Phenom Cogn Sci (2012) 11:79–94 DOI 10.1007/s11097-011-9230-2

Embodied technology and the dangers of using the phone while driving Robert Rosenberger

Published online: 15 October 2011 # Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Abstract Contemporary scientific research and public policy are not in agreement over what should be done to address the dangers that result from the drop in driving performance that occurs as a driver talks on a cellular phone. One response to this threat to traffic safety has been the banning in a number of countries and some states in the USA of handheld cell phone use while driving. However, research shows that the use of hands-free phones (such as headsets and dashboard-mounted speakers) also accompanies a drop, leading some to recommend regulation of both kinds of mobile phones. In what follows, I draw out the accounts of the driving impairment associated with phone use implicit in research and policy and develop an alternative account grounded in philosophical considerations. Building on work in a school of thought called postphenomenology, I review and expand concepts useful for articulating human bodily and perceptual relations to technology. By applying these ideas to the case of driving while talking on the phone, I offer an account of the drop in driving performance which focuses on the embodied relationships users develop with the car and the phone, and I consider implications for research and policy. Keywords Cellular phone . Driver distraction . Traffic safety . Postphenomenology . Field composition . Sedimentation

Introduction Scientific research and everyday experience indicate that the use of a cellular phone has the potential to be a significant distraction to one who is driving a car. The task of using the phone is understood to be a draw on driver attention, reducing a driver’s ability to concentrate on the road. However, as I explore later, there is disagreement between the trend in public policy and the scientific research on how these issues R. Rosenberger (*) Georgia Institute of Technology, School of Public Policy, DM Smith Building, 685 Cherry St., Atlanta, GA 30332, USA e-mail: [email protected]

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should be addressed. At the bottom of this disagreement are conflicting understandings of precisely how it is that cell phone use causes driving impairment. It is on this issue that insights from the philosophical tradition of phenomenology can be productively applied. I develop an alternative account of the phenomena of the drop in driving performance associated with cell phone use which at once challenges the central assumptions behind scientific accounts and at the same time remains consistent with research findings. The growing concern over these issues can be seen in the recent establishment of a number of state laws in the USA.1 For example, more than 30 states have enacted bans on sending “text messages” while driving. Sending a text message (or SMS, Short Message Service) involves typing a short communication into a cellular phone, and more and more both government and industry appear to see “texting” to be incompatible with the demands of safe driving.2 That is, the act of texting is taken to distract a driver from the crucial task of paying close attention to the road. Though there is not the same general consensus on the issue of talking on a cell phone while driving, the beginnings of a trend can be seen in the regulation of handheld phones while driving. Currently eight states in the USA have enacted bans on the use of a handheld phone while behind the wheel of a car, following the lead of nationwide bans in a number of countries around the world. No states, however, yet ban the use of hands-free cell phones, such as headsets or dashboard-mounted speakers.3 As I review later, scientific research instead finds significant impairment to occur regardless of whether the driver talks on a handheld or hands-free phone. Scientists have developed general accounts of how this impairment occurs. These accounts tend to rest on an understanding of the limited capacity of the human brain to divide attention between multiple tasks. In what follows, I review this scientific research and develop an alternative account of the data. My contrasting understanding of why both handheld and hands-free cell phone use results in driving impairment is based on insights from the history of philosophy. This analysis builds on ideas developed in a tradition of philosophy called phenomenology. Put generally, phenomenologists provide descriptions of the most basic elements of human experience. I build in particular on a contemporary school of thought called “postphenomenology.” Postphenomenology represents the efforts of an international and interdisciplinary collective of scholars whose work overlaps upon several themes. These include the endeavor to describe human relationships with technology, a focus on concrete case studies of technologies, and a basis in the work of phenomenologist Don Ihde.4 Though the concepts of the postphenomenological framework provide a basis for my analysis later, I claim that they require expansion if they are to capture the most salient aspects of phone use. 1

See www.distraction.gov/state-laws. For example, despite remaining neutral on the issue of talking on the phone while driving, the official position of The International Association of for the Wireless Telecommunications Industry (CITA) is in favor of the regulation of texting while driving. See www.ctia.org/advocacy/policy_topics/topic.cfm/TID/ 17. 3 Information on the regulation of cell phone use while driving, both in terms of countrywide laws and statewide laws in the USA, can be found at www.cellular-news/car_bans. 4 For introductions to postphenomenology see, e.g., Verbeek (2005); Ihde (2009); Rosenberger 2009; and the 2008, 31(1) special issue of the journal Human Studies. 2

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I begin with a review of the scientific research on driving while using the phone. In “The phenomenology of technology: an expansion”, I introduce the postphenomenological framework and develop the further concepts this project requires. In “The experience of the phone, the experience of driving”, the experiences of phone use and of driving a car are given phenomenological description. In “An alternative theory of cell-driving”, I put forward my phenomenological account of using the phone while driving and draw contrasts to the general accounts which can be abstracted from the scientific research and public policy.

