Society Abroad

EUROPE'S RESPONSE TO WORLD POLITICS Eckhard Deutscher and Dirk Messner le catastrophic flood in Asia set ;_ill unprecedented xample of illterllational readiness to provide aid and slrenglhened awareness anlonc'e, both politicians and citizens. In our globalized w,'orld, coopcralion wilh rcgioris beset by crisis should be a nlatter of course. Even Germariy resporided promptly to tile crisis and provided generous support for the affected countries. Never before had the public donaled so much for such a cause. The German chancellor reaffirmed his intention Io nlainlain increases in support for ccononlic clevelopment. Communities, federal states, and nunlcrous private organizations are engaged iri aid)rig the disaster-stricken regions. For the sake of the tsunami victims, it is hoped that the attention given is not of short duration. In addition. awareriess should increase among European politicians and people in general that crises as well as changes in world politics and economy do nol take place "'far away." they directly affect Europe's perspective on tlle future. The authors of this article refer Io numerous changes arourid the world and indicate that. in 2()05, world politics will Ilave to challc'ee direction. Etlrt)pean policies could chart new paths or throw away opportunities It) assist iri structuring the globalization process. The year 2005 has been one in which world politics is changing tracks. First. since Novenibcr ,'4, 2004, the international connllunitv has had to reconcile itself Io four more years of the Bush adnlinislration. [:roill the Etlropean point of view, Ihc question Illl.lSl be allSWel'ed as to whether the Europearl l,:niori, in reacliOll to the conservative landslide in the United States, has the energy to provide effective iillOrilalionai initiatives in such a way thai ii C;.ln be seen as a serious player in world polith:s, for oxalnple, in the Middle P]asl, clilnale policies, or world trade. On the olher hand. the F+U inusl inaJnlaJn a solid relationship with the Anlericail adnlJnistration, since none of the critical world probleins can be soh ed withOtll the L'niied States. Second. the t!nited Nations nltlsl decide whether to reslrtlclure itself peMlallenliy based upon the rec,t)111111elldaliOllSof a co111111issit)n t)l expeliS

alypointed by Kofi Annan. The goal el" this restructuring is to adapt to the new world situation. Third. in the fall of 2005, a global conference will be held in New York to review whether the "'Millennium Development Goals." established at the turn of the millennium by the international community to ,'educe gh)bal poverty by, half by 2015, are achieving their intended purpose, and what a realistic timetable for the implementation of this project might be as part of a "'fair globalization.'" l:]urope will have marly opporturiities to assert itself as a shaper of elobalization throu,,h constructive and effecti\e initiatives. However, if the EU succumbs to lelharev reeardine forei,m affairs, or if the 25 memberMales quarrel about an appropriate international action, then they' will have little inlluence on the course of events. It cannot be denied that during the 15 years since the end of the Cold War many hopes for a cooperative world order and the promised blessin,,s of an ecoriornic and political globalization process have flown out the window. From an economic standpoint, substantial promise was seen in the opening of the forrner Soviet bloc to the world economy, the reduction of mtde barriers, the growth and dynamics of international firiance, and the hlcreased corporate global perspective resulting in increased competition and improved welfare around Ihe v,.orld. The proporients c,f a co,operative world order were no less optimistic after the colhipse of lhc socialist world. Numerous experts were convinced that the fall of the Berlin Wall meant the end of the politics of hegcIllOily.

The world, hovcever, has charted a differenl course. ('tlrrellt analyses by the Wt'u'ld Bank and {;lfited Xalions indicate that the rich nations face a future threatened by' chaos, uphea\al, and terror if Ihe ecol)Ollly and politics tie not respond sensibly to coillplex glohal challenges as well as the dark side of globalJzation. "'Global leadership" is in short supply on botl-i sides of lhe Allantic. The t;nited States views the world in terms of fighling global terrorism and defending its one-dimensional and largely ineffective security policy aeainsl worlclwide resentment agairlsl the Llnited Slates and the West.

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Europe, on the other hand, is preoccupied with itself: expansion of the EU as well as weak economic performance of the old continent consumes a great deal of political energy. The world has slid from a bipolar ice age into an unstable world order. British Finance Minister Gordon Brown was correct when he described 2005 as a "year of decision" for future global tlevelopments. The refusal by "the Old Europe" to participate in the Iraq war and criticism of American tmilateral policies were correct. But this is no substitute for efforts to reduce global risks. Europe must stabilize its relationship with the American administration, develop viable initiatives tot the coming UN reforms, and put forth greater effort to fight global problems. These efforts must be accomplished in conjtmction with effective international programs.

