Frederick Jackson Turner and the Democratization of the Electronic Frontier ROD CARVETH AND J METZ

Introduction

T h e e c o n o m i c , political and social events of the 1990s have dramatically transf o r m e d the world. Industrial changes have b e e n b r o u g h t about by the converg e n c e o f technologies, c o r p o r a t e downsizing, megadeals b e t w e e n e n t e r t a i n m e n t and t e c h n o l o g y businesses, the literal e x p l o s i o n of the Internet, and the fascination w i t h multimedia devices. Unfortunately, there has also b e e n m o r e social unrest and social fragmentation. T h e en d o f the Cold War p r o m p t e d critical questions about the role of gove r n m e n t in U.S. society, questions that c o m e in the midst of one of the c o u n t r y ' s most dramatic political swings, w i t h the victories by the Republican party during the 1994 elections. Considerable debate has e n s u e d about the di rect i on of o u r d e m o c r a t i c f or m of g o v e r n m e n t . Over the last century, the p o w e r of the political p a r t y has w a n e d considerably, and ticket-splitting has b e c o m e c o m m o n place. In 1992, for the first time since T h e o d o r e Roosevelt ran as the Bull Moose party candidate, a third-party Presidential candidate, H. Ross Perot, g a r n e r e d m o r e than 15 p e r c e n t of the p o p u l a r vote. Political participation, as e v i d e n c e d by v o t e r tu r n o u t , has consistently declined during the c e n t u r y until flattening out in the 1990s. Th es e changes have b e e n c o n c o m i t a n t with the d e v e l o p m e n t of com m uni cations t e c h n o l o g i e s w h o s e technical sophistication and p o w e r have increased in a g e o m e t r i c progression. Sped by these technological advances, Americans have Rod Carveth is assistant professor and department head in the Department of Mass Communication at the University of Bridgeport. He is co-editor of Media Economics: Theory and Practice, and is currently researching free speech issues in cyberspace. J Michel Metz is a doctoral candidate at the University of Georgia and works as an Internet Systems Consultant for various corporations in the Southeast. Address for correspondence: Rod Carveth, Dept. of Mass Communication, University of Bridgeport, Bridgeport, CT 06601; Internet: [email protected]

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traveled f r o m farm to city to global village in a century. The changes that have o c c u r r e d along the way, how ever , have not b e e n slow and steady, but have o c c u r r e d at an increasingly accelerated rate. After the Second Industrial Revolution, innovation and technological diffusion slowly b e c a m e dom i nat ed by large corporations, an ever-growing federal governm e n t and a handful of educational institutions. Industries ranging from radio to the railroad w e r e established and maintained and their markets c o n t r o l l e d by large institutions t h r o u g h some form of g o v e r n m e n t collaboration. Much of the collaboration was codified t h r o u g h legislation, requiring c o m p a n i e s to have a license to o p e r a t e and to oper a t e "in the public interest." Because t h e r e w e r e so f e w p r o d u c e r s of technology, the p r o c e s s of innovation was deliberate and controlled. Social change, as a result of t e c h n o l o g y ' s push, came slowly. The automobile was mass p r o d u c e d by H enry Ford in the s e c o n d d e c a d e of this century, but it was not until the 1950s that w e began to see its imp act wi t h the creation of the m a m m o t h interstate highway system, the d e v e l o p m e n t of suburbia and the deterioration of the i nner cities. Th e n e w information technologies, on the o t h e r hand, m ove into the market and are rapidly diffused, often w i t h o u t the controls of these p o w e r f u l institutions. Deregulation is oc c ur r i ng in the majority of marketplaces t h r o u g h o u t the globe. Even those areas that retain some degree of regulation, such as broadcasting, are being besieged by market pressures to o p e n up. More than 180 million c o m p u t e r s are in use today. N o n e of their makers or users n e e d a license to o p e r a t e them, nor do the millions of fax m a c h i n e users or I n t e r n e t users n e e d permission to send a fax, "surf the Net" or create a n e w s g r o u p . Th e t e c h n o l o g y affecting the variety and forms of c o m m u n i c a t i o n changes so rapidly that the Federal Communications Commission is having enorm o u s difficulty keepi ng up with, let alone controlling, the best m e t h o d s for governing information dissemination. Fifteen years ago, few prognosticators could have envisioned the explosive g r o w t h of the Internet, the ability to view movies on demand, c o n s u m e r h o m e s hoppi ng via television and the proliferation of cellular p h o n e s . W h e r e will all this head? H ow will the t e c h n o l o g y affect the future of democracy in our society? We p r o p o s e that the answers may be found in examining the "frontier hypothesis" p r o p o s e d by Frederick Jackson T u r n e r in 1893, and applying the tenets of his hypothesis to the "electronic frontier." The Frontier Hypothesis Few academics have had an impact on a field of study at such a y o u n g age as did historian Frederick Jackson Turner. T u r n e r was thirty-one w h e n he delivered a p a p e r entitled "The Significance of t he Frontier in American History" to a m e e t i n g of historians at the World's Columbian Exposition in Chicago in July 1893. While th e original p r e s e n t a t i o n m e t with a tepid r e s p o n s e (Kyff, 1993), T u r n e r ' s "frontier thesis" was to r e p r e s e n t a paradigm shift in the scholarship regarding the historical d e v e l o p m e n t of the United States' national identity.

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In his paper, Turner took issue with the prevailing historical theory of America's development, the so-called "germ theory" of American history. Germ theory p r o p o s e d that people and institutions were comparable to biological germs, and that historical continuity ensued through the propagation of these social germs. As such, American people and institutions were spawned by the "social germs" of Western Europe; hence, America and its citizens were merely extensions of Western Europe. While historians such as Herbert Baxter Adams (Turner's mentor at Johns Hopkins) proposed that social germs required fertile soil for germination (meaning that environmental conditions do have an impact on historical development), "germ" theorists believed the movement west had little significance in explaining the American character. Turner took issue with the notion of germ theory. In researching land ownership patterns in Wisconsin, Turner discovered that the wealthy citizens did not buy up western lands in order to turn them into great estates, as did their European predecessors. In addition, the western economic elites tended to be m u c h more fluid (what Turner termed "peasant proprietorship" [Kyff, 1993]), as membership in those elites was as much achieved as ascribed. By contrast, in Europe, people were either born into elites or never became members. Thus, Turner reasoned, if American culture was merely an extension of European culture, w h y didn't the behaviors of American economic elites match those of their European ancestors? Rather, Turner argued, it was the frontier that was the key force in shaping American values and character: American democracy was born of no theorist's dream; it was not carried in the Sarah Constant to Virginia, nor in the Mayflower to Plymouth. It came out of the American forest, and it gained new strength each time it touched a new frontier. (Turner, 1920: 293) The basic concepts contained in the thesis have striking relevance to the develo p m e n t of the late twentieth century "electronic frontier." Cyberspace is a term that describes the convergence of the technologies of c o m p u t e r mediated communications (Rheingold, 1993). Computer mediated communications (CMC) is comprised of computers, their databases, c o m p u t e r software to read them, and the telecommunications networks that get us there. Our principal focus in this paper is the I n t e r n e t - - t h e huge (30 million users), global (135 countries), rapidly growing (1 O- 15% a month) network. It should be noted that the Internet is only a tiny part of the electronic frontier k n o w n as cyberspace. Cyberspace is a comprehensive information environment that encompasses telephone wires, coaxial cables, fiber-optic lines or electromagnetic waves. Cyberspace can also be conceptualized as a space that enables virtual communities, communities w h i c h potentially can be collectively e m p o w e r e d to pursue participatory democracy. While discussion here is focused on the Internet, the applications of the Internet to the development of cyberspace are far-reaching. The "Internet culture" has evolved over many years and has developed prototype solutions to