Cell-driving research Scientific research shows that the act of talking on a telephone while behind the wheel of a car is accompanied by significant impairment to one’s driving performance. As David Strayer and his colleagues summarize, “With respect of traffic safety, the data suggest that the impairments associated with cell phone drivers may be as great as those commonly observed with intoxicated drivers” (Strayer et al. 2006). But the study of driving while talking on a phone (or “cell-driving” as I refer to it here) is challenging work. An ideal investigative strategy would be to observe cell-driving under normal real-world road conditions, but this ideal is difficult to realize. Researchers cannot simply ask participants to engage in cell-driving on real highways and then observe the actual danger that may occur to participants and bystanders. It would also be difficult in this ideal scenario to control for all the relevant variables. In the face of these challenges, researchers have developed creative and effective investigative methods, conducting epidemiological studies, developing on-road and test-track experiments, performing naturalistic video studies of drivers, and constructing computerized driving simulations. In epidemiological studies of cell-driving, statistics are gathered on cell phone use, driving, and a variety of accident and police report data (e.g., Viotani and Marshall 1996; Redelmeier and Tibshirani 1997; Sagberg 2001; Laberge-Nadeau et al. 2003; McEvoy et al. 2005). The most influential of these is likely the study by Redelmeier and Tibshirani (1997) of mobile phone billing records and non-fatal accidents in Toronto. Their findings indicate that cell-driving presents a risk of accident four times greater than that of driving without talking on the phone. McEvoy et al. (2005) report a similar increase in risk based on their study of phone records and hospital interviews of drivers involved in traffic accidents. Another general line of research involves the observation of drivers’ behavior while behind the wheel of an actual car. One version of this strategy involves analyzing cell-driving tasks in areas safely secluded from real-world traffic, such as test tracks (e.g., Brookhuis et al. 1991; Hancock et al. 2003; Treffner and Barrett 2004). Observable behaviors include breaking distances, speed control, reaction rates, lane maintenance, and eye-tracking information. In some cases, researchers are even able to conduct experiments on stretches of real-world roadways (e.g., Parkes 1991; Lamble et al. 1999; Liu and Lee 2005; Patten et al. 2004; Crundall et al. 2005; Rosenbloom 2006). In a study conducted by Patten et al. (2004), the effects of cell phone use on the performance of professional taxi drivers was observed as they traversed a stretch of European International Highway no. 4. In contrast to these

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studies in which driver behaviors are observed by researchers in person, “naturalistic” observations are also made in which video cameras are placed in cars to observe drivers in their everyday lives (Stutts et al. 2003; Mazzae et al. 2005; Virginia Tech Transportation Institute 2005). A third strategy, increasingly widely used, is the development of driving simulations to investigate various cell-driving conditions (e.g., Alm and Nillson 1994, 1995; Haigney et al. 2000; Strayer and Johnston 2001; Consiglio et al. 2003; Hunton and Rose 2005; Jamson and Merat 2005; Shinar et al. 2005; Törnros and Bolling 2005; Strayer et al. 2006; Törnros and Bolling 2006; Beede and Kass 2006; Horberry et al. 2006; Strayer and Drews 2007; Drews et al. 2008; Cooper and Strayer 2008; Charlton 2009). The more advanced and increasingly more common versions of simulation include an actual car dashboard, steering wheel, pedals, and driver’s seat in front of multiple screens (e.g., Fig. 1). A version has even been developed in which fMRI brain scans are taken while the driver experiences the simulated environment (Just et al. 2008). While this mode of investigation raises its own case-specific issues on the degree to which reality is captured by the simulation, it presents distinct advantages in the number of runs and the control of variables possible. This body of work is expansive enough to be the subject of meta-analyses which attempt to abstract general claims (e.g., Horrey and Wickens 2004; McCartt et al. 2006; Caird et al. 2008; Ishigami and Klein 2009). For example, McCartt et al. (2006) analyze more than 120 different experimental studies conducted through the variety of research strategies reviewed previously. A specific issue addressed by much of this research is whether the use of a handsfree cell phone correlates to the same driving impairment as does the use of a handheld phone. Research findings in general do not report a significant difference; hands-free phone use is also associated with a significant drop in driving performance. Based on their meta-analysis of the data, Ishigami and Klein (2009, 169) offer the following generalization, “Experimental studies across a wide range of driving fidelity demonstrate that talking on a phone, regardless of the phone type, has negative impacts on detecting and identifying events”. These results are robust across a variety of variables. For example, evidence is emerging that the drop in performance associated with cell phone conversation is not associated with conversation with someone in the passenger seat (e.g., Strayer and Drews 2007; Drews et al. 2008; Charlton 2009). These data pit the scientific research findings against the policy trend in which only handheld cell phone use is subject to regulation. A clear implication of these Fig. 1 Participant using a hands-free phone device in the PatrolSim driving simulator (Cooper and Strayer 2008, 895; Image courtesy of David Strayer)

