1983

Inner-City Dislocations William Julius Wilson he social problems of urban life in advanced industrial America are, in large measure, viewed as problems of race. Joblessness, urban crime, addiction, out-of-wedlock births, female-headed families, and welfare dependency have risen dramatically in the past several decades. Moreover, as several of the essays in this special issue have clearly demonstrated, the rates reflect an amazingly uneven distribution by race. These problems are heavily concentrated in urban areas, but it would be a mistake to assume that they afflict all segments of the urban minority community. Rather, as some of the essays have also correctly pointed out, these problems disproportionately plague the urban underclass--a heterogeneous grouping of families and individuals in the inner city that are outside the mainstream of the American occupational system and that consequently represent the very bottom of the economic hierarchy. It is my view that the increasing rates of social dislocation in the inner city cannot be explained simply in terms of racial discfimination or in terms of a "culture of poverty," but should be viewed as having complex and interrelated sociological antecedents, ranging from demographic changes to the problems of societal organization. Racial discrimination is the most frequently invoked explanation of racial variation in certain forms of urban social dislocation, Proponents of the discrimination thesis, however, often fail to make a distinction between the eflects of historical discrimination and the effects of contemporary discrimination.

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There is no doubt that contemporary discrimination has contributed to or aggravated the social and economic problems of the black poor. But is discrimination greater today than it was in 1948, when black unemployment (5.9%) was less than half the rate in 1980 (12.3%), and when the black/white unemployment ratio (1.7) was almost a quarter less than the ratio in 1980 (2.1)? There are obviously many reasons for the higher levels of black joblessness since the mid1950s, but to suggest contemporary discrimination as the main factor is, as I shall soon show, to obscure the impact of major demographic and economic changes and to leave unanswered the question of why black unemployment was lower not after, but prior to, the mid- 1950s. It should also be pointed out that, contrary to prevailing opinion, the black family showed signs of deterioration not before, but after, the mid-twentieth century. Until the publication of Herbert Gutman's impressive historical study of the black family, it had been widely assumed that the contemporary problems of the black family could be traced back to slavery. Gutman, however, produced data demonstrating that the black family was not particularly disorganized either during slavery or during the early years of their first migration to the urban North, thereby suggesting that the present problems of black family disorganization are a product of more recent forces. But are these problems mainly a consequence of contemporary discrimination, or are they related to other fac-

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tors that ostensibly have little to do with race? If contemporary discrimination is the main culprit, why have its nefarious effects produced the most severe problems of inner-city social dislocation--including joblessness--during the 1970s, a decade that followed an unprecedented period of antidiscrimination legislation and that ushered in the proliferation of affirmative-action programs. To repeat, the problem is to unravel the effects of contemporary discrimination, on the one hand, and historical discrimination, on the other. Even if all contemporary discrimination were eliminated, the problems of social dislocation in the inner city would persist for many years, until the effects of historical discrimination disappeared. However, a full appreciation of the legacy of historical discrimination is impossible without taking into account other historical and contemporary forces that have helped shape the experiences and behavior of impoverished urban minorities. One of the major consequences of historical discrimination is the presence of a large black underclass in our central cities, plagued by problems of joblessness and other forms of social dislocation. Whereas blacks made up 23 percent of the population of central cities in 1977, they constituted 46 percent of the poor in those cities. In accounting for the historical developments that contributed to this concentration of urban black poverty, I will draw briefly upon Stanley Lieberson's recent and original study A Piece of the Pie: Black and White h,migpzmts since 1880. On the basis of a systematic analysis of early U.S. censuses and various other data sources, Lieberson showed that in many areas of life, including the labor market, blacks in the early twentieth century were discriminated against far more severely than the new immigrants from Southern, Central, and Eastern Europe. However, he cautions against attributing this solely to racial bias. The disadvantage of skin color---the fact that the dominant white population preferred whites over nonwhites--is one that blacks have certainly shared with the Chinese, Japanese, American Indians, and other nonwhite groups. Nonetheless, even though blacks have experienced greater discrimination, the contrast with the Asians does reveal that skin color per se was "not an insurmountable obstacle." Indeed, Lieberson argues that the greater success enjoyed by Asians may well be explained largely by the different context of their contact with whites. Because changes in immigration policy cut off Asian migration to America in the late-nineteenth and earlier-twentieth century, the Japanese and Chinese populations--in sharp contrast

