Int Polit DOI 10.1057/s41311-017-0062-8 ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Competing norms and foreign policy change: humanitarian intervention and British foreign policy Anne Peltner1
Macmillan Publishers Ltd 2017
Abstract During the 1990s the inhibition threshold for humanitarian interventions was lowered in British foreign policy. Whereas interventions in the early 1990s were conducted or approved very reluctantly by the UK, later interventions were pursued more actively. The humanitarian intervention debate is linked to the norms of state sovereignty and human rights protection. In the case of massive human rights violations, they allow for two contrary possible options of action and collide with each other regarding the appropriate behavior. Therefore, this article takes a closer look at policymakers and their response toward this norm competition. In the observed time frame the policymaker’s response changed as the sovereignty norm gained a less prominent role. This shift was due to several factors. The governmental change of the New Labour in 1997 pushed an ethical foreign policy forward. A second factor was the development at the international level, culminating in the emergence of the Responsibility to Protect, which changed the international norm environment. The domestic norm environment shifted to give state sovereignty a less decisive role in cases of massive human rights violations. Keywords Competing norms Foreign policy change Great Britain Humanitarian intervention Norm dynamics
Introduction In the late 1990s a foreign policy change in one of the instruments of British foreign policy could be observed: The threshold for conducting or approving humanitarian intervention was downscaled, including a greater willingness to intervene on humanitarian grounds. Even in the cases where no intervention was conducted, & Anne Peltner
[email protected] 1
Institute of Political Science, Goethe University Frankfurt, Frankfurt, Germany
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humanitarian interventions were a serious policy option and debated within the British public and Parliament. Since norms can drive change, the article tackles this shift by taking a closer look toward the competing norms underlying the humanitarian intervention debate: human rights protection and state sovereignty. These norms compete with each other, as they are often mutually exclusive: The norm of sovereignty suggests nonintervention. Therefore, it serves as an opponent toward the norm of human rights protection, which allows for humanitarian intervention. While both norms are appropriate in certain situations, agency remains crucial to ‘choose’ between the two norms. Thus, the article focuses on how British policymakers respond when both norms come into conflict and the effect on foreign policy change. This is analyzed by a content analysis of speech acts concerning four grave events of massive human rights violations between the early 1990s and 2007: the civil war in Angola, the genocide in Rwanda, the Kosovo conflict, and the conflict in Darfur.1 The policymakers’ response to the norm competition was influenced by three factors according to the Push–Pull model. First, the Labour Party took power in 1997, which promoted an ‘ethical foreign policy’ and worked as one domestic push factor on the agency level (Introduction this issue, p. 3). Second, the change of the domestic norm environment at the international level served as a pull factor. A growing acceptance emerged within the United Nations and elsewhere that humanitarian concerns sometimes outweigh sovereignty, largely as a result of brutal conflicts after the end of the Cold War. This development was advanced with the emergence of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which required a modified notion of sovereignty. Third, the domestic norm environment changed in favor of human rights at the expense of sovereignty.
Competing norms Human rights protection and state sovereignty as competing norms Human rights protection and state sovereignty have been previously studied as social norms. Sovereignty defines the basic constitution of what a state is (Biersteker and Weber 1996). Crucial is the connection of external sovereignty with the principle of non-intervention; state sovereignty was long considered as prescribing non-interference in internal matters and (military) intervention in another state without its consent. Even in cases of massive human rights violations, intervention was seen as inappropriate as this was just a matter of the host state (Krasner 1993, p. 264; Lu 2006, p. 195). The norm of human rights protection, on the contrary, suggests an intervention in such situations. When massive human rights violations are taking place, the two norms in question can have two contradictory recommendations for an actor regarding humanitarian interventions.
1
The data is derived from Peltner (2009).
