J. Value Inquiry 16:165 175 (1982) 0022-5363/82/0163-0165 $1.65. 9 Mart&us NifhoffPublishers, The Hague. Printed in the Netherlands.

Articles EXISTENTIALISM AND THE DEMONSTRABILITY OF ETHICAL THEORIES RALPH D. ELLIS Morehouse Collge

Demonstrability is in some sense a prerequisite for the bindingness of ethical theories, the demand that someone comply with a principle whose validity he cannot ascertain makes as little sense as the demand that he obey the law even though he has no way to find out what the law says. Suppose, for example, someone proposes to me an ethical doctrine which says that I must turn over all Jews to the Gestapo, but can offer no justification for this doctrine. Suppose further that at the same time someone else proposes to me the doctrine that I have moral responsibility to harbor Jews in m y home and to lie to the Gestapo if they should come looking for Jews, but can offer no justification for this doctrine. In such a situation, I remain just as ignorant of what the moral law says as if no one had ever presented me with the ungrounded claim, "The moral law says this," or "The moral law says that." To lack knowledge as to whether a proposed moral principle is epistemologically justifiable or not therefore appears tantamount to not knowing what the moral law says. Certainly, however, one would not consider someone morally blameworthy for failing to obey a moral principle of which he is ignorant and which he, like everyone else, is incapable in principle of ever discovering because it belongs to the infinite set of possible moral principles which cannot be demonstrated to be true. Nor, for that matter, would one consider someone morally praiseworthy for obeying a principle whose validity he cannot possibly ascertain; rather, he would more likely be considered dangerously gullible for accepting such a principle without demonstration, just the kind o f person one might expect to turn over Jews to the Gestapo simply because he had been told it was his duty to do so. Analysis of this need for demonstrability, in conjunction with the numerous criticisms of intuitionism which render it at best epistemologically inconclusive, 1 seems to suggest that ethical principles ultimately must be deducible from some nonethical ones. Traditionally, this position would be taken as implying that ethical meanings must also be definable in nonethical terms - i.e., not in terms of values people should have, but in terms o f values they do have. 2 Such a procedure, however, would appear to be a step backward from some well-taken criticisms o f Benthamism, 3 threatening to reduce ethics to a pure naturalism the most plausible variety o f which might well be mere egoism (if, that is, it cannot be demonstrated

166 that man has certain specifiable duties that override personal self-interest). This threat is all the more real since the ideal-utilitarian principle shared by Mill, 4 Sidgwick, and Moore, s that one should seek the general happiness rather than one's own, is no more demonstrable on nonethical grounds than are nonnaturalistic theories such as the intuitionism of Broad, Ross, or Prichard; 6 nor, for the same reasons, can any quantitative or qualitative utilitarianism ground an independent principle of distributive justice] Yet it cannot be denied that some people do in fact prefer justice over happiness in certain instances. Ironically, the mere fact that people's w~lues differ from each other is a nagging problem for both antagonists in the intuitionism/ideal-utilitarianism conflict: The problem for intuitionism is that individuals, even if 'disinterested,' will tend to 'intuit' different values and valuepriorities, a similar difficulty for utilitarianism is that some people will persistently value certain things (honesty, justice, loyalty, etc.) more than anyone's happiness, including their own. Thus neither intuitionism nor ideal-utilitarianism is demonstrable on nonethical grounds and therefore neither can be binding. Existential-phenomenological ethics, a third viable alternative, might be capable of circumventing this difficulty if only it can overcome the tendency toward arbitrariness for which so many critics have taken it to task. Existential ethics has the potential to become demonstrable with enough cogency to establish the bindinghess of its principles because its analysis of the structure of human consciousness posits that authenticity is a more primal value than happiness or self-interest of any kind. The basis for this assertion is that the desire to exist (which is presupposed by all other desires) entails a desire to be authentic, since the ontological status of human consciousness is a process rather than a staffs and since authenticity is necessary if consciousness is to guard against the continual temptation of stagnation into stasis, s Authenticity implies being in touch with one's own consciousness; for this purpose, authentic ways to symbolize, concretize, and explicate this consciousness must be used. 9 This, Finally, requires ethical involvement in the world and honest relationships with other people. At this point, however, we face a severe difficulty: Granted that the needed authenticity of consciousness ultimately requires empathic and concernful relationships to certain selected individuals or groups, how does this entail that I must follow any universally binding principles in my relations to all people? This paper will first trace the reasoning leading from the existential analysis of consciousness to ethical involvement. We shall then confront the difficult problem of grounding the universal bindingness of existential ethical principles.

