East Asia (2012) 29:215–234 DOI 10.1007/s12140-012-9176-1

Explaining Support for Democracy in East Asia Ming Sing

Received: 9 November 2011 / Accepted: 27 February 2012 / Published online: 30 March 2012 # Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Abstract This paper aims to explain public support for democracy in six East Asian societies using the 2006 AsiaBarometer data. The project investigates whether East Asians’ support for democracy is primarily based on perceived political performance, such as satisfaction with human rights, or perceived economic performance. The work also examines whether East Asians’ support for democracy is constrained by traditional values or the postmodern value of post-materialism. The analysis shows that for three democracies, satisfaction with human rights, i.e. perceived political performance and an intrinsic value embodied in democracy, counts more in shaping public support for democracy than perceived economic performance. Because support based on perceived economic performance is more volatile than support based on firm commitment to human rights, this finding sheds positive light on the prospects for democratic stability for the three East Asian democracies. For three East Asian autocratic societies, democratic support is based more on perceived economic rather than political performance, casting a pall on the future prospects for democratization of them. That said, these dim prospects are balanced by the finding of very weak and negative effects of some traditional Asian values on democratic support. Keywords East Asia . Political culture . Post-materialism . Support for democracy

Introduction Since 1974, a wave of democratization has swept over various parts of the world. According to the literature, a particularly important causal factor for such democratization has been “public support” for democracy [22]. Comparative studies of democratic development highlight the fact that higher levels of public support for democracy can raise the level of democracy [4]. Explaining the level of public

M. Sing (*) Division of Social Science, Hong Kong University of Science & Technology, Kowloon, Hong Kong e-mail: [email protected]

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support for democracy, therefore, has obvious practical significance. This paper aims to explain public support for democracy in six East Asian societies (China, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea) based on the AsiaBarometer surveys conducted in 2006. The six cases include three liberal democracies and three autocratic societies.1 The six societies were chosen partly because the Asiabarometer survey, which uses a standardised questionnaire, was conducted for them within the same year, rendering the comparison of their data more meaningful. These societies were also selected because they all belong to the economically dynamic region of East Asia. They at one time or another, have all enjoyed very rapid economic growth for a sustained period by a global standard. Besides, the six cases have been selected as the current literature has argued that they have been shaped by Confucianism to various extents [13]. Their common background of having enjoyed very rapid economic growth, and arguably Confucian value, has provided foundation for comparing them, as such growth and cultural context may have impacted the mass support for democracy. This project addresses the following two problems: i.)

Is East Asian popular support for democracy based mainly on perceived political performance or economic performance? As economic performance of societies can be volatile, if support for democracy hinges more on perceived political performance, such as the securing of political rights, than on economic performance, better prospects of democracy are expected [3, 10].2 ii.) Do East Asians have a higher level of commitment to the presumably traditional value of respect for authority than Westerners, and is East Asian support for democracy shaped by that traditional value? The answer to this question contributes to the debate on Asian values.

Why should democratic development among six East Asian societies be examined? With the exception of Middle East, East Asia has made less progress under the global tide of democratization than countries in other regions of the world [40]. Between 1974 and 2006, the third wave of global democratization generated 81 new democracies [16]. In 2005, only six of the 18 sovereign states and autonomous territories in East Asia were regarded as ‘free’ by Freedom House [18]. Economically, many East Asian societies have enjoyed sustained and rapid economic growth during authoritarian rule, diverging sharply from the continuous economic stagnation and social decay experienced by Central and Eastern Europe under communist rule and by Latin America under military rule [40]. Concurrently, East Asian authoritarian or semiauthoritarian regimes such as China and Singapore have demonstrated remarkable resilience in the face of challenges brought on by complex economies and globalisation. Their widely perceived good economic performance has arguably made East

1

It has been argued that Chinese Government’s interference with Hong Kong’s political development may have sapped the public support for democracy. However, past research has shown that Chinese government has not been a purely negative element in Hong Kong's democratization. The Chinese Government's potential threats to the core values of Hong Kong have unintentionally triggered the clamour for democratizing Hong Kong [44]. 2 Some recent research shows that perceived political performance counts more than perceived economic performance in shaping mass support for democracy [3, 9].

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Asians less motivated to embrace democracy than their counterparts in other authoritarian regimes [9]. To understand the democratization of East Asia, one useful way is to investigate public support for democracy, given that the level of such support directly affects the level of democracy in a given country [4, 23].

Existing Research on East Asia and Research Design Many studies explaining democratic support in East Asia have employed data from the World Values Survey (WVS) and the Asian Barometer Survey [9, 10, 12]. This research differs from previous work in several ways. First, a common assumption of existing work has been that the measured public support can predict the level of democracy [23]. However, this assumption remains unproven. To overcome the problem, Inglehart suggests that a democracy/autocracy index be used to assess public support [23]. Based on data from over 70 societies derived from the WVS and from the European Values Survey, Inglehart’s measure of support for democracy is correlated with cumulative scores of actual levels of democracy with a significant coefficient of 0.51. Although the correlation coefficient is not particularly strong, it provides a useful justification for our use of Inglehart’s measurement of support for democracy. Among the research on democratic support in East Asia, Dalton and Ong have used an index closely related to the “democracy/autocracy index, while Shin and Tusalem’s [39] one can be translated into my suggested measurement. In some new work studying support for democracy, other interesting measurements of support for democracy have been adopted, including those using data of Asiabarometer [6, 50]. Yet, the predictive value of those measurements on the actual level of democracy remains unknown, raising the risk of using such measurements [10]. Thus, as Inglehart’s measurement can partly explain the level of democracy, this research uses it to gauge democratic support. A second unique feature of this paper is that while recent research has integrated some significant and theoretically relevant variables into causal models for explaining democratic support, very few studies have used the dataset from AsiaBarometer. AsiaBarometer uses country-wide face-to-face surveys with standardised instruments designed around a common research framework. The data used in this paper were collected through AsiaBarometer surveys (ABS) collected in 2006 for the six East Asian societies under nation-wide samples including both urban and rural areas. They target adults between the ages of 20 and 69.3 In China, for instance, unlike a previous research in which data were only gathered from urban areas, data for this research were collected from respondents distributed approximately equally across genders, urban and rural areas and across the central and western regions of China. Multistage stratified random sampling was used to select respondents for face-to-face interviews. To reduce loss in observations, incomplete observations have been imputed by the NORM software. Multiple imputation has been commonly used as a strategy to 3

