SOPHIA DOI 10.1007/s11841-014-0427-z

Choosing Eternal Separation: Reply to Gwiazda Eric T. Yang & Stephen T. Davis

# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Abstract Recently, in this journal, Jeremy Gwiazda has offered a critique of our separationist view of hell. His objection relies on two key assumptions, and we show in our reply that both assumptions can be denied. Keywords Hell . Separationism . Free choice

We believe that some human beings will, after their deaths, exist eternally apart from God (let us call this view ‘separationism’) and that such individuals do so because they freely choose to exist in such a state. Recently, Jeremy Gwiazda (2011, 693) has argued that separationism is an incoherent position because it, along with certain assumptions, implies the universalist claim that ‘each person will eventually be reconciled with God.’ His argument begins with the claim that the residents of hell remain there only if they make an infinite number of choices to stay. Now, suppose that for each choice, it is extremely probable that some resident of hell—let us call this unfortunate person ‘Jones’—will choose to stay there, and we can be generous in assigning a high probability (say, .999) to such a choice. The problem, according to Gwiazda, is that the probability of Jones remaining in hell decreases over multiple choices, and the probability tends toward 0 over infinitely many choices.1 It follows that the probability that Jones will at some point in eternity choose reconciliation with God approaches 1. Thus, separationism seems to yield the contradictory result that eventually Jones will not remain in hell (and the same goes for all who dwell there).

1 To calculate the probability that Jones remains in hell over n number of choices, we take .999 to the nth power (on the assumption that we assign the same probability that Jones remains in hell for each choice). The larger the value of n is, the lower the probability that Jones remains.

E. T. Yang (*) : S. T. Davis Department of Philosophy, Claremont McKenna College, 850 Columbia Avenue, Claremont, CA 91711, USA e-mail: [email protected] S. T. Davis e-mail: [email protected]

E.T. Yang, S.T. Davis

The two key assumptions to Gwiazda’s argument are (1) ‘that remaining in hell eternally requires infinitely many choices’, and (2) ‘that [Jones’] choices can be modeled probabilistically’ (Gwiazda 2011, 694). But both assumptions can be denied. Concerning (1), there is nothing in the separationist account that requires the residents in hell to make an infinite number of choices to stay there. As some traditional accounts of hell maintain, it is sufficient for eternal separation that Jones makes a single decisive choice or a finite number of choices to be apart from God, and it is not uncommon to construe such a choice (or choices) as being made in Jones’ pre-mortem life. Now, one of us has entertained the possibility that some ‘will continue [to choose separation] after death; some will doubtless do so forever’ (Davis 1990). However, we merely note here that such a claim is not necessarily tied to separationism. Yet even accepting (1), we believe (2) is problematic. Gwiazda assumes that it is an open possibility (however slight) for a resident of hell to choose leaving, thereby assigning the probability of choosing to remain at an extremely high number (close but not exactly at 1) and assigning the probability of choosing to leave at an extremely low number (close but not exactly at 0). But we deny this assumption, for Jones’ choice to remain in hell may follow deterministically from the character he has formed (and this holds even under a libertarian account of freedom and responsibility). Jones is nevertheless responsible for the choice to remain in hell provided that he is responsible for having formed that character (and where earlier actions relevant to characterformation include alternative possibilities such as either accepting or rejecting God).2 So Jones lacks the ability to choose leaving hell but is still responsible for choosing to remain because that choice can be traced back to earlier decisions and actions relevant to the formation of Jones’ character. According to our view, the residents of hell all have characters set against God—they have hardened their hearts—given their earthly choices to reject God.3 Taking this understanding of the condition of those who reside in hell, we need not model Jones’ choice probabilistically since the choice to remain in hell is determined by his character (or we can use the probabilistic model, but it turns out that Jones’ choice to remain in hell will be assigned the probability of 1, thereby making the probabilistic model of no real use). Now, Gwiazda (2011, 695) may complain that such a response ‘fails to appreciate the awesome size of the infinite.’ He claims that if we were given an infinite number of lottery attempts, then we would eventually win one. So given an infinite number of choices, Jones will eventually choose to leave. However, even appreciating the awesome size of the infinite, a character that involves a hardened heart against God will never yield the choice to leave hell since the choice to remain has been determined by Jones’ freely formed character. (Using the probabilistic model, the probability that Jones chooses to remain in hell over a single choice is 1.4 Even over an infinite amount of time, it still turns out that the probability that Jones chooses to remain over that time is 2 For more on the idea of tracing the responsibility for some determined choice or act to formative choices and actions in the past, see Kane (1996), 39–40. 3 Pawl and Timpe (2009), 408 make a similar claim about the residents in heaven, such that their choice not to sin and to remain in bliss is determined by the character they formed in their earthly lives, and yet, they act freely and responsibly in heaven. 4 The probability is 1 because such choices are determined by Jones’ freely formed character, yet the choice is nevertheless a free choice (see references in Footnotes 2 and 3). For a distinct defense of a similar claim, see Swinburne (1983).

Choosing Eternal Separation

1, given that 1×1×1×1×1…=1—again, showing the irrelevance of the probabilistic model to our case.) To follow Gwiazda’s analogy, we can ensure that I never win the lottery provided that I never select or write down any of the numbers on my ticket; in such a case, an infinite number of lottery attempts will not ensure that I ever win. That there is an infinite amount of time is not problematic for the separationist; for eternal duration does not make it more probable that Jones will choose to leave given that Jones’ choices in hell are determined by his freely formed character. So Gwiazda has not shown separationism to be an incoherent position, and therefore, we maintain (unfortunately) that some people will choose to spend an eternity separated from God.

References Davis, S. T. (1990). Universalism, hell, and the fate of the ignorant. Modern Theology, 6, 173–186. Gwiazda, J. (2011). On making the same choice eternally: a reply to Davis. Sophia, 50, 693–696. Kane, R. (1996). The significance of free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pawl, T., & Timpe, K. (2009). Incompatibilism, sin, and free will in heaven. Faith and Philosophy, 26, 396– 417. Swinburne, R. (1983). A Theodicy of Heaven and Hell. In A. Freddoso (Ed.), The existence and nature of God (pp. 37–54). Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.