more detail below is that what can be witnessed here over time is a complex interplay of shifts within specific discursive fields as well as shifts in the relative visibility and influence between such discursive fields. Such a complex interplay cannot be reduced to simple self/other distinctions. On the contrary, it seems that assertions of such simple distinctions in themselves are part of an ongoing ‘othering’. This is not to say, of course, that some distinctions would not structure discourses more than others at any given point in time. Yet it seems important to acknowledge that such distinctions are always only temporarily stabilized in discourse, and do not identify any ‘core’ or ‘substance’ of European collective identity. It is in relation to this shift in the prominent distinctions used to draw the boundaries of European identity that the debate on whether Turkey belongs to Europe acquires its sometimes emotionally laden character. However, while after World War II notions of a European identity were asserted on different grounds, the idea of an identity resting on a temporal distinction prevailed: the project of Europe and European integration was asserted on the basis of its ‘other’ being its own past (of a conflict-ridden, war-torn continent). Arguably, this self-other distinction allowed the project of European integration to ‘take off’ as a peace project in the first place (see Wæver 1993: 173; Diez 2004; Rumelili 2004, 2008). The example of the sometimes fierce debates over a possible Turkish EU membership demonstrates that relating to such a temporal self–other distinction is no longer sufficient to warrant inclusion in the European project. The jury is still out on whether attempts to (re-) stabilize this self–other distinction will or can take place along the lines of cultural

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differences, or whether it will take place along geopolitical lines. Within both possibilities, it also remains an open question of whether semantics of inclusion or exclusion will prevail. For example, in geopolitical terms, Turkey could be ‘outside’ of Europe and ‘within’ a zone of Middle Eastern and Caucasian turmoil; or it could be ‘inside’ Europe as the last anchor of stability, and a possible bridge towards such a zone of turmoil. The purpose of the present contribution is not to try and predict which of these restabilizations and the ensuing inclusion or exclusion of Turkey as a part of Europe will prevail. Rather, it seeks to take a step back and inquire how such processes have taken place in the past and to inquire into the very conditions of and discursive microprocesses underlying such dynamics of identity construction via semantics of inclusion and exclusion in the case of Turkey. However, before we examine these issues by analyzing public discourse in Germany and Britain since the 1960s, the next section will discuss the method used in this analysis.

Studying discourse through observing communicative distinctions: outline of a research programme Most studies conceive of Europe as being socially or communicatively constructed, thereby containing no single, somehow objectively or naturally given identity. What Europe is and where it ends is seen as a result of communicative disputes and negotiations. It is thus a result of an interplay between performative discourses stretching over centuries and does not exist ‘outside’ of language and discourse. Europe should, therefore, be analyzed as an ‘essentially contested concept’ (Gallie 1955: 56; Connolly 1978: 10; Cederman 2000: 2; Walter 2008: 75–96), a concept which contains a multitude of conflicting and competitive European selfdescriptions on the European discursive battleground, and which is then positioned against and produces an Other (see Kohli 2000; Diez 2001: 6). However, despite such a rich tradition of theoretical insights, there are few contributions which translate them into methodological guidelines for empirical studies. Without going into too much detail about this, it remains a striking feature of most ‘discourse analyses’ in IR and beyond that the methodological wheel is permanently reinvented. The present contribution proves to be no exception to this rule in the sense that in order to connect its theoretical level of observation with the empirical study of public discourse it first needs to formulate and lay open its own theoretical and methodological foundations. In so doing, however, it proposes to start from a radically constructivist understanding of the notions of communication, communicative construction, Other/ Othering and discourse, thereby engaging with some of the basic concepts underlying Luhmann’s social theory. This brief (re-)reading of Luhmannian terms and concepts serves to demonstrate some of their

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advantages compared to other constructivist approaches which deal with the construction of collective identities. While the next paragraphs will define these concepts in the Luhmannian tradition and sketch the implications for empirical analysis, it needs to be reiterated that such an exercise is necessary here to clearly lay out the methodological approach adopted in this paper. The overall purpose thus is to incorporate Luhmann’s clear-cut conception of communication into the very foundation of a discourse analytical research strategy. Communication As discourses are first and foremost communicative events, communication is to be seen as the most basic level of any interpretation. Following Luhmann,5 communication arises ‘through a synthesis of three different selections, namely, selection of information, selection of the utterance of this information, and a selective understanding or misunderstanding of this utterance and its information’ (see Luhmann 1992: 252, 1999: Chapter 4). A specific information has to be selected out of an endless horizon of possible other information. Every selected information thereby produces a contingent distinction — one thing is selected, all other possible things are not (there is no communication without distinctions). The information selected marks the inner side of this distinction whereas the outside remains unmarked. But even this unmarked side of the distinction is part of the form of communication: every form includes what it originally excludes. It includes what it is not as the other side of the form (see Luhmann 1995; Spencer-Brown 1997). The selected information gets temporarily stabilized6 and has to be uttered towards an alter, whereby an ego has to choose how certain information is uttered. It is important to note here that this allows Luhmann to put ‘communication’ at the centre of analysis. Ego and Alter are not subjects or speakers, but observing systems. As psychic systems they are ‘black boxes’, that is, although like social systems they are meaning-based systems, they are not directly accessible (in the very trivial sense that it is not possible to look into one’s brain — and actually see thoughts — but only to observe communication). The utterance is different from the information and this difference must be observable for a person, as this difference distinguishes ‘it from the mere perception of the behaviour of others’ (Luhmann 1992: 252). Communication occurs when alter is able to understand that this utterance together with its selected information marks two different selections by ego and that these could have also been chosen differently.7 Communication is thus a contingent and only temporarily stable selection from a horizon of countless other possibilities, a difference as it distinguishes two sides through a boundary, and a form as it encompasses both sides in one form (see Baecker 2005).