Among a wide diversity of phenomenological and existential ethical theories, some appear to fall short of real demonstrability and therefore are subject to the above criticisms just as are utilitarianism and nonnaturalism. For example, much of Max Scheler's work has been criticized for too frequent excursions into the

t67 realm of metaphysics, 1~ although a few of his most basic premises, as we shall see, are among the most clearly demonstrable ones in ethics. Scheler is on the right track when he uses fellow-feeling as the psychological jumping-off point (by contrast to utilitarianism's emphasis on the pursuit of self-interest in the form of happiness), the distinctions he makes between fellow-feeling and the phenomena with which it is too often confused - 'infection' and 'identification' - are quite illuminating; 11 and if anything is certain in the realm of ethics, it must be Scheler's principle that, in establishing the priority of any values, the one which is presupposed by another should be given priority over that other. 12 (In our view, this principle will imply, in conjunction with the existential analysis of consciousness as a process rather than a stasis, that authenticity automatically enjoys a general priority over pleasure-seeking, we cannot experience pleasure or anything else unless we first exist, and inauthenticity cramps and reduces our capacity for a fully conscious existence. Consciousness is inherently motivated to transcend itself rather than to reduce itself to a stasis through some such mechanism as drive reduction.) The main problem for present purposes with Scheler's theory - as with Hartmann's phenomenological intuitionism as well 13 - is that, by failing to motivate ethical emotions (i.e., by failing to answer the question 'Why be any more moral than we already are?'), Scheler fails to show how the proposition that we shouM feel and act in the ways he considers 'moral' is indeed demonstrable. Moreover, a theory which relies entirely on the intuition of moral qualities falls victim to Georg Lukacs' criticism of Scheler's philosophical procedure in general - that once the phenomenological description of the Devil is complete, the question remains unresolved as to whether the Devil we have experienced really exists. 14 The bindingness of an ethical theory which depends exclusively on the intuition of moral qualities is nondemonstrable in the same way that intuitionism is. By contrast to Scheler and Hartmann, Sartre's ethics (or rather the ethics that Barnes, de Beauvoir, and others attribute to him ~s) does not claim to be binding; it is a free, spontaneous and, one might say, arbitrary creation of the individual. The same is true of Grisebach and the 'existential situationists. '~6 Thus Bollnow speaks of the purely "formal" nature of existential act-deontologism, ~7 while Frankena characterizes it as "up in the air."'s Manser criticizes Sartre specifically for reducing moral action "to the level of arbitrary decision, ''~9 and Mary Warnock says, "Freedom is in [Sartre's] view the supreme value. But we must admit that it is not wholly clear to what a man is committed if he chooses freedom, or what his alternatives are. ''2~ And many other critics have made similar charges. 2~ In any event, although such a nonbinding ethics as that of Sartre and the otfiet-'actdeontologists' is probably better than no ethics at all, the purpose of the presefit paper is to discover whether any ethical principles can be binding, which in turn presupposes that they must be demonstrable. The Sartrean kind of existential theory might encourage one to spontaneously affirm the value of one's fellow man on isolated and unpredictable occasions; nonetheless, it cannot establish any universally binding principle such as 'murder is wrong.' Let's therefore see if we can outline an existential-phenomenological theory

