The Journal of Value Inquiry (2005) 39: 203–214 DOI: 10.1007/s10790-006-5763-y

C 

Springer 2006

Fair-Weather Friendships JAMES O. GRUNEBAUM State University of New York, 639 Lafayette Ave., New York 14222-1435, USA

1. Seneca says that in “the so-called ‘fair-weather’ friendships; one who is chosen for the sake of utility will be satisfactory only while he is useful . . . . He who begins to be your friend because it pays will also cease because it pays.”1 Both fair-weather, and utility-based friendships have been unjustly undervalued by philosophers. Aristotle’s virtue friendship has been considered the pre-eminent ideal in Western Philosophy.2 Virtue friends have goodwill for each other because of their equally virtuous characters. They desire to share as much of their time together as possible. They regard property as common between them, and they consider a benefit to one as a benefit to both.3 Aristotle says of virtue friends that they are “other selves.”4 His other two forms of friendship based on utility or pleasure are regarded as far less valuable and therefore less worth pursuing and preserving. He gives the appearance, in some places, of arguing that these lesser friendships lack the reciprocal goodwill constitutive of virtue friendship and are not really friendships at all. For example, in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle provides the following contrast between character or virtue friendships and the lesser friendships based on pleasure or utility: Now those who love each other for their utility do not love each other for themselves but in virtue of some good which they get from each other. So too with those who love for the sake of pleasure; it is not for their character that men love ready-witted people, but because they find them pleasant. Therefore those who love for the sake of utility love for the sake of what is good for themselves, and those who love for the sake of pleasure do so for the sake of what is pleasant to themselves, and not in so far as the other is the person loved but in so far as he is useful or pleasant. And thus these friendships are only incidental; for it is not as being the man he is that the loved person is loved, but as providing some good or pleasure.

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Such friendships, then, are easily dissolved, if the parties do not remain like themselves; for if the one party is no longer pleasant or useful the other ceases to love him. Now the useful is not permanent but is always changing. Thus when the motive of the friendship is done away, the friendship is dissolved, inasmuch as it existed only for the ends in question.5 Appearances aside, when Aristotle opens his discussion of friendship, he distinguishes three kinds of friendship based on three reasons for loving: “For not everything seems to be loved but only the lovable, and this is good, pleasant, or useful.”6 Immediately after, he defines friendship as reciprocated goodwill: “To be friends, then, they must be mutually recognized as bearing goodwill and wishing well to each other for one of the aforesaid reasons.”7 In this passage, Aristotle seems to acknowledge that utility can ground reciprocal goodwill and friendship to the same extent that virtue can. Virtue friendships are too difficult for many people to achieve or sustain. Most actual friendships fall short of the ideal of virtue friendship and are based on either pleasure or utility. The implication must be resisted that most actual friendships have little value because they are less than ideal. Though many actual friendships are based on utility or pleasure, such friendships have much more value than Aristotle acknowledges. Providing a demonstration of the greater value of utility friendship requires three stages. The first is an analysis of Aristotle’s own reasons for thinking that utility friendships have so little value. In the second stage, the focus is on how differences between virtue friendship and utility friendship do not lessen the value of utility friendships in the ways that Aristotle believes. The final stage is comprised by reasons for thinking that utility friendships are valuable precisely because of their differences from virtue friendship.

2. Aristotle explicitly states that all forms of friendship, whatever their bases happen to be, share the same property of reciprocal goodwill.8 In friendship, friends want to promote each other’s well-being and each friend knows of the other’s goodwill. Utility-based friendships, according to Aristotle, are friendships in which the reciprocal goodwill of a friend is based on the mutual benefits of the friendship. While utility friends have reciprocal goodwill for each other, unlike virtue friends, their goodwill is based on the mutual advantage of the friendship not on the equally virtuous character of the friends. Utility friends rely on each other: they are there when we need them, willing to lend a helping hand, and someone to be counted on.

