CRITICAL REFLECTIONS A Response to Paramilitary Policing in Northern Ireland Pat Conway, NIACRO This essay arises from the experiences of a practitioner who has, until recently, managed a project offering services to those under threat from paramilitary organisations. This essay is divided into two sections. The first section offers an overview of the ideologies and practices of Loyalist and Republican pararrdlitaries regarding I informatjustice. The secondsection exa~nes theproblems of intervention with those [ under threat and the insights offered by an analysis of the project's casework.

INTRODUCTION During the past 27 years of the 'troubles' in Northern Ireland, there has existed a state of armed conflict between Republicans and the British State and Loyalists. A bi-product of this conflict has been the lack of consensus policing recorded since 1972 by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). It is important to note that, whilst there is little consensus on how the population of Northern Ireland should be policed, this does not equate to a policing vacuum. Given the fact that there are over 30,000 state police and military personnel as well as the Loyalist and Republican policing agents, it would be truer to say that the citizens of Northern Ireland experience a surfeit of policing. Since 1972, the RUC have noted that over 2,000 individuals have been subject to punishment shootings. The 1982 statistics from the same source suggest that, in addition, over 1,000 people have been assaulted by paramilitary organisations. During the course of the conflict, there has also been a development of tariff systems in Republican and Loyalist administration of their own informal justice systems. The Republican (primarily IRA) tariff system is more sophisticated than that of Loyalist organisations, but both reflect, in a more extreme form, the tariff system that exists within the state criminal justice system. In terms of the Republican tariff system, this ranges from cautioning and includes reparation,painting, tarring and feathering, placarding, curfewing, exiling (both locally and out of Northern Ireland), beatings, gradated shootings (knees, ankles, elbows, or a combination of these), culminating in some individuals being shot dead. The Loyalist tariff system is much looser and more truncated involving reparation, exiling, beatings, shootings, and death. In 1990, a project was established that sought to divert individuals from being subject to paramilitary physical punishments. From its inception, the project has dealt with over 1,000 people under threat. Base 2, as it was called, was also established to contribute to a co-ordinated response to the problem in

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co-operation with statutory and voluntary agencies. A specific intervention, based in the voluntary sector, was necessary because of the difficulty statutory agencies found in engaging with illegal, informal justice. Broadly speaking, the project was designed to respond to individuals and families presenting as under threat and provide a casework service where appropriate. It sought to do this by first, attempting to negotiate the safe maintenance of those under threat in their communities but where that was not possible, relocating people, principally in Northern Ireland, the Irish Republic, or Britain. Despite the dangers of being seen to legitimate paramilitary beating or exclusion systems (discussed below), the project was established because of the obvious need for practical services for the victims involved. COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS BETWEEN REPUBLICAN AND LOYALIST POLICING In the field of what is variously called community policing, alternative policing, or vigilantism, Johnson (1992) outlines three models. Pro-active Crime Prevention

The Neighbourhood Watch Schemes that are particularly prevalent in England and Wales fit this mode. Another example is the Guardian Angel movement originating in New York. Broadly speaking, the purpose of pro-active crime prevention is to provide a visible presence designed to dissuade offending. Retributive Justice

This is a violent reaction by individuals or groups who respond spontaneously to an offence or an alleged offence, for example, the assault of an unadj udicated sex offender. Maintenance of the Communal, Ethnic or Sectarian Order

This category is most appropriate to the situation in Northern Ireland. What distinguishes it from the other two, at least in the context of Northern Ireland, is that it is collective and organised rather than individualistic and spontaneous. This difference holds true whether it emanates from Republican or Loyalist sources. The degree of the collective and level of organisation is at this stage irrelevant. It has identif'uable political origins with considerable community support to enable it to function. It has at least significant degrees of acquiescence in the communities in which it is enforced. Johnston (1992) asks what the social pre-conditions are that would enable what he terms 'private justice' to develop. He suggests that this form of policing arises through populist mobilisation, 'following the state's apparent inability to deliver security and

