Int. Commun. Chin. Cult DOI 10.1007/s40636-016-0055-0

Zhu Xi’s completion of Confucius’ humanistic ethics Kirill O. Thompson1

Received: 29 April 2016 / Revised: 30 May 2016 / Accepted: 17 June 2016 © Academy for International Communication of Chinese Culture and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016

Abstract The archetypal Neo-Confucian philosopher, Zhu Xi (1130–1200), worked out a compelling summation of Confucius’ humanistic ethics, centered on Ren (humaneness, humane) practice and cultivation. Faced with competing philosophies and religions, Zhu Xi strove to deepen and broaden Confucius’ ethics and core teaching of Ren. He drew on Zhou Dunyi’s “Explanation of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity” to lay a naturalistic foundation for Confucius’ ethics, and on Zhang Zai’s “Western Inscription” to affirm the consanguinity between cosmos and humanity. He opened his “Treatise on Humanity” by linking Ren with the pervasive cosmic impulse to create, thus showing that the Way of Ren is not limited to the proper conduct of human affairs but springs from a pervasive beneficent creative impulse in the world. Zhu Xi also worked out a justification for Confucius’ Humanistic ethics centered on Ren cultivation and practice. This justification supports a sort of relational Humanistic ethics, the East Asian counterpart to Kant’s justification of an individual centered Humanistic ethics. Taken together, Zhu Xi’s mature comments and reflections on the formation of a moral exemplar (junzi) show that he, like Kant, set forth several conditions for the moral worth of ethical agency, decision, and action. For Kant, the moral agent must will to act from duty out of respect for reason (the Moral Law) which underlies the Golden Rule as the Categorical Imperative. Zhu Xi’s account is more practical and less theoretical than Kant’s. Zhu Xi’s aspiring moral exemplar undertakes his learning, cultivation, and practice in the spirit of reverence. Such reverence not only assures the concentration and seriousness of his dedication but purifies his mind-heart (xin) such that he becomes This paper benefited from the critical input of reader James Sellmann and the comments of Roger Ames and Chung-ying Cheng at the Confucian Studies Consortium Conference held at the University of Hawaii, Manoa on October 8–11, 2014. & Kirill O. Thompson [email protected] 1

National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan

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increasingly discerning of Heavenly pattern (tianli), which in turn sharpens his sense of appropriateness (yi). This deeper discernment also catalyzes his moral determination of will (zhuzai) to form within and to anchor his motivation to live by Ren, humanity. As Kant’s model incorporates the role of love and the Golden Rule, Zhu Xi’s centers on the cultivation of Ren and Confucius’ formulation of the Silver Rule, which are grounded in love and empathy. These teachings express a deeply emotional, relational, yet still rational form of Humanism that shows promise for a more salient Humanism by underscoring the unity of cosmos, nature, and humanity in a moral-ethical perspective. Keywords Zhu Xi · Confucius · Zhou Dunyi · Immanuel Kant · Humanism · NeoConfucianism · Ren (Humaneness)

Introduction Zhu Xi (朱熹 1130–1200 CE) worked out a compelling summation of Confucius’ humanistic ethics in Treatise on Humaneness (Renshuo 仁說) and other writings and discourses. He accomplished this by setting Confucius’ ethical teachings in a philosophical perspective that, by registering humanity in context, broadened the scope and laid the ground for a philosophic defense of that ethics. At the same time, he never forgot that Confucius’ teaching of humaneness is emotionally charged: it is animated by love, actuated by empathy, and grounded in reverence. Consequently, Zhu Xi’s summation of Confucius’ humanistic ethics makes it amenable both for intercultural dialogue and for addressing pressing concerns of our time. Confucius’ (孔子 551–479 BCE) centered his ethical teachings on the cultivation and practice of humaneness (ren 仁),1 the wellspring of Confucian Humanism. Providing the ethical theme and animating spirit of Confucius’ related teachings of appropriateness (yi 義), ritual propriety (li 禮), and wisdom (zhi 智), his notion of humaneness firmly stamped Confucian life and culture as humanistic from the very beginning. Several early followers, notably Zisi (子思 492–431 BCE), Mencius (孟子 c. 371–289 BCE), Xunzi (荀子 c. 298–238 BCE), and others, developed these core ethical teachings. With the passage of time and the challenges of other philosophies and religions, such as Mohism, Daoism, Buddhism, and religious Daoism, Confucians had to deepen and renew the Master’s teachings in response. Considering not just the Confucian tradition but the Chinese empire and culture at stake, Zhu Xi took on this project, and dedicated himself to enriching the philosophical foundations and broadening the significance of Confucius’ humanistic ethical teachings.2 1

Ren has been translated as benevolence (Legge 1960, Lau 1979), human-heartedness (Chan 1963), authoritative personhood (Ames and Rosemont 1998), and humaneness (Watson 2007). I here use “humaneness,” since Confucius’ ren 仁 is homophonic with ren 人, person/people.

2

This study is part of the effort of a global network of scholars led by professors Chun-chieh Huang (Taiwan), Joern Ruesen (Germany), and Sorin Antohi (Romania), to identify and examine Humanist expressions around the world and develop a field of intercultural Humanism. Ancient Chinese civilization produced forms of Humanism which held several traits in common with Western Humanism: (1) faith in the emotional and intellectual capacity of human beings to formulate humane values and ethical systems without divine revelation, (2) faith in the possibility of human cultivation and perfectibility, (3) dedication to the study of classical texts, (4) with various senses of religiosity (Bockover 2008; Thompson 1990).

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Importantly, Confucius’ teaching on the cultivation and practice of humaneness and the associated virtues3 was predicated on the notion of relational self.4 Besides pursuing his philosophic project, Zhu Xi strove to reinvigorate Confucian selfcultivation by stressing reverence, learning, observation, and self-reflection, as well as interpersonal conduct, to nurture and sustain one’s sense of relational ethical self.5 Zhu Xi thereby worked to set the stage for people to cultivate and be ethically actuated by humaneness not only in attitude and performance but also in a sort of philosophical realization similar to enlightenment but grounded in the propensity to undertake sincere ethical action. Moreover, as Immanuel Kant set forth a theoretical justification for Western humanistic ethics with his concepts of reason, respect, moral will, duty, and the Categorical Imperative, Zhu Xi set forth a practical justification for Eastern humanistic ethics with his notions of pattern/principle (li 理), natural pattern (tianli 天理),6 reverence (jing 敬), moral will (zhuzai 主宰), appropriateness (yi), the Silver Rule, namely, “do not do unto others what one would not have done unto oneself,” and the single thread that runs through the master’s teachings, namely, empathy (shu 恕),7 which is examined below. Indeed, an important follow-up project would be to bring Zhu Xi’s account of Confucian relational humanistic ethics into a global dialogue, and thus open the door to a wider awareness of relational Humanism as a necessary complement to Western individualist Humanism.8 The fount As noted, Confucius’ ethical teachings are centered on the relational cultivation and practice of humaneness in harness with appropriateness, ritual propriety, and wisdom.9 Drawing on a central thread of early Sinitic culture, Confucius registers that human beings are relational, and within their respective cultural matrices 3

Humaneness and the related concepts are usually regarded as “virtues,” but since they involve sensitive response and performance, I tend to prefer the expression “cultivation and practice.” The term virtue can be operative as character or cultivated propensity. See Ames’ and Rosemont’s exquisite discussions on these terms (1998, pp. 45–55).

4

For an account of relational self as a fact of human psychology and not just a theoretical or ethical construct, see Gergen, Relational Being (2009).

5

Confucian moral-ethical self would be relational by definition, i.e., committed to cultivating upright interpersonal relations, attitude, practices and conduct. See note 11 below.

6

Li traditionally was translated as principle but “pattern” works better, since li are immanent in the formations of things like the marbling of meat, the veins in leaves, and the grains in wood, as noted by Zhuangzi and Zhu Xi. The notion of li has an integrative organic character that is lost when translated as principle, which is more a propositional notion. Importantly, li and qi (cosmic vapor) are complementary terms for Zhu Xi that refer to two facets of holistic phenomena and do not indicate a fundamental dualism in his thought (Needham 1956, p. 477f; Graham 1986; Thompson 1988, 2015b).

7

Shu involves imagining oneself in the position of the other, and sensitizes oneself in applying the Silver Rule; discussed below.

8

It is my contention that the individual and relational components of self each contribute something that is irreducible to the notion of an ethical self (see note 11 below).

9

Thompson (2012, p. 68f).