For the Korean sample, every province has been covered except for Jeju province. For Taiwan, most of it has been covered except for Hualien and Taitung Hsien.

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handle missing data to avoid loss of observations due to listwise treatment [1, 2, 19, 32, 36, 45, 51]. King et al. have shown that estimates from list-wise deletion have greater efficiency loss and larger standard errors than estimates from multiple imputation which are approximately unbiased and more efficient [19]. Therefore, the latter approach has been used for dealing with missing data. Five imputed datasets are created and the regression models are then run on each dataset. The final estimates are combined into a single set of results by the NORM software according to Rubin’s (1987) rules for scalar estimates.

Perspectives of Perceived Performance and Cultural Values Perceived Performance Approach To explain East Asian support for democracy, the perceived performance and cultural approach will be adopted. The perceived performance approach stresses the importance of perceived economic and political performance in shaping democratic support, as argued in research on Africa, Eastern Europe and the rest of the world [4]. Based on this perspective, variables will be drawn to assess whether perceived performance can explain East Asians’ support for democracy. If democracy is supported because of a greater public emphasis on perceived political performance, such as satisfaction with human rights, than on economic achievements, then support for democracy is valued more intrinsically than instrumentally, for instance, as a tool for improving material living standards [4]. For Japanese, South Koreans, and Taiwanese, who live in democratic societies, any perceived good political and economic performance is expected to contribute positively to democratic support. By contrast, the relationship between perceived good performance and support for democracy should be negative in Singapore, China, and Hong Kong, given the autocratic nature of those societies. Recent research on transitional and new democracies in Africa, Eastern Europe, East Asia, and Latin America has found that perceived political performance is no less important than perceived economic performance in shaping the support [4, 10]. For East Asian countries, most of which are far from being well-functioning consolidated democracies, perceived political performance may have extra importance. To assess the impact of perceived political performance on democratic support, respondents were asked for their i) satisfaction with human rights; ii) extent of worry about corruption; and iii) political trust in the government and legal system. Regarding satisfaction with human rights, in the non-democratic societies of Africa and Eastern Europe, the desire to defend and improve human rights is crucial for public support for democracy [22]. Compelling evidence from various authoritarian countries testifies that brutal transgression of human rights has reinforced the determination of people in those countries to democratize to safeguard their human rights [27]. A low level of satisfaction regarding human rights may have different effects on democratic support in democratic and non-democratic societies. If the public in non-democratic countries experiences less satisfaction with human rights, it is expected that greater support for democracy will result. However, in democratic regimes, a lower degree of satisfaction with human rights may raise doubts regarding

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the ability of democratic institutions to defend human rights and thereby decrease public support for democracy. Given the poor human rights records of most authoritarian regimes in Asia and many of today’s democracies before their democratic transitions, this study assesses the impact of participants’ satisfaction with the right to participate in any type of organisation, to gather and demonstrate, to criticise the government, to be informed of the work and functions of the government, and to have freedom of speech on a five-point scale. In this assessment, standardised factor scores generated from principle component analysis were used for regression analysis.4 Regarding the perceived corruption, based on cross-national studies, citizens in countries with greater degrees of perceived corruption tend to have more negative evaluations of their political system. As corruption contradicts widespread values of equality, fairness and accountability, this finding is unsurprising [28, 35]. In addition, given the widespread perception that non-democratic systems more easily breed corruption than democratic ones,5 it is hypothesised that the greater the citizens’ worries about corruption, the higher the support for democracy will be [28]. The third variable in perceived political performance addressed in this study is “political trust” [11, 48]. This variable was measured by the standardized factor scores of trust in the central government, local government, and the legal system. Considering the empirical literature, a higher confidence in government institutions will bring about a stronger commitment to democracy [3]. Recent research shows that citizens tend to have more trust in existing institutions when they feel that their interests are protected. Those with greater trust in such institutions will also have greater support for the existing regime structure, regardless of whether it is democratic or autocratic [24]. Therefore, it is hypothesised that citizens who have more trust in existing institutions, such as the central government, local government and the legal system, will tend to have greater or lesser support for democracy under democratic or autocratic societies, respectively. Concerning the impact of perceived economic performance on support for democracy in East Asia, current research indicates the economy is given a higher priority than democracy by a wide margin [9]. Perceived economic performance has been found to be statistically significant in buttressing democracy in East Asia [38], though other recent research has not found such evidence [9]. This paper will explore whether support for democracy in the six studied societies rests mainly on economic and instrumental concerns. The following questions were used to gauge the impact of perceived economic performance on public support for democracy. i) Do you think the government has done well in handling unemployment? ii) Are you satisfied with your household income? and iii) Are you worried about the economy? It is hypothesised that the more satisfied respondents are with household income and the government’s handling of unemployment and the less worried they are about the economy, the more supportive they will be of the current political system. Therefore, for democratic and non-democratic societies, lower levels of perceived 4

Principle component analysis on the five human rights items produced one component in each country’s group. Standardized factor scores are used for regression analysis because it can capture the different weights each country group placed on satisfaction of human rights. 5 This perception has been challenged by the research of Treisman [47].

