Complexity theory and the War on Terror: understanding the self-organising dynamics of leaderless jihad Antoine Bousquet Department of Politics, Birkbeck, University of London, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HX, UK. E-mail: [email protected]

This article seeks to substantiate theoretically Marc Sageman’s claims of a ‘leaderless jihad’ through the application of the conceptual framework offered by the novel scientific paradigm of complexity theory. It is argued that jihadist networks, such as those behind the September 11 attacks and the bombings in London and Madrid, can be profitably understood in terms of complex adaptive systems, emergent organisations that coalesce and self-organise in a decentralised fashion. Complexity sheds new light on the jihadist movement by providing an account of the bottom-up self-organisation of its networks and the systems of distributed intelligence which allow those networks to operate and pursue successful attacks on the basis of partial and localised information, and this despite the strenuous efforts at counter-terrorism deployed by states. Journal of International Relations and Development (2012) 15, 345–369. doi:10.1057/jird.2011.24; published online 4 November 2011 Keywords: al-Qaeda; complex adaptive system; jihadism; network; self-organisation; terrorism

Introduction The summer of 2008 saw a virulent exchange of printed words between two of the most prominent scholars of terrorism in the pages of the journal Foreign Affairs (May/June and July/August 2008), following the critical review by Bruce Hoffman of Marc Sageman’s new book Leaderless Jihad (2008). The central bone of contention between the two analysts centred on the extent to which the threat of terrorism was presently to be primarily attributed to a central core of al-Qaeda still active in the borderland between Afghanistan and Pakistan (‘the centre holds’, as Hoffman put it) or to ‘a scattered global network’ constituted by ‘spontaneously self-organising groups of friends who become terrorists’ (Sageman 2008: 164). This high-profile crossing of swords encapsulated a debate on the organisational character of jihadist terrorism that Journal of International Relations and Development, 2012, 15, (345–369) r 2012 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1408-6980/12

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has been ongoing since the early days of the ‘Global War on Terror’ and which obviously holds significant analytical and policy implications. While the present author leans towards Sageman’s views, this article makes no pretence to contribute any new empirical information liable to adjudicate between the competing claims of Hoffman and Sageman. Indeed, in the final instance, the real picture of jihadist militancy is to be built up through the painstaking accumulation of evidence, without prejudging the findings that come out of research into a highly fluid area of enquiry further complicated by substantial methodological difficulties and a scarcity of reliable information. What this article will however seek to do is outline a set of mechanisms and dynamic processes that can plausibly account for the formation and operation of the decentralised self-organising jihadist networks described by Sageman and for which there already exists a significant evidence base. It is proposed that this can be done most effectively and insightfully by reference to the framework of complexity theory, from which we can draw a clearly defined language and set of concepts. Indeed, it is not sufficient to argue that jihadist networks emerge in bottom-up processes of self-organisation and operate in a decentralised and distributed fashion; it is also necessary to show how such forms of organisation are possible. This is all the more essential since the advantages and characteristics of hierarchical modes of organisation have long been understood in social science, notably in the formalised and rationalised forms that Max Weber (2009: 214) analysed in his seminal work on bureaucracies — ‘precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of material and personal costs’. If al-Qaeda and militant jihadists do not immediately evoke images of the archetypal bureaucracy, the top-down accounts of their organisations still emphasise fixed pre-determined roles and levels of graded authority within what Weber called a ‘firmly ordered system of super- and subordination in which there is a supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones’ (ibid.: 197). These are forms of organisation with which we are deeply familiar in our contemporary industrialised state-governed societies and which naturally strike us as the most efficient and natural ways of organising affairs. Any alternative account of jihadism that stresses the decentralised and self-organising character of the networks that constitute it must therefore strive to offer the same conceptual clarity and empirical plausibility as those that rest on hierarchical and bureaucratic conceptions. In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, President Bush (2001) told the world that ‘al-Qaeda is to terror what the mafia is to crime’, articulating a prevalent conception of bin Laden’s organisation as a tentacular multinational of terrorism with undercover branches implanted across the world and whose members patiently await the signal from their paymaster to

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unleash horrendous acts of mass murder. This became the working assumption with which the ‘War on Terror’ was launched and domestic anti-terror policies formulated. However, subsequent research soon began to problematise this conception, revealing not a monolithic organisation directed from the top by Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri or any putative leadership, but rather a complex disparate and continually evolving network of individuals and groups with shifting alliances and rivalries. Jason Burke (2004: 231) concluded that ‘the idea that al-Qaeda is a coherent hierarchical terrorist group, with a single leader, a broadly uniform ideology and an ability to conceive and execute projects globally through well-disciplined cadres, sleepers and activists spread around the world is misplaced’. For one, as Faisal Devji (2005) has persuasively argued, there is no ideological or cultic uniformity among the global jihadist movement. Certainly, there are recurrent tropes and grievances within jihadist discourse, such as the worldwide oppression of Muslims at the hands of the ‘Crusader-Zionist alliance’ and the corrupt apostate governments it is deemed to prop up across the Islamic world. One can also find a broad commitment to a literalist and fundamentalist reading of the Qur’an intended to return to the original message of Allah and Islam as practiced in the first few centuries following the Prophet’s death, along with a general aspiration to establish a new caliphate for the global ummah of believers. But all these lines of thought do not coalesce into a coherent and systematic doctrine that one must necessarily embrace and punctiliously abide by in order to join the jihad. Additionally, considerable differences and sharp disagreements over the methods and tactics to employ abound among militants, alongside personal rivalries and conflicts of interest. If anything, the ideas vehiculed by the global jihadist movement promote highly individualistic notions of ethical commitment to resistance and selfsacrifice that are profoundly subversive of established collectivist traditions of religious and political order in the Islamic world (Devji 2005, 2008). Even where there is a convergence of individuals over the means to be adopted or around a strong figurehead (as with bin Laden), we only rarely see the extensive formal organisational structures or hierarchical command frequently suggested by media coverage and mainstream political discourse. While there has been a growing recognition of this since the inception of the War on Terror, a robust theoretical framework accounting for the decentralised character and specific dynamics of the jihadist movement is still mostly lacking. The present article proposes to contribute to the elaboration of such a framework through an exploration of the insights that complexity theory can offer when applied to the study of contemporary jihadist networks. By drawing on existing work that has begun connecting complexity to the study of terrorist networks, as well as on current empirical studies, I will strive to provide a broad overview of how our understanding of the emergence,

