J OF CHIN POLIT SCI (2010) 15:153–167 DOI 10.1007/s11366-010-9095-1 R E S E A R C H A RT I C L E

Why Village Election Has Not Much Improved Village Governance Qingshan Tan

Published online: 2 March 2010 # Journal of Chinese Political Science/Association of Chinese Political Studies 2010

Abstract Village elections have been implemented throughout China for more than a decade. Much improvement has been made in the institutionalization of village elections. However, village election is widely viewed as producing little effect on village governance. What has been perceived as electoral achievement has yet to be translated into improving the way villages are governed. Why has village election remained largely irrelevant to effective village self-government? This paper intends to answer the question by examining some causal factors responsible for ineffective village governance. Specifically, this paper looks at the dysfunctional village governance structure, township re-assertiveness over villages, and the village dualleadership factor. This paper proposes a new governing model that incorporates major village players to ensure that village elections will lead to effective village governance in the countryside. Keywords Chinese Village Elections . Village Governance . Village Government Model . Local Political Development . Local Politics Democratic election is generally believed to be closely linked to responsive governance, although it does not necessarily have a causal-effect relationship. Much of it depends also on other institutional and cultural factors such as legal systems and civic culture. Village elections have been implemented throughout China for more than a decade. Much improvement has been made in the institutionalization of village elections. Village elections have now been conducted regularly every three years, and villagers’ awareness of democratic rights and election rules have been enhanced with each round of village elections. However, village election is widely viewed as producing little effect on village governance. What has been perceived as electoral achievement has yet to be

Q. Tan (*) Department of Political Science, Cleveland State University, Cleveland, OH 44115, USA e-mail: [email protected]

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translated into improving the way villages are governed. Why has village election remained largely irrelevant to effective village self-government? This paper intends to answer the question by examining some causal factors responsible for ineffective village governance. Specifically, this paper looks at the dysfunctional village governance structure, township re-assertiveness over villages, and the village dual-leadership factor. This study argues that despite new changes occurring in the countryside, village governance still consists of an important part of grassroots politics vital to political and social stability in the countryside. Therefore, this paper proposes a new governing model that incorporates major village players to ensure that village elections will lead to effective village governance in the countryside.

State of Village Governance Village self-government has been regarded as one of the important political developments in the Chinese countryside since late 1980s [37, 39, 40, 50, 55, 59]. Village self-government took place initially as villagers’ self-initiated efforts at the grassroots level to fill out political vacuum after decommunization [32, 57, 63]. When the Chinese government promulgated the Organic Law of Villagers’ SelfGovernment, this grassroots movement was transformed into a top-down, government-directed institutionalization process that is still on-going and incomplete [22, 33, 43, 67, 72, 73]. Much of this institutionalization is centered on building and implementing village election rules and procedures [2, 45, 46, 51]. While scholars and practitioners generally agreed that village election is an important part of village self-government and has been improved with each round of election at a regular three-year interval, they differ as to its significance and impact on village governance [1, 8, 10, 12, 17, 37, 42, 46, 52, 54, 70]. From a historical point of view, village election demonstrated that villagers not only conducted democratic elections, largely free and fair, but also are capable of electing their leaders [48]. Village elections gave villagers a democratic venue for participation [21, 71] and improved the electoral connectedness in villages [28]. Village electoral institution has been generally strengthened over the years in terms of electoral rules and procedures, although some vital aspects of institutional building are still very much desired to be completed [35, 47]. Has village election improved village governance? Village governance here refers to village decision making, execution, and administration that bring about positive changes in village life. Despite progress gained in village electoral institutional building and electoral practices, scholars differ considerably as to the actual effect of village elections on village governance [2, 15, 36, 38, 41, 48]. Many studies found that village elections have been related to various changes in rural political development. For example, village elections have been closely correlated with institutional building in village self-government, particularly with establishing village representative assemblies [4, 24, 66].1 Village elections also positively 1

Like village elections, institutional building such as village representative assemblies is incomplete, especially with regard to institutional functions, if not forms.