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many of the problems w h i c h will be inherent in any future cyberspace realization. The Internet from its earliest stages was designed to be inexpensive and uncontrollable, by people w h o believed that the collective will and w i s d o m of the users was superior to the arbitrary p o w e r of supervisors. In a frontier-like manner, users created their o w n justice (e.g., netiquette, flaming) rather than subscribing to order imposed by others. The spread of "free-nets'--multi-user computer services connected to the Internet, sponsored by local institutions and made available free to large numbers of c o m p u t e r users--has further "democratized" Internet use, while maintaining a c o m m u n i t y that is self-policing and self-reliant. The ease with w h i c h groups of people can gather together on Internet and readily communicate with one another across differences of time zones, working schedules and walks of life has effectively e x t e n d e d the definition of w h a t we mean by "community." Thus, cyberspace is primarily about social structures, interpersonal communication patterns, and the n e w forms of social relationships w h i c h it enables, and only secondarily about the architecture of moving and storing information. People are adding to cyberspace--creating it, defining it and expanding it. The Internet, Compuserve, and other services today are m u c h like book publishers for w h i c h readers serve also as writers and editors. Faster computers, cheaper means of electronic storage, improved software and more capable communications channels (satellites, fiber-optic lines)--each of these factors i n d e p e n d e n t l y add to cyberspace. But the real explosion comes from the combination of all of them, working together in ways many still do not understand. Applications

o f t h e F r o n t i e r T h e s i s to t h e E l e c t r o n i c F r o n t i e r

We see five applications of Turner's conceptions of the Western frontier and that of the electronic frontier. First, we propose that the stages of d e v e l o p m e n t of the w e s t e r n U.S. frontier proposed by Turner parallels the development of the electronic frontier. In addition, w e argue that the people w h o developed the electronic frontier shared four attributes with the individuals w h o settled the west: interaction with the environment, individualism, nationalism and the concept of democracy.

Stages of Development Turner proposed that the conquest of the western frontier occurred in three separate stages. First, the "pioneers" explored the frontier, established small settlements and then moved on. The second group, the "settlers," moved in to farm the land and to establish more permanent settlements. Finally, "men of capital" arrived, bringing investment to these western settlements and growing both businesses and the lands they occupied. The stages of development in the electronic frontier parallel those proposed by Turner.

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The Pioneers Th e early p i o n e e r s of the el ect r oni c frontier w e r e p e o p l e of science. Most w e r e engineers, w h o w e r e c o n c e r n e d with the need for defense. T he original n e t w o r k p r o p o s e d and a c c e p t e d ( w h i c h was to b e c o m e the ARPANET and later, I n t er n et) was designed by individuals w h o had a not i on of linking t o g e t h e r c o m p u t e r s for the sole p u r p o s e of communication. These scientists and programmers initially w o r k e d t h r o u g h the funding of the federal g o v e r n m e n t (commissioned by the Advanced Research Projects Agency--ARPA) to e x p l o r e the possibilities o f br a nc hi ng out a n e w form of t e c h n o l o g y w h i c h w o u l d enable p e o p l e to w o r k t o g e t h e r despite great distances (Staff, 1991). At the time, not unlike the original pi oneers of the 1800s, these scientists had no idea o f the e x t e n t to w h i c h t hey w oul d be forging ahead in a n e w realm of c o m m u n i c a t i o n that w o u l d lead to c om m un i t i es n e v e r b e f o r e envisioned. Nonetheless, th ey did k n o w that it was important. T h e y ran d e m o n s t r a t i o n s of the n e w n e t w o r k to o t h e r ARPA contractors, sites and research institutions. In o r d e r to e n h a n c e awareness t h e y began mandating use of the n e t w o r k site. The Settlers As k n o w l e d g e about the n e w territory grew, those w h o had forged the n e w g r o u n d began to give way to the n e w settler w h o came to the land in o r d e r to w o r k it for survival. In terms of the el ect r oni c frontier, those settlers came in the form of academics and scientists w h o w e r e using the machines for the p u r p o s e in w h i c h t h e y w e r e d ev elo p ed : sharing resources and c o m m u n i c a t i n g w i t h one another. T hose w h o used the system m o r e and m or e began establishing com fort abl e communities in w h i c h interests w e r e shared. Some of the first distribution lists w e r e d e v o t e d to the culture of the p e o p l e w h o used the net at the time: SFLOVERS, for example, was one of the first strong lists in the mid-1970s (Sterling, 1993). O t h e r uses of the n e t w o r k came into being from a natural desire to c o m b i n e c o m m u n i c a t i o n abilities and c o m p u t e r games, resulting in the e x t r e m e l y p o p u l a r Space War game in the 1970s. Still others e m e r g e d on the scene as pioneers first, and r e m a i n e d as settlers. One o f these, Jeff Kell, was a c o m p u t e r o p e r a t o r at the University of T ennessee. One evening, he was monitoring printouts from neighboring university extensions w h e n , suddenly, a strange message came over the console: "Having fun looking at the jobs for Memphis?" He had just recei ved the first interactive message of his life. Looking up the r e s pons e code, Kell began finding ways to c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h o t h e r c o m p u t e r ope r at or s w h o w e r e c o n n e c t e d to the net w ork. Soon, he began writing a p r o g r a m that w o u l d enable him to talk to m ore than one o t h e r p e r s o n at a time. This was the beginning of Relay. At the time, the p r o g r a m enabl ed him to c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h his boss at work. He had no idea that this little p r o g r a m w o u l d eventually c o n n e c t thousands (millions?) of users around the w o r l d and

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assist t h e m in developing their o w n Relay communities and culture. In total, this group of people believed that the realm of the Internet was limitless. There seemed to be enough room for all types of people to coexist peacefully. Communication was the goal, and it was easy to believe that usually those they w o u l d find to talk with would be similar " c y b e r n a u t s " - - e x p l o r e r s w h o tended to be interested in technology that the mainstream population esc h e w e d . The Internet was seen by these initial settlers as a public good, an expansive hinterland that could be shared by all.