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data appears to be that the regulation of only handheld cell phones would address only part of the problem. Indeed, the outlaw of only handheld phones may produce negative side effects. McCartt et al. (2006, 101) reason, “Handheld phone laws also may convey a message to drivers that hands-free phones are safe, which is counter to the preponderance of evidence.” The suggestion is that the banning of only handheld phones while driving, despite discouraging one type of unsafe driving practice, could have the additional effect of actually encouraging another unsafe practice, that is, driving while using a hands-free phone. A constitutive feature of the dispute between the public policy and the scientific research is their conflicting accounts of how cell phone use may cause driving impairment. In “An alternative theory of cell-driving”, I attempt to spell out the reasoning involved in both of these accounts. I also offer an alternative account based on the phenomenological reflections on phone use and on driving developed in sections “The phenomenology of technology: an expansion and The experience of the phone, the experience of driving”.

The phenomenology of technology: an expansion The tradition of phenomenology addresses philosophical questions through the careful description and analysis of human experience itself. This can at times facilitate the identification and conceptualization of issues that go otherwise unrecognized in established discussions.5 I review notions central to a school of thought called postphenomenology developed by Don Ihde and others and advance further concepts necessary for using this framework to describe the most salient aspects of the tasks of driving and of talking on the telephone. In the postphenomenological perspective, a technology is conceived as an artifact which comes between a user and the world, transforming the relationship between them. A technology plays a mediating role; it transforms a user’s abilities to perceive or act upon the world. One kind of mediation is what Ihde calls an embodiment relation. Building explicitly on the accounts of classical phenomenologists such as Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Ihde defines an “embodiment relation” as a relationship with a technology in which the user experiences the world through that technology (2009, 42). Insodoing, the technology becomes incorporated into the user’s bodily and perceptual experience; it becomes part of the manner in which a user encounters and engages the world. An example is a contemporary hearing aid. A user experiences a transformed relation to the world through her or his hearing aid as certain acoustic frequencies are amplified. As this user develops particular habits of auditory perception and bodily comportment with respect to the device, more and more her or his experience becomes centered upon

5 Merleau-Ponty puts the approach of phenomenology this way: “Not because we reject the certainties of common sense and a natural attitude to things—they are, on the contrary, the constant theme of philosophy— but because, being the presupposed basis of any thought, they are taken for granted, and go unnoticed, and because in order to arouse them and bring them into view, we have to suspend for a moment our recognition of them” (1962, xiii). By suspending judgments, and by focusing on the description of experience, unnoticed assumptions at play in established discussions may be revealed.

