WHY T R A D I T I O N A L THEISM DOES NOT ENTAIL P A N T H E I S M Michael Levine*

*University of Virginia, U.S.A.

In his essay "Does Traditional Theism Entail Pantheism?",

American Philosophical Quarterly 20, 1983, pp. 105-112, Professor Oakes attempts to defend the following thesis: Objects, including persons, that depend necessarily for their perdurance (i.e. lasting existence) upon some rational or "minded" entity are, ontologically speaking, necessarily such that they are aspects or modifications of the entity that is their conserving agent. If it is a necessary truth that something depends for its perdurance upon the conserving activity of an agent, then necessarily the dependent thing will be ontologically an "aspect" of the conserving agent. The former entails the latter, or rather the latter fact, if it is a fact, is a function of the former. The modal character of the thesis is crucial but ambiguous. Oakes thinks that Aquinas and Maimonides, as examples of those traditional theists who believe that the world and everything in it depends for its perdurance upon God's conserving activity, are claiming that it is logically impossible for entities conserved by God to exist {perhaps "subsist" is a better word here} apart from God's conserving activity. (pp. 107-108} He does not consider the possibility that they may have been claiming only that, as a matter of fact, it is impossible for such entities to exist apart from the appropriate activity by God. (It is physically but not logically impossible that such things perdure.} If they cannot logically exist apart from God's conserving activity, then neither can they exist as entities that are not "modifications" of God. He claims that this is so on the basis of an analogy drawn between {a} those things we acknowledge cannot exist apart from the conserving activity of an agent, and therefore exist as "aspects" of the agent, and

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(b) "mentalistic'" conserving activity of God t h a t allegedly enables persons and things to perdure. J u s t as t h o u g h t s are "merely aspects or modifications" of persons, by analogy, objects or persons m u s t be aspects or modifications of God.(pp. 108-110). Of course, if Aquinas and Maimonides etc. were claiming t h a t as a matter of fact entities could not exist apart from divine conserving activity, be it mentalistic or some other sort, then this would not entail a sort of ontological identification between God and those entities. Consider a person pushing a button to drink from a water fountain. The fountain of water is dependent upon the conserving activity of the drinker, but they remain distinct. The fountain is not an aspect or modification of the drinker ~. It is not clear t h a t a n y t h i n g more than factual impossibility is crucial to the conservation doctrine or t h a t a n y t h i n g more than this is in fact being claimed. Aquinas and Maimonides might be claiming t h a t it is logically impossible t h a t the world perdure apart from God's activity, but they need only claim factual impossibility 2. As Oakes apparently recognlses, since he stresses the logical character of their claim, the assertion t h a t the world would not and could not perdure apart from God's conserving activity does not lead one to the conclusion t h a t they are ontologically indistinguishable or logically non-distinct (in any pantheistic sense) unless one assumes the impossibility to be logical rather than merely factual. However, it can be shown that even if it is assumed that we are speaking of logical necessity, there is still no reason to assume t h a t God and the world are ontologicaUy related in the sense required by pantheism -as we shall see. II I think Oakes is correct in the examples he gives as being cases in which the existence of entities such as thoughts, beliefs, and sensa (if there are any) -- intentional, emotional and perceptual states of human persons -- are logically dependent for their perdurance on persons and therefore not ontologicaUy distinct from persons, but rather aspects or modifications of those persons. (pp. 108-110) W h a t he has to show is t h a t these cases in which there is no ontological distinguishability (in the sense t h a t one is an aspect of the other} are analogous to the case in which it

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is assumed that persons and objects cannot perdure apart from God's conserving activity. Oakes has a t t e m p t e d to establish a universal justification for the following: It is a necessary truth that the existence of x depends -at every moment of its existence -- upon some mentalistic conserving activity/power of C entails It is a necessary truth that x exists as an aspect or modification of C (p.110). ttowever he has shown this for only certain kinds of mentalistic activity. For example, he has not shown that if (necessarily) only I could keep a fountain running merely by thinking, then that fountain and I would be ontologically distinguishable or that the fountain would merely be an aspect of myself. W h y assume that God's conserving activity is necessarily on a logical par with mentalistic activity of the sort that does entail ontological unity between the conserver and that which is conserved? Even if the activity is mentalistic the analogy does not necessarily indicate that what is ontologically the case between thinkers and thoughts is also the case between God and the world 3. Perhaps in the case of Berkeley's "theocentric mentalism", where God's perceiving the world and its objects is understood to be the conserving activity logically necessary for the perdurance of the world, pantheism or the view that the world is an aspect or modification of God is entailed as Oakes suggests. (p.109) However, once again, even in this case, if the "perceiving"is understood as factually rather than logically necessary there will be no entailment. Therefore, I do not think that Berkeley's theocentric mentalism or the conservation doctrine p e r s e entails pantheism. If it is logically necessary that God's conserving activity enables the world to perdure, it must be shown that the analogy between God's conserving activity and our own is, in the relevant respects, analogous. To show why this cannot be done we