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economic performance are expected to lead, respectively, to lower and higher public support for democracy. The performance perspective, however, has been challenged for neglecting traditional and postmodern values that may shape support for democracy. The next perspective will therefore stress the impact of cultural factors on the support. Political Culture Approach This cultural approach claims that values shape behaviours over a long period despite changes in social structure [14]. Though mass values may not directly determine whether a country successfully democratizes, it is contended that they do affect mass pressure on democratization, particularly in the long term [15]. Many recent studies on democratization have emphasised cultural values, both traditional and nontraditional, in shaping support for democracy. Because many researchers have used Asian values to explain the relatively lower level of democracy in East Asia, the traditional value of respect for authority, a common indicator of Asian values, will be explored first. For over a decade, intellectuals and politicians have robustly debated the appropriateness and compatibility of Western-style democracy in Asia. Protagonists of the theory of so-called traditional Asian values argue that Asians place more emphasis on respect for authority than Westerners and that these values decrease mass support for democracy, thereby obstructing democratic development in Asia [12]. Advocates of Asian values maintain that a benevolent, paternalistic form of governance is better suited to Asian societies than liberal democracy [31]. Testing the effects of respect for authority, therefore, has implications for the debate over Asian values [12]. To assess the respect for authority in general, three aspects were assessed: i) respect for traditional authority; ii) respect for seniors among children at home; and iii) respect of children for teachers. It is hypothesised that greater levels of respect for teachers, seniors and authority lead to lower support for democracy. Besides the three traditional values, three non-traditional values were also tested, with the first centring on post-materialism. The theory of post-modernisation holds that continuous economic development triggers a gradual change from materialist to post-materialist values, i.e. towards a greater emphasis on freedom of speech and participation in public policy. The theory argues that post-materialists are more likely to buttress democracy than materialists for three reasons. First, post-materialism implies an emphasis on self-expression and participation that enhances political participation to attain democracy. Second, post-materialists tend to consider democracy an intrinsic value and, therefore, provide more secure support for democracy than materialists. Third, post-materialists are more likely than materialists to embrace a wide range of fundamental democratic values.6 Therefore, post-materialism will be measured to test its effect on mass support.7 The “post-materialism” and “support for democracy” are composed of different constituent variables, and therefore no tautology is involved in using the former to explain the latter. 7 It is measured by the choice of most important and second-most important selection regarding a) maintaining order in the nation; b) giving people more say in important government decisions; c) fighting rising prices; and d) protecting freedom of speech. A score of 1 is given to the materialistic choices a) and c), a score of 3 is given to the post-materialistic choices b) and d), and a score of 2 is given when one materialistic and one post-materialistic choice is made. 6

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Besides, because bribery is common in East Asian societies, how individuals’ acceptance of bribery in the course of their duties impact support for democracy will be studied. Research shows that corruption feeds a culture of mistrust and that greater acceptance of corruption breeds lower support for political institutions, including democratic institutions [8]. Finally, research shows that greater tolerance generally increases support for democracy. It has been argued that tolerance of out-groups is essential to democracy: civil liberties and legitimate opposition demand tolerance and patience towards groups with whom one disagrees and dislikes. In addition, many argue that a democratic system needs a civic culture under which people demonstrate tolerance to make the system work and endure [23]. Some useful indicators of tolerance include the degree to which abortion and homosexuality are tolerated. Therefore, the potential effect on support for democracy of whether the public find abortion and homosexuality justified will be assessed. The two items are combined to become one variable, representing the concept of tolerance.

Control Variables Data about the social bases of support for democracy remind us of possible social cleavages over such support. Findings about the effect of socio-demographic factors on mass support for democracy have been unclear [4]. Education has been cited by some analysts as important in raising tolerance, assertiveness, and political knowledge, which in turn increases public support for democracy in African and Arab countries. Other analysts argue that people with more education are more likely to accept prevailing norms and give greater support to authoritarian systems [20]. The effect of age on support for democracy has been found to be dependent on the collective experiences of various age groups. For instance, older people in Africa have been found to be more supportive of democracy owing to their generationspecific experiences under non-democracies [5]. It is thus important to understand the effects of age in relation to the cohort-specific experiences of individual countries with different overall contexts. The effect of income on democratic support will also be assessed. Research on Eastern Europe shows no evidence of effect of income on democratic commitment [17]. In another work, increased income has been found to have a positive, though weak, effect on support for democracy [28]. In this study, country dummies are used in the regression model to consider unobserved fixed country characteristics that may affect the support for democracy.

Measurement of Public Support for Democracy Similar to Inglehart’s measure, the measurement of support for democracy in this study is based on four indicators drawn from the Asia Barometer (2006) surveys reflecting respondents’ evaluations of democratic and autocratic systems. The first indicator represents the democracy component, asking respondents “whether they think a democratic political system is good for their country”. The other three indicators

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represent autocracy, asking respondents’ evaluation of “a military government”, “a system whereby decisions affecting the country are made by experts”, and “governance by a powerful leader without the restriction of parliament or elections”. All items were measured on a 3-point scale where 30very good, 20fairly good, and 10poor. Principle component analysis was performed on the three autocratic items and consistently one component is produced. The results indicated that there was no conceptual distinction among the three autocratic items across the six nations being studied. To derive a weighted and exclusive ‘level of democratic support’ scale, the democracy item was first standardised, and then its score was deducted by the standardised factor score of the autocratic component to reduce superficial support for democracy by gauging the extent that respondents support democracy and reject authoritarianism [12]. As a result, a higher exclusive level of democratic support not only suggests a greater level of democratic support but also reflects how exclusively respondents support democracy. The subtraction of autocratic component by democratic component is needed for another reason. Scholars of democratic transition have contended that legitimacy of democracy can be strengthened if there are no preferable alternatives [33]. The subtraction can therefore help assess a more meaningful level of support for democracy. Given the usefulness of the subtraction in indicating a more genuine level of how exclusively respondents support democracy, various work has used the subtraction to gauge the democratic support, despite the differences in their constituent measurements of democratic and autocratic component [31, 50, 52].