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the world through the hearing aid, rather than upon the technology itself. In this terminology, the user “embodies” the device. Ihde (2009, 42) continues this description by developing the notion of transparency. This refers to the degree to which an embodied technology recedes into the background of a user’s awareness as it is used. If, for example, one is accustomed to using a hearing aid, the sounds of the world through the device are experienced with the most significance, rather than the feeling of the aid itself upon the ear. In contrast, one new to the use of a hearing aid may remain explicitly aware of the feeling of the device itself and of other aspects of use, such as feedback, the amplification of background noise, and the limitations of the range of frequencies available. In the case of this new user, the hearing aid is embodied, but with a low degree of transparency. This identification of the notion of transparency also makes possible the contrast of the experience of different technologies on this issue. For instance, according to Ihde (2007, 248), himself a user of both hearing aids and eyeglasses, “hearing aid embodiment does not come with either the same ease or degree of transparency that eyeglasses or optical technologies seem to have”. That is, in his view, greater time and patience are required for adjusting to a new pair of hearing aids compared to a new pair of glasses. And more, while complete transparency is never achieved in any embodiment relation, the total level attainable for glasses is much higher than what is possible for hearing aid technologies.6 I have intentionally cast the notion of transparency as a variable, that is, as a feature of technological mediation which may be present to a greater or lesser degree depending on the circumstances of the individual relation. This is because I intend to expand the postphenomenological framework of concepts at this juncture. I suggest that transparency, rather than simply being a defining feature of embodiment relations, should be considered one variable among several. It points out one of the aspects of a person’s particular embodied relationship with a technology that is subject to change. Explicitly depicting the notion of transparency in this way, I suggest, prompts consideration of further variables that may also be important in individual technological relations. Here, I explore two further variables that can characterize embodiment relations to technology, notions crucial to my analyses of the experiences of driving and of phone use in the next section. The experience of embodying some technologies, I suggest, can be characterized by a large-scale change to the structure of awareness, one which involves more than the technology itself growing transparent. It can involve a reorganization of the user’s overall field of awareness. In such instances of human–technology relations, engagement with the world through the technology entails a restriction, or expansion, or directedness, or some other recasting of the manner and content of that which occupies the user’s awareness overall; that is, the user’s “field” of awareness on the whole becomes “composed” by a specific technologically mediated character. I refer to this as field composition and submit it as another variable at work in some instances of technological mediation. 6 Ihde’s account of the embodiment and transparency of technology is explicitly indebted to Martin Heidegger’s account of tool use and his notions of “present-to-hand” and “ready-to-hand,” developed in his work Being and Time (1953). I do not, however, wish to engage Heidegger’s work here since I do not want the concepts developed later to become embroiled in the larger ontological framework within which Heidegger’s notions of ready-to-hand and present-to-hand are inextricable centerpieces.

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An example of an embodiment relation typically characterized strongly by field composition is the use of binoculars. As a user holds the binoculars up to her or his eyes and adjusts the focusing knob, she or he becomes able to perceive something occurring some distance away. The binoculars transform the user’s perception of the world, enabling the visualization of something otherwise too far away to see. Before considering the field composition of this experience, let us consider its transparency. For one accustomed to using binoculars, the feeling of the eyepieces against the face, and even the active interface with the focusing knob, may fade into the background of awareness. Yet the changes to a user’s awareness are greater than only the increase in transparency of the eyepieces and focusing knob; the user’s field of visual perception overall becomes occupied with the content made available by the device, a content framed by the circular shape of the binocular lenses. If the user is concentrating on what appears through the binoculars, she or he may even grow less aware of the experiences of the immediate environment, such as the tactile and auditory sensations. In the terminology advanced here, with such substantial changes to the user’s field of visual awareness, the use of binoculars is deeply characterized by field composition. Along with the notions of field composition and transparency, a third variable is important to the following account of driving and phone use. I use the term sedimentation to refer to the particular depth or strength associated with the habits of an individual’s relation to technology.7 In the case of one deeply accustomed to the use of binoculars (say, an avid birdwatcher), the high level of transparency of the eyepieces and knob interface are characteristics of this human–technology relation which emerge immediately and automatically. Through a strong force of habit, these features of the binoculars take on high degree of transparency. Because this device and the user share an individual personal history, because its embodiment is routine, because its use is an “everyday” activity, and because its functioning is taken for granted, the particular characteristics of the relation are deeply entrenched in habit and occur with a kind of automaticity. Sedimentation refers to the particular depth of the habitual entrenchment of the characteristics of a human–technology relation.

The experience of the phone, the experience of driving I suggest that the notions of embodiment, transparency, field composition, and sedimentation can be productively applied to the description of the experiences of talking on the telephone and of driving an automobile. 7

The general idea that one’s field of awareness is organized by that which is significant is a theme explored throughout phenomenology (with a particularly helpful and sustained examination by Gurwitch (1964)). The term “field composition” is specific to my own work as I attempt to analyze this phenomenon in terms of its particular manifestation in the relationships between users, technologies, and the world. The term “sedimentation,” in contrast, is used throughout phenomenological thought, with a meaning generally similar to its deployment here, though of course with subtle differences between thinkers. In general, the term points to the ever-presence of past experiences actively informing the immediate experience of present encounters. It is with work of Merleau-Ponty (1962) that sedimentation is saddled as well with the connotation of bodily habituation, a connotation I hope to explicitly retain. Here I use the term sedimentation in my own technical way: to refer to the particular level of habit, the particular degree to which the past provides meaning to the present, in a given human–technological relation.