to blacks--did not reach large numbers and therefore did not pose as great a threat to the white population. Lieberson concedes that the "response of whites to Chinese and Japanese was of the same violent and savage character in areas where they were concentrated," but he also notes that "the threat was quickly stopped through changes in immigration policy."

The economic and social plight of the urban underclass calls for public policies that benefit all the poor, not just poor minorities.

Furthermore, the discontinuation of large-scale immigration from Japan and China enabled these groups to solidify networks of ethnic contact and to occupy particular occupational niches. The 1970 census records 22,580,000 blacks and only 435,000 Chinese and 591,000 Japanese. "Imagine," Lieberson exclaims, "'22 million Japanese Americans trying to carve out initial niches through truck farming!"

The Importance of Migrant Flows If different population sizes accounted for a good deal of the difference in the economic success of blacks versus Asians, they also helped determine the dissimilar rates of progress of urban blacks and the new Europeans. The dynamic factor behind these differences, and perhaps the most important single contributor to the varying rates of urban ethnic progress in the twentieth century, is the flow of migrants. Changes in U.S. policy first halted Asian immigration to America and then curtailed the new European immigration. However, black migration to the urban North continued in substantial numbers several decades after the new European immigration had ceased. Accordingly, the percentage of northern blacks who are recent migrants substantially exceeds the dwindling percentage of Europeans who are recent migrants. In this connection, Lieberson theorizes that the changes in race relations that accompany shifts in racial composition are not caused by any radical alteration in white dispositions but, rather, that shifts in composition activate dispositions that were present all along. "In other words," writes Lieberson, "there is a latent structure to the race relations pattern in a given setting, with only certain parts of this structure observed at a given time." The sizable and continuous

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migration of blacks from the South to the North, coupled with the cessation of immigration from Eastern, Central, and Southern Europe, created a situation in which other whites muffled their negative disposition toward the new Europeans and focused antagonism toward blacks. In the words of Lieberson, "the presence of blacks made it harder to discriminate against the new Europeans because the alternative was viewed less favorably." The flow of migrants made it much more difficult for blacks to follow the path of the Asians and new Europeans, who had overcome the negative effects of discrimination by finding special occupational niches. Only a small percentage of a group's total work force can be absorbed in such specialties when the group's population increases rapidly or is a sizable proportion of the total population. Furthermore, the flow of migrants had a harmful effect on the earlier-arriving or longer-standing black residents of the North. Lieberson insightfully points out that: sizable numbers of newcomers raise the level of ethnic and/or racial consciousness on the part of others in the city; moreover, if these newcomers are less able to compete for more desirable positions than are the longer-standing residents, they will tend to undercut the position of other members of the group. This is because the older residents and those of higher socioeconomic status cannot totally avoid the newcomers, although they work at it through subgroup residential isolation. Hence, there is some deterioration in the quality of residential areas, schools, and the like for those earlier residents who might otherwise enjoy more fully the rewards of their mobility. Beyond this, from the point of view of the dominant outsiders, the newcomers may reinforce stereotypes and negative dispositions that affect all members of the group. In sum, because substantial black migration to the North continued several decades after the new European and Asian migration ceased, urban blacks, having their ranks constantly replenished with poor migrants, found it much more difficult to follow the path of the new Europeans and the Asian immigrants in overcoming the effects of discrimination. The net result is that as the nation entered the last quarter century, its large urban areas continued to have a disproportionate concentration of poor blacks who, as I shall show, have been especially vulnerable to recent structural changes in the economy.