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contributed to an electoral institutional building that is largely based on rule of law, rational, transparent and in conformity to prevailing international standards [18, 46, 55]. Based on one provincial study, evidence shows that villagers are generally more positive in their evaluations of self-government institutions [5]. Village elections have involved hundreds of million villagers in rural political participation and generally raised rural participants’ political awareness of democratic rights. Scholars observed that village elections made so many villagers willing participants in the village electoral process [20, 50, 51], increased villagers’ political efficacy [5, 26], and opened up the way for villagers to engage in civic duties [29, 34] and for possible emergence of civil society [3, 31]. Many villagers through practices of elections became strategically “rational voters” in casting their support for certain leaders [18]. Village elections also produced positive influence on elections of other grassroots organizations. For example, the two-ballot election of village Party secretaries came in the wake of village elections [2, 25]. Studies have produced mixed findings when it comes to village election’s actual effect on village governance [13, 15, 26, 29, 48, 71, 74]. A recent study shows that village elections have produced more accountable village committees that increased the shares of public expenditures in the village budget [53]. Similar findings also show that village elections improve allocation of public expenditures by village committees [68]. Other studies suggest that types of elections also make a difference in village governance. For example, in truly competitive elections, elected officials were more likely to be held accountable for their decisions in land allocations [23]. Village government, unlike township government, is autonomous and selfgoverning, which means that villagers are supposed to manage their own life through electing village officials to administer village affairs. Village officials should be capable of exercising their governing power and at the same time be held accountable to their electorate for their performance. However, studies have shown that village governance remains illusive; elected village committees (VC) have not reached their full potential of self-government. Elected village officials faced various constraints that affect their ability to exercise power [36]. Despite state legislative measures and village elections, village self-government was incapable of dealing with the worsening “san nong” issue (villagers, villages, and agriculture), particularly with increasing burdens on villagers [6, 56]. Village self-government has hardly protected villagers’ interests, and is besieged with diminishing space for its own growth. Scholars in China called this phenomenon “the paradox of implementing village self-government [62] Studies have shown that village self-government is increasingly becoming a formality without substance of self-governing.2 In poor villages, VC officials lacked resources to do anything for their villagers.3 In villages that have resources, the village account is subject to the management by township government under the scheme of “cuncai xiangguan” (entrusting village accounts to township management).4 In others, village self-government has been paralyzed due to power struggle between village 2

For the debate on the formality, see, He Xuefeng [14]; Xu Yong [60]. This is particularly true in villages whose incomes were affected by the tax-for-fee reform. They have to totally depend on townships. See, Xu Yong [61], pp.177–184. 4 For the origin of this practice, see, Zhao Shukai [69]; see also Fubing Su and Dali Yang [11]. 3

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committees and village Party committees. According to a survey of Shanxi, Hebei, Shaanxi, Fujian, Anhui, Jilin, six provincial survey, the “two committees” that cannot work with each other accounted for 10%, 12.8%, 4.07%, 39.8%, 7%, and 6% of the provincial total villages respectively [44]. In Beijing, some village Party secretaries simply refused to hand over official village seals to new VC chairs after the election ([49], p.3). In such disputed cases, township governments often sided with village Party secretaries who play the “agent” role for townships [58]. Township and county governments often preempt village power by taking over the control of land use and playing the role of “land dealers” (Wu Yi, 84). Theoretically, village land is collectively owned by the whole village and only village committees, in consultation with villagers, can make decisions over village land. In reality, township and county governments make decisions for villagers over commercialization of village land, thus depriving villages a vital resource for village governance.5 In recent years, the central government has given developmental priority to resolving the “san nong” issue. However, this economically-oriented policy produced mixed results at best for village self-government. The developmental policy of the countryside has reduced economic burdens of villagers through tax elimination, fee reduction, and agricultural subsidies, all of which aim at increasing villagers’ income. At the same time, rural developmental policy places much emphasis on building rural infrastructure such as roads, electricity, public facilities, etc. Such investments directly concern the interests of villagers and village government, and yet, villagers and village governments actually have limited role to play in building the “socialist new countryside.” An Anhui survey showed that more than 90% of surveyed village cadres confirmed a huge gap existing between village reality and state development objectives [9]. The rural policy has empowered county and township governments since they are the ones that make key decisions on village projects and fund allocations. This new development further subjects village governments to the planning and control of township and county governments. The same survey found that 70 percent of village officials expressed their concerns over “image projects” and insufficient funds.