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As both possible actions are in opposition to the other, this relationship is considered as a competition between the two norms, which long favored sovereignty. However, in the last decades this process seems to have been reversed due to the increasing relevance of human rights ‘in comparison with state sovereignty’ (Peters 2009, p. 514). This shift seems to be puzzling as international norms were long analyzed under the perspective of stability: Once a norm emerged, it should have a constant effect on an actor, ‘leaving only marginal space for the mutually constitutive effect of agency on norm dynamics’ (Wunderlich 2013, p. 24). Internalization leads to norms gaining a ‘taken for granted’ status, which no longer encourages one to think about whether to comply or not (Risse and Sikkink 1999, p. 17). This view resulted in a very limited space for ‘actorness’ and led to a privilege of structural influences. This is remarkable when considering the assumption that norms do not have a causal effect (Ruggie 1998, p. 97), but rather enable—but do not determine—actions (Finnemore 1996, p. 158). A second wave of norm research focused instead on the ‘ambiguous and indeterminate nature’ (Wunderlich 2013, p. 26) of norms within norm contestation (e.g., Wiener 2007), localization (e.g., Acharya 2004; Capie 2008; Zimmermann 2014) or norm erosion (e.g., Rosert and Schirmbeck 2007; Panke and Petersohn 2012; Heller et al. 2012). Furthermore, the difference between validity and application of norms came into focus (Deitelhoff 2013) as well as dynamics of already established norms (Mu¨ller and Wunderlich 2013). As norms can often stand in conflict with each other (Hurrell 2006, p. 143), they can be subject of norm dynamics due to the resulting dissonance. Of the few authors who concentrated on competition between two or more norms, most have a special interest toward emergent norms (Florini 1996; Grillot 2011), on justifications by competing norms (Jetschke and Liese 2013, p. 35) or on competing norms within the EU (Zwolski 2012). The emphasis of this study is to analyze norm competition under the perspective of norm dynamics of already established norms. I define norm competition as a specific form of norm conflict, involving two or more norms and questioning their validity or their application. The competing norms both claim to be applicable in similar situations but imply competing courses of action. As the impact of norms on actors’ behavior is contingent on the norms’ robustness (Legro 1997, p. 33), a norm’s specificity is reduced if it is no longer exclusively appropriate to the situation in question. Therefore, agency—and thus a closer look at the response of agents or, in this case, policymakers toward competing norms—remains crucial: As long as only one norm can be applied to a situation, the actor can easily act according to the specific norm. However, if the situation can be interpreted as a case for two competing norms, the question arises, which norm matters (more), as long as these two norms have contradictory imperatives. This is especially relevant to the underlying notion of a constitutive norm effect according to the logic of appropriateness. If several actions seem to be appropriate, the actor has to choose (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p. 914). Policymakers may reduce the dissonance by ascribing more or less significance to one of the norms. As norms can define the goals of state action as well as the means to achieve them through the transnational and societal level (Boekle et al. 2001, pp. 110–118), a changing
A. Peltner Table 1 Different responses of speakers toward competing norms Source: compiled by the author Main category
Subcategory
Abbreviation
Hierarchy
State sovereignty ranks above human rights in an hierarchy
HIER_SOV
Hierarchy
Human rights rank above
HIER_HR
State sovereignty in an hierarchy Mix
Sovereignty implies responsibility—sovereignty is modified
MIX_MOD
Mix
Indecision between the two norms, the speaker remains undecided
MIX_UNDEC
One-norm guidance
Only sovereignty is decisive
SOV
One-norm guidance
Only human rights are decisive
HR
Third-norm guidance
A third norm is guiding the competition
THIRD
response toward competing norms across different actor groups among policymakers may give rise to a (lasting) shift of foreign policy. Response toward norm competition: hierarchy, mixed motives, one-norm or third-norm guidance The analysis uses a system of categories relating to different ‘solutions’ of the norm competition by individual speakers. A composition of four main categories and related subcategories is derived from the academic discourse about the specific conflict between the two norms (see Table 1).2 The first main category refers to a hierarchical order between the two norms constructed by the speaker. Both norms are seen as being on a scale and whenever one norm gains more significance, the other one loses this amount at the same time—a zero-sum game. Several studies noticed a shift from the rise of the human rights protection norm at the expense of state sovereignty. This was seen as a result of different factors, such as the proceeding legalization of human rights and the increasing socialization of the international community toward a perspective which views the protection of human rights both as an essential asset and as a prerequisite of being a member of the international community (Risse 2007, p. 22). In this view, sovereignty is not eroded completely, but it is still a robust norm in international relations (Philpot 2001, p. 42). It does matter, but has decreased significance when competing with human rights. In a situation where both norms were to be weighed against another, this would result in a preference toward human rights protection (Brock 1999, p. 338): ‘Humanitarian claims now frequently trump sovereignty claims’ (Finnemore 2003, p. 79). Contrary to that is the assumption that sovereignty trumps human rights protection, which was the case for the first four decades after the Second World War (Thakur 2007, p. 391). A hierarchy between the two norms is 2
For a more detailed derivation of the categories see Peltner (2009). For a similar compilation relating to normative orders and a typology of their solution strategies see Zimmermann et al. (2013). They also differentiate between hierarchisation of normative orders and the solving by third norms.
