ERA Forum (2010) 11: 459–516 DOI 10.1007/s12027-010-0173-9 C A S E L AW O F T H E U N I O N

Case Law of the European Union Courts Leading Judgments 1 December–15 June 2010 Editor: Dr. Johanna Engström (JE) · Contributors: Jean-Claude Alexandre Ho, LL.M. (AH) · Dr. Malte Beyer-Katzenberger (MBK) · Kassiani Christodoulou, LL.M. (KC) · Dr. Angelika Fuchs (AF) · Florence Hartmann-Vareilles, Avocate (FHV) · Leyre Maiso, LL.M. (LM) · Dr. Michele Messina (MM) · Carolin Mester · Cornelia Riehle, LL.M. (CR) © ERA 2010

Area of Freedom, Security and Justice Jasna Detiˇcek gegen Maurizio Sgueglia (Rs. C-403/09) Europäischer Gerichtshof (Dritte Kammer): 23. Dezember 2009 Justizielle Zusammenarbeit in Zivilsachen – Ehesachen und Verfahren betreffend die elterliche Verantwortung – Verordnung (EG) Nr. 2201/2003 – Einstweilige Maßnahmen in Bezug auf das Sorgerecht – In einem Mitgliedstaat vollstreckbare Entscheidung – Widerrechtliches Verbringen des Kindes – Anderer Mitgliedstaat – Anderes Gericht – Übertragung des Sorgerechts auf den anderen Elternteil – Zuständigkeit – Eilvorlageverfahren Das Vorabentscheidungsverfahren betrifft die Auslegung von Art. 20 Brüssel IIaVO. Frau Detiˇcek, die slowenische Staatsangehörigkeit hat, und Herr Sgueglia haben eine gemeinsame Tochter, Antonella, die am 6. September 1997 geboren wurde. Die Eheleute lebten 25 Jahre zusammen in Rom. Im Sommer 2007 überträgt das für die Scheidung der Ehegatten zuständige italienische Gericht das alleinige Sorgerecht vorläufig auf Herrn Sgueglia und ordnet die vorläufige Unterbringung von Antonella im Heim der Suore Calasanziane in Rom an. Am selben Tag verlässt Frau Detiˇcek mit Antonella das Land und zieht nach Zgornje Poljˇcane in Slowenien, wo beide seither wohnen. J. Engström, Course Director () European Public Law, Academy of European Law, Metzer Allee 4, Trier, Germany e-mail: [email protected]

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Der Beschluss des italienischen Gerichts wird im Hoheitsgebiet der Republik Slowenien von den dortigen Gerichten für vollstreckbar erklärt und das Bezirksgericht Slovenska Bistrica (Slowenien) mit dem Vollstreckungsverfahren zur Herausgabe des Kindes an Herrn Sgueglia und die Unterbringung in dem genannten Heim befasst. Das slowenische Gericht setzt jedoch mit Beschluss vom 2. Februar 2009 die Vollstreckung des Beschlusses bis zur rechtskräftigen Entscheidung des Ausgangsverfahrens aus. Dem Antrag von Frau Detiˇcek, ihr das Sorgerecht im Wege einer einstweiligen Anordnung (Schutzmaßnahme) zu übertragen, wird in Slowenien mit Hinweis auf die veränderten Umstände und das Kindeswohl stattgegeben; dagegen erhebt Herr Sgueglia Einspruch und nach dessen Zurückweisung Beschwerde zum Obergericht Maribor (Slowenien). Dieses legt dem EuGH die Frage vor, ob ein Gericht eines Mitgliedstaates die Zuständigkeit besitzt, eine einstweilige Anordnung in Bezug auf das elterliche Sorgerecht zu erlassen, mit der das Sorgerecht für ein Kind, das sich im Hoheitsgebiet dieses Mitgliedstaates befindet, auf einen Elternteil übertragen wird, wenn ein Gericht eines anderen Mitgliedstaates, welches nach der Brüssel IIa-VO zuständig ist, bereits eine Entscheidung erlassen hat, in der das Sorgerecht vorläufig auf den anderen Elternteil übertragen wurde, und diese Entscheidung im Hoheitsgebiet des erstgenannten Mitgliedstaats für vollstreckbar erklärt worden ist. Das Vorabentscheidungsverfahren wird dem Eilverfahren unterworfen. Gemäß Art. 8 der Brüssel IIa-VO ist das italienische Gericht für die Entscheidung von Fragen zuständig, die elterliche Verantwortung betreffen. Die Zuständigkeit für den Erlass von einstweiligen Maßnahmen einschließlich Schutzmaßnahmen ergibt sich aus Art. 20 Brüssel IIa-VO: Voraussetzung dazu ist erstens, dass die betreffenden Maßnahmen dringend sind, sie müssen zweitens im Bezug auf Personen oder Vermögensgegenstände getroffen werden, die sich in dem Mitgliedstaat befinden, in dem das mit der Sache befasste Gericht seinen Sitz hat, und sie müssen drittens vorübergehender Art sein (siehe auch Urteil vom 2. April 2009, C-523/07, Rn. 47). Der EuGH betont, dass Art. 20 als Ausnahme zu der Grundnorm von Art. 8 restriktiv auszulegen sei. Der Gerichtshof untersucht daher zunächst die Voraussetzung der Dringlichkeit, wobei er feststellt, dass sich dieser Begriff sowohl auf die Lage, in der sich das Kind befindet, als auch auf die praktische Unmöglichkeit bezieht, den Antrag bezüglich des Sorgerechts bei dem zuständigen Gericht der Hauptsache zu stellen. Das Kreisgericht von Maribor begründet in seinem Beschluss, mit dem es das Sorgerecht vorläufig der Mutter zusprach, eine dringliche Lage damit, dass sich die Umstände derart geändert hätten und sich das Kind so gut in die Umgebung integriert habe, dass eine Rückführung nach Italien dem Kind schwerwiegende physische und psychische Schäden zufügen würde. Diese Begründung wird vom Gerichtshof als unzureichend verworfen. Eine Dringlichkeit im Sinne von Art. 20 Abs. 1 der Brüssel IIa-VO sei damit nicht begründbar. Zum einen liefe eine derartige Begründung dem Grundsatz der gegenseitigen Anerkennung zuwider. Wäre die Berücksichtigung geänderter Umstände, die sich aus der Integration des Kindes in eine neue Umgebung ergäben, ausreichend, so hätte dies

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zur Folge, dass die Vollstreckung durch eine etwaige Langsamkeit des Vollstreckungsverfahrens im ersuchten Staat verhindert werden könnte. Dies würde jedoch die in der Brüssel IIa-VO enthaltenen Grundsätze erschüttern. Zum anderen ist die veränderte Lage vorliegend Folge der (unrechtmäßigen) Kindesentziehung durch die Mutter. Ziel der Brüssel IIa-VO sei es jedoch, der Kindesentziehung entgegen zu wirken; es solle gerade verhindert werden, dass der entführende Elternteil Vorteile aus der neuen Situation zieht. Gleiches gilt für das Haager Kindesentführungsübereinkommen von 1980. Bezüglich der zweiten Voraussetzung für die Anwendung von Art. 20 Abs. 1 der Brüssel IIa-VO, dass sich die Personen, auf die sich die einstweilige Maßnahme bezieht, in dem Mitgliedstaat befinden müssen, stellt der EuGH fest, dass diese Voraussetzung bei allen beteiligten Personen erfüllt sein muss. Folglich muss sich nicht nur das Kind in dem Mitgliedstaat aufhalten, sondern auch beide Elternteile. Für den vorliegenden Fall ist diese Voraussetzung nicht erfüllt, da der Vater nicht in Slowenien, sondern in Italien lebt. Als weitere Begründung für die Ablehnung der Anwendbarkeit der Ausnahmeregelung des Art. 20 Abs. 1 der Brüssel IIa-VO führt der Gerichtshof an, dass der Artikel nicht so ausgelegt werden dürfe, dass er Grundrechten zuwiderliefe. Das hier betroffene Grundrecht des Kindes aus Art. 24 Abs. 3 der Charta, welches ihm einen Anspruch auf regelmäßige persönliche Beziehungen und direkten Kontakt zu beiden Elternteilen gewähre, wäre hier möglicherweise verletzt. Das Urteil stärkt – wie schon die Entscheidung in der Sache Rinau (Rs. C-195/08 PPU) – die Stellung des im Falle einer Kindesentziehung zurückbleibenden Elternteils. Die Veränderung der tatsächlichen Situation durch den anderen Elternteil soll diesem keinen rechtlichen Vorteil gewähren. Vielmehr ist das Kind nach den Vorgaben der Brüssel IIa-VO und des Haager Kindesentführungsabkommens von 1980 schnellstmöglich an seinen bisherigen gewöhnlichen Aufenthalt zurückzuführen. Etwaige Entscheidungen über das Sorgerecht sind – nach der Rückführung des Kindes – grundsätzlich von dem Gericht am gewöhnlichen Aufenthalt des Kindes zu treffen. AF MG Probud Gdynia sp. z o.o. (Rs. C-444/07) Europäischer Gerichtshof (Erste Kammer): 21. Januar 2010 Justizielle Zusammenarbeit in Zivilsachen – Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1346/2000 – Insolvenzverfahren – Weigerung eines Mitgliedstaats, die Entscheidung des zuständigen Gerichts eines anderen Mitgliedstaats über die Eröffnung eines Insolvenzverfahrens und die Entscheidungen über die Durchführung und die Beendigung dieses Insolvenzverfahrens anzuerkennen Das Vorabentscheidungsverfahren betrifft die Auslegung mehrerer Bestimmungen der InsolvenzVO. Über das Vermögen des Bauunternehmens MG Probud Gdynia sp. z o.o. (im Folgenden: MG Probud) mit Sitz in Polen wird am 9. Juni 2005 von einem polnischen Gericht das Insolvenzverfahren eröffnet. Das Amtsgericht Saarbrücken ordnet am 11. Juni 2005 auf Antrag des Hauptzollamtes Saarbrücken den dinglichen Arrest über Bankguthaben des Unternehmens

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in Höhe von 50.683,08 Euro und die Pfändung verschiedener Forderungen an, die das Unternehmen gegen deutsche Vertragspartner hatte. Die gegen diesen Beschluss eingelegte Beschwerde wird vom Landgericht Saarbrücken am 4. August 2005 verworfen. Im Rahmen des Insolvenzverfahrens stellt sich die Frage, ob die deutschen Pfändungen rechtmäßig sind. In diesem Zusammenhang hat der Gerichtshof zu klären, ob ein Mitgliedstaat verpflichtet ist, die Entscheidungen über die Durchführung und Beendigung des im ersten Mitgliedstaat eröffneten Insolvenzverfahrens anzuerkennen und gegebenenfalls zu vollstrecken. Um die Frage zu beantworten, prüft der Gerichtshof zunächst, ob es sich bei dem vorliegenden Insolvenzverfahren um ein Hauptinsolvenzverfahren nach Art. 3 Abs. 1 der Verordnung handelt, welches universale Wirkungen hat, oder ob es ein (auf das Territorium des Mitgliedstaates begrenztes) Sekundärinsolvenzverfahren nach Art. 3 Abs. 2 der Verordnung ist. Für das Hauptinsolvenzverfahren ist das Gericht zuständig, in dessen Gebiet der Schuldner den Mittelpunkt seiner hauptsächlichen Interessen hat. Im vorliegenden Fall befindet sich der Gesellschaftssitz der MG Probud in Polen und das Insolvenzverfahren wurde am 9. Juni 2005 von einem polnischen Gericht eröffnet. Gemäß Art. 3 Abs. 1 der Verordnung besteht eine widerlegliche Vermutung dafür, dass der Mittelpunkt der hauptsächlichen Interessen der Ort des satzungsmäßigen Sitzes ist. Gemäß den im Urteil Eurofood aufgestellten Grundsätzen kann diese widerlegliche Vermutung nur dann entkräftet werden, wenn objektive und von Dritten überprüfbare Tatsachen belegen, dass die tatsächliche Lage nicht der von der Verordnung vorgesehenen Lage am satzungsmäßigen Sitz entspricht. Beispielhaft hat der EuGH hierfür den Fall benannt, dass die Gesellschaft im Gebiet des Mitgliedstaates, in dem sich ihr Sitz befindet, keine Tätigkeit ausübt. Für den vorliegenden Fall stellt der Gerichtshof fest, dass keine Anhaltspunkte gegeben sind, welche die Vermutung entkräften könnten. Der Mittelpunkt der hauptsächlichen Interessen ist somit in Polen. Das polnische Gericht war somit für die Eröffnung des Insolvenzverfahrens zuständig. Der EuGH prüft und bejaht, dass es sich bei dem vorliegenden Verfahren um ein Insolvenzverfahren im Sinn von Art. 1 Abs. 1 der Verordnung handelt. Gemäß Art. 3 der Insolvenz-VO sind die polnischen Gerichte für die Eröffnung des Hauptinsolvenzverfahrens und für alle Entscheidungen über die Durchführung und die Beendigung des Verfahrens zuständig; nach Art. 4 ist auf dieses Verfahren und seine Wirkungen polnisches Recht anwendbar. Ein Sekundärverfahren wurde nicht eröffnet. Wegen der universalen Geltung, die jedem Hauptinsolvenzverfahren zuzuerkennen ist, erstreckt sich das Verfahren auf alle Vermögenswerte von MG Probud. Folglich konnten die deutschen Behörden Vollstreckungsmaßnahmen nach deutschem Recht nicht rechtswirksam anordnen. Vielmehr ist die Eröffnung eines Insolvenzverfahrens in einem Mitgliedstaat automatisch und ohne weitere Förmlichkeiten in allen anderen Mitgliedstaaten anzuerkennen (Artt. 16, 17 InsolvenzVO). Etwaige Nichtanerkennungsgründe sind vorliegend nicht ersichtlich: das deutsche Gericht ist verpflichtet, sowohl die Eröffnung des Insolvenzverfahrens anzuerkennen als auch alle anderen Entscheidungen, die im Zusammenhang mit diesem Verfahren ergehen.

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Die Entscheidung kommt keineswegs überraschend (so auch Fichtner, BB 2010, 529, 532; Werner, GWR 2010, 42; Laukemann, LMK 2010, 299062), denn die Eröffnung eines Insolvenzverfahrens durch das zuständige Gericht wird nach Art. 16 EuInsVO in allen Mitgliedstaaten automatisch anerkannt. Nach Eröffnung eines Insolvenzverfahrens in einem anderen Mitgliedstaat sind die Forderungen in diesem Verfahren anzumelden. Die universale Geltung des Hauptinsolvenzverfahrens kann nur durch die Eröffnung eines Sekundärinsolvenzverfahrens beschränkt werden. Die Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1346/2000 des Rates vom 29. Mai 2000 über Insolvenzverfahren und insbesondere deren Artt. 3, 4, 16, 17 und 25 sind so auszulegen, dass in einem Fall wie dem des Ausgangsverfahrens nach der Eröffnung eines Hauptinsolvenzverfahrens in einem Mitgliedstaat die zuständigen Behörden eines anderen Mitgliedstaats, in dem kein Sekundärinsolvenzverfahren eröffnet worden ist, vorbehaltlich der in Art. 25 Abs. 3 und in Art. 26 der Verordnung genannten Nichtanerkennungsgründe verpflichtet sind, alle Entscheidungen im Zusammenhang mit diesem Hauptinsolvenzverfahren anzuerkennen und zu vollstrecken, und daher nicht berechtigt sind, nach dem Recht des anderen Mitgliedstaats Vollstreckungsmaßnahmen in Bezug auf in diesem anderen Mitgliedstaat befindliche Vermögenswerte des Schuldners, über dessen Vermögen das Insolvenzverfahren eröffnet worden ist, anzuordnen, wenn das Recht des Staates der Verfahrenseröffnung dies nicht erlaubt und die Voraussetzungen für die Anwendung der Artt. 5 und 10 der Verordnung nicht erfüllt sind. AF Car Trim GmbH gegen KeySafety Systems Srl (Rs. C-381/08) Europäischer Gerichtshof (Vierte Kammer): 25. Februar 2010 Gerichtliche Zuständigkeit in Zivil- und Handelssachen – Verordnung (EG) Nr. 44/2001 – Art. 5 Nr. 1 Buchst. b – Zuständigkeit, wenn ein Vertrag oder Ansprüche aus einem Vertrag den Gegenstand des Verfahrens bilden – Bestimmung des Erfüllungsorts der Verpflichtung – Kriterien zur Abgrenzung zwischen ,Verkauf beweglicher Sachen‘ und ,Erbringung von Dienstleistungen‘ Verschiedene Verfahren zur Auslegung des praktisch wichtigen Gerichtsstands für Vertragsklagen (Art. 5 Nr. 1 Brüssel I-VO) sind derzeit anhängig. Die vorliegende Entscheidung des EuGH betrifft die Frage, wie Verträge über den „Verkauf beweglicher Sachen“ und Verträge über die „Erbringung von Dienstleistungen“ voneinander abzugrenzen sind und wo bei Versendungskäufen der Erfüllungsort belegen ist. KeySafety, die ihren Sitz in Italien hat, stellt Airbagsysteme her und kauft dafür im Zeitraum von Juli 2001 bis Dezember 2003 bei der in Deutschland ansässigen Car Trim im Rahmen von fünf Lieferverträgen Komponenten, wobei KeySafety genaue Vorgaben zur Beschaffung, Verarbeitung und Lieferung der herzustellenden Airbags macht. Als KeySafety die Verträge im Jahre 2003 kündigt, erhebt Car Trim, die von einer Vertragslaufzeit bis 2007 ausgegangen ist, in Deutschland Klage auf Schadensersatz wegen Vertragsverletzung. Die internationale Zuständigkeit deutscher Gerichte könnte sich aus Art. 5 Nr. 1 Brüssel I-VO ergeben.