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A phenomenology of telephone use Telephone use of course transforms a user’s abilities in significant ways. A user becomes able to converse with others over great distances, so long as all involved are connected to the network of telephone lines and satellites. Phone use can itself loosely be considered a mode of experience; phone users sometimes refer to themselves as ‘being on the phone,’ as if that were a kind of experiential category. I suggest that a useful way to describe to this phenomenon is as follows: as a user comes to embody the telephone, the relationship between the user and this technology restructures the user’s experience of the surrounding space in significant ways. This restructuring can be articulated in terms of transparency, field composition, and sedimentation.8 First, phone use often involves a deeply transparent relationship to the device itself. After dialing and connecting, a user focuses on having a conversation, the typical intention of a phone call. As this happens, the phone itself in one’s hand withdraws into the background of her or his awareness. Though the user holds the receiver up to her or his ear (or holds the entire phone in the case of cell phones), gripping the phone and maintaining its location beside the face are actions which do not demand much conscious attention. Even if the user is tethered to the telephone base by a coiled cord, she or he often manages this anchored relation without much awareness of doing so. Despite enabling the conversation in the first place, the phone itself does not retain a prominent position in the awareness of one engrossed in its use. Second, I suggest that the experience of telephone use has field composition as a central characteristic. For a person accustomed to using the phone, as she or he becomes engrossed in conversation, her or his field of experience takes on a particular structure. The content of the conversation comes to positively compose her or his field of awareness. The user’s focus becomes trained upon the voice of the interlocutor and on what is happening in the discussion. Through the engagement with the content of conversation and through the immediately significant presence of a human interlocutor (however technologically mediated that presence may be), the realm of the phone user’s awareness overall becomes substantially occupied by audio sensation. Though in this account the typical relation is understood to be deeply characterized by field composition, it can of course vary and can be partial; one can clearly also be aware of other things while on the phone, at least sometimes. Third, I suggest that these structures of telephone experience—the field composition focused on the interlocutor’s voice and conversation content and the transparency taken on by the phone itself—are deeply sedimented for the typical user. For a user that shares a long history with this device and for whom phone use is routine, strong habits have been created. It is through a highly developed force of habit that the user’s field of awareness is changed so automatically and so immediately when she or he begins a new phone conversation. A phenomenology of driving Like using the telephone, the act of driving a car is also an example of an embodiment relation to technology. Through use of the car, the driver’s experiences 8

I first developed a short version of this account of phone use in (Rosenberger 2010).

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are substantially transformed. Of course the car enhances the driver’s abilities in many ways, enabling increased speed with little exertion. The driver experiences the world through the car in many transformed ways. In a limited manner, the driver can feel tires touching the road, especially when slamming on the breaks. A driver deeply familiar with a particular vehicle may have a good idea of the speed without even checking the speedometer, simply through the feeling of motion and the sounds of the engine. On a windy day, a driver can feel the air’s impact on the entire car. Merleau-Ponty (1962, 144) gives the related example of a driver that experiences the whole car and senses whether it will fit into an approaching tunnel.9 And like telephone use, driving can be also be characterized by the variables of transparency, field composition, and sedimentation. For one accustomed to driving, certain features of the car are experienced as highly transparent. As explicit attention is directed to the road, to other cars, to traffic lights, and such, many features of the car’s interface fade into the background of the driver’s awareness. For a person for whom driving is familiar, the grip on the steering wheel, the pressure on the pedals, and even the feeling of being belted into the driver’s seat are all experienced with a high degree of transparency. When a driver turns at an intersection, she or he may be explicitly aware of the intention to turn the car, rather than the intention to turn the steering wheel. A driver may think consciously about the desire to decrease the car’s speed, rather than about the action of pressing the break pedal. Indeed, safe driving depends on the transparency of these relations. It depends on the driver’s capacity to focus on the road, rather than on the interface with the vehicle. I suggest that in a typical moment, a driver’s experience is considerably characterized by field composition, but its structure is complex and it shifts frequently. A driver’s awareness becomes occupied by the space in front of the vehicle out through the windshield, and also by the content of mirrors, by relevant audio aspects of driving and by the readouts of dashboard dials and displays (the speedometer, gas gauge, etc.). She or he can shift between these spaces, sometimes seamlessly, sometimes with more conscious effort (e.g., cautiously checking her or his “blind spot” before merging, that area beside the car not captured by mirrors). These various yet specific aspects of the inside and outside of the car stand forward and compose the space of the driver’s awareness. Safe driving necessitates a deeply sedimented relationship with the car. It is important for the driver to be able to focus conscious attention on the road, and this requires the capacity to delegate specific aspects of driving to well-established bodily and perceptual habits. As discussed previously, certain aspects of the vehicle’s interface are experienced by the accustomed driver as deeply transparent, and the transparency of these aspects is imperative for safe driving. For these aspects of driving—the grip on the steering wheel, the pressure of one’s feet on the pedals— to be experienced regularly and automatically as transparent, one’s habits regarding this interface must become deeply sedimented. The field of awareness composed by the mediation of the car (including focus upon the road ahead, mirrors, gauges, and