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justice under conditions of instability and change.' He goes on to argue that it 'is commonly associated with social disorder or at least with the wide spread perception that social order is under threat' (ibid.: 15). Both Republican and Loyalist paramilitary groupings operate strict systems of internal discipline and some 'informal policing' is directed to its enforcement. Both also operate in what Cain (1985) describes as the 'advance mode' of community policing. This means that they purport to advance the interests of their entire communities by protecting them from anti-social crime through informal policing. Bell (1996) notes that alternative justice systems have existed in Ireland in the 19th and 20th centuries and that these have been directly linked to political unrest. She advances the notion that law is a means of communication and that acts of violence, whether they be carried out by the state, paramilitary organisations, or vigilante groups, are perceived differently by each of these groupings. She suggests that: The existence of the dual system has implications for state justice. The existence of alternative justice systems in both Nationalist and Loyalistareas graphically raises the issues of the involvement and ownership of the criminal justice apparatus by working class communities.., both state and alternative systems show a failure of law to rise above partisan interests and toarticulateaclear vision oftherule of law. Theirpresent symbiosis presents a unique form of 'Irish law' which presents a tangible challenge to innovations which seek to replace it. (Bell 1996: 166-167) THE NATURE OF REPUBLICAN POLICING Practically all the media and research material relating to Republican policing relates to the current phase of civil unrest in Ireland, i.e. the period from 1968 to the present. However, commentators such as O'Doherty (1994) have noted that there are precedents, particularly in the early part of the 20th century. Sinn Fein Arbitration Courts and Dail 1Courts operated during the War of Independence, mainly in the South of the country, between 1919 and 1922. They involved lay arbitrators and jurors but were largely administered, and their judgements enforced, by the IRA. Morrissey and Pease (1982) direct the first serious academic attention to what was subsequently called an informal justice system. This is despite the fact that the phenomenon has existed at least since 1972. Morrissey and Pease also note that following the defacto breakdown of the civil powers in the early 1970s, attempts were made to replicate their functions on a community basis. Peoples' Courts were established in Catholic 'no-go areas' with the IRA acting as the ultimate sanction. These Peoples' Courts, with their relatively elaborate structures, collapsed for various reasons and have not been re-activated.

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Morrissey and Pease (1982) identify the double paradox of the present-day situation as it relates to Republican Policing. On one hand, an urban guerrilla organisation conducting violent acts with the object of overthrowing a British State in Ireland simultaneously takes on the responsibility of dealing with those whom it considers engaged in violent acts against the community. On the other, it metes out forms of punishment greater in severity than those practised by the state itself on the West Belfast community, by justifying the actions as protection of that community. Morrissey and Pease (1982: 165) conclude that: 1 The range of options used by the IRA, i.e. 'tariff' merited the description 'punishment system.' 2 There is a significant degree of support among the community in West Belfast for an informal justice system. 3 Key elements of a justice system exist, e.g. seriousness of offence, previous record, youth and gender as mitigating factors to name but some. 4 The most crucial difference between the state and anti-state system is the right to trial. The contradictions in this system of justice are questioned by human-rights organisations and some community groups, not to mention press and media. However, the Republican Movement is robust in its own defence, pointing to the lack of legitimacy of the RUC, the latter's use of petty criminals as informers and the community's fight of self-defence (Kennedy 1995). Quite apart from these communal issues, it has also been suggested that there is a military dynamic to the IRA's engagement in these activities. For example, Munck (1988) has suggested that the Provisional IRA police the 'hoods' only because of the'harm they cause the war effort' against British forces. McCorry and Morrissey (1989) argue that in formal policing diverts resources away from the military effort. It may be difficult to make clear distinctions between what constitutes the 'military struggle' and communal policing. However, it is certainly true that the Republican Movement invests considerable time and energy in policing its communities with a distinct element of the IRA in each identifiable Republican area administering its own policing. ~ The logistical and administrative requirements of hearing complaints, investigating, and deciding on appropriate action are considerable? A particular target of Republican policing in the recent past has been the use and sale of illicit drugs. As Hollywood (1997) argues in this volume, it is clear that, to some extent, IRA action against drugs is driven by a moral disapproval and their reaction to moral panic in the community. A less publicised argument heard by the author from Republican sources is that the main reason why the Provisional IRA is opposed to the use of drugs by young people in the area is because Loyalist organisations were perceived to be the suppliers of drugs, sometimes using the republican splinter group, the Irish People's Liberation