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Die erste Vorlagefrage betrifft die Abgrenzung von Kauf- zu Dienstleistungsverträgen. Der EuGH stellt zunächst fest, dass Art. 5 Nr. 1 Buchst. b der Verordnung weder eine Definition noch Merkmale zur Unterscheidung enthalte. Gerade der erste Gedankenstrich beinhalte keine Angabe darüber, ob ein Verkauf beweglicher Sachen auch dann anzunehmen sei, wenn die fragliche Ware vom Verkäufer unter Beachtung bestimmter Vorgaben des Käufers hergestellt oder erzeugt werden soll und damit auch eine Dienstleistung enthält. Entscheidend für die Abgrenzung ist die charakteristische Verpflichtung: Ein Vertrag über den Verkauf beweglicher Sachen ist demnach dann anzunehmen, wenn die charakteristische Verpflichtung in der Lieferung eines Gegenstandes besteht, wohingegen ein Vertrag über die Erbringung von Dienstleistungen dann anzunehmen ist, wenn die charakteristische Verpflichtung in der Erbringung von Dienstleistungen liegt. Welche Verpflichtung charakteristisch ist, hängt von den jeweiligen Umständen ab. Aus Bestimmungen des Unionsrechts und des internationalen Rechts ergeben sich Anhaltspunkte für die Auslegung des Begriffs „Verkauf beweglicher Sachen“. So werden etwa Verträge über die Lieferung herzustellender oder zu erzeugender Waren in Art. 3 Abs. 1 CISG den Kaufverträgen gleichgestellt, es sei denn, dass der Käufer die notwendigen Stoffe selbst zur Verfügung stellt. Gleiches gilt für Art. 6 Abs. 2 des Übereinkommens der Vereinten Nationen vom 14. Juni 1974 über die Verjährung beim internationalen Warenverkauf. An der Einstufung als Kaufvertrag ändert sich also nichts dadurch, dass die zu liefernde Ware zuvor hergestellt oder erzeugt wird. Dieses Ergebnis wird auch durch die Entscheidung des Gerichtshofs vom 11. Juni 2009 in der Rechtssache Hans & Christophorus Oymanns (C-300/07) auf dem Gebiet der öffentlichen Aufträge bestätigt: ein Kaufvertrag liegt auch dann vor, wenn die Ware individuell nach den Bedürfnissen des jeweiligen Kunden hergestellt oder angepasst wird. Weiter bezieht der Gerichtshof das Kriterium der Herkunft der zu verarbeitenden Stoffe mit in die Abgrenzung ein. Stellt der Käufer alle oder die Mehrzahl der Stoffe zur Verfügung, so liegt ein Dienstleistungsvertrag vor. Vorliegend hat KeySafety zwar den Lieferanten bestimmt, doch selbst kein Material zur Verfügung gestellt. Ein weiterer beachtlicher Umstand ist die Frage der Haftung des Lieferanten. Haftet der Verkäufer für die Qualität und die Vertragsgemäßheit der Ware, so liegt ein Kaufvertrag vor. Die zweite dem Gerichtshof vorgelegte Frage, wo der Erfüllungsort bei Versendungskauf belegen ist, ist in Rechtsprechung und Lehre umstritten. Art. 5 Nr. 1 lässt offen, ob der Erfüllungsort an dem Ort liegt, an dem die Leistungshandlung erbracht wird (Absendeort) oder an dem Ort, an dem der Leistungserfolg eintritt (Bestimmungsort). Unter Heranziehung der Entstehungsgeschichte, der Ziele und der Systematik der Verordnung entscheidet sich der Gerichtshof für den Ort der körperlichen Übergabe der Ware an den Käufer. Dieser Ort ist in hohem Maße vorhersehbar. Diese Auslegung trägt dem Ziel der räumlichen Nähe Rechnung, da es eine enge Verknüpfung von Vertrag und zuständigem Gericht gewährleistet. Ziel des Kaufvertrags ist die Übergabe der Ware an den Käufer; dieser Vorgang ist erst bei Ankunft der Ware am Bestimmungsort vollständig abgeschlossen. Die Entscheidung ist zu begrüßen: Zum einen schafft die getroffene Abgrenzung zwischen Kauf- und Dienstleistungsverträgen Gleichklang mit internationalem

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Recht, vor allem mit dem CISG. Zum anderen wird mit dem Abstellen auf den Ort, an dem der Käufer die Ware entgegennimmt, die Beweiserhebung in Sachmängelprozessen erleichtert, weil sich die Ware bereits im Gerichtsbezirk befindet; im Übrigen wird bei Kaufpreisklagen ein Klägergerichtsstand vermieden. 1. Art. 5 Nr. 1 Buchst. b der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 44/2001 des Rates vom 22. Dezember 2000 über die gerichtliche Zuständigkeit und die Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen in Zivil- und Handelssachen ist dahin auszulegen, dass Verträge über die Lieferung herzustellender oder zu erzeugender Ware auch bei bestimmten Vorgaben des Auftraggebers zu Beschaffung, Verarbeitung und Lieferung der Ware, ohne dass die Stoffe von diesem zur Verfügung gestellt wurden, und auch wenn der Lieferant für die Qualität und die Vertragsgemäßheit der Ware haftet, als „Verkauf beweglicher Sachen“ im Sinne von Art. 5 Nr. 1 Buchst. b erster Gedankenstrich dieser Verordnung einzustufen sind. 2. Art. 5 Nr. 1 Buchst. b erster Gedankenstrich der Verordnung Nr. 44/2001 ist dahin auszulegen, dass bei Versendungskäufen der Ort, an dem die beweglichen Sachen nach dem Vertrag geliefert worden sind oder hätten geliefert werden müssen, auf der Grundlage der Bestimmungen dieses Vertrags zu bestimmen ist. Lässt sich der Lieferort auf dieser Grundlage ohne Bezugnahme auf das auf den Vertrag anwendbare materielle Recht nicht bestimmen, ist dieser Ort derjenige der körperlichen Übergabe der Waren, durch die der Käufer am endgültigen Bestimmungsort des Verkaufsvorgangs die tatsächliche Verfügungsgewalt über diese Waren erlangt hat oder hätte erlangen müssen. AF Abdulla and others (Joined cases C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08 and C-179/08) Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber): 2 March 2010 Directive 2004/83/EC – Minimum standards for determining who qualifies for refugee status or for subsidiary protection status – Classification as a ‚refugee‘ – Article 2(c) – Cessation of refugee status – Article 11 – Change of circumstances – Article 11(1)(e) – Refugee – Unfounded fear of persecution – Assessment – Article 11(2) – Revocation of refugee status – Proof – Article 14(2) The case deals with Iraqi nationals who fled Iraq because they claimed to be persecuted by the Baath party regime of Saddam Hussein. They were granted refugee status in Germany in 2001 and 2002. In 2005, the German authorities revoked their refugee status. The relevant administrative decision was challenged before the Federal Supreme Administrative Court (the Bundesverwaltungsgericht). The European Court of Justice had first to deal with questions of jurisdiction ratione temporis. The persons concerned had applied for international protection before the entry into force of the Qualification Directive (Directive 2004/83/EC) on 20 October 2004. It was therefore not applicable in the instant case. However the Court felt obliged to deal with the question of the Bundesverwaltungsgericht. The provisions of the German law transposing amongst others the Qualification Directive had retroactive effect. By way of this, it could be argued that the provisions of the Qualification

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Directive were applicable to the case. The ECJ argued that there was a strong Community interest in using the opportunity to give an interpretation on these norms of Community law. Examining the case on the merits, the Court used the opportunity to recall a number of well-established principles of refugee law. In particular it provided a thorough construction of the term ‘protection’ employed in Article 2(c) of the Qualification Directive (which lays down the criteria of recognition as a refugee) and in Article 11(1)(e) (which lays down criteria for when the need for international protection ceases to exist). The Court concluded that ‘protection’ here refers to the same kind of protection – protection that was originally lacking (giving rise to the asylum claim) and is now available again (resulting in the possibility of ending refugee status). A change of circumstances may bring this. The Court recalled that Article 11(2) of the Qualification Directive requires that such a change needs to be ‘significant’ and of ‘non-temporary nature’. It recalled further that potential providers of protection do not necessarily need to be governmental authorities. International organisations can also provide such protection when they control the State or a substantial part of it. ‘International organisations’ includes multilateral troops in the country. A change of circumstances might end a certain kind of persecution. Nonetheless new other grounds for persecution might then exist with the effect that the refugee status could not be withdrawn. The Bundesverwaltungsgericht further wanted to know whether the standard of probability applied in the examination of potential new grounds of persecution should be the same as that in the examination of the grounds for the initial asylum claim. The Court of Justice responded that while the degree of difficulty for the refugee in present evidence of his new claim might differ due to his absence from the country of persecution, the standard of probability did not vary. The same principles applied as were applied to the initial refugee claim. Finally the Bundesverwaltungsgericht sought to know which provision of the Qualification Directive provided the standard for the assessment of the risk of continued persecution after a change of circumstances: the standard of Article 4(4) (applicable for examining the first application) or the standard of Article 11(1)(e) (applicable for examining the cessation of refugee status). Clarification of the relation between the two Articles by the Court of Justice was necessary, as the reasons for withdrawing refugee status in Article 11(1)(e) and (f) (in contrast to those Article 11(1)((a) to (d)) require new assessments of evidence and Article 11 does not provide for these. The Court held that the provisions of Article 4(4) can be applicable also in cessation proceedings. This can be the case when there were several reasons for persecution at the time of the original application for refugee status and the refugee chose to present not all of them. If s/he now invoked one of the other previously existing reasons, the standard of examination would be the one under Article 4(4). Also there might be a situation where causes giving rise to persecution or the fear of persecution for other reasons originated only after the refugee had left the country. If the refugee claimed in cessation proceedings that even after a change of circumstances other facts would lead to a continued fear of persecution for the same reasons as in the original examination of his/ her refugee status, the standard applicable would be the one under Article 11(1)(e). MBK

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Wood Floor Solutions Andreas Domberger GmbH gegen Silva Trade SA (Rs. C19/09) Europäischer Gerichtshof (Dritte Kammer): 11. März 2010 Gerichtliche Zuständigkeit und Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen in Zivil- und Handelssachen – Verordnung (EG) Nr. 44/2001 – Besondere Zuständigkeiten – Art. 5 Nr. 1 Buchst. a und Buchst. b zweiter Gedankenstrich – Erbringung von Dienstleistungen – Handelsvertretervertrag – Vertragserfüllung in mehreren Mitgliedstaaten Im Rahmen eines Rechtsstreits zwischen der Wood Floor Solutions Andreas Domberger GmbH (Wood Floor) mit Sitz in Amstetten (Österreich) und der Silva Trade SA (Silva Trade) mit Sitz in Wasserbillig (Luxemburg) wegen Ersatzes des durch die Auflösung eines in mehreren Mitgliedstaaten erfüllten Handelsvertretervertrages stellt sich die Frage nach der internationalen Zuständigkeit. Wood Floor macht gegen Silva Trade wegen der Auflösung eines Handelsvertretervertrages einen Ausgleichsanspruch geltend. Die Zuständigkeit des österreichischen Gerichts ergebe sich aus Art. 5 Nr. 1 Brüssel I-VO, weil die Anwerbung und Gewinnung von Kunden in Österreich erfolgt sei. Silva Trade macht geltend, der größte Teil des Umsatzes sei in anderen Ländern erwirtschaftet worden. Mit der ersten Vorlagefrage möchte das OLG Wien vom Gerichtshof wissen, ob Art. 5 Nr. 1 Brüssel I-VO auch im Fall der Erbringung von Dienstleistungen in mehreren Mitgliedstaaten anwendbar sei. Für die Beantwortung dieser Frage zieht der Gerichtshof seine frühere Rechtsprechung zu Art. 5 Nr. 1 Brüssel I-VO heran: danach ist die Vorschrift bei der Lieferung beweglicher Sachen auch dann anwendbar, wenn es mehrere Lieferorte gibt. Gleiches gelte für die Erbringung von Dienstleistungen: die Vorschrift ist auch dann anwendbar, wenn die fraglichen Dienstleistungen an mehreren Orten in verschiedenen Mitgliedstaaten zu erbringen sind. Im Weiteren beschäftigt sich der EuGH mit der Frage, nach welchen Kriterien der Erfüllungsort der charakteristischen Verpflichtung zu bestimmen ist und welche Kriterien im Fall eines Handelsvertretervertrages heranzuziehen sind. Gibt es bei der Lieferung beweglicher Sachen mehrere Lieferorte, so ist auf den Ort der Hauptlieferung abzustellen. Dies gelte mutatis mutandis auch für Dienstleistungsverträge; abzustellen sei also auf den Ort der hauptsächlichen Leistungserbringung. Bei einem Handelsvertretervertrag erbringt der Handelsvertreter die charakteristische Leistung; Erfüllungsort ist also der Ort der hauptsächlichen Leistungserbringung durch den Handelsvertreter. Bei Leistungen in verschieden Mitgliedstaaten ist zunächst aus den Vertragsbestimmungen selbst der Ort der hauptsächlichen Leistungserbringung zu ermitteln. Ist dies nicht möglich, ist hilfsweise der Ort heranzuziehen, an dem der Handelsvertreter seine Tätigkeit tatsächlich überwiegend vorgenommen hat, solange dies nicht dem Parteiwillen widerspricht. Für die Frage, welches der Ort der tatsächlichen Erfüllung ist, können als Kriterien die aufgewendete Zeit oder die Bedeutung der dort ausgeübten Tätigkeit miteinbezogen werden. Ist auch eine solche Ermittlung des Ortes der tatsächlichen Erbringung der Leistung nicht möglich, ist auf den Wohnsitz des Handelsvertreters abzustellen.

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Die Entscheidung des EuGH schafft für Handelsvertreterverträge im Rahmen des Art. 5 Nr. 1 Brüssel I-VO eine klare zuständigkeitsrechtliche Hierarchie. Es bleibt abzuwarten, ob diese auch für andere Dienstleistungsverträge gelten wird. 1. Art. 5 Nr. 1 Buchst. b zweiter Gedankenstrich der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 44/2001 des Rates vom 22. Dezember 2000 über die gerichtliche Zuständigkeit und die Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen in Zivil- und Handelssachen ist dahin auszulegen, dass diese Bestimmung anwendbar ist, wenn Dienstleistungen in mehreren Mitgliedstaaten erbracht werden. 2. Art. 5 Nr. 1 Buchst. b zweiter Gedankenstrich der Verordnung Nr. 44/2001 ist dahin auszulegen, dass im Fall der Erbringung von Dienstleistungen in mehreren Mitgliedstaaten für die Entscheidung über alle Klagen aus dem Vertrag das Gericht zuständig ist, in dessen Sprengel sich der Ort der hauptsächlichen Leistungserbringung befindet. Bei einem Handelsvertretervertrag ist dies der Ort der hauptsächlichen Leistungserbringung durch den Handelsvertreter, wie er sich aus den Bestimmungen des Vertrags oder, mangels solcher Bestimmungen, aus dessen tatsächlicher Erfüllung ergibt; kann der fragliche Ort nicht auf dieser Grundlage ermittelt werden, so ist auf den Wohnsitz des Handelsvertreters abzustellen. AF TNT Express Nederland BV gegen AXA Versicherung AG (Rs. C-533/08) Europäischer Gerichtshof (Große Kammer): 4. Mai 2010 Justizielle Zusammenarbeit in Zivil- und Handelssachen – Gerichtliche Zuständigkeit, Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen – Verordnung (EG) Nr. 44/2001 – Art. 71 – Von den Mitgliedstaaten über besondere Rechtsgebiete geschlossene Übereinkommen – Übereinkommen über den Beförderungsvertrag im internationalen Straßengüterverkehr (CMR) Im Mittelpunkt des Rechtsstreits steht die Auslegung von Art. 71 Brüssel I-VO, der das Verhältnis der Verordnung zu multilateralen Übereinkommen wie dem CMR regelt. Gemäß dieser Vorschrift lässt die Brüssel I-VO diese Übereinkommen unberührt. In dem Fall geht es um die Beförderung von Waren auf der Straße von den Niederlanden nach Deutschland. Die Waren erreichten ihren Bestimmungsort nicht. Die zur Beförderung der Waren verpflichtete Partei TNT erhob in den Niederlanden Klage auf Feststellung, dass sie für keinen Schaden mit Ausnahme von 138,- €gemäß Art. 23 CMR haftbar sei. Die Klage ist noch anhängig. Wenig später erhob der Versicherer AXA in München Klage gegen TNT auf Ersatz des Schadens, der durch den Verlust der Waren entstanden war. Das LG München verurteilte TNT zur Zahlung von Schadensersatz. AXA beantragt, das Urteil in den Niederlanden zu vollstrecken. TNT beruft sich einerseits darauf, dass die Vollstreckung des Urteils wegen der entgegenstehenden Rechtshängigkeit dem ordre public widerspreche. AXA macht demgegenüber geltend, die Zuständigkeit des deutschen Gerichts dürfe im Vollstreckungsverfahren nicht nachgeprüft werden. Dem widerspricht TNT unter Hinweis auf Art. 71 Brüssel I-VO.

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Der Gerichtshof stellt zunächst fest, dass der Rechtsstreit zwischen TNT und AXA sowohl in den Anwendungsbereich der Brüssel I-VO als auch des CMR fällt. Nach dem Wortlaut von Art. 71 Brüssel I-VO sind die Regeln des besonderen Übereinkommens anwendbar, wenn der Rechtsstreit von dessen Anwendungsbereich erfasst ist. Einschränkend stellt der Gerichtshof fest, dass die Anwendung der besonderen Übereinkommen die Grundsätze, auf denen die justizielle Zusammenarbeit in Zivilund Handelssachen in der Union beruht, nicht beeinträchtigen darf. Zu diesen Grundsätzen gehören das reibungslose Funktionieren des Binnenmarktes, Vorhersehbarkeit der Gerichte und Rechtssicherheit. Da diese Grundsätze die sachliche Rechtfertigung der Brüssel I-VO bilden, dürfen auch einzelne Vorschriften nicht mit diesen Grundsätzen kollidieren. Besondere Übereinkommen wie das CMR dürfen also nicht zu weniger günstigen Ergebnissen im Hinblick auf das Ziel des reibungslosen Funktionierens des Binnenmarkts führen; als es bei Anwendung der Brüssel I-VO der Fall wäre. Darüber hinaus erinnert der EuGH an seine ständige Rechtsprechung, wonach mit Drittstaaten geschlossene Übereinkommen in den Beziehungen zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten nicht entgegen den Zielen des Unionsrechts angewendet werden dürfen. Dies bedeutet, dass im Rahmen von Art. 71 Brüssel I-VO nur diejenigen Regeln von besonderen Übereinkommen angewendet werden dürfen, die diese Grundsätze einhalten. Grundsätze für die Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen sind der freie Verkehr von Entscheidungen und das gegenseitige Vertrauen in die Justiz (favor executionis). Die Vorschriften spezieller Übereinkommen finden demnach nur dann Anwendung, wenn sie die Ziele des freien Verkehrs der Entscheidungen in Zivil- und Handelssachen unter mindestens ebenso günstigen Bedingungen erreichen, wie dies unter Anwendung der Brüssel I-VO der Fall wäre. Was die Auslegung des Art. 31 CMR betrifft, stellt der Gerichtshof fest, dass ihm weder eine Zuständigkeit direkt zugewiesen ist noch eine Zuständigkeit daraus erwächst, dass die Rechtsvorschrift zum Unionsrecht gehört, da die CMR für die Union nicht bindend ist. Der EuGH ist somit für die Auslegung von Art. 31 CMR nicht zuständig. 1. Art. 71 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 44/2001 des Rates vom 22. Dezember 2000 über die gerichtliche Zuständigkeit und die Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen in Zivil- und Handelssachen ist dahin auszulegen, dass in einer Rechtssache wie der des Ausgangsverfahrens die in einem Übereinkommen über ein besonderes Rechtsgebiet vorgesehenen Regeln über die gerichtliche Zuständigkeit, Anerkennung und Vollstreckung, wie z. B. die Rechtshängigkeitsregel in Art. 31 Abs. 2 des am 19. Mai 1956 in Genf unterzeichneten Übereinkommens über den Beförderungsvertrag im internationalen Straßengüterverkehr in der Fassung des am 5. Juli 1978 in Genf unterzeichneten Protokolls oder die Vollstreckbarkeitsregel in Art. 31 Abs. 3 dieses Übereinkommens zur Anwendung kommen, sofern sie in hohem Maße vorhersehbar sind, eine geordnete Rechtspflege fördern, es erlauben, die Gefahr von Parallelverfahren so weit wie möglich vermeiden, und den freien Verkehr der Entscheidungen in Zivil- und Handelssachen sowie das gegenseitigen Vertrauen in die Justiz im Rahmen der Union (favor executionis) unter mindestens ebenso günstigen Bedingungen gewährleisten, wie sie in der genannten Verordnung vorgesehen sind.