168 of ethics which can be ontologically demonstrated by making a statement about the way things are imply a statement about the way things should be, thus attaining a bindingness lacking so far in the history of existential theories. To show how such a theory is possible, three basic theses must be established: (1) Consciousness by its very nature desires to unfold authentically.(2) In order to unfold authentically (or to the extent that it is to unfold authentically), consciousness must necessarily affirm certain basic values. (3) These basic values are the true source (or one of the true sources) of the phenomena we call ethical principles. This last thesis is the logical starting point of an existential theory, since the relevance of the other two presupposes it. Within the diversity of existential approaches, there seems to be consensus on the point that 'the valuable' must always be experienceable by someone as valuable, thus (at least potentially) valuable to someone. 22 If there is any absolute or objective value, defined in any other sense than valuable to persons (or to some form of consciousness), it cannot be experienced and therefore cannot be demonstrated. All value which is demonstrable is humanistic and subjective in origin, so that 'valuable' must be somehow derivative from the more basic concept 'valued', although these two terms must be distinguished and can be distinguished in various ways, even if a doctrine of the derivativeness of 'valuable' is allowed. This view is reinforced by the phenomenological observation that the experience of value always has an emotional component, implying that value is something that we human beings wish to realize or accomplish. Rather than finding value readymade in life, human beings must (in one sense or another) create value. Of course, existentialism generally does not go so far as to infer from the humanistic origin of value - as Sidgwick does, for example -- that nothing can be valuable except desirable experiences or states o f consciousness. Rather, the principle of intentionality would leave this question open: It is quite possible that if I hold something beyond my own consciousness as valuable, then that which my consciousness intends to posit as valuable may well be (and in fact often is) the object o f that consciousness, not the consciousness itself. 23 The intentional consciousness of the (alleged) value of a political goal, for example, intends the political goal as valuable; it does not intend that the consciousness o f the value of the political goal is the thing that is valuable. (Camus well dramatizes this point in his play "The Possessed," where he examines the possibility of dying for an ethical cause). At the same time, however, we must not be misled into thinking that the phenomenological analysis of valueconsciousness forces the positing of value as a really and independently existing, objective entity whose value would remain even if no conscious beings existed. The general orientation of a demonstrably binding existential ethic will therefore be that, since value implies value to someone, values stem in some sense from subjectivity (thus there c a n b e an answer to the question "Why be moral?") - while at the same time these values are not arbitrary. The problem, of course, is then to find a way of distinguishing mere self-interest or idle whim from value in the genuinely ethical sense, and to guarantee that, at least in some cases, values can be binding as general rules.

169 The first step in distinguishing such subjective 'ethical' values from mere idle whim and self-interest is to show that they are different in principle from the values at the root of other kinds of naturalistic or teleological ethical systems. The difference can be established along two lines. (A) Existentialism denies that man is completely motivated by any reductionistic tendency, such as a drive to reduce needs or an inescapable desire to seek happiness and/or pleasure. For the existentialist, man creates value through an active choice and therefore is not bound to a prescribed essence or 'human nature' which would force one particular choice such as happiness or pleasure as the only possible value. 24 Among nonexistentialists, even Kant was misled into embracing such a psychological reductionism and therefore had to posit God, freedom, and immortality in order to compensate for the supposed 'natural law' that man must always seek his own self.interest. But the question of whether human behavior can be explained in terms of drive reduction is entirely distinguishable from the question of whether all human behavior is caused. Here, then, is an instance where an ontological question has an effect on which ethical system we must choose: ls man characterized by such-and-such 'human nature' consisting of 'drives' ("physiological deficits external to the nervous system ''2s) and of prescribed desires ultimately derivative through learning from the drives? The drive-reductionist faces the bleak choice between hedonism and some form of duty ethics reinforced by the practical postulation of God, freedom, and immortality. The nonreductionist, who denies that man by his very nature must seek an experience called happiness or pleasure, is free to opt for an existential ethical system. Both the logical feasibility and the factual likelihood of drive-reductionism have been severely criticized in recent years. 26 Robert White's critique of the concept of drive is especially incisive (see note 26). (B) A second promising feature which helps ground a distinction between existentialism and ethical egoism is that existentialism is not a merely emotive theory of ethics. The existential analysis of the meaning of being human can allow human emotions to found ethical values, while at the same time it can posit that some emotions are more worthy of serving as the basis of ethics than others and even that certain emotions are unethical. 27 Emotions are ethical to the extent that they contribute to the authentic functioning of consciousness as a whole, due to a line of argument leading from the nonreductionistic motivation of the individual to the necessity of concern for other people. Consciousness exists to a greater extent when it functions authentically; authenticity implies self-honesty, which in turn demands that the person explicate, concretize, and symbolize (via concrete media such as words, gestures, or pictures) his consciousness in the context of authentic relationships with other people, since the immanence of consciousness tends to correlate with the ways in which it is transcendently symbolized. Such a tendency toward correlation between subjective consciousness and the objective manifestations through which it is symbolized is an ontologically necessary feature of consciousness because consciousness cannot take place, and certainly cannot unfold in authentic directions, if not adequately symbolized in concrete ways. This point has been demonstrated more fully elsewhere; 28 the rationale behind it is