It should also be emphasized, however, that black migration to urban areas has been minimal in recent years. Indeed, between 1970 and 1977, blacks actually experienced a net outmigration of 653,000 from the central cities. In most large cities, the number of blacks increased only moderately; in some, in fact, the number declined. As the demographer Philip Hauser pointed out, increases in the urban black population during the 1970s were "'mainly due to births." This would indicate that, for the first time in the twentieth century, the ranks of blacks in our central cities are no longer being replenished by poor migrants. This strongly suggests, other things being equal, that urban blacks will experience a steady decrease in joblesshess, crime, out-ofwedlock births, single-parent homes, and welfare dependency. In other words, just as the Asian and new European immigrants benefited from a cessation of migration, there is now reason to expect that the cessation of black migration will help to upgrade urban black communities. In making this observation, however, I am in no way overlooking other factors that affect the differential rate of ethnic progress at different periods of time, such as structural changes in the economy, population size, and discrimination. Nonetheless, one of the major obstacles to urban black advancement--the constant flow of migrants--has been removed.

By treating blacks and other ethnics as monolithic groups, we lose sight of the fact that high-income blacks and Hispanics have even fewer children than their counterparts in the general population.

Hispanics, on the other hand, appear to be migrating to urban centers in increasing numbers. The status of Hispanics vis-a-vis other ethnic groups is not entirely clear because there are no useful figures for 1970 on their type of residence. But data collected since 1974 indicate that their numbers are increasing rapidly in central cities, as a consequence of immigration as well as births. Indeed, in several large cities (including New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Diego, Phoenix, and Denver) Hispanics apparently outnumber black Americans. Accordingly, the rapid growth of the Hispanic population in urban areas, ac-

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companied by the opposite trend for black Americans, could contribute significantly to different outcomes for these two groups in the last two decades of the twentieth century. Specifically, whereas blacks could very well experience a decrease in their rates of joblessness, crime, out-of-wedlock births, single-parent homes, and welfare dependency, Hispanics could show a steady increase in each of these problems. Moreover, whereas blacks could experience a decrease in the ethnic hostility directed toward them, Hispanics, with their increasing visibility, could become victims of increasing ethnic antagonism. The flow of migrants also has implications for the average age of an ethnic group. The higher the median age of a group, the greater its representation in the higher-income and professional categories where older individuals are more heavily represented. It is not mere coincidence, then, that younger ethnic groups, such as blacks and Hispanics, who are highly concentrated in age groups where unemployment and violent crime are prevalent, also tend to have high unemployment and crime rates, even if other factors are considered. In 1980, ethnic groups differed significantly in median age, ranging from 23.2 years for blacks and Hispanics to 31.3 years for whites. Only 21.3 percent of all American whites were under age 15, compared with 28.7 percent for blacks and 32 percent for Hispanics.

Cultural values do not determine behavior or success. Rather, cultural values grow out of specific circumstances and life chances and reflect one's position in the class structure.

In the nation's central cities in 1977, the median age was 30.3 years for whites, 23.9 for blacks, and 21.8 for Hispanics. One cannot overemphasize the importance of the sudden increase of young minorities in the central cities. The number of central-city black teenagers (16-19 years old) increased by almost 75 percent from 1960 to 1969, compared with an increase of only 14 percent for whites in the same age group. Furthermore, young black adults (ages 20 to 24) in the central city increased in number by twothirds during the same period--three times the increase for comparable whites. From 1970 to 1977, the increase in the number of young blacks slackened oft