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persistence and modes of operation of jihadist groups can be enhanced by reference to the theoretical and conceptual framework of complexity theory. One of the main benefits of such an analysis is precisely to dispense with the view of al-Qaeda as a centralised unified organisation with operational control over cells across the world, while equipping us with a set of conceptual tools to grasp the processes through which such networks emerge and self-organise with limited centralising oversight. Through the lens of complexity, we can gain a clearer grasp of the dynamics of the jihadist movement as a polymorphous phenomenon composed of complex adaptive systems that continually evolve and learn from their preparation and execution of violent actions in the face of strenuous state efforts to detect and counter them. The premise of this article is thus not to contribute any new empirical information but to propose a conceptual framework derived from complexity theory and through which one can read the work of certain key researchers such as Jason Burke (2004) and Mark Sageman (2004, 2008). The first section of this article will provide a brief account of complexity theory and the central concepts that can be fruitfully applied to the study of jihadist networks. I will here seek to offer a synthetic summation of the key relevant ideas and terminology developed by complexity theorists with the intention of providing a concise overview that nevertheless remains accessible to non-specialists.1 A wide variety of methodological approaches have been deployed under the banner of complexity, ranging from network analysis and computational modelling to more qualitative and descriptive approaches. I will not privilege any single one in this article as my main purpose is to argue for complexity theory as a social ontology liable to illuminate certain crucial processes or dynamics and from which we can draw a clearly defined set of concepts and mechanisms.2 Such an ontology should allow for methodological pluralism, and it is likely that any subsequent enriching of our empirical insights will benefit from a combination of approaches. The respective merits of different methodologies are in any case too substantial an issue not to deserve a more extensive treatment than can be afforded here. The following section will begin deploying this conceptual framework in considering the al-Qaeda network in terms of a complex adaptive system and developing a complexity-based account of its emergence and evolutions, of the role of its leadership, and of its relation to the broader jihadist movement. The organisational structure of al-Qaeda both prior and subsequent to September 11 will be considered, noting both the developments and continuities between these two periods. I will then turn to jihadist operations themselves, emphasising the networks of distributed intelligence that allow these groups to learn and innovate for the purpose of achieving their objectives in spite of intense state efforts to disrupt them.3 Finally, this article will conclude that, notwithstanding the still-considerable theoretical and empirical work that

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remains to be done, complexity theory holds already significant promise in enhancing our understanding of the social dynamics of the jihadist movement.

A brief guide to complexity theory and non-linear dynamics Providing any succinct overview of complexity theory is an arduous task, not least because the very notion of complexity does not enjoy any fully consensual definition or theorisation. The nebulous characteristic of the term reflects in part the fact that it covers a broad field of enquiry into non-linear dynamic systems rather than denoting a clearly delineated and formalised scientific theory. As such, complexity is best treated as a broad header for an array of insights and concepts developed through a range of investigations into the formation and behaviour of dynamic systems. Murray Gell-Mann (1996) nonetheless argues for the appropriateness of the word in reference to its etymology; plexus means braided or entwined, from which is derived from complexus, meaning braided together. Hence complexity suggests the ‘intricate intertwining or interconnectivity of elements within a system, and between a system and its environment’ (Mitleton-Kelly 2000: 25), and this constitutes as good a starting definition as any. With the above caveat in mind, one might proceed to define complexity theory tentatively as the study of non-linear phenomena and bottom-up processes of emergent self-organisation. Non-linear phenomena or systems are those that do not display proportionality between input and output and in which small influences can result in large effects. This was the basic intuition that founded chaos theory, the precursor to complexity. Its most famous metaphor is the ‘butterfly effect’ according to which a butterfly flapping its wings in Tokyo can cause a tornado in California.4 While this has imposed some limitations on the ability to predict the long-term behaviour of systems (notably in terms of the timing and magnitude of specific events), it has also provided new insights into the world, revealing a subtle order and structure to phenomena previously believed to be completely devoid of recognisable patterns, for example the turbulence of fluids or plate tectonics. Of particular importance to non-linear phenomena are positive feedback loops, whereby a system amplifies any perturbation or new input through cycles of recursion or iteration. This leads to run-away processes that take a system away from its present state and can lead to radical transformations in its composition and behaviour (even potentially causing its complete dissolution if these perturbations are too great or insufficiently tempered).5 This brings us to the concepts of self-organisation and emergence central to complexity theory itself. Self-organisation is the process by which the

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autonomous interaction of individual entities results in the bottom-up emergence of complex systems, systems composed of many parts that are coupled in a non-linear fashion. Here the notion of network is vital to describe the patterns of interaction that are constituted by the interplay of entities in a complex system (Capra 1996: 82), about which more will be said in the next section. A key related concept is that of emergence, the process by which complex structures form on the basis of simple rules. As scientist Stephen Wolfram put it, ‘whenever you look at very complicated systems in physics or in biology, you generally find that the basic components and the basic laws are quite simple; the complexity arises because you have a great many of these simple components interacting simultaneously y the complexity is actually in the organisation — the myriad possible ways that the components of the system can interact’ (Waldrop 1992: 86). This view is in opposition to reductionist approaches that view properties of the system as the mere aggregation of those of their constituent parts. Emergent properties, however, are properties of the whole that cannot be deduced from the properties of the individual parts making it up. Complex adaptive systems constitute a special case of complex systems that are capable of changing and learning from experience and thus appear particularly relevant to the social world. Complexity theorist John Holland defines a complex adaptive system as a dynamic network of many agents acting in parallel, constantly acting and reacting to what the other agents are doing. The control of a complex adaptive system therefore tends to be highly dispersed and decentralised. Any coherent behaviour in the system arises from competition and cooperation among the agents themselves. It is the accumulation of all the individual decisions taken by the multitude of agents that produces the overall behaviour of the system, and which can thus be said to be emergent (Holland 1992, 1995). Complex adaptive systems are deemed to include living organisms, insect colonies, bird flocks, ecosystems, businesses, stock markets and other forms of social and cultural organisation with the constituent agents being cells, species, individuals, firms or nations. This non-exhaustive list makes clear that the designation of agent and system is dependent on the scale or level of analysis being privileged and that what at one level may be considered an agent will be a system at another (and vice versa). Furthermore, the outer boundaries of any complex system are generally difficult to ascertain, and thus any such system must be considered as open in terms of its interactions with the wider environment. The analyst therefore plays an important role in determining the scale and system boundaries to be privileged according to the specific dynamics to be illuminated. One way of thinking about the connections or interactions between the agents or nodes within the network of a complex adaptive system is in terms of