170 briefly as follows. Consciousness needs symbols in order to unfold. If I want to formulate my ideas or feelings on any subject, symbolizing activities - such as using (materially embodied) words - must be engaged in. For example, if I try to remember something that I have forgotten, using words helps me do so. In explaining to someone how to operate a complex machine, actually going through the physical motions helps me remember what these motions are and is sometimes indispensable to remembering. Similarly, a chess player uses the pieces on the board as physical symbols to help him formulate his mental strategy. A child is encouraged to pray to a deity and subsequently learns to believe in that deity. (Symbolizing the conscious state of belief makes it more likely that he will eventually have that conscious state.) In each case, a physical activity, the motion of matter (whether the mouth, the hands, the brain, or an object of perception) serves to symbolize a state of consciousness in order to help that state of consciousness to occur (i.e., to exist as consciousness). If no consciousness can take place without some concrete symbolizing activity to explicate it, then everything I do also has its effect upon the kinds of consciousness which that action symbolizes or fails to symbolize and therefore indirectly renders possible or impossible. Regarding the effect of any concrete action upon the authenticity of my consciousness, the crucial question becomes: What kind of symbolizing function is a given activity capable of assuming? How broad is the range of possible consciousnesses (and therefore of possible persons) capable of being symbolized and explicated by this activity, and are any of these possible persons really my own authentic choice? As a general rule, an equilibrium obtains between arrays of available symbols (activities in the world that I can use to define myself) and the range of possible thoughts and feelings that can maintain themselves within such a structure: (1) A state of consciousness must be concretely symbolized in the world before it can be fully experienced and carried forward. (2) If the consciousness is not concretized in this way, it will either die out or change into a less fully aware form, thus reducing the extent to which I am a conscious existant. (3) If the activity in which I am engaged and the values which I am motivated to pursue are not capable of assuming the relation of symbol to symbolized, then either I must desist in doing the activity, or I must desist in having the value or consciousness which fails to get symbolized and objectified as a result of the activity. (4) If I cannot or will not desist in the activity and therefore must desist in having the state of consciousness or value direction, then either I must lose part of my conscious being, or I must try to deceive myself into having feelings that are capable of being symbolized by the activity which I must perform. If the action cannot be forged to fit the motivation, then the motivation will be forged to fit the action. For this reason, the factory foreman, like Sartre's cafe waiter, finds it difficult to play his role for a number of years without effectually becoming the role. A conscious being therefore needs to find adequate opportunities through really embodied, concrete activity in the world, to symbolize and explicate its consciousness so that it can continue to exist and to change in the directions authentically

