SOPHIA (2011) 50:221–232 DOI 10.1007/s11841-009-0115-6

Hell Despite Vagueness: A Response to Sider Matthew Konieczka

Published online: 11 August 2009 # Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2009

Abstract Ted Sider argues that a binary afterlife is inconsistent with a proportionally just God because no just criterion for placing persons in such an afterlife exists. I provide a possible account whereby God can remain proportionally just and allow a binary afterlife. On my account, there is some maximum amount of people God can allow into Heaven without sacrificing some greater good. God gives to all people at least their due but chooses to allow some who do not deserve Heaven to enter out of grace. Although this model implies a precise cutoff between those who enter Heaven and those who do not, I have argued that there is a precise point where God best serves justice and some greater good. Although God’s actions may appear arbitrary and ‘whimsically generous,’ it is merely because we are ignorant of the precise cutoff point that best serves his purposes. Keywords Sider . Vagueness . Hell . Heaven . Justice Ted Sider (2002) presents a novel and compelling argument that the traditional binary afterlife is incompatible with the existence of a just God. If we assume that all individuals are determinately and eternally placed in either Heaven or Hell, he argues, God could not formulate any just criterion for placing persons in such an afterlife: [A]ny just criterion must judge created beings according to a standard that comes in degrees, or admits of borderline cases; but no such criterion can remain simultaneously just—or at least non-arbitrary—and consistent with the nature of the afterlife just described (Sider 59). I contend, however, that under a certain criterion for afterlife placement, vagueness does not pose a problem for God’s judgment. I do not intend to show that this is the criterion God actually uses. Rather, my claim is merely that there is M. Konieczka (*) Saint Anselm College, 100 St. Anselm Dr. #1651, Manchester, NH 03102, USA e-mail: [email protected]

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some criterion for placement in a binary afterlife that is consistent with God’s justice. I will first outline Sider’s argument in section I. In section II, I will argue that a standard theist response to the problem of evil provides a response to Sider’s vagueness argument as well. In section III, I will defend the epistemic theory of vagueness and explain why it is the best candidate to explain the type of vagueness issue at hand. Finally, in section IV, I will respond to what I think are the strongest objections to my view.

I According to Sider, a certain type of binary afterlife is incompatible with God’s perfect justice. Such a conception of the afterlife has the following properties: Dichotomy Badness Non-universality Divine Control

One will end up, determinately, in either Heaven or Hell. Those in Hell are much, much worse off than those in Heaven. There is at least one person in both Heaven and Hell. God determines the criterion for placement in the afterlife (58).

According to Sider, these four characteristics are incompatible with God’s perfect justice. There is no just criterion that will give each individual what he or she deserves if there is a binary afterlife. Why is this the case? Simply put, if two people only slightly differed in desert, it would be unjust to give each of them very different rewards. Certainly, if the ‘worst’ person in Heaven differed from the ‘best’ person in Hell only negligibly, it would be unjust to give to one a great reward while horribly punishing the other. One might wonder why we ought to suppose that God’s criterion will admit of borderline cases. Perhaps there is a significant gap between the worst person in Heaven and the best person in Hell. Sider addresses roughly three types of criteria God might use to determine admittance into Heaven: (1) works, (2) faith, and (3) grace. He argues that each notion admits of borderline cases and thus is subject to the type of vagueness objection above. First, it is clear that any viable works criterion will have borderline cases. Whatever actions turn out to be right or wrong, there is no vague-free distinction between persons that perform right actions and those who perform wrong actions. For any person S who does the right thing 62.334% of the time, it is quite likely that there is another person R who does the right thing 62.335% of the time. Given the billions of human beings that are now living, not to mention those from previous generations, the likelihood that a sizeable gap exists between any S and R, a gap large enough to justify such placement in the afterlife, is extremely low. For this reason, it seems that any criterion specifying a precise percentage of good works as the cutoff point is hopelessly arbitrary. According to Sider, such a sharp cutoff would be ‘monstrous’ because, ‘it would blatantly violate the proportional nature of justice’ (60). Whatever point God uses as the cutoff, there will be one individual who is eternally damned, while another is eternally rewarded, though only negligibly better than the first. Following Sider’s example, let us call the ‘best’ person in Hell ‘Goofus,’ and the ‘worst’ person in Hell, ‘Gallant’ (62). Suppose Goofus and Gallant both volunteer at a soup kitchen.