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It is a mistake, however, to dissociate, completely, benefits from friendship and the character of the friends. Some benefits from friendship are consequences of external circumstances or social position of the friends, for example, being in a position to offer employment to a friend’s children. In such circumstances Aristotle is right in suggesting that the friend’s character plays only a minor role in the reasons for friendship. Overlooked by Aristotle are other causes of benefits in friendship. Often the benefits that friends provide each other arise from their characters. For example, two utility friends can mutually benefit from philosophical conversations with each other only because they are both philosophers. It is having the character of being philosophers that enables the friends to benefit in this way. Benefits of this variety can be as permanent and stable as are their characters, and thus no more changeable than virtue friendships. Aristotle is not consistent in his discussions about reciprocal goodwill in utility friendships. In some places he sees utility friends having goodwill for each other. In other places he describes utility friendships in such a caustic way that it is difficult to see that they are friendships at all: Friendship being divided into these kinds; bad men will be friends for the sake of pleasure or utility, being in this respect like each other, but good men will be friends for their own sake, i.e., in virtue of their goodness. These, then, are friends without qualification; the others are friends incidentally and through a resemblance to these.9 The man who has received a benefit bestows goodwill in return for what has been done to him, and in doing so is doing what is just; while he who wishes some one to prosper because he hopes for enrichment through him seems to have goodwill not to him but rather to himself, just as a man is not a friend to another if he cherishes him for the sake of some use to be made of him.10 But the friendship of utility is full of complaints; for as they use each other for their own interests they always want to get the better of the bargain, and think they have got less than they should, and blame their partners because they do not get all they want and deserve; and those who do well by others cannot help them as much as those whom they benefit want.11 In these passages, Aristotle draws a different picture of utility friendships than he paints about the way virtue-based friends value each other. Unlike virtue friends, utility friends as Aristotle is here portraying would not desire to share their lives together or regard a benefit to one as equivalent to a benefit to both. They appear to be more self-interested than friendly. If utility friends

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lack reciprocal goodwill for each other, it may not be plausible to conclude that they are friends at all. Fair-weather friends may fail to be utility friends because goodwill is not genuinely reciprocated. The goodwill of friends can arise from any of the three bases of friendship, pleasure, utility, and goodness. These “motives of the friendship” as Aristotle also calls them resemble Kant’s three motives of action.12 In the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant explains how duty can be performed from the motive of duty or from the motives of self-interest or inclination.13 Because, for Kant, doing our duty can be both pleasurable and in our own interest, discerning which motive is dominant may be impossible. Kant understands that all three motives can be present simultaneously in any act thus making it impossible to discover in anyone, even in oneself, which is the strongest or dominant motive.14 When Aristotle says that reasons for loving are the good, pleasant, or useful, he appears to view these motives as mutually exclusive. He then defines his three forms of friendship on the basis of these reasons for loving someone or something. While he mentions twice that the best friendship, virtue or character friendship, will also be pleasant and useful in the best sense, Aristotle never explicitly considers the possibility that friendships could be based on more than one of the three simultaneously.15 One possible way of making sense of Aristotle’s omission is to assume that when he discusses utility and pleasure as bases for friendship he has in mind what is merely useful or merely pleasant. He may be trying to contrast these lesser bases to the best friendship based on the goodness of the friend that additionally encompasses the friend’s truly useful and truly pleasant characteristics. Aristotle undoubtably expects that whatever is good will also be pleasant and useful to people who have a virtuous character. Reciprocal goodwill friendships based on utility can exist. It is possible to have both a goodwill toward someone and also base the friendship relation on utility. The alternatives are not mutually exclusive. The useful, according to Aristotle, is something that primarily has extrinsic value though, like the pleasant, he believes it may have intrinsic value as well. For a thing to be useful is to have its value derive from something else which itself may have extrinsic or intrinsic value until there is a final intrinsic value that is the source of the value of the whole sequence. Still it is important to remember that, for Aristotle, things having extrinsic value may also be valued intrinsically. There is no reason why something extrinsically valuable as a means to something else cannot also be valued for its own sake. Exercise and education are good examples of things that typically have both kinds of value. Also, to be valued extrinsically need not imply that the thing valued has little value. Intrinsic value is not always greater than extrinsic value. Some bit of trivial information about the history of philosophy may have a slight intrinsic value as knowledge, if knowledge always has intrinsic value. In contrast, knowing how to use a computer has primarily extrinsic instrumental value yet it may have much