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somewhat but was still substantial. For example, the number of young blacks (ages 14 to 24) in the central cities of our large metropolitan areas (populations above 1 million) increased by 22 percent from 1970 to 1977: young Hispanics, by 26 percent. The number of young whites in these central cities, however, decreased by 7 percent. On the basis of these demographic changes alone, one would expect blacks and Hispanics to account disproportionately for the increasing social problems of the central city. Indeed, in 1980, 55 percent of all those arrested for violent and property crimes in American cities were younger than 21. Age is also related to out-of-wedlock births, femaleheaded homes, and welfare dependency. Teenagers accounted for almost half of out-of-wedlock births in 1978. Moreover, 80 percent of all out-of-wedlock black births in 1978 were to teenage and young-adult (ages 20 to 24) women. Further, the median age of female householders has decreased significantly in recent years because of the sharp rise in teenage and youngadult female householders. (In 1970, young black-female householders, ages 14 to 24, having children under 18 years old constituted 30.9 percent of all black female householders with children under age 18: by 1979, their proportion had increased to 37.2 percent, compared with increases from 22.4 to 27.9 percent for comparable white families and from 29.9 to 38.3 percent for comparable Hispanic families.) Finally, the explosion of teenage births has contributed significantly to an increase in the number of children on AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) from 35 per 1,000 children under age 18 in 1960 to 113 per 1,000 in 1979. In short, recent increases in crime, out-of-wedlock births, f,emale-headed homes, and welfare dependency are related to the explosion in numbers of young people, especially among minorities. However, as James Q. Wilson pointed out in his analysis of the proliferation of social problems in the 1960s, a decade of general economic prosperity, "'changes in the age structure of the population cannot alone account for the social dislocations" in those years. Wilson argues, for instance, that from 1960 to 1970 the rate of serious crime in the District of Columbia increased by more than 400 percent, heroin addiction by more than 1,000 percent, welfare rates by 100 percent, and unemployment rates by 100 percent: yet the number of young persons between 16 and 21 years of age increased by only 32 percent. Also, the number of murders in Detroit increased from 100 in 1960 to 500 in 1971, "yet the number of young persons did not quintuple."

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Wilson, drawing from published research, notes that the "increase in the murder rate during the 1960s was more than ten times greater than what one would have expected from the changing age structure of the population alone," and that "only 13.4 percent of the increase in arrests for robbery between 1950 and 1965 could be accounted for by the increase in the numbers of persons between the ages of ten and twenty-four." Speculating on this problem, Wilson advances the hypothesis that the abrupt increase in the number of young persons had an "exponential effect on the rate of certain social problems." In other words, there may be a "critical mass" of young persons such that when that mass is reached or is increased suddenly and substantially, "a self-sustaining chain reaction is set off that creates an explosive increase in the amount of crime, addiction, and welfare dependency." This hypothesis seems to be especially relevant to densely populated inner-city neighborhoods, especially those with large public housing projects. The 1937 United States Housing Act provided federal money for the construction of housing for the poor. But, as Roncek and colleagues pointed out in a recent article in Social Problems, opposition from organized community groups trying to prevent public housing construction in their neighborhoods "led to massive, segregated housing projects, which become ghettos for minorities and the economically disadvantaged." As large poor families were placed in high-density housing projects in the inner city, both family and neighborhood life suffered. Family deterioration, high crime rates, and vandalism flourished in these projects. In St. Louis, for example, the Pruitt-Igoe project, which housed about 10,000 children and adults, developed serious problems only five years after it opened and became so unlivable that it was closed in 1976, less than a quarter-century after it was built. If James Q. Wilson's critical-mass theory has any validity, it would seem to be readily demonstrated in densely populated inner-city neighborhoods having a heavy concentration of teenagers and young adults. As Oscar Newman showed in Defensible Space, the population concentration in these projects, the types of housing, and the surrounding population concentration have interactive effects on the occurrence and types of crimes. In other words, the crime problem, generally high in inner-city neighborhoods, is exacerbated by conditions in the housing projects. But as Lee Rainwater has suggested, in his book Behind Ghetto Walls, the character of family life in the federal housing projects "shares much with the family life of lower-class Negroes" elsewhere. The popula-

tion explosion of young minorities in already densely settled inner-city neighborhoods over the past two decades has created a situation whereby life in innercity neighborhoods closely approximates life in the projects. In both cases, residents have greater difficulty recognizing their neighbors and, therefore, are less likely to be concerned for them or to engage in reciprocal guardian behavior. The more densely a neighborhood or block is populated, the less contact and interaction among neighbors and the less likely the potential offenders can be detected or distinguished. Events in one part of the neighborhood or block tend to be of little concern to those residing in other parts. And it hardly needs emphasizing that what observers call "the central city crisis" derives in part from the unprecedented increase in these neighborhoods of younger blacks, many of whom are not enrolled in school, are jobless, and are a source of delinquency, crime, and ghetto unrest.