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2. Der Gerichtshof der Europäischen Union ist für die Auslegung von Art. 31 des geänderten Übereinkommens über den Beförderungsvertrag im internationalen Straßengüterverkehr nicht zuständig. AF ˇ Ceská podnikatelská pojišt’ovna as, Vienna Insurance Group gegen Michal Bilas (Rs. C-111/09) Europäischer Gerichtshof (Vierte Kammer): 20. Mai 2010 Verordnung (EG) Nr. 44/2001 – Klage eines Versicherers vor dem Gericht seines Wohnsitzes auf Zahlung einer Versicherungsprämie durch den Versicherungsnehmer, der seinen Wohnsitz in einem anderen Mitgliedstaat hat – Einlassung des Beklagten vor dem angerufenen Gericht – Keine Geltendmachung des Mangels der Zuständigkeit und Einlassung zur Sache – Zuständigkeitsbegründende Einlassung ˇ Im vorliegenden Rechtsstreit verklagte Ceská podnikatelská pojišt’ovna as, Vienna ˇ Insurance Group (im Folgenden: CPP), eine Versicherungsgesellschaft mit Sitz in der Tschechischen Republik, Herrn Bilas, einen Versicherungsnehmer mit Wohnsitz in der Slowakei, auf Zahlung einer Versicherungsprämie. Die Klage wurde vor dem Bezirksgericht Eger (Okresní soud v Chebu) erhoben, welches Herrn Bilas daraufhin zur Stellungnahme aufforderte. Dieser bestritt, ohne die Einrede der Unzuständigkeit ˇ des angerufenen Gerichts geltend zu machen, den Anspruch der CPP in der Sache. Das Bezirksgericht Eger möchte nun wissen, ob es seine internationale Zuständigkeit zu prüfen hat, obwohl sich der Beklagte auf das Verfahren eingelassen hat. In diesem Zusammenhang geht es um die Auslegung des Art. 24 Brüssel I-VO, also um die Frage, ob dieser die internationale Zuständigkeit auch dann begründet, wenn das Verfahren sonst den Vorschriften über die zwingende Zuständigkeit nach Abschnitt 3 der Verordnung unterliegt und die Klage unter Verstoß gegen diese Vorschrift erhoben wurde. Dem Gerichtshof stellt sich somit die Frage, ob eine stillschweigende Zuständigkeitsvereinbarung vorliegt, wenn sich der Beklagte auf das Verfahren einlässt und nicht den Mangel der Zuständigkeit des angerufenen Gerichts geltend macht, obwohl es sich um eine Streitigkeit handelt, auf die Regeln für besondere Zuständigkeiten der Brüssel I-VO anwendbar sind. Gemäß Art. 24 Satz 1 Brüssel I-VO begründet die Einlassung des Beklagten die Zuständigkeit des Gerichts. Ausnahmen von dieser Regel sieht Art. 24 Satz 2 Brüssel I-VO vor. Da es sich um eine Ausnahmeregelung handelt, ist sie eng auszulegen. Somit kann die Vorschrift nicht dahingehend verstanden werden, dass sie es erlaubt, die Ausnahmen auf weitere Fälle auszudehnen. Selbst wenn die Zuständigkeitsregeln zu Versicherungssachen nicht beachtet worden sind, ist das Gericht für den Rechtsstreit zuständig, wenn sich der Beklagte auf das Verfahren einlässt und keine Einrede der Unzuständigkeit erhebt. Im Hinblick auf eine mögliche Nichtanerkennung des Urteils gemäß Art. 35 Brüssel I-VO stellt der Gerichtshof fest, dass diese Bestimmung nur anwendbar ist, wenn eine Entscheidung von einem unzuständigen Gericht erlassen wurde, in diesem Fall das Gericht aber gerade nach Art. 24 zuständig ist.

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Die Vorschriften über die Versicherungssachen bezwecken den Schutz der schwächeren Partei. Wenn sich diese Partei jedoch bewusst dafür entscheidet, auf diesen Schutz zu verzichten, so lässt die Brüssel I-VO ihr diese Möglichkeit. Dem angerufenen Gericht steht es frei steht, sich davon zu vergewissern, dass der Beklagte umfassende Kenntnis von den Folgen seiner Einlassung auf das Verfahren hat. Art. 24 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 44/2001 des Rates vom 22. Dezember 2000 über die gerichtliche Zuständigkeit und die Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen in Zivil- und Handelssachen ist dahin auszulegen, dass das Gericht, das angerufen worden ist, ohne dass die Bestimmungen in Abschnitt 3 des Kapitels II dieser Verordnung beachtet worden sind, sich für zuständig erklären muss, wenn der Beklagte sich auf das Verfahren einlässt und keine Einrede der Unzuständigkeit erhebt, da eine solche Einlassung eine stillschweigende Zuständigkeitsvereinbarung darstellt. AF

Common foreign and security policy M and Others v Her Majesty’s Treasury (Case C-340/08) Court of Justice (Fourth Chamber): 29 April 2010 Common foreign and security policy – Restrictive measures taken against persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda network and the Taliban – Freezing of funds and economic resources – Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 – Article 2(2) – Prohibition of making funds available to the persons listed in Annex I to that regulation – Scope – Social security and social assistance benefits paid to the spouse of a person included in Annex I This reference for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC from the House of Lords concerned the interpretation of Article 2(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda network and the Taliban, and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 467/2001 prohibiting the export of certain goods and services to Afghanistan, strengthening the flight ban and extending the freeze of funds and other financial resources in respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan, as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 561/2003. Article 2(2) of Regulation No 881/2002 states that “[n]o funds shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to, or for the benefit of, a natural or legal person, group or entity designated by the Sanctions Committee and listed in Annex I.” The reference was made in proceedings between M and Others and Her Majesty’s Treasury, concerning the decisions by which the Treasury considered that the grant of social security and social assistance benefits to the appellants in the main proceedings and the spouses of persons designated by the Committee created pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Resolution 1267 (1999) of the Security Council of the United Nations and listed in Annex I to Regulation No 881/2002, was prohibited by the restrictive measure laid down in Article 2(2) of that regulation.

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In essence, the question of interpretation was whether the words ‘for the benefit of’ in Article 2(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 have a wide meaning which covers any application of money from which a listed person derives some benefit, or whether they apply only to cases in which funds or assets are ‘made available’ for his benefit, so that he is in a position to choose how to use them. The representatives for the United Kingdom Treasury submitted that the prohibition laid down by the Security Council resolution and the Community Directive should apply whenever a designated individual might well also benefit from the funds, as was most likely the case with payments made to persons in the same household. Such a situation, they maintained, required extraordinary precautions. However, the Court of Justice ruled that the United Kingdom’s interpretation had been too wide. The Court indicated that the essential purpose and object of asset freezing was to combat international terrorism and to cut off terrorists from financial resources that would be used for terrorist activities. Yet, the Court reasoned that separate examination of Article 2(2) in various languages did not support the argument that, by making social security or social assistance benefits available to the spouses of designated persons, the authorities concerned have ‘used’ those funds ‘for the benefit’ of a designated person. The Court stated that it is not those authorities, but the spouses of the designated persons to whom the funds at issue are made available, who then use them to buy goods or services which they provide as assistance in kind for the designated persons in order to meet the basic expenses of the household to which those persons belong. The Court continued by stating that it is very unlikely that those funds could be turned into means that could be used to support terrorist activities, especially because the benefits at issue are fixed at a level intended to meet only the strictly vital needs of the persons concerned. Thus, the Court reasoned, it should be presumed that the social payments involved here would be used only for household expenses. Finally, the Court clarified that the more restrictive interpretation of rules would not prevent a State from restricting benefits if it considered that the benefits were being used for criminal purposes. If and when such payments were turned over to the designated spouse for terrorist purposes, the Court reasoned, the United Kingdom authorities could then hold the spouse accountable to other national laws and penalties on the basis of such misappropriation of funds. Therefore, according to the Court, Article 2(2) of the Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 must be construed as not applying to the provision by a State of social security or social assistance benefits to the spouse of a person designated by the committee created pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Resolution 1267 (1999) of the Security Council of the United Nations and included in the list in Annex I to that regulation, as amended, on the grounds only that the spouse lives with that person and will or may use some of those payments to pay for goods or services which the designated person also will consume or from which he also will benefit. CR and CM

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Environment and consumers Aventis Pasteur SA v. OB (Case C-358/08) Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber): 2 December 2009 Directive 85/374/EEC – Liability for defective products – Articles 3 and 11 – Mistake in the classification of ‘producer’ – Judicial proceedings – Application for substitution of the producer for the original defendant – Expiry of the limitation period In this case, the European Court of Justice was asked by the House of Lords to deliver a preliminary ruling on an appeal in a product liability case concerning Council Directive 85/274/EEC on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the member states concerning liability for defective products, which provides for full harmonisation within its scope and for producer’s liability for damage caused by a defect in his product (Article 1). OB had been administered a vaccine during surgery that allegedly caused him severe brain damage. Eight years after the incident, OB started proceedings against APMSD (Mérieux UK Ltd at the time of the surgery), the supplier of the vaccines used in the hospital in which he had been operated upon. APMSD contended that it was not the producer of the vaccine but only its United Kingdom distributor, following which OB brought an action against APSA, the mother company of Mérieux UK Ltd at the time the facts of the case took place. APSA admitted being the vaccine’s producer but argued that the action had to be rejected, since it was initiated only after the expiration of the ten-year limitation period for which Article 11 of the Directive provides. OB applied then for the substitution of APSA for APMSD in the action he had instituted two years earlier and thus that the proceedings came within the limitation period. The High Court of Justice granted the substitution in the light of the European Court of Justice interpretation of the Directive in the O’Byrne case (Case C-127/04 O’Byrne [2006] ECR-I-1313). In this judgment, the European Court of Justice had concluded that it is for national law to determine whether substitution of the real producer is possible, when an action is brought against a company mistakenly considered as the defect product’s manufacturer. APSA appealed against the High Court’s decision and when the dispute reached the House of Lords, the latter decided to stay the proceedings and make a reference to the European Court of Justice on whether allowing substitution after the expiration of the ten-year limitation period is in conformity with the Directive, when proceedings were addressed to a defendant not falling within the Directive’s personal scope within this period. The European Court of Justice confirmed that it is for the national court to define the appropriate procedural mechanisms in order to address an error on the producer’s identity, without however compromising the Directive’s personal scope. Since the Directive provides for full harmonisation within its scope, all limitations it sets, in terms of the persons against whom a claim may be brought or the period within which a claim may be brought, have to be respected. Thus, unless proceedings against the producer are initiated, the right to compensation of the damage caused by a defect product is extinguished after ten years and the producer is relieved from any responsibility. This provision aims at the protection of both producers and consumers by

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ensuring legal certainty, by impeding a disproportionate burdening of producers and by thus encouraging technological progress. It follows that a national rule permitting substitution of the producer after the ten-year period in proceedings instituted against someone else cannot be seen as conforming with the Directive, since that would be equivalent to an extension of the limitation period, jeopardising both the full harmonisation introduced by the Directive and legal certainty from the producer’s perspective. The reference to subjective factors such as the claimant’s error, did however constitute justification for the substitution if the latter resulted in an infringement of the harmonised rules introduced by the Directive. The European Court of Justice continued by confirming its jurisdiction to guide the referring court in its judgment. Since APMSD, the initial defendant that supplied the vaccine, was a wholly-owned subsidiary of the actual producer, APSA, it had to be assessed according to national law whether it was indeed the parent company that put the vaccine into circulation. If this was the case, the Directive should not be interpreted as precluding the substitution of the producer having put the defect product into circulation for its subsidiary, merely by including a limitation period. Lastly, the Court of Justice noted that the Directive in its Article 3 par. 3 provides that in cases in which the actual producer of the defective product cannot be identified, its supplier is to be treated as producer, unless he informs in a timely fashion the injured person of the producer’s identity. According to the Court of Justice, the national court should determine whether indeed it was not possible for OB to have found the vaccine’s producer, but the mere denial by APMSD that it produced the vaccine could not in any case be viewed as having respectively informed the consumer, if not accompanied by information about the latter’s actual identity. Also, this information should, according to the Directive be provided ‘within a reasonable time’, thus on the defendant’s own initiative and promptly. Again, whether APMSD fulfilled this obligation being an APSA subsidiary and thus in possession of the relevant information, would be assessed by the national court. If it concluded that this was not the case, AMPSD could be treated as the vaccine’s producer for the purposes of the Directive and the proceedings initiated against it considered having interrupted the limitation period set by the Directive. Thus, the European Court of Justice concluded that national legislation permitting the substitution of one defendant for another could not be considered to conform to the Directive if it resulted in proceedings being initiated against the producer after the expiration of the ten-year limitation period. However, in proceedings initiated against the producer’s wholly-owned subsidiary, it is possible for the national court to accept the substitution of the producer if the latter is responsible for putting the product into circulation. Also, if the injured person was not reasonably in a position to identify the producer and exercised his rights against the product’s supplier, the supplier is to be treated as the producer, unless in timely fashion, and on its own initiative, it informs the consumer of the producer’s real identity. KC

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Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs eV v Plus Waren-handelsgesellschaft GmbH (Case C-304/08) Judgment of the Court of Justice (First Chamber): 14 January 2010 Directive 2005/29/EC – Unfair commercial practices – National legislation laying down a prohibition in principle of commercial practices which make the participation of consumers in a lottery conditional on the purchase of goods or the use of services In 2004, Plus Warenhandelsgesellschaft, a German retail undertaking, launched a campaign giving its customers the possibility of accumulating points with their purchases and then, on accumulating a minimum number of points, participating free of charge in the draws of the national association of lottery undertakings. This practice was seen by the German association for combating unfair competition as ‘unfair commercial practice’ under the German law on unfair competition (hereinafter referred to as the UWG), leading to an application for an injunction ending this practice by the association. German courts at first and second instance found that the practice was indeed unlawful according to the UWG, which provides that making the participation of consumers in a prize competition or lottery conditional on the purchase of goods or services is an unfair act and that unfair acts affecting consumers, competitors or other market participants are unlawful. On being seized on appeal on a point of law, the Federal Court of Justice decided to refer a question to the European Court of Justice in order to examine the issue of whether the UWG general prohibition of such practices was compatible with Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market. The Directive provides an exhaustive list of practices in Annex I that are per se unfair and requires a case-by-case assessment of all other practices against its general conditions, in order to identify whether they should or not be prohibited. The referring court noted that considering a practice such as the one in the current case as always unfair although not in Annex I, would result to a higher level of consumer protection than that sought by Directive 2005/29. Since however the latter provides for full harmonisation of the relevant national laws, there seems to be no discretion of the member states’ in ensuring higher protection within its scope. The Federal Court then clarified why it considered it necessary to form its decision in the light of the Directive despite the fact that the practice in question was launched before Directive 2005/29 was transposed into German law, according to earlier case-law of the European Court of Justice (Case C-212/04, Adeneler and Others [2006] ECR) applicable national law should be interpreted by the national judge in conformity to the Directive even if the latter has not yet been transposed in the Member State in question, as long as its implementation period has expired. The fact that the events giving rise to the case in question occurred even before the adoption of the Directive should not, according to the Federal Court, have an impact on this interpretation, since the order for the injunction which had been sought by the applicant would also aim at the prevention of future breaches, requiring thus the legal framework applicable at the time of the decision to also be taken into account when deciding if the order should be issued.

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The first issue the European Court of Justice examined was the admissibility of the reference, which had been challenged by the Spanish Government. The European Court of Justice stated first that according to Article 234 EC and the settled case law thereon, it was for the national court to assess the necessity and relevance of a reference for a preliminary ruling (inter alia Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra [2006] ECR-2099) and that the European Court of Justice could only be exempted by its obligation to provide an interpretation, when the reference has obviously no relation to the facts or purpose of the main action. The Spanish Government argued that the lack of a cross-border dimension to the facts of the case precluded the application of Directive 2005/29 in this dispute (Case C-97/98 Jägerskiöld [2006] ECR I-7319), an argument which was rejected by the Court since this case referred to the freedom to provide services which was not applicable to merely national activities. The Directive in question on the contrary did not require a cross-border element, as stated in Article 3 par.1 thereof, provided that it was applicable to all unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices. The Spanish Government further found that an assessment of the German law’s conformity to the Directive could not take place, since the Directive had not even been adopted and thus certainly not was not applicable at the time in which the facts giving rise to the case took place. The Court did not uphold this argument either, stating that from the date a Directive entered into force the member states should abstain from interpreting national law in a way that could compromise its objective, even if the transposition into national law had not yet taken place (inter alia, Joined Cases C-261/07 and C-299/07 VTB-VAB and Galatea [2006]). Also, it followed from the reference that the outcome of the appeal on a point of law depended on whether the injunction sought could still be applied at the time when the decision was taken, under the current legal framework, inasmuch as the application also referred to future breaches. Thus, the European Court of Justice concluded that the interpretation of Directive 2005/29 could be of use to the Federal Court. Insofar as concerned the last argument raised by the Spanish Government that the commercial practice in question did not fall within the scope of Directive 2005/29, since it would be covered by the proposal for a Regulation COM(2001) 546 final concerning sales promotions, if this had not been withdrawn, the Court replied that this did not preclude the possibility that the practice constituted an unfair commercial practice under the Directive, which would in that case be applicable, especially since the aforementioned proposal was not adopted. Concerning the substance of the conflict, the Court first examined whether the contested practice indeed constituted a commercial practice falling within the scope of Directive 2005/29 and concluded that this was the case, since Article 2(d) provided a very broad definition of ‘any act, omission, course of conduct or representation, commercial communication, including advertising and marketing, by a trader, directly connected with the promotion, sale or supply of a product to consumers’ for commercial practices, thus including also the commercial strategy of linking the participation to a lottery to the purchase of products in order to increase sales. Recital 6 of the Directive explicitly exempted only ‘national laws on unfair commercial practices which harm only competitors’ economic interests or which relate to a transaction between traders’, so that the argument raised by the Austrian and Czech Governments

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that the UWG provisions should not be seen as falling within the Directive’s scope because they primarily aimed at the protection of the operator’s competitors rather than consumer protection could not be retained, since consumer protection was also among the purposes of the UWG, as stated in Article 3 thereof. In order to identify whether the practice in question was indeed unlawful, the Court first noted that Directive 2005/29 provided for full harmonisation within its scope (Article 4), restricting, according to former case law (VTB-VTA and Galatea), member states’ discretion to consider unfair and subsequently unlawful, commercial practices beyond those covered by the Directive. Article 5 of the Directive provides that commercial practices found to be unfair are to be prohibited. In order to evaluate if a practice is unfair, an individual assessment has to take place in order to identify whether it is ‘contrary to the requirements of professional diligence and likely to distort the economic behaviour of the average consumer’. The Article further provides that misleading and aggressive practices (as defined in Articles 6 and 7 of Directive 2005/29) are in particular prohibited when ‘likely to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision which he would not otherwise have taken’, after the examination of their nature and factual context. Directive 2005/29 also provides in its Annex I an exhaustive list of all commercial practices that are per se unlawful and are, according to Recital 17 of the Directive’s preamble, the only practices that do not require an individual assessment against the above-mentioned criteria. It will thus have to be seen whether the UWG provision according to which a commercial practice linking the participation of a consumer to a lottery or prize competition to their purchases is always prohibited, is indeed contrary to Directive 2005/29. The Court found that the general prohibition of such practice by the UWG rules, even though they are not listed under Annex I, without a further assessment of whether in each particular case they were likely to produce the results Directive 2005/29 seeks to impede, was not in conformity with the Directive’s provisions. Article 4 of the Directive explicitly excludes more restrictive national legislation – even if it providesgreater consumer protection – in matters within its scope. The fact that the UWG provided for an exception from the general prohibition for practices concerning lotteries or prize competitions inherently linked to the goods or services in question could not replace the lack of a case-by-case assessment and did not suffice to justify the provision’s general character. KC Rosalba Alassini v Telecom Italia SpA (C-317/08) and Filomena Califano v Wind SpA (C-3 18/08) and Lucia Anna Giorgia Iacono v Telecom Italia SpA (C-319/08) and Multiservice Srl v Telecom Italia SpA (C-320/08), (Joined Cases C-317/08, C318/08, C-319/08 and C-320/08) Court of Justice (Fourth Chamber): 18 March 2010 Reference for a preliminary ruling – Principle of effective judicial protection – Electronic communications networks and services – Directive 2002/22/EC – Universal Service – Disputes between end-users and providers – Mandatory to attempt an outof-court settlement

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Background to the case These references for preliminary rulings concerned the interpretation of the principle of effective judicial protection in relation to national legislation. According to this legislation, an attempt to achieve an out-of-court settlement was a mandatory condition for the admissibility before the courts of actions in certain disputes between providers and end-users under Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on Universal Service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive) (OJ 2002 L 108, p. 51). The cases giving rise to the preliminary rulings all concerned disputes between consumers and electronic communications companies. Before being able to bring a provider of electronic communication services (such as telephone companies) to court, Italian law required that the end user first attempted to achieve an out-of-court settlement. Failing such an attempt, their claims would be found to be inadmissible before the Italian court (Article 84 Electronic communications Code, Law No 249 of 31 July 1997, Decision 173/07/CONS). The national court wondered whether European Union law, more specifically the interpretation of Article 34 of the Universal Service Directive and the principle of effective judicial protection, Directive 1999/441 and Recommendation 98/2572 and Recommendation 2001/3013 had to be interpreted as precluding national legislation which made it mandatory to attempt out-of-court proceedings before initiating a claim in court. The case is interesting as it presented an opportunity for the Court to express a view on how to balance the right of access to court with current legal developments seeking to promote outof-court dispute settlement in, inter alia, consumer-oriented fields of law, such as those included in Article 34 of the Universal Service Directive. That Article provides that member states must ensure that transparent, simple and inexpensive out-of-court procedures are available, enabling disputes involving consumers and relating issues conferred by that directive to be settled fairly and promptly. Those procedures, is it provided, should be without prejudice to national court proceedings. When making those out-of-court procedures available, the member states must, moreover, take due account of Recommendation 98/257, which lays down certain principles applying to the out-of-court settlement bodies. The admissibility of the reference As the orders for reference did not provide any detail, both the Commission and Italy argued that the preliminary references were inadmissible; it was argued that it was not clear what rights were disputed and that the questions thus were purely hypothetical. The Court underlined that it is the responsibility of the national court to 1 Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects

of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees (OJ 1999 L 171, p. 12). 2 Commission Recommendation 98/257/EC of 30 March 1998 on the principles applicable to the bodies

responsible for out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes (OJ 1998 L 115, p. 31). 3 Commission Recommendation 2001/310/EC of 4 April 2001 on the principles for out-of-court bodies

involved in the consensual resolution of consumer disputes (OJ 2001 L 109, p. 56).