Perceived Economic Performance Outweighs Political Performance To explain support for democracy, multivariate regression modelling was performed using the STATA statistical software package. The standardised findings are presented in Table 1. To obtain a more refined analysis, the autocratic societies were divided into three groups: all three autocratic societies, the most autocratic society (China) and the two less autocratic societies (Singapore and Hong Kong). Similarly, the democratic societies were divided into three groups: all three democratic societies (Japan, Taiwan and South Korea), the oldest democracy (Japan), and the two younger democracies (Taiwan and South Korea). Given that rapid and sustained economic development is viewed as important in explaining the relatively lower level of democracy in East Asia, it is worth exploring whether variables of perceived economic performance count more than those of perceived political performance in explaining democratic support in the region. The difference in explanatory power among many variables in Table 1 is statistically insignificant. However, when the explanatory power of different categories of explanatory variables is compared, the group of perceived economic performance stands out as the most important for the group of autocratic societies (Table 2).8 8 Table 2 shows the r-squares adjusted by different blocks of independent variables listed in Table 1. To statistically examine the group(s) that contribute(s) the most to explaining the support for democracy within a nation, the Vuong (1989) test, a test of two non-nested linear regressions based on the level of r-square, was performed. Given that each block of factors contains the same number of independent variables, testing based on r-square rather than on the adjusted r-square is acceptable. The Vuong (1989) test is a Stata module written by Caskey [7].

Perceived economic performance:

Traditional cultural values:

Non-traditional cultural values:

0.02 (1.47) -0.10

Satisfaction in household income

10Dissatisfied to 50Very satisfied

Worry aboute#

0.10

00Not mention, 10Mentioned as important (1.29)

Teach children respect for teachers

Gov’t effective in handling unemployment

-0.06 (0.70)

00Not mention, 10Mentioned as important

10Not Well to 40Very well

0.01 (2.42)*

Teach children respect for seniors

-0.03

10Never to 100Always justified (4.29)**

Homosexual & abortion justification

Respect for authority

-0. (2.32)*

10Never to 100Always justified

10Bad, 20Do not mind, 30Good

-0.01 (5.51)**

Accepting a bribe in the course of duties

-0.07

10Low, 20Medium, 30High (0.32)

Income level

Post-materialism

-0.09 (4.45)**

10Low, 20Medium, 30High

10Materialism, 20Mixed, 30Post-materialism

0.08 (6.12)**

Education level

0.07 (4.19)**

Age

Socio-demo-graphic factors:

(1)

Group of three autocratic societies

Ranged from 18 to 64

Independent variables: Equations:

Group of variable:

Societies:

Table 1 Standardised OLS regression model of public support for democracy

-0.02

(0.79)

0.07

(0.32)

0.12

(0.59)

0.00

(0.76)

-0.02

(3.56)**

-0.02

(1.85)

-0.02

(3.16)**

-0.01

(0.56)

-0.08

(2.81)**

-0.08

(5.42)**

0.07

(3.64)**

0.09

(2)

China

-0.14

(1.76)

0.00

(2.11)*

0.06

(0.23)

-0.06

(2.65)**

0.06

(2.18)*

-0.06

(2.15)*

-0.04

(5.70)**

0.00

(0.94)

-0.05

(2.92)**

-0.15

(3.25)**

0.08

(2.94)**

0.07

(3)

Hong Kong & Singapore

0.00

(0.54)

0.00

(1.87)

0.00

(2.21)*

-0.06

(2.14)*

0.01

(4.27)**

0.12

(4.88)**

-0.01

(5.08)**

-0.04

(2.18)*

-0.09

(1.07)

-0.10

(1.65)

0.02

(4.57)**

0.10

(4)

Group of three democratic societies

0.00

(1.72)

0.00

(0.64)

0.00

(0.20)

0.00

(2.76)**

-0.04

(4.81)**

0.19

(2.44)*

-0.06

(0.59)

0.01

(2.75)**

-0.18

(1.82)

-0.02

(2.68)**

0.07

(3.04)**

0.12

(5)

Japan

0.00

(0.84)

0.00

(2.65)**

0.00

(2.50)*

-0.06

(0.94)

0.04

(2.12)*

0.07

(4.60)**

0.02

(5.75)**

-0.06

(0.93)

-0.05

(0.16)

-0.14

(0.20)

0.00

(2.18)*

0.06

(6)

South. Korea & Taiwan

East Asia (2012) 29:215–234 223

6.9 %

Adjusted R-squared:

5.3 %

6.8 %

5.4 %

10.31**

18.88**

F-statistics:

10.36**

3019

4021

Observations:

8.57**

(2.61)** 2029

0.00

Reference group is Taiwan (00) 1990

(4.17)**

South Korea dummy (01) where

(0.77)

0.00

(1.19)

0.00

(5.85)**

0.00

(0.67)

(4)

Group of three democratic societies

0.00

(2.02)*

0.04

(2.44)*

0.02

(0.03)