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need to ask the following question. " I s it possible to find a case in which conserving activity is logically necessary to something's perdurance, but where this does not entail t h a t what is being conserved is an aspect or modification of the person or thing doing the conserving?" Suppose t h a t "life" so to speak, is a fountain and t h a t God's conserving activity is logically necessary to keep it going. Suppose it is logically impossible, for reasons t h a t m a y or may not be clear to us, that anyone who is not God could enable the fountain to perdure. Is it not possible t h a t God's activity be such t h a t no one but God can perform it without t h a t activity being conceived of in such a way that, ontologicaUy or pantheistically, the entities t h a t are made to perdure are necessarily aspects or modifications of GOd? It may be that God's activity is logically necessary for the perdurance of the world because God is, logically speaking, the only person capable of doing the job. Who knows why it is the case t h a t only God can keep the fountain running? In this case there need be no ontological entailment between God and the world. Even if God necessarily has the property of being the only one who, logically speaking, could keep things going, this does not necessitate t h a t God and the world m u s t be identified with each other in any pantheistic or ontological sense. III There is an important sense in which the claim t h a t God is the creator and conserver of the universe actually presupposes t h a t God is ontologically distinct from the universe -- t h a t the universe is not merely an aspect or modification of God but is an "independent existence". If we assume t h a t God caused the universe to come into existence or causes its continued existence, or indeed bears any genuine causal relation to the universe whatsoever, then are we not thereby committed to the view that God is "independent" of creation? Does not "A caused B" presuppose t h a t A and B are distinct existences? I s n ' t it true t h a t we would not ordinarily say t h a t A caused B unless we regarded A and B as distinct existences -- no m a t t e r how we chose finally to analyze the notion of distinct existences? ~ However, perhaps this supposition, if indeed we are committed to it, only has to do with our concept of "cause" in ordinary 16

usage. Oakes' argument that divine conservation entails pantheism might be employed to s u g g e s t that speaking of God as the "cause" or "conserver" of the universe is, metaphysically speaking, mistaken. Perhaps this way of speaking of God is mere metaphor or analogous to our ordinary way of speaking of the causal relation. I do not see how this issue can be adjudicated since Oakes may well claim that despite appearances, for all we know, we are not really distinct from God, as his argument concerning the implications of accepting the doctrine of divine conservation has allegedly shown. But then I am not really sure what this claim amounts to. It is a metaphysical claim about the constitution of ontological identity, and the ultimate identity of all things. Specifically, the claims seems to be that everything is ultimately one. The universe is ultimately part of, or ontologically indistinguishable from, that which is ontologically prior to it. The universe and God are not separate existences, or at least not ultimately separate existences. So perhaps Oakes' argument m a y best be understood not merely as an argument for pantheism, b u t rather as an argument for strict metaphysical monism as well. (Some types of pantheism clearly do entail monism and perhaps one could even argue that all t y p e s do.) After all, Oakes does not only claim that everything that exists ultimately constitutes an all-inclusive (divine) unity as I think most "classical" pantheists do; rather he identifies God with everything, ontologically speaking, in a manner very much reminiscent of Spinoza. Indeed, perhaps Oakes is arguing only for monism since he wants to maintain that the universe and God are distinct existences in some ways, though ultimately ontologically indistinguishable. In other words, everything that exists does not constitute a divine unity except in an ultimate ontological sense. I am not sure whether this latter view is pantheistic or not. IV Finally there are several issues raised by Professor Oakes that are not central to his thesis, b u t deserve discussion. (a) Oakes argues that "Hell", as traditionally conceived involves separation from God. However, if he is correct in arguing that traditional theism or more specifically, the conservation doctrine, entails pantheism, then he has, as promised shown us