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Organisation, as a conduit. This arrangement had security implications for the Republican movement. In addition, young people implicated in drug use might be susceptible to pressure from the RUC to act as informers. On Tuesday 26 April 1994, Frank 'Rico' Rice was shot dead and 15 others knee-capped, allegedly for dealing in drugs. In the days that followed, others were knee-capped and a women in her twenties had her head shaved (Andersonstown News 1994: 5). The IRA statement said that it, would continue to hunt down around 90 drug pushers who escaped its massive dragnet on Monday night. A number of these have been sentenced to death. That sentence will be carried out in due course. (ibid.) Since the declaration of the cease-fires in 1994, several individuals were shot dead by an organisation called 'Direct Action Against Drugs' (DAAD) which is generally accepted to be a flag of convenience for the IRA. THE NATURE OF LOYALIST POLICING The complexity of Loyalist policing (discussed in greater detail by Winston [1997] in this volume) can only be understood in terms of their ideological and practical ambiguity with regard to the state. On the one hand, they purport to be defenders of the British nation and its union with Northern Ireland. On the other, they go outside the law and have confronted the security forces of that state. It is because of these complexities that Loyalism in general has proved extremely difficult on which to comment accurately, particularly when describing or accounting for the need for Loyalistparamilitary groups to exercise a policing function. This difficultyaccounts for the paucity of literature on the subject. In addition, Bruce's (1992: 268) description of Loyalist paramilitary organisations as compared to the IRA is worth repeating here: Less well organised and less well staffed; less selective and less skilful in their operations; less well funded and less well armed; more vulnerable to the policing of the security focus; more vulnerable to the propaganda work of the government's agencies; less well able to develop an enduring political programme and community base for their activity; more vulnerable to racketeering; and hence less popular with the population they claim to defend. It is noticeable that of those referred to Base 2, where there are suspicions of membership of Loyalist paramilitary organisations, it has to be said that the quality of recruits would appear to be significantlylower than that of the IRA. Bruce (ibid.: 271) gives an explanation that would seem to account for this

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difference, arguing that 'the state and the pro-state recruit from the same population. The Crown forces have the advantages of being legal, respectable, and paying well.' Those factors may be relevant in accounting for differences in the structure and administration of punishment carried outby Loyalist paramilitaries. Bell (1996) suggests that they lack the formalisation of the more systematic IRA punishment shootings. Warnings tend not to be given, and there has been little attempt to communicate any ideology behind the shootings, or develop the more fully-fledged community-justice system with a wider range of punishments. RUC statistics indicate that the policing of Loyalist areas would appear to have become more widespread. Although Republican organisations are using exclusion to a greater degree, this does not seem to have been adopted by Loyalist paramilitary groupings. The reason for this may be because excluding somebody from 'the country,' in their terms, would mean outside the United Kingdom. Bruce (1992: 105-106) alludes to a form of internal exile where members of paramilitary organisations are excluded from particular districts of Belfast - this possibly reflects the factional nature of Loyalism particularly during the 1970s and early 1980s when 'spheres of influence' were relatively small and unity of purpose was at times of secondary consideration. In terms of Loyalist policing, there are again two distinct elements. The first is the internal policing of a particular organisation and the second would be what broadly is described as community policing. In terms of community policing, the major issue during the past few years has been the use of drugs and the role the paramilitary organisations - particularly the UVF/UDA and IPLO.4 In particular, discussions have focused around the extent to which Loyalist and fringe Republican groups have colluded with each other in supplying drugs. This is traditionally denied by the UVF. ~ In the following section, I offer an account of the experiences of a practical project engaged in dealing with the victims of paramilitary punishment beatings. BASE 2: AN INTERVENTION TO ASSIST PEOPLE UNDER THREAT Problems of Intervention

The issue of working with those under threat presents difficulties for both statutory helping agencies and non-government organisations (NGOs). The statutory helping agencies can be represented by the organisations providing assistance in the field of welfare, probation, education, housing, and youth work. There also exists in Northern Ireland a very highly developed NGO network working in the areas of social policy and practice. The problem for all

