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An Unnecessary Neologism in Two Systems of Mediation PeterJ.D. Carnevale

The analysis of mediation and other forms of third party intervention requires grappling with difficult conceptual problems, some of which Keith Murnighan discusses in the preceding article. Two such problems are: (a) how to define and describe mediation; and (b) how to develop models of mediation that are applicable across the variety of contexts within which mediation occurs. My purpose in this article is to examine how these problems have been handled in recent discussions of mediation, and then shove- how they relate to Keith Murnighan's new concept, "intravention." Several recently proposed distinctions between two systems of mediation have a great deal in common with one another, and with Murnighan's distinction between "intravention" and mediation. These include Kressel and Pruitt's (1985) distinction between "emergent" and "contractual" mediation; Smith's (1986) "traditional" and "internatiolml" mediation; Touval's (1986) "apolitical" and "political" mediation; Susskind and Madigan's (1984) "passive" and "active" mediation; and Kolb's (1986) "industrial relations" and "organizational" mediation (a distinction also made by Carnevale, forthcoming). To my mind, Mumighan's "intravention" concept is a form of emergent mediation, and thus fits very well with recent conceptual work in this field. Murnighan argues that to understand mediation we should not pay attention to how it is practiced. Instead, he argues, we should start with dictionary definitions of mediation and intervention and then develop a theoretical framework that follows from these definitions. It is encouraging that Murnighan's conceptual results are similar to the results of those who have paid more attention to how it is practiced.

Systems of Mediation Because of the variety of domains--international, interpersonal, labormanagement, divorce, etc.~within which mediation occurs, it is not surprising that people who study, practice, and write about mediation disagree about what mediation is and what mediators do. It seems that mediation in each domain has its own set of unique characteristics and assumptions that make it difficult to see common features with other domains (see, for example, Kressel and Pruitt, 1985, p. 196). But recently, several writers have proposed that some mediation contexts have features in common with others, and that it is possible to identify P e t e r Carnevale is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Psychology and the Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, University of Illinois, 603 East Daniel St., Champaign, Ill. 61820. His publications include (with Edward Lawler) "Time Pressure and the DeveloDment of Integrative Agreements in Bilateral Negotiation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming.

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two distinct contexts or systems of mediation. Murnighan's notion of"intravention" fits nicely with this work.

Distinguishing Mediation Contexts Kressel and Pruitt (1985, p. 189) make a distinction between "contractual" mediation, where the mediator is an "outsider" whom the parties hire to help them reach agrcement, versus "emergent" mediation, where the mediator and parties are involved in a long-term continuing relationship. "Ilhey argue that in contractual mediation, entry into a dispute requires little initiative on behalf of the mediator. But in emergent mediation, entry becomes a paramount strategic issue. And emergent mediation is the more c o m m o n type, occurring in everyday relationships found in families, organizations, and international affairs. A related distinction is made by Rubin (1985), who argues that mediation in formal, institutional settings, such as labor relations, is different from mediation in organizations, families, and international relations. Other writers make similar points. Kolb ( 1 9 8 6 ) and Carnevale ( f o r t h c o m i n g ) argue that organizational researchers have been using the wrong model for understanding the forms that mediation takes in organizations. They argue that the formal, professional model of labor mediation is not adequate because mediation like that does not o c c u r in organizations. Instead, organizational mediation takes on a more informal, less structured form. Kolb (1986, p. 6), in fact, notes that: Looking for examples of organizational mediation solelyin terms of formal role ignores the emergent and less formal types of mediation that are common in community and international disputes. The general characteristics of mediation in these contexts may be more appropriate analogs for what occurs in organizations. It may be that Murnighan's notion of mediation is based on the formal, professional model of mediation, common in labor relations contexts, and that his notion of"intraventioff' is this less formal, emergent mediation, albeit a high power form of it. If this is the case, it m a y b e useful to consider the similarities in the distinctions drawn by different wa'iters and Murnighan's distinction between mediation and intravention. As another example, Smith ( 1 9 8 5 ) and Tom~al ( 1 9 8 5 ) make a very clear case for considering mediation in two different contexts. They make similar distinctions between two systems of mediation: "traditional" versus "international" for Smith, and "political" versus "'apolitical" for Touval. In apolitical systems, the mediators are commonly invited by the parties, who are paid to help them resolve the dispute. They have no long-term relationship or interdependences with the mediator. They can terminate the relationship with the mediator without much difficulty In this system, power and influence are not much of an issue. Here, the mediators are usually impartial, in part due to the lack of prior and future relationships. "Mediators in apolitical systems," notes Touval (1985, pp. 376-377) "are usually invited by the parties, in the expectation that they will help resolve the conflict. They are also usually impartial, a quality made possible by the absence of previous interdependence, and the mediation is not expected to affect future relations between the mediator and the parties." In political systems, 358

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the mediators are often not invited, but interject themselves in the dispute, and they have an interest in the outcome. 'I~ney often are not impartial, yet remain acceptable and even effective. And, according to Touval, they are usually powerful. Finally, SussMnd and Madigan (1984, p. 182) distinguish passive mediation from active mediation. In passive mediation, they note, "the mediator is only concerned with process issues, working hard to ensure that the process is fair and unbiased in the eyes of the parties at the table. The active mediator is concerned wdth the process and quality of the outcome." The active mediator is concerned about the broader context of relationships, with other parties not at the table, and with the long-term consequences of the outcome. According to Susskind and Madigan, the advocates of passive mediation are influenced by the labor-management model, whereas "advocates of active mediation rely more on an international relations model of dispute resolution."