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They always arrive and depart at the same time. On October 14, 1987, however, Gallant stayed 5 minutes later at the soup kitchen than Goofus. Perhaps he stayed only 5 seconds longer. If this action is what earned Gallant’s ticket to Heaven while Goofus is damned, God is not proportionately just. It seems, then, that any criterion based on good works will be unsatisfactory. The second possible criterion, faith, appears more promising at the outset. If we divide our candidates for admittance to Heaven into those who have faith in Jesus Christ and those who do not, it seems that we can avoid the vagueness problem. But, while it might seem that faith is a binary property, Sider argues that any faith criterion is also vague. What of the child who commits himself to God but later rejects religion altogether? What of the woman who believes in and commits herself to God every Sunday but then loses faith during the week? Certainly, the notion of a faithful individual can admit of degrees. Moreover Sider claims that faith, like any belief, can admit of degrees (60). Thus, if faith is the criterion for placement in the afterlife, there will be borderline cases. If God were to use such a criterion, he would allow Gallant into Heaven because he had faith to degree .69 at the moment of his death, or perhaps on average, while Goofus is denied access to Heaven because he had faith to degree .6899. Whatever faith criterion one arrives at, a variety of borderline cases will arise. In each case God cannot maintain proportional justice because he gives vastly different rewards for negligible differences. Ceding Sider’s arguments against both works and faith based criteria; I would like to focus my criticism on Sider’s response to a third possible criterion. According to this criterion, God gives all people at least what they deserve but chooses to be generous to some and give to them more than they deserve. This model, which I will call the grace model, claims that God is doing nothing wrong by sending Gallant to Heaven and Goofus to Hell. In fact, he has met the demands of proportional justice, giving to each his due. He simply decides to extend his grace and give to some more than they deserve. The basis for this model is the Biblical parable of the generous landowner. According to this story, the landowner sets the terms of employment for a full day’s work ahead of time. Then, he decides to pay some a full day’s wage for a few hours’ work while those who worked the full day complain that they are not being treated fairly. Nonetheless, the landowner insists that he is only being especially generous to some while giving to each at least his due.1 If, for example, a storeowner decided to give out extra goods to every fourth customer, one could hardly complain that he was being unfair to the others. In the same way, God remains perfectly just in giving a bonus to some (allowing them undeservedly into Heaven) although he does not extend this bonus to those only slightly less deserving. Sider has two criticisms of the grace model. First, God, unlike the landowner, has unlimited resources. It is permissible for the landowner to be generous to some but not to others because the landowner has a finite amount of money. God, on the other hand, has infinite resources and presumably is not running out of spots in Heaven. For this reason, Sider argues that we might hold God to a higher standard. Second, it is one thing to give a bonus to some people and leave 1

See Matthew 20: 1–15.

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others with an acceptable amount. It is another thing to give a bonus to some and leave others in a horrible state. Since Hell is very bad, it seems that God is being ‘whimsically generous’ when he extends his grace to some but not to others (66). But it is not his generosity that is problematic. Rather, it is the fact that a being with infinite resources saves some individuals while inexplicably abandoning a very similar portion of his creation to horrible suffering. If grace is the criterion, it is hopelessly arbitrary for God to extend his grace to Gallant but not to Goofus when he could easily have saved Goofus as well.

II In what follows, I wish to show that there is a non-arbitrary response to the question, ‘Why does God stop extending his grace after saving Gallant?’ One of the main reasons Sider thinks God’s whimsical generosity is problematic is the absolute agony of Hell. As God could save everyone through his grace, it seems arbitrary to save some but not others. Why would God choose some of his ‘children’ to enjoy everlasting paradise, but let other similarly deserving creatures burn in horrendous suffering? God has infinite resources, yet he ‘arbitrarily’ grants salvation only to some. If I have an infinite amount of money and similarly deserving people are starving all around me, it seems that I should see to it that everyone’s needs are met. It would be wrong to save only some lives when I could save many more with a simple snap of the fingers. But as God is perfectly good, he would never do what is wrong. This problem closely resembles the traditional problem of evil. Rather than ask, ‘Why does God allow anyone to suffer at all?’ Sider asks, ‘Why does God allow similarly deserving people to suffer very different fates?’ While these two questions may appear to be quite different at first blush, they are in fact very similar when one considers that both questions point to an alleged arbitrariness on the part of God. Consider the first question, the traditional problem of evil. If all suffering in this life were proportional to desert, this problem would lose much of its bite. The most troubling aspect of evil is the fact that bad things often happen to good people. It is because people suffer inexplicably and seemingly arbitrarily that the problem of evil provides a powerful criticism of theism. Sider’s vagueness objection is a new variation on the same theme. Just as we cannot comprehend why good people suffer and bad people often thrive in this world, it would be equally baffling if negligibly different people experienced dramatically different consequences in the afterlife.2 In both cases, the difficulty is one of apparent injustice and arbitrariness that appears incompatible with a good and just God. Given the similarity between these cases, a standard theist response to the problem of evil lends itself quite well to Sider’s vagueness argument.