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flows: flows of resources (e.g. money, material) or flows of ideas and communications (e.g. knowledge, information). According to Holland (1995: 23), in complex adaptive systems, ‘flows through these networks vary over time; moreover, nodes and connections can appear and disappear as the agents adapt or fail to adapt. Thus, neither the flows nor the networks are fixed in time. They are patterns that reflect changing adaptations as time elapses and experience accumulates’. Crucially, within a complex adaptive system one can designate neither the agents/nodes nor the network of connections linking them together as single-handedly determining the other and by extension the overall behaviour of the system. Rather, agents and networks of relation co-evolve together and co-constitute one another as twin facets of a single reality. In this way the pitfalls of both methodological individualism (such as rational choice theory, which recognises no power of the environment in shaping the agent’s internal life) and various structuralist approaches (which reduce agents to empty vessels shaped by a totalising structure) can be avoided in favour of a more sophisticated account of agency and structure. Sawyer (2005) has provided a notable discussion of this perennial problem in social theory in the light of complexity, arguing for an ‘emergentist’ approach to sociology akin to that employed in the present article. All of the above poses significant challenges in the analysis of complex systems, particularly with regard to the question of causality, which needs to be recast accordingly. Indeed, when dealing with complex systems in which neither structure nor agency take precedence, in which the different constitutive parts are tightly interconnected and where borders with the broader environment are porous and ill-defined, it is largely futile to seek either to outline linear causal chains or to assign any final causality to a given phenomenon. Rather, one should strive to identify the points at which feedback loops both drive the emergence and maintain the coherence of such systems. Complexity theory thus suggests the need to move away from the search for covering laws towards what Tilly has called ‘mechanism-process’ accounts, with analyses that are historically sensitive and show how ‘initial conditions, sequences, and combinations of mechanisms concatenate into processes having explicable but variable overall outcomes’ (2008: 9).6 Such is the exercise that will be attempted, in however preliminary a fashion, in the following sections, starting with an account of the genesis and development of the most notorious of jihadist organisations.

Al-Qaeda as a complex adaptive system With the events of September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda almost instantly became a household name through the attribution of these spectacular and deadly

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attacks and the anticipation of follow-up operations. A label originally created for legal expediency, the term soon became a convenient shorthand for governments worldwide seeking to frame the authors of terrorist or guerrilla actions, or even any jihadist sympathisers or Islamic fundamentalists, as part of a unified arch-enemy in a global war on terror while simultaneously providing attention-grabbing headlines for media organisations trading on public anxiety over terrorism.7 Such careless labelling has consequently obscured much of the complex political and social context in which specific acts of violence have been committed and has contributed to spreading the early popular image of al-Qaeda as a coherent organisation centred on bin Laden and exporting terror across the globe. While it is not possible to dispense entirely with the term (if only because it has been picked up by jihadists themselves), a high degree of care must be exercised in the way it is employed, and due attention must be paid to the distinct yet overlapping significations that may legitimately accrue to it, namely as organisation, ideology and mode of operation. Likewise, although the term ‘network’ is now commonly affixed to any mention of al-Qaeda to signify its widespread extension and nebulous character, insufficient attention has been paid to the specificities of the network form. Indeed, it is only by probing the particular dynamics of networks, their interaction with their surrounding environment and the relationship between the whole and its parts that we can gain the fullest available insights from this conceptual tool. It will be argued here that it is by reference to the notion of complex adaptive systems as elaborated within complexity theory that we can most profitably develop such an understanding. In his seminal study of network society, Manuel Castells (2000: 51) defined a network-based social structure as ‘a highly dynamic, open system, susceptible to innovating without threatening its balance’. While Castells did not explicitly derive his ideas from a complexity-informed perspective, his definition of a network is a close match to that of complex adaptive systems and captures many of the features of contemporary jihadist networks.8 Indeed, viewing al-Qaeda as a complex adaptive system allows us to bring greater conceptual finesse to its characterisation as a network and to develop a deeper appreciation of its dynamics and potentialities. When combined with existing empirical evidence, the network that is al-Qaeda appears as one that is decentralised and polymorphous ‘with recursive operational and financial interrelationships dispersed geographically across numerous associated terrorist organisations that adapt, couple and aggregate in pursuit of common interests’ (Beech 2004). In accordance with complexity theory, it is through the interplay of autonomous entities cooperating and competing according to their locally bounded goals that interdependent relationships are formed and collective behaviour emerges

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rather than through a unique top-down chain of command-and-control. As Marion and Uhl-Bien (2003: 56) put it: Complex adaptive agents view organising as a bottom-up dynamic that is generated through interactive bonding among interdependent, need-seeking individuals, each of whom is driven by local (bounded) assessments of social and organisational events. This interactive dynamic can be described in terms of process theory in that it represents a series of causally linked events. Unlike most views of process theory, however, complex dynamics are recursive; they exhibit interdependent, multiway chains of causality, nonlinear behaviors, and multiple, often conflicting, feedback loops. The recursive aggregation process is too complex to be effectively controlled or determined by leaders. It may be influenced, however, by leaders who foster or enable the emergence of complex networks. This entails a careful reading of the history of al-Qaeda’s development and role in the jihadist movement, a reading that eschews placing too great an emphasis on bin Laden, al-Zawahiri or any of their close associates. In a sense, al-Qaeda as a formal terrorist organisation led by bin Laden can be said to have only truly existed between 1996 and 2001, predominantly based in Afghanistan. During this period, an organised group was formed, expanding from the dozen or so individuals who had sworn an oath of personal loyalty to bin Laden in 1988 at the end of the Afghan war against the Soviets to reach no more than between 50 and a hundred dedicated members (Burke 2004: 5). Beyond this hard core was a diffuse and shifting web of related jihadist groups more or less tightly connected to al-Qaeda and with no formalised hierarchical relation to it, bin Laden essentially limiting himself to encouraging ‘terror networks that arose spontaneously and locally with funding, training and sometimes weaponry’ (Sageman 2004: 41). For Burke (2004: 13), it is more apposite to view al-Qaeda in this period as akin to a venture-capitalism firm speculatively sponsoring projects submitted by a variety of groups or individuals within the jihadist constellation. Thus, bin Laden did not exert direct control on the networks or cells that came into contact with him but was able to facilitate their activities. According to Magnus Ranstorp, ‘the typical pattern before September 11th was of local al-Qaeda cells initiating reconnaissance of potential targets, planning and then going back to the al-Qaeda leadership for approval and possible funding. The foot soldiers are self-initiating and self-sustaining’ (Eggen and Dobbs 2002). Even where financial and logistical support was made available by the core, local cells planning operations generally had to supplement it with revenues from other sources, such as petty criminal activity or the use of Muslim charities as fronts for fundraising. The al-Qaeda of that period coalesced briefly from the broader and fluid jihadist movement, acting as a magnet for radicalised activists, before