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Communicative constructions and news articles Building on such a radically constructivist understanding of communication (see particularly Albert et al. 2008), the concept of communicative construction refers to the assumption that there is no chance to get a grip on a ‘real’ meaning, but only on different forms or versions of observing or interpreting the world. It is in this sense that a Luhmannian approach squarely belongs to forms of social theorizing commonly referred to as ‘constructivism’. Regarding newspaper articles (as the main body of material analyzed in the following) this does not mean that journalists invent or imagine certain political or cultural events. But there is no other way than to select certain events out of a horizon of thousands of possible others — some topics are highlighted while others are not. Only through being extracted from a complex totality of events and being cut off from the specific flow of time, ‘real events’ can be transformed into news articles.8 Which information is chosen for news coverage while others are not marks the first selection. In addition, a difference is marked by how a certain event is described and by how this description is stabilized, for example by using a specific vocabulary, specific metaphors or stylistic/rhetorical figures which may evoke different emotions in the reader. The decision of how selected information is uttered marks the second selection to be interpreted. Communicative construction is thus understood in two ways: Firstly, every information chosen marks a contingent decision, inevitably involving a selection and an interpretation in constructing meaning. Secondly, newspaper articles direct the attention of the reader towards specific phenomena, thereby constructing the readers’ image of the world as they serve as the primary source for observing it (see Waldenfels 2006: 107–8). Or, as Luhmann puts it: ‘What we know about our society or even from the world in which we live in, we know it from the mass media’ (Luhmann 1996: 9, our translation).

Processes of inclusion and exclusion and the concept of Othering There is no non-interpretative access to the world. Rather, there are various forms of differential descriptions and constructions of the world complementing or conflicting with each other.9 As all communicative constructions of a coherent entity produce distinctions which encompass an included and an excluded side, communicative constructions concerning a specific topic or a subject area also (and inevitably) produce an other or excluded side. This relational ‘Other’ is often described as being foreign, strange, or alien, particularly if the included side understands or describes itself as a self or an identity (see Somers 1994; Laclau 2005).

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Let us reiterate this point: We are always dealing with self-descriptions which have to be observed regarding which specific distinctions they make, thereby distinguishing themselves from an Other. There needs to be a speaker position involved who is describing itself as being different from an Other in one of the above-mentioned ways: German people distinguish themselves from French people and vice versa, Germans and French distinguish themselves as Europeans against the people of the United States and so on (see Waldenfels 2006: 15–21, 27, 111). A social scientific interpreter thus needs to observe how an Other is constructed through differential processes of Othering. Such a constructed Other affects the included side (the self) in different ways, as it could possibly be perceived either as a challenge or as a threat, but also as a partner and friend (see Stetter 2005). Observing communicative distinctions The selectivity of Luhmann’s concept of communication enables an observer to draw a differentiated picture of communicative constructions. Yet it is only possible to analyze phenomena that are at least observable, that is, regarding communication processes only the ‘utterance’ components of communication can be observed (see Titscher et al. 2000: 186). A social scientific interpreter cannot know why a person selects this or that specific information and can only observe processes of understanding indirectly, that is, by observing subsequent communications. What is observable for an interpreter are the positivity of signs, with all the selections sedimented therein, the distinctions/differences and forms established by them, and finally the way these forms are stabilized. Utterances can be analyzed as they are put down and handed over as signs, as oral speech, or as texts. These different forms of utterances can be observed with respect to the guiding distinctions, forms, selections, topics and rhetoric figures they contain and establish, as well as regarding what they thereby include and exclude. To make this point clear: All these phenomena are only generated by utterances, not by the intentions of a person or an author.10 In contrast to classical hermeneutics which aims at an understanding that is ‘deeper’ or even ‘better’ than the self-understanding of the author him- or herself (see Schleiermacher 1977: 94), a constructively informed version of hermeneutics aims at an analysis of all of the different phenomena mentioned above, solely understood as facets of the text (see Kneer and Nassehi 1991). Discourse and discourse analytical strategy For our purpose, texts cannot be analyzed as isolated entities, but need to be treated as embedded in a wider discourse. In this context then the question is

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not only one about the meaning of a given text, but about the success of a text in establishing specific readings of how Europe should be imagined. Since such an establishment, in order to be effective, necessarily transcends single bodies of texts, we define discourses as networks or chains of interconnected textual differences and distinctions. Discourses thus contain efforts to authoritatively establish certain meanings for a specific topical field, even though (and also: because) a totally fixed meaning remains impossible (see Torfing 1999: 85; Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 112; Jørgensen and Phillips 2002). As every communicative utterance can be rejected and contradicted for several reasons, ongoing alterations and (re-) stabilizations of meaning can be observed on the ‘discursive battleground’, where different discursive readings of the same subject are positioned against each other. Discourses are circling around communicative distinctions, fighting about the correct reading of this distinction. At the same time discourses connect or tie together different distinctions. In this sense discourses can be seen as the textual macrostructures as they define a set of texts as belonging together (e.g. for thematic reasons; see van Dijk, 1980: 41–50). The research strategy sketched so far shares many basic interests and concepts with other well-established discourse analytical approaches like that of Michel Foucault (1972) or Ernesto Laclau (Laclau and Mouffe 2001): how meaning or knowledge is produced discursively, how identities are differentially constructed against an excluded Other, and how this Other affects the self. Furthermore, with Jacques Derrida’s semiotic approach it shares an interest in the permanent shift or deconstruction of meaning that can only be stabilized temporarily (Derrida 1997). What distinguishes the present strategy from these approaches is the addition of a hermeneutic-interpretative reading method, which focuses on the observation of communicative distinctions. Introducing and implementing Luhmann’s concept of communication into a discourse analytical programme tries to illuminate the very basis of discourses: communicative distinctions together with the ongoing processes of inclusion and exclusion. Both Foucault and Laclau remain rather unclear on this point as they do not make their understanding of communication explicit. As a consequence, empirical research following them often lacks comprehensibility as the main units of analysis and their interpretation remain ambiguous. The same applies to Derrida’s semiotic approach of deconstruction: How ‘diffe´rance’ actually ‘works’ and how it can be interpreted coherently remains somewhat blurred. What Derrida lacks is a method of reading, interpreting and deconstructing texts made explicit (but see e.g. Ashley 1988; Titscher et al. 2000). We thus do not aim to break with the approaches mentioned above but try to clarify very basic steps towards an empirical analysis of communicatively constructed discourses embedded in texts.11 It is for this reason that