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recognize patterns of upright relationships, including interpersonal practices, often ritualized, which express self-dignity, other-respect, and proper conduct. He also registers that the cultivated person’s proper conduct of such relationships in turn serves to nurture and guide the people involved, and as well to form the pattern, weave, and ambiance of family and society, hence to induce tacit senses of appropriateness and proper conduct. What prompted Confucius to register and reflect on these implicit, typically unnoticed facets of life in family and society? To give a short answer, he was drawn to note these facets of human life in response to certain critical problems of his time. Confucius lived in an age of familial, social, and political upheaval and breakdown. As the central Zhou court lost power and prestige and the states and principalities rose and gradually drifted away from the court, a period of strife among the states and principalities ensued. Moreover, as the noble families within and across states increasingly connived, betrayed, attacked, and preyed on each other, the states, especially the people, suffered from the bloody intrigues. Sons rose up to seize power from their fathers, siblings plotted bloody murder against each other, and the like. As a consequence, the people’s suffering seemed to have no end in sight. In fact, Confucius lived during the tipping point between the Spring and Autumn period (722–481 BCE) and the Warring States period (403–222 BCE) when the states ceased to recognize the central Zhou court altogether, and fiercely vied for greater power, or in many cases just struggled for survival. Confucius’ diagnosis of the situation was that people were losing sight of their basic interpersonal relatedness and the sorts of mutual appreciation and respect they owed to one other qua human beings. In his view, they had moreover lost sight of their traditional mutual relations and obligations, and had grown increasingly selfcentered and selfish. Rather than consider how best to pay respect to their parents, deal well with their neighbors, enrich the community, pay homage to neighboring states and the central court, and so forth, many had devolved to prioritizing their own personal advantage for influence, wealth, and power, above all else.10 This was the trend of the times, and there was no going back, save, in Confucius’ view, through the inculcation and rise of an inspiring noble regime supported by promulgation of a strengthened ethical teaching, commitment, and practice to light the way.11 Confucius remarked that he was a transmitter rather than a creator (Analects 7.1). This was not just humility or a cultural nicety. In his teachings, Confucius principally sought to remind people of the ethical implications of their experiences, traditions, and especially their relationships. He did not preach truisms or parlay new-fangled notions, except for humaneness, which was more a reset of the guiding theme of noble customs and practices bequeathed by the early sage kings and observed by the Zhou nobility than a conceptual novelty. Let us unpack this guiding This was the social background of Confucius’ moral dichotomy of junzi 君子 (gentleman, moral exemplar, well-cultivated person) and xiaoren 小人 (petite person, self-centered person), which underscores that for Confucius these terms referred to ethical stances rather than social classes.

10

11 I regard “moral” as referring to one’s personal character and handling of close relationships and “ethical” as referring to one’s more professional and public code of conduct.

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theme, for it is what makes Confucius’ project essentially humanistic, albeit with important Sinitic characteristics. As modern readers, we are inclined to regard Confucius’ teaching of humaneness (ren) as an abstract general concept endowed with descriptive and prescriptive purchase. In Confucius’s hands and in his time and place, however, while regarded as an ideal theme,12 humaneness was most basically a practical, lived cultivation and practice involving affection, love, reverence, respect, proper attitude, alertness, responsiveness, uprightness, humane action, and the like. Since we moderns are accustomed to viewing terms like “humaneness” as flat abstractions, to be understood cognitively and lived up to as general ideals, we need to recall that for Confucius the notion of humaneness is rooted in filial devotion (xiao 孝) and fraternal love (ti 悌), which certainly are meant as practical, lived cultivations and practices involving respect, commitment, uprightness, responsiveness, and the like (Analects 1.2). For Confucius, the humane person is not simply one who upholds the ideal of humaneness and who rationally decides to cultivate and honor it in a Western Enlightenment fashion, but rather one who not only honors and upholds the ideal theme but who genuinely is sincere, diligent, respectful, responsive, and devoted to fulfilling his interpersonal relationships, especially the five cardinal relationships (ruler–minister, father–son, brother–brother, husband–wife, friend– friend) as well as the community. As our teacher in Taiwan, Yang-you Wei, used to say, these Confucian virtue terms are not to be understood as abstract nouns; they are performative more than stative terms. They are immanental and to be manifested by living human beings; they indicate ethical forms of being and living. The humane person is not one who has merely grasped the word “humaneness” and its implications, but rather one who manifests the bearing and practices involved in “being humane,” “being wise,” “being upright,” “practicing ritual action,” and the like. While filial devotion and fraternal love concern well-defined family relationships and the concomitant obligations and duties, Confucius’ humaneness broadens the canvas to cover the entire sweep of a person’s interpersonal relationships with varying degrees of closeness and obligation and ranges of competing obligations and duties. How does Confucius expect people to see their way through this thicket of relationships and conflicting interpersonal concerns and responsibilities? First, he considers that people in society have been brought up to have a sense of appropriateness—to be continuously refined—which gives them a basic sense of what sort of response, or even a gesture, would be most fitting in a given relationship and situation. This sense of fittingness is as often negative in entailing restraint, what not to do, as it is positive in intimating positive action. Moreover, it is self-regarding with respect to, say, one’s sense of integrity when acting alone and probity when considering one’s uniqueness, as well as in maintaining one’s fidelity in conversation and uprightness in dealings with others.13 Complementing this sense of appropriateness by offering traditionally accepted modes of respectful interpersonal conduct is ritual propriety, which encompasses the received ritualized ways of 12

Cua (2002).

13

Thompson (2012, p. 72).

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maintaining one’s own sense of gravitas and expressing one’s respect and propriety vis-à-vis others. While such a precedent-bound conception might appear to be conservative and stultifying of moral creativity, apart from basic court rituals which were scrupulously maintained, many of the ritual forms in daily and social life tended to be flexible and adaptable to time, place, situation, and personality. Early Sinitic ritual arose in conjunction with song, poetry, music, and performance, and in many instances allowed for the same sorts of free play and innovation as music and lyric. Naturally, the earliest expressions were highly localized, and even after they became generalized for the empire their observances still had distinctive localized colorations and presentations. In this light, the ritual and musical components of humaneness certainly enriched the Humanism of Confucius’ position culturally and aesthetically.14 Additionally, if Confucius’ notion of humaneness were simply a matter of respecting and doing well by others according to ritual propriety, that would not really have laid the grounds for or added up to a Humanist ethic worthy of the name. However, there is more to it. Consider, for example, Confucius’ discussions on Guan Zhong (管仲), a pragmatic state minister who was unversed in the niceties of appropriateness and ritual propriety but who, on Confucius’ account, was resourceful and solved problems and often fulfilled humaneness without invoking ritual practices. Although Guan Zhong was a pragmatic minister, he, as Confucius notes, manifested humaneness in devising benevolent solutions to serious problems, solutions that disregarded the received norms of ritual propriety and appropriate conduct. In one such instance, he arranged a truce among several contending rulers, which stopped the regional strife, bloodshed, and suffering (Analects 14.17). In another, he arranged for the continued survival of a people, which normally would have been massacred according to received custom (Analects14.9). In other words, Guan Zhong broke through, or ignored, received rituals and traditions that would have entailed further strife in one instance and unnecessary deaths in another in order to ameliorate the situation and thereby, in Confucius’ estimation, fulfill humaneness. Ritual per se is not humaneness Again one’s cultivation and practice of humaneness, ultimately, does not depend on ritual propriety. In fact, Confucius maintains the converse proposition: “What has a man to do with ritual propriety who is not humane? What has a man to do with music who is not humane?” (Analects 3.3). Moreover, Confucius realizes that the received rituals and accompanying wisdom are not a “one size fits all” proposition, and registers there often are situations in which and times of life when one has to weigh things up and use one’s sense of discretion (quan 權) to resolve the situation propitiously. This is his recommendation to think outside the box when the received ritual practices do not seem to be fitting or appropriate, when competing or conflicting rituals would come into play, or simply when there are no applicable 14

Chen (2007) and Thompson (2015a).