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dissolving back into it in all but name after the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. It benefited during this time from bin Laden’s sizeable wealth, his growing reputation within the jihadist cause (ironically assisted by the United States’ very public attempts to kill him in the cruise missile attacks of 1998), as well as the rapprochement with the Taliban and their tolerance of the operation of jihadist training camps. For Marion and Uhl-Bien (2002), interactive non-linear bottom-up dynamics account for the self-organisation of al-Qaeda (understood in the broader sense) in which the bin Laden leadership is an emergent phenomenon: ‘leaders do not create the system but rather are created by it, through a process of aggregation and emergence’. Indeed, bin Laden and his close associates were only one group among many mujahedin veterans of the Afghan war against the Soviets, and it was only in the second half of the 1990s and their rapprochement with the Taliban that they emerged as dominant players in the jihadist movement. Post 9/11, of course, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri acquired de facto spiritual leadership of jihadist militancy, regardless of whether they were still in any meaningful sense operationally active or not within the global movement. To underline the diffuse networked character of the jihadist movement is of course not to presume that all actors are equally important within it. Castells (2000: 187) has observed that ‘nodes increase their importance for the network by absorbing more information and processing it more efficiently. The relative importance of nodes does not stem from its specific features but from its ability to contribute valuable information to the network’. Indeed, some nodes in the broad jihadist network are more connected than others and act as relays for communications or resources between different parts of the network — these are commonly designated as hubs — and from this centrality, they acquire the status of leaders. Around these hubs form clusters of densely connected individuals, often according to geographical proximity and cultural affiliation. Sageman (2004: 1389) distinguishes between the Core Arab (i.e. Middle Eastern), Maghreb Arab and South-East Asian clusters along with a Central Staff cluster that included bin Laden and his close associates (the ‘al-Qaeda hardcore’). All the network clusters appear to be highly decentralised and not reliant on any single hub, the only exception being the South-East Asian Jemaah Islamiyah, which seems to have had a formal hierarchical structure at least until 2003. Therefore, if leading individuals or groups are predominantly emergent from the bottom-up processes of self-organisation constitutive of jihadist networks, they can nonetheless play an important role in assisting the continued development of a decentralised movement, notably by resisting the urge to centralise control when doing so would not be operationally advantageous. This practice has been explicitly theorised by al-Qaeda strategists, most notably Abu Mus’ab al-Suri (real name Mustafa Setmariam

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Nasar), whose voluminous Call for a Global Islamic Resistance (2004) advocates a decentralised networked form of organisation for global jihad (‘leaderless resistance’ in his own words). Its benefits are clearly understood, as another jihadist strategist, Abu Ubayd al-Qurashi, has noted: America today is facing a huge problem with Clausewitz’s theories. The latter are premised on the existence of a centralised hostile power with a unified command. Assuredly, the mujahidin, with the al-Qaeda organisation in their vanguard, believe in decentralised organisations. Thus the enemy cannot ascertain the centre of gravity, let alone aim a mortal blow at it. (cited in Zabel 2007: 9) For Marion and Uhl-Bien (2003: 72), the great skill of the al-Qaeda leadership has therefore been to maintain and foster ‘a moderately coupled network, but one possessing internal structures that were loosely and tightly organised as appropriate’. The authors distinguish between loosely coupled networks in which the parts have functional independence, thus granting the system great resilience to large-scale perturbations, and tightly coupled networks in which the leadership imposes control mechanisms that enable it to direct activities and receive regular reports. In between these two poles, we find moderately coupled networks that allow some degree of directing by leadership but retain great resiliency. If the wider radical Islamic movement is only loosely coupled and individual terrorist cells are tightly coupled, the pre-9/11 al-Qaeda network sat somewhere in between, performing the function of a galvanising interface. This view is substantiated by Burke (2004: 216), who proposes a sliding scale on which to locate attacks depending on the degree of involvement of the al-Qaeda ‘hardcore’, ranging from plots imagined, planned and closely run by the core to those perpetrated by local groups broadly sympathetic to bin Laden’s aims but with at best tenuous links to him or his associates. Following September 11 and the subsequent global crackdown on al-Qaeda, the pattern of attacks has clearly shifted towards the latter end of the spectrum. Jordan and Horsburgh (2005: 182) point out that it is easier to discuss jihadist networks linked to concrete individuals because the members of such networks ‘do not have an abstract idea of the organisation that transcends loyalty and interpersonal ties’. The authors point to the limited importance attached to the names of groups by their members: groups operating in Spain seem to have used a variety of names in public communications and have paid little attention to their denomination in their own internal communications. Furthermore, simultaneous membership and allegiance to several networks by individuals is common, suggesting that interpersonal relationships and a sense of adherence to the broad ideals of jihad matter more than conforming to any formal organisational structure in which roles can be abstracted from the