Causes of Important Village Self-Governance Village self-government has been in practice for twenty years. Throughout that time, much fanfare was given to village elections. In recent years, both scholars and practitioners have begun to focus on other aspects of village self-government. The Ministry of Civil Affairs (MoCA), which has been responsible for implementing village self-government, has shifted its work gravity to “democratic decision making, management, and supervision” of village governance. The central government has also issued several important documents know as the “Central Party Document Number One” to boost rural investment and development. The central government openly called on college graduates to take up village positions as 5

According to a survey by Rural Development Institute of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, township-village land disputes have become a focal point of villagers’ protest replacing disputes over fees as the number one issue. See, Yu Zhengrong [65].

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their new career in the countryside.6 Despite this top-down approach to improve rural conditions and governance, village self-government has not been able to overcome the existing obstacles such as institutional weakness, lack of resources, as well as new challenges emerging from the construction of the new socialist countryside. Institutional Deficiencies One of the fundamental causes of weak village governance is the institutional makeup of village self-government. The 1998 Organic Law on Village Selfgovernment establishes some principles for building the institutional framework of village self-government, but these principles are vague and contradictory. The law does not spell out how exactly village self-government to be institutionalized. The law specifically mentions three village organizations: village committees, village assemblies, and village Party committees. Village committees are to perform the executive function of village government, including, but not limited to administering village public affairs, managing economic development, and collective land and property, and assisting township governments in fulfilling state tasks such as birth control, disaster relief, etc. The law empowers village assemblies some legislative functions; village assemblies can legislate and revise village self-government regulations and village charters (Article 20). Village assemblies also have oversight power in the following areas: approval of village income allocations, fund-raising for village schools, roads, and other public works, village business projects, villagers’ land contracts, and use of village land (Article 19). The relationship between village committees and assemblies is clearly spelled out in Article 18 that village committees are answerable to village assemblies and should report directly to the assembly. The assembly will carry out annual review of VC work reports and the work of VC members. Based on these principles, it should be relatively straight forward to institutionalize village self-government. However, the law’s vague language on village Party committees complicates the institutional setup of village self-government. While the law does not define village Party committees any specific functions, it does designate the Party committee to exercise core leadership in village selfgovernment. Due to this leadership, institutionalization of village self-government has never been seriously implemented. Many practitioners refrained from establishing self-government institutions that could be interpreted as overpowering village Party committees. For those villages that followed the letter of the law and established village committees and assemblies, self-government institutions only existed in name without truly exercising governing power. Village government often defers decision making and managing power to village Party committees.7 Unlike the village election institutional building that focused on the creation of standardized rules, norms, procedures, and regulations, self-government institutions 6

Selecting college graduates to take up village positions is a strategic decision made by the CCP. Most of them are expected to become village Party secretaries. See The CCP Organization Department Chief Li Yuanchao’s letter to some college graduates who became village cadres, http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/ 64093/64094/7216737.html. 7 Or in some cases, elected village chiefs simply protested by resigning. See, Cui Shixin [7].