There is at least one obvious difference between the ‘standard’ problem of evil and the problem of Hell: Hell is infinite while all worldly suffering is finite. I will address the special problem this creates in section IV.

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A common theist reply to the problem of evil is to appeal to human ignorance.3 If there is a benevolent and just God, he undoubtedly has some good reason for allowing suffering in the world although we cannot expect to know what that good is. Gratuitous suffering is incompatible with God’s omnibenevolence. Thus, if God exists, there must be some overall good or just end that all suffering serves. In the same way, if God exists, Hell would exist only if there were some good or just purpose that compensated for its evil. What such a purpose might be, I do not pretend to know. I will however offer a possible reason for the existence of Hell. Recall that I only intend to show that there is a criterion for placement in a binary afterlife that is consistent with God’s justice, whether it is the one God actually uses or not. Following the grace model, then, let us first suppose that most individuals deserve Hell. In addition, while God would like to allow everyone into Heaven, let us suppose that there is some greater good (perhaps in Heaven itself) that would be impossible to attain if too many undeserving sinners were admitted to Heaven. Let us call this claim the ‘Necessity of an Exclusive Heaven,’ or NEH. God finds this greater good preferable to allowing everyone into Heaven. Thus, the ‘necessity’ of NEH is not logical necessity, but is necessary given the goals and preferences of God. If NEH is true, there is some maximum number of people God could allow into Heaven without also sacrificing some greater good. While NEH may not be true, it does provide a possible explanation for God’s extending his grace to Gallant but stopping before admitting Goofus. God stops at precisely the point where the benefit of allowing undeserving sinners into Heaven is outweighed by the cost, whatever that may be, of allowing in too many undeserving sinners. Let us then suppose that God’s criterion for entry into Heaven is: (C) God will send person S to Heaven (Hell) iff doing so is consistent with maximizing the number of people in Heaven without sacrificing greater good G and doing so will give S at least as much as she deserves. So long as each person gets at least what she deserves, God will increase the population of Heaven by letting as many undeserving people into Heaven as possible until the point at which extending his grace sacrifices greater good G. C preserves God’s justice as well as his omnibenevolence. Note how this account also resolves Sider’s objection to a binary afterlife. If C is God’s criterion for admittance to Heaven, a binary afterlife is compatible with God’s proportional justice. God’s justice is preserved in that everyone receives at least what he or she deserves.4 He would not allow Goofus to suffer eternally for no reason. If he did permit pointless suffering, Sider would be correct that it would be ‘whimsically generous’ to save some but not others. But if one assumes that, because of his omnibenevolence, God only allows purposeful suffering, it is clear that a sharp cutoff for membership in Heaven is perfectly acceptable. At precisely that point where God allows the most people into Heaven as possible without sacrificing whatever greater good the exclusivity of Heaven serves, he draws the line. 3

For an excellent example of such a reply see Wykstra (1984). The humean obstacle to evidential arguments from suffering: on avoiding the evils of ‘Appearance’. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 16, 73–93. 4 Some like Sider argue that such a ‘whimsical generosity’ is unjust. I will address this criticism in section IV.