The Men (and Women) o f Capital The electronic frontier is in the midst of being infiltrated by modern-day "carpetbaggers" w h o see great financial profit potential in the Internet. These m e n and w o m e n of capital come in two forms: private entrepreneurs and large information corporations. The first group of people include individuals w h o see high profit potential in advertising to large markets. Time magazine reported (July 25, 1994) the CanterSiegel affair, in w h i c h an Arizona husband-and-wife law firm sent advertisements across the Internet to aliens interested in getting a green card. The resulting "flame war" (a furious exchange of hostile e-mail messages) is indicative of the resistance to this type of advertising. Indeed, even on distribution lists, w h e r e advertisements may seem germane, as in a discussion group involving cybersex w h e r e a January 1995 advertisement for a phone-sex service met with v e h e m e n t hostility, there is a knee-jerk rejection. As Time writer Philip Elmer-Dewitt succinctly put it, the Internet "was not designed for doing commerce, and it does not gracefully a c c o m m o d a t e n e w arrivals--especially those w h o d o n ' t bother to learn its strange language or customs or, worse still, openly defy them" (1994, p. 52). This is a difficult lesson for the s e c o n d - - a n d m a j o r - - f o r m of entrepreneurship: the corporate information provider (also k n o w n as videotex services). W h e n America OnLine (AOL) o p e n e d up its gateway (the connection b e t w e e n the Internet and the videotex service allowing people to c o m m u n i c a t e from one to the other) to its more than 1 million customers in April, 1994, a massive culture clash ensued that continues to this day. Not only were they behaving badly (e.g., making all the usual "newbie" mistakes: asking dumb questions, posting messages in the w r o n g places, not bothering to learn about the resident culture, essentially "behaving like boorish tourists" [Elmer-Dewitt, 1994; p. 54]), but an initial bug in the software caused every message they w r o t e to be duplicated eight times. As if things w e r e n ' t bad enough, this extra straw finally broke the camel's back. The resulting fray b e t w e e n the cultures has become legendary. The animosity b e t w e e n these two groups has escalated to a form of bigotry and prejudice that rivals a joint picnic b e t w e e n the Nation of Islam and the Ku Klux Klan. The implication is that the new group (such as AOL) believes that the veteran old-timers should move out of the way for people w h o actually pay for their Internet Carveth and Metz

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services. T h e i m a g e r y h e r e is i m p o r t a n t . T h e n o t i o n o f p a y i n g f o r i n f o r m a t i o n g o e s d i r e c t l y a g a i n s t t h e t e n e t s o f t h e purists, w h o s u b s c r i b e to t h e old h a c k e r b e l i e f t h a t all i n f o r m a t i o n s h o u l d b e f r e e a n d a c c e s s to c o m p u t e r s s h o u l d b e u n l i m i t e d a n d t o t a l (Levy, 1984). T h e r e s o u r c e t h a t o n c e s e e m e d vast a n d limitless sudd e n l y s e e m s to b e g e t t i n g o v e r c r o w d e d a n d a n t a g o n i s t i c . Interaction with the Environment A k e y c o n c e p t u n d e r l y i n g T u r n e r ' s f r o n t i e r thesis is t h e s e t t l e r s ' i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h t h e e n v i r o n m e n t . As settlers m o v e d w e s t to c o n q u e r t h e w e s t e r n U.S. f r o n t i e r , t r a d i t i o n a l w a y s o f life w e r e r e d u c e d to a m o r e p r i m i t i v e e x i s t e n c e . A c c o r d i n g to T u r n e r , " T h e w i l d e r n e s s m a s t e r s t h e colonist. It strips o f f t h e g a r m e n t s o f civilization a n d arrays h i m in the h u n t i n g shirt a n d m o c c a s i n " (Turner, 1920). T h e r e f o r e , settlers n o t o n l y c h a n g e d t h e frontier, t h e y w e r e c h a n g e d b y it. Settlers w e r e f o r c e d to a d a p t to t h e i r e n v i r o n m e n t , a t e n e t o f t h e e v o l u t i o n a r y t h e o r y c e n t r a l to T u r n e r ' s thinking. Similarly, an i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r e x p l a i n i n g t h e c o n q u e s t o f t h e e l e c t r o n i c front i e r is u s e r s ' i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h t h e t e c h n o l o g i c a l e n v i r o n m e n t . In m a s t e r i n g t e c h n o l o g y , u s e r s are also s h a p e d b y it. C o m p u t e r - m e d i a t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n (CMC) is u n i q u e in t h a t it is p e r h a p s t h e o n l y m e d i u m a l l o w i n g u s e r s to c h a n g e t h e v e r y n a t u r e o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n . A p e r f e c t e x a m p l e is t h e i n t e r s p e r s i n g o f c o n v e r s a tions within conversations during realtime (synchronous) c ommunic a tion. In email conversations, for example, it is not u n c o m m o n to witness the practice of inserting responses in the midst of the original message, addressing each point as it is presented. More drastic, however, are realtime conversations, where individuals can send single-line messages across the network to each other. Empirically, it is feasible to conduct more than one conversation at the same time with the same person, due to the time differential in receiving feedback to statements. One individual might move on to another topic, and then receive a response to a statement sent several minutes before, and respond to the previous topic. Maintaining cognitive awareness of each conversation becomes a balancing act at which some CMC users b e c o m e quite adept. (Metz, 1994) In n o o t h e r f o r m o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n do c o n v e r s a n t s "flip-flop" t o p i c s w i t h s u c h rapidity. In addition, t h e r e are t h e r a r e c a s e s ( y e t n o t i m p r o b a b l e ) w h e r e a n i n d i v i d u a l ' s p r o g r a m m i n g ability c a n m o d i f y t h e v e r y p r o g r a m t h a t p e o p l e u s e to c o m m u n i c a t e . U s e r s o f CMC c h a n g e t h e i r m e d i u m , e v i d e n c e d n o t just b y t h e a d v e n t o f e m o t i c o n s ( e m o t i o n a l i c o n s or "smileys," s u c h as :) f o r a smile), b u t also t h e c h o i c e o f i m m e d i a c y a n d i n t e r a c t i o n . Both a s y n c h r o n o u s e-mail a n d s y n c h r o n o u s Relays ( w h e r e c o n v e r s a t i o n s are in real t i m e ) are CMC, y e t t h e level o f i n t e r a c t i o n v a r i e s b e t w e e n t h e t w o . In n o o t h e r m e d i u m d o e s c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e c o m e s u b j e c t to p e r s o n a l m o d i f i c a t i o n . T h e v i e w e r d o e s n o t c h a n g e t h e w a y a m e s s a g e is b r o a d c a s t o v e r television, and t y p i n g and w r i t i n g are t h e o n l y w a y s to p h y s i c a l l y w r i t e a letter. 78