Any significant reduction in joblessness and related problems will require a program of socioeconomic reform far more comprehensive than what Americans have usually regarded as appropriate.

It should be pointed out, however, that the cessation of black migration to the central cities and the steady black outmigration to the suburbs will help relieve the population pressures in the inner city. Perhaps even more significant is the fact that in 1977 there were overall 6 percent fewer blacks in the age group 13 and under than there were in 1970. In metropolitan areas there were likewise 6 percent fewer blacks in that age group; and in the central cities, there were 13 percent fewer black children age 13 or younger. Similarly, between 1970 and 1977, white children in this age group decreased by 14 percent overall, by 17 percent in metropolitan areas, and by 24 percent in the central cities. By contrast, Hispanic children age 13 or younger increased during this period--18 percent overall, 16 percent in metropolitan areas, and 12 percent in the central cities. Thus, just as the change in migration flow could contribute to differential rates of ethnic involvement in certain types of social problems, so too could changes in the age structure. In short,

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whereas whites and blacks--all other things being equal--are likely to experience a decrease in such problems as joblessness, crime, out-of-wedlock births, family dissolution, and welfare dependency in the near future, the growing Hispanic population is more likely to show increasing rates of social dislocation.

Economic Changes and Ethnic Culture Problems of social dislocation in the inner city have also been profoundly exacerbated by recent structural changes in the economy. Indeed, the population explosion among young minorities in recent years occurred at a time when changes in the economy are posing serious problems for unskilled workers, both in and out of the labor force. Urban minorities are particularly vulnerable to structural economic changes: the shift from goods-producing to service-producing industries, the increasing segmentation of the labor market, the growing use of industrial technology, and the relocation of manufacturing industries out of the central cities. Such economic changes serve to remind us, as John Kasarda notes in this issue, that for several decades America's urban areas have been undergoing what appears to be an irreversible structural transformation--from centers of production and distribution of material goods to centers of administration, information exchange, finance, trade, and government services. This process has effectively eliminated millions of manufacturing, wholesale, and retail jobs since 1948, a process that has accelerated since 1967. At the same time, there has been an increase in "postindustrial society" occupational positions that usually require levels of training and education beyond the reach of disadvantaged inner-city residents. These changing employment patterns have accompanied shifts in the demographic composition of our central cities--from predominantly European white to predominantly black, Hispanic, and other minorities--leading to a decrease both in the total population size of the central cities and in aggregate personal-income levels. The cumulative effect of these technological-employment and population changes, as Kasarda points out, has been a growing mismatch between the level of skill or training of city residents and the formal prerequisites for urban jobs. Thus we have deeper "ghettoization," solidification of high levels of urban poverty, increased institutional problems in the inner city (e.g., the declining quality of public schools, poorer municipal services), and a rise in such social dislocations as joblessness, crime, single-parent homes, and welfare dependency.