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are rudimentary, experimental, and irregular. Feeble attempts were made to strengthen village government; some villages have created village charters in which rules and procedures are written to define the power and functions of village committees and assemblies. The issue lies in the implementation of village selfgovernment; more often than not, either village committees or village Party committees exercise too much power, disregarding the actual institutional arrangements for governance. Most of village assemblies do not function as a check on other village institutions. Instead of self-government, village governance remains to be elitist, centering on village Party chiefs or VC chairs [4, 22]. Therefore, in practice, there are varying models of village governance throughout the countryside, which are subject to the influence of local conditions, manipulation, and personal will. Five types of village government are identified here that share something in common: village government by elites, there are no checks and supervision (see Fig. 1). Decision making rests on the dominating figure(s), and little accountability is ensured since village assemblies or representative assemblies existed only nominally. Under these models, villagers are either passively following their village leaders or bypassed by their leaders in most of the decision making. The governing models offer no or little opportunity for villagers to participate in village governance. When things go terribly wrong, mass protests are the only way to try to get things corrected [19]. Elitist dual leadership models also produce paralysis and inaction. Villages governed by a persisting Party chair and a strong-headed VC chair often resulted in a deadlock that crippled village government. Or in villages where neither Party chair nor VC chair is willing to take up the task but does not want to see the other to call the shot either, villagers would suffer from an inactive government. This kind of governance usually takes place in resource-poor villages. There are some bright spots in terms of institutional development of village selfgovernment. Village assemblies have been long recognized as an ineffective institution because it is difficult to convene village meetings that require a large turnout. Many villages started to replace village assemblies with village representative assemblies (VRA) which are also subject to election. Some rules and procedures have been established governing the operation of VRAs. VRAs are more Five Types of Village Government

VP Chair-dominated government (Functioning: Village Party Chair leads, VC follows)

VC Chair-dominated government (Functioning: Strong VC Chair, weak VP chair)

Fig. 1 Types of village governance

VP/VC single leadership (Functioning: VP/VC power vested in one person)

VP/VC Dual Leadership (Malfunctioning: Two strong-headed chairs leading to governing paralysis

VP/VC Dual Inaction (Malfunctioning: both chairs give up governing)

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practical and feasible to function as a de facto legislature for village self-government. Another major development is the institutionalization of village election. Standardized institutional rules and procedures have been established throughout the countryside; village elections have been essentially guided and governed by the election institution. The institution has been able to regulate and correct some election issues [46]. Scholars noticed that village elections have yet to produce a “spillover” effect on other aspects of village self-government, particularly on village governance. This reflected in villagers’ distrust of and the inability of village government to solve village problems. In a recent study on villagers appeal to higher government, village elections have no effect on villagers’ appeal, and villagers have low confidence in the ability of village and township governments to work for farmers ([19], 140). Township and County Interference Township government is another factor in undermining village self-government. Although the Organic Law, which was passed after heated debates on township government’s relations with village committees and over the objection of many county and township officials, has clearly stated that township governments can only give village committees “guidance, support, and assistance”, but cannot interfere with matters belonging to village self-government (Article 4). In return, village committees would assist township government work. In practice, township governments did not adhere to the letter or the spirit of the law, treating village committee members as their “legs” or “agents” in dealing with village affairs [64]. Township officials are generally skeptical of village self-government. According to a survey, 60.4% agree that village elections are not suitable for the current rural society, 62% agree that elections make their work more difficult, 44.4% claim that less than 50% of the villages within their precincts are fit for village governance. Most of township officials pointed out two reasons why those villages are not fit for village self-government, namely, economic backwardness and the low educational level of the villagers [27]. Township treatment of elected officials stems from township officials’ disregard of village self-government institutions. Despite the law’s designation of a “guided” relationship, township officials never ceased to view elected village committees as their “subordinates” in managing rural affairs. After decommunization, the central government relied on township governments to administer the vast countryside, thus township governments would enforce and implement state laws, regulations, and policies and carry out state tasks and their own administrative works. It would be impossible for township governments to deal directly with villagers without some kind of intermediaries such as village committees or Party committees. That is why the law also stipulates village committees to assist township governments in accomplishing state tasks. However, township governments failed to alter their orientation towards village selfgovernment and continue to treat village committees as their lower “administrative units” whenever need arises. For example, Wu Yi vividly described how township officials pressured village leaders to take away villagers’ furniture in order to pay their levies and to buy into township’s scheme of planting economic crops that ended up in losses for most of villagers ([58], Chapter 4).