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these organisations is that they operate in a climate where the very legitimacy of the state is continually under question, particularly in Republican areas. One of the key areas where contested legitimacy manifests itself is in the lack of consensus around policing. By definition, statutory organisations have to operate within the constraints of legislation and government policy. Acknowledgement and interaction with elements of the in formaljustice system creates difficulties for statutory helping organisations as to interact may imply at least tacit acceptance of the power that paramilitary organisations exert. It is a central strand of British Government policy to deny the legitimacy of paramilitary organisations. Having said that, the individuals and families that are being dealt with by statutory organisations are impacted on by the actions of paramilitary organisations, particularly those engaged in policing activities. During the past ten years, there has been a significant increase in the number of NGOs prepared (to varying degrees) to engage directly with the problem and the systems. Many of these organisations are in receipt of state finance and it can be therefore argued that, while these organisations have an advocating role, they represent, in effect, state intervention, albeit carried out by proxy. In other words, the NGOs carry out work that statutory helping organisations are unwilling or unable to undertake. In the area of the informal justice system, which involves direct contact with paramilitary organisations, NGOs must tread carefully. Their organisational stance (for example, opposition to violent punishments) has to be stated and acknowledged very clearly. Issues such as distinguishing between verification of the nature of a threat and negotiation on the 'sentence' to be imposed, need to be clearly delineated. The former is a proper exercise in discovering the extent of danger; the latter is to collude with the right of organisations to use violent punishments. NGOs, and specifically Base 2, can therefore appear to operate within the 'no-man's land' dividing state and anti-state policing systems. In order that safe practice be achieved, Base 2 in particular subscribes to two broad principles. 9 Base 2 aims to establish a safe system of practice that seeks to intervene effectively with those individuals or families under threat of physical injury or possibly death from paramilitary organisations in Northern Ireland. 9 Base 2 provides a discrete and confidential service to those presenting as being under threat and at the same time, operates within the parameters of the criminal justice system and child-care legislation of Northern Ireland. Based on these two principles, Base 2, through its expertise and experience, developed a proactive style of intervention - first, to verify the nature of the threat and second, where appropriate, to relocate the individuals in a safe placement.

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Casework Undertaken By Base 2 in 1996

The experience of Base 2 bears out the arguments in the literature that there are significant differences between Loyalist and Republican policing. The reasons for being under threat are more varied within the Loyalist context. Those cases that have been referred to Base 2 from Loyalist areas (and referred to in the following section) are more significantly about Loyalists policing their own organisations for reasons such as internal disputes and informing. This is substantially different from what occurs within Republican areas. Very rarely are referrals made to Base 2 about individuals who are believed to be associated with the Republican movement. Within the Loyalist context, young people involved in anti-social crime rather than being marginalised by paramilitaries can often be actively encouraged to either 'join up' or at the very least contribute a percentage of proceeds obtained through criminal activity. This has also been the case in regard to peripheral Republican groups. It may also prove difficult for an individual who wishes to cease membership of a Loyalist organisation to do so. Since its inception in December 1990, Base 2 has dealt with over 1000 cases of individuals and families under threat. The analysis of casework that follows is designed to illustrate and support the general points made in the previous sections. Until the Republican and Loyalist cease-fires were declared in 1994, the numbers being referred to Base 2 averaged approximately 200 per annum. (Base 2 for various years). The number of individuals shot by paramilitary organisations in the year 1993 was 85, while those being subject to punishment assaults numbered 41 (RUC 1994: 3). In the few months prior to the cease-fires being declared, a policing 'mopping up' operation seems to have occurred, particularly on the Republican side. This was reflected in the numbers of punishment shootings and assaults actually carried out as well a significant increase in the numbers referred to Base 2 - a 50% increase. In 1996, the RUC catalogued a total of 302 punishment assaults. Of these 172 were carried out by Republican organisations and 130 by Loyalists. In addition, there were 21 punishment shootings carried out by Loyalist organisations and three by Republicans. The total number of punishment attacks carried out by paramilitary organisations for 1996 was 326. This significant rise in attacks is reflected in the number of referrals to Base 2. For the whole of 1995, there were 224 referrals, this increased to 393 in 1996 (Conway 1995, 1996). It is evident from the statistics that the issue of paramilitary policing has moved centre stage. This is acknowledged in the call contained within the Mitchell Principles *that violent attacks carried out on individuals by paramilitary organisations should cease. It is interesting to note that, after the cease-fire declarations, punishment shootings, as opposed to beatings, decreased dramatically. Itis also the case that, although the RUC statistics attribute assaults