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In this way, then, users interact with their environment on a m u c h more intimate level than they do w h e n using other forms of media. W h e n users say that they talk "over the computer," it is a generic form of explaining a type of interaction. In reality, CMC is regulated heavily by the type of equipment and software that each user is utilizing. The ability to c o n n e c t to Usenet, for example, is specifically limited by not only the type of newsreader each user has, but also by whether or not the Usenet provider allows access to certain newsgroups. For example, in November 1994, Carnegie-Mellon University denied students online access to newsgroups that discussed forms of erotica. This action occurred after an internal report overestimated the prevalence of "cyberporn" on the Internet. Users at times have the ability (depending on their programming proficiency) to circumvent such roadblocks, providing t h e m with not only a "hands on" approach to communication through the medium, but ultimately a form of reshaping their environment, not unlike the early settlers w h o reshaped the land in order to grow food. Individualism Turner argued that people w e n t West because of the vast wealth of fertile lands that awaited t h e m there; n o w h e r e else in the world could one acquire wealth so quickly. Because aristocratic families of the eastern seaboard seldom had reason to migrate westward, the western settlers were mainly middle- and lower-class immigrants. With hard work and good fortune, a penniless migrant could b e c o m e a rich plantation o w n e r or cattle rancher in a single generation. Thus, the West meant upward social mobility. The ideal of the frontier society was the self made individual, and wealth and p o w e r w o n by c o m p e t i t i v e skill w e r e m u c h admired. What o f f e n d e d the frontierspeople was wealth and p o w e r obtained through special privilege. They believed in a natural aristocracy, rather than an aristocracy by birth, education or special privilege. It was not absolute equality d e m a n d e d by the westerners, but a more open elite system--a greater opportunity for the rising middle class to acquire wealth and influence through competition (social Darwinism). Likewise, the modern-day frontierspeople feel they have "tilled" the n e w cyberspace. They get offended, as noted above in the conflict b e t w e e n videotex users and Internetters, by those w h o feel the greater privilege goes to the financial aristocracy. Like their geographic counterparts before them, the settlers of the Cyberfrontier believe in the natural p o w e r of the equality provided for t h e m through the openness of the environment. Seemingly, the resources and boundaries are limitless, and there is more than enough opportunity for everyone to have the potential to maximize the services of the Internet. While almost anarchistic in nature, it is this c o u r s e - - t h e course of open and utilitarian access and equality of s t a t u r e m t h a t leads to true democracy. In the 1800s, the rise of corporations and of stock markets for the accumulation of capital upset old-fashioned ideas about property. The introduction of machinery in factories revolutionized the conditions of labor and made the masses

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d e p e n d e n t on industrial capitalists for their livelihoods. This n e w industrial elite e m b r a c e d social Darwinism, the idea p r o p o s e d by sociologist H e r b e r t S p e n c e r that a natural social elite w o u l d evolve t hrough free c o m p e t i t i o n and self-reliance. For Turner, individualism--self-reliance and achieved s t a t u s - - w a s the key ing red ien t for the taming of the Western frontier. For the e l e c t r o n i c frontier, individualism relates to choice. Choice in itself has b e c o m e a p a r a m o u n t value, as i m p o r t a n t as the goods and services offered. Mass c o n s u m p t i o n o n c e characterized o u r society, n o w individualized c o n s u m p t i o n will shape our lives. T he c o u n t r y has c o m e a long w ay f r om Henry Ford's assembly line stamping out the same black Model Ts. Of course, ch o i c e can be distracting, alienating, anarchic and liberating. Information glut can be a c o n s e q u e n c e , with individuals having to make h u n d r e d s of m u n d a n e choices every day. However, most p e o p l e find too m u c h c h o i c e preferable to too little, especially if they can envision c h o i c e curtailed by poverty, o p p r e s s i o n or a boringly h o m o g e n e o u s society. In the marketplace, n e w techn o l o g y has b r o u g h t p o w e r to the p e o p l e in the form of c h o i c e and has f o r c e d big business to cater to cons um er s ' diverse buying preferences. A key e l e m e n t of c h o i c e for the c y b e r f r o n t i e r is the ability to select areas of interest from anything. It is p o w e r in the rawest sense: if one does not find the information or topics of interest, he or she can create one. Usenet new sgroups, for example, are not or i ous for their ability to be created by a f e w clever programming hacks. Choice is not limited to w h a t is provided, it is limited to the h u m a n imagination and p r o g r a m m i n g ability. T h r o u g h this, information overload is a v er y real possibility, but only for those w h o attempt to d e c i p h e r each c h o i c e as it is p r es en te d. Cyberspace is, for all intents and purposes, organized in logical patterns m u c h like a c o m p u t e r with hierarchies and b o o l e a n decision processes. O n c e that pa t t e r n of learned behavior is a c c o m m o d a t e d , m u c h in the same w a y the great plains n e e d e d to be "figured out," navigating t h r o u g h the I n t e r n e t is a simple m a t t e r of creating and recreating choices. Finally, in many ways, I nt er ne t users have m ore "choice" in achieving status. As Nancy Baym (1995) discovered in her study of participants in a soap o p e r a n e w s g r o u p , many secretaries enjoy high status because of their k n o w l e d g e of the soaps. Thus, achievement, rather than heritage, can b e s t o w status u p o n the online w o r l d ' s inhabitants.