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rituals. Often the problem is that simply observing the ritual or tradition itself would be inhumane, which for example led Confucius’ defender Mencius to alert people to the need sometimes to “overthrow ritual propriety in order to fulfill humaneness” (Mencius 4A.17)! Consequently, Confucius’ virtue of wisdom is very much about thinking outside the box to fashion understandings and responses that respect and honor all involved, fulfill humaneness, and thus hit upon utmost propriety.15 At this point, we should pause to consider what is meant by “fulfilling humaneness” and how it could enjoin departing from the norms of ritual propriety. Early Confucianism had complementary notions of “hitting the mark” (zhong 中) and “hitting utmost propriety in the common situation” (zhongyong 中庸).16 These conceptions guided the most learned, well cultivated, and experienced Confucian adepts in focusing and seeing through complex situations to fashion the most fitting responses that would best fulfill humaneness and extend the way (Analects 15.28). This complements Confucius’ notion of wisdom, which, like the cultivation and practice of humaneness, is not theoretical or scholarly but practical and action oriented.17 It is with this in mind that Confucius sometimes associates humaneness with both wisdom and courage (yong 勇). In his view, one needs to be wise to focus clearly on situations and people, know oneself and other, see through the complexities, and weigh things up without blinkers, while one needs to be courageous to respond deliberately and carry things through, while not going too far and making sure the means are consistent with the ends.

Confucius’ definitions and accounts of humaneness Confucius’ accounts of humaneness underscore the essential Humanism of his teaching. As to the content of humaneness, Confucius says it consists in “loving others” (Analects 12.22). Confucian commentators have tried to water down this “love” as affection and/or consideration, and stress that Confucian love is graded such that substantial true love is confined to close family members, with weakened extensions to other people with whom one is less closely related.18 Confucius elsewhere says without qualification that all men are brothers (Analects 12.5). He undoubtedly thinks it best to care about all people, even though such love might be less palpable than love for those with whom one is closely related. No matter what, 15 Thompson (2002). Rites were not moral rules or laws but commonly accepted practices, so they did not necessarily express binding moral-ethical norms. Confucius, Mencius, and Zhu Xi reminded people to use their discretion and devise alternative responses when observances of the rites and customs would entail unintended hardship or suffering or simply be too costly. 16 Zhongyong 中庸 (Doctrine of the Mean, Focusing the Familiar) is the title of a text focused on this very topic. As this text was originally a chapter of the Liji 禮記 (Record of Rites), the notion of zhongyong as hitting the utmost propriety in the common situation was originally intended for observances of ritual propriety. Zhu Xi broadens this notion to cover a well-cultivated person’s conduct generally by including Zhongyong as an independent work in the Sishu jizhu 四書集註 (Four books, with collected commentaries). 17

Thompson, “The Archery of Wisdom,” (2007).

18

Confucius’ own feelings of love could be deeply emotional and strong; consider his response to the death of his favorite follower, Yan Hui, which exceeded the bounds of propriety: Analects 11.8-10.

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one ought to care about others, feel other concern, and treat others with due considerateness. Naturally, to Confucius, people in positions of power have increased responsibility to love and be considerate of their charges (Analects 1.5). In a real sense, Confucius thinks that rulers should regard their people as their children, in the sense of their moral if not legal dependents. Overall, with his teaching of humaneness, Confucius wishes that people feel love and affection for others, treat them with courtesy, and assist them in need. And the ruler and state should set positive examples of such feelings, attitudes, and conduct for the people. Confucius makes several recommendations regarding the cultivation of humaneness: on the view that the rites offer tried and true means of paying one’s respects to others while manifesting one’s own dignity, Confucius tells his best student Yan Hui that mastering the self by practicing observances of the rites is the way to cultivate one’s humaneness. He continues, if for a single day one could master the self and practice observances of the rites, the whole empire would respond to him in kind, that is, with humaneness. At the same time, the practice of humaneness depends on oneself alone and not on another (12.1; italics added). Crucially, Confucius insists that one cannot defer to others in the practice of humaneness, even to one’s teacher (15.35).19 In the Analects, Confucius is recorded as using several terms for self, most of which imply relationality.20 In this instance at 12.1, however, he uses a term which indicates the feeling, sensory, empirical self, which experiences the world subjectively. Cultivation is a process of reminding oneself of one’s essential relatedness to others and the moral-ethical implications. This involves a disciplining, training, mastering, overcoming of the raw empirical self, and an effective means for accomplishing this is by practicing observances of the rites, performances by which one gains poise and gravitas, and learns to pay one’s respects to others with due propriety. Again, on Confucius’ view, if one were to treat others consistently with humaneness, they would naturally tend to pay it forward and treat one in kind. On this conception, the notion that the cultivation and practice of humaneness depends on oneself alone is absolutely crucial. Even though much of one’s cultivation and practice involves increasing one’s awareness of one’s interpersonal relationality and the practical ethical implications, the success of this Confucian ethical project depends crucially on people, especially those in leading roles, taking it upon themselves personally to dispose themselves and act forthrightly and sincerely in the spirit of humaneness. While it is perhaps easy to go with the flow of one’s interpersonal relations, it remains incumbent on each person to maintain his or her seriousness and bearings, and to dispose him or herself, conduct affairs, and treat others in ways that are not only expressive of but conducive of humaneness.21 Confucius thus always incorporates ethical conditions of being humane and appropriate, respectful and proper. After all, the relational flow 19 Confucius is aware of the need for each person to be ethically responsible and motivated, and not just be appropriately responsive in relationships. 20

Thompson, “Lessons,” (2012, p. 69ff).

21

Confucius’ methods of instruction are quite similar to Kenneth Gergen’s (2009) account of how people learn relationally from one another. For examples, see (Thompson 2012, p. 73f).

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might easily, perhaps subtly, leave the rails of appropriateness and propriety and need to be nudged back just as the filial son must at times remonstrate with his parents. Sometimes, Confucius speaks of leaving a position when the leader proves to be incorrigible and not open to remonstrance, and the court practices have become contrary to propriety and, most importantly, to humaneness. This brings us to the methodology of humaneness: how can one assess whether a certain response or course of action would be compliant with humaneness and not just seem to be so according to one’s subjective perspective? Confucius counsels his version of the Silver Rule (i.e., negative formulation of the Golden Rule): “Do not do unto others what you do not have done unto yourself” (Analects 12.2, 5.12). Elsewhere, he stresses the method of empathy (Analects 15.24). Zengzi, Confucius’ student, is recorded as saying that the Master’s way consisted in doing one’s utmost and empathy. That is all (Analects 4.15). Hence, one who considers the position and stance of the other by empathy, then, sensitized by the Silver Rule, may go on to do one’s utmost to treat the other with utmost propriety, all things considered. The watchword is to be sensitive, compassionate, and diligent in dealings with others.22 Again, to underscore the relational character of humaneness, Confucius avers that the humane person endeavors to “help others to take their stand in so far as one wishes to take one’s stand, and to get others there in so far as one wishes to get there oneself. The ability to take as analogy what is near at hand thus can be called the method of humaneness” (Analects 6.30). In sum, on the one hand, Confucius’ ideal theme of humaneness is lofty and difficult to realize, as the mountain rises ever higher (Analects 9.11); however, on the other hand, he asks, “Is humaneness really far away? No sooner do I desire it than it is here” (7.30). As noted, Confucius likes to regard being humane (free of fret), in conjunction with being wise (not of two minds), and being courageous (free of fear) (Analects 9.29, 14.28). Being wise contributes elements of self-awareness (Analects 2.17) and alertness to self-deception to Confucius’ notion of ethical realization. Being courageous in tandem with humaneness means standing up for what is most upright and fitting. Being courageous, in turn, has to be restrained by one’s wisdom and sense of propriety, lest it become boorish and violent (Analects 8.2). Confucius’ account of humaneness lent itself to several sorts of philosophic development in the tradition. First, Confucius set up humaneness as a lofty ideal. Second, his gloss of humaneness as loving others served to ground humaneness in this human emotion and led to the formation of Confucian moral psychology. Moreover, this gloss assured that humaneness should not be overly slotted and parceled within levels in a hierarchical human beehive. Third, Confucius’ indication of a methodology of humaneness in terms of the Silver Rule, empathy, and doing one’s utmost kept the humaneness ethic relational, sensitive, and dedicated. Finally, his notion of hitting utmost propriety ensured the lofty uprightness of the endeavor, which can be highly challenging to the extent that death might be the price: “A 22

Notably, the rites lose their ultimacy in this conception. They have heuristic value, and in certain crucial situations, such as at court, they must be followed to the letter; however, generally they are just accepted vehicles to follow in paying one’s respect in a dignified way, which may be modified or replaced according to one’s wisdom and cultivated sense of humaneness, appropriateness and propriety.