The changes brought about by the cessation of migration to the central cities and by the sharp drop in the number of black children under age 13 seem to make it more likely that the economic situation of urban blacks as a group will noticeably improve in the near future. However, the present problems of black joblessness are so overwhelming (less than 30 percent of all black-male teenagers and only 62 percent of all black young-adult males [ages 20 to 24] were employed in 1978) that perhaps only an extraordinary program of economic reform can possibly prevent a significant segment of the urban underclass from being permanently locked out of the mainstream of the American occupational system. In focusing on different explanations of the social dislocation in the inner city, I have yet to say anything about the role of ethnic culture. Even after considering racial discrimination, migrant flows, changes in ethnic demography, and structural changes in the economy, a number of readers will still maintain that ethnic cultural differences account in large measure for the disproportionate and rising rates of social dislocation in the inner city. But any cultural explanation of group behavioral differences must deal with, among other things, the often considerable variation within groups on several aspects of behavior, For example, whereas only 7 percent of urban black families having incomes of $25,000 or more in 1978 were headed by women, 85 percent of those having incomes below $4,000 were headed by women. The higher the economic position of black families, the greater the percentage of two-parent households. Moreover, the proportion of black children born out of wedlock (See Diana Pearce's article in this issue) is partly a function of the sharp decrease in fertility among married blacks (i.e., two-parent families) who have a higher economic status in the black community. By treating blacks and other ethnics as monolithic groups, we lose sight of the fact that high-income blacks, Hispanics, and Indians have even fewer children than their counterparts in the general population. Nonetheless, in the face of some puzzling facts concerning rates of welfare and crime in the 1960s, the cultural explanation seems to hold validity for some observers. From the Great Depression to 1960, for example, unemployment accounted in large measure for welfare dependency. During this period, the correlation between the nonwhite-male unemployment and the rate of new AFDC cases was very nearly perfect. As the nonwhitemale unemployment rate increased, the rate of new AFDC cases increased: as the former decreased, the latter correspondingly decreased. Commenting on

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this relationship in his book The Politics ofa Gumzmteed hlcome, Daniel E Moynihan stated that "the correlation was among the strongest known to social science. It could not be established that the men who lost theirjobs were the ones who left their families, but the mathematical relationship of the two statistical series-unemployment rates and new AFDC cases--was astonishingly close." However, the relationship suddenly began to weaken at the beginning of the 1960s, had vanished by 1963, and had completely reversed itself by the end of the decade--a steady decline in the rate of nonwhite-male unemployment and a steady increase in the number of new AFDC cases. Some observers quickly seized on these figures. Welfare dependency, they argued, had become a cultural trait; even during an economic upswing, welfare rates among minorities were increasing. Upon closer inspection, though, one sees that even though nonwhite-male unemployment did drop during the 1960s, the percentage of nonwhite males who dropped out of the labor force increased steadily throughout the decade, thereby maintaining the association between economic dislocation and welfare dependency. The importance of labor-force participation in explaining certain types of social problems was also demonstrated in a recent empirical study relating labor-market opportunities to the increasing rate of crime among youths, reported in the JourmU of Political Economy: The labor force/not-in-the-labor-lorce formulation has greater explanatory power than the non-working formulation, demonstrating the importance of participation rates relative to unemployment rates in explaining crime rates. This point is reintbrced when one observes that during the middle and latter sixties, crime rates rose while unemployment rates declined. It is the decline in the participation rate which provides an explanation of the rise in crime during this period. A well-founded sociological assumption is that different ethnic behaviors and different ethnic outcomes largely reflect different opportunities for, and external obstacles against, advancement--experiences that are in turn determined by different historical and material circumstances and by different times of arrival and patterns of settlement. In addition, even if one can show that different values are related to differences in ethnic group behavior, mobility, and success, this hardly constitutes a lull explanation. By revealing cultural differences, we reach only the first step in a proper sociological investigation: analysis of the social and his-

torical basis of those differences remains to be done. In the words of Stephen Steinberg, "only by adopting a theoretical approach that explores the interaction between cultural and material factors is it possible to assess the role of values in ethnic mobility without mystifying culture and imputing a cultural superiority to groups that have enjoyed disproportionate success."

Hispanics, increasingly visibility, could well become the victims of mounting ethnic antagonism.

In short, cultural values do not determine behavior or success. Rather, cultural values grow out of specific circumstances and life chances and reflect one's position in the class structure. Thus, if lower-class blacks have low aspirations or do not plan for the future, this is not ultimately because of different cultural norms but because the group is responding to restricted opportunities, a bleak future, and feelings of resignation originating from bitter personal experience. Accordingly, as Steinberg persuasively argues, behavior described as social-pathological and associated with lower-class ethnics should nol be analyzed as a cultural aberration but as a symptom of class inequality. If impoverished conditions produced exceedingly high rates of crime among first-generation Irish, Italians, and Jews, what would have been the outcome of these groups had they been mired in poverty lk)lfive to ten generations like so many black families in the United States? Adaptive responses to recurrent situations take the lbrm of behavior patterns, norms, and aspirations. As economic and social opportunities change, new behavioral solutions originate, form patterns, and are later upheld and complemented by norms. If new conditions emerge, both the behavior patterns and the norms eventually undergo change. As Herbert Gans has put it: "some behavioral norms are more persistent than others, but over the long run, all of the norms and aspirations by which people live are nonresistant: they rise and fall with changes in situations."