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Townships’ power play over village committees presents a challenge to village self-government. External influence from above started to manifest as early as in the nomination process of village elections. State promotion of “yi jian tiao” (elected chiefs concurrently holding Party and VC chair positions) further opened the door for township officials to wield their influence in recruiting non-Party VC chairs into the Party.8 Now that Party committees are the leadership core of village selfgovernment, townships can interfere with village governance easily along the Party line. With more VC chairs becoming Party committee chiefs, their primary duty is to serve townships rather than villagers.9 For those “wayward” VC chairs who dare not to be cooperative, townships simply flex political muscle to bring them in line. For example, one VC chair who was not a preferred candidate of the township helped improve his village power grid and lowered electricity bills for fellow villagers. However, his negotiation with the township electricity office on the fee structure hit a wall. After he rejected a mediation proposal by the township Party secretary, the township sent electricity workers to cut off the village power line. It almost took the whole village to riot before the township reversed the decision (Fu Zeyue, Nanfang Weekly, March 20, 2003). Lack of financial independence of village self-government gives township government an important leverage over villages. Prior to rural tax reform, village government had limited financial resources based on the formulated return of village fees and taxes paid to the state. Villages that have village enterprises may have extra village income to manage. After the tax-for-fee reform, villages solely in agriculture have no other collective income, thus do not have any resources to work with. To launch any village project, village governments either have to raise money from fellow villagers, which is not easy to do, or to ask townships for funding, which subjects village government to township control and administration. For those villages that have village incomes from village enterprises or other resources, a new scheme of “entrusting village accounts to township management” deprived village government of financial initiatives and management. Townships can use its management power to undermine village self-government. A case in point was that Zhengzhuang Township of Shaanxi province built itself an office building with more than 80 rooms; and yet the township government has only 40 employees. With so many rooms unoccupied and a debt of 1.2 million yuan, the township decided to exercise its “accounts management” power to pressure villages to rent out the rest of empty offices as villages’ liaison offices. Dang Tun Village Chair Zhang Wentong was one of those VC chairs who were pressured to sign a 30 year rent contract with the township, which required his village to pay 100,000 yuan up front (Ding Haitao and Chen Changqi, “xiangzhen juzhai gai bangonglou” (township borrowed to build its office building), Xinhuan News Agency, September 15, 2006). Zhengzhuang is a small and poor township with limited resources, extorting funds from villages is the quickest way to pay the wasteful project.

8

Jiangsu and Hainan have the highest rate of VC chairs who are Party members. Some scholars in China warned that this practice could revert village self-government to the commune style of rule. See, Bai Gang and Zhao Shouxing [2], p. 293.