9 Ihde (1990, 74) adds the example of parallel parking, “when well embodied, one feels rather than sees the distance between car and curb—one’s body is ‘extended’ to the parameters of the driver–car ‘body’”.

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relevant sounds) is one which manifests through the force of strongly entrenched habits. This sedimentation is acquired through practice, through bodily training, and through a long personal history of interaction with the car.10

An alternative theory of cell-driving While scientific research findings support the general claim that cell phone use inhibits driving performance, there remains room for disagreement over why this inhibition occurs. It is possible to abstract from discussions on this topic two general accounts of the cause of the drop in driving performance that accompanies cell phone use. The first is implied by public policy, and the second guides much of the scientific research on the topic. After reviewing these, I offer an alternative account based on the phenomenological reflections mentioned previously and consider its relationship to the other two. Two prominent positions: the one-handedness account vs. cognitive capacity accounts As mentioned previously, laws in a number of countries across the globe and in some states in the USA prohibit the use of handheld phones while driving yet allow the use of hands-free devices. Implied here is the theory that cell phone use causes a drop in driving performance because the handheld phone leaves only one hand available for holding the steering wheel. That is, in this view, the drop in driving performance is attributable to the fact that handheld cell phones force a driver to hold the steering wheel with only one hand, presumably decreasing control and the ability to make swift responses. For the sake of contrasting this view with the alternatives discussed here, I will refer to this position as the one-handedness account. As reviewed previously, much of the scientific research shows hands-free cell phone use to also eventuate the drop in driving performance. This prompts many researchers to disagree with the one-handedness account and to offer comments on—and sometimes explicit theoretical interpretations of—what is instead the cause. I suggest that a general theory which guides much of the scientific research can be abstracted from published articles in their descriptions of findings and discussion sections. These descriptions and comments are cast through a broad cognitive science and human factors interpretive framework, with emphases on notions such as “multitasking,” “mental workload,” “attention distribution,” “information processing,” and “cognitive resources.” The implicit theory that can be abstracted from these various scientific descriptions can be roughly stated: impairment occurs because the brain’s limited quantity of cognitive resources is stretched inadequately across the tasks of driving and cell phone use. Like driving, participating in a conversation on the phone is

10 Another example of the strength of the habits associated with driving is the experience of a driver who sits in the passenger seat and finds her or himself compelled to press upon the floor as if operating pedals (especially when uncomfortable with the driving style of the person behind the wheel).

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understood to be a task which exercises the brain’s limited reserves.11 Thus, in this view, the drop in driving performance is attributable to the limitations of brain capacity—in this case, the brain’s inability to meet the demands of the combined tasks of driving and engaging in telephone conversation. I refer to claims consistent with this formulation as cognitive capacity accounts. A number of more specific explanations of the drop in driving performance associated with cell phone use are developed within this scientific literature. One way the combination of the actions of talking on the phone and driving is conceptualized is in terms of “dual tasks”; cell-driving is an example of a dual task scenario (e.g., Haigney et al. 2000; Strayer and Johnston 2001; Horrey and Wickens 2004; Jamson and Merat 2005; Just et al. 2008). This highlights the fact that conversation itself, like driving, is an action which the brain performs and that the combination of these actions is a form of multitasking. But exactly how the demand placed on the brain is conceived varies in subtle ways from paper to paper. One conception is that it is the brain’s “processing” power that is taxed (e.g., Alm and Nillson 1995; Liu and Lee 2005; Just et al. 2008). Another way this demand is cast is in terms of the “workload” by which the brain is encumbered, a labor which drains “cognitive resources” (e.g., Lamble et al. 1999; Patten et al. 2004; Hunton and Rose 2005; Jamson and Merat 2005; Törnros and Bolling 2005; Beede and Kass 2006). Yet another central way the cell-driving phenomenon is articulated is in terms of 11