-0.06

(2.22)*

-0.05

(5.09)**

(3)

Hong Kong & Singapore

Reference group is Taiwan (00)

0.01 (2.60)**

Reference group is Singapore (00)

(1.02)

-0.06

(0.37)

0.01

(0.69)

-0.18

(3.23)**

(2)

China

Japan dummy (01) where

(6.03)**

Hong Kong dummy (01) where

(0.76)

00Not mentioned, 10Mentioned

Reference group is Singapore (00)

-0.01

Worry about corruption 0.12

(0.45)

Higher score, Greater trust

China dummy (01) where

(1.76) -0.04

Political trust#

Satisfaction with human rights#

Higher score, Greater satisfaction

(5.92)** -0.09

00Not, 10Either, 20Both mentioned

(1)

Group of three autocratic societies

Independent variables: Equations:

Societies:

12.2 %

10.46**

993

(1.31)

0.00

(0.01)

0.00

(5.42)**

0.00

(1.86)

(5)

Japan

5.5 %

7.56**

2028

0.00

(2.37)*

(1.70)

0.00

(1.54)

0.00

(3.02)**

0.00

(1.69)

(6)

South. Korea & Taiwan

Note: Entries are standardised OLS regression coefficients with robust t statistics in parentheses based on results from five individual imputed dataset; * significant at 5 % and ** significant at 1 %. There is no multicollinearity in the data according to Variance Inflation Factors. Data are drawn from AsiaBarometer Surveys (2006). # “Worry about economy” is a composite score that includes mention of worry about economy and unemployment in one’s country. “Satisfaction with rights” is a factor score generated from four items including the right to participate in any kind of organisation, to gather and demonstrate, to criticise the government, and to be informed about the work and functions of the government. “Political trust” is a factor score derived from trust in the central government, local government, and legal system

Country dummy:

Perceived political performance:

Group of variable:

Table 1 (continued)

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Table 2 Adjusted R-square by block of independent variables Societies:

Group of three autocratic societies

China

Hong Kong & Singapore

Group of three democratic societies

Japan

South. Korea & Taiwan

Group of variables: Equations:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Group 1. Country dummies:

1.6 %

0.0 %

0.0 %

Group 2. Sociodemographic factors:

2.9 %#

3.7 %#

1.3 %#

0.6 %

3.5 %#

0.0 %

Group 3. Non-traditional cultural values:

1.7 %#

1.5 %

1.7 %#

2.2 %#

1.4 %

3.2 %#

Group 4. Traditional cultural values:

0.6 %

1.1 %

0.8 %#

1.3 %#

4.1 %#

0.7 %

Group 5. Perceived economic performance:

2.0 %#

0.7 %

1.9 %#

0.4 %

0.3 %

0.8 %

Group 6. Perceived political performance:

0.0 %

0.0 %

1.4 %#

1.7 %#

4.6 %#

1.0 %#

All independent variables:

6.9 %

5.3 %

6.80 %

5.4 %

12.2 %

5.5 %

1.4 %

Note: Simulation is done based on the variables of Table 1. # denotes the Vuong (1989) test results on the most important block of factors in explaining the support for democracy within a nation

The effect of variables regarding perceived economic performance for autocratic societies is witnessed by the finding that the greater the “worry about economy” in China, the group including Singapore and Hong Kong, and the group of all three autocratic societies, the larger the mass support for democracy is. In addition, for Singapore and Hong Kong, the better the government was considered in handling unemployment, the less support for democracy was expressed. Even when the respondents are divided into the employed and the unemployed, the same statistical relationships hold. These findings confirm the hypothesis that in authoritarian regimes, unfavourable perceptions of economic performance tend to raise public support for democracy. Concerning perceived political performance, it has been hypothesised that greater satisfaction of citizens with human rights within non-democratic regimes leads to less support for democracy. Regression analysis (Table 1) shows that for the group of Singapore and Hong Kong, greater satisfaction with human rights does lead to less support for democracy. One reason for this trend may be that when the public is more satisfied with human rights in their autocratic societies, they feel little need to change their non-democratic system, a finding compatible with my hypothesis. Another possible explanation pertains to conceptions of democracy in those societies. The government of Singapore and some scholars have branded its political system as a “practical” democracy in which collectivism and respect for authority are emphasised over protection of human rights and political participation [11]. The conception of democracy among Singaporeans may help us understand why greater satisfaction with human rights in Singapore has led to less support for democracy there. Likewise, for Hong Kong, a high proportion of the population conceives of democracy as a political system that consults public opinion [26]. Therefore, the more