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and shootings to paramilitary organisations, the same organisations have been less inclined to claim responsibility for these attacks. There appears to be a direct correlation between the political situation at any given time and the rate of referral to Base 2. For example, the number of those who were subject to sectarian intimidation rose directly as a consequence of the events around Drumcree in the summer of 1996. In 1996 most (93.1%) of the 393 referrals to Base 2 were male (Conway 1996). This gender breakdown has remained similar to that of previous years in overviews carried out by the author (Conway 1995, 1996). Almost 20% of those referred to Base 2 were aged 17 and under (Conway 1996). These young people present a particular problem to child welfare services and some cases are inappropriately placed in state institutions. In the past, the IRA has operated a less violent tariff system aimed at under 17 yearolds that included 'curfewing,' 'tarring and feathering,' and 'placarding.' Figures have always been difficult to obtain in relation to the lower end of the tariff, given its localised nature and the fact that it is rarely reported to the RUC and/or the statutory authorities. The largest group referred would be over 17 and under 25 years of age- 42% (ibid.). It is this age group that is probably most criminally active and the proportion is in itself unsurprising. During the year 1996, 60% of those under threat claimed to have been threatened by the IRA (Conway 1996). The remaining 40% claim to have been threatened by a range of Loyalistorganisations (ibid.). Individuals under threat are threatened for a variety of reasons. The largest group would be those engaged in anti-social behaviour - 138 or 35% (ibid.). However, there are a significant number of individuals who were referred to the project for drug usage and/or dealing- 110 or 28% (ibid.). Other reasons for being under threat would include; intimidation; informing; sex offences, either adjudicated or non-adjudicated; joy-riding; and significantlyamongst Loyalistorganisations, internal feuding- 20 or 6% (ibid.). In previous overviews of Base 2, (Conway 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995) internal feuding and informing has generally been a feature of Loyalist organisations placing people under threat.

What Happens To Those Under Threat Once They Have Contacted The Project During the period 1996, 12 (4%) left their home address, 72 (18%) left their area, 42 (11%) left the city of Belfast and 106 (27 %) left the country usually to somewhere in England and Scotland (Conway 1996). At the time the statistics for 1996 were being compiled, 26 (7%) were still in prison (ibid.). No threat existed in relation to 37 (9%) of referrals, and in the case of 22 (6%) individuals, the threat was lifted (ibid.). The remaining referrals made no further contact after an initial visit (5%), or rejected assistance from Base 2 - 29 or 7% (ibid.). It is known that 10 (2.5%) referrals decided to ignore the threat and stay where they were (ibid,).

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Most of those using the service of Base 2 seek to re-locate from their home. However, a significant number of individuals and families for a variety of reasons decided to remain where they were. In terms of service delivery, Base 2 had to acknowledge this and sought to develop a system of practice that would retain individuals where they were without them coming to harm. Placements in Britain, often of young people who have never been outside their own communities, are problematic. When one considers the ambivalent (at the very least) attitudes towards them experienced by young Irish people living in Britain (Curran 1993), particularly at a time when the IRA is at its most active in Britain, it is hardly surprising that placements break down. Placements can either break down by the individual returning to Northern Ireland, 'taking their chances' and facing whatever punishment may be meted out by paramilitary organisations, or as has happened in several cases, individuals will continue to practice what they are good at when faced with the enormity of their move. In short, they will turn to crime if that was the reason they were told to leave Northern Ireland in the first place. From their point of view, the unfortunate thing is that they are more likely to be apprehended by the local police. 7 People referred to Base 2 have articulated feelings such as anger, lost, worry, instability, panic, rejection, confusion, loneliness, and being out of control. If exiled, these feelings were not left behind in Northern Ireland but rather they were exacerbated. One of the issues to which Base 2 workers have to make individuals going to Britain aware, is the fact that, although some of them may consider themselves to be British (Loyalists), they will find this questioned when they leave Northern Ireland. In many cases, they will be viewed as Irish despite protestations to the contrary.8 Given that a significant amount of resources, particularly in the London area, are controlled by organisations that would have a Southern Irish Catholic ethos, it can be difficult, if not impossible, to place perceived Loyalist individuals with these organisations. There is, therefore, a conscious decision on the part of Base 2 to re-locate those who would describe themselves as Loyalist, or coming from a Loyalist background, in a' more secular and certainly non-Catholic environment. Taking into account the cultural shock and, at worse, mental illness and/or prison, involved in a placement outside Northern Ireland, as opposed to being possibly maimed or killed by paramilitaries, it is not surprising that, in some situations, there are individuals who will choose to take their chances with the paramilitary organisations and turn up for a pre-arranged 'knee-capping' or beating. An important issue rarely commented on is the fact that being under threat affects not only an individual directly, but in many cases, partners and children of potential victims. In 1996, Base 2 facilitated the move of 121 children (Conway 1996). These children are the hidden victims of paramilitary policing who have had to leave their schools, friends, and other social networks.