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That line, however, is not arbitrary. Rather, it is the result of a precise calculation. Drawing the line after Gallant and before Goofus is the furthest point God can extend his generosity without sacrificing greater good G. Indeed, if God is to achieve this greater good, he needs to have a sharp cutoff at some point. There will be some ‘Goofus’ who must be denied entry into Heaven because (a) he does not deserve it, and (b) letting him in would sacrifice the greater good. Just like the storeowner who gives out free goods to every fourth customer, God is benevolent, just, and generous. And, as in the case of the storeowner, there is a reason that such generosity cannot be extended to all. The storeowner’s generosity is limited by his finances. God’s reason for drawing the sharp boundary is mandated by his preference to bring about greater good G. Before continuing, I would like to consider a pair of objections to the view that God would allow some people to be condemned to Hell in order to further some greater good. The first objection is that, in some sense, we are all God’s children whom he loves and with whom he desires to be reconciled. It is hard to see why a loving parent would sacrifice his own children in order to accomplish some consequentialist goal, whatever it may be.5 While it may be the case that God strongly desires to be reconciled with a particular individual, say Goofus, this is by no means his only goal. He also desires to be reconciled with everyone else. Although we may all be God’s children in some important sense, God may not be able to achieve his desires concerning every person because some of those desires may be incompatible. Indeed, if NEH is true, God’s desire for some greater good to come about (perhaps, his desire for Heaven to exist at all) cannot be realized if Heaven is not exclusive. God is not sacrificing his children for abstract consequentialist goals; he is choosing to satisfy his desires regarding some of his children rather than his desires regarding others when these two desires are incompatible. A second objection is that God cannot be a consequentialist, so the idea that God must act in a certain way in order to achieve the greatest good is mistaken. According to Stephen Kershnar, it is logically impossible for God to be a consequentialist because, although consequentialism requires that one bring about the best state of affairs, there is in fact no best state of affairs, and so God cannot be required to do the impossible (Kershnar 119). Even if we assume that Kershnar’s argument is successful, it does not threaten my argument here because I am not assuming that God is a consequentialist. One need not be a consequentialist in order to have two mutually incompatible goals and prefer one to the other. God desires that each person is able to enjoy Heaven, but he also desires some greater good that cannot be accomplished if each person enjoys Heaven. This view does not presuppose that God must bring about the best state of affairs that is possible, only that given his preference to achieve some greater good, God must act in a certain way to bring about that greater good. In other words, God does not make Heaven exclusive because he is obligated to maximize the good. Rather, he chooses to exclude some from Heaven in order to satisfy a goal that he values more.

5

I am grateful to an anonymous referee for articulating this objection.

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III Because the extension of God’s grace has a definitive endpoint, my account brings to mind what is called the epistemic theory of vagueness. According to epistemicists, vague terms actually have sharp boundaries, but we are ignorant of the precise location of these boundaries. For a term such as ‘bald,’ there is a precise hair, the loss of which makes one bald. A common objection to the epistemic theory of vagueness is that it would be arbitrary (and unintuitive!) to say that the 4,390,202nd lost hair rather than the 4,390,203rd lost hair makes the difference between being bald and not being bald. I contend, however, that in at least some cases of ethical vagueness, the epistemic theory of vagueness yields nonarbitrary and intuitive results. Such a theory would allow for God to stop extending his grace at one precise point. An epistemic view of vagueness matches many of our intuitions in cases of ethical vagueness. For example, suppose I have an obligation to give a negligible portion of my income to those in immediate need. It seems I do have an obligation to give one penny to Jenny if it would save her life. But then should I not also give a second penny if doing so will save Bill’s life as well? Certainly, it seems, one penny will not make the difference between having an obligation and lacking an obligation. If one penny can never make a difference, however, we are lead to the unintuitive conclusion that I am obligated to give all of my money away if each penny would save someone’s life. But according to the epistemic theory of vagueness, there is one penny that makes the difference between an obligatory donation and a nonobligatory donation. Which penny that is may be unknown to the human mind. Nonetheless, there still exists some optimal point where obligation ends. Our inability to know the right thing to do in difficult moral situations may often boil down to our lack of epistemic access to that optimal point between obligation and lack of obligation. Sider anticipates an epistemic response to his argument and claims that the theory is implausible, especially in ethical cases. He argues that even if it were true that there are sharp cutoffs in the extension of terms such as ‘bald,’ such cutoffs could not grant any moral significance. Using the term ‘faith’ as an example, Sider criticizes the epistemic theory: Consider again our [ordered] sequence M1, …, Mn of [negligibly different] mental states. The epistemicist postulates a sharp cutoff in the extension of ‘faith’: M i-1 is in while Mi is out. Thus the epistemicist grants semantic significance to the difference between Mi-1 and Mi. It would be quite another thing to grant important moral significance to this distinction. Nothing in epistemicism implies that the proposed semantic cutoffs are due to unknown factors that have special significance of any kind, whether ontological or moral. Nor should it (Sider 62). Sider’s point seems to be that if we are ignorant of the precise boundary of a certain term, the location of that boundary should not hold any moral significance. For example, suppose that it is vague whether action A has the property of being obligatory. Certainly, I cannot be held accountable for performing action A since, on