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citizens of Hong Kong are satisfied with the right to gather, demonstrate and participate in any type of organisation, the more likely they are to support democracy, a system that consults public opinion. In short, in the three non-democratic systems in East Asia, increased satisfaction with human rights leads to less support for democracy, perhaps owing to the people’s conceptions of democracy in these countries. Similarly, regarding the extent of worry about corruption, for the group of autocratic regimes of Singapore and Hong Kong, less worry about corruption is correlated to greater support for democracy. This finding aligns well with the hypothesis that people in autocratic societies expect democracy to be able to contain or reduce corruption. However, when considering the group of three autocratic societies together, no variable within the category of perceived political performance is statistically significant. Therefore, for the entire group of autocratic societies, perceived political performance does not shape democratic support. This finding deviates from earlier findings for other autocratic societies. For the group of three East Asian democracies, the category of perceived political performance counts more than that of perceived economic performance in explaining the support. For the three democracies, none of the three variables in perceived economic performance is significant except that when government is perceived to be able to effectively handle unemployment, greater democratic support is generated in Taiwan and South Korea. The same statistical significance for the variable of “government perceived to be able to handle unemployment” is found when the population is divided into the employed and the unemployed. By contrast, for democracies, a high satisfaction with human rights has consistently led to a high level of support for democracy. Because human rights are an intrinsic value of liberal democracies, support for democracy in these three East Asian countries is therefore less driven by either perceived political performance or intrinsic value. This finding is unsurprising considering that all three of these countries, now liberal democracies, suffered blatant violations of human rights before they became highly democratized. In South Korea and Taiwan, the desire to improve human rights became a major impetus for democracy movements prior to transition to full democracy [25]. In addition, a larger extent of worry about corruption among the democratic countries failed to exert a statistically significant effect on the support for democracy. Overall, among the three East Asian liberal democracies, democratic support depends more on a secure basis of commitment to human rights than on a potentially volatile economic good. This finding bodes well for continued mass support for democracy in them and for their democratic consolidation even should their economies turn sour. By contrast, for the three autocracies, support for democracy has hinged on low satisfaction with perceived economic performance rather than on perceived political performance. This finding implies that in non-democratic East Asian societies, the public will bring greater pressure for democratization when the economy deteriorates than when political performance is judged increasingly negatively.

Impact of Cultural Values In terms of variables regarding traditional values, regression shows that the higher the level of “respect for authority”, the larger the support for democracy for all six

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227

combinations of societies (Table 1). However, this finding is not sufficient to confirm the thesis of Asian values. Protagonists of the theory of Asian values argue for the following two core premises: i) Asians more strongly emphasise respect for authority than Westerners and ii) Asian values decrease mass support for democracy, thereby obstructing democratic development in Asia [12]. To provide partial confirmation of the theory of Asian values, both i) and ii) need to be confirmed. Contrary to the theory of Asian values, few people in Hong Kong and Japan subscribe to respect for authority; in 2006, these countries were ranked the third and fourth lowest in this value, respectively, among ten Asian and 14 Western societies (Fig. 1). Even in Taiwan, China, Singapore and South Korea, respect for authority is less than in some developed Western societies. Why has the average level of respect for authority in the six societies been lower than what has been presumed under the theory of Asian values. Post-modernisation theory suggests economic development and peace can foster a sense of security and consequently dampen the desire for the strong authority that religion and the centralised nation-states supplied. Accordingly, the sustained economic growth of Japan, Taiwan, Singapore and China may have contributed to the erosion of respect for authority, as has been found in many developed societies. However, given the higher level and longer history of economic development in many advanced Western societies compared to most East Asian ones, it is unlikely that economic development alone can entirely explain the lower levels of respect for authority in East Asian societies. Another factor that complements post-modernisation theory in accounting for the relatively low respect for authority among East Asian 100% 90%

86% 86% 81%

80%

79% 73%

71%

% Say Good

70% 60%

60%

59% 58% 54%

52% 52% 49%

50%

43% 38% 38% 36% 35%

40%

31%

30% 24% 19% 18% 17%17%

20% 10%

Thailand

Indonesia

*Japan

*Hong Kong

Norway

Sweden

*China

*Singapore

India

*Taiwan

Italy

Finland

Malaysia

Germany

New Zealand

Australia

*S. Korea

USA

Canada

Britain

Netherlands

Spain

France

Vietnam

0%

Fig. 1 Respondents who consider “respect for authority” a good quality in 11 Asian and 13 Western societies. Note: “*” denotes data drawn from AsiaBarometer Survey (2006), otherwise from WVS (20052008). Question wording of AsiaBarometer: “Is it a good thing to have greater respect for traditional authority?” Wording on WVS: “I'm going to read out a list of various changes in our way of life that might take place in the near future. Please tell me for each one, if it were to happen, whether you think it would be a good thing, a bad thing, or don't you mind?”

228

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societies is cumulative public frustration with the performance of governments, especially in Japan, mainland China, and Hong Kong. In Japan, long-time one-party rule by the conservative Liberal Democratic Party has been associated with political malaise and has contributed to the lack of trust of politicians and dissatisfaction with democracy [32]. In Hong Kong, the legitimating bases for Hong Kong’s non-democratic political system have been continuously hit by deepening social inequality, blatant cronyism, incomplete economic restructuring, an unaccountable political system, and threats of decreased freedoms since its handover to mainland China [42]. Furthermore, despite the rapid economic growth of mainland China, this region has been plagued by rising inequality, underinvestment in human capital, damage to the environment, and pervasive corruption [32]. The aforementioned scenarios have fostered cumulative public frustration with the performance of governments and, as a result, have decreased respect for authority. To test the Asian values thesis further, we need to determine whether respect for authority can explain mass support for democracy. As shown in Table 1, a higher degree of respect of authority decreases support for democracy in all six East Asian societies. However, given the relatively lower respect for authority among East Asian societies compared with Western ones, a core feature of the theory of Asian values has not been confirmed by this research. The efficacy of the theory of Asian values in explaining democratic support is further weakened by another finding. Contrary to what has been hypothesised, it was found that the more respondents that taught children to respect seniors, the higher the level of democratic support is in the three autocratic societies and Taiwan and Singapore. More research needs to be conducted to interpret this finding. Can non-traditional values account for democratic support? Table 1 shows for both autocratic and democratic societies except for China, higher tolerance of abortion and homosexuality favours higher democratic support. This finding aligns well with existing research [23]. In addition, for five of the six countries (not Japan), the more respondents do not accept bribery in the course of duties as justified, the more democratic support they exhibit. Thus, in the majority of both democratic and nondemocratic societies of East Asia, citizens who do not accept corruption in the course of public duties show greater support for democracy. Concerning post-materialism, the percentages of post-materialists are the highest in the two most economically developed societies, namely Japan (11.94 %) and Hong Kong (10.41 %) (Fig. 2). In Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea and mainland China, less than ten percent of the population is post-materialist. Overall, East Asians exhibit relatively low levels of post-materialism compared with citizens in developed Western countries (Fig. 2). Greater post-materialism was found to be conducive to higher support for democracy in the group of democracies and in Japan alone. According to post-modernisation theory, the rise of post-materialism can be partly traced to sustained economic development. In the group of all three democracies, economic growth over the last few decades may have raised economic security for many people, leading to a change in values: people who formerly gave top priority to physical sustenance and safety may now assign greater relative value to freedom, self-expression and participation in public policies. For instance, the long-term economic development in Japan has boosted a post-materialist shift in values among Japanese citizens [46]. For Hong Kong, more or less sustained economic growth and