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determine the necessity of a preliminary ruling and that it only rejects questions when it is quite obvious that the interpretation of European Union law sought is unrelated to the facts, is hypothetical or where there is not enough factual or legal material to give a useful answer. In the case at hand it found that it had enough material as there was a reasoned statement of facts and law and reasons why a reference was needed in the national court’s submission and although the specific rights were not mentioned, it was possible to see that it concerned electronic communication services between end users and providers and out-of-court procedures. The references were thus admissible. The merits of the case In its assessment of whether the Italian legislation implementing Article 34 of the Universal Service Directive was compatible with the principle of effective judicial protection and the right of access to court provided therein, the Court started by stating that nothing in the Directive or the Recommendation set out the precise content of out-of-court settlement procedures and that there was nothing in those instruments preventing member states from making such proceedings mandatory. The only requirement imposed on member states was that the right to bring an action before the courts be maintained. Therefore, the Court concluded that it was for the member states to lay down the rules and to define the nature, which can be mandatory, of out-of-court proceedings while ensuring that the Directive remained effective. Nevertheless, the Court went on to assess whether establishing a mandatory settlement procedure was compatible with the right to effective judicial protection. The Court started by recalling the principles of equivalence, effectiveness and effective judicial protection and the member states’ obligations arising there from. It held that while it is true that making the admissibility of an action conditional upon a prior out-of-court settlement affects the rights of individuals, various factors showed that the mandatory settlement procedure in this case did not make it impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the rights in question. First, the outcome of settlement proceedings did not bind parties and did not prejudice their right to bring legal proceedings. Secondly, the settlement procedure did not result in any substantial delay. There was a time-limit of thirty days for the completion of the procedure from the date it was requested. Thirdly, during the settlement procedure, the period for timebarring of claims was suspended. Fourthly, the Court took into account that there were no, or only minor, costs for out-of-court proceedings. The Court however noted that the exercise of the rights conferred on individuals under the Universal Services Directive might be rendered impossible in practice to exercise for certain individuals who had no access to the internet, if the procedure could be accessed only through electronic means. It was for the national courts to ascertain whether that was the case. Moreover, the referring court must also ascertain whether in exceptional cases where interim measures are needed, the out-of-court settlement procedure allowed, or did not preclude, such measures. In those circumstances, and as long as interim measures were possible in exceptional circumstances and in so far as electronic means were not the only means by which the settlement procedure could be accessed, the national legislation complied with the principle of effectiveness.

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Interestingly, the Court thereafter analysed whether the rules produced any difficulties from the perspective of the general principle of effective judicial protection, in that the admissibility to legal proceedings introduced an additional step for access to justice, which might prejudice the implementation of the principle of effective judicial protection. By doing so, it appears as if it considered the obligations that the principle of effectiveness imposed on national courts to be different from those imposed under the general principle of effective judicial protection. The Court recalled that the principle of effective judicial protection is a general principle of law that stems from the member states’ constitutional traditions, and that it has been enshrined in Article 6 and 13 ECHR and reaffirmed by Article 47 in the Charter. The Court held that the case-law on fundamental rights does not constitute unfettered prerogatives and that they may be restricted, provided that the restrictions correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by the measure in question and that they do not involve a disproportionate and intolerable interference which infringes on the very substance of the rights guaranteed. The Court noted that the aim of the national provision was the quicker and less expensive settlement of disputes and that it is a lightening of the burden of the court system. They thus pursue legitimate objectives in the general interest. Secondly, the Court found that the out-of-court settlement procedure, in the light of the specific function of that procedure, was not disproportionate in relation to that objective. A non-mandatory out-of-court settlement procedure, as observed by the Advocate General, would not be as efficient and it was not evident that any disadvantages caused by the mandatory nature of the out-of-court settlement procedure were disproportionate to those objectives. In the light of this, the Court found that the national procedure at issue in the main proceedings complied both with the principle of effectiveness and with that of effective judicial protection. JE Handelsgesellschaft Heinrich Heine GmbH v Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen eV (Case C-511/08) Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber): 15 April 2010 Directive 97/7/EC – Consumer protection – Distance contracts – Right of withdrawal – Consumer charged with the cost of delivering the goods The consumer association Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen brought an action against Handelsgesellschaft Heinrich Heine, a mail-order company, for charging consumers a flat-rate charge of € 4.95 for delivery of goods, which the supplier would not refund in the event of withdrawal from the contract. The German Federal Court hearing the case in appeal asked the European Court of Justice whether Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts precludes national legislation allowing the costs of delivering the goods to be charged to the consumer even where he has withdrawn from the contract. Article 6 of Directive 97/7/EC provides: “1. For any distance contract the consumer shall have a period of at least seven working days in which to withdraw from the contract without penalty and with-

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out giving any reason. The only charge that may be made to the consumer because of the exercise of his right of withdrawal is the direct cost of returning the goods. ... 2. Where the right of withdrawal has been exercised by the consumer pursuant to this Article, the supplier shall be obliged to reimburse the sums paid by the consumer free of charge. The only charge that may be made to the consumer because of the exercise of his right of withdrawal is the direct cost of returning the goods. Such reimbursement must be carried out as soon as possible and in any case within 30 days.” According to the Court of Justice, the wording ‘sums paid by the consumer’ imposes on the supplier, in the event of the consumer’s withdrawal, a general obligation to reimburse all of the sums paid by the consumer under the contract, regardless of the reason for their payment, and not only the price paid by the consumer, excluding the costs borne by him, as claimed by the German Government. The Court then examined the words ‘because of the exercise of his right of withdrawal’ and concluded that, in line with the general scheme and purpose of that Directive, relate to all of the costs incurred by the conclusion, performance and termination of the contract which may be charged to the consumer if he exercises his right of withdrawal and not only costs incurred following the exercise of the right of withdrawal and caused by it. The Court noted that the Directive authorises suppliers to charge consumers, in the event of their withdrawal, only the direct cost of returning the goods. Since Article 6 thus clearly has as its purpose not to discourage consumers from exercising their right of withdrawal, the Court found that it would be contrary to that objective to interpret Article 6 as authorising member states to allow delivery costs to be charged to consumers in addition to the direct cost of returning the goods in the event of such withdrawal and would compromise a balanced sharing of the risks between parties to distance contracts, by making consumers liable to bear all of the costs related to transporting the goods. The Court added that the fact that the consumer has been informed of the amount of the delivery costs prior to concluding the contract cannot neutralise the dissuasive effect which the charging of those costs to the consumer would have on his exercise of his right of withdrawal. LM

European Citizenship Janko Rottmann gegen Freistaat Bayern (Rs. C-135/08) Europäischer Gerichtshofs (Große Kammer): 2. März 2010 Unionsbürgerschaft – Art. 17 EG – Durch Geburt erworbene Staatsangehörigkeit eines Mitgliedstaats – Durch Einbürgerung erworbene Staatsangehörigkeit eines anderen Mitgliedstaats – Verlust der ursprünglichen Staatsangehörigkeit aufgrund dieser Einbürgerung – Rückwirkender Verlust der durch Einbürgerung erworbenen

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Staatsangehörigkeit wegen betrügerischer Handlungen bei ihrem Erwerb – Staatenlosigkeit, die den Verlust der Unionsbürgerschaft zur Folge hat Der Kläger des Ausgangsverfahrens Janko Rottmann war ursprünglich österreichischer Staatsangehöriger. Er lebte eine Zeitlang in Deutschland und beantragte 1998 die deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit. Im Antragsverfahren verschwieg er, dass in Österreich ein Ermittlungsverfahren gegen ihn anhängig war. 1999 wurde ihm die deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit verliehen. Wenige Monate später erging ein Haftbefehl des österreichischen Gerichts gegen Herrn Rottmann. Die Stadtverwaltung Graz setzte die zuständige Stadtverwaltung München hierüber in Kenntnis. Die Stadtverwaltung München erfuhr außerdem von der österreichischen Staatsanwaltschaft, dass das Ermittlungsverfahren gegen Herrn Rottmann schon zum Zeitpunkt des Antrags auf Einbürgerung lief. Im Jahr 2000 entzog der Freistaat Bayern Herrn Rottmann auf Grundlage dieser Tatsachen rückwirkend die Staatsangehörigkeit. Herr Rottmann wurde dadurch staatenlos. Seine österreichische Staatsangehörigkeit hatte er im Rahmen des Antragsverfahrens betreffend die deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit aufgeben müssen. Das Verfahren zur Wiedererlangung der österreichischen Staatsangehörigkeit war zum Zeitpunkt der Entscheidung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs noch nicht abgeschlossen. Herr Rottmann klagte gegen den Entzug der deutschen Staatsangehörigkeit. Der Bayerische Verwaltungsgerichtshof vermerkte in seiner zweitinstanzlichen Entscheidung, dass den Aspekten des Europarechts und der Unionsbürgerschaft Genüge geleistet sei, wenn die nationalen Behörden diese Belange bei der Ausübung ihres Ermessens berücksichtigten (unter Verweis auf Micheletti und andere, Rs. C-369/90, Urteil vom 7. Juli 1992). Im Übrigen seien Fragen der Staatsangehörigkeit der Kern nationaler Souveränität. Das vorlegende Bundesverwaltungsgericht wünscht sich mit dem Vorabentscheidungsersuchen eine weitere Klärung, insbesondere der Rechtsprechung Micheletti und andere. Es möchte wissen, ob die Gefahr der Staatenlosigkeit einer rückwirkenden Entziehung der rechtswidrig erlangten Staatsangehörigkeit entgegensteht. Es fragt auch danach, ob das Verfahren des Entzugs möglicherweise solange ausgesetzt werden sollte, bis Klarheit darüber besteht, ob der Betroffene seine frühere Staatsangehörigkeit wiedererlangen kann. Im Ergebnis akzeptiert der Europäische Gerichtshof die von den deutschen Behörden gefundene Lösung. Unvollständige oder fehlerhafte Angaben im Verfahren zur Erlangung der Staatsangehörigkeit berechtigen die nationalen Behörden zur Rücknahme der Einbürgerung. Die relevanten europäischen und internationalen Übereinkommen betreffend die Staatsangehörigkeit bzw. betreffend die Verhinderung von Staatenlosigkeit stehen einer Rücknahme in einem Fall wie dem vorliegenden nicht entgegen. Die Rücknahme ist auch mit den Bestimmungen über die Unionsbürgerschaft vereinbar. Der Gerichtshof äußert sich nicht zu der Frage, ob die Behörden des einen Mitgliedstaates gegebenenfalls abwarten müssen, wie der Mitgliedstaat der früheren Staatsangehörigkeit zur Wiederverleihung der Staatsangehörigkeit entscheidet. Von österreichischer Seite liege noch keine Entscheidung vor, die Grundlage einer Beurteilung durch den Gerichtshof sein könne. Interessanter als das Ergebnis ist die Behandlung der Frage, ob der Anwendungsbereich des Unionsrechts überhaupt eröffnet ist, mit der Folge, dass Fragen der

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Erteilung oder des Entzugs der nationalen Staatsangehörigkeit vom Europäischen Gerichtshof überprüft werden können. Konnte man nicht aufgrund des Textes der Verträge und der Erklärung Nr. 2 zur Schlussakte des Vertrags von Maastricht zu dem Schluss kommen, dass die Staatsangehörigkeit allein Frage des innerstaatlichen Rechts sei? So heißt es etwa in der Erklärung: „Die Konferenz erklärt, daß bei Bezugnahmen des Vertrages zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft auf die Staatsangehörigen der Mitgliedstaaten die Frage, welchem Mitgliedstaat eine Person angehört, allein durch Bezug auf das innerstaatliche Recht des betreffenden Mitgliedstaats geregelt werden kann.“ Konnte man also bislang nicht davon ausgehen, dass die Unionsbürgerschaft ein rein abgeleiteter Rechtsstatus ist, der mit dem Verlust der nationalen Staatsangehörigkeit ipso jure erlischt? Nach Auffassung des EuGH ist das zwar so. Jedoch folge aus dem Unionsrecht ein Überprüfungsrecht des EuGH. Der EuGH formuliert das Verhältnis zwischen nationaler Regelungszuständigkeit und dem Einfluss des Europarechts so: „Dass für ein Rechtsgebiet die Mitgliedstaaten zuständig sind, schließt aber nicht aus, dass die betreffenden nationalen Vorschriften in Situationen, die unter das Unionsrecht fallen, dieses Recht beachten müssen“ (Rn. 41). Er führt weiter aus, dass es sich bei der Unionsbürgerschaft um einen “grundlegenden Status der Angehörigen der Mitgliedstaaten“ handele (Rn. 43), aus dem sich eigene Rechte aus dem Unionsrecht ergeben. Diese Rechte gingen aber verloren, wenn die nationale Staatsangehörigkeit entzogen würde. Daraus folge eine Pflicht zur Beachtung des Unionsrechts und mithin die Zuständigkeit des EuGH, die Einhaltung dieser Pflicht zu überprüfen (Rn. 46–48). Da die Rückerlangung der österreichischen Staatsangehörigkeit noch ungewiss war, konnte das Argument nicht vorgebracht werden, Herr Rottmann werde Unionsbürger bleiben. Es drohte ihm die Staatenlosigkeit. Hinsichtlich des konkreten Einflusses des Unionsrechts auf die Entscheidungsfindung der innerstaatlichen Behörden verweist der EuGH auf die Anwendung des Grundsatzes der Verhältnismäßigkeit. Bei der Beurteilung seien die Schwere des Verstoßes des Antragsstellers, die Zeit, die seit der Einbürgerung vergangen ist, und die Chancen des Betroffenen, seine ursprüngliche Staatsangehörigkeit wiederzuerlangen, zu berücksichtigen. MBK Maria Teixeira v London Borough of Lambeth, Secretary of State for the Home Department (Case C-480/08) Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 23 February 2010 Freedom of movement for persons – Right of residence – National of a member state who worked in another member state and remained there after ceasing to work – Child in vocational training in the host member state – No means of subsistence – Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 – Article 12 – Directive 2004/38/EC The Court in this judgment examined the relationship between Regulation 1612/68 on freedom of movement of workers and the later Citizenship Directive (Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move

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and reside freely within the territory of the member states) and the conditions under which an European Union citizen may reside in a member state of which he or she is not a national, as primary carer of a child remaining in education in that member state. The case was brought before the Court as a preliminary reference from the Civil Division of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales, seized on appeal against a decision rejecting an application for housing assistance. Ms Teixeira, a Portuguese national, moved to the United Kingdom in 1989 with her husband, who was also Portuguese, and worked there for two full years, as well as for intermittent periods subsequently. Her daughter was born there in 1991 and lived in the United Kingdom for her entire life. When the latter entered education in the United Kingdom, her mother was not working, but she did so for limited periods in the following years, her last occupation being in 2005. From 2007 and after her parents’ divorce Ms. Teixeira’s daughter lived with her mother, who shortly after applied for a housing assistance. The responsible body rejected her application by referring to the Citizenship Directive, according to which Ms Teixeira had no right of residence in the United Kingdom given her lack of self-sufficiency. Ms. Teixeira admitted that she did not fulfil the criteria set by Article 7 of that Directive, granting a right of residence of more than 3 months to European Union citizens who are workers, self-employed or enrolled in an educational institution of the member state in question and self-sufficient or visiting such a European Union citizen and granting the same right under certain circumstances to European Union citizens who are in duly recorded involuntary unemployment, incapable of working or in vocational training. She also agreed that she did not fulfill the criterion of Article 16 providing for a right to permanent residence to European Union citizens who have legally resided for a continuous period of five years in another member state. She insisted however that she was eligible for the housing allowance, since she had a right of residence deriving from Regulation 1612/68, Article 12 of which, as interpreted by the European Court of Justice in Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] ECR I-7091, granted such a right to the primary carer of those in education in the member state in question. Ms Teixeira claims that this provision granted a right of residence both to her daughter and to her which did not depend on whether they were self-sufficient, whereas the opposing side contested the applicability of Article 12 of Regulation 1618/68 arguing it had been replaced by the Citizenship Directive and claimed that even if that Article was applicable, Ms. Teixeira would have to be self-sufficient to have a right to reside and even then would have this right only until her daughter reached the age of 18. Moreover, the fact that Ms. Teixeira was not working when her daughter entered education in the United Kingdom and only did so for short periods afterwards, meant that she was not permitted to claim a right of residence only founded on her daughter being still in education. The seized court decided to stay the proceedings and refer a number of questions to the European Court of Justice. The Court started by examining two questions, namely whether in circumstances such as those in the instant case a European Union citizen having worked in a member state of which he or she is not national and where his or her child is in education may claim a right of residence in that member state as