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resolute scholar and person of humaneness would not seek to survive at the expense of injuring humaneness. He would rather sacrifice his life in order to realize humaneness” (Analects15.8). Confucius’ cultivation of reverence: a religious dimension Confucius incorporates several other ethical notions that serve to orient the humane attitude, cultivation, and practice, and add a religious dimension. First, he speaks of reverence (jing 敬).23 Originally this described the requisite state of mind of a person taking part in an ancestral sacrifice. In support of Confucius’ cultivation and practice of humaneness, reverence signifies an awareness of one’s overwhelming responsibility to care about others, such as a father and mother’s concern for the family and the ruler’s concern for the welfare of his people. Reverence encompasses both the fear of failing to carry out one’s responsibilities and the single-mindedness with which one carries out one’s responsibilities. In Song times, the reverential attitude in the senses of alertness and concentration was broadened to the proper mindset for engaging in cultivation and practice generally.24 Since this mindset includes sensitivity, alertness, and readiness to act, it has been retranslated as mindfulness for the Song-Ming context and beyond.25 Another crucial concept is “virtue” (de 德) which signals both one’s latent moral capacity as well as moral charisma and efficacy.26 Confucius underscores the relational character of virtue by intimating that the person of virtue never dwells alone but always has neighbors (Analects 4.25). Finally, Confucius avers that Heaven authored the virtue within him (Analects 7.23). This proposition, as we discuss below, inspired later Confucian claims about human propensities (xing 性). Moreover, since Heaven, for Confucius, Mencius, and early Confucian scholars, represented the collective spirits of early Shang and Zhou leaders, this authoring of Confucius’ virtue involved a sort of ethical calling, which the Master took as a personal mission to nurture his virtue and the way of the early sage kings. In sum, for Confucius, humaneness and virtue involve distinctively different cultivation approaches. While humaneness is to be pondered, worked, realized, and practiced, virtue is inherited from Heaven as a moral endowment and mission, to be incubated, nurtured, and realized. Challenges and responses Soon after Confucius passed on, other thinkers and schools arose to challenge his teachings. Sensitive to the people’s increasing suffering and needs, Mozi (墨子 fl. 5th cent. BCE) drew upon Confucius’ admonition to love others, Silver Rule, and counsel that all men within the four seas are brothers to formulate his counterpoint to humaneness: impartial regard (jianai 兼愛).27 With this teaching, Mozi sought to 23

Bockover, “Ren Dao,” (2008).

24

Thompson, “The Religious,” (1990).

25

Kalton, To Become a Sage (1988).

26

This is thus virtue in the classical sense rather than the Christian sense.

27

Thompson, “Mozi’s Teaching,” (2014). See also Lowe 1992.

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preserve Confucius’ humanistic spirit, since some of Confucius’ followers had begun to cater to the nobility and stress humaneness as graded love, which was to be parceled out according to relationship or lack thereof. Mozi accepted that people prioritize family members and friends and acquaintances, and recognized that traditional customs supported this, however he saw that if humaneness was parceled out too finely, its beneficent impact wouldn’t reach those most in need. Confucians never accepted Mozi’s teaching of impartial regard tout court, especially after Mencius’ spirited criticisms of Mozi and the Mohists; however, they quietly broadened the significance of humaneness to accommodate Mozi’s insights, such as with the teachings of Great Unity (Datong 大同) and fairness/impartiality (gong 公). Zhu Xi was to regard the latter as an irreducible component of humaneness.28 Confucianism also faced Legalist criticisms that it was artificial and atavistic in upholding passe´ traditions and customs. Confucius’ early followers responded by underscoring the naturalness of the teachings, especially of humaneness. For example, the text Five Modes of Ethical Conduct (Wuxing pian 五行篇; c. 300 BCE), sec. 1, associated with the school of Zisi, distinguishes between authentic and artificial expressions of humaneness and Confucius’ other ethical teachings and it affirms the naturalness and efficacy of their authentic manifestations: 1. Humaneness forming within is called virtuous character; when it is not formed within it is merely called upright conduct.29 Appropriateness forming within is called virtuous character; when it is not formed within it is merely called upright conduct. Ritual propriety forming within is called virtuous character; when it is not formed within it is merely called upright conduct. Wisdom forming within is called virtuous character; when it is not formed within it is merely called upright conduct. Sagacity forming within is called virtuous character; when it is not formed within it is merely called upright conduct. There are five forms of virtuous conduct. The formation of harmony among them [in virtuous conduct] is called virtuous character. The harmonization of four of the forms of virtuous conduct is called efficacy [goodness]. Efficacy is the way of humanity; virtuous character is the way of Heaven (tian 天, nature).30 Also associated with Zisi, the Doctrine of the Mean (Zhongyong 中庸) opens by generalizing Confucius’ sentiment that Heaven authored the virtue, moral capacity, in him into: “Heaven bequeaths what is called the basic propensities, the basic propensities lead what is called the way, and the cultivating the way is what is called the teaching” (Zhongyong ch. 1). These lines served to naturalize Confucius’ ethics by rooting it in basic human propensities as a sort of bequeathed ethical mission. 28

Chan, A Source Book (1963, pp. 552f, 635), Thompson, “Lessons,” (2012, p. 75ff).

29

The formation of virtuous character refers both to inner character and outer conduct. An early alternative form of the graph for ren 仁 appears in the excavated scripts of this text featuring the radical for body/person, shen 身 above the radical for mind-heart, xin 心, which has aroused reflection on the embodimental, performative character of Confucius’ humaneness. 30 Heaven endows the natural propensity to form virtuous character. Informed by role models, one’s moral efficacy has to be nurtured and practiced in interpersonal conduct.

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Later chapters of the Doctrine of the Mean present Confucius’ Way as the path to an ethically potent humanistic form of realization termed authenticity (cheng 誠).31 Mencius on human propensities and emotions, and Xunzi’s counterpoint A century after Zisi, Mencius augmented this picture by demonstrating the deep emotive roots of Confucius’ virtues and by stressing the role of human determination and decision in cultivating Confucius’ way. He demonstrated the emotional roots of Confucius’ teachings in several ways: by proving that many of the received rituals reflected and gave ways of expressing human feelings, such as funerals to express grief when mourning one’s parents (Mencius 3A.5), by giving examples of ethical emotions yielding ethical responses, such as the unease felt when witnessing suffering (Mencius 2A.6), and by thought experiments, such as considering the response of people who suddenly see an infant about to crawl into a well (Mencius 2A.6). For Mencius, one had to draw on precisely such emotions in cultivating, practicing, and realizing humaneness. Mencius regarded Confucius’ related teachings of appropriateness, ritual propriety, and wisdom as also rooted in human emotions—shame and aversion, deference and respect, and right and wrong, respectively.32 He argued further that human propensities were inclined toward goodness (efficacy), gave explanations for the appearance of selfishness or evil, and argued against the view that human nature reduces to the appetites (Mencius 6A.8). Perhaps uniquely among early Chinese thinkers, Mencius recognized the role of determination and decision both in cultivating Confucius’ way and in upholding the ideal theme of humaneness throughout life. Mencius declared this life project to be one’s ultimate ethical mission but nowhere spoke of rewards in an afterlife. In this, his ethical teaching was, like Confucius’, decidedly humanistic. In life, serve; in death, rest. And, to serve meant to fulfill one’s interpersonal relationships and care for the people.33 Mencius had a less personalized view of Heaven than did Confucius, who spoke of Heaven as giving him a personal mission. Mencius thought of Heaven rather as presenting challenges and hardships to be faced. He spoke of personally cultivating the lively cosmic vapor (qi 氣) to be charismatic and forceful: by breathing deeply, exercising, and drawing on this cosmic vapor, one could purify one’s emotions and reduce one’s desires, in effect releasing and vitalizing one’s basic good propensities. Conducted in tandem with one’s self-cultivation efforts, the nurturing of cosmic vapor could elicit one’s better propensities such that one would have enhanced ethical decisiveness, responsiveness, and efficacy (Mencius 2A.2). Mencius did not go unchallenged in the Confucian tradition. A century later, during a harsher, more cut-throat age, Xunzi argued that human propensities were not good; they were essentially needy, desirous, and self-centered, and so strict regimens of learning and cultivation had to be imposed to train and discipline

31

Adler, Reconstructing (2014a, b).

32

Mencius’ moral psychology has been compared with David Hume’s in this regard (Liu 2003).

33

This is echoed in Zhang Zai’s Western Inscription. See below.