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assumed where one norm trumps the other: the hierarchy can favor human rights protection (HIER_HR) or favor states sovereignty (HIER_SOV). Another conceptualization sees a change in the substance of the norms themselves. The tension between both norms is solved, especially as a result of the changing nature of sovereignty. The concept of sovereignty was seen as shifting toward the implication that a state holds a responsibility to its own people. This view of a qualified sovereignty emerged alongside the problem of internally displaced people (Deng 1993). Sovereignty implied responsibility, and if a state failed to assume its responsibility, its claim to sovereignty was to expire (Deng 1993, p. 125). This conceptualization was further used within the framework of the R2P (ICISS 2001). If the ‘internal’ responsibility is not exercised, the international community has a fallback responsibility to step in (Thakur 2002, p. 330). The modified sovereignty norm does not stand in opposition to the human rights protection norm. This sets the stage for another subcategory: the norm of sovereignty was modified and now implies responsibility, therefore ‘allowing’ an intervention in case of massive human rights violations (MIX_MOD). A second subcategory (MIX_UNDEC) relates to the case when the speaker is undecided about which norm is seen as paramount, ultimately comes to no decision and is paralyzed. The speaker considers both norms as being appropriate but cannot favor one of them. A third main category can be derived from the point of view that only one norm is relevant. Contrary to the hierarchical main category above, the competition between the two norms can be solved by eliminating one of them. Few approaches stated an erosion of the sovereignty norm (Fodor 2007, p. 9). This would result in a one-norm guidance, with only human rights as the decisive norm (HR). In contrast, it is possible that only state sovereignty is decisive (SOV). Central here is the assumption that only one of the two norms guides the behavior and the respective other norm has lost its significance completely (at least in this special situation). This stands in opposition to the hierarchical main category where the second norm is not eliminated, but just overtrumped. As norms do encounter a set of multiple norms, it is also possible that a third norm is crucial to the conflict between human rights and sovereignty. The tension between the two norms is solved as to which norm serves the third one better. Therefore, a fourth main category is conceived, in which a third norm can be relevant in the speaker’s view, which provides a hierarchy between the two norms and solves the competition (THIRD).