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the epistemic theory, I am ignorant of the precise boundary of the property of being obligatory. I concur with Sider that for predicates such as ‘bald’ the mere semantic difference between hair Mi and hair Mi-1 cannot constitute a moral distinction. Nonetheless, when the vague predicate itself has moral significance, the sharp cutoff will also have moral significance. Take, for instance, the following predicate: P:

Being an amount of money one is obligated to donate to those in need given one’s circumstances.

If one accepts the claim that P is a vague predicate, it seems that it is a vague predicate that has moral significance. Although I may not know the precise limit of P’s extension, it certainly is significant whether I am obligated to donate $50 or whether it is merely permissible for me to do so. Following Sider, it may seem unreasonable to hold someone accountable for a distinction that is, according to the epistemic theory, beyond human knowledge. But, morality does not require us to know the precise limits of our obligations, it merely requires us to perform our obligations. If it is unclear whether action A is obligatory or not, it would be wise to perform action A nonetheless.6 It seems, then, that precise cutoffs can be morally significant even when their location is unknown. But, if predicates such as P have moral significance, it seems that the following vague predicate also has moral significance: P’:

Being such that one can justly be sent to Heaven without losing the greater good that an exclusive Heaven serves.

As in the case of P, the precise extension of P’ is morally significant. Suppose that Gallant has P’ while Goofus does not. If Gallant is such that he can be admitted to Heaven while Goofus is not, God would certainly be doing something wrong if he admitted Goofus. Vagueness in moral predicates can be morally significant. While it may seem arbitrary that God chooses Gallant but not Goofus, it is actually for good reason. P’ applies to Gallant but does not apply to Goofus. It is our limited epistemic situation that makes the precise extension of P’ unclear to us. The epistemic theory of vagueness, far from being implausible, is quite insightful in some cases of ethical vagueness.

IV I would finally like to respond to what I think are the two most pressing objections to my defense of a binary afterlife. The first objection, that Hell imposes an infinite punishment when human agents can only deserve finite punishments, has been pointed out by Marilyn McCord Adams (1975) and further articulated by Stephen Kershnar (2005). This objection, if successful, undercuts my premise that nearly everyone deserves Hell to begin with and God simply allows a number of 6

Of course, this may not always be possible without significant risk of performing an impermissible action. While there is not room to fully address this issue here, it seems that in general there is good reason to ‘err on the side of obligation’ when it is unclear whether an action is obligatory or merely permissible.