171 called for by that consciousness itself; the conscious being also wants to find as many effective opportunities for symbolization as it can. Moreover, this need for symbolization/explication is the most urgent need and desire of a conscious being, since our very survival qua conscious beings depends upon its fulfillment. No other gratification or value.fulfillment can be experienced (or at least fully experienced) unless consciousness first truly exists in order to (fully) experience whatever it experiences. Whether the value structure ultimately discovered or created by consciousness is going to turn out to be egoistic, altruistic, or both, consciousness at least knows from the beginning that only to the extent that it is authentic will it fred itself able to discover or create value. Authenticity is thus motivated by the structure of conscious existence itself. The value which consciousness places upon its own authenticity is presupposed by any other value it might be able to establish. Consciousness therefore wants to symbolize and explicate itself. Eugene Gendlin suggests that dialogue with other persons is the most effective overall way to symbolize our consciousness and therefore to concretize, explicate, and carry it forward. (This concept of Gendlin profoundly influenced Carl Rogers and the nondirective therapy movement in psychology.) By establishing give-andtake communication and understanding, Smith helps Jones to remember, for example, how he got where he is in his stream of consciousness, where he has come from, why he chose this direction, how it relates backward in the pattern, what the overall meaning is, etc., meanwhile Jones is helping Smith in the same way. :9 In order for this degree of understanding to take place, a corresponding degree of mutual empathic consciousness must be established. By 'empathic consciousness,' I mean simply that Smith must attempt to achieve insight into the meaning of Jones' expressions by putting himself in Jones' place and imagining what subjective states of consciousness might be symbolized by these expressions, in short, he must be able to empathize with Jones' consciousness, as Hussefl and Merleau-Ponty both maintain is a prerequisite for liguistic communication. 3~ That such empathy is to some extent possible is a datum, since everyone has experienced it. It is presupposed by the fact that we have learned to talk. Precisely what experienceable meaning is designated by 'empathic consciousness' becomes quickly evident if we imagine an instance where we fail to establish it or purposely suspend it, as when a doctor makes an incision or when a soldier kills in war. Such an empathic consciousness is a condition for the possibility of authentic interaction. Without it, distraction through Heidegger's "idle talk" would block the flow of both people's consciousness within the interaction, and the full existence of the consciousness Smith and Jones are trying to explicate could not reach its potential fruitions (not to deny that idle talk may still be authentically chosen as one moment of the attention progression). The best example of such mutual explication might well be the Platonic dialogue. If this kind of communication is to be possible, each person must achieve some degree of empathic identification with the other, at least during the time when they are interacting with each other. Here we use the word 'identification' in its somewhat loose contemporary sense, as for example in 'identification with the oppressor,' not in the sense of a really existing unity between two minds such as

172 Scheler's Einsfuhlung. In fact, the meaning which the other person is trying to communicate is only comprehended (rightly or wrongly) if we projectively imagine what subjective meanings his discourse is supposed to concretely embody for him. (By adding 'rightly or wrongly,' we disengage the present inquiry from any metaphysical speculation as to an already existing unity among diverse conscious beings such as the one Scheler proposes.) If this reasoning is valid, then the initial assumption that consciousness is a process rather than a stasis not only implies that not all values are drive-reductionistic (since some seek to increase rather than to reduce the activity which consciousness is), it also implies that consciousness must find ways to symbolize and explicate itself in order to continue this activity and must do so authentically; that authentic and concrete interaction with other people is necessary to such a symbolization process, finally, that empathic identification with these other people is necessary prerequisite for this kind of interaction. But at this point, the most difficult question of all arises: Even granting that empathic identification with other people is necessary for the authentic functioning of consciousness and that this empathic identification leads to ethical comportment toward these other people - to a sort of personal loyalty toward them -~ how does it follow that we must always comport ourselves ethically toward all other people? That I want to establish empathic relations with other people would no more seem to imply that I must establish these relations with all others, than my wanting an apple implies that I must eat all apples. What is to prevent me from forming a small circle of friends toward whom I am loyal, and whom I use as my cultural context for symbolization purposes, and proceeding to ignore or even transgress against the rest of society altogether, as do many organized criminals in their criminal subculture?

II Loyalty to an in-group or to an individual by preference over outsiders is one possible dimension of consciousness (one possible symbolizing relationship that can help consciousness to unfold in those patterns which it is capable of symbolizing). The attempt to establish some form of interface with the whole of humanity, with humanity in the abstract (a universal empathic identification) is another possible dimension. We shall soon see that to close off either dimension - personal loyalty, or interrelation with all of humanity - is to reduce one's possibilities for growth, complexity, variety, and change. Phenomenological analysis of the empathic identification process shows that it is motivated by a desire to keep all symbolization channels open. Immanuel Levinas' "infinite curvature of intersubjective space ''31 becomes finite if we cut off communication possibilities and limit them to a narrow and explicitly defined in-crowd. The universal empathic identification is not a mere quantitative increase in the sheer number of explication opportunities available to the individual, but rather a qualitatively different kind of explication possibility. For example, in writing this