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the child’s primary carer only on the grounds of Article 12 of Regulation 1618/68 or whether he or she should also fulfil the conditions set by the Citizenship Directive. Article 12 of Regulation 1618/68 provides migrant workers’ children a right to access the educational system of the host member state, as long as they reside in it. Interpreting this provision in its above-mentioned decision Baumbast, the Court recognised a right of residence on the part of the child while attending educational courses and a corresponding right on the part of its primary carer. The subsequent divorce of the child’s parents or their lack of economic activity in the host State did not influence the child’s right to reside for educational purposes. The Court acknowledged that not allowing the primary carer to reside in the host member state might deprive children of their right to education in that member state and concluded that Article 12 of the Regulation should be interpreted in the light of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights protecting private and family life as conferring to the child of a migrant worker the right to be accompanied by its primary carer as well, irrespective of whether he or she had an individual right to reside in that State. The referring court continued by asking whether these rights of the child and its carer were based solely on Article 12 of Regulation 1618/68 or whether they resulted from the combined application of Articles 10 and 12 thereof – Article 10 regulating under which conditions family members of a migrant worker had a right of residence in the host member state and having being repealed by the Citizenship Directive. In the second case, it would be necessary for the primary carer of the child in education to fulfil the criteria set out by the Citizenship Directive, such as being self-sufficient and have sickness insurance, in order to be allowed to retain his right of residence in the host member state. The European Court of Justice first stated that the right to equal treatment in access to education under Article 12 of Regulation 1618/68 depends on the prior residence of the child in a member state in which his or her parents work or have worked. Article 12 grants to the child an individual right of residence as well, if he or she is a beneficiary of the right to equal treatment in access to education, irrespective of whether he or she would have such a right on grounds of Article 10 of Regulation 1618/68, as stated by the Court in Case C-7/94 Gaal [1995] ECR I-1031. This is the outcome of both the teleological and the systematic interpretation of the Regulation and it also entails that the corresponding right of the primary carer cannot be contested either simply because the latter does not fulfil the conditions set out by Article 10 of that Regulation. Furthermore, a child’s right to equal treatment in education is also independent from whether the parent maintains his or her status as migrant worker, since Article 12 of the Regulation explicitly grants such a right to the children of those who worked in the host state in the past. The only condition set by this Article, as the Court had repeatedly stated, was for the child to have resided in the member state in question, while at least one of the parents resided there as a worker. This interpretation of Article 12 was part of the Court’s settled case-law and had not been contested since the Citizenship Directive entered into force, as Article 12 of the Regulation has not been explicitly repealed unlike Articles 10 and 11 thereof. Also, it resulted from the travaux préparatoires of the Citizenship Directive that it aimed at being compatible with the judgment in Baumbast and that there was no indication from the legislator

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that the scope of Article 12 was to be influenced by it. Furthermore, if the content of this Article merely involved the granting a right to equal treatment in education to migrant workers’ children with no subsequent right of residence, there would be no reason for it to be retained after the adoption of the above-mentioned Directive, since the latter provided for equal treatment of European Union citizens in a host member state in all matters within the scope of the Treaty and thus also in access to education according to settled European Court of Justice case-law (see inter alia Case C-293/83 Gravier [1985] ECR 593). Lastly, the Citizenship Directive’s preamble (recital 3) entailed that its aim was to simplify and strengthen European Union citizens’ right to free movement and thus it could not be considered that it introduced stricter conditions for the application of Article 12 of Regulation 1618/68. Thus, the Court concluded that an European Union citizen having resided in a host member state as a migrant worker could claim a right of residence as primary carer of a child who was still in education in that State, without having to fulfil the conditions set by the Citizenship Directive. The next issue raised by the referring court was whether the primary carer’s right of residence depended on whether he or she was self-sufficient, did not burden the social assistance system of the host member state and had full sickness insurance, as was the case in Baumbast. According to the body rejecting Ms. Teixeira’s application, this was exactly the reason for which a right to reside was recognised in the above judgment. The European Court of Justice explained that whether Mr. Baumbast was self-sufficient was only examined with regard to his individual right of residence, whereas his children’s and their primary carer’s rights were grounded not on their self-sufficiency, but on Regulation’s 1618/68 objective of facilitating migrant workers’ integration in the host state and the risk of undermining the right to education granted to the migrant worker’s children, if no right of residence for them and their carer accompanied it In any case, there had been no reference to self sufficiency in the interpretation of Article 12 of the Regulation in the Baumbast judgment. Such a restrictive interpretation would render the provision ineffective and could not be accepted. Furthermore, Article 12 of the Citizenship Directive provided that death or departure of the migrant worker did not impact on his or her children and their carer’s right of residence, illustrating – even if not applicable in the case at hand – the particular importance and the level of protection the Citizenship Directive sought to provide. The next issue raised was whether the primary carer’s right of residence was linked to whether he or she actually exercised an economic activity in the host state when the child entered education. It occured from the wording of Article 12 of Regulation 1618/68 that the provision applied to children whose parent is or has been employed in the host member state with no further restriction; consequently it had no influence on the rights deriving from this provision whether the parent has or not a migrant worker’s status when the child enters education. The Court reiterated its earlier jurisprudence, according to which as long as a child in education in the host State became installed there while his or her parent was a migrant worker, the rights provided by Article 12 of the Regulation to the child and its primary carer were acquired. Whether the right of the primary carer to reside in the host State ends when the child in education reaches the age of majority was the last matter the European Court

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of Justice addressed in this judgment, since the daughter of Ms. Teixeira reached the age of 18 during the proceedings – the age of majority according to United Kingdom law. The Court had already settled that reaching majority did not affect the right in education or the right to reside of the child itself, in particular because the scope of education included higher studies as well. More specifically, in the Gaal case, the European Court of Justice examined whether a child over the age of 21 and selfsufficient retained his right to equal treatment deriving from Article 12 of Regulation 1618/68 and concluded that the principle of equal treatment set out in this provision extended to providing migrant workers’ children with the possibility of successfully completing their studies and should for this reason also be eligible for a student allowance. Linking the application of this Article to the age or the status of the child would be contrary to the wording and to the objective of the Directive. Since the Court concluded in its judgment that not permitting the child’s primary carer to reside in the host State may lead to an infringement of the child’s right to education and it can be that even a child above the age of majority still requires the primary carer’s presence and care to complete his or her studies, it is for the national courts to assess whether the mere fact that the child has reached the age of majority ends the primary carer’s right to reside in the host State. KC

Freedom of Establishment José Manuel Blanco Pérez v Consejería de Salud y Servicios Sanitarios (Joined cases C-570/07 and C-571/07) Court of Justice (Grand Chamber): 1 June 2010 Article 49 TFEU – Directive 2005/36/EC – Freedom of establishment – Public health – Pharmacies – Proximity – Provision of medicinal products to the public – Operating licence – Territorial distribution of pharmacies – Establishment of limits based on population density – Minimum distance between pharmacies – Candidates who have pursued professional activities on part of the national territory – Priority – Discrimination This reference for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Asturias (Spain) concerned the interpretation of Article 49 TFEU. The reference was submitted in the course of proceedings brought by Mr Blanco Pérez against the Consejería de Salud y Servicios Sanitarios (Ministry of Health and Public Health Services). In 2002, the Autonomous Community of Asturias decided to launch a procedure, in accordance with Articles 6 to 17 of Decree 72/2001, for the grant of licences to open new pharmacies which included certain restrictions on the setting up of new pharmacies within the region. Such restrictions included a geographical restriction preventing the opening of a pharmacy within 250 metres of another pharmacy and a limit on the number of pharmacies in an area by reference to the population of that area. A number of other criteria were set out for the selection of competing candidate pharmacists, namely: points allocated for the professional and

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teaching experience of the candidates; and professional experience gained in a town with a population of less than 2,800 people. José Manuel Blanco Pérez was a Spanish citizen. Whereas he was a qualified pharmacist, he was not accredited to open a pharmacy. His application for permission to open a pharmacy was denied by the Council of Health and Sanitary Services, a decision which was confirmed by the Asturian Government Council in 2002. Mr Blanco Pérez disputed the legality of these decisions and of Decree 72/2001, inter alia on the ground that they had the effect of preventing pharmacists from gaining access to new pharmacies in Asturias. Further, he claimed that Decree 72/2001 set out improper criteria for the selection of licencees for new pharmacies. In that context, the national court chose to refer a question to the Court asking whether the body of rules laid down in Decree 72/2001 constituted a restriction on the freedom of establishment which is incompatible with Article 49 TFEU. The Consejo General de Colegios Oficiales de Farmacéuticos de España and the Spanish, Greek, French and Italian Government disputed the admissibility of the references for a preliminary ruling inter alia because of an absence of any cross-border element, however, the Court held the questions referred for a preliminary ruling to be admissible. The Court of Justice pointed out that national legislation such as that at issue in the case did in fact constitute a restriction on the freedom of establishment within the meaning of Article 49 TFEU. However, the Court went on to consider that in some instances such measures might be justified by overriding reasons relating to the general interest provided that they satisfied certain conditions: they must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest; they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; and they must not go beyond what was necessary in order to attain that objective. The Court held that the provisions in question were on the whole non-discriminatory, treating all pharmacists equally, regardless of origin. Moreover, the Court pointed out that restrictions on the freedom of establishment might be justified by the objective of ensuring that the provision of medicinal products to the public is reliable and of good quality. Further, the Court had to investigate whether the legislation was appropriate to the attainment of the objective of ensuring that the provision of medicinal products to the public was of good quality. Here, the Court observed that if this field were wholly unregulated, pharmacists would become concentrated in the most profitable areas so that certain other less attractive areas would suffer from a shortfall in the number of pharmacists needed to ensure a good pharmaceutical service. Thus, the distance rule and the population size rule were considered to be appropriate as they were likely to result in an even distribution of pharmacies throughout the national territory, in that way ensuring that the population as a whole had adequate access to pharmaceutical services. However, the Court then had to consider the second part of the questions referred for a preliminary ruling, relating to the selection criteria for licensees for new pharmacies, as set out in points 4, 6 and 7(a) to (c) of the Annex to Decree 72/2001. Point 6 of the Annex to the Decree 72/2001 stated that points for a professional qualifications shall be increased by 20% for professional experience obtained within the

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Autonomous Community of Asturias and it emerged from point 7(c) of that Annex that if candidates had equal qualifications, licences were to be granted to pharmacists who have pursued their professional activities within the Autonomous Community of Asturias. Thus, through these two criteria the selection process favoured pharmacists who had pursued their activities on part of the national territory and the Court held that this amounts to impermissible discrimination on grounds of nationality contrary to the principle of freedom of establishment The Consejería de Salud y Servicios Sanitarios and the Principado de Asturias contended that the difference in treatment could be justified by the need to maintain a level of quality in the pharmaceutical service, given that its quality would be impaired if pharmacists who had set up in business were not immediately capable of providing pharmaceutical services. They argued that if pharmacists were to be able to operate immediately in this way, they needed to be acquainted with the way in which the pharmacies in that region operated. However, the Court did not uphold these arguments since, under Article 1(1) and (2) of Directive 85/432 and Article 45(2)(e) and (g) of Directive 2005/36, holders of evidence of formal qualifications in pharmacy at university level had to be able to perform all duties that were required from a pharmacist. In those circumstances, the foregoing argument could not justify unequal treatment such as that at issue in this case. Therefore, in its judgment the Court held that Article 49 TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding, in principle, national legislation such as that at issue in the concerned case which imposed certain restrictions on the issue of licences for the opening of new pharmacies. However, Article 49 TFEU precluded such national legislation in so far as the basic ‘2,800 inhabitants’ and ‘250 metres distance’ rules prevented, in any geographical area which had special demographic features, the establishment of a sufficient number of pharmacies to ensure adequate pharmaceutical services, that being a matter for the national court to ascertain. Moreover, the Court concluded that Article 49 TFEU, read in conjunction with Article 1(1) and (2) of Council Directive 85/432/EEC and Article 45(2)(e) and (g) of Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament must be interpreted as precluding criteria, such as those set out in points 6 and 7 of the Annex to Decree 72/2001. CM and CR Freedom to provide services Commission v. Spain (Case C-211/08) Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber): 15 June 2010 Failure of a member state to fulfil obligations – Article 49 EC – Social security – Hospital care needed during a temporary stay in another member state – Lack of right to assistance from the competent institution to supplement that of the institution of the member state of stay A French citizen resident in Spain and insured under the Spanish national health system, received hospital care during a stay in France. The Spanish institution refused to reimburse the portion of the hospitalisation costs which, in accordance with

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the French legislation, the French institution had left him to pay. The Commission decided to bring an action against the Kingdom of Spain for failure to fulfil its obligations under Article 49 EC. The European Commission argued that the Spanish legislation constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide medical, tourist or educational services liable to induce a person insured under the Spanish national health system, who is faced with such a situation and has a choice between going to hospital in the member state of stay and an early return to Spain to be treated there, to choose the second option whenever the level of cover applicable in the member state of stay is less favourable than that applicable in Spain. The Spanish Government challenged this view and contended that, in any event, the alleged restriction was justified by overriding reasons relating to the public interest in maintaining the financial balance of the national health system concerned. First of all, the Court stated that the freedom to provide services encompasses the freedom of an insured person established in a member state to travel to another member state for a temporary stay and to receive hospital care there from a provider established in the latter member state, where the need for such care during that stay arose because of his state of health. With regard to hospital care, the Court found it necessary to distinguish between cases of ‘unscheduled treatment’ from cases of ‘scheduled treatment’, as referred to in Article 22(1)(a) and (c) of Regulation No 1408/71, in the light of Article 49 EC. The Court recalled that in cases of scheduled hospital treatment, the member state of affiliation must ensure that the insured person had a level of cover equally advantageous to the level of cover which would have been recognised if that treatment had been available under its own national health system within a medically acceptable length of time. However, the Court added that the situation is different in the case of unscheduled treatment, where the rules of the Treaty on freedom of movement offer no guarantee that all hospital treatment services which may have to be provided to him unexpectedly in the member state of stay will be neutral in terms of cost. Given the disparities between one member state and another in matters of social security cover and the fact that the objective of Regulation No 1408/71 is to coordinate the national laws but not to harmonise them, the conditions attached to a hospital stay in another member state may, according to the circumstances, be to the insured person’s advantage or disadvantage. The Court also pointed out that in cases of unscheduled treatment, the legislation could not be regarded as having any restrictive effect on the provision of hospital treatment services by providers established in another member state, since the situations covered were those in which the state of health of the insured person made hospital treatment necessary during a temporary stay in another member state, because of circumstances relating to the urgency of the situation, the seriousness of the illness or the accident, or even the fact that a return to the member state of affiliation was ruled out for medical reasons, etc. which, objectively, left no alternative but to provide the insured person with hospital treatment in an establishment in the member state of stay. In such cases, the Court concluded, the possibility that persons insured under the Spanish national health system might be induced to return early to Spain in order to receive hospital treatment there which had been made necessary by

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a deterioration in their health during a temporary stay in another member state, or to cancel a trip to another member state because they could not count on the competent institution making a complementary contribution if the cost of equivalent treatment in Spain exceeded the level of cover applicable in that other member state, appeared too uncertain and indirect. Finally, the Court also noted that cases of unscheduled treatment are unforeseeable and uncontrollable for the member states. Thus, cases in which unscheduled hospital treatment provided to an insured person during a temporary stay in another member state bring about a heavier financial burden for the member state of affiliation than if that treatment had been provided in one of its own establishments, are deemed to be counterbalanced overall by cases in which, on the contrary, application of the legislation of the member state of stay leads the member state of affiliation to incur lower costs for the hospital treatment in question than those which would have resulted from the application of its own legislation. Imposing on a member state the obligation to guarantee to persons insured under the national system that the competent institution will provide complementary reimbursement whenever the level of cover applicable in the member state of stay in respect of the unscheduled hospital treatment in question proves to be lower that applicable under its own legislation would ultimately undermine the system which Regulation No 1408/71 sought to establish, based on the principle of overall compensation of risk. LM

Intellectual Property Google France SARL, Google Inc. contre Louis Vuitton Malletier SA (C-236/08), et Google France SARL contre Viaticum SA, Luteciel SARL (C-237/08), et Google France SARL contre Centre national de recherche en relations humaines (CNRRH) SARL, Pierre-Alexis Thonet, Bruno Raboin, Tiger SARL (C-238/08), Dans les affaires jointes C-236/08 à C-238/08 Cour de Justice (Grande chambre): 23 mars 2010 Marques – Internet – Moteur de recherche – Publicité à partir de mots clés (‘keyword advertising’) – Affichage, à partir de mots clés correspondant à des marques, de liens vers des sites de concurrents des titulaires desdites marques ou vers des sites sur lesquels sont proposés des produits d’imitation – Directive 89/104/CEE – Article 5 – Règlement (CE) n◦ 40/94 – Article 9 – Responsabilité de l’opérateur du moteur de recherche – Directive 2000/31/CE (‘directive sur le commerce électronique’) Ces trois affaires similaires portent sur la responsabilité des prestataires de référencement sur Internet, au regard du droit européen des marques et de la réglementation européenne sur le commerce électronique, dont l’activité consiste à proposer un service, moyennant rémunération, permettant à un opérateur économique, moyennant une sélection de mots clés, de faire apparaître, en cas de concordance entre ces mots clés et ceux contenus dans la requête adressée par un internaute au moteur de recherche, un lien promotionnel vers son site. Le moteur de recherche sur Internet

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mis en place par Google, permet à un internaute qui effectue une recherche à partir d’un ou plusieurs mots, de voir afficher sur son écran les sites qui paraissent le mieux correspondre à ces mots par ordre décroissant de pertinence. A côté de ce système permettant un résultat dit «naturel» de la recherche, Google a mis en place le service de référencement payant dénommé «AdWords» par lequel, moyennant rémunération, il offre, aux annonceurs, moyennant une sélection de mots clés, de faire apparaître, en cas de concordance entre ces mots clés et ceux contenus dans la requête adressée par un internaute au moteur de recherche, un lien promotionnel vers le site de l’opérateur économique. Ce lien promotionnel accompagné du bref message commercial, apparait dans la rubrique «liens commerciaux» qui est affichée soit en partie droite de l’écran, à droite des résultats naturels, soit dans la partie supérieure de l’écran. Dans la première des affaires (C-236/08), le titulaire de la marque communautaire et des marques nationales renommées Vuitton, qui commercialise des produits de luxe, avait assigné Google en contrefaçon devant la juridiction française. Le système «Adwords» permettait en effet aux internautes qui saisissaient le mot Vuitton, d’avoir accès, dans la rubrique des liens commerciaux, à des liens vers des sites proposant des imitations de produits de la marque Vuitton. Les juridictions de première et de deuxième instances avaient conclu que, par son système, Google offrait aux annonceurs la possibilité de sélectionner des mots clés correspondant à la marque de Vuitton ou associés à des expressions évoquant l’imitation, telles que «imitation» ou «copie», et avaient condamné Google pour contrefaçon. Dans la deuxième (C-237/08) et la troisième affaire (C-238/08), Google avait été condamné en première instance pour contrefaçon, puis en appel pour avoir permis lors de la saisine par les internautes des termes constituant les marques d’un titulaire dénommé Viaticum (2ème affaire) et «Eurochallenges» (3ème affaire), l’apparition de liens commerciaux vers des sites de concurrents de ces deux marques. Il avait été établi qu’en offrant aux annonceurs la possibilité de sélectionner des mots clés correspondant auxdites marques, Google avait enfreint au droit des marques. Chacune de ces affaires a fait l’objet d’un pourvoi en Cassation de la part de Google. La Cour de Cassation, dans chacune de ces affaires, a décidé de surseoir à statuer afin de poser des questions préjudicielles à la CJEU portant sur la compatibilité de l’activité exercée par Google avec la Directive 89/104/CEE et le Règlement 40/94 sur les marques, ainsi qu’avec la Directive 2000/31/CE sur le commerce électronique. En raison de leur similarité et de leur portée, ces affaires ont été jointes et délibérées en Grande Chambre. En application de l’article 5, paragraphe 1, sous a), de la Directive 89/104 ou, en cas de marque communautaire, de l’article 9, paragraphe 1, sous a), du Règlement n◦ 40/94, le titulaire de la marque est habilité à interdire l’usage, sans son consentement, d’un signe identique à ladite marque par un tiers, lorsque les trois conditions suivantes sont réunies: cet usage a lieu dans la vie des affaires, il est fait pour des produits ou des services identiques à ceux pour lesquels la marque est enregistrée, et enfin, il porte atteinte ou est susceptible de porter atteinte aux fonctions de la marque. En ce qui concerne la première de ces conditions – l’usage dans la vie des affaires, la Cour rappelle que cet usage doit se situer dans le cadre d’une activité commerciale visant à un avantage économique. L’annonceur qui achète le service «AdWords» et qui choisit en tant que mot clé un signe identique à une marque d’autrui, fait un usage dudit signe dans la vie des affaires dans la mesure où le signe sélectionné en