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CONCLUSION The first recorded punishment shootings and assaults in the current conflict were recorded in 1972. It is thus clear that paramilitary policing has occurred and developed within a context of serious social unrest. It is also clear that, by the time the 1994 cease-fires were declared, informal policing was almost institutionalised within certain areas of Northern Ireland, particularly in working-class Republican and Loyalist areas. The cease-fire declared by the IRA in 1994 was declared in the expectation that political gains would be made without the need for 'armed struggle.' The subsequent Loyalist declaration was clearly conditional on the maintenance of the IRA cease-f'tre. Both ceasef'tres were defined in terms of'military operations' and this definition seems to have excluded paramilitary policing activities, although there have been a significant reduction in the number of shootings carried out in punishment attacks by both Republican and Loyalist organisations. There seems to have been a tacit acceptance by all parties that usage of f'trearms would endanger both Republican and Loyalist cease-fires. The effect of the cease-fires has been to project the policing debate into the wider public arena (Kennedy 1995). The context of this essay has been the identification of the lack of consensus policing. Ultimately, it has to be said that consensus policing is unlikely to be achieved without a positive resolution to the political circumstances of Northern Ireland. In themeantime, itislikelythat paramilitary organisations will continue to exert themselves in a military and policing manner. As long as this situation continues, it is important that a service continues to be provided for those individuals who are a product of nonconsensus policing. Base 2 is an example of how practical projects within civil society in Northern Ireland have evolved around the ideological and material contours of the violent conflict. It is the author's hope that this essay, as well as offering an understanding of the character of the informal policing element of that conflict, also describes a non-violent and effective response which, it is hoped, will ultimately become unnecessary. NOTES I The Dail was the revolutionary assembly established by Sinn Fcin in the period following the Easter Rising. It is now the Irishterm for the lower house of the parliament of the Republic of Ireland. 2 The degree of autonomy of IRA policing units in differentareas produces the anomaly that it is possible in some cases for individuals to m o v e from one Republican area to another whilst being under threat. It can be the case that they will not come to any physical harm providing they do not acquire a profilesimilar to the one they had in thclrarea of origin. 3 A n interesting account of the decision-making process and actions carded out is contained within the testimony given in court by the discreditedRepublican informer Christopher Black. This account has several features that are not u n c o m m o n with many other cases. Essentially, two juvcnilcs were questioned about joy-riding,burglaries,glue-sniffmg, and involvement in drugs. They were told to turn up at a specific location at a specifictimc and were questioned