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Luhmann’s concept of communication seems to serve as a more manageable research tool.12 Approaching the empirical material against this background requires searching for a variety of textual features. It first needs to be established when and how Europe and Turkey are part of the news coverage. Furthermore, it is necessary to focus on the specific ways in which Turkey and Europe are depicted as relating to each other and to trace how such depictions change over time. In addition, the texts are to be scanned regarding the question of whether and which guiding distinctions are established in reference to Turkey and/or in Europe: which unity or entity is conceived as the ‘Other’ of Europe or Turkey and how is this inscription stabilized or made plausible? Beyond the ‘surface’ of the texts, it is also of interest to analyze the underlying stylistic figures, rhetorical categories or tropes — like metaphors or metonymies (e.g. Chilton 1996; Musolff 2000; Hu¨lsse 2003; Beer and de Landtsheer 2004; Walter and Helmig 2008) — which structure the texts on a deeper level. Such stylistic figures, rhetorical categories or tropes contribute to the ‘effectiveness’ of a text in terms of constructing and shaping specific images of what is seen as European and what is not (see Link 1982; Fowler 1996; Landwehr 2004: Chapter 5).

Observing observations of Europe, Turkey and the European Communities (1960–1963, December 1999–2004) This contribution analyzes British and German news coverage on the question of a possible Turkish accession to the European communities (EEC/EC/EU) between 1960 and 2004. These two national public spheres represent two rather different cases in terms of their attitudes towards Europe and especially in their relation to Turkey. Whereas Germany showed great support for the idea of a united Europe and the founding of common economic and political European institutions after World War II, Britain acted on a much more cautious and sceptical note, following its own path of ‘exceptionalism’, even after it joined the European Community in 1973 (George 1990). In addition, while German perceptions of Turkey are strongly influenced by a large Turkish minority living in Germany since the 1950s, no significant Turkish minority can be found in Britain. It is this generally perceived contrast which led us to select German and British news coverage for our purpose, even though other public spheres would be worth dealing with too.13 German news is covered by analyzing the liberalconservative newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), the liberal-left weekly journal Der Spiegel, and the tabloid newspaper Bild. In the British case, the liberal-conservative newspaper The Times, the liberal weekly journal

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Economist and the tabloid newspaper Daily Mirror are analyzed. The six selected sources approximately cover the spectrum of mainstream political opinion in Germany and Britain and through their high circulation rates reach a significant proportion of the general public.14 We do not attempt to cover the entire time-span between 1960 and 2004 but will focus on specific time-spans centred around ‘discursive events’15 which have been selected after a first scan of all volumes: Early discussions of Turkish Europeanness can be found in the early 1960s in the mass media, following Turkey’s application for EEC association in 1959 (which was granted in 1963) and after the first Turkish military coup d‘e´tat in 1960. After the EU summit in Helsinki in 1999 where Turkey was granted EU candidate status, the period between December 1999 and 2004 was marked by a broad discussion of Turkish Europeanness. In 2004 the EU finally decided to initiate membership negotiations. The two time-spans selected cover much of the ‘official institutional interaction’ (applications for membership together with their acceptance or rejection, summit conferences, the signing of treaties, etc.) between Turkey and the European communities. In this case they are analytically ‘thick’ in that they contain a lot of news coverage about the relation between Turkey and Europe.16 The great gap: Turkey as a strategic partner vs ‘the Turks’ as backward strangers (1960–1963) German news coverage There are two main discourses about Turkey–Europe relations in the period from 1960 to 1963: the geostrategic discourse, which is characterized mainly by inclusive arguments; the political discourse of democracy, which is used in a more ambivalent fashion; and characterizations which undermine and direct both the geostrategic and the political discourses, which could be called the cultural anthropological discourse of Turkish Otherness. We can thus distinguish three guiding distinctions within these discourses: (1) ‘the West’/‘Free World’ vs ‘the East’/the ‘Communist Bloc’; (2) democracy vs non-democracy/deficient democracy; (3) enlightenment/modernity vs backward strangeness/pre-modern religiousness. Europe or European people are always identified with the ‘left’, the included side, of the distinction. Turkey is described as one of the most important strategic actors in a difficult and important world region, being a western-oriented nation state and a member of NATO situated right next to the fragile Middle East, clearly opposing both the USSR and — at this time of lesser importance — political Islam. The USSR serves as the dominant and threatening Other which embodies the worldwide ‘communist menace to the security of the free world’

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(FAZ, 28 April, 1961).17 Apart from this, the Soviet Union serves as a kind of projection surface for all the things that ‘the West’ or Europe fears most. Turkey, with its NATO missile bases, is described as the ‘NATO guardian of the Dardanelles’ (Spiegel, 26 September, 1962), serving as the military stronghold of south-eastern Europe and thereby defending the ‘margins of the Mediterranean sea’ (FAZ, 3 January, 1961) against supposed Soviet influences and infiltrations. Because of its geostrategic key position, it is argued that Turkey should be recognized as a part of ‘the West’ or even ‘Europe’. But explicit assignments to Europe like the ones referred to above are exceptions to the rule in the texts, as the question of whether Turkey ‘belongs’ to Europe is not much discussed in this period. Instead, there are a few more implicit inclusions into Europe — hidden in subordinated clauses — which are not expanded further. Besides, not only is Turkey’s belonging to Europe not overtly discussed, but the content of the European self is also not charged with any specific meaning — at least when regarding the geostrategic discourse. ‘The West’ or Europe — both terms are used interchangeably — is basically supposed to be not the Soviet Union. We are thus dealing with a nearly empty or merely ‘technical’ distinction, where both sides are more or less undetermined. Turkey plays a more important role in formulating a politico-cultural European self. Every article dealing with Turkey as a political system describes it as a deficient democracy in contrast to Western European standards, especially in the aftermath of the first Turkish coup d’etat in 1960. There are numerous articles which describe democratic deficiencies (e.g. the dominant military, authoritarian politicians, violations of human rights) as well as signs for an incomplete, superficial or endangered Turkish secularization (e.g. signs for a revival of political Islam). Both — democracy and secularism — are described as mere projects of the Turkish elite, not (yet) supported by the Turkish people. Turkey is thus implicitly described as being different from an ordinary European democracy which at the same time repeatedly serves as the comparative form relevant for Turkey. This also means that Europe is primarily identified with democracy. Following this interpretation, Turkey is conceived as being not yet a European state, but on its way to becoming one. A number of metaphors can be found which depict Turkey as being ‘on its thorny way towards full democratic restoration’ (FAZ, 13 March, 1962). While Turkey is excluded from Europe because of its democratic deficiencies, it is at the same time closely related to it, as it is compared to a supposed European key condition: democracy. In this context it is important to note that the comparison of Turkey with Western European standards of democracy in the first place is due to an ascribed role within this kind of democratic-cultural discourse: Turkey is supposed to function as a role-model, as it represents a ‘democratic experiment’ (FAZ, 28 October, 1963) that could inspire other