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tant que mot clé lui permet de créer un affichage publicitaire des produits et services qu’il offre à la vente sur Internet. S’agissant de Google, prestataire du service «AdWords», dans la mesure où son activité consiste, moyennant rémunération, à stocker ou à sélectionner, pour le compte de ses clients, des signes identiques aux marques, il apparaît constant qu’il opère dans la vie des affaires. En revanche, s’il permet effectivement à son client de faire usage des signes, il n’en fait pas usage lui-même dans le cadre de sa propre communication commerciale, par conséquent, selon la Cour, même s’il en retire un bénéfice financier, il ne peut en être déduit qu’il fait usage du signe dans la vie des affaires, au sens de la directive et du règlement sur le droit des marques. S’agissant de la deuxième condition – l’usage du signe par le tiers dans son annonce commerciale sur internet, il doit porter sur des produits et services identiques à la marque. Selon l’argumentation de Google, une distinction était ici à faire entre l’affaire Vuitton et les deux autres affaires soumises à questions préjudicielles. Dans la première affaire qui concernait des produits d’imitation de la marque, des signes identiques à des marques de Vuitton étaient apparus dans les annonces affichées dans la rubrique des liens commerciaux. En ce qui concerne en revanche la deuxième et la troisième des affaires soumises à questions préjudicielles, elles portaient sur des produits concurrents à la marque et l’annonce du tiers ne faisait aucune référence au signe identique de la marque. Google faisait donc valoir ici que de ce fait, on ne pouvait considérer que l’usage du signe en tant que mot clé était fait pour des produits et services , au sens de la Directive. La Cour écarte cette argumentation en énonçant d’abord que l’article 5 paragraphe 3 de la Directive sur les marques énumère un certain nombre de comportements qui sont constitutifs d’usages pour des produits ou des services, mais que cette liste n’est pas exhaustive et que l’on doit tenir compte de l’évolution des techniques du commerce électronique et des publicités développées dans ce cadre. Dans le cas du service de référencement, il est constant que l’annonceur ayant sélectionné en tant que mot clé le signe identique à une marque d’autrui, vise à ce que les internautes introduisant ce mot en tant que terme de recherche cliqueront non seulement sur les liens affichés qui proviennent du titulaire de ladite marque, mais également sur le lien promotionnel dudit annonceur. Ainsi que la Cour l’énonce dans son considérant 68, «dans la plupart des cas, l’internaute introduisant le nom d’une marque en tant que mot de recherche vise à trouver des informations ou des offres sur les produits ou les services de cette marque. Dès lors, lorsque sont affichés, à côté ou au-dessus des résultats naturels de la recherche, des liens promotionnels vers des sites proposant des produits ou des services de concurrents du titulaire de ladite marque, l’internaute peut, s’il n’écarte pas d’emblée ces liens comme étant sans pertinence et ne les confond pas avec ceux du titulaire de la marque, percevoir lesdits liens promotionnels comme offrant une alternative par rapport aux produits ou aux services du titulaire de la marque.» Cette situation relève de la notion d’usage «pour des produits ou des services» au sens de l’article 5, paragraphe 1, sous a), de la Directive 89/104». Il en serait de même lorsque l’annonceur utiliserait dans son annonce des mots clés se rapportant au signe de la marque protégée afin d’induire les internautes en erreur sur l’origine des produits et services car dés lors, il s’établit un lien entre ledit signe et les produits ou services qu’il commercialise.

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Troisième condition – le titulaire de la marque est habilité à interdire l’usage, sans son consentement, d’un signe identique à ladite marque par un tiers, si l’usage porte atteinte ou est susceptible de porter atteinte aux fonctions d’indication d’origine et de publicité de la marque. En ce qui concerne l’atteinte aux fonctions d’origine de la marque, et ainsi que la Cour le rappelle (considérant 84), Il y a atteinte à la fonction d’indication d’origine de la marque lorsque l’annonce ne permet pas ou permet seulement difficilement à l’internaute normalement informé et raisonnablement attentif de savoir si les produits ou les services visés par l’annonce proviennent du titulaire de la marque ou d’une entreprise économiquement liée à celuici ou, au contraire, d’un tiers. La Cour renvoie à la juridiction nationale le soin de déterminer, au cas par cas, si les faits du litige sont caractérisés par une atteinte, ou un risque d’atteinte à la fonction d’indication d’origine de la marque. Elle précise cependant qu’il y aura lieu de conclure qu’il y a atteinte à la fonction d’indication d’origine dès lors qu’une annonce d’un tiers suggère l’existence d’un lien économique entre lui-même et le titulaire de la marque ou, sans suggérer ce lien, reste simplement vague sur l’origine des produits ou services. S’agissant de la fonction de publicité de la marque, il est évident selon la Cour, que l’usage est susceptible d’avoir certaines répercussions sur l’emploi publicitaire et sur la stratégie commerciale adoptée par le titulaire de la marque. Néanmoins, ces répercussions ne constituent pas en soi une atteinte à la fonction de publicité de la marque dans la mesure où lorsque l’internaute introduit le nom de la marque dans son moteur de recherche, le site d’accueil de la marque apparaît dans la liste des emplacements naturels, donc dans un emplacement bien distinct de celui de ses concurrents ou de ses contrefacteurs qui figurent dans les liens commerciaux, en haut ou à droite de l’écran. En ce qui concerne enfin la responsabilité du prestataire du service de référencement, après avoir rappelé qu’un service de référencement sur Internet constitue un service de la société de l’information au sens de la Directive 2000/31 sur le commerce électronique, la CJEU indique qu’il appartient à la juridiction nationale d’apprécier le rôle exercé par Google en tant qu’intermédiaire afin d’engager ou non sa responsabilité. La Cour rappelle à ce sujet que la Directive, tout en affirmant le principe de responsabilité des prestataires de services intermédiaires, renvoie aux Etats membres la compétence de déterminer les conditions de cette responsabilité, mais exclut expressément dans sa section 4, la responsabilité du prestataire, lorsque son activité revêt un caractère purement technique, automatique et passif, impliquant qu’il n’a pas la connaissance, ni le contrôle des informations transmises ou stockées. Dans le cadre de cet examen, la Cour suggère à la juridiction nationale, d’analyser particulièrement le rôle joué par Google dans la rédaction du message commercial accompagnant le lien promotionnel ou dans l’établissement ou la sélection des mots clés. Si le prestataire n’a pas joué de rôle actif au sens de la Directive, il ne peut être tenu pour responsable des données qu’il a stockées à la demande d’un annonceur, à moins que, selon les termes employés par la Cour par référence à la Directive, ayant pris connaissance du caractère illicite de ces données ou d’activités de cet annonceur, il n’ait pas promptement retiré ou rendu inaccessibles lesdites données. FHV

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Principles of Community law Transportes Urbanos y Servicios Generales SAL v Administración del Estado (Case C-118/08) Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber): 26 January 2010 Procedural autonomy of the member states – Principle of equivalence – Action for damages against the State – Breach of European Union law – Breach of the Constitution Introduction In this case, which was the first reference from the Spanish Tribunal Supremo, several issues relating to the procedural autonomy of member states were raised, especially with regard to the compatibility of certain Spanish judge-made rules on state liability. The national court asked in essence whether European Union law precludes a rule of member state law under which actions for damages against the State alleging a breach of that law by national legislation, are subject to a condition requiring prior exhaustion of remedies against a harmful administrative measure, when those actions are not subject to such a condition where they allege a breach of the Constitution by national legislation. It seemed as the Court would at last have to take a stance on the issue of whether it is compatible with the principle of effectiveness to require individuals to first rely on other remedies before bringing a claim for state liability. However, as the Court resolved the issue on the basis of the principle of equivalence, this question still remains open for future case-law. The case is another one in the line of cases over the last year where the Court has had recourse to the principle of equivalence instead of the principle of effectiveness. One could ask whether this new trend bears witness to a greater wariness regarding the use of the principle of effectiveness and makes incursions into the national procedural autonomy on the basis of the latter. Background to the case The national proceedings concerned a claim for state liability, brought by the company Trasportes Urbanos against the Spanish State (Administracion del Estado). In a judgment of 6 October 2005,4 the Court of Justice had found that the Spanish rules limiting the right to deduct VAT were incompatible with European Union law, more precisely with Article 17(2) (5) and Article 19 of the Sixth VAT Directive.5 The company Transportes Urbanos had made self-assessments for the tax years 1999 and 2000 in which they had made VAT payments according to Spanish law, payments that were not due under European Union law. The company did not avail itself of the right to request, under the General Tax Law, the rectification of those self-assessments. By 4 Case C-204/03 Commission v Spain [2005] ECR I-838. 5 Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the member

states relating to turnover taxes – Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1).

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the time of the judgment in the infringement proceedings in 2005, the right to ask for rectification was time-barred. In order to rectify the loss sustained, the company brought an action for damages against the Spanish state on account of the Spanish legislature’s breach of the Sixth VAT Directive. It claimed €1,228, 366.39 which corresponded to the VAT payments made. The action was brought before the Council of Ministers, but it was dismissed as it was held that the company’s failure to request a rectification of the self-assessments had broken the causal link. The Council’s decision was in particular based on two judgments of the Tribunal Supremo, according to which actions for damages in respect of breach of European Union law are subject to a rule requiring prior exhaustion of administrative and judicial remedies against the challenged administrative measure. Trasportes Urbanos appealed the decision to the Tribunal Supremo, which made a preliminary reference on the compatibility with European Union law of the rule requiring prior exhaustion of other remedies. First of all, the national court noted that when bringing an action for damages on account of the unconstitutionality of an act, such an action is not subject to prior exhaustion of remedies against the challenged administrative measure. There thus appeared to be a difference in treatment depending on whether the action for damages was brought because an administrative measure was incompatible with the Spanish Constitution or with European Union law. The referring court however also observed that in other aspects, it is easier to obtain redress for breaches of European Union law than of the Spanish Constitution. It explained that national measures that are based on valid law are presumed to be lawful, and administrative and judicial authorities cannot annul administrative measures unless the legislation on which they are based has been declared unconstitutional by the Tribunal Constitutional, under the procedure in Article 163 of the Spanish Constitution. It is only the court hearing the matter which has power to refer the issue. The referring court observed that in such circumstances, it would be unacceptable to require individuals to exhaust all administrative and judicial remedies before initiating an action for damages, as it would mean that the individual first would have to challenge the administrative measure, then initiate the judicial remedies and appeals until such a time that one of the courts raises the issue of unconstitutionality and refers the matter to the Constitutional Court. If, on the other hand, an administrative of judicial authority holds that an administrative measure is contrary to European Union law, European Union law binds them to directly disapply that legislation and annul the administrative measure. In such situations, it is thus possible for individuals to obtain redress by directly applying to the authorities for annulment of the harmful administrative measure, something which is not possible in the case of a potential conflict with the Spanish Constitution. In those circumstances, the Tribunal Supremo asked whether it is contrary to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness that it applies different principles for State liability actions in respect of administrative measures enacted pursuant to legislation which has been declared unconstitutional and to State liability actions in respect of measures enacted pursuant to a rule which has been held contrary to European Union law?

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The judgment of the Court of Justice The Court started by recalling that the principle of state liability is inherent in the Treaties and that individuals thus have the right to claim compensation when three conditions are met (viz., that the rule infringed confers rights on individuals, that the breach is sufficiently serious and that there is a causal link). It also underlined that while the right to reparation flows directly from European Union law, the reparation takes place on the basis of national law, and those rules must not be less favourable than those relating to similar domestic claims or make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to obtain reparation. The Court then moved on to assess whether the Spanish system in applying the different rules developed in case-law for the admissibility of a state liability claim, complied with the principle of equivalence. First, the Court set out that the principle of equivalence requires that all applicable rules apply without distinction to actions alleging infringement of European Union law and to similar actions alleging infringement of national law. It does not require that a member state extends its most favourable rules to all actions brought within a certain field of law. To examine whether the principle is complied with, it is necessary to assess whether the two actions are similar, by examining the essential characteristics and the purpose of the two actions. In this regard, the Court noted that the purpose of an action for liability on the basis of unconstitutionality of an administrative measure and an action for liability for an administrative measure contrary to European Union law is identical, namely compensation for the loss suffered by the harmed person for an act or omission by the State. As regards the essential characteristics of the procedures, the Court observed that in the case at hand, the distinction between the two actions was that there was a rule of exhaustion of all remedies for state liability for breaches of European Union law. It pointed out that, contrary to what the Spanish Court seemed to believe, reparation of the damage caused by a breach of European Union law is not dependent on the breach being confirmed by the European Court of Justice in a preliminary reference proceedings. In the action at hand, however, Transportes Urbanos had based its claim directly on the judgment from the Court of Justice, finding that Spain had infringed the Sixth VAT Directive. This led the Court to point out that had Trasportes Urbanos been able to base its action for damages on a judgment of unconstitutionality by the Spanish Constitutional Court, its action might have been successful, even if the time-limit for requesting the rectification of the self-assessment had expired. Thus, the Court found that the only difference between the two actions in the case at hand was that in one, the breach of law was established by the Court of Justice, and in the other by the Spanish Constitutional Court. This fact alone did not suffice to make the two actions “not similar”. In the absence of the national court mentioning any other factor demonstrating that there were further differences between the two actions, the two actions must be regarded as similar. The Court concluded that the principle of equivalence precludes the application of a rule requiring prior exhaustion of remedies for purposes of state liability on the basis of an European Union law breach. It can be noted that the Court’s reasoning on the essential characteristics of the actions is somewhat odd. It makes an in casu comparison between the two situations, taking into account the fact that there actually was a judgment in an infringement

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proceedings in the case at hand. By letting this be the decisive element to make the two situations similar, its decision becomes very narrow. It does not provide any guidance what happens if there is no judgment from the Court of Justice confirming the breach and whether the Spanish courts in such situations would infringe the principle of equivalence by requiring prior exhaustion. Hence, its judgment is of rather limited importance, and I suspect that the narrow solution was chosen as there were diverging opinions in the Court as to whether the two actions really were similar in view of the different powers of the national courts to set aside the law in national and European Union law cases. It is also unfortunate that the Court did not express itself on the compatibility with the principle of effectiveness,6 but this is in line with its recent trend to try to solve matters of procedural autonomy with the principle of equivalence, possibly in an attempt to seem deferential to national procedural autonomy. JE

Research, information, education, statistics Commission v. Germany (Case C-518/07) Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber): 9 March 2010 Failure of a member state to fulfil obligations – Directive 95/46/EC – Protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and the free movement of such data – Article 28(1) – National supervisory authorities – Independence – Administrative scrutiny of those authorities With the infringement action the Commission challenges the German system of data protection authorities. Given the federal structure of the country, there are data protection authorities at federal and at Länder level. According to the 1995 Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC) every member state is under the obligation to establish supervisory authorities responsible for the monitoring of the application of the provisions of the Directive in the member state. According to Article 28(1) of the Directive, these authorities are to operate in ‘complete independence’ (emphasis added). Under the general principles of German government and administration one can distinguish three types of method of administrative review by a hierarchical superior entity. Tellingly this differentiated system of administrative oversight is not dealt with by the Court at great length, either by the Advocate General or by the Grand Chamber. It is summarily referred to as ‘State scrutiny’ in the judgement. Considering the diversity of national models in respect of this as between the member states is important for the purposes of understanding the German model so as to better appreciate the results of the case. Leaving aside mechanisms of holding accountable individual officials (Dienstaufsicht) German administrative procedure knows two different methods of 6 In his opinion, Advocate General Poiares Maduro discusses the issue of compatibility with the princi-

ple of effectiveness, and finds that requiring prior exhaustion of administrative and judicial remedies is acceptable.

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hierarchical oversight or scrutiny of administrative decision-making: (1) Rechtsaufsicht is the term used for a legality review by the hierarchically superior authority over the lower one. It is designed to ensure respect for the law, in particular that an administrative authority uses the discretion that may be provided by the applicable legislation in a lawful way. There will be no control over the solution chosen by the lower authority as to its appropriateness when there are several legal appreciations possible. Rechtsaufsicht flows from the general principle of the rule of law and more specifically the legality of administrative actions and is connected to the idea of popular sovereignty. Laws enacted by parliament need to be respected by the administration. The competent government minister should be responsible in the last instance before Parliament for the action of the administrative authorities that he oversees. (2) Fachaufsicht is the most comprehensive form of oversight going beyond the review of legality including also the assessment of the appropriateness of the action/measure chosen by the competent administrative authority. The institutional position of the Länder data supervisory authorities and the scope of their competence varies between the Länder. Some Länder distinguish between supervision of the protection of data in the public sector and in the private sector. According to this distinction, supervision of the private sector is a responsibility attributed directly to the Ministry of the Interior in some Länder. In other Länder, there is a separate government body responsible for data protection. A feature common to all Länder authorities is that they are subjected to Rechtsaufsicht (legality review) of their actions and their staff can be individually held accountable (Dienstaufsicht). Rechtsaufsicht is limited in regard to the authorities’ duty to monitor respect for privacy legislation by governmental entities. For the supervision of compliance of the private sector, some Länder admitted supervision in the sense of Fachaufsicht, that is a full control of the action/ measures taken by data protection authorities. The European Court of Justice found this system of legality review in violation with the obligations flowing from the 1995 Data Protection Directive. The Court began its construction of the relevant provision of Article 28(1) of the Directive by underlining that the text refers to ‘complete independence’ (emphasis added). According to the Court, ‘independence’ in the sense of Article 28(1) goes beyond the mere relationship between the supervisory authority and the bodies subject to that supervision. It means that decision-making shall be possible without any outside influence. It recalls the important function data protection authorities have in the protection of privacy rights. Taking all forms of ‘state scrutiny’ together, the Court held that some forms of scrutiny are meant to guarantee the proper application also of the data protection legislation by the data supervisory authorities. However it concluded that also those forms of oversight may influence decisions taken by the supervisory authorities (or even to replace them entirely) and thus there is a ‘possibility’ that the supervisory authority cannot ‘act objectively’ when interpreting and applying data protection legislation (See §34). The Court considered a number of potential cases of conflict of interests regarding the supervision of data collection and processing by private entities. A mere risk of the exercise of political influence by a hierarchically superior

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authority on the supervisory authorities was enough for the Court to conclude that there was no independent supervision for the private sector. The Federal Republic contended unsuccessfully in its first plea that its existing system of administrative control – as set out above – should not be challenged by an extensive interpretation of the 1995 Directive as it flowed from the principle of democratic government, a principle protected by European Union law. The argument was that the principle of democratic government was given full effect when every administrative authority was subject to oversight by a hierarchically superior body and ultimately by the government minister responsible before Parliament. The Court’s response was that these considerations were valid in principle but that democratic control could also be implemented in other ways. The Court confirmed that it would be inconceivable to have no parliamentary control over data supervisory authorities. This did not, however, require a chain of control inherent in German administrative law and procedure. Such control can e.g. also be exercised through the designation of the management of data protection authorities by Parliament, by the framing of its legislative mandate in Parliament and by obligations to report to Parliament at regular intervals. The second plea of the German government related to the principle of conferred powers. Germany could not be obliged under what was then Article 100A TEC (later Article 95 TEC and now Article 114 TFEU – regarding harmonisation of the internal market) to modify its established system of internal administrative control. The Court did not agree to this and believed that a requirement to exclude data supervisory authorities from the traditional system of internal administrative control was covered by the then Article 100A. The Court could have added that the Directive was not intended to modify this system in its entirety but only required exempting one specific kind of authorityfrom this system. Finally the German government argued that it would violate the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality to require Germany to change its established system of administrative oversight. The Court referred to its remarks on the previous two arguments and rejected this argument. MBK