Nationalism Part of the appeal of T ur ne r 's frontier thesis was that in an era of violent management-labor strife, problems with the integration of h u n d r e d s of thousands o f immigrants into society, social problems caused in urban areas that w e r e g r o win g too fast, and h e i g h t e n e d international tensions, the thesis cele b rated a uniquely American character. Rather than merely creating a neo-Europe, T u r n e r p r o p o s e d that the m o v e m e n t West resulted in an unique national identity. Horace Greeley's advice, "Go West, young man" was not only a call to e m b r a c e o p p o r t u n i t y , but a call to be American as well. Within the first w e e k of his t e n u r e as Speaker of the House of Representa80

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tives, Newt Gingrich declared that the poor in America should receive a tax credit in order to b u y a laptop computer. Gingrich's statement symbolized h o w being part of the information superhighway is not only a necessity for the twentyfirst century, but is increasingly an element of the national identity. This sentiment has been an increasingly important aspect of American culture. In 1991, then-Senator AI Gore proposed the "High Performance Computing Act," w h i c h was "to provide for a coordinated Federal research program to ensure continued United States leadership in high-performance computing" (p. 1). Given that the Internet's beginnings were through funding by the Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA) and the original ARPANET, a certain amount of nationalism and pride has continued to this day to ensure that it remains a primarily American entity. This may not be so easy, of course. The Internet has become a truly international institution. Finland, Canada, Australia, Norway, France, Israel, and the United Kingdom are just a few of the dozens of countries that have not only c o n n e c t e d to the Internet, but have continually and consistently provided n e w and exciting advances to the frontier. Still, as of today, the United States remains the major player in the Internet.

Democracy W h e n the colonies formed the United States, voting was granted only to white males w h o o w n e d land. The conquest of the West had as a c o n s e q u e n c e the expansion of access to the political process. All the n e w Western states entered the Union granting universal white male suffrage. This m o v e m e n t was not entirely altruistic. The rising western elite saw in a w i d e n e d electorate a chance for personal advancement that they could never have achieved under the auspices of the eastern, propertied elite. Today, technological advances in communication make possible a return to this ideal of increased political participation, or w h a t is k n o w n as teledemocracy. In the 1992 presidential campaign, candidates reached out to the electorate using interactive satellite hook-ups, radio and television call-in programs, and live c o m p u t e r conferencing. As candidates gear up for the 1996 political battles, almost all have sites on the World Wide Web. The growing interest in teledemocracy comes as m u c h from a strong discontent with contemporary American politics as from technological advances. The n e w technologies offer ways for citizens to enter into a dialogue w i t h public officials in such a way that will engage them and make t h e m feel responsible for the workings of government. Advocates of teledemocracy point to numerous advantages, including (London, 1995: 38): 9 Interactive telecommunications can foster increased civic participation in the democratic process. 9 Telecommunications can link citizens together across the boundaries of time and space. It can also involve citizens who may ordinarily have no opportunity to participate. Carveth a n d Metz

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9 Electronic media can function as a mass feedback system, providing legislators with instant public opinion on issues. 9 The new media can facilitate direct public participation in governance through plebiscitary mechanisms or direct communication between citizens and policymakers. 9 Electronic communication can guarantee equal access to information to large numbers of citizens. 9 Teledemocracy enhances political competence by involving large numbers of people more directly in the process of public discussion. 9 New technologies provide improved access to government information and services. T h o u g h critics poi nt out that t her e are significant risks in a t e l e d e m o c r a c y - lack o f r eas o n ed dialogue and debate; issues of access, cost, and literacy; the possibility that electronic discourse may result in the political survival of t he w i t t i e s t - - t h e p r o s p e c t s of a t e l e d e m o c r a c y are attractive to many w h o have settled the online world.

H o w t h e F r o n t i e r T h e s i s I n f o r m s Us A b o u t C y b e r s p a c e Th e p r imar y advantage of the application of the frontier thesis to t he discussion o f the d e v e l o p m e n t of c y b e r s p a c e is that it may help us forecast future d e v e l o p m e n t issues. Paramount among these issues are the roles o f t he governm e n t and e c o n o m i c c o n c e n t r a t i o n in the d e v e l o p m e n t of cyberspace.

The Role o f Government Not only does the m o v e m e n t West help explain the e x p a n s i o n of individual political participation (at least for w hi t e males), it also helps explain t h e expansion o f the federal g o v e r n m e n t . As the final stage of d e v e l o p m e n t , the moving in of the m e n of capital, o c c u r r e d , the n e e d for order to p r e s e r v e e c o n o m i c stability and gain increased. As T u r n e r observed, UIn a w ord, capital, labor, and the W e s t e r n pioneer, all deserted the ideal of competitive individualism in o r d e r to organize their interests in more effective combinations" (pp. 305-306). Thus, the role o f the federal g o v e r n m e n t was e x p a n d e d so that o r d e r could be c r e a t e d out of chaos. At first, the g o v e r n m e n t ardently p r e s e r v e d the p o w e r o f the business elite, as e v i d e n c e d by the tenures of James Blaine and Nelson Aldrich and the use of the Sherman Antitrust Act to p r e v e n t the establishment of labor unions. Eventually, h o w e v e r , one of the effects of the g r o w t h in g o v e r n m e n t was to make society m o r e i n c l u s i v e - - e n s u r i n g that w o m e n and minority group m e m b e r s had access to political and e c o n o m i c institutions, such as obtaining the vot e or being eligible for a job. W o m e n and minority group m e m b e r s had b e e n victims of e c o n o m i c exclusion, by being the property--literally or virtually--of those granted access to the political system. The c o n s e q u e n c e of including e v e r y o n e into the d e m o c r a c y is that America b e c a m e k n o w n as a "melting pot," with e v e r y o n e learning the same language,