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countries of the region to choose democracy rather than communism. This inclusionary reading of the political-cultural discourse is stabilized through the evocation of threat scenarios: Turkey is depicted as being deeply divided, sick from the inside and covered only with a ‘thin varnish of civilisation’ (FAZ, 19 July, 1960). If ‘the West’/Europe would refuse to support Turkey’s democratic restoration, it could turn away and move to the communist side. Both the geostrategic and the political-cultural discourses are infiltrated by and connected through a cultural anthropological discourse of Turkish Otherness. Turkey is not only described as a backward-oriented nation-state, but also the great mass of ‘the Turks’, particularly the rural population, is depicted as being poor, naive, blindly obeying the authorities, religious/ superstitious, unworldly, non-political, irrational, uncultured (‘the trusting illiterate Turk’), stubborn, xenophobic (‘The Turk only loves Turks’; FAZ, 23 March, 1962), even dirty and in bad health or with a latent propensity to violence.18 In addition, an excessive national pride is said to be combined with an ‘innate mistrust against all foreign advice’ (FAZ, 16 March, 1962). All these descriptions evoke a picture of a latent threatening mass of people which seems to be clearly non-European.19 While ‘the Turks’ as a people are mainly depicted as a threatening but also passive mass, Turkish politicians are described as being quite imperious or aggressive (uttering ‘battle cries’) in their efforts to achieve EEC association.20 In contrast to this Turkish offensiveness, Europe is constructed and interpreted as a passive or uncertain entity, mainly characterized through psychoanalytic vocabulary and concepts.21 Motives and figures of this cultural anthropological discourse are interwoven with both other discourses in different ways. While Turkish religiousness is suggested as undermining Turkey’s secular state order, the notion of ‘stubbornness’ is used to explain the authoritarian style of the Turkish political elite. Therefore, psychological concepts coined for the characterization of individual humans are not only applied to the nation as a whole, but also to its political constitution. However, the themes of naivety and the non-political nature of rural Turkish people are also interpreted in a geostrategic context, as articles repeatedly suggest a communist or Marxist temptation emerging from the USSR to which Turkish people — being naive and non-political — might be susceptible. As a reaction to this ‘communist threat’, a full incorporation of Turkey into ‘the West’ is demanded, in whatever frightening terms Turkey or ‘the Turks’ are otherwise conceived. The geostrategic discourse is thus the dominant one between 1960 and 1963. However, the discourse of Turkish cultural anthropological Otherness, which later becomes dominant in a slightly changed version, can also be noted at this time.

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British news coverage Quite similar to the German case, British observations of the relation between Europe and Turkey during the period from 1960 to 1963 circulate around the same distinctions, namely ‘the West’/Europe vs Communist Bloc/Soviet Union (geostrategic discourse), democracy vs deficient democracy (political-cultural discourse) and enlightened/modern/rational Europeans vs pre-modern/irrational Turks/Orientals (anthropological-cultural discourse). The reading of the global distinction ‘the West’ vs ‘the communist East’ is similar to the one found in the German case. Owing to an inclusionary reading of the geostrategic distinction, Turkey is observed as being ‘Western’ — or even an ‘individual western nation’ (Economist, 14 May, 1960) — because of its strategic importance for a turbulent region of the world. This observation is reinforced through the observation of Turkey’s self-proclaimed anti-communist position, which leads us to a specific reading of the political-cultural distinction. Numerous alarming voices can be found in British news coverage in the aftermath of the Turkish coup d’etat, claiming to observe a slightly menacing ‘leftish tinge’ (Economist, 3 September, 1960) or ‘slogans full of communist phraseology’ (Times, 6 February, 1961) used by the new Turkish rulers. The threat of the Soviet Union is conceived as being so strong on a global level that the Turkish coup is automatically interpreted as a communist threat. This fear leads to resolute demands for support and recognition of Turkey as a Western state as otherwise it could move over to the Soviet camp.22 Democratic reforms in Turkey are thus interpreted as a matter of fate for the West as a whole, as Turkey is conceived of as a possible Achilles heel. Supporting Turkish reforms and Turkey is linked with supporting the West in general and is presented as a task without alternatives. Semantics of fear and threat stabilize this inclusionary reading. Quite similar to the German news coverage, ‘pro-democracy’ is equated with ‘pro-Europe’. Turkey is interpreted as a country with a ‘genuine passion for everything European’ (Economist, 4 June, 1960), with a strong and historically deep-rooted affinity for Western democracy. Meanwhile, Turkish democratic deficiencies are stated and criticized as well; the crucial point seems to be that Turkey is portrayed as constantly aiming for a Western-style democracy. It is however not (yet) a democratic — also implying a ‘European’ — state, but it seeks to become one. According to the British observation, this Turkish European-democratic ambition itself should be recognized as legitimate. Furthermore, Turkey is observed as a kind of democratic test case which could function as a role model for other (formerly) non-Western states, which might follow the Turkish example. To ‘make Turkey European’ (Times, 22 May, 1963) is the ultimate goal, even though the great mass of ‘the deeply divided Turks’ (Economist, 25 November, 1961) are regarded as being