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undeserved sinners into Heaven through grace. In Kershnar’s view, an agent can only deserve an infinite punishment if she (a) has done an act or acts of infinite seriousness, (b) has an infinitely bad character, or (c) has some combination of (a) and (b) (Kershnar 107). He then proceeds to show how none of these options are both possible and consistent with theism. While (b) seems wholly implausible, I contend that (a) is certainly possible because an agent may commit repeated sins in the afterlife and thus deserve an infinite punishment. To use a more ordinary example, suppose Smith is guilty of perjury. He deserves to be imprisoned for eight months. Now, further suppose that while Smith is imprisoned, he commits an assault and adds five years to his sentence. While serving his time for assault, he commits another crime and adds more time to his sentence. If it were not for one’s eventual death, an agent could accumulate an infinite punishment through repeated finite crimes. In a parallel manner, one could deserve an infinite punishment in Hell by repeatedly turning away from God. One obvious difference between the prison model and Hell is that, on the traditional view assumed by Sider, one is placed determinately in either Heaven or Hell. One cannot get out of Hell after a finite amount of time. Thus, it seems that God would not be able to place an individual in Hell as one has not yet committed an act that deserves infinite punishment. This objection, however, fails to consider another obvious difference between the prison model and Hell, namely, that God is omniscient. If God knows at the time of an individual’s death that he will freely turn away from God for eternity, it would be just for God to place such a person in Hell. Using the grace model, it is possible that almost all people deserve Hell because God knows that they will turn away from him for eternity, but chooses to save some of these individuals through grace. Whether or not this possibility is actually the case, it provides a way for a proportionately just God and a binary afterlife to coexist. Nonetheless, Kershnar criticizes the view that an infinite number of bad acts can merit an infinite punishment on the grounds that it would unjustly punish those who cannot control their own actions: Over an infinite period of time, a responsible agent grasps the nature of the good and right and that following it is strongly in his interest. The only explanation for his failure to think and do the right things would be an inability to control which desires get translated into action. This inability is sufficient to hold the agent blameless for his actions and it is unjust to continually punish such a person (116). Kershnar’s criticism here seems to rest on a misunderstanding of eternal life. Although Kershnar allows the possibility for rational individuals to repeatedly make the same mistakes that lead to the same punishments in a finite period of time, he denies that the same is possible over an infinite amount of time. The difference is that in a finite period, individuals, ‘lack information or the time to properly discipline themselves’ (116). It is hard to see, however, why the conditions change when given an infinite amount of time. If eternal life is simply an infinite series of finite events, it seems that the ‘lack of time’ explanation will apply to any finite subset of the infinite series

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and thus to the series as a whole. There will be no moment when a responsible agent is guaranteed to understand the ‘nature of the good and right.’ Just as it is possible to draw one card out of a full deck every day for eternity and never pick the ace of spades, it is possible for a responsible agent to spend eternity in punishment without deciding to change one’s behavior. Moreover, unlike drawing cards out of a deck, an agent’s resentment of God will likely increase the chance of further resentment of God in the future. Thus, rather than come to the knowledge of the good and right over an infinite period of time, it seems perfectly coherent and plausible that one might turn further and further away from God over an infinite period of time. Therefore, the objection that no individual deserves an infinite punishment fails. The second major objection to my account comes from Sider himself. He objects to the grace model in the following way: But even if Hell is not so bad, if it is much worse than Heaven God would be whimsically generous in granting the gift of Heaven to Gallant but not to Goofus. I say that whimsical generosity is unjust; or, more cautiously, that it falls short of God’s perfect justice (Sider 66). While in some sense God is just for giving all people at least their due, Sider suggests that it is unjust to do so while giving a great deal more to some. Here it seems that there are intuitions on either side of the debate. First examine each of these two cases: A1: A billionaire gives out a million dollars to every person who shares his birthday. A2: An employer gives her 50 best employees substantially more money than they deserve. It is clear that in each of these cases the giver is not unjust but generous. To say that these givers somehow “fall short” of an ideal of perfect justice does not seem right at all. On the other hand, examine these two cases: B1: A parent gives both of her children the privileges that they deserve, but gives the younger child substantially more privileges. B2: An employer always gives his attractive female employees extra holiday bonuses but does not give anyone else the extra bonuses. Each of these cases is an example of injustice. Even though everyone receives at least what they deserve, it seems that in some cases it is not just to substantially favor one group over another. In this sense, it may be unjust to be ‘whimsically generous.’ Do A1 and A2 resemble God’s judgments concerning the afterlife more closely than B1 and B2? Sider points out a number of unique and relevant facts about Heaven and Hell that make it different than cases like A1 and A2. First, Hell is very bad. It is one thing to give someone a million dollars and leave others as they were. It is another thing to let people face eternal suffering rather than save them (66). Second, there is a very large difference between Heaven and Hell that makes the decision seem all the more arbitrary (66). This second point I find unconvincing. One can alter A1 to increase the difference between those who receive the gift and