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the same values, and so on. Not surprisingly, the use of technology focused on mass production. The so-called "consumer society" of the last 50 years, with its culture of c o m m o n aspirations and goals, was based on the technology of production and communication. In the early 1900s, the effects of m o n o p o l y capitalism p r o m p t e d the federal g o v e r n m e n t to reduce the p o w e r of big business to ensure the liberties of the citizenry. With the electronic frontier, however, the government is seen as an obstacle and is being asked to "get out of the way" of the communications industry. In the last decade of the twentieth century the public has come to see the g o v e r n m e n t as the institution limiting personal liberties, not the economic marketplace. In the electronic frontier, the role of the federal government is being diminished, not expanded. Ironically, while "Big Business" decries the g r o w t h of the "Big State," this may be a self-serving complaint made in deepest bad faith (Heilbroner, 1993). Government has grown as it has to a large degree because of the g r o w t h of capitalist e n t e r p r i s e - - b o t h to serve it and to control and manage it "in the public interest." At the time of this writing, Congress is considering Senate bill $315 and House bill HR1555. The proposed legislation represents the most significant rewrite of t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n policy since the enactment of the 1934 Federal Communications Act. The two bills redefine the regulatory controls and future markets of local and long-distance p h o n e companies, cellular and other wireless communications, cable television companies, over-the-air broadcasters, electronic publishers, and manufacturers of telecommunications and c o m p u t e r equipment. The bills w o u l d have set U.S. telecommunication policy for private companies, nonprofit organizations, and citizens for decades to come. Most provisions of the House and Senate versions are similar. They generally allow the large telecommunication companies to enter previously restricted markets. For example, the financially powerful regional telephone companies, w h i c h are n o w restricted to providing local p h o n e service, would eventually be permitted to manufacture communications equipment and compete for services n o w delivered by cable TV operators and long-distance p h o n e companies like AT&T, MCI, and Sprint. The local p h o n e companies would also be able to offer video and electronic publishing services. Long distance providers w o u l d be permitted to enter the local p h o n e market and provide other communication services. Cable companies could distribute expanded video platforms as well as telephone services. Broadcasters would be allowed to own more stations and offer various n e w services via their broadcast frequencies. The bills also permit more mergers b e t w e e n major media companies that are n o w in different, and perhaps even competing, industries. Corporations that will be allowed to enter n e w fields will typically be required to set up separate subsidiaries to avoid predatory pricing policies. In some situations, companies must act as common carriers or they may be required to distribute their competitor's signals. Taken as a whole, these changes are e x p e c t e d to speed up infrastructure d e v e l o p m e n t and the delivery of more advanced information services. One controversial provision of $315 is the a m e n d m e n t proposed by Sen. James Exon (D-Nebraska) that would prohibit indecent and obscene speech from being Carveth and Metz

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d i s s e m i n a t e d o v e r o n l i n e services. While HR1555 c u r r e n t l y c o n t a i n s n o s u c h a m e n d m e n t , and d e s p i t e the t h r e a t o f a p r e s i d e n t i a l v e t o , the final bill n o t o n l y will significantly d e r e g u l a t e the t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s business, b u t is also likely to h a v e s o m e r e s t r i c t i o n s o n w h a t c o n t e n t is carried o v e r o n l i n e services. Similarly, Vice P r e s i d e n t AI G o r e p r o p o s e d in a J a n u a r y 9, 1995, s p e e c h that t h e t w o p r i m a r y roles that the g o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d play in the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e National I n f o r m a t i o n I n f r a s t r u c t u r e (NII) is to e n s u r e real c o m p e t i t i o n and universal service. W h e t h e r the g o v e r n m e n t will m a n d a t e universal service t h r o u g h service r e g u l a t i o n o r a c c e s s r e g u l a t i o n is, to date, unclear. Service r e g u l a t i o n o c c u r s w h e n the g o v e r n m e n t specifies a m i n i m u m level o f service, and sets rates f o r t h o s e m i n i m u m services. This t y p e o f service r e g u l a t i o n is p r e s e n t in the c o n t e m p o r a r y cable industry. Access r e g u l a t i o n s f o r c e a c o m p a n y to o f f e r its services to all c u s t o m e r s w i t h o u t r e q u i r i n g that s o m e b o d y b u y its t e l e p h o n e s e r v i c e in o r d e r to w a t c h its m o v i e s o n cable television. Access r e g u l a t i o n s also r e q u i r e that c o m p a n i e s m a k e available to c o m p e t i t o r s the c o m p o n e n t s f r o m w h i c h t h e i r services are c o n s t r u c t e d . As B r o w n i n g observes: Access regulations thus boost choice and competition at two levels. First, they eliminate the possibility that existing companies can use their huge investments in infrastructure to squeeze out new competitors. The regulations would enable anybody and everybody to have access to, say, installed coaxial cable at roughly the same price at which the cable companies' accountants charge the costs of that cable to their own businesses. Second, they enable customers to mix and match various offerings from a variety of companies to create services they want. (1994) Yet a n o t h e r signal o f the g o v e r n m e n t ' s r e d u c e d role in p o l i c y affecting t h e e l e c t r o n i c f r o n t i e r was t h e Justice D e p a r t m e n t ' s a g r e e m e n t w i t h M i c r o s o f t in J u n e 1994 r e g a r d i n g allegations o f a n t i - c o m p e t i t i v e b e h a v i o r b y t h e c o m p a n y . R a t h e r t h a n s u b j e c t the c o m p a n y to penalties, including the b r e a k u p of t h e c o m p a n y , the g o v e r n m e n t got Microsoft to agree not to e n g a g e in anti-competitive p r a c t i c e s in the future. In n e g o t i a t i n g the deal, the federal g o v e r n m e n t sent a m e s s a g e that antitrust p o l i c y r e g a r d i n g the i n f o r m a t i o n s u p e r h i g h w a y w o u l d b e substantially m o d i f i e d to allow for m a r k e t p l a c e f o r c e s to play a g r e a t e r role (Page, 1994). T h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s a g r e e m e n t w i t h Microsoft was p e r c e i v e d to b e so l e n i e n t to the c o m p a n y that the p a c t c a m e u n d e r strict judicial r e v i e w b e f o r e b e i n g a p p r o v e d in 1995.

Issues of Access T h e m o v e to strip g o v e r n m e n t o f its "intrusion" into the d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n s u p e r h i g h w a y leaves a c c e s s in the hands o f the m a r k e t p l a c e , w h i c h m a y result in a p r a c t i c e o f e c o n o m i c e x c l u s i o n . Ironically, the d i f f e r e n c e in t h e p r a c t i c e o f e c o n o m i c e x c l u s i o n will b e b a s e d o n a c h i e v e d status (i.e., h o w m u c h m o n e y y o u h a v e ) v. a s c r i b e d status (i.e., w h e t h e r y o u w e r e b o r n f e m a l e or African-American, for e x a m p l e ) . T h e result c o u l d be a s o c i e t y o f " i n f o r m a t i o n h a v e s " and " i n f o r m a t i o n have-nots" ( F o r m e r , 1995; Lauria and W h i t e , 1995).