Developments in Global Risk The world must be understood as an interdependent system where general welfare, security, and democracy in Europe are inc,'easingly dependent upon global processes. Only three central problem categories will be mentioned here: the trap of poverty and global demographic change" climate change: and the development of new economic areas. Widespread population growth of groups living in poverty, particularly in the Southern Hemisphere, has caused dramatic destabilization. Today there arc more than 6 billion people on earth, and 1 billion consume more than 80 percent of their gross domestic product. On the other hand, however, half of the world's population lives on less than two dollars per day, and 1.2 billion must survive on less than one dollar per day. Unless this situation is turned around, insurrections, civil wars, and floods of refugees, combined with related global boomerang effects, will become even more widespread. At which juncture do social polarization and expanding regions with widespread suffering on the edges of the Organization of Economic Cooperation l)evelopment and (OECI)) world translate into significant political instability and security risks for the international system? At the same time, there is a glaring discrepancy between the funds provided by rich countries for economic deveh)pment ($56 billion annually) and annual expenditures of $1 trillion tot armaments and defense, as well as $350 billion spen! for domestic subsidies, including agriculture. Even the armament budget of developing countries, totaling over $200 billion, outstrips spending for education, again demonstrating a gross imbalance. By 2040, the world's population will have grown f,om 6 to about 8 billion inhabitants. This growth will

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take place almost exclusively in poorer countries. I talt of the current world population is under 25 years of

age. And 1.6 billion people--a quarter of the total popul a t i o n - a r e less than 14 years of age. In the future, the average age of the population in these countries will be even younger. If not enough is done to supply suf]'icient measures to provide work and perspectives on development, contlicts in these regions will be unavoidable. There are aheady upheavals in many developing countries, which arise mainly from the multitudes of young men with no vision of the future. The increasing ntunber of child soldiers in Africa will not be reduced so long as insurrection and war provide their only means of earning a living. War and unrest in Africa and other poor regions threaten international security. Poverty and population growth could be effectively managed using far-reaching investments in education, health programs, and the creation of productive and durable institutions in developing countries. ]'he effects of such efforts can be realized only in the long run: however, the lobbies for agrarian subsidies in industrialized countries are more influential than those liar investment in global development programs. With an aging population in Europe, the likelihood of far-reaching programs in the future is in question. By the end of the century, the population of Western Europe will decline by 75 million, with half the population being over age 6(). The United States will be able to offset this trend by a high level of immigration: in Europe, on the other hand, proponents of a "'Fortress EU'" are becoming more intluential. Demographic change also influences economic and political activity and future planning. A lead article in the Washington P o s t (May 3, 2004) asks the question: In an aging, shrinking population, who will stand up for future international issues and propose long-feral political and economic strategies? Climate change could also contribute to future conflicts in the coming decades. A study released in February 2004 by the American Defense Department (Pentagon) came to the following conclusion: if climate change causes a reduction of food, water, and energy reserves, political instability and conflict will arise in numerous regions of the world. Millions of homeless, starving people would leave their home countries. Rapid climate change would bring the world to the brink of anarchy, since countries faced with diminished food, water, and energy reserves would seek to defend their borders with nuclear weapons. The study strongly proposes that the threat of climate change be made a top priority of international policy. It is conceivable that Great Britain, for example, could experience in the foreseeable future Siberian-like winters if average Euro-

pean temperatures fell radically by 202(). In addition, there are solid data indicating the possibility that powerful storms by the end of the decade could make parts of the Netherlands uninhabitable. California could experience a severe water shortage. Tile Pentagon study warns that the United States and Europe couh.l become fortresses to hold off millions of refueees front regions retried by climate change. Starting in 2020. catastrophic shortages of energy and water couh_l push the world into lltilllerotis new contlicts. In the Pentagotl's viev,:, climate change poses as great a threat Io intel'llaliollal stability as terroristn. Even if one does not share this conclusion, the current stalemate in the politics of world clilnate is a cause for concern. The character of the world economy will also change consMerably in the conling decades. [:nlike past decades, Europe will be less of a driver of the world economy, but more of a region thai illtlSl adapt to fiureaching cham,es ~, ,. By the end of this decade, the concept of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego will probably be implemented with a potential market of 950 million people. For two years, Japan and China have been negotiating a common currency union in order to make the Asian inarket--with 2.5 billion people more dynamic. Other countries in the area, such as India, could affiliate with this enormous economic region. The working population of India is expected to grow bv 335 million in the next 35 years; this would correspond to the employed population of the ELI and United States combined. In coming decades, China and India could develop into the center of global industry. In short, the Asian-Pacific Region will become the economic power center of the future; the United States, given tl-lc current trend, will increasingly lose interest in Europe. The European Union, with 25 member-states and more than 453 million people, is confronted with more than just the prohlena of fixing its economy and developing new core processes to allow it to compete in the changing markets, thus assuring the general welfare of the continent. At the moment, Europe sees itself confronted by dramatic problems related to financing its social welfare systems due to the graying of its population. Geopolitical challenges are at Isutopc's front door, resulting from the exclusion of African nations from world trade. Europe cannot avoid responding to this. If current trends continue, the ELl share of world production will decline from 18 to 10 petvent over the next 20 years: by 2()IN, China will laave the same economic power as Germany.