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people, thereby to socialize and ultimately civilize and ennoble them.34 He stressed the need for strict cultivation via study of the classics and ritual conduct as the way to make people other-minded, to sharpen their sense of appropriateness, and instill them with the spirit of humaneness. Xunzi regarded earlier Confucian views of the rituals as expressions of inborn senses of humanity and appropriateness, as a pipedream and maintained that the early sage kings had consciously devised the rituals as ways to discipline and artificially inculcate ethical sensibility into people —and study was to make them rationally see the benefits of being socialized and ethical in terms of the increased personal security that would accompany social status. He also regarded Heaven as simply the natural order with no moral impulses, and called for people to study natural cycles and processes solely for developing agriculture and technology in step with Heaven as nature.35 Centuries later, Zhu Xi would not accept Xunzi’s accounts of humaneness and Confucius’ way, so we needn’t consider them further here. At the same time, Zhu Xi, a student of history, accepted with Xunzi that appearances of human selfishness and vice were real and potent threats to personal security and social harmony. Moreover, he advocated lifelong study and cultivation, as reflected in his inclusion of the Great Learning in the Four Books, a collection of the essential texts of Confucianism.36 Naturalizing Confucian Humanism and ontologizing human propensities Let us consider two more intellectual developments before examining Zhu Xi’s synthetic notion of humaneness and humanistic ethics. First, in the later Warring States period and the early Han, Confucian thinkers and classical commentators correlated Confucius’ virtues with natural forces and processes, as discussed in connection with the Book of Changes (Yijing 易經). Suffice it to say that these correlations lent a naturalistic, cosmic dimension to Confucius’ teachings and virtues. During this period, Confucius’ virtues were also associated with the idea of the five phases (earth, wood, fire, water, metal), which were understood to be basic components in the formation of the natural world, just as Confucius’ virtues were regarded as basic components in the formation of the human world. Zhu Xi took an interest in these correlations and associations, which broadened the significance of 34 At this time, the idea that human nature was good or tended to the good flew in the face of people’s everyday experience of political and military strife and social upheaval. 35 Xunzi’s doctrines that human nature tends toward evil and that nature is simply natural cycles and processes possibly yielded undesirable political consequences. During Xunzi’s later life, Legalist (Fajia 法家) thinkers, such as Hanfeizi 韓非子 (d. 233 B.C.E.), made the case that since human nature was basically evil, it didn’t make sense to make people undergo costly, drawn out regimens of cultural education, cultivation, ritualization, and practice. What was needed was to govern people by strict regimens and sharply defined codes of reward and punishment to keep them (including the royal family and high ministers) obedient and in line with the ruler’s game plan. These ideas contributed to the rise of the state of Qin, the formation of the Qin dynasty, and the enthronement of Qinshihuang 秦始皇 in 221 B. C.E. Later, Han dynasty Confucians, such as Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 (c. 179-c. 104 B.C.E.), drew upon Xunzi in establishing bureaucratic Confucianism for organizing society and ruling the empire that forwent the spirit of humaneness and related humanistic values and cultivations of early Confucianism. 36 Zhu Xi held a multifaceted view of human nature that accommodated both Mencian and Xunzian insights: while he saw good natural propensities and intuitions to nurture, he also registered the advent of appearances of selfishness and missteps to be rectified and cultivated away.

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humaneness, and ultimately placed the realized human mind-heart at the center of the cosmos.37 Second, chapters 18 and 19 of the Laozi text make the criticism that Confucius’ virtues had been proffered as stopgap solutions to deeper problems of the age. For Laozi, Confucius’ virtues floated on the surface and did not address the core problem that, for a variety of reasons, people were straying ever further from their “basic simplicity” and original sense of “belonging together.”38 As noted above, Mencius had identified the good basic human propensities as the touchstone of the Confucian teaching. Mencius’ arguments for this position were persuasive, but they were not fully compelling. As we saw, a century later, Xunzi could still make a compelling case that human propensities were self-centered, appetitive, and tended toward evil unless rigorously cultivated. In the Tang dynasty, Li Ao (fl. 800 CE) sought to demonstrate the deeper ontological underpinnings of human propensities in the essay, “Restoring the Nature.”39 He drew on a cultivation method described in the Zhuangzi, chapter 6, as a “forgetting” and “fasting of the mind-heart.” By fasting the mind-heart, one would become quiescent and free of thought. This was a fundamental quiescence that transcended the dualism of activity and stillness. With references to the Doctrine of the Mean, the Great Learning, and commentaries on the Book of Change, Li Ao further maintained that people who achieved this mindset would become luminous, perspicuous, and responsive. Since their minds would be discerning and unbiased, they would be able to respond appropriately in all situations and thus set ethical precedents and models for others to emulate. At the same time, Li Ao did not attribute any sort of automatic perceptivity or allknowingness to this mind-set; he insisted that enlightened people still needed to continue conducting cultivation, learning, and investigations of things to maintain their enlightened state. Moreover, they would need to continue carrying out advanced learning as they extended the scope of their activities and concerns to wider circles of family, community, school, court, state, empire, world/cosmos. Li Ao thus set forth a compelling view which anticipated salient teachings in Song Confucianism, such as the teachings of Li Tong (李同 1093–1163), Zhu Xi’s teacher, and Zhu Xi himself. Song renaissance of confucian humanism, culminating in Zhu Xi Zhu Xi’s Northern Song intellectual forbearers deepened and developed the early Confucian views of human basic propensities, self-realization, and the Confucian cultivations and practices, especially humaneness. Notably, Zhou Dunyi (周敦頤 1017–1073) wrote a succinct account of the formation of the cosmos, with implications for the formation of the human self,Explanation of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity (Taijitu shuo 太極圖說), and Zhang Zai (張載 1020–1077) wrote an expansive essay on the cosmic roots and the humane efficacy of the Confucian 37 See Zhou Dunyi, Explanation of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity (Taijitu shuo 太極圖說). Chan 1963, p. 463ff). Discussed in Fung (1953, v. 2, pp. 435–451) and Needham (1956, pp. 458–465). 38

See Laozi chs. 37 and 80 (Ames and Hall 2003).

39

Chan, A Source Book (1963, p. 456ff).

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virtues, “Western Inscription” (Ximing 西銘). Ironically, both of these masterpieces were testaments to humaneness without explicitly mentioning the term. Later, Cheng Hao (程顥1032–1085), Cheng Yi (程頤 1033–1107), and their followers discoursed and essayed on Confucius’ teaching and cultivation of humaneness in light of their own new philosophic outlook and ideas.40 Inspired by the Northern Song discourses, Zhu Xi sought to refine their new insights and idea to more accurately capture the content, cultivation, and practice of Confucius’ teaching of humaneness. As noted, Zhou Dunyi’s Explanation of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity exhibits the macrocosm-microcosm identity of cosmos and realized self.41 It also lays a naturalistic foundation for Confucius’ humanistic values: … humanity alone receives [the five phases] in their utmost excellence, and therefore is the most intelligent. The human form appears, and its spirit develops consciousness. The five virtues of human nature (humaneness, appropriateness, ritual propriety, wisdom, fidelity) are stirred by and responsive to phenomena in the world and engage in activity, good and bad are differentiated, and human affairs are conducted. The Sage handles these affairs by means of utmost propriety, uprightness, humanity, appropriateness, regarding quiescence as fundamental…. Hence, the character of the sage matches that of Heaven and Earth; his perspicuity matches that of the sun and the moon; his order matches that of the four seasons…42 Zhang Zai’s Western Inscription opens by celebrating the consanguinity between cosmos and humanity: Heaven is my father and Earth is my mother, and even such a small creature as I finds an intimate place in their midst. Therefore, that which fills the cosmos I regard as my body and that which directs the cosmos I consider my nature (basic propensity). All people are my brothers and sisters, and all things are my companions…43 The rest of the essay discusses concomitant ethical relationships and then gives examples of exceptional humane conduct from antiquity. Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi discourse generally on humaneness, which for Zhu Xi is the problem. He considers that Cheng Hao speaks vaguely of the form and feeling of humaneness, without capturing its emotional core and ethical directionality.44 He admires Cheng Yi’s relating of humaneness with fairness and impartiality: 40

See A.C. Graham’s (1986, 1992) studies of the Cheng brothers.

The Taijitu 太極圖 (Diagram of the Supreme Polarity) was rooted in alchemical Daoism for which it was a chart of the human psyche and body, hence depicting microcosm-macrocosm identity. See Fung (1953, v. 2, pp. 438–442). 41

42

Chan, A Source Book (1963, p. 463f).

43

Chan (1963, p. 497).

44

Chan (1963, p. 523f).