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greater value. No contradiction exists in two friends having a goodwill toward each other and valuing each other for their own sakes. Friendships based on utility do not logically rule out goodwill between the friends. Genuine utility friendships are possible. While many utility-based relations do not exhibit goodwill, friends are capable of reciprocal goodwill for each other based on mutual advantage. This is true even in non-Western conceptions of friendship that are not influenced by Aristotle. Bhikhu Parekh discusses three Indian ideals of friendship “that occur in the literature and are thought to cover most relationships of friendship.”16 The second ideal he discusses resembles Aristotle’s utility friendship: Unlike the first kind of friendship, which is based on pure feeling, the second kind [of friendship] is based on mutual help and gratitude. Two individuals who render each other valuable services are placed under each other’s debt. Such acts over a period of time create a relationship of shared mutual gratitude and pave the way for friendship. Although they have good feelings for each other, not the feelings but the accumulated weight of mutual assistance is the basis for their friendship.17 Parekh points out that Indians consider a favor as a sign of goodwill and harm as a sign of hostility. A favor is a sign that a person wants to become a friend and is intended to create a bond that has a deeper moral meaning. Future reciprocal favors are not so much repayments of debts but expressions of the developing friendship.18 Clearly similarities exist between this form of Indian friendship and Aristotle’s motion of utility friendship because a goodwill is believed to arise between friends. It is possible to understand how utility friendships are constituted by reciprocal goodwill by contrasting them to other utility-based relationships that fail to exhibit the reciprocal goodwill of friendship. Many of Aristotle’s negative complaints are more appropriately directed against other utility relationships in which fair-weather friendships are counted. There are what can be called occasional utility-based relationships where there is not even a pretense of reciprocal goodwill. A supermarket cashier who checks out a customer’s groceries benefits the customer if he quickly accomplishes his task, and he is benefitted through the employment that the customer’s patronage provides. Thus, they are useful to each other. Their relationship is based on utility, but they need not have any goodwill for each other. They may be polite and courteous as morality requires, but because their interaction is occasional, not frequent, they need not have goodwill and want to promote each other’s well-being. Other utility-based relationships incorporate reciprocal goodwill in which the participants try to promote each other’s well-being but fall short of that full-bodied reciprocal goodwill of friendship. Teachers and students

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benefit each other: teachers earning a living and students receiving an education. Committed teachers want to benefit their students through the education they provide in order to keep their jobs. Serious students want their teachers to prosper, because this will enable them to teach well. Much the same is true of neighborhood merchants. They want to benefit their customers through efficient personal service in order to keep their customers returning, and the customers want the merchants to remain in business and continue to serve them. These relationships are constituted by what can be called a restricted goodwill. An unrestricted goodwill of friendship is aimed at a friend’s complete overall well-being. A restricted goodwill is aimed at only the portion of well– being relevant to the flourishing of the mutually beneficial relationship of the friends. Student–teacher and employer–employee reciprocal goodwill is a form of restricted goodwill extending over only the portion of well-being is necessary for the specific relationship of the friends to flourish. Their goodwill need not extend to each other’s overall well-being, to the portion of their well-being that is outside of, their particular mutually beneficial relationship. A restricted goodwill does not constitute the unselfish interest in the overall well-being of another person that Aristotle believes defines friendships. Still, it is much more valuable than many other ways that we treat each other. Restricted goodwill is morally superior to indifference to the wellbeing or exploitation of other people, or to using other people merely as means to our own ends. When Aristotle is critical of utility friendships because friends either complain about their relative benefits, or because, like fair-weather friends, they are too willing to end their relationship when some particular benefit disappears, he is focusing upon either relationships that lack goodwill entirely or relationships that are only composed of restricted goodwill. In virtue friendships, as Aristotle understands them, goodwill is unrestricted. Virtue friends want to promote each other’s well-being in all areas of their completely shared life. They view each other as they view themselves and value each other intrinsically. As a result, each virtue friend considers satisfying the wants and desires of the other person as having the same value as satisfying her own wants and desires. A benefit to one friend is understood to be a benefit to the other person as well. Martha Nussbaum also believes goodwill is possible within Aristotlean friendships based on utility. In The Fragility of Goodness, she explains a difference between friendship and other instrumental or exploitative relationships where no reciprocal goodwill exists: they may think of one another as useful to their other projects (as might be the case between business partners), and still have, again, no deeper mutual knowledge or attachment. Such relationships will not be merely