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non-European (still) because of their religion, ethnical belonging and cultural behaviour. Yet, in contrast to German news coverage, there are only few negative descriptions of the Turkish population as a threatening mass. Rather, it is possible to observe a kind of romanticized reading of a suggested Turkish strangeness: Turkey is depicted as a ‘grim-looking world of gorge and precipice reined by torrents and lonely tracks’ (Times, 20 April, 1963), the Turks as being ‘in the grip of spells and incantations, djinns, charms, and amulets, love potions, and magical rubbish’ (Times, 12 January, 1963). An inclusionary reading of the geostrategic discourse is thus knitted together with a reading of the political-culture discourse which emphasizes the aim of ‘becoming European’ as a goal in itself. Quite contrary to the German case, the reading of the cultural anthropological discourse of Turkish Otherness plays no prominent role in the British case. In another significant respect British news coverage is generally marked by a perception slightly differing from the German case as to what ought to be regarded as European now and in the future. This mainly refers to the (self-)observation of Britain’s standing in Europe itself: Europe is depicted as a continent deeply divided, not only between West and East but also inside Western Europe itself: between the Europe of the Six (EEC) and the Europe of the Seven (EFTA). The initial rejection of the British accession attempt in 1963 to the EEC is thus interpreted as a serious crisis of the European idea in general. Several appeals to stop a process leading to a further division of Europe can be found, pleading for the acknowledgement of the existence of a ‘wider’ Europe that should be integrated primarily economically, whereas political and cultural differences should be tolerated. This idea of Europe might explain why the Turkish accession to the EEC and the Turkish belonging to Europe are depicted less ambiguously than in the German news coverage. Turkey ‘on its way’ to Europe? Europe as an essential or as a constructed entity? (December 1999–2004) German news coverage The period between December 1999 and 2004 is marked by an explosion in the number of news articles about Turkish politics and Turkey’s possible accession to the European Union. Connected to this are various forms of reasoning about a specific European identity. In contrast to the earlier period analyzed in this contribution, this one is characterized by the emergence of a broad intellectual or elitist discursive formation23 which accompanies ordinary news coverage. In this context, an explicit debate about Turkish Europeanness and its relation to a European identity emerges. Europe is thereby actually used as an ‘essentially contested concept’, whereas in the 1960s observable discussions about different visions of a supposed European self where more or less silenced

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because of the omnipresent geostrategic confrontation during the Cold War. With the cessation of the central geostrategic distinction of ‘the West’/Europe vs ‘the communist bloc’/Soviet Union, communicative restrictions of talking about Europe/a European self seemed to diminish as well. Many articles lament the omission of an open and honest discussion about Turkish ambitions to become part of Europe and it is frequently suggested that it could be too late to withdraw from the earlier promises made to Turkey. Such lamentations mostly refer to the political-institutional discourse which can be found in everyday news coverage about Turkey and in the ‘official political reasoning’ on Turkish accession to the EU. This discourse strongly ties Turkish progress (or lack thereof) to the ‘Copenhagen criteria’. Nearly all articles dealing with problems of Turkish democracy, like violations of human rights (e.g. torture in prisons), the discrimination of women or minorities (e.g. Kurds, Christians), or the lack of pluralism and freedom of speech, apply these deficiencies to the ‘Copenhagen criteria’, concluding that Turkey still has ‘a long way to go’ in order to be part of Europe. Nevertheless, if the criteria are someday fulfilled, Turkey has the undisputable right to become a member of the European Union and would thus be put on the ‘rails that lead towards the West’ (FAZ, 24 November, 2003). The underlying — nearly technical — distinction may be described as follows: fulfilling democratic/the Copenhagen criteria vs not fulfilling democratic/the Copenhagen criteria. Europe is once again defined via democratic values. But this distinction is much more concrete and bureaucratic/technocratic than in the political-cultural discourse of the 1960s, and several attempts can be identified which seek to cool down or even to de-politicize the entire debate about whether or not Turkey should have the right to join the European Union. As Jean-Claude Juncker puts it: ‘We can no longer question this decision of general principle’ (FAZ, 17 September, 2004). This suggested ‘automatism’ or ‘non-political politics’ (FAZ, 10 October, 2004) seems to be one of the main reasons for the take-off of the intellectual or elitist discursive formation, which draws upon European identity at a more abstract level, sidelining or even opposing ‘technocratic obligations’. Picking up the frequently used train metaphor, the European Union is criticized as a ‘driverless ghost-train, dashing through all actual stations’ (FAZ, 5 September, 2000). Instead of putting the enlargement of the European Union on autopilot, an explicit debate about ‘what holds the continent together’ (Spiegel, 9 December, 2002) or about the ‘European value of Europe’ (FAZ, 25 November, 2002) is vehemently debated. Therefore, in the course of the rejection of the distinction fulfilling democratic criteria vs not fulfilling democratic criteria, the usage of Europe as an ‘essentially contested concept’ flourishes. The intellectual discursive formation at this point can roughly be divided into two opposing camps, with one camp clearly opposing the notion of

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Turkey belonging to Europe and the other side supporting claims of Turkey being part of Europe. In the course of this debate many contradicting readings of discourses can be found: the political-cultural discourse, the historicalcultural discourse, the economic/demographic discourse, the geographic and the geostrategic discourse. The decisive factor for interpreting the intellectual discursive formation is thus to observe how different authors of both ‘camps’ respectively read and evaluate different discourses. The exclusionary camp knits together specific readings of the historical-cultural, the political-cultural, the economic-demographic and geostrategic discourse. The inclusionary camp mainly ties together a specific reading of the historical-cultural and geostrategic discourse. The historical-cultural discourse seems to be the dominant one — and most hardly fought over — between December 1999 and 2004. Yet whether a European (cultural) identity is formulated in an inclusive or in an exclusive fashion on this basis does not follow automatically from this dominance. The main question is how a European cultural identity can be conceived of. While the ‘exclusionary camp’ prefers an essentialist conception, the ‘inclusionary camp’ advocates an open or constructivist interpretation of European identity. The essentialist conception of European identity is therefore marked by the following ‘chain of equivalence’ (see Torfing 1999: 124–6; Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 128): because of Europe’s specific rationality, Greek philosophy and Roman law, self-reflexivity, commonly shared history, art, architecture, its Christian values, as well as because of the achievements of the enlightenment and the industrial revolution, Turkey is the explicitly named and undisputed ‘constitutive outside’ of this ‘chain of equivalence’ as it is said to be neglecting all these achievements. Turkey is even supposed to endanger them through an Islamic orientation. Therefore, the plea for Turkish accession to the European Union is answered with apocalyptic undertones, suggesting the ‘destruction’ or ‘devastation’ of Europe or European identity. The acceptance of ‘OrientalIslamic’ Turkey (FAZ, 13 April, 2000) would ultimately lead towards a ‘cultural shock — and towards violence’ (Bild, 9 March, 2004). At the same time economic-demographic arguments — poor Turkey is supposed to ‘outpour its huge birth surplus [y] over central Europe’ (FAZ, 9 September, 2004) and thereby destroy its economic health — as well as geographical arguments (‘The biggest part of Turkey does not belong to Europe’; Bild, 11 December, 1999) stabilize this exclusionary reading. Opposed to this exclusionary reading, Turkish inclusion into Europe is forcefully supported by a specific reading of the geostrategic discourse. Unlike in the 1960s, the underlying global distinction is no longer ‘the West/Europe vs the communist bloc/Soviet Union. Rather now the Middle East and — especially after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 — political/terrorist Islam are seen