R e f o r m i n g the G l o b a l A r c h i t e c t u r e Kofi Annan's initiatives in reforlning the architecture of international institutions cannot be overesti-

niated. The global political structure is a key area where tile dichotomy of sustainable global deveh)l~ment and the risk of economic and social instability can be overcome. Refornl of the UN has been on the a-igenda lor decades, and progress in this regard hits been difficult. The problenis have been identified: (I) Debates in the General Assembly are based on the lowest coninlon denominator a-rod therefore Lit) not COllie to iuly significant decisions regarding refornl. The entire system tippears to bc handicapped. (2) Powerful organizations such its the Sccurity Council, the World Bank, and International Monetary Fund, whose decisions have farreaching effects in the world economy, particularly in developing countries, do not represent the interest strutlure of the international community as a whole and are therefore confronted with the issue of political legitimacy. (3)There are too many UN and muhilateral instilt.lions ,,s.ith unclear goals and which function inefficiemly, not consulting with one another: the result is overlapping activities. In Berlin, on January 21, 2004, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan described three great tasks facing the internatitmal community: (I) The attention and resources of the conimunity of nations illUSI focus on the needs of lhe poorer countries. ~2) The system of worldwMe collective security must be strengthened so that no single nation will feel confronted by global threats. 13) Mistrust hetween people of different cultures and religions inusl be overcome. The question arises whether the current architecture of global organizations allows a sufficient response to these tasks and goals. The secreta U general appointed a high-level commission to study this, and the results were presented at the end of 2004. Kofi Annan has emphasized that there have long been discussions regarding UN relornls as well as the political effectiveness of individual organizations, the cohesion of the entire systern, strengthening the Economic and Sociul Council (ECOSOC), and the relationship of the tTN to tile Bretton Woods institutions (WorM Bank and IMtq. But required reforms can no hmger be pul off. Some radical and fundanlental questions nlust be posed: Which changes will be required for a redesign of Ihe slruclure of global institutions? If the current activities and concepts of existing institutions hilve shown to he ineffective, how should the goals of the various organs of the [,:nited Nations as well as future activities of tile World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, Ihe World Trade Organization (WTO), and regional deveh+pment hanks be defined? For reasons of cost and efficierlcy, should individual institt.tions be dissoh'ed or charged with different tasks? Will partial reforms work, or ILIUM all entirely new system be conceived, requiring radical changes?

tr

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The international system of development cooperation itself requires extensive reform and must adapt mox'e quickly to the new demands of globalizalion. The complexity of this is quite apparent to experts. Thousands of large and small institutions and organizations are involved in economic cooperation. According to World Bank estimates, there are more than 300,000 projects in process, involving the United Nations, 24 (!) multilateral (regional) development banks, the European Union and a lmmber of bilateral players in developed countries and NGOs. The entire system is too self-referential, ineffective, and therefore part of the political cohesion problem, tile inability of various policy seclors to function together. On the other hand, the World Bank and IMF, for example, have created highly effective conceptual and pragmatic structures, but such instl'unaents of international development cooperation and global financial stability must be adapted and focused through the community of nations. An example of this is the voting rights in the Bretton Woods institutions. Although the political realities have chanoed=, the participation structure is the same as it was decades ago. Shouldn't countries such as India. China, South Africa or Brazil assume more responsibility in multilateral institutions, thus requiring a restructuring of the participation structures'? Here is the paradox, according to World Bank President James D. Wolfensohn: although the UN has access to various instruments, they are not maintained. Indeed, there is a danger that multilateral institutions only serve one another. This is just one example of governance problems, which themselves obstruct the process of international development. The discussion of the significance and continued development of tile United Nations and the multilateral system is always reduced to a dichotolnous contlict of interests: on the one side are the representatives of the short-tern "'national interests" who decry the money pit jungle of multilateral organizations. On the other side are "'naive multilatendists" who, unlike Kofi Annan, are defensive about even justified criticism of the multilateral system and thus offer no constructive contributions to the improvement of the global political syslenl.