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personalities that fulfil them. These observations apply equally well to al-Qaeda proper since the term was used infrequently and inconsistently by bin Laden and his associates until it began gaining currency in the West. Indeed, in such fluid self-organising collectives, roles rarely tend to be fixed or clearly defined, changing according to immediate needs and requirements. Conversely, the entry into a network of a new member with specific skills, characteristics and outlooks can also bring about a significant change in the behaviour and patterns of organisation of the entire network. Stadler (2006: 189) has made the general observation that, in a network, ‘the value of each node is not intrinsic to the node but stems from its relation to the overall project, which, in turn, is shaped by the actions of the various nodes’. In other words, the parts and the whole define one another. This is in contrast with a hierarchy, in which the whole defines the parts, that is, where individuals are assigned roles within a pre-determined formal organisational structure such as the Weberian rationalised bureaucracy. Studies within complexity theory have shown that decentralised networks tend to be highly resilient and possess a marked capacity for recovering from external shocks and disruption. In contrast, hierarchical structures are much more vulnerable to a decapitation strike that will leave them leaderless and unable to mount substantial operations. This is not to say that some networks cannot be permanently disrupted or disabled by the removal of certain key members who act as hubs and may possess particular skills or aptitudes. Nonetheless, jihadist networks have, in several instances, demonstrated a remarkable ability to regenerate and self-organise even after the destruction of significant nodes, although the speed and ease with which they are able to do this is dependent upon how conducive to recruitment the ambient milieu of the network is. In Spain, the network centring on Abu Dahdah, a Syrian-born Spaniard with connections to senior jihadist figures, suffered over 20 arrests in the aftermath of September 11, including that of Dahdah himself. Within 2 years, a new network, which counted members of the Abu Dahbah network who had escaped arrest and individuals from other jihadist groups to whom the original network had connections, had emerged and was able to carry out the 2004 train bombings in Madrid.9 Burke (2004: 272) likewise insists on the local self-organisation of the Madrid bomb cell that ‘grew out of highly informal circles of militants in the Maghreb and southwest Europe’ and lacked any tangible link to the al-Qaeda leadership. There are of course drawbacks to the decentralised network form, which, according to Fallon and Henkes (2007), include problems of legitimacy, weakness of secrecy and trust, and limited command-and-control. These should not be underestimated, and the failure to repeat attacks on the scale of September 11 despite the stated aim of doing so, notably through the acquisition of chemical, biological or radiological weapons, could be seen as

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evidence of such weaknesses thwarting jihadist ambitions. At the same time, the weakness of command-and-control is not necessarily seen as problematic by jihadist groups in the way they might be by various violent revolutionary and nationalist organisations. Al-Qaeda has never shown any sustained interest in either directly seizing state power or putting forward clear and consistent demands liable to be a basis for political negotiations, both of which entail the establishment of state-like hierarchical structures and centralised control over the exercise of violence.10 For Devji (2005: 3), al-Qaeda has to be understood as operating beyond the ‘politics of control’: ‘the actions of this jihad, while they are indeed meant to accomplish certain ends, have become more ethical than political in nature, since they have resigned control over their own effects, thus becoming gestures of duty or risk rather than acts of instrumentality properly speaking’. Therefore, if the organisational form of al-Qaeda may have been partly imposed upon it by external conditions, Devji’s reading of jihadist ideology does also account for why it has been seemingly so willing to renounce the command-and-control that more instrumentally minded agents of political violence have been much more reluctant to forsake. But if the command-and-control that is generally associated with military or paramilitary operations is largely lacking, it remains for us to explain how such loose and relatively ill-funded and ill-equipped networks have been able to carry out an attack as spectacular as September 11 while evading the extensive machineries of state surveillance. In fact, as we shall now see, what such organisations lack in resources and command structures, they make up in flexibility and creativity; complexity theory can here again provide powerful insights into the processes that may be at work.

The jihadist swarm: networks of distributed intelligence If an account of the emergent self-organisation of jihadist networks can be derived from complexity theory, it can also be profitably recruited to explain how specific operations are carried out and creative responses to unforeseen challenges are produced. Indeed, the polymorphous and acentred character of these networks not only grants them great resilience and capacity for selforganisation; it also affords them a high degree of adaptability and innovation when pursuing their specific objectives. Complexity scientist Stuart Kauffman (1995: 26) tells us that ‘networks in the regime near the edge of chaos — this compromise between order and surprise — appear best able to coordinate complex activities and best able to evolve as well’.11 A further conceptual figure drawn from complexity, which has not been mentioned until now, can shed particular light here: that of the swarm.

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Through a combination of observation and simulation, complexity theory has contributed to illuminating the behaviour of animal swarms, packs and flocks by uncovering the networks of distributed intelligence that enable bees, ants, birds and other creatures to evolve complex forms of collective behaviour on the basis of their individual members’ simple rules of interaction. Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2000: 48) describe this research as follows: This theoretical and experimental work usually depicts swarming as a system in which autonomous agents interact and move around according to a set of rules and a schedule, often seeking an optimal outcome vis-a`-vis another agent, set of agents, or environmental feature. The modelling allows for continual interactions among the agents, as they form and reform in fluid, shifting networks (and maybe hierarchies as well). These networks may persist for some time, or may break down and recombine into others opportunistically. Information may flow quite freely from one agent to the next about conditions near them in the model, but, in the examples we have seen, there is rarely an identifiable distribution of, or hub for distributing, topsight among all the agents. Within a complexity-informed perspective, the focus of analysis must be on the pattern and nature of interactions between actors or agents, so that one can trace the new systemic properties that can emerge and that may subsequently modify the very behaviour of individual agents. As Marion and Uhl-Bien (2003: 56) put it, ‘knowledge — the source of innovation, emergence, and structure — is not the property of individuals or groups but rather emerges out of interactions’. This has important implications for how we view social organisation. Kevin Kelly (1994: 27) contrasts the clock model, whereby ‘you construct a system as a long string of sequential operations’, with the swarm model, ‘systems ordered as a patchwork of parallel operations’ where, in the absence of a chain of command, ‘what emerges from the collective is not a series of critical individual actions but a multitude of simultaneous actions whose collective pattern is more important’. These two models constitute for Kelly the two theoretical poles of organisation and offer a trade-off between control and predictability on the one hand and adaptability and resilience on the other, with real-life systems lying somewhere in between these two poles. The fluidity of swarms allows these forms of social organisation to adapt more rapidly and effectively to the unforeseen. When discussing ant colonies, Nicolis and Prigogine (1989: 233) argue that: [a] permanent structure in an unpredictable environment may well compromise the adaptability of the colony and bring it to a suboptimal