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a way out of "Metaphysical Hell", since if we are aspects or modifications of God we obviously cannot be separate from God. (pp. 105-6) His account of Hell bears little resemblance to traditional concepts -- though "separation" is central to both accounts. In the traditional accounts what is stressed is not ontological distinctness. This is assumed, except by some mystics -generally non-Western -- and these mystics do not give a special type of ontological account of Hell. At the most, and at the very least, ontological separation is a necessary condition of being in Hell -- not a sufficient one. It is a lack of closeness to GOd, deprivation of the beatific vision, t h a t is crucial, not ontological separation. (b) As Oakes notes, ontological independence between God and the world is also insisted upon in traditionaltheism, so at best there appears to be a standoff between two doctrines, both equally necessary. Oakes however thinks that the thesis of divine conservation is clearly necessary whereas that of ontological independence is not clearly essential to traditional theism. I doubt that m a n y traditionaltheists or philosophical theologians would agree. Therefore, if Oakes is correct in his claim t h a t traditional theism entails pantheism, then his conclusion should be t h a t traditional theism is incoherent since it maintains two contradictory theses. {c) Oakes claims t h a t minus the conservation doctrine theistic belief reduces to deistic belief {p. 107) I don't see how this follows in any apparent way. For example, one can still believe in the efficacy of prayer and not hold the conservation doctrine. Contrary to deism one m a y hold t h a t God exerts and assumes all sorts of controls and powers over the world while maintaining t h a t the conservation doctrine is false.

(d) Oakes wishes to show not only the centrality of the conservation doctrine to traditionaltheism, but also to provide us with "some reasonable grasp of what it means to claim that God conserves the existence of all 'finitethings' at every moment of their existence." {p.I07)At firstglance the doctrine appears to be intelligible.However, it seems so blatantly falsethat one wonders ifone really does understand what is being claim-

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ed. Take, for example Descartes' s t at em e nt . " I t is ...perfectly clear and evident ... t h a t in order to be conserved in each mom e n t in which it endures, a substance has need of the same power and action as should be necessary to produce and create it anew." (p. 107) For this to be plausible it must be tied to some metaphysical u n d e r s t a n d i n g of substance in relation to creation ex nihilo. If we s ubs t i t ut e "material o b j e c t " or " e v e n t " for " s u b s t a n c e " in Descartes' s t a t e m e n t and assume t h a t what is being " p r o d u c e d " is not being produced ex nihilo the conservation doctrine is clearly false. It does not take as much effort to hold a boulder in place on top of a mountain as it takes to roll it up there -- unless Sisyphus was confused as well as damned. I t does not take as much effort or " f o r c e " to " m a i n t a i n " a house in existence as it takes to build it -- t h o u g h it m ay sometimes seem t h a t way. The only sense I can make of the doctrine is, as Berkeley suggests, t h a t " c o n s e r v a t i o n " is really c o n s t a n t creation ex nihilo.

References 1. Of course if one believes in God's conserving activity then in the case of God and the world one believes t h a t there is no possibility, either logically or factually, t h a t the world can continue to exist apart from God's conserving activity. In the case of the drinker and the fountain, one does not assume logically or factually th at the fountain of water could not exist apart from the drinker etc. However, simple restrictions can be stipulated for the example of the fountain to make it more congruous with the case of the world depending for its perdurance upon God, not logically speaking but as a m a t t e r of fact -- the fountain never breaks, there is only one drinker etc. 2. Oakes' interpretation of the modal character of their s t a t e m e n t s as logical rather than factual is not support ed in any obvious way by the quotations he cites on pp. 107-108. 3. Oakes does not claim t h a t the analogy necessarily holds. He does, however, think he has given good reasons for thinking t h a t it does hold. See Oakes, p. 110. 4. See, J. L. Mackie, The C e m e n t o f the Universe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974}, pp. 31-32. Mackie says, ...are there cases where we would not say t hat X caused Y but would say t h a t X and Y both occurred and t h a t in the cir-

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cumstances Y would not have occurred if X had not? Would we not have to say the latter, trivially, if X and Y were identical?...But events ... are not commonly said to cause themselves. Equally, the penny could not have fallen heads-up if it had not fallen tails-down; but we would not say t h a t its falling tails down caused its falling heads-up. Again, the driver would not in the circumstances have broken the law if he had not exceeded the speed limit: but we would not say t h a t his exceeding the speed limit caused his breaking the law. To exclude all such counter-examples, we would say that, in addition to the meaning suggested above. 'X caused Y' presupposes that X and Y are distinct events, and, as the last two examples show, this m u s t be taken in a stronger sense than merely t h a t 'X' and 'Y' are logically or conceptually independent descriptions. Indeed, it is not even necessary, anymore than it is sufficient for this purpose, t h a t these should be logically independent descriptions. It is legitimate, though trivial, to say that X caused every effect of X... what is required is t h a t the cause and effect should be, as Hume says, distinct existences. It may be objected t h a t this requirement is vague or obscure, but it is not, I think, necessary for me to aim at any great precision here. I am discussing only what causal statements mean, and for this purpose it is sufficient to say t h a t someone will not be willing to say t h a t X caused Y unless he regards X and Y as distinct existences.

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