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those who do not. Still, even if the billionaire gives out billions of dollars to some and none to others, he hardly seems unjust. What reason do we have for thinking that a perfectly just being would give to everyone equally? If everyone is already decently well off, the simple fact that there is a large discrepancy between what some receive and what others receive does not by itself make the act of giving unjust. Sider’s first point is much stronger. In the case of Hell, it simply is not the case that everyone is already decently well off. Since Hell is very bad, ‘it is harder to admit the justice of arbitrarily rescuing some from horrible agony while abandoning relevantly similar others to their fate’ (66). An analogy would be helpful to show that ‘whimsical generosity’ in this case is not unjust. Suppose a wealthy philanthropist is traveling to a nation of extreme poverty. Suppose for the sake of discussion that all the members of this nation are adults who are responsible for putting themselves in the situation they are in. None deserve charity, yet some are slightly more deserving than others. The philanthropist has pity on them. She travels to their country, builds a home and recruits the 1,000 most deserving people to live in the home and eat enough food to make them healthy again. Despite all of this, thousands upon thousands of other people continue to starve outside of that home. The philanthropist, after setting this up, travels back to her native country. Were the philanthropist’s actions unjust? It seems that, in many ways, the philanthropist was more than just. The actions themselves were very generous. She helped people who deserved to suffer get more than they deserved. What falls short of perfect justice, one might argue, is that the philanthropist could have fed more people. Certainly she could afford it. If this philanthropist could do more, then certainly God, who has unlimited resources, should do more. The fact that God has unlimited resources is a third relevant difference between God and the givers in cases like A1 and A2. According to Sider, because God’s resources are unlimited, he should be held to higher levels of perfection than humans with limited resources (66). If God were the philanthropist, he could have fed all of those in need. Likewise, it seems that given unlimited resources, God does not need to set an arbitrary limit to Heaven’s occupancy. Recall, however, that in an important respect, God does have ‘limited resources.’ If we grant that having some people suffering in Hell serves some greater purpose, God is ‘limited’ in that he cannot achieve that greater purpose without allowing some to suffer in Hell. In the problem of evil debate, some argue that humankind’s freedom is necessary for some greater purpose.7 God is limited by this constraint, some argue, because preventing all possible evil is inconsistent with the existence of meaningful free will. In the same way, one could argue that God has a limited amount of grace that he can employ and still achieve his purposes. Thus, God does not differ from the philanthropist in this respect. Just as the philanthropist has to pick and choose when to be generous since she has a finite amount of money, God can only grant so many undeserved tickets to Heaven without sacrificing the overall purpose that an exclusive Heaven serves. Even though Hell is very much worse than Heaven, the situation is not unlike the case of the philanthropist. Although very few people, if any, are entitled to his generosity, he chooses to give great gifts to those who are 7

For an example, see Swinburne (1996).

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most deserving. Although God’s actions may appear arbitrary and whimsically generous, they are precisely calculated to give to all people at least their due and be as generous as possible while preserving the specific purposes he has. Ultimately, God’s generosity is more akin to the situations in cases A1 and A2 than those in B1 and B2. The parent who favors her youngest child (B1) and the employer who favors his attractive employees (B2) each give benefits to some rather than others for arbitrary reasons that have no relation to desert. God’s actions, on the other hand, resemble A1 and A2 more closely. Like an employer giving her 50 best employees a substantial bonus (A2), God rewards a certain number of individuals (beginning with the most deserving and moving toward the less deserving) by giving to them more than they deserve. As God’s generosity is more like that in A1 and A2, it is not the kind that falls short of perfect justice. Sider has argued that a binary afterlife is inconsistent with a God that is proportionally just. I have merely provided a defense, a possible account whereby God can remain proportionally just and allow a binary afterlife. On this account, there is some maximum amount of people God can allow into Heaven without sacrificing some greater good. God gives to all people at least their due but chooses to allow some who do not deserve Heaven to enter out of grace. Although this model implies a precise cutoff between those who enter Heaven and those who do not, I have argued that there is a precise point where God best serves justice and some greater good. Although God’s actions may appear arbitrary and whimsically generous, it is merely because we are ignorant of the precise cutoff point that best serves his purposes. Following the epistemic theory of vagueness and the grace model of eternal reward and punishment, a proportionally just God is not inconsistent with a binary afterlife.

References Adams, M. M. (1975). Hell and the God of Justice. Religious Studies, 11, 433–447. Kershnar, S. (2005). The Injustice of Hell. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 58, 103–123. Sider, T. (2002). Hell and Vagueness. Faith and Philosophy, 19, 58–68. Swinburne, R. (1996). Some Major Strands of Theodicy. In D. Howard-Snyder (Ed.), The Evidential Argument From Evil (pp. 30–48). Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Wykstra, S. J. (1984). The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments From Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils of “Appearance”. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 16, 73–93.