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229

30% 28%

25% 24% 23% 22% 19%

20%

19% 18%

18%

17%

16%

15% 12% 12% 12% 10%

10% 7% 5%

5%

5%

4%

4%

4% 3%

2%

*Taiwan

7%

*S. Korea

% Support Postmaterialism

25%

25%

*Singapore

*China

Thailand

India

Indonesia

Vietnam

Malaysia

*Hong Kong

Finland

Spain

*Japan

Germany

Netherlands

USA

France

Italy

Norway

Australia

New Zealand

Britain

Switzerland

Canada

Sweden

0%

Fig. 2 Respondents who consider post-materialists important in 11 Asian and 14 Western societies. Note: “*” denoted data drawn from AsiaBarometer Survey (2006); otherwise WVS (2005-2008)

relatively high-level economic development in East Asia since the 1960s has fostered post-materialism among some of its citizens [43]. The much smaller proportion of post-materialists in Singapore and South Korea compared with those in Japan and Hong Kong suggests that in addition to sustained economic growth, the perceived adequacy of welfare and external military threats also shape the level of post-materialism. For China, the poorest one among the six East Asian societies, previous research reveals a relatively low level of economic development has disposed its people to treasure physical security more than post-materialist needs. The majority of Chinese people grew up under economic scarcity, and their political culture was formed when scarcity and shortage were a consistent reality. People born before the 1970s were found to place a much higher priority on physical security than on the political rights embodied in post-materialism [49]. My research also shows that post-materialism fails to explain the level of support for democracy in China. Will post-materialism grow among the younger and more educated generation in East Asia? In another regression analysis, post-materialism was regressed on age and education, for each of the six country groups; the adjusted R-square is no more than 2 %. Younger people tend to be more supportive of post-materialism than older people for the category of two societies of Korea and Taiwan as well as that of Singapore and Hong Kong, but this pattern is not repeated in the other four combinations of societies. In addition, for the category of Taiwan and Korea, well-educated people are not more inclined than less educated ones to be supportive of postmaterialism. Thus, there is little evidence that East Asians would be remarkably more supportive of post-materialism when education improves and new generations follow. In general, the explanatory power of the block of traditional Asian values does not outweigh that of non-traditional values in any of the six East Asian countries studied.

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Socio-Demographic Factors Like some African and Eastern European countries, education exerts ambiguous effects on the support in East Asia. While education is positively associated with democratic support for all three combinations of autocratic societies, it is positively associated with the support only in Japan. What is more revealing is that older people tend to embrace democracy more than younger people in all six combinations of societies. This finding echoes a recent research on Africa, which finds older people who have been haunted by brutal repression under authoritarian regimes are more supportive of democracy than younger ones without such experiences [5]. Thus, understanding the relationship between age and democratic support in the light of cohort-specific experiences is important. In Japan, for instance, previous literature highlights that younger people have been far from being pro-democracy [29]. Economic decline in Japan since the 1990s has induced so much financial and psychological stress that the socio-economic context has dampened the support of this cohort for democracy. In Hong Kong, older people have been more supportive of democracy in Hong Kong than younger people [41]. As Hong Kong was once a refugee society, many middle-aged and older people in Hong Kong were refugees fleeing from mainland China seeking more freedoms, prosperity and political stability [21]. Beleaguered with vivid experiences of communist rule in mainland China, older people demonstrate more support than younger ones for democracy to secure their freedoms, stability and prosperity. Age may also interact with conceptions of democracy to shape the support. It has been argued previously that Chinese equate democracy with good governance [37]. The possible equation of democracy with good governance in China allows us to understand why older Chinese faced with many challenges in their lives are more likely to espouse democracy than younger ones. The allegation that Chinese equate democracy with good governance has received some support from the latest data of the World Values Survey (2005-2008), which includes measurements of conceptions of democracy for China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. The survey reported that an obviously higher proportion of Chinese conceive of democracy as an economic good, based on agreement with statements such as “government taxes the rich and subsidises the poor” (80.69 %) and “people receive state aid for unemployment” (88.92 %) (Table 3). The data suggest, compared to their counterparts in three East Asian democracies, mainland Chinese have a more mixed conception of democracy and tend to equate democracy with both positive economic goods and political rights. In Singapore, some scholars and politicians contend that its political system is a form of pragmatic democracy pervaded by a communitarian ethos stressing collectivism, greater acceptance of and respect for authority and hierarchy, and the continued rule of a dominant party. Younger Singaporeans, finding political restrictions on civil liberties and free elections associated with the alleged “pragmatic democracy” of their country [34], may thus be less enthusiastic about democracy than the older generation. Finally, income is statistically significant and negatively related to democratic support for all three combinations of autocratic societies, though it is not significant for all three groups of democratic societies. People with higher income in autocratic societies are those with vested interests who may resist regime change to ward off possible damage to their interests.