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regime. A possible reaction toward such an environment is to maintain a high rate of exploration and the ability to rapidly develop temporary structures suitable for taking advantage of any favourable occasion that might arise. For example, despite the limited perceptive and cognitive apparatus of the single ant, a colony can identify rapidly the shortest route across a rugged landscape through the process of distributed computing, which the interaction of its members can be thought of as embodying. When faced with an unfamiliar environment, a large number of ants will be tasked with exploring the terrain and progressively accumulating knowledge of it, which will produce an optimal pattern of behaviour that percolates through the colony. This is achieved by the secretion of pheromones, which serve to communicate between colony members and act as markers deposited on the landscape being explored — ‘pheromones can be thought of as information broadcasted or communicated within the ant system’ (Kelly 1994). In this manner, tiny pieces of local knowledge acquired by individual ants combine to constitute the emergent global knowledge that characterises the colony as a whole and yet is never immediately present to any of its members. The sheer number of ants allows for a process of computational trial and error, which enables the colony to evolve the optimal solution to any problem and grants it an ability to respond creatively to unforeseen situations. This distributed form of computing and the types of benefits that accrue from it are deemed to be common to all complex adaptive systems. Now, there are obviously clear differences between ant colonies and human societies, the enumeration of which is hardly necessary. However, what the analogical reference to the former permits is the identification of certain mechanisms by which organisational coherence and creative adaptive behaviour can be generated without top-down oversight and commandand-control. Indeed, this section will argue that al-Qaeda can be said to have successfully constituted a distributed intelligence network that has ‘enabled creativity and innovation on a large scale (such as that needed to pull off the 9/11 events), and helped assure the broadly based viability of the system’ in an environment largely shaped by counter-terrorist measures (Marion and Uhl-Bien 2003: 72). Sageman’s (2004: 165) own empirically rich account of the manner in which jihadist networks carry out operations substantiates this claim: When a terrorist network embarks on a major new operation, the people involved do not know exactly how they are going to do it. No role is specified in advance. Each mujaheed starts with a general notion of what is required of him and improvises with other mujaheed as he goes along. Terrorist operations are not so frequent that they become routine, for law

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enforcement forces would then catch on and be able to prevent them. These operations involve much uncertainty and many unanticipated obstacles. The state of affairs requires communication among mutually dependent mujahedin, in the sense that each possesses information and resources relevant to the other and none has enough to act in isolation. At this local level, the mujahedin form a network of information processors, where the network handles large volumes of information efficiently without overloading any individual processor y Communications are possible horizontally among multiple nodes, allowing them to solve their problems locally without having to refer up to Central Staff and overwhelming the vertical links of communication. It is therefore through a form of parallel processing that jihadists find their way towards a solution to the organisational and logistical challenges of fulfilling a designated mission and collective behaviour emerges without direction from a hierarchy. One way of thinking of jihadist networks is as communities of practice, ‘emergent groups in which knowledge is concentrated around common problems and interests, and the core competencies of an organisation are shared and developed’ (Vos Fellman and Wright 2003), and certainly there is evidence that they are understood as such by the participants. According to FBI investigators, Khalfan Khamis Muhamed, one of the suspected bombers of the East African embassies in 1998, spoke of al-Qaeda as a ‘formula system’ for what they had carried out. In 2000, the aforementioned al-Suri had insisted that ‘al-Qaeda is not an organisation, it is not a group, nor do we want it to be. It is a call, a reference, a methodology’ (Wright 2006). Thus the phrase ‘al-Qaeda’ describes above all ‘a function or a tactic, not an entity’ (Burke 2004: 7). Decentralised self-organising systems are also better equipped than centralised systems to deal with conditions of contingency and limited predictability. For complexity theorist Christopher Langton, ‘since it’s effectively impossible to cover every conceivable situation, top-down systems are forever running into combinations of events they don’t know how to handle. They tend to be touchy and fragile, and they all too often grind to a halt in a dither of indecision’ (Waldrop 1992: 279). In contrast, decentralised systems of quasi-autonomous units can operate more effectively and with a greater degree of adaptability through a form of parallel computing on the basis of agents’ local calculations. Again, Sageman’s study of terrorist networks yields similar observations: ‘in an operating terrorist hierarchy, the uneven burden of information processing jams the chain of command. Central staffers who try to micromanage will become over-burdened and ineffective in dealing with unanticipated obstacles’ (2004: 165). In addition, the parcelised character of knowledge within a decentralised terrorist network reduces the

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probability that the arrest or state surveillance of any single member will reveal the full extent of the composition or details of any given network or plot. Even in the case of the September 11 attacks, it has become increasingly clear that the planning and execution of the operation were far more decentralised than initially supposed. The different cells in the plot, although tightly coupled internally, functioned quasi-autonomously, and although they received some financial, logistical and training support from other parts of the organisation, were not exclusively dependent on them. Much of the detail of the plot and the prior implantation in the United States was left up to the individual cells, allowing them to deal with any of the inevitable contingencies that would arise as they saw fit. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, said to be the operational ‘mastermind’ behind September 11 (a designation that, although commonly used in the media, is problematic as it suggests highly centralised planning and control) and now in American military custody, is alleged to have claimed that ‘the final decisions to hit which target with which plane was entirely in the hands of the pilots’ (United States v. Mouassaoui 2006). Sheikh Mohammed was only then subsequently informed of their decision in July 2001. According to this same testimony, bin Laden and the high ranks of the al-Qaeda organisation were also only very loosely informed of specific details and had a very limited directing role. Many of bin Laden’s close associates were never even made aware of the plot. This form of organisational and operational structure is one that is particularly alien to Western states and their hierarchical military and security apparatuses, as Mohammed himself recognises: ‘I know that the materialistic Western mind cannot grasp the idea, and it is difficult for them to believe that the high officials in al-Qaeda do not know about operations carried out by its operatives, but this is how it works’ (ibid.).12 In the Hamburg cell that included three of the four pilots of the 9/11 attacks (Mohammed Atta, Ziad Jarrah and Marwan al-Shehhi), the individuals who composed it met for the first time in Germany through a network of acquaintances and mutual friends gravitating around a radical Hamburg mosque, the al-Quds, where they became committed to active participation in the jihadist cause. Initially intent on fighting in Chechnya, the men found their way to the Afghan training camps in November 1999 where they met bin Laden. According to German investigators, the group had already formulated at the time of travel the plan to ‘commit assassinations by means of aircraft attacks’ and had made the trip ‘in order to talk about the details with the persons responsible of the international network and to secure financial and logistic support’ (Burke 2004: 244). In this account, the essence of the plans for what became the September 11 attacks originated from a cell that had independently coalesced in the radicalised milieu surrounding a Hamburg mosque, a cell that was initially completely autonomous from bin Laden and his associates and only sought their help subsequently for training and finance.