9

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State Orientation and Macro Developmental Policy Despite the best intention of some state officials who supported village selfgovernment, people like Peng Zhen, and the promulgation of the Organic Law, some scholars remain skeptical of the practice of village self-government, questioning its significance in rural development. Some believed that village self-government was more of a “gift” from state elites than an institutional creation based on the desire of various social forces [70]. Others argued that village self-government as an institution was at the mercy of the state: if state wants it, villages can have it, if not, there will not be self-government [30]. It is not without reason that State was seen as playing such a pivotal role in village self-government. State passed the Organic Law, implemented village election, and promoted “democratic decision making, management, and supervision”, only to have village self-government upset by the usurpation of Party committees and townships. Village self-government and election, despite the fanfare of the 1990s, was initially a low state priority, thus being able to enjoy steady and somewhat “stealthy” growth. After village elections became known to the world, thanks in large part to the Carter Center reports, the central government began to pay close attention to the rural political development. The Party Secretary General Jiang Zemin and other top leaders went down to the countryside to investigate village self-government. After seeing and hearing reports on the state of village election, which began to challenge the authority of village Party committees, the central leadership felt the need to strengthen rural Party organizations. The issuance of Document 14 by the joint General Offices of the Central Party Committee and the State Council in 2002 was the embodiment of the new State orientation towards village self-government ([46], Chapter 7). By issuing this rare joint document entitled Circular to Further Improve Work for New Rounds of Village Committee Elections, the Party overpowered the Ministry of Civil Affairs which is in charge of implementing village elections. The document, while reaffirming village elections, defined in details the core leadership role of village Party committees and openly supported the “yi jian tiao” model by calling on village Party members to concurrently hold VC and Party committee positions (Zhan, 2004, 165–173). The Party document effectively ended the debate as to who is calling the shots in the practice of village self-government. The latest state policy on eliminating rural tax and building a new socialist countryside ironically did not bode well for the growth of rural self-government. To be sure, tax elimination and rural subsidies have reduced burdens of villagers and increased rural income (author’s field visit, Summer 2008). Rural levies used to be the source of village financing, but now village committees lost that portion of village income (in many not well-to-do villages, that is the only source of income); with less resources, many village committees now exit only in name. At the same time, village committees are becoming more dependent on township governments. Village officials are now on township governments’ payroll. Their salaries are determined by responsibilities and performances defined by township governments. Financial dependence further puts village committees in a subordinate position to townships [71]. Moreover, State policy in building the new countryside has strengthened township grip over village committees. State funds in improving rural infrastructure are allocated through county and township governments; various

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rural development projects such as roads, power lines, health and sanitation programs, and village economies and resources are incorporated into township administrative management. In Sucun Township of Shangdong province, the township decided, in the name of building the new socialist countryside, to build a business street as wide as 64 m and long as 1,150 m in the central village of the township. To accomplish this project required dismantling of 140 villagers’ houses on both sides of the road. The township not only took down the houses but also confiscated the “residential land” (zhai ji di) without compensation, on the ground that those are collective property. The township act obviously neglected that fact that villagers’ residential land belongs to the village, not the township; even village committees cannot take over residential land at will (Qin Peihua and Ding Zhijun, People’s Daily, April 3, 2007, p.9).

Proposing a Village Self-Governance Model Village self-government is at cross-roads, just as the village election institution is [47]. Village elections have not produced effective governing institutions in vast villages. Continuing erosion of village government by the factors discussed above will put village self-government into oblivion. As some have pointed out, that as villages have increasingly become an “empty nest” as young villagers left to seek jobs in cities, village government is becoming non-existent [16]. However, the new state policy on building the socialist countryside has reversed some of the trend, now that farming is becoming profitable. It also opens up opportunities for villagers to participate in and contribute to village self-government, as tasks of constructing village roads, new village houses, activity centers, schools, sanitation facilities, pipe water, sewage, and waste management are mounting. All of those works call for villagers’ participation in democratic decision making, efficient management, and competent oversight. Institutionalization of village government is the key to democratic decision making, administration, and supervision. It concerns whether proper governing structures and institutional rules, norms and procedures can be established and functioning in ways that guarantee villagers’ participation in village governance and supervision. Institutionalization needs to take into account the existing village organizations and fair distribution of power. Any exclusion of them or insensitivity to their influence in the new institutional arrangement will only create new problems. In reality, three major village organizations are relevant to village governance, namely village Party committees (VPC), village committees, and village assemblies (VA or village representative assemblies, VRA). Although village assemblies have been part of village governance, their functions vary from village to village, but most of them are not effective in representing villagers’ interests. Village Party committees and village committees or some combination of both have acted in the name of governing villages. It is a known phenomenon that Party and village committees are often locked in power struggles and become a source of village governing problems. Thus, a new institutional model has to address the issue of villagers’ representation, administrative effectiveness, and organizational balance of power. The proposed model of village self-government below intends to overcome