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Every recent telecommunications reform bill has had provisions to expand the definition of "universal service." Originally put in place in the Communications Act of 1934, universal service applied only to telephony. Each n e w legislative proposal has attempted to leave the issue open-ended. Such open-endedness means that the definition of "universal service" is elusive. As such, universal service could range from being completely market-driven to being perpetually redefined by the FCC for each n e w telecommunication service. For example, the legislation proposed by Congress provided for universal s e r v i c e - - p h o n e service to rural and other less profitable areas of the country at an affordable price. The bills left open the possibility, however, that companies could engage in "electronic redlining'--targeting more profitable and urban users and not delivering the most advanced n e w services to poor and rural communities. Currently, the government does not have an adequate understanding of h o w the Internet can assist t h e m in reaching their constituency. The immediate interpretation of the availability of access mimics the misunderstanding of the culture of the net seen before by those w h o choose to advertise. At the 1994 American State Legislators Foundation Conference in Atlanta, state legislators were introduced to various methods of electronic communication, including videotex services and Internet providers. Unfortunately, the first thought that came to mind for the use of the Internet was mass mailings for reaching their constituencies. The primary focus fell on the ability to send relatively inexpensive messages requesting donations for reelection campaigns. The Internet has the ability to bring democracy to an altruistic level, allowing more people than ever before direct access to true public forums and debate. Sadly, however, elected officials have yet to ride the crest of the learning curve and use the technology to its most efficient and productive potential. E c o n o m i c C o n c e n t r a t i o n : F r o m V o t i n g B l o c s to Markets The m o v e m e n t to reduce the influence of government in people's lives has two important implications for democracy. First, the reduction of the influence of the government grants more rights (and responsibilities) to the citizenry. The g o v e r n m e n t takes less away in taxes, lessens the burdens of federal regulation, and generally grants more a u t o n o m y to state and local areas. Second, as the government "downsizes" its scope, the role of the marketplace becomes more critical. As such, citizens become transformed into "markets." How important businesses consider separate markets is a critical element in w h a t "rights" individuals will have on the electronic frontier. For example, there are three major classes of stakeholders that will be affected by the o u t c o m e of the debate over telecommunications policy. First, there are the telecommunications companies and their shareholders. Their shortrun strategy is to be as u n e n c u m b e r e d by regulations as possible. Their longterm goal is to enlarge their markets. People w h o use telecommunications services and pay for t h e m represent the

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second class of stakeholders. This group of stakeholders is c o n c e r n e d with having access to as many services at the lowest cost possible. A variety of special interest groups constitute the third group of stakeholders, many of w h o m are not-for-profit organizations. These groups w a n t to use telec o m m u n i c a t i o n services but can't (or don't want to) pay the price. They generally w a n t some sort of subsidized access, w h i c h means in the absence of governmental subsidy, that the first two groups of stakeholders pay for them. In e c o n o m i c terms, demand for telecommunications services seems to be more elastic than is the supply. A small increase or decrease in costs for these services will have a significant effect on users' consumption habits. The first group of stakeholders (whose 1995 closed-door meetings with Republican congressional leaders suggest they currently have the most political influence) argue that unburdening them of regulation will allow t h e m to take advantage of the so-called "learning curve" as quickly as possible. The learning curve is an effect that suggests the price of providing a p r o d u c t declines as the totai c o n s u m p t i o n increases. To bring prices d o w n as fast as possible requires increasing total consumption. That suggests an economic model with the fewest possible subsidized users; if consumption is very elastic, even small subsidies (including set-aside "free access" services) will cut into c o n s u m p t i o n significantly, and slow d o w n the learning curve effect. The consequence, however, is that what is delivered in the cyberspace marketplace will be determined by consumption patterns (quantity of use) rather than the intrinsic value of the service (quality) to the public. Very possibly, the environment available to citizens of a fully commercialized cyberspace will be more analogous to Prodigy than to a privately maintained Internet bulletin board. The fear is that if this happens, then the c o n t e n t of "cyberdiscourse" will be limited to least-common-denominator, PG-rated, publicly postable messages. In addition, the opportunity to form communities that w a n t to deal privately with serious and controversial matters will be lost.

The Commodification of the Information Superhighway It's not just that the citizenry is being transformed into markets; the information superhighway is becoming commodified. If the Internet was McDonalds, its "golden arches" would say "30 Million Served." The analogy may not be that strained. Marketers cannot sell an entity as dense and complex as the Net on its o w n values. They turn it into a form of conveyance and sell w h a t people get through it. The c o n c e r n over Microsoft's size and business practices indicates the worry that major "trusts" will control the online communications marketplace, not unlike trusts that controlled the steel, oil, and railroad industries at the turn of the century. Microsoft's introduction of Windows '95 in August 1995 brought millions more consumers onto the Internet. While working out the technological bugs, Microsoft is already deep into the process of forging major alliances with newspapers, cable companies, magazines and ad agencies. Microsoft is offering 86

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the " c o n t e n t providers" financial and creative terms that appear more attractive, at least initially, than those offered by existing online services to those of the 40 to 60 million people with modems, many of w h o m aren't subscribing to existing services. Among the potential companies looking to link up with Microsoft are ESPN, Viacom Inc., Reader's Digest Association, U.S. News & World Report, Dodge and Suzuki. The November 1994 a n n o u n c e m e n t by MCI of its "internetMCI" service points to the commodification of the Internet. In MCI's case, w h a t people will get access to through the net are the staples of MCI's business: friends, family and corporate connections. Previous services have sold the Internet as a p r o d u c t unto itself. MCI's "internetMCI" is the first marketing program to transform the connectivity offered by the Net into a simple commodity. As part of a comprehensive communications offering, the Internet has been transformed by MCI into a service such as the telephone or the mail. Like McDonalds, MCI is employing a consumer pricing strategy that balances quality with cost in order to make the transaction as painless as possible for the average customer. MCI is aiming for the "newbies" (newcomers to online services), especially the small businesses getting onto the Net for the first time, as well as the legions of h o m e o w n e r s taking a PC out of the den and into the family room. The thoughts of invasion by customers of a c o m p a n y that has made a name for itself with its calling circles will conjure up the culture clash that occurred w h e n American Online c o n n e c t e d to the Internet (Metz, in press). If the t h o u g h t of such commercialization and commodification strikes a raw nerve, there is plenty of cause for such concern. For years the threat of a "Big Brother" government has loomed over technological advancement such as that illustrated here. The fact that the threat comes from vastly powerful companies such as Microsoft, AT&T, and the like, seems to give the individual cyberfrontier layperson cold chills. Even outside of cyberspace the average citizen has just cause to be c o n c e r n e d about social and political fragmentation. The move to viewing the citizenry as a series of markets is not just restricted to technology, but extends to other institutions as well. For example, while its progress has been slow, companies such as Project Edison and Educational Alternatives, Inc., have been successful in privatizing public education. The m o v e m e n t to educational privatization not only represents an attempt to control spending for public education, but also symbolizes public frustration with educational reforms such as mainstreaming and multiculturalism, and a m o v e m e n t to tighten control of educational curriculum, including the teaching of values. For certain segments of the public, the foundation of their favorable attitudes toward educational privatization is simmering racism--a partial explanation for the success of The Bell Curve (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994), w h i c h argues that African Americans are largely, and inherently, uneducable. Privatization may not be an answer to educational reform, but it is a rationale for the elites to promote the idea of school privatization as a way to accelerate the social bifurcation already u n d e r way. Carveth a n d Metz