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While this specific version has been contested by other foreign intelligence agencies, such a narrative is certainly not inconsistent with other known patterns of jihadist organisation. Sageman also observes that innovations are more likely to occur in network nodes than in hubs because of their greater number. If innovations then appeal to hubs, it will likely spread rapidly to other nodes. The idea of using airplanes as weapons predated any specific planning for September 11 as it is said to have originated from the airline pilot Abdul Hakim Murad, who was introduced by childhood friend Ramzi Yousef, one of the conspirators behind the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, to his uncle Sheikh Mohammed (Sageman 2004: 164). If this account this time places greater onus for planning the September 11 attacks on Mohammed and the al-Qaeda core, it nonetheless underlines how ideas or tactics can diffuse from the periphery of the network towards its central hubs and percolate back out. If the network form of organisation is not strictly dependent upon modern information and communication technologies such as the Internet, their role in facilitating the emergence and operation of jihadist networks that extend across the globe cannot be understated. Beyond its role in communicating the jihadist message to a wider audience and potentially drawing sympathisers into the orbit of militancy, the Internet can be seen to serve three main purposes among active participants. First, it maintains their connection to the wider cause through both access to jihadist propaganda and interpersonal communications with other like-minded individuals, ensuring that their motivation, commitment and sense of belonging are sustained even if they become temporarily geographically isolated. Second, it allows the sharing of knowledge regarding the methods and tactics to adopt, notably concerning the means to avoid detection in the face of heightened state efforts to track and break up networks. Lastly, it can be used to liaise directly for the coordination of operations, although the most sensitive communications are likely to be kept offline as much as possible to avoid eavesdropping. In practice, face-to-face interactions with their peers are likely to remain the strongest links connecting individuals to the jihadist movement, but the Internet does provide a unique channel for the rapid diffusion and discussion of ideas that can thereby flow between geographically remote elements of jihadist militancy, thus allowing for the rapid development and emulation of novel responses to changes in counterterrorism practices or the geopolitical environment. In conclusion to this section on the jihadist swarm, it is necessary to note that alongside the aforementioned benefits that accrue to this mode of operations come also significant drawbacks. In addition to the general problems of control previously discussed, the cost of distributed intelligence and the autonomous exploration of the security landscape by jihadist cells is the high probability of failure and ineffectiveness of individual cells. In order

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for the collective production of emergent knowledge to occur, a high degree of trial and error in the conduct of operations is required. Thus numerous cells will inevitably prove unable to mount any substantial operations or will be intercepted or infiltrated by state security forces while others will see those plots they attempt to carry out fail through technical malfunction, general amateurishness or simple misfortune. From the 2000 Millennium plots and attempted 21 July, 2005 London bombings to the 2006 German train bombing plot and 2010 Times Square car bombing attempt, the vast majority of terror plots end in failure for the conspirators. Furthermore, a successful plot such as that of September 11 will almost certainly bring about a number of security responses that will make the methodology employed unlikely to succeed again. Therefore, it is only collectively that the swarm most clearly demonstrates its superior adaptability and creativity, the failures of past cells laying the ground for the success of future ones. But precisely because the foiling or failure of any individual plot does not by itself endanger the decentralised jihadist movement as a whole, it is able to remain a durable and credible threat as long as it is can count on fresh recruits to replace the militants it has lost. As has been often observed, the few plots that do succeed overshadow the many more that do not, whether in terms of media coverage, symbolic impact or political ramifications.

Conclusion A decade into the proclaimed ‘Global War on Terror’, and despite the absence of any repeat attacks on the scale of September 11, the global jihadist movement remains a dynamic and potent threat that still ranks highly in the priorities of intelligence and security agencies worldwide. If al-Qaeda has suffered the loss of its host state of Afghanistan, a global crackdown on its financial sources, the arrest or death of many its core members and the restriction of movements and communications of its remaining cadres, it remains a powerful symbol for the jihadist movement at large. Endowed with an authority and prestige that enabled it to claim responsibility for major attacks in Madrid and London despite scant evidence of logistical or organisational connections to the responsible cells,13 al-Qaeda’s leadership has in a sense blended back into the loosely connected radical Islamic movement while giving a name and a face to the fluid and amorphous networks that compose it and crystallise at certain points to carry out violent actions — both for the West, which tends to see al-Qaeda at every turn, and for aspiring militants, who see it as a model to follow. For Sageman (2008: 143), we are now in presence of ‘leaderless jihad’ as the ‘natural outcome of a bottom-up mechanism of group formation in a specific environment shaped by top-down counterterrorist strategy’.14

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This article has argued that complexity theory offers the best resources to substantiate such claims theoretically by outlining a set of concepts and operational mechanisms that can plausibly account for the organisation and operation of such a leaderless jihad. These include such notions as networks, emergence, complex adaptive systems and distributed intelligence, which have all been applied to some of the most well-read empirical accounts of al-Qaeda and the wider jihadist movement. Clearly, much research still remains to be done in this area, both in determining how ideas derived primarily from the physical and natural sciences may have to be adapted and amended in their application to the social world, as well as empirically verifying and validating the intuitions presented here. It may well be that subsequent evidence shows a greater degree of centralisation than has been presumed here, but this in itself would not constitute an objection to the present argument. One should certainly resist using notions derived from complexity to essentialise al-Qaeda or jihadist groups as decentralised networks devoid of any hierarchical structures. It is certain that, in practice, all social groupings display both hierarchical and distributed patterns of organisation, the proportions, interplay and dialogic developments of which can only be ascertained empirically.15 This article’s purpose has not been to prove that Sageman’s thesis of ‘leaderless jihad’ is correct but rather to show how it could be and to clarify the types of mechanisms that may be at play. Regardless of the subsequent amendments that we may need to make to our continually evolving picture of jihadist militancy, we will nonetheless in all likelihood continue to require an understanding of the role played by dynamics of self-organisation and decentralised operations. Such processes have generally been poorly understood in the social sciences as a whole, not least in the state-centric discipline of International Relations, and if the remedial potential of insights garnered from complexity theory far exceeds the study of international terrorism, it certainly provides a highly apposite field of application.

Acknowledgements I would like to thank Simon Curtis and the anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful comments and helpful suggestions in response to earlier versions of this article, along with the editorial team of the Journal of International Relations and Development for their diligence and valuable guidance throughout the review process.