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“Humanity is universal impartiality; it is the foundation of moral efficacy,”45 but he thinks Cheng Yi hadn’t sufficiently explored the relationship as well as the similarities and differences between these two terms. As we shall see below, Zhu Xi feels the need to clarify what is wrong and right about the Cheng school discussions on humaneness in the conclusion of his own Treatise on Humaneness. Zhu Xi’s treatise on humaneness Zhu Xi thought deeply about the meaning and significance of Confucius’ humanness as a virtue, cultivation, and practice with deep philosophical roots and broad implications for personal realization and socio-political renewal. Consequently, in Treatise on Humaneness (Renshuo 仁說), he draws on a wide variety of traditional insights into humaneness while critiquing some recent accounts of the term which he considered to be misguided, vague, or incoherent.46 He commences the Treatise by associating humaneness with the incipient impulse to create which permeates the cosmos. Quoting the Cheng brothers, “The mind of Heaven and Earth is to produce things,” he adds that in the production of things, including human beings, they each in turn receive this very mind to produce things, and sums up by affirming that the term humaneness best covers this fecundity that permeates the world.47 He next draws on early commentaries on the Book of Change to flesh out the place of humaneness in what we might term the semantic field of Confucianism, and 45

Chan (1963, p. 571).

46

On the Treatise on Humaneness, see Sato (1986) and Chan (1989). Chan in particular shows that whereas the Treatise is bold and forthright in its presentation, it was written in the wake of Zhu Xi’s discussions with other scholars and critical reflections. While the Treatise shows humaneness’ systematic relations in Neo-Confucian thought, Zhu Xi was concerned to express it’s emotional grounds in love and expression in ethical concern. “This fecundity” is spelled out by Zhou Dunyi in the opening paragraphs of Explanation of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity. Zhu Xi’s Treatise was highly influential in East Asia down to the turn of the last century. Kalton (1988) and Huang (2015) present traditional Korean and Japanese receptions and responses. Tan (1898, 1984, 2000) wrote a more eclectic Renxue 仁學 (A Study of Humanity) in support of radical reform in the late Qing.

47

In the context of Heaven and Earth, “mind” refers to a ubiquitous natural tendency or impulse. Even with respect to human beings, this refers to a tendency or impulse but with a varying degree of intentionality. This proposition gains significance in light of the macrocosm-microcosm identity implicit in Zhou Dunyi’s Explanation. as noted in note 29 above. Notably, “things” refers primarily to living creatures and more generally to things, which are more properly “events” in Zhu Xi’s process ontology. This ubiquitous impulse to (pro)create has classic Greco-Roman counterparts, such as Plato’s Eros (Geier 1990; Gordon 2012) and world soul (Plato 1972, p. 46f) and Lucretius’ Venus (1994, p. 10). Interestingly, we see a parallel between the relation between love and humaneness in Zhu Xi’s thought and eros and justice in Plato’s thought. For both, love and eros signify a sort of basal impulse both to create and, ultimately, to return to a holistic primal origins. For both, each human being needs guidance and direction along the way to achieve both inner excellence and outer relations so that both inner realization and outer community are sought and mutual concern and assistance are shared along the way to realization. While Zhu Xi kept to the practical ethical path, Plato let himself get sidetracked by theoretical concerns; in later life, however, Plato criticized the theory of Forms in the Parmenides and turned to more practical concerns in the Statesman and the Laws. Plato’s dialogues also presented cultivation as preparation for an afterlife and rebirth, topics which Zhu Xi did not take up; however, Plato presented these accounts as conscious myths and not as factual or true accounts. Zhu Xi’s view of life and death is decidedly more naturalistic in temper than Plato’s (Gordon 2012; Kim 1984, 2000).

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introduces the humaneness spirited attitude, cultivation, and conduct as both conducive to the proper realization of human relationships and interpersonal harmony as well as supportive of the flow and harmony of natural events and phenomena. He cites the characteristics of Heaven (vis-à-vis Earth) as intimated by the first hexagram of theBook of Change, Qian (vis-à-vis Kun): “Origination, flourish, advantage, and firmness,” adding that “origination” encompasses and guides the rest. This pattern is mirrored in the cycle of the four seasons, which are infused with the vital qi of spring, and reflected in the virtues of the mind-heart: humaneness, appropriateness, ritual propriety, and wisdom, which too are embraced and guided by humaneness.48 As the mind of Heaven and Earth to produce things leads their impulse to interact and create, the formation (ti 體) and expression (yong 用) of the four characteristics are naturally given.49 Turning to the excellence of the human heart-mind, Zhu Xi quotes Mencius, “Humaneness is precisely the [fulfillment of] the mind-heart of humanity (Mencius6A.11),” adding that the formation and expression of the four virtues is naturally given.50 Consequently, the way of humaneness is manifested not only in the proper conduct of human affairs but in the beneficent impulse to create and produce throughout the world. As the core formation and expression of the human mind-heart, the basic virtues are consciously experienced in the two phases of “before” and “after” the emotions are aroused. As described in the Doctrine of the Mean and developed by Li Ao, in the pre-aroused phase of the emotions the cultivated mind-heart is empty yet alert and poised while in the latter aroused state the emotions are stirred and expressed in due degree. Zhu Xi stresses that these two phases of the emotions are but the stagesetting for dedicated humaneness spirited cultivation and practice; for “if we could but truly practice love and maintain it(italics added), then we would possess it in the spring of all virtues and the root of all good deeds.” Under this premise Zhu Xi stresses the approach to the cultivation of humaneness that Confucius had suggested to his gifted follower Yan Hui, “Master yourself by practicing observances of ritual propriety” (Analects 12.1). In Zhu Xi’s account, such mastering oneself is the reining in of one’s self-centeredness by means of paying respect to others, thereby to change the axis of one’s moral motivation and action from the inklings and impulses of the raw sensory ego-self to alertness to others, especially one’s close relations. Zhu Xi associates the former state of self-centeredness with incipient “(excessive) personal desires” and the latter state of alertness to others with 48 Qian stands for Heaven as Kun stands for Earth, and the two hexagrams are assigned appropriate properties and associations, such as male and female, respectively. This line harks back to Explanation of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity, paragraph 4 (Chan 1963, p. 463). See the opening sentence of Western Inscription by Zhang Zai (Chan 1963, p. 497) where Qian and Kun are directly translated as Heaven and Earth (Chan 1963, p. 497). 49

Ti and yong are often translated as substance and function, respectively. But this over-interprets ti and under-interprets yong. Ti is just the formation or structure that produces a certain effect or impact, and does not necessarily indicate a fundamental ontological status. Yong refers to how that structure is expressed or plays out. For Zhu Xi, these were relative terms in that something could be a ti at one level and a yong at another. The substance/function interpretation also introduces an inappropriate dualism into the terminology. 50 With respect to the virtues, formation and expression refer to human basic propensities xing and emotions qing, which are also intimately correlated.

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intimations of “Heavenly pattern/principle.” That is to say, whereas the raw ego-self tends to prompt action on its own wants and impulses, the cultivated self tends to stir action on its cultivated (and reasoned) senses of relational humanity, appropriateness, and propriety. What is important, then, is not any sort of ontological difference between the two states, but rather the moral-ethical axis of one’s motivations. How then is one to cultivate, maintain, and express the latter pattern of motivation such that one sustains humaneness in practice? In answering, Zhu Xi does not appeal to philosophic reflection but recommends being mindful in daily practice, such as by consciously being respectful in personal life, diligent in conducting affairs, and dedicated in upholding interpersonal relations. Indeed, he here registers the fundamental role that emotion and feelings play in sustaining the spirit of humaneness in one’s cultivation and practice: laying stress on serving one’s parents with filiality and treating one’s elder brother with respect, Zhu Xi boldly adds, “Be loving in dealing with all things”. To underscore how one is to go beyond immediate, personal, relatively selfcentered concerns, Zhu Xi gives examples of ministers, mentioned by Confucius in the Analects, who had declined official posts to maintain their integrity. As Confucius asserts, there are times when one is willing to sacrifice one’s own life to fulfill humaneness (Analects 15.8). Nonetheless, the basic animating spirit remains: “love people gently and benefit things,” as intimated in Mencius’ four beginnings and Confucius’ four virtues. In concluding the Treatise, Zhu Xi addresses several errors that had appeared in prominent Cheng school discussions on humaneness. Since Cheng Yi had made the distinction that love is an emotion while humaneness is a pattern/principle, some of Cheng Yi’s followers went on to discuss humaneness apart from love as a separate matter. In response, Zhu Xi qualifies that humaneness is the pattern/principle of love, and maintains that emotion and the basic propensities are intertwined in a subtle network, underscoring that love and humaneness are intimately related, and that humaneness ought not be grasped in isolation from love. His point is never simply to mark an ontological difference between love and humaneness or even to classify them as such, but rather to indicate that the virtue of humaneness intimates the ethical nuances of love. Love comes in many shapes and forms; there is good love and bad love with a grey zone in between, while humaneness is to be animated and inspired by love and concern for others but always expressed in considerate, other-minded, altruistic ways. Zhu Xi was aware that Mencius’ notion of love with distinctions and the Confucian parceling of humane other-concern through the rites governing human relationships and affairs threatened the deeper humanistic impulse that had animated Confucius’ call to love others and reminder that all men within the Four Seas are brothers, which Mozi heroically sought to recapture. Hence, Zhu Xi mentions love throughout this Treatise while taking care not to step into the overly generalized terrain Mencius had attributed to Mozi’s notion of impartial regard. Two other views proffered by the Cheng school on humaneness are that its formation lay in the unity of all things with mind and that humaneness is the character of human consciousness. Zhu Xi criticizes that while the cultivation and practice of humaneness might yield a sort of feeling of the unity of self and all