Allies Needed To suggest that changes in social and economic situations will bring about changes in behavior patterns and norms raises the issue of public policy: how to deal effectively with the social dislocations that have

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plagued the urban underclass over the past several decades. Space does not permit a detailed discussion of public policy and social dislocations in the inner city, but it must be emphasized that any significant reduction of inner-city joblessness, and of the related problems of crime, out-of-wedlock births, single-parent homes, and welfare dependency, will call for a program of socioeconomic reform far more comprehensive than what Americans have usually regarded as appropriate or desirable. A shift away from the convenient focus on "racism" would probably result in a greater appreciation and understanding of the complex factors that account for recent increases in the social dislocations of the inner city. Although discrimination undoubtedly still contributes to these problems, in the past twenty years they have been more profoundly affected by shifts in the American economy that have both produced massive joblessness among low-income urban minorities and exacerbated conditions stemming from historical discrimination, the continuous flow of migrants to the large metropolises, changes in the urban-minority age structure, and population changes in the central city. For all these reasons, the urban underclass has not significantly benefited from race-specific policy programs (e.g., affirmative action) that are designed only to combat discrimination. Indeed, the economic and social plight of the uuderclass calls lk~r public policies that benefit all the poor, not just poor minorities. 1 have in mind policies that address the broader, and more difficult to confront, problems of societal organization, including the problems of generating full employment. achieving effective welfare reform, and developing a comprehensive economic policy to promote sustained and balanced urban economic growth. Unless these problems are seriously addressed, we have little hope that public policy can significantly reduce social dislocation in the inner city. I am reminded, in this connection, of Bayard Rustin's plea in the early 1960s--that blacks ought recognize the importance o f j i m d a m e n t a l economic reform and the need for an effective and broad-based interracial coalition to achieve it. It is evident--more

now than at any time in the last half of the twentieth century--that blacks and other minorities will need allies to effect a program of reform that can improve the conditions of the underclass. And since an effective political coalition will partly depend upon how the issues are defined, the political message must underscore the need for socioeconomic reform that benefits all groups in society. Civil rights organizations, as one important example, will have to change or expand their definition of racial problems in America and broaden the scope of their policy recommendations. They would, of course, continue to stress the immediate goal of eliminating racial discrimination: but they will have to recognize that low-income minorities are also profoundly affected by problems in social organization that go beyond race (such as structural changes in the economy) and that the dish> cations which follow often include increased joblessness, rising crime, family deterioration, and welfare dependency.

SUGGESTED FURTHER READING

Gans, Herbert. "Culture and Class in the Study of Poverty," In Daniel R Moynihan, ed., O, Understa,di,g Poverty: Perspectives for the Social Scie,ces. New York: Basic Books. 1968. Lieberson, Stanley. A Piece (~]'the Pie: Black and White h,mi~rants si,ce 1880. Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1981. Rainwater. Lee. Behind Ghetto Walls: Black Famih' Life i, a Federal Slum. Chicago: Aldine. 1970. Steinberg. Stephen. The Etlmic Myth: Race. Eth,icitv. a , d Class iH Ame~4ca. New York: Atheneum. 1981. Wilson, James Q. Thi,ki,g about Crime. New York: Basic Books. 1971. William Julius Wils(m is the Lucy Flower Professor q/" Urban Sociology at the U, iversitv of Chicago. He is the author; most rece,tl3; (!f The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions. His hook

The Hidden Agenda: Race. Social Dislocations and Public Policy is.fi~rthcoming.fiwm the UnivetwiO' of Chicago Press. [ C,rre, t aj.'fi'lialion: Harvard University]