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231

Table 3 Frequency distribution of the conceptions of democracy among four Asian societies Score:

China 1-5

Taxation State aid Elections Liberty Score: Taxation State aid Elections Liberty

Japan 6-10

Total

1-5

6-10

Total

314

1312

1626

240

746

986

19.31 %

80.69 %

100.00 %

24.34 %

75.66 %

100.00 %

183

1468

1651

186

790

976

11.08 %

88.92 %

100.00 %

19.06 %

80.94 %

100.00 %

137

1442

1579

95

894

989

8.68 %

91.32 %

100.00 %

9.61 %

90.39 %

100.00 %

102

1313

1415

145

737

882

7.21 %

92.79 %

100.00 %

16.44 %

83.56 %

100.00 %

1-5

6-10

Total

1-5

6-10

Total

273

927

1200

251

964

1215

22.75 %

77.25 %

100.00 %

20.66 %

79.34 %

100.00 %

South Korea

Taiwan

344

856

1200

162

1053

1215

28.67 %

71.33 %

100.00 %

13.33 %

86.67 %

100.00 %

141

1059

1200

77

1141

1218

11.75 %

88.25 %

100.00 %

6.32 %

93.68 %

100.00 %

275

924

1199

75

1138

1213

22.94 %

77.06 %

100.00 %

6.18 %

93.82 %

100.00 %

Note: Data are from the World Values Survey (2005-2008). Respondents’ conceptions of democracy were tapped in four ingredients i) taxation: “governments tax the rich and subsidise the poor,” ii) state aid: “people receive government benefits for unemployment,” iii) elections: “people choose their leaders in free elections” and iv) liberty: “civil rights protect people’s liberty against oppression” are a characteristic of democracy on a 1-10 point scale, where 1 means not an essential characteristic of democracy and 10 means an essential characteristic of democracy. This table shows the frequency distribution on each conception of democracy by collapsing the respondents into two groups. Scores of 1-5 and 6-10 represent, respectively, the percentage of those who think a certain ingredient an unessential or an essential characteristic of democracy. (Data for Hong Kong and Singapore are not available.)

Prospects for Democracy and Theoretical Implications Unlike research that underscores the primacy of economic goods in shaping democratic support in East Asia [9], this study shows perceived economic performance outweighs perceived political performance in affecting the support only for autocratic countries. In three East Asian democratic countries, the support hinges more on perceived political rather than economic performance. The last finding aligns with the pattern exhibited by many new democracies in Africa and Eastern Europe [4, 30]. Because satisfaction with human rights represents both an intrinsic value of democracy and a central element of perceived political performance, the findings presented here suggest a good chance of democratic survival among the three East Asian democracies, given the small danger of suppressing popular demand for

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democracy by offering economic benefits in the three democratic countries. By contrast, among the three non-democratic societies in which perceived economic performance is more important than political performance in explaining democratic support, given the expected large volatility in perceived economic performance across time, building sustained support for democracy may be a difficult task. That said, the dim prospect for building up democratic support in East Asia needs to be balanced by our partial challenge on the validity of the “Asian values” thesis and, subsequently, on the alleged unsuitability of democracy for Asia. Respect for authority, an essential characteristic of Asian values, has been regarded as detrimental to democratic support. Advocates of Asian values believe that East Asians tend to have higher levels of respect for authority than Westerners. The low levels of respect in Japan, China and Hong Kong and the average levels in Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea compared with those of 13 Western countries call into question the validity of the Asian values thesis. The fact that “teaching children to respect seniors” triggers higher support for democracy further undermines the support of the thesis of Asian values. Yet, because respect for authority includes many dimensions, more indicators of it need to be used in future to put the theory of Asian values to a fuller test. This statement is especially true because there was no significant association (p> 0.05) between “respect for authority” and “support for democracy” at the individual level across 57 countries in the WVS (2005-2008) examined by the author. On post-materialism, the small proportion of post-materialists (Fig. 2) in East Asian than Western societies cautions us against inflating the democratic support in East Asia. Moreover, post-materialism can weaken rapidly, especially during economic downturns [20]. What is worse, in the six societies studied, young people have not been more supportive of post-materialism than older respondents. This finding reveals a lack of guarantee that East Asians will support post-materialism, and in turn, democracy more as time progresses. Further work is needed to assess why young people have not been more enthusiastic than older people about post-materialism. In the model with democratic support as the dependent variable (Table 1), while the adjusted R-square for Japan was in double digits, those for other societies were in single digits. To improve the model, future research may explore how Asians conceive democracy. Public conceptions of democracy may affect how they expect and evaluate democracy, which in turn shape their support for democracy. In the questionnaire of AsiaBarometer, no variable is available to assess the possible impact of external factors on democratic support. The external factor of China may have shaped democratic support in Hong Kong. Similarly, the support for democracy in Taiwan and South Korea may have been bolstered by the complex and often fraught relations with the mainland and North Korea respectively. Exogenous factors should thus be included in the future questionnaire for better analysis. In the future, as data from more countries in other parts of Asia are collected under projects such as the Asian Barometer and World Values Surveys, it will be possible to conduct similar tests on a larger and broader sample of Asian countries. Of no less importance, the inclusion of more variables, including variables that reflect differences at both the individual and the national levels, will permit more rigorous testing. In this paper, the testing of the impacts of variables was mainly performed at the individual level; the effects of regime type and other country-level variables were not investigated other than by dividing the cases into two different regime types. To test

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233

the hypotheses more completely and to more thoroughly account for public support for democracy, variables at both the individual and country levels should be adopted for a much larger number of countries.

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