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exploitative: for we recall that without mutuality of genuine good wellwishing for the other person’s own sake the relationship will not deserve the title of philia at all.19 She continues on the same page in a footnote: Pleasure, advantage, and good character are three different bases or original grounds of philia; they are not the goal or final (intentional) end of the relationship. In other words, the two people are friends ‘through’ or ‘on the basis of ’ these, but the goal they try to achieve in action will still be some sort of mutual benefit. Pleasure and advantage-friendships, while not perfect, are importantly distinct from exploitative relationships, in which the parties aim each at their own pleasure, and not at all at the other’s good. The object of the relation in all cases is the other person; but the person will be conceived of and known in a way bounded by the basis: as someone who is pleasant to be with, as a person well-placed for useful dealings, as a person of good character. Thus the two inferior types aim at benefit for the other only under a thin and superficial description of the other.20 If Nussbaum’s “thin and superficial description” is replaced by the contrast between restricted and unrestricted goodwill, the distinctions are equivalent.21 While some relationships based on utility may not be mutually beneficial, other utility-based relationships can be mutual but support only a restricted not an unrestricted goodwill. Neither of these type of relationships are, however, friendships. Utility friends possess an unrestricted reciprocal goodwill to each other just as virtue friends do. The basis of goodwill is not the virtuous character of the friends. Utility friends have goodwill to each other because, ultimately, they find their friendship mutually beneficial. Michael Slote’s concept of a satisficer accurately illustrates how utility friends may regard each other.22 Utility friends can be satisfied that their friendship produces more benefits than they would receive without their friendship. Their benefits are good enough. Utility friends need not squeeze every drop of individual advantage out of their relation. Thus, their goodwill for each other need not be tested or destroyed by an unending quest for ever greater benefit. Aristotle’s unkind descriptions of utility-based relationships appear to be focused on relationships that are either exploitative, occasional, or only supportive of a restricted goodwill. He does not fully examine genuine utility friendships that suffer none of the disadvantages of these other utility-based types of relationships. One primary benefit of utility friendship is that two persons can accomplish a great deal that a single person cannot. In considering the value of

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friendship, it is a mistake to ignore the obvious advantage that two people can accomplish more than one person alone. Many activities logically require others, for example, having a philosophical conversation, performing string quartets, racing bicycles, or playing chess. Other activities, such as building the Acropolis, are in fact possible only with the assistance of others. One of the greatest sources of benefits for friends is this ability to cooperate in producing what they cannot accomplish individually. Utility friends’ goodwill for each other permits them to cooperate to a greater extent than others who may not recognize each other as potential cooperators. Perhaps Aristotle denigrates utility friendship because he is more concerned with defending virtue friendship as an ideal, a task that he believes is more crucial and more difficult because virtue friendship is so exceptional. Aristotle’s emphasis on the value of virtue friendship results in utility friendship being unduly neglected.

3. Aristotle’s neglect can be remedied by substantiating the genuine value of utility friendship. This requires a demonstration of how utility friendship more closely resembles ideal virtue friendship than Aristotle claims. Then it can be shown that utility friendship has significant unappreciated value because of its differences from ideal virtue friendship. Utility friendships with unrestricted goodwill can approximate virtue friendships in value. To the extent that having a goodwill is ennobling and self-fulfilling, utility friendships and virtue friendships share in those values. Unrestricted goodwill that Aristotle says is found in virtue friendships also provides utility friends the same “opportunity of beneficence, which is exercised chiefly and in its most laudable form towards friends.”23 Beneficence may even reside in utility friends to a greater extent because their friendship is based on benefits for each other that friendship provides. Aristotle’s second reason for highly praising virtue friendships is that the prosperity of virtue friends can be “guarded and preserved” by each other.24 Here too, utility friendships have the same value. Utility friends guard and preserve each other’s prosperity: because of their unrestricted goodwill utility friends are there when we need them. A potential reason for thinking that virtue friendships are better is that virtue friendship might require friends to be morally good, while no similar requirement is thought to exist in utility friendships. Some utility relationships that are not friendships fail to require any minimum moral goodness in the participants, because they are exploitative. Other utility relationships are based only on restricted goodwill. Such relationships do require more than a minimum degree of morality because morally bad people are not sufficiently reliable to produce their share of the common, though restricted, reciprocal benefits. Students, for example, must believe that their teachers are sufficiently