Evidence for the claim that this body of scientific research is guided by a general theoretical framework centered on notions of the limitations of the human brain—couched in terms of concepts such as workload, information processing, attention capacity, and cognitive resources—can be found in the following selection of quotes: “Extreme levels of workload may also mean that processing resources for new information are limited” (Alm and Nillson 1995, 714). “It would seem that participants were finding task performance cognitively more effortful in the during call period, and were having to invest greater attentional resources in task performance” (Haigney et al. 2000, 119). “The purpose of this study was, therefore, to explore the ability of drivers to cope with different levels of cognitive or mental workload that were introduced as secondary tasks and their effect on attention resource allocation” (Patten et al. 2004, 342). “In essence, drivers appear to be attempting to free-up resources for the secondary task by simplifying the primary task” (Jamson and Merat 2005, 93). “This inferior performance demonstrates that, although participants can switch attention between tasks, there appears to be an upper limit to available cognitive processing within the context of maintaining vehicle control” (Liu and Lee 2005, 379). “Research has demonstrated that the adverse effects of driving while talking are most likely not related to the motor control issues of manipulating a hand-held phone … or driving experience …. Rather, it is believed that the effects are a result of competition for limited cognitive resources” (Beede and Kass 2006, 416). “Whether the explanation lies at the sensory level … or at the attention resources management level … the results are in line with the theory of inherent limited capacity of human attention …, which predicts that the attentional resources allocated to one task (talking) come at the expense of the other (driving)” (Rosenbloom 2006). “We interpret this diversion of attention as reflecting a capacity limit on the amount of attention or resources that can be distributed across the two tasks. This capacity limit might be thought of as a biological constraint that limits the amount of systematic neural activity that can be distributed across parts of the cortex. The specific biological substrate that imposes the capacity limitation is not currently known” (Just et al. 2008, 76). “If the human brain were not limited in attending to multiple tasks at the same time, driver distraction would not be an issue” (Regan et al. 2009, 3).

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one’s “attention,” the limited quantity of which cannot be allocated in a way that provides an adequate amount to both the tasks of driving and talking on the phone at once (Haigney et al. 2000; Patten et al. 2004; Rosenbloom 2006; Young and Regan 2007; Just et al. 2008). A further example of this general view claims that while sufficient resources may exist for our brains to process both tasks at once, there do not exist the pathways for both to be enacted; there is a kind of “bottleneck” which prevents both tasks from being adequately addressed (Levy et al. 2006; Strayer and Drews 2007; Kunar et al. 2008). These various conceptions of brain activity are not necessarily inconsistent with one another and indeed are often used together. At least for the purpose of contrasting this perspective with the one-handedness account mentioned previously and the alternative account developed later, the views of this paragraph together fall under the category of cognitive capacity accounts. The phenomenological alternative: an experiential content account I suggest that an alternative theory of the impairment associated with cell-driving can be developed based on the phenomenological descriptions of the experiences of driving and of phone use provided previously. In the phenomenological reflections described in the previous sections, driving has been described as an experience constituted by deeply sedimented habitual relationships, such as transparent relations to the steering wheel, pedals, and other interface, as well as an explicit awareness of the road ahead through the windshield, mirrors, the audio aspects of driving, etc. In the previous account, cell phone use is also understood to be characterized by a specific and sedimented structure of experience, namely a field composition in which conversational content occupies the user’s awareness. My contention, articulated in the following paragraphs, is that the field composition inclined by phone use is incompatible with the field composition required for safe driving and that the habitual inclination toward this phone-mediated structure of experience (a habitual pull against which a driver must resist) constitutes the basis for an explanation of the data which show phone use to accompany driving impairment. What is striking about these phenomenological descriptions of phone use and driving is what is revealed by their juxtaposition: that the content of these two experiences—what occupies awareness, what does not, how it is shaped, the direction of habitual pull—appears largely incompatible. The task of driving calls for a specific habitually entrenched structure of experience in which the driver’s overall awareness is primarily occupied by particular things. The task of engaging in conversation on the phone brings about another, though also specific and also habitually entrenched, structure of experience in which the phone user’s overall awareness is primarily occupied by other particular things. One who engages in celldriving is thus met with two competing strongly established habitual inclinations, each of which tugs one’s awareness toward a certain overall composition. It may be the case that these inclinations and experiential structures are responsible for the performance drop associated with cell-driving. For driving inhibition to occur, it does not need to be the case that the habits of cell phone usage automatically take primacy over those of driving. (Which takes primacy may vary between individuals, their personal histories with these devices, and the circumstances of each phone conversation.) What is important is simply that