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things this feeling does not in itself mark the significance of humaneness, which is associated with love, intercourse, production, flourishing, and harmony. Moreover, he admits that while the concomitant virtue of wisdom implicates humaneness in consciousness, humaneness per se is a focused ethicalvirtue, cultivation, and practice, and cannot be generalized to consciousness. Consciousness plays a role in ethical cultivation and practice but is more broadly about awareness and cognizance than is humaneness per se with its ethical focus. Zhu Xi sums up by observing that discussing humaneness as unity with all things or as consciousness makes it too general and vague, and undercuts the grounds of one’s cultivation, alertness, and practice, while identifying humaneness directly with love makes it too specific, sporadic, and lacking in ethical depth. Finally, Zhu Xi asks, if humaneness were consciousness, what sense could we make of Confucius’ dictum that the man of humaneness delights in mountains while the man of wisdom delights in water? (Analects 6.21). And, if humaneness were simply love, what sense could we make of Confucius’ teaching that only through humaneness can one preserve what one has learned? (Analects 15.32). Zhu Xi’s Treatise on Humaneness has been compelling for subsequent tradition. It successfully stresses the emotive and practical thrust of humaneness while delineating its conceptual roots, formation, and structure. Moreover, while some criticize his appeals to the apparent dualisms of formation (ti) and expression (yong) and Heavenly pattern/principle and personal desire, he is careful from start to finish to underscore the unity of formation and expression as mutually dependent and to stress that the latter distinction was about motivational axis rather than ontological difference. The latter distinction reflects the insight that one’s moral sensitivity and performance depend on a sort of general reflection of self vis-à-vis others as ideally expressive of humaneness and appropriateness. Hence, Heavenly pattern/principle should be taken as a sort of shorthand for the networks of relationships and concomitant attitudes and obligations that constitute humanity’s lived world and not just as a distinct and distant ontological other. Zhu Xi’s defense and justification of a humanistic ethics Notably, Zhu Xi went on to work out a justification for acceptance of his humanistic ethics centered on the cultivation and practice of humaneness. This justification is interesting and significant in that it supports a sort of relational humanistic ethics, the East Asian counterpart to Kant’s justification of a Western individual humanistic ethics. Importantly, this sort of relational humanistic ethics need not be regarded as a competitor to Western individualist approaches but rather should be taken as complementary to them, as each perspective highlights an irreducible element of what would be an adequate humanistic ethics and notion of ethical self. In Zhu Xi’s mature comments and reflections on the formation of a moral exemplar, we find that he, like Kant, set forth several conditions for what we might term the “moral worth” of one’s ethical agency, decision, and action. As we recall, for Kant, the moral agent wills to act from duty out of respect for reason (the Moral Law), which underlies the Categorical Imperative. For Kant, one just needs to reflect rationally on the constituent concepts and principles of his account to recognize its validity. Zhu Xi’s

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account is more practical and less theoretical than is Kant’s.51 Zhu Xi’s aspiring moral exemplar will undertake his learning, cultivation, and practice in the spirit of reverence, i.e., mindfulness. Such mindfulness not only assures the concentration and seriousness of his dedication but in a sense purifies and clarifies his mind-heart such that he will have a dawning discernment of Heavenly pattern/principle, which in turn will refine and actuate his sense of appropriateness.52 This dawning discernment will also catalyze a moral determination or will (zhuzai 主宰) to form within and anchor his determination to live in the spirit of humaneness.53 As Kant incorporates love and the Golden Rule, Zhu Xi stresses humaneness and Confucius’ Silver Rule, which are grounded in love and empathy. Zhu Xi had to undertake considerable study, practice, and reflection in order to reach this position. In his late 20s, he began to study and cultivate Confucianism under Li Tong (李同 1093–1163), with whom his late father had recommended he study. Zhu earlier had dabbled in Daoism and Buddhism for a decade, but Li Tong beckoned him to turn back decisively to the path of Confucianism. In those days, Zhu Xi encountered Cheng school scholars who cued their approaches to cultivation and practice to chapter one of the Doctrine of the Mean, which speaks of the already aroused and pre-aroused states of the emotions. Prioritizing the pre-aroused state, Zhu Xi’s teacher Li Tong advocated cultivation by quiet-sitting (jingzuo 靜坐) as a way to draw in one’s thoughts and concentrate one’s mind on the view that once the emotions are sufficiently tranquil and the mind empty, one will be perfectly alert and poised to respond to people and affairs with utmost propriety. This somehow reflected Li Ao’s conception, save that Li Ao had spoken of an unconditional state of tranquility, which hosted both the aroused and pre-aroused states of the emotions. Active by nature, Zhu Xi found it difficult to accept Li Tong’s teaching of quietsitting. Later, he became friends with Zhang Shi (張栻 1133–1181), who prioritized the already aroused state of the emotions, following his master Hu Heng’s (胡宏 d. 1161) teaching of continuous reflective action. Hu’s reasoning was that since the mind and emotions are always stirred, the point would be to continuously monitor the correctness of one’s perceptions and the propriety of one’s actions, even in the heat of the moment. To them, if there were any identifiable state of quiescence or tranquility, it would just be a respite, not an underlying state to be cultivated and preserved. Since Zhu Xi had felt that it would be difficult to act dynamically from a state of tranquility, he went along with Hu Heng’s view for a while. However, he soon found that it was very difficult to be reflective when one is actively doing things. He saw that trying to be continuously reflective in action makes one become overly self-conscious in action, and thus uneasy and clumsy; nor does it leave time for one to reflect on the propriety of one’s intentions or the appropriateness of one’s ongoing actions. Later, Zhu Xi discovered Zhou Dunyi’s proposition that in the context of mind and spirit, “stillness and activity interpenetrate” and realized there is no need to prioritize either stillness or activity since they revolve and are mutually 51

Thompson, “Li and Yi,” (1988).

52

See Zhu Xi’s extended remark on Great Learning, ch. 5 (Chan 1963, p. 89).

53

I believe that Mencius’ notion of moral will or determination was an inspiration to Zhu Xi in this regard.

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implicative.54 Moreover, recalling Li Tong’s teaching, Zhu Xi identified the Cheng brothers’ cultivation of mindfulness as encompassing both phases of the aroused and not yet aroused states of the emotions (stillness and activity) and also purifies the mind such that it will be perspicacious and sensitive to the intimations of pattern/ principle in affairs and thus tend to be on the mark in its responses and actions. In these ways, Zhu Xi came to think that mindfulness was a potent stance for cultivation and practice, which both encompassed stillness and activity and presented an avenue to realize pattern/principle. Generalizing his findings, Zhu Xi maintained that through regimens of mindful cultivation and practice, one’s mind would be sensitized to the intimations of pattern/principle in relationships and affairs—and ultimately of pattern/principle itself as natural pattern. At this stage, one would be ethically perspicacious and act impeccably by drawing on one’s finehoned sense of appropriateness. Needless to say, one’s sense of appropriateness would take ritual propriety as a reference but be informed by one’s spirit of humaneness and cued and guided by one’s accumulated wisdom. By this stage, one’s mindful attitude would have developed into a moral determination, dedicated to hitting utmost propriety in the service of humanity. Moreover, the cultivation of mindfulness would expand the ethical purview of humaneness and propriety. Expanded ethical purview of humaneness In line with Peter Singer’s notion of humanity’s expanding circle of ethical concern (1981), Zhou Dunyi’s Explanation of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity, Zhang Zai’s Western Inscription, and Zhu Xi’s Treatise on Humaneness not only intimate but affirm humanity’s consanguinity and resonance with other life forms. They do not see difference in kind but difference in degree only between humanity and other biological species. They expand the ethical purview of humanity beyond humanity to its cosmic womb (nature, the natural environment) and fellow offspring of nature and progeny of evolution. On this basis, Zhou Dunyi, Zhang Zai, Cheng Hao, and Zhu Xi affirm the sensitivity and communicability of feeling between humanity and other species, which are humanity’s putative basal grounds for respecting other species and according them a sort of prima facie moral status.55 Hence, in the concluding chapter of the quintessential Neo-Confucian anthology, Reflections on Things at Hand (Jinsilu 近思錄), “The Disposition of the Sages and Worthies,” sec. 18, editor Zhu Xi quotes Cheng Hao’s observation: “Zhou Maoshu [Zhou Dunyi] did not cut the grass growing outside his window. When asked about it, he said, “[The feeling of the grass] and mine are the same.” When Zihou [Zhang Zai] heard 54

Adler, Reconstructing (2014a, b).