Strategic Mediator Choice in Two Systems of Mediation ff it is useful to distinguish two systems of mediation, it becomes interesting to consider the differences in the types of mediation strategy that occur in each system. According to Murnighan, intravenors, because of their expanded base of control, have more strategic options than. mediators, mainly because they can reward the disputants in the outcome. He argues that mediators can use only integrating and pressing, but intravenors can use these, as well as inaction and compensation. Murnighan says that an intravenor may not want to bother with integration--that it is too much effort, and that because the mediator is more dependent than the intravenor, integration is more likely for mediators than intravenors. Aggressive pressing is more likely to be the case for intravenors than mediators, and compensation is also more likely for the intravenor. Murnighan argues that by definition, mediators do not have the opportunity to choose inaction. His reason is that they are invited to join a dispute--and for them to be inactive makes their reason for being there unnecessary. But this is a simple and narrow view of inaction--that of becoming involved or not in a dispute. Inaction is a much more complex strategy than that. It is a strategy that can be used in mediation. An example of inaction, that I have observed in labor mediation in the public sector, was the mediator sitting in the hall and letting the parties talk it over by themselves before entering their joint session. Murnighan also argues that mediators are not able to compensate. A similar argument is made by Young (1972, p. 53) who stated that an absence of a contract zone produces "no scope ff)r the activities of an intermediary." But this view belies the many instances where mediators offered compensation, or side pa~a-nents, which added new elements to the bargaining set, restructured the bargaining emdronment, and p r o d u c e d agreements. Of course, mediators can only do this if the strategic power, the compensation, is in their repertoire. Nevertheless, Murnighan's ideas appear to represent reasonable hypotheses about the influence of mediator power on mediator strategic choice. And they appear to be generally consistent with predictions from the strategic choice model (Carnevale, 1986), which recent research supports (Carnevale and Henrg, 1986).

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Conclusions My strategic choice model was constructed in part to tie together, in general terms, research on mediation in a variety of domains. After some thought, the model is probably most fully applicable to emergent mediation contexts, such as found in interpersonal, organizational, and international mediation, and less applicable to public sector or judicial mediation, where there are constraints on mediation, especially institutional arrangements and other constraints that preclude compensation. But I hope that there are features of the model that are useful for understanding contractual mediation. Aside from Muruighan's paper, Pruitt's (1981) paper on Kissinger's activities in the Middle East raises many interesting questions about mediator power: Under what circumstances will a powerful third party who can impose an outcome decide not to, and instead choose to mediate? What are the key dimensions that distinguish powerful third parties? Are there different forms of mediator power, and do they have different consequences for mediation and negotiation? With regard to this last question, I should note that in a recent study, Jackie Idaszak and I have found that when mediators had the p o w e r to compensate, bargainers held back from making concessions in an apparent effort to extract the compensation from the mediator (Carnevale and Idaszak, 1986). To my mind, Murnighan's neologism is unnecessary. Rather than create "intravention," I would refer to mediation in political and apolitical systems, as suggested by Touval; or emergent and contractual systems, as suggested by Kressel and Pruitt. And, I would regard variables such as mediator power, dependence, and entry issues such as who initiated third party involvement, as a few of the dimensions that may distinguish these two systems of mediation.

NOTE Portions of this paper were presented at the annual conference of the American Psychological Association, Washington D.C., August, 1986, in a symposium on mediation chaired by Dean G. Pruitt. Portions of my paper "Strategic Choice in Mediation" were first presented at the Negotiating in Organizations Conference at Duke University, March, 1985, and later at the Ninth Scientific Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, June, 1986, in a symposium on mediation chaired by William P Smith and Blair Sheppard. The paper from the Duke conference, which focuses on the special problems of organizational dispute resolution, is entitled "Mediating Disputes and Decisions in Organizations," and will be published in Research on Negotiation in Organizations, Vol. 1, edited by RoyJ. Lewicki, Blair H. Sheppard, and Max H. Bazerman, JM Publishing Company, forthconling. REFERENCES Carnevale, PJ. "Strategic Choice in Mediation." Negotiation Journal 2 (1986):41-56. ............ "Mediating Disputes and Decisions in Organizations." In Research on Negotiation in Organizations, Vol. 1., eds. RoyJ. Lewicki, Blair H. Shepperd, and Max H. Bazerman. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Publishing Company, forthcoming. Carnevale, PJ., and Hem'y, R.A. "Determinants of Mediator Behavior: A Test of the Strategic Choice Model." Manuscript submitted for publication, 1986. Carnevale, PJ., and Idaszak, J. "The Influence of Time Pressure, Limit, and Mediator Power on Negotiation Process and Outcome." Unpublished manuscript, Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1986. Kolb, D. "Organization Mediation." Paper presented at the Ninth Scientific Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, June, 1986.

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Kressel, K., and Pruitt, D.G. "Themes in the Mediation of Social Conflict."Journal ofSociallssues 41 (1985):179-198. Pruitt, D.G. "Kissinger as a Traditional Mediator with Power." In Dynamics o f Third Party Inl~'vention, ed. Jeffrey Z. Rubin. New York: Praeger, 1981. Rubin, J.Z. "Third Party Intervention in Family Conflict." Negotiation Journal 1 (1985):269-281. Smith, W.P. "Effectiveness of the Biased Mediator." Negotiation Journal 1 (1985):363-372. Susskind, L. and Madigan, D. "New Approaches to Resolving Disputes in the Public Sector." The Justice System Journal 9/2 ( 1984): 179-203. Touval, S. "The Context of Mediation." Negotiation Journal 1 (1985):373-378. Young, O. "Intermediaries: Additional Thoughts on Third Parties.'Journal of Conflict Resolution 16 (1972):51-65 Zartman, I.W., and Touval, S. "International Mediation: Conflict Resolution and Power Politics." Journal of Soc~l lssues 41 (1985):27-45.

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