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as the new Others. The Middle East is mostly depicted as a bewildering and unstable world region whereas political Islam is interpreted as an overt threat. According to the overall geostrategic distinction, Turkey is supposed to serve as a ‘hinge between Europe and the Middle East’ (Bild, 17 February, 2004). To ‘avoid the so-called clash of civilizations’ (Bild, 25 October, 2001) a European Turkey could function as a stabilizing and pacifying factor, as ‘a magnet for democracy and a social market economy’ (FAZ, 8 June, 2003), or as a ‘bridge between Islamic societies and the Western democracies’ (Spiegel, 3 May, 2004) as then-German foreign minister Joschka Fischer said. When talking about Turkey, the bridge metaphor is used frequently and in prominent places. This usage illuminates Turkey’s designated function for Europe, namely to act as a political-cultural archetype of its own. This reading is strengthened further after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Turkish accession to the European Union is thereafter described as a ‘D-Day in the course of the war on terror’ (FAZ, 21 October, 2004) as Fischer put it. Turkey is thus often included into Europe due to negative reasoning: If Europe refuses Turkish accession to the EU, it is supposed that ‘70 million Turks could turn away from Europe crestfallen’ (Bild, 17 February, 2004). Turkish inclusion into Europe is thus justified with semantic scare tactics and stabilized through metaphors of fear. As in the 1960s, the geostrategic discourse contains no positively assigned European value or definition of a European self. A specific reading of the political-cultural discourse fills this gap (i.e. the ‘European side’ of the global distinction). According to this, Europe is defined as an ‘open communicative sphere’, which is ideologically neutral and characterized by a certain fairness and culture of discussion. It is stated that ‘the history of Europe always has been — and still is — a construction’ (FAZ, 6 January, 2004) that only ‘exists in the minds of people’ (FAZ, 21 February, 2004). Europe is thus defined through ‘democracy, mutual thoughtfulness, equality, acceptance of the human dignity and minority rights’ (Bild, 13 August, 2004). Whoever wants to be European and joins the European communicative sphere with good will — like Turkey — is able to enrich the European project and should be regarded as a part of it (e.g. Bild, 2 September, 2004). This reading clearly opposes an essentialist disposition of what is to be seen as Europe/European. The relevant political-cultural distinction of that period can thus be identified as: Europe as an essential/historically grown entity vs Europe as an open communicative arrangement.

British news coverage Turkish accession to the European Union or the recognition of the European character of Turkey is far less contested in British news coverage. Inclusionary readings of the different discourses are thus dominant. Readings of the

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geostrategic discourse are connected with those of a political-institutional, a politico-cultural, and a cultural-religious discourse. All of them are embedded in an understanding of the future shape of a European Union that clearly differs from the German understanding. At the same time, however, and quite similar to the German case, it is possible to observe a global geostrategic distinction between ‘the West’/Europe vs Middle East/political/terrorist Islam which reinforces most inclusionary readings. Unlike in the German case, the official reference to the Copenhagen criteria is not contested. On the contrary, Turkey’s right to join is identified as having historical roots. There is a dominant reading of Turkish history as a long walk towards Europe, thereby talking of a Turkish ‘tradition of accession to the European unions’ which is dated back vaguely to the 19th century. It is argued that Turkey at least earned the right to have a fair chance to become officially recognized as a part of Europe — if it wishes so: ‘So long as it fulfils the Union’s usual membership criteria, there might seem little reason not to take it’ (Economist, 18 September, 2004). Or: ‘Yes flatly, Turkey should join the EU, on EU terms’ (Economist, 20 July, 2002). Turkey is broadly defined as having a European character; therefore it should get the chance to join the political institutions of Europe. This inclusionary reading is emphasized in the geostrategic interpretation of a possible Turkish accession to the EU. It is often argued that Turkish accession could serve as a positive signal since an ‘EU that is open to Turkey should send a message to the troubled Muslim world of today’ (Economist, 7 December, 2002). This reading gains even more ground after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the following ‘war on terror’, as it is argued that the socalled ‘clash of civilisations’ could best be prevented by acknowledging Turkey as the ‘bridge between the Judaeo-Christian and Muslim cultures which is so badly needed’ (Times, 15 December, 2002), or as the ‘bulkwark against the rise of radical Islam’ (Times, 7 October, 2004). According to Tony Blair, Turkish accession to the European Union would ‘send a signal to the wider Islamic world that we want to engage with them’ (Daily Mirror, 13 December, 2002). If Europe were to neglect Turkey again, ‘it would be widely interpreted in the Muslim world as a blow against all Islam’ (Economist, 18 September, 2004). As in the German case, Turkish inclusion into Europe is often justified in a negative fashion, as a refusal of Turkey might provoke serious dangers for the West. Thus, for example, it is asserted that an ‘alienated, destabilised, probably radicalised country of 70 million on Europe’s doorstep would be in prospect. The price of keeping Europe ‘‘European’’ could be terrifying high’ (Times, 28 May, 2004). Or: ‘Without Turkey there will never be peace and unity in Europe’ (Times, 10 March, 2004). However, such threat scenarios also provoke exclusionary statements as well as it is argued that ‘al Quaeda is now to be allowed to decide which countries