55

This assumption is also made in Zhuangzi’s anecdote of the happiness of the fish, which concludes the “Autumn Floods” chapter of the Zhuangzi (Watson 1965). Also, Dong Zhongshu writes of a minister who releases a fawn, against his prince’s orders, because he is moved by worried bleats of the fawn’s mother. The ruler reduces the minister’s penalty for this disregard of his order, because, “He had encountered a fawn and treated it with compassion. How much more would this be the case with regard to other human beings?” (De Bary 1999, p. 310). Rowland argues for this emotional similitude, which implicates human moral sensitivity and thus responsibility toward other species as well as humanity in Animals Like Us (2002). His “Introduction” is recommended.

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the bray of a donkey, he said the same thing.”56 Attributed to sages and worthies, such sensitivity and feeling are, to Zhu Xi’s way of thinking, reflective of the most acute and proper ethical exemplars whose feelings and emotions run deeper and more truly than do common sentiment and social values. Wing-tsit Chan provides Zhu Xi’s comment: Someone asked: As to Zhang Zai’s hearing of the donkey’s bray, was it his idea that the originative process of Nature became active of its own accord? Reply: Yes. But Master Zhang also happened to see the donkey in this way. If we were to say that one’s feeling and that of the grass were the same, shouldn’t we also say that that one’s feeling and those of trees and leaves are also the same? And if we say that one’s feeling in response to the brays of the donkey and one’s own call, shouldn’t we say that a horse’s neigh and one’s own call are the same, as well?”57 The moral-ethical implications of this sensitive, trans-species emotional resonance have yet to be worked out; however, they are not only poignant but ethically significant and, in my view, hold potential for grounding prospective ethics of animal (wild and domesticated) welfare, ecological sustainability, and environmental protection in East Asia and globally.58 Zhu Xi’s appreciation of Zhang Zai’s “Ode to Joy”: western inscription As noted, Zhang Zai authored a spirited and moving ode to Confucian Humanism: Western Inscription. It is fitting to conclude with this poignant masterpiece and Zhu Xi’s appreciation. Heaven is my father and Earth is my mother, and even such a small creature as I finds an intimate place in their midst. Therefore, that which fills the cosmos I regard as my body, and that which directs the cosmos I regard as my nature (basic propensity). All people are my brothers and sisters, and all things are my companions… Respect the aged—this is the way to treat them as elders should be treated. Show deep love toward the orphaned and the weak—this is the way to treat them as the young should be treated. The sage identifies his character with that of Heaven and Earth, and the worthy is the most outstanding man. Even those who are tired, infirm, crippled, or sick; those who have no brothers or children, wives or husbands, are all my brothers who are in distress and have no one to turn to.59 56

Chan, Reflections (1967, p. 302), slightly modified.

57

Ibid., 303.

58

For discussion, see Adler, Reconstructing (Adler 2014a, b) and Thompson, “Hierarchy of Immanence,” (1994). It is essential for East Asia to recognize its indigenous humanistic values, including their implications for animal welfare and environmental, ecological, and sustainability, to justify and spur needed developments in these domains. 59

On treating the young, the infirm, and the elderly, see Mencius 1A.7, 1B.5 (translator’s note).

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When the time comes, to keep himself from harm—this is the care of a son. To rejoice in Heaven and to have no anxiety—this is filial respect at its purest. He who disobeys [the pattern of Nature] violates virtue (De). He who destroys humanity is a robber. He who promotes evil lacks moral capacity. But he who puts his moral efficacy into practice and brings his physical existence into complete fulfillment can match [Heaven and Earth]. One who knows the principles of transformation will skillfully carry forward the undertakings of Heaven and Earth, and one who penetrates spirit to the utmost will skillfully carry out their will.60 Do nothing shameful in the recesses of your own house61 and thus bring no dishonor to them. Preserve your mind and nourish your nature (basic propensities) and thus serve them with untiring effort. The Great Yu disliked pleasant wine but attended to the protection and support of his parents.62 Border Warden Ying brought up and educated the young and extended his love to his own kind.63 Shun’s merit lay in delighting his parents with unceasing effort,64 and Shensheng’s reverence was demonstrated when he awaited punishment without making an attempt to escape.65 Cang Shen received his body from his parents and reverently kept it intact throughout life,66 while Boqi vigorously obeyed his father’s command.67 Wealth, honor, blessing, and benefits are meant for the enrichment of my life, while poverty, humble station, and sorrow are meant to help me to fulfillment.

60

Cf. the Doctrine of the Mean, ch. 19 (Chan 1963, p. 103f) (translator’s note).

61

Quoting the Odes, ode no. 256. “The recesses” refers to the northwest corner, the darkest place in the house (translator’s note).

62 Founder of the Xia dynasty (r. 2183–2175 B.C.E.). The story alludes to Mencius 4B.20 (translator’s note). 63 The story is found in Zuozhuan, Duke Yin, 1st year. See Legge trans. (1960 rpt.) Ch’un ch’iu, p. 4 (translator’s note). 64

Legendary sage emperor (3rd millennium B.C.E.). The story alludes to Mencius 4A.28 (translator’s note).

65

Heir apparent of the state of Jin who committed suicide because he was falsely accused of attempting to poison his father. Duke Xian (r. 676–651 B.C.E.). See Book of Rites (Legge trans. 1885) Li Ki, vol 1, pp. 126f (translator’s note). 66

Zengzi (505-c. 436 B.C.E.), pupil of Confucius, was known for his filial respect. In the Book of Filial Respect (Xiaojing), traditionally attributed to him, it is said, “Our bodies—to every hair and bit of skin— are received by us from our parents, and we must not presume to injure or wound them.” See Makre trans. Hsiao King, p. 3 (translator’s note). 67

Yin Boqi’s was a ninth century B.C.E. prince. He obediently accepted his father’s expulsion of him at the instigation of his stepmother, who wanted her own son to be the crown prince. See annotations on the eulogy at the end of ch. 79 of Qian Hanshu (History of the Former Han), 206 B.CE.-8 A.D. (translator’s note).

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In life, I follow and serve [Heaven and Earth]. In death, I will be at peace68 These teachings express a deeply emotional, relational, yet rational form of Humanism that underscores the unity of cosmos, nature, and humanity in a moralethical perspective.

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Chan trans., A Source Book (1963, p. 497f). Translator W.T. Chan comments (1963, p. 498ff): “Zhang Zai’s Western Inscription has become the basis of Neo-Confucian ethics. Cheng Yi was not exaggerating when he said there was nothing like it since Mencius…. As Cheng Yi said, it deals with the formation of Humanity (ren). Its primary purpose, as Yang Shi 楊時 (1053–1135) pointed out, was to urge students to cultivate and practice ren. “Zhu Xi commented, “There is nothing in the entire realm of creatures that does not regard Heaven as the father and Earth as the mother. This means that pattern/principle is one…. Each regards his parents as his own parents and his son as his own son. This being the case, how can pattern/principle not be regarded as many?… When the intense affection for parents is extended to broaden the impartiality that knows no ego, and absolute sincerity in serving one’s parents leads to the understanding of the way to serve Heaven, then everywhere there is the operation that “the pattern/principle is one but its manifestations are many.” In summary, “in the understanding of Neo-Confucianism, the Western Inscription in thus preserving the harmony of formation and expression of humaneness and putting it on a deeper basis, carries the doctrine of humaneness to a higher level than before. It also paves the way Zhu Xi to work out his mature NeoConfucian account of humaneness” (Chan 1963, p. 497f).

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