Challenges for Europe One inust agree with Paul Kennedy, who believes that Europe cannot act as a counlerbahmce to the American empire. There is an "acquis transatlantique'" (histo O' o/'common achievement.s) between Europe and the United States, which must be strengthened, but the F,U must strengthen its policies regarding foreign relations and security. This is necessary because at thc start of

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the twenty-first centtn'y, Europe must help shape the globalization process. The question is whether in the year 2030 Europe will be at the center or at the periphery of world events. ]'here is strong indication that the EU should pursue this more rapidly in order to awlid paralysis in foreign affairs due to the self-discovery process of the expanded 25-state union. Which EU states are ready to take significant steps toward integrating their forei,m policies throuoh the establishment of an EU foreign minister, as provided for in the European Union Constitution? European tk)reign policy should be an example for wo.'ld politics of the future, based upon democracy, social justice, and multilateral cooperation. Using this as a lkmndation, Europe will be viewed as a cooperative workl power, an attractive partner tk)r fair, democratic and lmmane globalization, providing a model of an international social and ecological market society, a counterpoint to "robber baron capitalism." Second, a strong Europe is the starting point for an equal partnership with the United States. A revitalization of the transatlantic relationship will be indispensable during the next four years in order to clarify the role of a proactive European Union in international relations, an entity willing to initiate projects with the "'sole superpower." A coherent and European foreign and security policy must rest on a foundation of a reliable and equal strategic partnership with the United States. In addition, Europe will have to develop strategies to include countries like China. India, Brazil, Thailand, and South Africa in international cooperation, since their suppo,'t is critical for the solution of any world problem. Initiatives of German development policies serve as an example of this. The fight against international terrorism will requi.'e not only new efforts in security and defense policy, but also activities to fight the causes of terrorism. Development policies, reduction of poverty and efforts to create social justice in developing countries are integral components of a common foreign and security policy. Third, Europe must promulgate a policy of expanding existing military capacity and use synergies in order to face global threats, as delineated in the EU security strate,,y~ paper in D e c e m b e r 2003 ( " S o l a n a Strategy"). This process will cost money. At the same time, Europe n3ust strengthen its willingness to support the African continent more fully, but not with the old reason, to help the poorest of the poor. Geographical proximity, failing governments, privatized violence. floods of migration, unrestricted trade in humans, weapons, and drugs will threaten the security of Europe and create even more instability in the international sys-

tern. A future-oriented defense and security policy tnust also include activities oriented toward global disarmarllellt. Fourth, Europe naust become more intensively involved in the reform of the United Nations. thereby supporting efforts to increase the influence of important cotintties outside the OF, CD world. The year 20(15 offers a great opporturiity to initiate serious reforms in the UN system. The EU should use the reform suggestions by the higll-levcl panel as a bash, for its own program for modernizing the UN: after all. effective multilateralism is not possible without a full\, futactional United Nations. Fifth. security policy will require Europe to increase its developtnent expenditures significantly over the longestablished 0,7 percent of GNP. This will inchtde not only investment in capital and infrastructure, but investment in education arid trainirm+, scholarships, and international exchange programs. The support of a united Europe (identity) can structure such an exchange with other cultures ;.tilt] ecc)nonlic regions. Future strategy should be cliaracterized by political. economic, cultural and intellectual openness instead of isolation (as ix usually the case today). This will also include giving tip e c o n o m i c p r o t e c t i o n i s m , which is greeted cynically by many developing countries. European development policv currently represents over half of all worldwide expenditures in the area of gh)bal cooperation. If the metnber-states \yore able to combine the forces tit" the Et; and i~roml_il gale a clear division of effort, thus creating a com-

nlon Europeall strate<,v~, for COOl)oration oulside the reahn of the OECD. the EU could become a powerhouse for ecoriomic develofmlent. Since the most tit-

gent world problems (such as clinlate change, emigration and refugees, instability of international financial inarkets, iransnational terrorism) cannot be solved without the help of developing couilti'ies, nlcdium-terin

progress in these arezis Wotlld be ;.is significant as the transatlantic relationships. Si• the political re-orientation outlined above can only take place if the economy of the EU regains speed and adapts to new future-oriented markets and [)roducts. This will require efforts on three levels. First. investment in research innovation and education must be permanently increased. Included in this would be a F,ttropeatl strategy to attract the "best rninds'" of the world to l','uropean research institutes. Second, reforms in the social security system nltist be niade to bring costs under control. Third, a modern family policy is of vital importance in order to take advantage of the e n o r m o u s potential offered by highly qualified young women, and to turn arouild the sinking birth rate. A dynamic econonay, technoh)gical and social innovations, as well as attractiveness of the European research landscape arc prerequisites for play, ing a leadirig role in world politics. It is hoped lllat the new EL,; commission will place central importance upon these challenoes~, in their work. The days when the EU could afford to allow the largest portion of the state bud,,et~ to be nlana,,ede by the Conm-iissioncr of Agriculttn'e are over. l-ckhard Deut.~cher is the G e n m m e_w,cutive director at the World Bank in Washington. Dirk Messner is director +!/ the (;erman In,~titute,t?~r Develolmtent Pelt 0" (DIE) in B+mn. a m / m e m h e r of the "German Advisory Crmncil +m Gh)ha] ('han,qe '" (WlkGU),

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