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can join the EU’ (Times, 26 March, 2004). But only few such exclusionary statements can be found. Most of them are actually imported from ‘the continent’. Valery Giscard d’Estaign’s frequently cited statement that the EU ‘would be destroyed by the entry of Turkey’ (Times, 9 November, 2002) is labelled as an instance of ‘ignorant prejudices’ (Times, 28 May, 2004) or ‘prejudices of several EU-members’ (Times, 6 November, 2003). Turkey is thus repeatedly depicted as a decidedly European country. But which is the underlying understanding of a European self here? Europe is mainly interpreted as a genuinely ‘open construction’ which can ‘never be a fortress against people’ (Times, 7 February, 2001). Values such as ‘individualism, experimentation, openness to outside influences and exposure to constant change [y] have been most quintessential of European history’ (Times, 5 July, 2001). According to this definition, there is minimum space to exclude Turkey with good reasons. Instead, Europe, which has ‘reached out once (y) should do so again’ (Times, 15 December, 2002): ‘The Economist would prefer a thin looser sort of Europe, perhaps comprising overlapping inner clubs who wish to integrate more tightly. As for Russia, or Morocco, why should geography or religion dictate who might join?’ (Economist, 7 December, 2002). Regarding this frequently found conceptualization of a loosely integrated Europe, it is hardly surprising that in general a possible Turkish EU accession is unchallenged in the media.

Conclusion This paper has tried to demonstrate that the construction of a European ‘self’ through a construction of an Other, in this case Turkey, is a process which is both highly flexible and stable over time. It is stable in the sense that different representations of the Other persist over time in that it is variably represented in geopolitical/strategic, economic, political, or cultural terms. Yet it is highly flexible in that the relative importance of these different discursive representations, the way in which they are related to each other, and the way in which within these representations the Other is addressed in either inclusive or exclusive terms varies significantly over time. Incorporating Luhmann’s straightforward conception of observing communicative distinctions into the very heart of a wider discourse analytical research programme enables a scientific observer to analyze even a great amount of research material, for example, texts or speeches. Without the classic (hermeneutic) obligation to understand the ‘true’ meaning of a given utterance it becomes possible to solely focus on distinctions, on how they emerge and develop, and on what they include and exclude, as well as on how and when this relation between inclusion and exclusion changes (over time or in the context of different

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discursive settings). It is this ‘reading strategy’ or ‘device’ which orders research at exactly the point at which most discourse analytical approaches remain rather vague (or silent). The first text corpus analyzed (1960–1963) is characterized by a ‘great gap’ primarily between the geostrategic and the cultural anthropological discourses of Turkish Otherness. While the Turkish affiliation to ‘the West’ or even Europe is not in doubt for geopolitical/strategic reasons, ‘the Turks’ are, at the same time and especially in Germany, depicted as a backward and threatening mass, being clearly non-European for cultural anthropological reasons. The period between December 1999 and 2004 is characterized by an ‘explosion’ of texts which aim at the definition of a supposed European identity. The different attempts to describe the core of a European identity circle around different cultural reasonings. In a nutshell, an essentialist conception is held against a constructivist conception of European identity. This antagonism is far more pronounced in German news coverage whereas the observations in Britain clearly lean towards a more constructivist understanding, matching its understanding of Europe as a loosely integrated entity. Comparing both periods analyzed in this contribution, it seems striking that Turkey serves as a ‘contrast foil’ for representations of Europe, be they more explicit or implicit. Turkey truly seems to be the ‘sting of the other’ for Europe, provoking a variety of including and/or excluding reactions. The present contribution has sought to establish the complexity of these different discursive arrangements and settings, which cannot easily be reduced to a ‘single’ discourse. This also means that rather than a clear-cut and historically stable construction of a Turkish ‘Other’ regarding a single rationale or theme, a multitude of changing and interconnected discourses, discursive settings and scripts can be found which exist simultaneously and are used to either include Turkey into Europe or ‘the West’, or to exclude it from there. Inclusions or exclusions thus depend on the specific reading of those different discourses or discursive elements together with their respective distinctions. Thus, for example, the geographic position of Turkey is used to promote both Turkey’s inclusion into and its exclusion from Europe. On the one hand, Turkey’s location is depicted as a chance for Europe as it serves as a stabilizing factor in a critical region; on the other hand, its geographic position is sometimes — and particularly in Germany — interpreted as a threat to Europe, as Turkey could be used as a gateway for importing radical Islam or terror. Both readings connect and combine geopolitical/strategic reasoning with politico-cultural reasoning. The connection or framing of inclusionary or exclusionary readings with specific ‘discursive events’ exhibit a typical pattern of argumentative reasoning: By constructing specific chains of references, historical events happening in

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Turkish society or politics are connected to historical events of overriding importance. For example, signs of a rise of the Turkish Marxist movement in the 1960s are connected to the depiction of a general Marxist threat, initiated by the Soviet Empire and challenging the entire West. Such events which have the potential for dramatization or scandalization (e.g. violence, threat, surprising changes) are likely to be transformed into ‘discursive events’ in the mass media, even if they are of a relatively small scale ‘on the ground’ (Luhmann 1996; Trenz 2004: 313). Furthermore, such ‘discursive events’ get exaggerated as they are read into a larger historical scenario of threat. Another typical argumentative pattern can be observed in this context: in the 1960s, there is an ‘ultimate Other’ for Europe or ‘the West’, an Other who clearly exceeds Turkish Otherness, that is, the Soviet Empire. This ‘ultimate Other’ seems to cover up explicit representations of Turkish Western or Europeanness. Even though Turkey is frequently described as an Other to Europe or ‘the West’ for cultural-anthropological or politico-cultural reasons, it is nevertheless not seen as that strange or threatening, that is, some kind of ‘ultimate Other’. Turkish Otherness is thus pushed back and subordinated under the geostrategically motivated plea for assigning Turkey to ‘the West’ as a bulwark against the Soviet Other. The end of the Cold War initiates the dissolution of the Soviet Empire as an ‘ultimate Other’. That may be the reason why (Turkish) Europeanness or the ‘true nature’ of Europe are heavily discussed after the Cold War and particularly between December 1999 and 2004. As there is no longer an ‘ultimate Other’ opposing Europe, Europe’s attention shifts towards Europe itself and towards the next level of Otherness that lies underneath an ‘ultimate Other’. Liberated from an immediate threat, the general European public thus seems to be able to reflect upon its own ‘nature’ or ‘self’. Turkish ambitions for joining the EU are therefore interpreted as a ‘test’ for European self-reflexivity and self-determination. But with the terror attacks of 9/11, political Islam revives as the ‘ultimate Other’ for the Western sphere and also for Europe, thereby intensifying the debates about the proposed nature of Turkish cultural Otherness, discussing how — or whether — this fits to the proposed European self-understanding. Finally, it is quite surprising that despite the obvious and often stated differences between the visions and observations of what ought to be seen as European in Great Britain and Germany in general, both public spheres when dealing with a possible Turkish accession to the EC/EU are quite similar regarding the appearance of discourses, metaphors, as well as discursive nodal points and their respective readings. Whether a truly common European public sphere exists or not, there are at least strong indicators for the existence of shared ‘European’ interpretative schemes.