173 paper, I may at some point reread it from the perspective that would result from imagining how my friend X would react to it, by viewing the paper through X's eyes in this way, I may achieve a fuller understanding of the problems, contradictions, unclear meanings, and unsupported presuppositions (not to mention self-deceptions) involved in my thinking and presentation. By again rereading the paper from the standpoint that I can imagine another friend Y would take toward it, I see it from a still different perspective and therefore am able to evaluate it still more fully. Each person whose perspective I imaginatively assume (through empathic identification) sparks whole new trains of thought, originally unthought of, thus allowing my consciousness to unfold and progress through the dialogical function. (This progression is consciousness's aim and desire, since, qua process as opposed to stasis, it must desire to keep unfolding; it cannot exist as stasis.) All of this, however, presupposes the ability to perform the empathic identification. But what all these particular identifications are ultimately aimed toward is a general or abstract empathic identification in the same way that the correlation of different perspectives on the same object, as Merleau-Ponty says, aims toward the ideal of seeing that the object exists in a world where all perspectives coexist and coalesce in the full being of the object in space. 32 Similarly, my dialogical relations with other individuals, besides being ways of using a specific person for specific symbolizing/explicating purposes, must simultaneously also aim to treat my empathic identification with that individual as one perspectival element in my empathic identification with the abstract phenomenon, 'all humanity' or 'humanity in general' or 'the complete array of possible ways of being authentically human.' The universal empathic identification therefore relates to that in an individual which authentically expresses the abstract concept, 'conscious being.' It values him not because he is who he is, but because (to a greater or lesser extent) he is one more instance of the abstraction, 'authentically unfolding stream of consciousness.' It empathizes with a form which his being exemplifies rather than merely with the actual individual present at hand. The empathic identification which is relevant to universally binding ethical principles which I choose to impose upon myself (on pain of inauthenticity and atrophy) is the kind that values the person because he is a person, not because he is the particular person he is. Thus there are at least two kinds of empathic identification: (1) Personal loyalty, which seeks to serve the object of the identification (because it cannot avoid vicariously feeling his pleasure and pain) and does so even if his 'form' O.e., the structure of his personality) changes beyond recognition. (2) Empathy with all humanity as such (agape) - with the abstract idea of humanity. (Socrates, in the Symposium, does not seem to recognize the kind of personal loyalty which continues to identify with a person even after he has completely ceased to manifest the formal features which one originally admired, as for example when one's parent has become a vegetable in a lung machine. While existential ethics does not argue that personal loyalty can serve as the basis of a demonstrable and binding set of universal ethical principles, the existentialist need not deny that affection for a particular, concrete being might in fact exist either.) Here, then, we have two kinds

174 of relationships which can be used to explicate, concretize, symbolize, and carry forward my subjective consciousness in its authentic unfolding. To neglect either possibility would be to close myself off from my own possibilities as a consciousness, it would render certain ones of the motivated directions of my consciousnessprogression impossible by depriving them of the opportunity for symbolization and embodiment, and therefore of the opportunity for concrete existence. Whatever might be someone's motivation for dosing off his source of symbolization for a whole realm of conscious progressions, that motivation cannot be authentic, since it would be self-defeating from the standpoint of the existential analysis of consciousness as a process as opposed to a stasis. Moreover, any denial of universal empathy in favor of a personal empathy - e.g., a case where a friend demands that I commit some crime against humanity - would result in a corresponding lessening of the authenticity of the personal empathy itself; thus the universal empathy has precedence in ethical matters. In cases where society finds itself in the position of forcing someone to be moral, this forcing is motivated by the universal empathy as applied to the victims of crimes, although there is not space here to explore this application in detail. This completes our meta-ethical grounding of an existential theory of ethics which is demonstrable and binding, since all we still needed to demonstrate was that in order for a person's consciousness to unfold authentically (as it necessarily wants to do), he must symbolize and explicate this consciousness through dialogical relationships, not merely with certain specific significant others in his life, but with the whole of mankind, viewed as an abstraction. We demonstrated that this in fact must happen because phenomenological analysis of any particular empathic identification shows that it opens toward the horizon of a universal empathic identification. A principal advantage of existential ethics over both intuitionism and utilitarianism is that neither of the latter can ground an ethical system which is demonstrable on nonethical grounds and therefore which is morally binding. Existentialism can ground ethics by means of the ontological analysis of the meaning and implications of authentic human existence. Much normative work in this area has yet to be carried out but we have at least tried to hint at some directions that would seem to follow from the primacy of the universal empathic identification. The importance of the epistemological grounding of a binding ethical system cannot be overemphasized; without it, not only the rational discipline of ethics, but rationality itself, is prone to be shunned by many people in favor of one or another potentially dangerous irrationalism, since dogmatism will appear to be the only alternative to skepticism.