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the key problems affecting village self-government, such as “two committee” gridlock, ineffectiveness of village assemblies, and government accountability (Fig. 2). The proposed model reestablishes village assemblies as the supreme body of village governance, they act as a miniature legislature with power of enacting and revising village self-government charter, regulations, and other contracts, approving VC budgets and administrative recommendations concerning village land and resource use, schools, village public projects, economic programs, and general village welfares, as well as censure power. Most of VA responsibilities have been spelled out in the Organic Law. The key to make village assemblies perform their functions lies in the creation of VA special committees, one of which is finance committees consisting of elected VA members and village accountants. Other committees, such as public project committees, disciplinary committees or planning committees can be established according to village needs. The idea is to have those specialized committees to review VC budgets, project proposals, recall recommendations, and then recommend them for VA approval or rejection. Rules of VA membership or electing VRA have been established throughout the countryside, but rules of governing village assembly proceedings are sketchy and are not institutionalized. Again, it is up to village assemblies to establish and institutionalize the self-government model, starting with a new village selfgovernment charter that spells out the functions and responsibilities, rules and procedures of each village governing body. Village committees are the administrative body of self-government, entrusted with executive management functions of village government. The major function of village committees is to administer and manage village daily affairs, execute the decisions made by the village assembly. This model shifts decision making power to village assemblies, thus village committees cannot carry out major initiatives without villagers’ approval. By defining village committees’ administrative power, this model reduces any incentive to engage in power wrangling as well as confusions as to who exercise what power. Again, VC functions and responsibilities should be defined with rules and procedures in the village charter. Another key aspect of this model is regarding the role of village Party committees. VPC have been designated as the core leadership in village selfgovernment, and have been exercising pivotal power in village governance. However, it is also the source of village governance impasses, controversies, and confusion. This model incorporates the VPC traditional role in village governance and entrust the committee with oversight power that is consistent with its designated function defined in the Law. In this governing system, the Party committee takes Fig. 2 Village government

VA/VRA-Decision Making

VC-Management

VPC -Supervision

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itself out of day-to-day administration, which is not really the committee’s cup of tea, but ensures itself a unique role in supervising the legislative and administrative bodies of government. Here the Party committee has a chance of recreating itself with a new image that it truly represents and works for the fundamental interests of villagers. As a watchdog, the major function of the Party committee is twofold: monitor the work of administrative and legislative branches, addressing complaints, investigating possible misconducts, abuse of power, and corruption; recommend retributions and recall to VA committees or the village assembly. The committee’s role in moral leadership and supervision is important in guaranteeing the normal function of village government. The committee can be charged with investigative power to ensure self-government rules and regulations are properly observed and implemented. The committee could work closely with the village assembly to enforce the rules by recommending the assembly to take disciplinary actions including recalls of elected officials who are found unfit in their official capacity. The current situation of reasserting the Party committee in village selfgovernment in part is due to the fact village government is plague-ridden with ineffectiveness, clan interference, gangster intimidation, mismanagement, and corruption. However, Party assertion in grassroots government did not reduce or solve the problems, but has become part of the problems. Village Party committees have been blamed for governing gridlock, power struggle as well as administrative incompetence. It is time to get village self-government back on track and to make it work for the general welfare of villagers and the grassroots Party organizations should not stand in the way but help improve rural grassroots governance.

Conclusion Despite village elections and state policy shift to emphasize “democratic village decision making, management, and supervision,” elected village committees have not reached their potential as effective village self-government. This paper has argued that the macro impact of state orientation toward as well as micro management of township government of village self-government is the causes of weak village government. But to argue that they are the only causes overlooks the underdevelopment in the institutionalization of village self-government. Village self-government is still too important in maintaining social stability and in providing public goods to hundreds of millions of villagers to be neglected or fail. This paper addresses the key institutionalization issue by proposing a village self-government model that incorporates and differentiates the role of traditional village organizations.

References 1. Alpermann, Bjorn. 2001. The post-election administration of Chinese villages. The China Journal 46: 45–67. 2. Bai, Gang, and Shouxing Zhao. 2001. Xuanju yu Zhili (Election and Governing). Beijing: Zhongguo shehuikexue chubanshe.

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