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about various alleged activities. Because of their age, the two boys were allowed to leave the location unharmed. At some stage, a decision was made at higher level that the individual who was receiving goods stolen by the two youths was going to be 'knee-capped.' The victim was told to turn up at a pre-arranged location but was not given the real reason as to why he should be there. A gun was obtained and the victim was gagged and then shot, once in each knee. (Papers obtained by the author, Linenhall Library, Belfast, December 1996). The UVF (Ulster Volunteer Force) and the UDA (Ulster Dcfence Association) are the two main Loyalist paramilitary organisations. The IPLO (Irish People's Liberation Organisation) were a Republican Socialist splinter grotlp, ultimately disbanded after the IRA killed one of its leading members and injured a number of its members for alleged drug dealing and collusion with Loyalists. In a suppliedstatementfrom the Brigade staffofthe U V F (Combat March, 1991 :6),the U V F deny any involvement in the trade,'The Command Staffof the UlsterVolunteer Force state unequivocally that they never have, do not, and will not have any dealings in drugs nor be in any way associated with drug dealers. To the contrary in the past volunteers have been responsible for breaking up of drag cartelsand the punishment of participants. On the accusationof collusionwith any Republicans thereare many men incarceratedin prisons and many who have losttheirlivesby engaging againstthesepeople. Wo4ald the UlsterVolunteer Force sullythe names of theircomrades by fraternisingwith the enemy7 The answer is an ernl~aticno and the only exchange with the IPLO and theirsortwould bc the exchange of live ammunition. The U V F warned thatthose stillengaged in drug dealingdo so attheirown peril.' The MitchellPrincipleswere drawn up by SenatorGeorge Mitchellto lay down the framework in which the politicalwings of Loyalistand Republican paramilitaryorganisationscould take up theirseatsin the all-partypeace talks. The author had the expeficneeof visitingone individualplaced in England who had ended up in Wandsworth Prison. When enteringthe visitingarea of the prison,two other individuals known tothe authorgave him a cheery wave,both of whom were residentsof thisestablishment. The author was toldby one individualwho receiveda prison sentencefor making hoax bomb calls,thatbe objectedtobeing calledan Irishterroristby thepresidingjudge ina casein London. His protestations that he was a British terrorist did not result in any diminution of his sentence.

REFERENCES

Andersonstown News. April 30, 1994. 21 (21): 1-24 Base 2. 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996. Casework Overviews. Author's personalpapers Bell,C. 1996. 'AlternativeJusticein Ireland,'in N. Dawson, D. Grecr, and P. Ingrain,eds.,One Hundred and F ~ y Years oflrishLaw, 145-167. Belfast:Queen's Univcrsltyof Belfast,SIS Legal Publications - 1992. 'Puishment Beatings.'Unpublished paper,Law Faculty,Queen's University,Belfast Black, C. 1982. Police Statement made on 24th September. Author's personal papers Brace, S. 1992. The Red Hand: Protestant Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland. Oxford: Oxford University Press ) Cain, M. 1988. Beyond InformalJustice,in R. Matthcws, cd.,InformalJustice,51-87. London: Sage Combat. March, 1991. 'UVF Deny IPLO Drugs Link.' Belfast : Combat Publications,1-14 Conway, P. 1992 - 1996. Annual Overview of Base 2 Casework. Belfast:Niacro Curran, MJ. 1993. 'Effectsof CultureShock and Other Factorson IrishImmigrants in London.' Unpublished M.Sc. thesis.Universityof Surrey, Department of PsychologicalCounselling, Roehampton Institute Johnston,L. 1993. 'Vigilantismand Informal Justicein the United Kingdom.' Paper presentedto the BritishSociety of Criminology, Universityof Cardiff,28th-31stJuly Kennedy, L. 1995. 'Nightmares within Nightmares: ParamilitaryRepression within Working Class Communities,' in I..Kennedy, ed.,Crime andPunishment inWestBelfasl,67-80.Belfast: The Summer School McCorry, J, and M. Morriscy. 1989. 'Community Crime and Punishment in West Belfast.' Howard Journa/, 28 (4): 289-292

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Morrissey, M., and K. Pease. 1982. 'The Black Criminal Justice System in West Belfast.' Howard Journal, 21 (Spring): 159-166 Munck, R, 1988. 'The Lads and the Hoods: Alternative Justice in an Irish Context,' in M. Tomlinson, T. Vadey, and K. McCullagh, eds., Whose Law and Order: Aspects of Crlme and Social Control in an Irish Society, 41-54. Belfast: Sociological Association of Ireland O'Doherty, M. 1994. Uncompleted Doctoral Thesis at Queen's University Belfast. Author's personal papers RUC. 1994. Statistics relating to punishment shootings and assaults provided toauthoron request. Belfast: Central Statistics Unit, M Dept., RUC Lisnasharragh Belfast