NOTES 1.

Brand Blanshard, Reason and Goodness (London: Allen, 1961), pp. 149-50; G.J. Warnock, Contemporary Moral Philosophy (London: MacMillan, 1967), pp. 12-13; William Frankena, "Broad's Analysis of Ethical Terms," in The Philosophy of CD.

175

2. 3.

4. 5. 6.

7. 8.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

Broad, ed. Paul Schlipp (New York: Tudor, 1959), p. 555. Moritz Schlick, Problems o f Ethics (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1939). A.J. Ayer, "The Principle of Utility," in Philosophical Essays (London: Macmillan, 1963), pp. 250-65; Henry Sidgwick, The Method of Ethics (New York: Dover, 1966), pp. 84-85; Charles Stevenson, Ethics and Language (New Haven: Yale, 1944), p. 256. J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism (London: Longmans and Green, 1907). G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903). C.D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory (Paterson: Littlefield, 1959); David Ross, Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939); H.A. Prichard, Moral Obligation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949). Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1963), p. 38 Theodore Steinbuchel, Die philosophische Grundlegung der Katholischen Sittenlehre (Dusseldorf: Patmos, 1947); Raymond Polin, La creation des valeurs (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1944); see also Patka, note 24. R.D. Ellis, "Prereflective Consciousness," Man and Worm 13:173-91; see note 29. Marvin Farber in William Sahakian, Ethics (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1974), p. 174, calls Scheler's ethics "a dogmatic defence of selected articles of faith." Max Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, ed. W. Stark (Hamden: Archon, 1970), pp. 14-36. Ibid., p. xv. W. Werkmeister, Theories of Ethics (Lincoln: Johnson, 1961), pp. 269-73. Steinbuchel (note 8) asks, "Why is the responsibility for the Thou a morally good attitude?"; similar criticism is in Q. Lauer, Phenomenology (New York: Harper, 1965), p. 165: "Quite obviously the presence of t h e . . , values defies proof." Hazel Barnes, An Existentialist Ethics (New York: Knopf, 1967); Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity (New York: Philosophical Library, 1967). Eberhard Grisebach, Gegenwart eine kritische Ethic (Halle: Niemeyer, 1928). Otto Bollnow, Neue Geborgenheit (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1960). Frankena, Ethics, p. 21. A. Manser, Sartre: A Philosophic Study (New York: Oxford, 1966), p. 164. Mary Warnock, Ethics Since 1900 (London: Oxford, 1966), p. 138. G. Shapiro, "Choice and Universality, " Man and World 7:20-36; D. Klinefelter, "The Sartrean Ethics of Hazel Barnes, "Philosophy Today 19: 330-40. H. ~,~eyerhoff, "Emotive and Existentialist Theories of Ethics, "Journal of Philosophy 48:7'~9 82; E. Wyshogrod, Emmanuel Levinas (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974). Edmu d Husserl, Ideas (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1962), pp. 314-15. F. Patk ~, Existentialist Thinkers and Thought (New York: Citadel, 1960). Robert White, "Motivation Reconsidered, "Psychological Review 66:298-330, D. Bindra, Motivation (New York: Ronald, 1959), p. 295; M.R. Jones, ed., Nebraska Symposium on Motivation (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1954), p. 314 f. R. Ginsberg, "Self and Others, "Southern Journal of Philosophy 11:254-59. See note 12. Eugene Gendlin, "Experimental Phenomenology, " in Phenomenology and the Social Sciences, ed. M. Natanson (Evanston: Northwestern, 1973). Husserl, Cartesian Meditations (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1966), pp. 114-20; M. MerleauPonty, Signs, ed. John Wild (Evanston: Northwestern, 1964), p. 97. Emmanuel Levinas, Totality andlnfinity (Pittsburgh: Duquesne, 1969). Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (New York: Humanities, 1962), pp. 327-34.