Humanitarian intervention and foreign policy change in the UK Content analysis The UK with its permanent seat in the Security Council is likely to have a specific response about this norm competition since its government can decide whether or not to authorize military interventions. Within a democracy the foreign policy can be openly debated. As norms can only be observed indirectly via communication
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(Rieth and Zimmer 2004, pp. 11–12, Fn 15), a content analysis (Mayring 2007) is a useful tool to analyze if the observed response toward both competing norms changes. Speeches of British political decision makers within the national and international arena were chosen based on the criteria of covering a broad spectrum, but at the same time being crucial for political decisions. Therefore, speeches of diplomats in the Security Council, in the General Assembly and those accessible by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office were analyzed, as well speeches in the House of Commons and the House of Lords.3 Using the above mentioned categories, the study investigated speeches regarding four of the bloodiest intrastate conflicts in the 1990s and the beginning of the following century: the Angolan civil war in the early 1990s, the genocide in 1994 in Rwanda where an intervention was conducted too late, the conflict in Kosovo, and the bloody civil war in Darfur since 2003.4 These conflicts were chosen since they involved massive human rights violations, were noted in the international community, and debated in the United Nations. Other possible conflicts with equally massive human rights violations were not chosen since they involved failed states, e.g., Somalia in the early 1990s. They contributed to a lesser extent to the norm competition debate since they could not be regarded as a ‘traditional’ sovereign state. The speeches concerning the four conflicts were selected according to time frames with violence peaks where human rights were violated to a great extent, including some time before and after.5 Parliamentary speeches and speeches from the website of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office were, due to their high number, also limited by significant search terms (sovereignty, internal affairs, intervention, human rights, genocide). Of all 600 speeches found, 216 were regarded as relevant and included in the content analysis. Non-relevant speeches did not center around humanitarian interventions, e.g., focused on parliamentary sovereignty.6 Britain as a reluctant actor toward humanitarian intervention In the early 1990s, humanitarian interventions were not seen as a general foreign policy instrument in British foreign policy. They were authorized or carried out very reluctantly (Otte et al. 1995, p. 185), only at a late point in the conflicts or without initially referring to humanitarian interventions. The no-fly-zones in Iraq in 1991, which were proclaimed by the US, the UK, and France, were initially justified without reference to humanitarian intervention. Although some conditions for 3
Parliamentary debates allow ‘for representation of wide range of viewpoints’ (Cantir and Kaarbo 2012, p. 14) and are therefore a possible forum for a debate over competing norms.
4
Since the civil war in Darfur lasted for so long, speeches were only selected in a limited time frame: climaxes of violence were defined and speeches were selected from 1 January, 2003 till 30 June, 2008.
5
Speeches were selected from 1 July, 1993 until 30 June, 1996 (Rwanda), from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 1997 (Angola), from 1 July, 1998 until 30 June, 2001 (Kosovo) and from 1 January, 2003 until 30 June, 2008 (Darfur).
6
The 216 speeches were distributed as followed: 25 about Angola, 20 about Rwanda, 111 about Kosovo and 61 about Darfur (one speech could be used for Angola as well as for Rwanda). Speeches were held in the Security Council (35), in the General Assembly (5), in the House of Lords (53) in the House of Commons (62) and of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office held at various occasions (60).
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humanitarian interventions were formulated in 1992 (Gray 2008, p. 37), this process of actively engaging with the concept slowed down. In 1994, the genocide in Rwanda did not lead to a British intervention: The French push for the ‘Ope´ration Turquoise’ was approved within the Security Council by the UK at a very late point in the conflict. The UK even failed to authorize a delegation mandated by the Security Council to gather information (Gaskarth 2013, p. 107) and could be seen as a ‘key force in the international inaction over Rwanda’ (Gaskarth 2013, p. 106). Concerning the civil war in Angola, with thousands of deaths, humanitarian intervention did not even play a role as a British policy option. In the Bosnian conflict, a humanitarian intervention was conducted by the UK after the conflict had gone on for several years. An intervention was debated and ruled out in 1992 (Bevins 1992) until it was finally approved in 1995. Then the engagement in the intervention was very low: ‘of