Social policy Colin Wolf v Stadt Frankfurt am Main (Case C-229/08) and Domnica Petersen v Berufungsausschuss für Zahnärzte für den Bezirk Westfalen-Lippe (Case C-341/08) Judgments of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber): 12 January 2010 Directive 2000/78/EC – Article 4(1) – Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age – National provision setting a maximum age of 30 years for the recruitment of officials to posts in the fire service – Aim pursued – Genuine and determining occupational requirement Directive 2000/78/EC – Articles 2(5) and 6(1) – Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age – Provision of national law setting a maximum age of 68 for practice

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as a panel dentist – Aim pursued – Measure necessary for the protection of health – Consistency – Appropriateness of the measure These two cases were delivered on the same day by the Court’s Grand Chamber. They were both concerned with the interpretation of Directive 2000/78/EC on the prohibition of age discrimination in employment matters and its compatibility with the setting of age limits. The first case concerned a maximum recruitment age of 30 for certain fire-fighters and the second dealt with a maximum age of 68 for practising as a panel dentist. First of all, the Court found that Directive 2000/78/EC applied since the German measures at issue in both cases affect the conditions for access to employment, to selfemployment or to occupation within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a) and employment and working conditions within the meaning of Article 3(1)(c) of the Directive. Secondly, the Court found that, in both cases, the application of the provisions in question had the consequence that persons were treated less favourably than other persons in comparable situations on the ground of their age. Thirdly, the Court analysed whether the difference of treatment was justified. In the Wolf case (concerning fire-fighters), the Court ascertained whether the difference of treatment on grounds of age could be justified with regard to Article 4(1) of the Directive which provides that ‘a difference of treatment which is based on a characteristic related to any of the grounds referred to in Article 1 shall not constitute discrimination where, by reason of the nature of the particular occupational activities concerned or of the context in which they are carried out, such a characteristic constitutes a genuine and determining occupational requirement, provided that the objective is legitimate and the requirement is proportionate.’ The Court observed that the objective pursued by that national legislation setting the age limit for recruitment to intermediate career posts in the fire service in the Land of Hesse at 30 years was to ensure the operational capacity and proper functioning of the professional fire service. Such an objective constituted a legitimate objective within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the Directive. It continued by saying that the possession of especially high physical capacities could be regarded as a genuine and determining occupational requirement since persons in the intermediate career of the fire service perform tasks of professional fire-fighters on the ground: fighting fires, rescuing persons, environmental protection tasks, helping animals and dealing with dangerous animals, as well as supporting tasks such as the maintenance and control of protective equipment and vehicles. Also, the need to possess full physical capacity to carry on the occupation of a person in the intermediate career of the fire services is related to age. The Court supported the view of the German Government that the fire-fighting and rescue duties which were part of the intermediate career in the fire service could only be performed by younger officials. This was proved by scientific data deriving from studies in the field of industrial and sports medicine which show that respiratory capacity, musculature and endurance diminish with age. Finally, the Court found that the measure could be regarded as appropriate to the objective and as not going beyond what was necessary to achieve that objective, since recruitment at an older age would have the consequence that too large a number of

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officials could not be assigned to the most physically demanding duties for a sufficiently long period. In the Petersen case (concerning panel dentists), the Court considered three adduced objectives pursued by the measure at issue: • first, the protection of the health of patients covered by the statutory health insurance scheme, it being thought that the performance of dentists declines after a certain age; • second, the distribution of employment opportunities among the generations; • and third, the financial balance of the German health system. The Court examined the first and third objectives from the point of view of Article 2(5), which states that the Directive shall be without prejudice to measures laid down by national law which, in a democratic society, are necessary for (inter alia) the protection of health. The Court found that the age limit imposed on panel dentists was not necessary for the protection of health of patients, from the point of view of the competence of doctors and dentists since the measure only concerned dentists practising under the panel system. Outside that system, dentists could practise their profession at any age and patients could be treated by dentists older than 68. However, the Court found that the introduction of an age limit which applies only to panel dentists is compatible with the objective of achieving a high level of protection of health, when it is intended to prevent a risk of serious harm to the financial balance of the social security system. As for the second objective, the Court examined it from the point of view of Article 6(1), which states that differences of treatment on grounds of age may be objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim, including legitimate employment policy, labour market and vocational training objectives, and if the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary. The Court concluded that the aim of sharing out of employment opportunities among the generations within the profession of panel dentist could objectively and reasonably justify the measure and could be regarded as appropriate and necessary, provided that there was a situation in which there was an excessive number of panel dentists or a latent risk that such a situation will occur. The Court left it for the national court to identify the aim pursued by the measure laying down that age limit. LM

Social Policy Seda Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co. KG, (C-555/07) Court of Justice (Grand Chamber): 19 January 2010 Principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age – Directive 2000/78/EC – National legislation on dismissal not taking into account the period of employment completed before the employee reaches the age of 25 in calculating the notice period – Justification for the measure – National legislation contrary to the directive – Role of the national court

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Introduction In 2005, the Court of Justice delivered its seminal ruling in Mangold,7 in which it found that the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age laid down in Directive 2000/78 of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, is a general principle of law. As such, it is binding on private individuals, even if the Directive has not been implemented into national law and also before the time of implementation of the Directive had expired. After the Mangold ruling, the Court has come back to the issue in three cases; Palacios de la Villa,8 Bartsch9 and in the ruling Kücükdeveci which will be discussed in detail in this note. Mangold was controversial and criticised, both in legal doctrine and from within the Court.10 The criticism related, on the one hand, to whether the prohibition of age discrimination really is a general principle of law, despite the relatively scarce mention of it in national Constitutions and international documents. Secondly, critics argued that by finding that a Directive merely enshrines a general principle of law, the Court of Justice had sought to get around the prohibition of horizontal direct effects of Directives and make them binding on individuals. One of the first critiques came in the Advocate General’s opinion in the subsequent case on the matter, Palacios de la Villa. Advocate General Mazák delivered an extensive and well-argued critique of the Court’s Mangold ruling, both insofar as concerned whether age discrimination is a general principle of law,11 (which he found not to be the case12 ) and the possible effects of a general principle of law on individuals, and when it should be binding on them. In this respect, Advocate General Mazák took the view that in order to have direct effect, the obligations derived from a general principle of law must be sufficiently clear and precise and he did not find that in the case at hand the prohibition on grounds of age, the principle fulfilled the criteria to obliged the national court to disapply national law. The Court did not address those issues in detail as it found that the measures at issue in the case were not incompatible with Directive 2000/78 and the prohibition of age discrimination. Also the Bartsch case came as something as an anti-climax; many had expected that the Court would explain, develop and possibly circumscribe its ruling from Mangold in the light of Advocate General Mazák’s criticism and the concerns raised. Instead, the Court found that as Bartsch concerned a purely internal situation, it was not competent to give a preliminary ruling on the matter. It however explained its ruling in Mangold, and clarified that the Directive as such cannot be binding before the expiry of the time-limit, but that the general principle enshrined in it can be. In order 7 Case C-144/04 Mangold v Rudiger Helm [2005] ECR I-9981. 8 Case C-411/05 Félix Palacios de la Villa v Cortefiel Servicios SA [2007] ECR I-8531. 9 Case C-427/06 Bartsch [2008] ECR I-7245. 10 See Opinion by Advocate General Mazak, Case C-411/05, Félix Palacios de la Villa v Cortefiel Servicios

SA [2007] ECR I-8531. 11 Opinion by Advocate General Mazak, Case C-411/05, Félix Palacios de la Villa v Cortefiel Servicios

SA, paras 86-100. 12 Para 100.

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for the general principle to be binding, the legal situation must however fall within the scope of European Union law and in Bartsch, the Court found that the situation had no connection with European Union law. Article 13 EC, which permitted the Council, within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by the EC Treaty, to take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on age, could not as such bring the situation within the scope of EC law, for the purposes of prohibiting discrimination based on age. Neither could Directive 2000/78, as the time-limit provided therein for its transposition has expired. It is difficult to see how this situation differed from the one in Mangold, and why the latter then fell within the scope of European Union law before the time-limit for implementation had expired. This brief account of case law shows the unclear legal situation before the Kücükdeveci ruling, and illustrates that it was complicated for a national court to be sure of the nature of the principle of age discrimination, when and why it is binding on individuals etc. First, it was uncertain when a situation fell within the scope of European Union law, so that the general principle of law binds private individuals. Secondly, the debate and criticism as to the binding nature of made many doubt whether the Court really would maintain its position or revise it. In the Kücükdeveci case, the Court again got the opportunity to express its opinion on the effects that a national court has to give to the general principle of law prohibiting age discrimination in proceedings between two private parties, when such discrimination falls within the scope of European Union law. With the delivery of the Kücükdeveci case, it is clear that the Court has confirmed its ruling in Mangold and it is determined to further European Union law’s effectiveness at the cost of the judicial protection of individuals. In my opinion, however, it does further blur the limits to the prohibition of horizontal direct effect, where something falls within the scope of European Union law and by its ruling, the Court continues the on-going trend of undermining the legal certainty of private individuals. The incoherent line of cases Mangold, Palacios de la Villa, Bartsch and Kücükdeveci raises the question whether it would not better to recognise that directives have horizontal direct effect, and whether that solution would not better preserve legal certainty of individuals? The facts in the case The reference was made in the course of proceedings between Ms Kücükdeveci and her former employer Swedex GmbH & Co. KG (‘Swedex’) and concerned the calculation of the notice period applicable to her dismissal. Under German law, the notice period is calculated on the basis of the years in service, the period becoming longer for persons having worked for a long time. German law provided that in calculating the length of employment, periods completed before the employee was 25 years old should not be taken into account. Ms Kücükdeveci started working for Swedex at the age of 18, in June 1996. In December 2006, at the age of 28, she was dismissed with a notice period of one month. The employer calculated the notice period as if she had been employed for only three years, although she had worked for the company for ten years. Ms Kücükdeveci challenged her dismissal before the Labor Court and claimed that the notice period should have been four months, as she had been employed for ten years. She argued that the German legislation providing that periods completed

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before the age of 25 years should not be taken into account is contrary to European Union law as it is a measure discriminating on grounds of age. The national court hearing the case on appeal regarded it as doubtful whether German legislation complied with European Union law and referred a number of questions to the Court of Justice. First, it wanted to know whether the German provision was contrary to European Union law, and in that case if it was contrary to primary law or contrary to Directive 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation inter alia on grounds of age, implements Article 13 EC (now Article 19 TFEU). It also inquired whether the German legislation could be justified on the ground that only a basic period is to be observed for younger workers in order to enable employers to manage their personnel flexibly and because it is reasonable to require greater personal and occupation mobility from younger than from older workers. Secondly, the German court inquired what effects to give to European Union law in case German legislation was found incompatible with European Union law; the proceedings were between private individuals and it asked whether one could take into account the legitimate expectations of the persons to be bound only after a disputed provision has been interpreted by the European Court of Justice, a very pertinent question which raises the crucial question to what extent the legal certainty of private individuals can be preserved in the light of the Mangold case-law. The judgment of the Court of Justice Before answering the first question, the Court examined whether the situation in Kücükdeveci fell within the scope of European Union law. It found that in contrast to Bartsch (C-427/06 2008 ECR I-7245), the alleged discriminatory conduct in the present case fell within the scope of European Union law. This was because the conduct arose after the expiry of the deadline to implement Directive 2000/78 and the rule in question lay down rules on the conditions of dismissal, a matter which fell within the scope of the Directive. The expiry of the deadline for implementation of the Directive thus had the effect of bringing the national legislation at issue within the scope of European Union law, and thereby general principles became binding on individuals (even if the Directive does not bind them. . . ). Thereafter, the Court also assessed what ground in Community law that would be the basis on which to assess the compatibility of national law; was it primary law or the Directive 2000/78/EC? In this respect, the Court of Justice first recalled that Directive 2000/78 was adopted on the basis of Article 13 EC and that it had held that it was not the Directive in itself that laid down the principle of equal treatment in the filed of employment of occupation. This derived from various international instruments and constitutional traditions of the member states and the Directive had the sole purpose of laying down a general framework for combating discrimination on various grounds, inter alia, age. In this context, the Court had acknowledged the existence of a principle of nondiscrimination on grounds of age which must be regarded as a general principle of law, to which the Directive gave special expression. From this, it followed that it was the general principle of European Union Law prohibiting all discrimination on grounds of age, as given expression in Directive 2000/78, which must be the basis of the examination whether European Union law precluded national legislation such as the one at issues in the case.

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Thereafter, the Court went on to assess whether the German legislation contained a difference in treatment on grounds of age and if this is the case, whether the difference was objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving this aim were appropriate and necessary. First, the Court without any further ado found that the German rule indeed afforded less favourable treatment on grounds of age for employees entering service before the age of 25. When assessing whether this constituted discrimination or was justified, the Court first looked at the reasons behind the German regulation. It reflected the legislature’s assessment that young workers generally react more easily and rapidly to the loss of their jobs and greater flexibility can be required by them. More over, shorter notice periods facilitate the recruitment of young workers as there is a greater flexibility in personnel management. The Court held that the cited objectives clearly fell within possible grounds for justifying a difference of treatment, within the meaning of Article 6(1) of Directive 2000/78, as they concerned employment and labour market policy. It thus moved on to ascertain whether the measures were appropriate and necessary to achieve the aim. The Member states enjoyed a broad discretion in the choice of measures capable of achieving the aims in the field of social and employment policy. In this case, the Court however found that the measures were not appropriate for achieving the cited aim. This was so as the legislation applied to all employees who joined the undertaking before the age of 25, notwithstanding their age at the time of the dismissal. Thus, concluded the Court, European Union law – and more particularly the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age as given expression in Directive 2000/78 – had to be interpreted as precluding national legislation such as the one at issue in the main proceedings. By the second question, the national court asked whether in order to disapply a national provision considered to be contrary to European Union law, it must first, to ensure the protection of legitimate expectation of persons subject to the law, make a reference to the European Court of Justice so that the European Court of Justice could confirm that the legislation is incompatible. The court interpreted the second question along Simmenthal lines, reading it as an inquiry whether it had to set aside national law only after the Court of Justice had ruled on the compatibility of the national rules with European Union law.13 The Court first recalled that also in proceedings between individuals, in which it is was apparent that national law is contrary to European Union law, it was for the national courts to provide the legal protection which individuals derive from European Union law and to ensure that these rules are fully effective. However, a Directive cannot of itself impose obligations on individuals and cannot be relied on as such against another individual. The obligation to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations under the Directive was binding on all authorities of the member state, including the courts. The Court recalled that in applying national law, the national court was required to do so as far as possible in the light of 13 Another possible interpretation of the question could have been that the national court wondered if it was

only the ruling of the Court of Justice on the matter which actually brought legal clarity to the question, so that it was only after the Court had made it clear that something actually was contrary to European Union law that an individual could be bound by a general principle of law.

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the wording and the purpose of the directive in question to achieve the result pursued by the directive. In this case, however, the national court had stated that because of the clarity and precision of the national provision in question, it could not be interpreted in conformity with European Union law. The Court recalled that the principle laid down in Directive 2000/78 merely gave expression to the general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age. Thus, it was for the national courts to provide, within the limits of its jurisdiction, the legal protection individuals derive from European Union law and to ensure the full effectiveness of that law. The Court added that this included disapplying, if necessary, any provision of national legislation contrary to that principle. Discussion In many respects, this writer find the Kücükdeveci ruling more confusing than enlightening. The legal reasoning is much less convincing that Advocate General Mazák’s opinion in Palacios de la Villa. First of all, it is difficult to grasp when something is within the scope of European Union law and when general principles become binding on private individuals. For example, if the individual is bound by the general principle of law, why then is the expiry of the deadline for implementing the Directive important? In Kücükdeveci the Court stated that, contrary to Bartsch, the time-limit for implementation of Directive 2000/78 had expired, and therefore, the situation came within the scope of European Union law and consequently, the general principle of age discrimination became binding on individuals. So, although the Directive is not what imposes the obligation not to discriminate individuals on grounds of age, the expiry of the time-limit for its implementation still has important legal effects for the individual employer: for this is what brings the legal situation within the scope of European Union law and triggers the application of the general principle of law in relation to the private individuals. Is that not very close to the Directive actually being what imposes the prohibition of age discrimination on the individual? And if the expiry of the time-limit is important to make the general principle binding, does that mean that the Mangold ruling was incorrect, as there the time-limit for implementation had not yet expired and still the general principle was binding on the employer? Moreover, when assessing whether the German provision really constitutes age discrimination, the Court uses the Articles in the Directive to establish when age discrimination can justified and whether the provisions are proportionate. Does this not indicate that, even if there is a general principle of age discrimination, that is not the one in play in the case. Apparently the contents of the principle still needs to be established on the basis of the Directive, and in any case, if one needs the clarification of the Directive to really understand what measures are allowed and not, can one then say that the general principle is sufficiently clear and precise to prohibit age discrimination? These inconsistencies and complications are a result of the Court’s stubborn insistence on denying horizontal direct effect to Directives, in the name of protecting legal certainty. The result is however one where private individuals really cannot be certain what legal effects Directive will have on them. The Court’s wish not to recognize horizontal direct effect for directive has brought it onto a path where it uses more and

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more sophisticated and complicated legal reasoning explaining why individuals are bound by negative effects of European Union law. We are at a point of complexity, in terms of the negative effects which Directives can have in private individuals, which justifies us in asking the question of whether it is not more honest, and in line with the principle of legal certainty of individual, to simply recognise Directives as having horizontal direct effect? JE

State aid Centre d’exportation du livre français (CELF), Ministre de la Culture et de la Comunication v. Société internationale de diffusion et d’édition (SIDE) (Case C-1/09) Court of Justice (Fourth Chamber): 11 March 2010 State aid – Article 88(3) EC – Unlawful aid declared compatible with the common market – annulment of the Commission decision – National courts – Application for recovery of unlawfully implemented aid – Proceedings stayed pending the adoption of a new Commission decision – Exceptional circumstances liable to limit the obligation to repay. This case originated from a reference for a preliminary ruling from the French Conseil d’État concerning the interpretation of Article 108(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (formerly Article 88(3) EC Treaty).14 The reference was made in the course of proceedings between the Centre d’exportation du livre français (CELF) and the Ministre de la Culture et de la Communication, on one hand, and the Société internationale de diffusion et d’édition (SIDE), on the other, concerning aid paid to CELF by the French State. The facts at the origin of the case dated back to 1992, when SIDE, a competitor of CELF, a cooperative society in public limited company form, which carried on the activity of export agent, complained to the European Commission about some operating subsidies CELF was receiving from the French State to offset the extra costs of handling small orders placed by booksellers established abroad. Following that complaint, the Commission declared the aid at issue compatible with the common market.15 A judgment from the Court of First Instance (now General Court) of 18 September 1995 annulled that decision insofar as it concerned the subsidy granted exclusively to CELF.16 A successive decision from the Commission, concerning state aid in favour of CELF, declared the aid to be unlawful but compatible with the common market.17 By a judgment of 28 February 2002, the then Court of First Instance 14 For the sake of this case comment, I will still refer to Article 88(3) EC, as this was the numbering

referred to by the European Court of Justice. 15 See Decision of the European Commission n. 127/92 of 18 May 1993, OJ 1993, C 174, p. 6. 16 See the Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 18 September 1995 in Case T-49/93, SIDE v. Com-

mission [1995] ECR II-2501. 17 See Decision of the European Commission 1999/133/EC of 10 June 1998, OJ 1999, L 44, p. 37.