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trustworthy to teach them. Thoroughly immoral people could not participate in restricted goodwill relations that still fall short of utility friendships. Utility friendships with their unrestricted goodwill require a higher degree of morality than restricted goodwill relations. Participants in utility friendships must be able to trust each other to fulfill their share of mutual benefits. Because utility friendships are based on long-term mutual advantage, each friend must be sufficiently virtuous to refrain from taking advantage of the other person’s vulnerability. Utility friends must forgo selfish short-term benefits that would undermine long-term reciprocity. Furthermore, differences in the degree of morality between utility and virtue friendships may not be all that great because, as Aristotle points out, virtue friends need not be perfectly virtuous. They only need to be equal in virtue. Thus, though virtue friends must be equally virtuous, they may be a considerable distance from perfect virtue. The degree of virtue in utility friendship, therefore, may differ little from the degree required by virtue friendship. Utility friends conceivably could have an even higher degree of morality than virtue friends. It is illuminating to consider Aristotle’s own reasons for holding that virtue friendships are more valuable than the other forms of friendship. In the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle explicitly claims that virtue friendship based on character is best because it the most stable and lasting.25 Though Aristotle gives no defense of his claim, there are two obvious reasons why being stable and long lasting are desirable characteristics of friendships. First, because friendship is valuable, so valuable in fact that Aristotle believes no one would choose to live without friends though with all other goods, the loss of a friendship is the loss of something having exceptional value.26 Second, friendships take time and effort to cultivate. While pleasure friendships take little time to cultivate according to Aristotle, utility and virtue friendships require considerably more times. A sizable investment of time and effort is needed to discover who will reciprocate an unrestricted goodwill on either virtue or utility bases. Discovering another person who possesses a similar manner and degree of virtue involves sharing many experiences over an extended time. One or two days, weeks, or months of common experiences may not be enough to judge virtue accurately. Judgments about goodwill based on utility also require a variety of experiences over an extended time. A lengthy period of testing is needed to discover that genuine unrestricted goodwill is possible based on mutual advantage. Because of the sizable investment, friends would want their friendships to remain stable and to survive. Even if stability and long lastingness are an important way of ranking forms of friendship, Aristotle overestimates the stability of virtue friendships compared with utility friendships. Aristotle believes that virtuous characters in mature adults are more stable than the natural or social circumstances that make people useful or pleasurable to each another. This is his primary reason for believing that virtue friendships are more long-lasting. It is unnecessary to

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question Aristotle’s assumption about the stability of adult characters, though he may have overestimated their constancy. The emphasis instead should be on his underestimating the stability of benefit-producing natural and social circumstances. Many of Aristotle’s reasons for thinking that utility friendships are shortlived arise from examples of relationships based on either exploitation or restricted goodwill. Such relationships are especially sensitive to changes in natural or social circumstances. Seneca makes a similar observation about fair-weather friendships. Many causes of disagreement that Aristotle and Seneca believe destroy utility relations only arise where goodwill is absent or restricted. Minor short-term disadvantages need not destroy unrestricted goodwill. Utility friends operate within a long-term perspective. If utility friendships are correctly understood as constituted by unrestricted reciprocal goodwill, little reason exists to suspect that conflicts over benefits will make them more fragile or short-lived than virtue friendships. While virtue friendships conceivably are more stable and long lasting than utility friendships, it is doubtful that there need be all that much potential difference between them. More social stability is also possible than when Aristotle wrote. While the days of lifetime employment by one industrial company may be over, utility friendships arising from working in close contact can last many years or decades. In stable neighborhoods where people live in one place for many years, utility friendships can flourish, for example, arising from helping with snow removal or watching for prowlers and then expanding into an unrestricted goodwill. Natural and social regularities forming a basis for the unrestricted goodwill of utility friends may be more stable and more reliable than Aristotle assumes. Utility friendships produce advantages missing from virtue friendships. This is the final stage of the defense. Utility friendships produce benefits for the friends that Aristotle overlooks in his discussion. The primary advantage of utility friendships over virtue friendships is the number of friends it is possible to have. Because virtue friends, according to Aristotle, share together as much of their lives and goods as they can, it is not possible to have more than one or two virtue friendships. Not enough time, energy, and material resources are available to devote to more than a couple of virtue friends. Trying to spend all of our time and material resources with several friends would disperse us too thinly and superficially. In contrast to virtue friendships, utility friends need not want to spend all of their time and goods engaging in a shared life. Fewer demands are placed on scarce material and temporal resources. More than only one or two utility friends are possible for these reasons. Constrained resources are not, however, the only limitation on the number of friends. Because virtue friends must closely resemble each other in both their manner and degree of virtue, the number of potential friends