the major troop contributors, Britain was the least willing to strengthen the UN and NATO mandate in Bosnia’ (Rathbun 2004, p. 46). Despite the fact that the UK sent troops ‘the UK was seen as an obstructive actor in attempts to confront human rights abuses aggressively in Bosnia’ (Gaskarth 2013, p. 107). Taking a closer look at the policymaker’s response toward the norm competition within the conflicts of Angola and Rwanda in the early 1990s (see Fig. 1), this foreign policy was accompanied by a high relevance of sovereignty in the speaker’s statements. Although the human rights norm as ‘one norm guidance’ was strongly present in 36% of statements concerning the conflict in Rwanda (HR), the prevailing norm was sovereignty in speeches concerning both conflicts. Sovereignty—as the one norm guiding (SOV)—dominated with more than 46% (Angola) and 45% (Rwanda) of speeches. Often the policymakers referred implicitly to sovereignty and stressed the responsibility of the conflicting parties in ending the conflict: The international community wants, before all else, to see an end to war in Angola and the reconstruction of the country. There is an immense amount of potential assistance ready to be offered, but help can be given only if the two sides in the present conflict themselves create the right conditions. That is their responsibility. Only they can give the Angolan people the peace and the prosperity they so desperately need and deserve (Hannay 1993). The high relevance of sovereignty is also represented by the use of the hierarchy category favoring state sovereignty over human rights (HIER_SOV) in the speeches concerning Angola (30%). Statements noticed the need for human rights protection but favored a solution by the host state, setting the sovereignty higher than the human rights protection. Willingness to intervene on humanitarian grounds Foreign policy change At the end of the 1990s a ‘shift, from the openly declared pursuit of national interest in foreign policy, to the growing emphasis on ethical or moral duties to protect the rights and interests of others’ could be seen (Chandler 2003, p. 295). The UK
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Fig. 1 Distribution of categories concerning the four conflicts Source: compiled by the author
became willing and disposed toward humanitarian intervention (similar Rathbun 2004, p. 47), which was included in being a ‘good citizen’ and having a responsibility to act (Bono 2004, p. 234). This development culminated in the decision to intervene in Kosovo—even without Security Council authorization: the war ‘was fought on humanitarian grounds’ (Kavanagh et al. 2006, p. 625). Indicators for this change relate to the prominence of the discussion about possible interventions as well as to the attempt to develop a doctrine. Humanitarian interventions became a serious option of foreign policy instruments. As in the case of Kosovo, several political decision makers mentioned the possibility of an intervention very early (Bono 2004, p. 227). The threshold for humanitarian intervention was lowered, and Great Britain became more disposed to intervene on humanitarian grounds. Taking a closer look at speeches of the policymakers referring to the conflict in Kosovo, the analysis showed a changing response toward the competing norms of human rights protection and state sovereignty. Sovereignty as on top of a hierarchical order or as the only norm guiding behavior played a far less decisive role compared to Rwanda and Angola. Instead, the category of ‘one norm guidance’ by human rights (HR) played a greater role than in the two conflicts before with more than 70%. Speakers often emphasized the need for an intervention:
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This is a just war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on values. We cannot let the evil of ethnic cleansing stand. We must not rest until it is reversed. We have learned twice before in this century that appeasement does not work. If we let an evil dictator range unchallenged, we will have to spill infinitely more blood and treasure to stop him later (Blair 1999). The second most frequently used category in speeches concerning Kosovo was the category hierarchically favouring human rights (HIER_HR) with 15%, expressing the notion that human rights override state sovereignty and non-intervention. Factors influencing the policymaker’s response toward the norm competition The changing response of the policymakers to the underlying norm competition between sovereignty and human rights protection was influenced by three factors. First, the government change from the conservative Major to the ‘New Labour’ government in 1997. Government changes can serve as a domestic push factor (Introduction, this issue, p. 3). In the case of Great Britain this was highlighted in several studies (e.g., Wheeler and Dunne 2001; Rathbun 2004, Fey 2013). Blair himself was seen as the chief determinant (e.g., Daddow 2009; Bono 2004) as well as internal party politics (Hill 2003, p. 222). The new foreign minister, Robin Cook, pronounced an adjustment of foreign policy with an ‘ethical dimension’ and human rights ‘at the heart’ (Cook 