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Acknowledgements We thank the editors and the three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

Notes 1 Research for his article was conducted within the German Research Council-funded Collaborative Research Centre 584 ‘The Political as Communicative Space in History’; a fuller elaboration of the empirical results, particularly also pertaining to the late 1980s can be found in Walter (2008). 2 The following paragraphs further develop some parts of an argument which was first sketched out in Albert (2005). 3 This dynamic has been demonstrated in Russian–European relations by Neumann (1998). 4 The agreement entered into force on 1 December, 1964. 5 We are thus not trying to adopt Luhmanns modern systems theory, as a full-fledged theory of society, but just make use of his concepts of communication and distinction/difference. See Kra¨mer (2001). 6 Maybe, for example, as a coordinated set of movements of the body (e.g. to tap one’s forehead) or as words, which are compounded of formerly unfixed letters and fade away after their verbal use. 7 The selected and uttered information may then be adopted or rejected by alter. 8 See, for example, Fairclough (1995), Luhmann (1996), Merten (1977). 9 Which is not to suggest that there is no real world ‘out there’. See Goodman (1978): Chapters I and VI, Lenk (1993: 25), Laclau and Mouffe (2001: 108). 10 Which is not to say that authors have no intentions; however, an observer cannot observe them directly. See Nassehi (1997), but see also Ricœur (1991). 11 There are of course other possible steps towards an operationalization of discourse theoretical ideas for empirical research. See, for example, Larsen (1997), Diez (1999), Torfing (1999), Jørgensen and Phillips (2002), Howarth and Torfing (2005). 12 The similarity of approaches is underscored by Luhmann’s many references to Derrida in his later writings. 13 Like for example the French (with a huge Muslim minority), the Austrian (with the historical experience of the Ottoman sieges of Vienna in 1529 and 1683), or of the former Yugoslavian countries (with a good deal of commonly shared Muslim and Ottoman history). For an overview, see Giannakopoulos and Maras (2005); also Baasner (2008). 14 The selection of newspapers sought to cover a broad spectrum of the print media landscape in both countries. Exemplary samples of more newspapers in both cases did not lead to significant deviations from the results gained from the present analysis. We proceeded on the basis of a full analysis of all newspaper contents (all genres and text sorts). In total, 844 articles matching our search items (like Europe, EEC, EC, EU, and Turkey) were analyzed (1960–1963: 68 German articles, of which 53 in FAZ, 15 in Der Spiegel, and 15 in Bild, and 63 British articles, of which 29 in The Times and 14 in The Economist; December 1999–2004: 538 German articles, of which 438 in FAZ, 20 in Der Spiegel, and 80 in Bild, and 178 British articles, of which 105 in The Times, 53 in The Economist: 53, and 17 in The Daily Mirror. 15 It is supposed that discourses are concentrated around specific historical-discursive events and are directed by discursive scripts. See Schwab-Trapp (2002: 63). 16 The period between 1963 and 1987, for example, is remarkably less ‘thick’. Of course, the selected years are nevertheless contingent, which means that they could have also been chosen differently. However, they seem to include decisive historical events and relevant newspaper articles to answer the proposed questions.

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247 17 All translations from German newspaper articles are our own. 18 We may thus talk of a ‘chain of equivalence’. For this, see Laclau and Mouffe (2001: 127–34). 19 This implication is further supported by repeated references to the growing Turkish population. This also leads to first interpretations of Turkish foreign workers (‘Gastarbeiter’) as being a threat to German society (‘The Turks are coming’, FAZ, 28 March, 1962) 20 Which are mainly suggested to be economic or monetary. But the economic discourse is a minority position in 1962. This untrustworthiness somehow refers to the much older picture of the ‘sly Oriental’. See Said (1979) 21 Which means that terms and concepts originally formulated in a psychoanalytical context to analyze individual persons are — metaphorically — projected upon an entire country, geographical area or people. See Lakoff and Johnson (1980: Chapter 7). 22 For example, economic aid programmes should aim for keeping Turkey militarily strong ‘while at the same time bracing her tottering economy to resist the dangers of communist subversion’ (Times, 16 March, 1962). 23 A discursive formation is characterized as integrating different thematic discourses (e.g. geostrategic, economic, cultural etc.) into one larger formation, as all the discourses are explicitly connected to each other.

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About the Authors Jochen Walter holds a Ph.D. from Bielefeld University. His research interests include theories of international community and world society, discourse analysis, and processes of European identity formation. He currently works as a research associate at the collaborative research centre The Political as Communicative Space in History (Bielefeld University). Recent publications include: Die Tu¨rkei — ‘Das Ding auf der Schwelle’. (De-) Konstruktionen der Grenzen Europas (VS Verlag fu¨r Sozialwissenschaften, 2008) and Transnational Political Spaces (ed. with Mathias Albert, Gesa Bluhm, Jan Helmig, Andreas Leutzsch; Campus, forthcoming 2009). Mathias Albert is a Professor of Political Science at Bielefeld University and one of the co-directors of the Institute for World Society Studies. He is also Honorary Professor at the University of Arhus, Denmark. His current research focuses on the theory of world society, issues of functional differentiation, global legalization, space and IR, and youth studies. His most recent book publications include: The European Union and Border Conflicts (ed. with Thomas Diez and Stephan Stetter; Cambridge University Press, 2008) and New Systems Theories of World Politics (ed. with Lars-Erik Cederman and Alexander Wendt; Palgrave, forthcoming 2009).