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is limited as well. Few people may possess requisite equal virtues. Utility friendship increases the number of possible friends, because utility friends need not closely resemble each other in virtue to be useful to each other. A greater pool of potential friends therefore exists. Another advantage derives from the greater diversity in the character of the friends that utility friendships permit. A wider diversity of points of view and variety of experiences may produce benefits for friends that would be absent were they more similar. Each can bring to the friendship something the other lacks.27 Furthermore, because utility friends have extra time to participate in activities outside of their friendship, they can magnify their usefulness to each other. While, according to Aristotle, both utility and virtue friendships require more time to develop than pleasure friendships, utility friendships have an advantage in that they are easier to establish. Virtue friendships that require similarity in manner and degree of character create substantial barriers to finding friends. Few people may possess the requisite similarity of virtue. They may be difficult to locate, even on the unlikely assumption that they live nearby. Utility friends who do not need to resemble each other so closely are easier to find because they are more plentiful. Also, the testing period for utility friends can be telescoped. It may not take as much time to discover that reciprocal goodwill exists based on utility because the knowledge needed to discover mutual benefit is not as extensive as the knowledge needed to discover precise similarity of virtue. As a basis of friendship, similarity of virtue requires more extensive testing and knowledge. Friendships are among the greatest values of life. If, as Aristotle believes, virtue friendships are rare and exceptional, then very few people will ever experience their great value. Nevertheless the unrestricted goodwill of utility friendship enables friends to complete their individual characters by acting virtuously to each other. Because many utility friendships are possible, utility friends conceivably could gain in quantity from several friendships what they might miss in quality from one or two virtue friendships. Greater value may result from the ability to maintain more than a very few friendships. Utility friendship more closely approximates the actual friendships of many people. Most people have more than one or two friendships that they value a great deal, though they do not resemble their friends as closely as do Aristotle’s virtue friends, and though they do not share all of their time with their friends and do not consider their property common. Such differences from virtue friendships are sources of value, not a lack of value, in utility friendships. Though Aristotle emphasizes the greater value of virtue friendship, each of his three forms of friendship has value. The point is that people should not judge themselves disadvantaged because their friendships are more likely based on utility. More value resides in utility friendships than Aristotle concedes and more of these friendships are possible at any given time.

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Notes 1. Seneca, “On Philosophy and Friendship,” in Michael Pakaluk, ed., Other Selves (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1991), p. 121. 2. See Nancy Sherman, “Aristole on the Shared Life,” in Neera Kapur Badhwar, ed., Friendship: A Philosophical Reader (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 91. 3. Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, trans. and ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1166a30, 1171b29 and 1159b25, pp. 1833–1851. 4. Ibid., 1166a30 and 1159b25, pp. 1833–1843. 5. Ibid., 1156a25, p. 1827. 6. Ibid., 1155b19, p. 1826. 7. Ibid., 1156a3, p. 1826. 8. Ibid., 1156a3, p. 1826. 9. Ibid., 1157b1, p. 1829. 10. Ibid., 1167a12, p. 1845. 11. Ibid., 1162b22, p. 1837. 12. See ibid., 1156a22 and 1157a26, pp. 1827–1828. 13. Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981) p. 10. 14. Ibid., p. 19. 15. See, Aristotle, op. cit. 1156b13 and 1157a1, pp. 1827–1828. 16. Bhikhu Parekh, “An Indian View of Friendship,” in Leroy S. Rouner, ed., The Changing Face of Friendship (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994) p. 105. 17. Ibid., p. 106. 18. Ibid., p. 107. 19. Martha C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 355. 20. Ibid., p. 355. 21. Ibid., p. 355. 22. Michael Slote, Beyond Optimizing (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 12. 23. Aristotle, op. cit., 1155a4, p. 1825. 24. Ibid., 1155a9, p. 1825. 25. Ibid., 1237b10, p. 1960. 26. Ibid., 1155a5, p. 1825. 27. Cf. Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Peter Heath (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 187.