1997). This ethical approach was not restricted to the initially referred arms trade in repressive countries (Leach et al. 2011, p. 434). It crystallized into a more positive attitude toward humanitarian intervention and ‘sovereignty talk, so loud under the previous government, was nowhere to be heard’ (Wheeler and Dunne 2001, p. 167). Additionally, the idea of developing a doctrine of humanitarian intervention including conditions (as in 1992) was revived within the ‘Blair Doctrine’ (Blair 1999). This development culminated in the decision to intervene in Kosovo. However, there seem to be additional factors influencing the policymaker’s response toward the norm competition (McCourt 2013, p. 246). The fact the foreign policy shift outlasted the Labour government, supports the idea. Even Conservatives are now ‘more open to humanitarian intervention than ever before’ (Beech and Oliver 2014, p. 103). A second factor was the development at the international level concerning the norm environment of both norms. During the Cold War, nonintervention was seen as ‘fundamental’ (Roberts 2004, p. 80). However, starting with Resolution 688 in 1991, it became common within the Security Council to see refugees and later human rights concerns themselves as a threat to international peace and security. Additionally, ‘a changed sense of the importance of humanitarianism in world politics’ (MacQueen 2011, p. 42) emerged. The idea and discourse of human rights gained more prominence within the United Nations (MacQueen 2011, p. 43). Nevertheless, in the aftermath of brutal conflicts like Rwanda, Somalia or the former Yugoslavia the idea prevailed, that the UN had failed (MacQueen 2011, p. 72) which changed the context of both norms regarding non-intervention. Third, on the domestic level a corresponding development worked as a push factor relating to the norm’s environment and changing the context of the norm
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(Introduction, this issue, p. 3). Some ‘wider shifts’ took place (McCourt 2013, p. 246), connected to a ‘powerful change in both British and international thinking’ (Oliver 2013, p. 114). This shift was in line with the changing public awareness in other Western societies and concerned non-intervention in the case of massive human rights violations: ‘Non-intervention is synonymous with ‘allowing’ nasty things to happen’ (Heins and Chandler 2007, p. 10). This development started with the establishments of no-fly zones to protect the Kurds in Iraq in 1991. Their human rights violations were in the public focus, leading to a lesser relevance of sovereignty, as mentioned in this newspaper article: ‘For once the Kurds have been in luck, beneficiaries of a vague but apparently growing conviction in public opinion that gross violations of human rights, in an area of eroding sovereignty, are not longer an internal matter’ (Graham 1991). Nevertheless, at that time non-intervention was still of great importance as echoed in other newspaper articles: ‘The principle of nonintervention is still a substantial one, and to breach it is always a contentious course of action’ (Guardian 1991). Central to the further development was the intervention in Bosnia in 1995. British policymakers learned during the crisis about the appropriateness of the use of force (McCourt 2013, p. 260): ‘This change led beliefs, firmly held in London in 1992 about the importance of territorial integrity and state sovereignty and the inadvisability of military intervention, to give way to the view that humanitarian catastrophe outweighed sovereignty in instances like Kosovo’ (McCourt 2013, p. 260). The rapid success of the intervention in Bosnia surprised many. The years before the intervention where named as ‘years of failure’ (Rifkind 1995). The special relevance of the Bosnia intervention was also resonated in the media: ‘As Bosnia has shown, sovereignty is no longer an absolute bar to foreign concern where human rights are violated’ (Guardian 1998). On the international level, the development preceded in the aftermath of the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999. In 2000 the United Nations Secretary General demanded a review of the status of sovereignty in cases like Rwanda and Kosovo (A/54/2000). Afterward, the Canadian Government initiated the International Commission on Sovereignty and Intervention. Its report (ICISS 2001) entailed the idea of the ‘Responsibility to Protect,’ including a modified, since qualified sovereignty. Sovereignty implied responsibility, which meant ‘externally—to respect the sovereignty of other states and internally, to respect the dignity and the basic rights of all people within the state’ (ICISS 2001, p. 8). This concept changed the norm environment as it adjusts the sovereignty norm’s substance (Introduction, this issue, p. 3). The Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit (A/Res/60/1) did not contain the original exact wording of ‘sovereignty as responsibility.’ However, the qualified sovereignty was included in the notion that the international community should take action if national authorities fail to protect their populations in specific situations of violence. In several documents before—but also after—the 2005 Summit the idea of a modified sovereignty norm was implicitly or explicitly present, also due to Deng’s ideas on internally displaced persons (e.g., E/CN.4/1998/53). Also