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a habitual pull toward the phone is strongly present, a pull that a driver must resist while she or he simultaneously concentrates on the road. That is, while the act of talking on the phone of course does not render driving impossible, I suggest that a driver who talks on the phone is forced to resist the habitual inclination toward an overall awareness focused primarily on the phone conversation rather than on the road. Put as a hypothesis: the drop in driving performance that accompanies cell phone use (both handheld and hands-free) is attributable to the way that phone use inclines one away from focus on the road and toward an awareness composed by phone conversation. For the sake of dramatizing the contrast between this account and the two reviewed previously, this phenomenologically informed theory can be categorized as an experiential content account. That is, this account of cell-driving emphasizes a concrete description of the quality of a person’s experience, a depiction of what occupies the content of an individual’s awareness. The two accounts reviewed previously, in contrast, maintain other emphases. The research scientists’ cognitive capacity accounts emphasize the capabilities of the human brain. The onehandedness account implicit in public policy emphasizes a phone user’s ability to physically grip the steering wheel. It is important to note that, despite holding different interpretations of the cause of the performance drop associated with cell-driving, the cognitive capacity accounts and the experiential content account stand together in opposition to the onehandedness account on the issue of what is required for safe driving. Both the cognitive capacity accounts and the experiential content account are consistent with the scientific data which show that both handheld and hands-free cell phone use accompany a drop in driving performance. Both are inconsistent with the suggestion that regulation of only handheld phones is all that is required for addressing the dangers of talking on the phone while driving. As Drews and Strayer (2009, 185) put it, “Most researchers conclude that a significant contributor to cell phone-related driver distraction is the engagement in the conversation, which leads to a withdrawal of attention from the immediate driving environment.” At this level of description, both the cognitive capacity accounts and the experiential content account are consistent. It is only at a deeper interpretation of what factors account for the drop in performance that differences emerge. One further point is that the cognitive capacity accounts and the experiential content account, while each inconsistent with the one-handedness account, are also not necessarily incompatible with one another. Since both are consistent with the evidence that both handheld and hands-free cell phone use results in driving inhibition, it is possible that the factors identified by each are together causes of the impairment. However, the claim that both accounts identify factors involved in the performance drop associated with cell-driving is one which requires substantiation in the same way as would a claim to prefer one over the other.

Discussion Philosophers of technology struggle to conceptualize the issues involved in predicting the effects of transferring a technology developed in one context into

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another. The phenomenon of distracted driving is a case-in-point example of how difficult it can be to foresee and to understand the implications of such transfers. With the advent of mobile phone technology, the long-developed technologically mediated practices of driving and of phone use can now be performed together. The task of comprehending the particular kind of driver distraction which results may require the combined efforts of cognitive scientists, philosophers, policy analysts, and others. What is clear is that simple intuitions about how cell phones should affect driving performance are inadequate for addressing the issue and indeed appear to differ between individuals. By developing a phenomenological account of cell-driving I hope to contribute to discussions on these issues by raising several concerns. First, I hope to support the position argued for by a number of scientists that the current direction in public policy—i.e., the regulation of only handheld, and not hands-free, cell phone use while driving—is inadequate for addressing the threat to traffic safety introduced by cell-driving. The previously described development of an alternative reading of the data offers another angle from which to argue against the position that only handheld phones require regulation. Second, I hope to contribute to the discussion in the scientific literature over how to account for the cell-driving data. The alternative reading of the data developed here may be of value for the way it draws out assumptions involved in the explanations offered by scientists so far. It may be possible to develop experiments for evaluating the account developed here and for evaluating the assumptions revealed to guide the established line of thinking. Third, this alternative account introduces a number of concepts into this discussion that may prove useful for efforts to communicate the dangers of this form of driver distraction to the public. Notions of embodiment, the overall composition of awareness, and habituation may be helpful tools for raising public consciousness to these issues. They may provide an alternative strategy of argumentation, one which appeals not to the limitations of the brain but to the content of driver experience. Acknowledgments Special thanks to Michael Hoffmann, Sabrina Hom, Nancy Nersessian, Bryan Norton, and Victor Wanningen for comments on earlier drafts of this piece.

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