Notes 1 A range of texts can be referred to for a non-technical introduction to complexity theory and non-linear science, among which are Prigogine and Stengers (1985), Prigogine (1996), Lewin (1992), Waldrop (1992), Capra (1996), Stewart (2002) and Gleick (1987). Taylor (2001) provides a stimulating reflection on the wider social and cultural ‘moment of complexity’.

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365 2 See Bousquet and Curtis (2011) for a more detailed argument for the value of complexity theory as a social ontology for the reinvigoration of systems thinking in the study of global politics. The early pioneering attempts to apply complexity to International Relations include such seminal works as those of Rosenau (1990) and Jervis (1997). For the computational approach of agentbased modelling, see Marchi and Page (2008) and Geller (2011). 3 For further accounts of the growing influence of complexity theory in the theories and practices of war, and notably within the US military, see Bousquet (2008, 2009). 4 This is in contrast with the fundamental assumption underpinning the tradition of Western science, according to which ‘you don’t have to take into account the falling of a leaf on some planet in another galaxy when you’re trying to account for the motion of a billiard ball on a pool table on earth. Very small influences can be neglected. There’s a convergence in the way things work, and arbitrarily small influences don’t blow up to have arbitrarily large effects’ (Gleick 1987: 15). 5 In contrast, negative feedback counters perturbations and preserves the stability of a system through recursive loops. Negative feedback was at the heart of cybernetics, an early precursor of complexity theory that studied the stabilising homeostatic mechanisms common to living beings and machines (as embodied in thermostats, self-guided missiles, or animal metabolism). While shifting their focus to the productive effects of positive feedback (until then essentially viewed as entirely destructive), complexity scientists do still see negative feedback as complementary in moderating run-away processes of change. In practice, most if not all living systems will display both types of feedback. The seminal formulation of cybernetics remains Norbert Wiener’s Cybernetics or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine (1949). 6 Peter Hedstro¨m (2005: 25) likewise argues against covering laws and in favour of a mechanismbased approach within which a social mechanism describes ‘a constellation of entities and activities that are organised such that they regularly bring about a particular type of outcome’. I do not however share his commitment to methodological individualism, nor do I believe it to be a logical correlate of a mechanistic approach. 7 The notion of a coherent organisation called al-Qaeda first emerged during the FBI-led investigation into the bombing of the African embassies in 1998. For legal reasons, it was convenient to claim that suspected individuals were members of an organisation in order to facilitate their prosecution. This was due to reliance on a legal framework originally set up to deal with mafia-like criminal enterprises. 8 Stadler (2006: 1705) convincingly argues for the direct influence that complexity theorists such as Fritjof Capra had on Castells during his time at Berkeley. 9 A similar story can be told regarding the Algerian network dismantled in Spain in 2004, which had formed from the remnants of previous GIA (Groupe Islamique Arme´) networks (Jordan and Horsburgh 2005: 183). 10 Al-Qaeda has at different times called for the removal of US troops from Saudi Arabia, the retreat of Western influence in the Middle East, and the resolution of the Israel–Palestine conflict, but these appear either essentially opportunistic or just facets of the broader jihadist aspiration to a global Islamic revival rather than substantive demands that might prompt a cessation of the call to jihad upon being acceded to. It is particularly noteworthy that Hamas, a violent Islamist group with clear political and territorial demands, has consistently shunned al-Qaeda. 11 For complexity theorists, the key characteristic of life and its unique capacity for creativity and adaptability is that it lies in between highly ordered structures, which are resilient but unable to alter their internal organisation or their external behaviour (minerals, for example), and chaotic systems, whether non-linearly determined or stochastic, which are too fluid and transient to generate any enduring forms (such as particles within a gas).

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366 12 This does not however mean that Western states have no past experience of dealing with such decentralised modes of operation or that there is anything specifically non-Western about them. As noted by one of the anonymous reviewers, similarly decentralised operational practices were implemented from 1977 by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) to minimise the risk of police and military disruption of individual cells. Nevertheless, in comparison with al-Qaeda, the IRA arguably maintained a clearer command structure above the cell level along with an association with a political party legitimately contesting elections. 13 See ‘Madrid Bombing Probe Finds No al-Qaeda Link’, MSNBC.com, 9 March, 2006, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11753547/from/RL.1/ (accessed 15 March, 2010); and ‘Leak Reveals Official Story of London Bombings’, The Guardian, 9 April, 2006, available at http://politics.guardian.co.uk/labour/story/0,,1750264,00.html (accessed 15 March, 2010). Reports of a known terrorist mastermind entering and leaving the UK just before the 7/7 bombings or of any tangible connection to senior al-Qaeda figures have proven so far unfounded. For one police source, ‘All the talk about “Mr Bigs” and al-Qaeda masterminds looks like something from a film script at the moment. Of course, things could change if new intelligence comes through, but it looks increasingly as if these people were largely working on their own. It is not something we expected’ (Phythian 2005: 370). However, contact with jihadist figures and some form of operational training may have occurred when two of the bombers (Siddeque Khan and Shazad Tanweer) went to Pakistan between November 2004 and February 2005 (Intelligence and Security Committee 2006). 14 One anonymous reviewer correctly points out the need also to consider the role that state agencies may play in supporting certain militant groups for their own ends, in the way the CIA did with the mujahedin during the Soviet War in Afghanistan, or how parts of the Pakistan ISI probably do to this day. This does not fundamentally alter the analysis, however, but suggests the need for further detail in the examination of the multifarious relationships jihadists entertain with their environment and the other actors within it. 15 Edgar Morin (1977: 80) uses the term ‘dialogic’ to encapsulate the simultaneous competition, antagonism and complementarity of distinct logics, here those of hierarchy and network. A close parallel can be drawn to Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of their concepts of ‘tree’ and ‘rhizome’ and the relation between them (1987). There is not the space here to develop this argument in greater depth, but it is worth noting the influence of precursor sciences to complexity on the thought of Deleuze and Guattari, the interface of which has been subsequently developed by DeLanda (2004, 2006) and Bonta and Protevi (2006).

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About the Author Antoine Bousquet is a lecturer in International Relations at Birkbeck, University of London. His research interests include political and social theory, war and political violence, and the history and philosophy of science and technology. He is the author of The Scientific Way of Warfare: Order and Chaos on the Battlefields of Modernity (Hurst and Columbia University Press, 2009) and has contributed recent articles to International Affairs, Cold War History, The Cambridge Review of International Affairs and Millennium: Journal of International Studies.