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Nongovernmental Organizations used R2P language even before 2005 (Badescu 2011, p. 128). Therefore, the idea’s influence can be traced back even before 2005. The influence of this Pull factor of the international level can be seen within the speeches concerning the violence in Darfur, which did not lead to a humanitarian intervention by the international community. Instead, the Security Council made diplomatic efforts, approved humanitarian help and sanctions.7 Nevertheless, intervention was a possible option at a particular time on the British political agenda (MacAskill 2004; Guardian 2005). British statements concerning the Darfur conflict used the category with the modified sovereignty understanding the most (36%, MIX-MOD). In this respect, speakers recognized the principle of sovereignty, but emphasized the responsibility of the international community as well: ‘We must offer President Bashir a choice. Engage with us on a solution. Or, if you reject responsibility for the people of Darfur, then we will table and put to a vote sanctions against the regime. I believe we have a Responsibility to Protect (Blair 2007).’ The category of one norm guidance with respect to human rights was used often as well with 32% (HR) in speeches relating to the Darfur conflict. Compared to Rwanda and Angola, the one norm guidance by sovereignty was used far less with 11%. Comparing the results of the content analysis over time, categories with sovereignty as the primary or only guiding role decreased over time: The speakers saw the (traditional) sovereignty norm as guiding to a far lesser extent than in the later conflicts. Due to this development, which was furthered by the idea of a modified sovereignty, to conduct or to approve a humanitarian intervention lost an ideational ‘barrier.’
Conclusion The change in British foreign policy concerning humanitarian intervention resulted in a greater willingness to approve or conduct interventions on humanitarian grounds. This was enabled by the changing response of British policymakers toward the underlying competing norms human rights protection and state sovereignty. The norm dynamic between those competing norms could be reconciled by focusing on the agency perspective. This was allowed by concentrating on the individual interpretations of competing norms and their view of the relationship between both norms. Four possible responses of speakers toward competing norms were assumed: Hierarchical order, mixed motives and one norm as well as third norm guidance. In the analyzed statements concerning the Rwandan or Angolan conflict those categories with sovereignty as the primary or only guiding role were used fare more than in speeches about the conflicts in Kosovo and Darfur. During the later conflicts, sovereignty was of reduced significance compared to the human rights norm. This 7
As past events have an impact on decisions, too, the intervention in Iraq in 2003 may have influenced the British reluctance to intervene in Darfur as it undermined its standing as a ‘human intervention norm carrier[s]’ (Bellamy 2005, p. 51). This was one among other factors impeding a consensus towards interventions within the Security Council (Bellamy 2005, p. 51) but did not undermined the general willingness to intervene on humanitarian grounds.
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dynamic solved the dissonance between the two competing norms in cases of massive human rights violations at the expense of sovereignty. This indicates over time a shrinking relevance of the sovereignty norm for the speakers and a norm dynamic between the two norms beyond complete erosion of one of the norms. This shifting response toward both competing norms was influenced by two push factors on the domestic level—a governmental change and a changing domestic norm environment. On the international level the changing norm environment worked as a second pull factor. The norm competition relates to security politics where changes have to overcome substantial barriers. Factors, which cover both the international and the national level, as well as policy and politics, seem to be helpful to induce change within high-level issue areas. As competing norms provide potential for foreign policy change, other norm pairs across different policy areas and corresponding factors influencing change may be of interest for future research, e.g., human rights and state security within the fight against terrorism. Though the different possibilities of the speaker’s attributions about the competing norms are derived from the literature about sovereignty and human rights protection, they seem to be useful to analyze the response of actors to other competing norms. Acknowledgements The author would like to thank the editors of this issue, the two anonymous reviewers and Tanja Bru¨hl for their fruitful comments and suggestions.
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