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annulled that decision to the extent of declaring the aid in question to be compatible with the common market, on the ground that the Commission had committed a manifest error of assessment with regard to the definition of the relevant market.18 In a third successive decision, the Commission accepted once again that the aid was compatible with the common market.19 The Court of First Instance annulled again that decision on the grounds that the Commission had, first, erred in law by applying the then Article 87(3)(d) EC to the period before 1 November 1993 instead of applying the substantive rules in force during the period in question and, secondly, committed a manifest error of assessment in its examination of the compatibility of the disputed aid.20 On 8 April 2009, the Commission decided to extend the formal examination procedure started in 1996, in such a way as to state its reservations concerning the compatibility of the aid at issue in view of the judgment of the Court of First Instance of 15 April 2008, and to allow the French Republic, in addition to the recipient of the aid, and the other interested parties to state their views again before a final decision was taken. Almost in parallel with the proceedings at European Union level, on 5 October 2004, a judgment of the Administrative Court of Appeal of Paris ordered the French State, at the request of SIDE, to recover the aid paid to CELF for handling small orders for books placed by foreign booksellers, together with a default penalty for each day of delay. Appeals to that judgment were brought to the Conseil d’État by CELF and the Minister for Culture and Communication. The appellants argued that the Administrative Court of Appeal of Paris should have ruled that the compatibility with the common market of the aid, as recognised by the Commission, precluded the obligation to repay the aid, following its unlawfulness consisting of implementation of measures of state aid contrary to Article 88(3) EC. The Conseil d’État decided to stay proceedings and refer two questions to the Court of Justice (giving rise to the CELF I judgment).21 The first question asked whether it was permissible under the then Article 88 EC for a State which had granted to an undertaking unlawful aid, which the Court of that State had found to be unlawful on the ground that it had not been previously notified to the Commission, not to recover that aid from the recipient on the ground that the Commission then declared that aid to be compatible with the common market. The second question asked whether, in case the obligation to repay was confirmed, the periods during which the aid in question was declared by the Commission to be compatible with the common market, before those decisions were successively annulled by the Court of First Instance, be taken into account for the purpose of calculating the sums to be repaid. The Court of Justice, in the reply to those questions, held that the national court is not bound to order the recovery of aid implemented contrary to Article 88(3) EC, where the Commission has adopted a 18 See the Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 28 February 2002 in Case T-155/98, SIDE v. Com-

mission [2002] ECR II-1179. 19 See Decision of the European Commission 2005/262/EC of 20 April 2004, OJ 2005, L 85, p. 27. 20 See the Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 15 April 2008 in Case T-384/04, SIDE v. Commission

[2008] ECR II-625. 21 See the judgment of the Court of Justice of 12 February 2008 in Case C-199/06 CELF and Ministre de

la Culture et de la Communication (CELF I) [2008] ECR I-469.

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final decision declaring the aid to be compatible with the common market. According to Community law, the national court must order the aid recipient to pay interest in respect of the period of unlawfulness. It is however in the framework of its domestic law that the State may, if appropriate, also order the recovery of the unlawful aid, without prejudice to its right to re-implement it subsequently. In replying to the second question, the Court stated that the obligation to remedy the consequences of the aid’s unlawfulness extends also, for the purposes of calculating the sums to be paid by the recipients, and save for exceptional circumstances, to the period between a decision of the Commission on the compatibility of the aid and the annulment of that decision by the European Court of Justice. In the light of the reply of the European Court of Justice, the Conseil d’État ordered the Minister for Culture and Communication to recover from CELF interest on the unlawful aid in respect of some limited periods of time. On the recovery of the principal amount of aid provided, the Conseil d’État took the view that the outcome of the case depended on the interpretation of European Union law given by the Court of First Instance in its judgment, subsequent to the CELF I,22 by which it annulled the Commission decision declaring the aid to be compatible with the common market. In the light of the above, the Conseil d’État decided to stay proceedings again and to refer two further questions to the European Court of Justice. The answers from the European Union judges are the subject of the present comment. The first question concerned whether it was possible for the national court to stay proceedings concerning the obligation to recover state aid until the Commission had ruled on the compatibility of the aid, where a first decision of the Commission declaring that aid to be compatible had been annulled by the European Court of Justice. A second question was also posed, namely whether a situation in which the Commission has on three occasions declared the aid to be compatible with the common market, before those decisions were annulled by the Court of First Instance, is capable of being an exceptional circumstance which may lead the national court to limit the obligation to recover the aid. According to the European Court of Justice, in its answer to the first question, a national court before which an application has been brought for repayment of unlawful state aid may not stay the adoption of its decision until the Commission has ruled on the compatibility of the aid following the annulment of a previous positive decision. The Court based its answer on the fact that when an action for annulment is well founded, the European Union judges must declare the contested act void, with the result that the annulment decision will produce its effects retroactively and erga omnes. Therefore, once the European Court of Justice annuls a positive decision from the Commission, it is as if the aid in question has never been declared compatible with the common market.23 It followed that, in the dispute in the main proceedings before the Conseil d’État, it was as if an action had been brought before the national court 22 Reference is made to the Court of First Instance Case T-384/04, delivered on 15 April 2008, two months

after the CELF I case above. 23 See Case C-199/06, at paras. 61-63, as restated in para. 24 of the judgment under discussion.

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even though no decision had yet been adopted by the Commission on the compatibility of aid. According to the European Court of Justice, the objective of the national courts’ tasks was to pronounce measures appropriate to remedy the unlawfulness of the implementation of the aid, in order that the aid did not remain at the free disposal of the recipient during the period remaining until the Commission made its decision. A decision to stay proceedings would amount to maintaining the benefit of aid during the period in which implementation was prohibited, which would be inconsistent with the very purpose of Article 88(3) EC and would render that provision ineffective.24 Therefore, the national court could not stay the proceedings without rendering Article 88(3) EC ineffective, contrary to the principle of effectiveness of the applicable national procedures. As for the second question on whether the adoption by the Commission of three successive decisions declaring aid to be compatible with the common market, subsequently annulled by the Court of First Instance, was, in itself, capable of constituting an exceptional circumstance such as to justify a limitation of the recipient’s obligation to repay that aid, in the case where that aid was implemented contrary to Article 88(3) EC; in order to answer this question, the European Court of Justice referred to the previous CELF I judgment, where the Court had reserved the possibility of taking exceptional circumstances into account when assessing the scope of the obligation to remedy the unlawfulness of aid. In particular, in paragraph 65 of the CELF I judgment, the Court had acknowledged that the recipient of an unlawfully implemented aid was not precluded from relying on exceptional circumstances on the basis of which it had legitimately assumed the aid to be lawful. On that occasion, the Court noted that a positive decision from the Commission cannot give rise to a legitimate expectation on the part of the aid recipient where that decision has been challenged in due time before the Community judicature, which annulled it, or, so long as the period for bringing an action has not expired or, where an action has been brought, so long as the Community judicature has not delivered a definitive ruling.25 According to the European Court of Justice, since the CELF I judgment was delivered, only one new event had taken place before the second reference was made, namely, the annulment of the third positive Commission decision by the Court of First Instance. Such an event was not liable to give rise to a legitimate expectation and to constitute an exceptional circumstance. In fact, the unusual succession of three annulments reflects the difficulty of the case and would rather appear likely to increase the recipient’s doubts as to the compatibility of the disputed aid. The European Court of Justice then went on by affirming that, in a situation like the one in the main proceedings, the existence of an exceptional circumstance also could not be upheld in the light of the principle of legal certainty since, so long as the Commission had not taken a decision approving aid, and so long as the period for bringing an action against such decision has not expired, the recipient could not be certain as to the lawfulness of the aid. Furthermore, the existence of an exceptional circumstance could not finally be upheld in the light of the principle of proportionality. In fact, eliminating unlawful aid by means 24 See the judgment under discussion at paras. 30-31. 25 See Case C-199/06, at paras. 66-68.

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of recovery was the logical consequence of a finding that it was unlawful. Accordingly, the recovery of such aid, for the purpose of restoring the previously existing situation, could not in principle be regarded as disproportionate to the objectives of the Treaty provisions on state aid. To conclude, in the specific circumstances of the case at issue, neither the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations nor that of legal certainty nor that of proportionality can be relied upon in the main proceedings to justify a limitation of the recipient’s obligation to repay that aid, in the case where that aid was implemented contrary to Article 88(3) EC. MM Scott SA, Kimberly Clark SAS, formerly Kimberly Clark SNC v. Ville d’Orléans (Case C-210/09) Court of Justice (Third Chamber): 20 May 2010 State aid – Regulation (EC) No 659/99 – Recovery of aid – Principle of effectiveness – Assessments vitiated by a procedural defect – Annulment This case originated from a request for a preliminary ruling made in the course of proceedings involving Scott SA and Kimberly Clark SAS, on the one hand, and the city of Orléans, on the other, concerning the validity of assessments issued by the city for the recovery of state aid declared incompatible with the common market. The background of the dispute in the main proceedings dated back to 1987, when the city of Orléans and the Département du Loiret sold on preferential terms to Bouton Brochard Scott, (succeeded by Scott owned by Kimberly Clark), a plot of land situated in the La Saussaye industrial estate in Orléans. In addition, the city and the Département also undertook to charge a preferential rate for the water treatment levy. On 12 July 2000, the European Commission adopted a decision on the state aid granted by France to Scott Paper SA Kimberly Clark, declaring state aid in the form of a preferential land price and a preferential rate of water treatment levy to be incompatible with the common market.26 In Article 2 of the same decision, the Commission ordered France to take without delay and in accordance with the procedures provided by national law all necessary measures to recover the aid unlawfully made available to beneficiaries, therefore allowing immediate and effective execution of the Commission decision in question. On 5 December 2001, the city of Orléans issued three assessments with a view to recovering the aid granted in the form of a preferential rate of water treatment levy.27 According to the applicable national legis26 See Decision of the European Commission 2002/14/EC of 12 July 2000, OJ 2002, L 12, p. 1. 27 Scott and the Département du Loiret brought two different actions against the Commission decision

2002/14, which concerned only the recovery of the aid granted in the form of a preferential price for the land. See Case T-366/00 Scott SA v. Commission, [2007] ECR II-797, and Case T-369/00 Département du Loiret v. Commission, [2007] ECR II-851. The first case before the Court of First Instance (now called the General Court) culminated in the annulment of Article 2 only of the Commission decision, and only in so far as it concerned the aid granted in the form of preferential price for the property. This judgment is now under appeal from the Commission to the Court of Justice (see case C-290/07 P, in which the Opinion by Advocate General Mengozzi has already been delivered on 23 February 2010). The second

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lation,28 all persons dealing with one of the administrative authorities were entitled to know the first name, surname, title and administrative address of the officer assigned to deal with their request; those details were to appear on correspondence addressed to them. Moreover, all decisions taken by one of the administrative authorities shall include, alongside the signature of the author thereof, reference to the first name, surname and title of that person in legible writing. In the case at issue, the assessments had borne the stamp of the mayor’s office, a signature and the words “pour le maire l’adjoint délégué” (“appointed deputy on behalf of the Mayor”), but had not referred either to the scope of the powers conferred by the mayor on the deputy who signed the assessment, or to his surname and first name. On the basis of the applicable national legislation, Scott and Kimberly Clark had brought actions challenging those assessments before the tribunal administratif d’Orléans, which had automatic suspensory effect under national legislation.29 Consequently, the enforceability of the assessments was suspended and they were not initially enforced. In the meantime, the Court of Justice had delivered a judgment against the French Republic, following an action brought by the Commission, for having failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 288(4) TFEU (formerly Article 249(4) of the EC Treaty), and Article 2 and 3 of Decision 2002/14.30 In particular, the Court of Justice held that a procedure providing for suspensory effect for actions brought against demands for payment issued for the recovery of unlawfully received aid did not fulfil the conditions laid down in Article 14(3) of Regulation 659/1999, and that therefore, the rule providing for such suspensory effect should have not been applied.31 On 9 January 2007, the tribunal administratif d’Orléans dismissed the actions brought before it, and a month later Scott and Kimberly Clark reimbursed the principal amount of the aid which they had unlawfully received. Successively, on 8 December 2008, they also reimbursed the interest on the aid they had received. Notwithstanding the reimbursement, on 8 March 2007, Scott and Kimberly Clark appealed against the judgment of the tribunal administratif d’Orléans before the Cour administrative d’appel de Nantes, alleging the case before the General Court culminated in the annulment of the decision in its entirety because of an error made by the Commission in its calculation of the interest to be applied when the aid was recovered. The Commission appealed that judgment and the Court of Justice, while confirming the reasoning followed by the General Court in relation to the calculation of the interest, held that unlawful aspect of the decision did not constitute sufficient grounds for annulling the act in its entirety, but only for annulling the specific part which related to interest. This case is now pending again before the General Court. Therefore, the Court of Justice of the European Union as a whole had the chance to examine only the aid granted in the form of a preferential price for the land, as the second one, concerning aid granted in the form of a preferential rate of water treatment levy, never arrived before any level of the Court, except indirectly through the preliminary ruling at issue in the present comment. 28 See Article 4 of Law No 2000-321 of 12 April 2000 on the rights of citizens in their dealings with

administrative authorities, JORF of 13 April 2000, p. 5646. 29 See Article L.1617-5, para 1, sub-para 2 of the General Local Authorities Code. 30 See Case C-232/05 Commission v. France [2006] ECR I-10071. For our purposes, it is worth mentioning

that Article 288, para 4, TFEU, provides that: “A decision shall be binding in its entirety. A decision which specifies those to whom it is addressed shall be binding only to them.”, whereas Article 14(3) of Regulation 659/1999 provides that: “[...], recovery shall be effected without delay and in accordance with the procedures under the national law of the member state concerned, provided that they allow the immediate and effective execution of the Commission’s decision.” 31 See Case C-232/05, at para 53.

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infringement of Article 4 of Law No 2000-321, in particular the requirements of the second paragraph, namely the lack of indication of the surname and first name of the signing officer for the assessments issued by the city of Orléans. The administrative appeal court, having to judge in the main proceedings, found itself confronted with a difficult task. In fact, if, on the one hand, the assessments in question did not comply with the formal requirements laid down in the national law, thus leading to the annulment of those assessments, on the other, the same court had doubts as to the compatibility of the annulment of the assessments of grounds of procedural defect with Article 14(3) of Regulation 659/1999. Considering the circumstances above, the Cour administrative d’appel de Nantes decided to stay the proceedings and to refer a question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. Basically, the administrative appeal court asked whether the possible annulment of the assessments issued for the recovery of aid, on grounds that they infringe legislative provisions on the physical presentation of those assessments, but also assuming the ability of the competent administrative authority to remedy the vitiating defect, might hinder the immediate and effective implementation of the Commission decision at issue, contrary to Article 14(3) of Regulation 659/1999. The Court of Justice, before answering the question, highlighted the necessity of full respect for national procedural autonomy making clear from the outset that review by the national court of the formal legality of an assessment issued for the recovery of unlawful state aid and possible annulment of the assessment on grounds of non-compliance with the requirements of Article 4 of Law No 2000-321 must be viewed simply as an expression of the principle of effective judicial protection which constituted a general principle of European Union law. However, the Court, recalling the above-mentioned judgment in Commission v. France, observed that Article 14(3) of Regulation 659/1999 reflected the requirements of the principle of effectiveness laid down in the previous case law. Therefore, in accordance with this latter principle, a member state which, pursuant to a decision of the Commission, is obliged to recover unlawful aid is free to choose the means of fulfilling that obligation, provided that the measures chosen do not adversely affect the scope and effectiveness of European Union law.32 The referring court considered that the assessments in question infringed Article 4 of Law No 2000-321 and must accordingly be annulled on that ground, because, as also evidenced by the French Government in its written observations submitted to the Court of Justice, the purpose of the national provision in question, through the lifting of anonymity in dealings between the administrative authorities and citizens, was to increase administrative transparency and afford the opportunity to ascertain that an administrative decision was taken by a competent authority. It was therefore necessary for the Court of Justice to examine whether the application of those national provisions was ultimately irreconcilable with the requirement of immediate and effective recovery of aid, as provided in Article 14(3) of Regulation 659/1999 and as interpreted in the light of the guidance set out in the relevant case law. 32 See Case C-24/95 Alcan Deutschland [1997] ECR I-1591, at para 24; Case C-209/00 Commission v.

Germany [2002] ECR I-11695, at para 34; Case C-369/07 Commission v. Greece [2009] ECR I-0000, at para 67.

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The Court of Justice then affirmed that, while the annulment of an assessment could not be criticised per se, in accordance with the above mentioned principle of national procedural autonomy, it should nevertheless be borne in mind that such annulment might, in principle, confer an advantage on an aid recipient who had been successful in legal proceedings if he was also conferred with the right to claim that sums corresponding to the previously-reimbursed aid be paid out to him once again. However, the Court of Justice, in the case at stake in the main proceedings, appraised, from the very wording of the question referred by the national court, that the competent authority which issued the assessments for the recovery of the aid had the power to rectify the procedural defect vitiating those assessments; therefore, it could infer that the annulment of the assessments will not necessarily lead to the sums which the companies concerned paid pursuant to the issue of the assessments being paid once again to the companies because of their annulment.33 In the light of the above, the Court of Justice affirmed that, if, under national law, the assessments in question could be rectified in circumstances guaranteeing that the previously reimbursed aid was not, even provisionally, once again paid out to the recipients in the event of annulment of those assessments by the national court, that annulment would not then have any actual effect on the implementation of Decision 2002/14. Therefore, if the recipients would not have at their disposal, even provisionally, amounts equal to the aid previously reimbursed, with the result that they would remain without the competitive advantage which would be unduly conferred on them if they were once again recipients of those amounts, the annulment alone of the assessments issued by the city of Orléans would not prevent immediate and effective execution of that decision, as required by Article 14(3) of Regulation 659/1999. The Court of Justice then answered to the question posed by the Cour administrative d’appel de Nantes by affirming that Article 14(3) of Regulation 659/1999 was to be interpreted as not precluding, in circumstances in which amounts corresponding to the aid in question had already been recovered, annulment by the national court of assessments issued in order to recover the unlawful state aid on grounds of there being a procedural defect, where it was possible to rectify that procedural defect under national law. That provision did, however, preclude those amounts being paid once again, even provisionally, to the beneficiary of the aid. The case at issue is a very interesting case as it goes beyond the national rules available in order to assure the recovery of the aid unduly received by a company from the State. In fact, it regards more generally the not-always-easy relationship between national procedural autonomy, on one side, and the principle of effectiveness of the application of European Union law, on the other. In the present case, the 33 According to the Court, that can also be inferred from the written observations submitted by the French

Government and the Commission, when they stated that “French law has the mechanisms necessary to ensure that annulment of an assessment will not automatically lead to immediate restoration of the amount reimbursed by the person liable in order to comply with the assessment. The competent authority will therefore be able to rectify the procedural defect vitiating those assessments, without being required to pay once again to the applicants in the main proceedings, even provisionally, the sums they reimbursed pursuant to those assessments.” See Case C-210/09, object of the present comment, at para 27.

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contrast was easy to work out as the procedural defect could be rectified, in accordance to national law, by the same competent authority issuing the assessments then annulled for the procedural defect above. What is open to question, instead, is how the Court of Justice might have answered the same question concerning a similar scenario without, however, the availability of national rules allowing for that kind of rectification. The Court of Justice, in this case, seemed to answer that question too,34 although the possible effects of such an answer are, if not difficult, at least controversial in terms of reconciling the principle of national procedural autonomy with that of effectiveness. MM

34 See Case C-210/09, at paras 31-32, but also the mentioned Case C-232/05 Commission v. France, in

particular paragraph 53, where the Court affirmed that a national provision having a suspensory effect should not have applied if it did not fulfil the conditions laid down in Article 14(3) of Regulation 659/1999, that is, inter alia, the effective execution of the Commission’s decision.