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T h e dangers of the r e d u c t i o n of the d e m o c r a c y into e c o n o m i c segments are considerable: increasing social stratification along lines of advanced technical education, c o u p l e d w i t h a c o n c e n t r a t i o n of investment in the kinds of technologies that s u p p o r t w o r k p l a c e productivity, political cohesiveness in the elites and e n t e r t a i n m e n t c o n s u m p t i o n for the "masses;" a decline in public forms of social entitlements; growing differences in educational experience across different cultural g r o u p s and c o n s u m p t i o n of c o m m u n i c a t i o n resources typified by regressive e c o n o m i c practices (such as high prices). While the p o in t her e is not to cause a panic, nor to allow ourselves the l uxury o f falling into a paranoid nightmare of a t e c h n o c r a t i c and ultimately divided society, it is i m p o r t a n t to identify the direction of possible trends. History has s h o w n us that the promise of a seemingly unlimited r e s o u r c e (in T u r n e r ' s case, the vast e x p a n s e of the Western Frontier) does not automatically guarantee a fairy-tale happily-ever-after ending. If the c y b e r f r o n t i e r follows along the guidelines of its g eo g r a phi c p r e d e c e s s o r , w e shall see the "men of capital" e m e r g e as the d o m i n a n t force in restructuring and refocusing the frontier, to the chagrin (and ultimate co m m odi f i c a t i on) of the citizenry.

L i m i t a t i o n s o f the Frontier Thesis While a useful f r a m e w o r k to exam i ne its d e v e l o p m e n t , the application of the f r o n tier thesis to c y b e r s p a c e is not w i t h o u t its limitations. First, as p e o p l e migrated West in the 1800s, they b e c a m e geographically and physically distinct fr o m those in the East. Individuals w h o have settled the c y b e r f r o n t i e r also exist in the "real world" and are not physically separate from those not yet participating in the online world. In c y b e r s p a c e , n e w social situations are created by the application of information system tech nol ogi e s (Meyrowitz, 1985). As Cutler (1995) notes, users' prese n c es on e l e c t r o n i c n e t w o r k s have b e c o m e distributed because of the distribu t ed nature o f networks. These distributed places and p r e s e n c e s a t t e m p t to m e e t social and emotional needs for c o m m i t m e n t , intimacy, and a sense of belonging. This distribution of presences, or "selves," can result in conflicts b e t w e e n individuals' real life identities and their distributed selves. Cutler (1995: 25) argues "Automated systems and e c o n o m i c s of efficiency have c o n s p i r e d to c reate a society of isolated individuals with uncertain futures and the n e e d to be flexible and mobile in o r d e r to survive. ~ In o t h e r w o r d s our "social situation" has c h a n g e d b ec aus e of the t e c h n o l o g y of communication. The n o t i o n of traditional c o m m u n i t y - - b a s e d u p o n location, a history of i nt erl ocked relationships and a diversity of individuals--is r e pl a c e d by participation in a n u m b e r of distributed communities. For ex amp le, Harrington and Bielby (1995) argue that a n e w form of trust e mer g es online. This f or m of trust, w h i c h t hey t e r m impersonal trust, is characterized by t h r e e factors: 1) social cont r ol measures are unavailable; 2) mutual i m b e d d e d n e s s in social relations is not possible; and 3) participants can't evaluate or influence courses of action. Thus, trust b e t w e e n interactants on the Internet 88

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must c o m e f r o m within individual social actors. In many ways, then, interaction is based less o n "who" the p e r s o n is than on w h a t or h o w t h e y say things. T h e r e f o r e , interpersonal relationships for p e o p l e populating the c y b e r f r o n t i e r are significantly different than t hey w e r e for those populating the W e s t e r n Frontier. Th e s e c o n d major drawback to the frontier hypothesis is that c y b e r s p a c e has no national borders. Turner's frontier thesis enjoyed an acclaimed place in American historical thinking until the late 1920s, w h e n revisionists began attacking its r e l ev an ce to c o n t e m p o r a r y U.S. urban society. Similarly, the application of the frontier thesis to t he c y b e r f r o n t i e r is limited by its relevance to the c o n t e m p o rary global e c o n o m y . The issues are not just American issues, but international issues as well, including differences in cultures, e c o n o m i e s and political philosophies. T w o countries that share a great deal of mediated culture w i t h the United States, Australia and Canada, are m u c h more restrictive in terms of c o n t e n t and user behavior. The Canadian gove r nm e nt , for example, a t t e m p t e d (with limited success) to k eep information about the 1994 m u r d e r trials of Karla Homolka and Paul Bernardo f r om bei ng disseminated online, citing a "publication ban" on such information. And, Australia is considering, at the time this article was written, a m u c h m o r e restrictive policy on online erotica than is likely to be e n a c t e d in the United States.

Conclusion Alvin Toffler, George Gilder, Esther Tyson and others have p r o p o s e d their p h ilo s o p h ical foundation for the n e w c y b e r f r o n t i e r in their "Magna Carta": As humankind explores this new "electronic frontier" of knowledge, it must confront again the most profound questions of how to organize itself for the common good. The meaning of freedom, structures of self-government, definition of property, nature of competition, conditions for cooperation, sense of community and nature of progress will each be redefined for the Knowledge Age--just as they were redefined for a new age of industry some 250 years ago. Large b u r eau c r a t i c institutions, such as the g o v e r n m e n t , education, and many big businesses, are inherently slow to change. In this new, fast-paced information society, the y have b e c o m e , by and large, the followers rather than the leaders. Institutions that will survive are those that can adjust quickly, moving to a team, p r o je c t orientation. We n e e d to look at d e m o c r a c y as a process and not a thing. That process appears to take a helical form, converging, t hen separating, converging again, and separating again. With technological and social transitions, the old and the n e w a p p e a r side-by-side as paradoxical and confrontational. We d e c r y the disuniting o f America, yet w e segment markets, for commercial reasons, by sex, age, eth n ic b a c k g r o u n d and in a myriad of o t h e r ways. Michael K a m m e n (1972) notes that "the American seems to be b o t h antitraditionalist and highly conformist." Th es e American t e n d e n c i e s w e a ve in and out over time. T e c h n o l o g y and

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