Int J Polit Cult Soc DOI 10.1007/s10767-015-9208-0

Manipulated Society: Paralyzing the Masses in Post-revolutionary Iran Saeid Golkar 1,2

# Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Abstract Social riots, popular uprisings, and revolutions are among the threats that could have jeopardized the stability of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) in its recent history. Since 1979, the clerical establishment has utilized a number of institutions and social groups and applied various strategies to control Iranian society and neutralize such threats, including policies used to silence the masses and force public allegiance to the Islamic Republic. One of Iran’s key strategies involve social manipulation, which includes the Bengineering^ of the minds, bodies, and emotions of its population. In addition to distributing massive amounts of propaganda and regulating and disciplining citizens’ bodies, the Islamic Republic has deliberately been depressing Iranian citizens through a policy which I call the Bpolitics of sadness.^ Through this strategy, the IRI has promoted despondency and hopelessness to the extent that citizens become paralyzed and incapable of challenging the political status quo. The result has simultaneously been satisfying the more conservative and religious parts of society while suppressing its more progressive social spheres. Through these policies, the Islamic Republic has been able to maintain power and has survived despite several social protests that have occurred in last two decades. Keywords Survival of authoritarian regimes . Social manipulation . Cultural engineering . Politics of sadness . Propaganda . Iran

Introduction In Iran’s contemporary history, mass protest movements have been one of the most common threats to face the country’s various political regimes. Some scholars labeled Iran as a * Saeid Golkar [email protected] 1

Middle East and North Africa Program, Northwestern University, 1800 Sherman Ave, Suite 5314, Evanston, IL 60208-4005, USA

2

Iran’s Policy, Chicago council on Global Affairs, 332 S Michigan Ave #1100, Chicago, IL 60604, USA

Golkar

revolutionary country, as Bit has seen more revolutions and rebellions than any other Muslim country and more than all but one third of world countries^ (Keddie 1995, 60). The 1891–2 Tobacco protests, 1905 Constitutional Revolution, the 1963 Uprising, and the 1979 Islamic Revolution are but a few examples of popular revolts in modern Iranian history. Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) in 1979, the clerical establishment has tried to reduce and nullify any social and political upheavals. Although the country has experienced several periods of unrest in the post-revolutionary era, including fragmented social protests during the Hashemi Rafsanjani era in 1994 and 1995 and student protests during the reform era in 1998 and 2003, none of these events acquired the momentum needed to seriously threaten the deeply entrenched Islamic regime (Bayat 2010; Mahdi 1999; Entessar 1999). It was only the Green Movement, a series of protests that followed the disputed presidential election in 2009, that shocked the Iranian revolutionary state and remains today the most notable uprising in Iran’s recent history. The regime’s endurance through more than 35 years, and its ability to maintain pervasive state control has raised many questions about the IRI’s strategies for controlling the people and ensuring regime survival. For example: How has the Islamic Republic controlled the Iranian population and neutralized mass uprisings? Why have these specific strategies been successful? The IRI has employed several methods to counterbalance threats such as those of mass uprising or revolt. Some of these strategies, such as the use of repression, populist policies of buying citizen loyalty, and social exclusion, have been widely studied (Abghari 2007; Abrahamian 2009). Less studied have been the regime’s attempts to reduce the likelihood of a mass uprising through systematic Bcultural engineering^1 of the minds, bodies, and emotions of the Iranian people in order to neutralize individual and collective desire and the ability to promote political change. The Islamic Republic uses manipulation policies in an attempt to insulate society, control the citizenry, eliminate, or reduce the risk of mass opposition movements and ultimately maintain the social and political status quo (Golkar 2012a). There is a large and growing body of literature on coercive and ideological methods of social control. This study seeks to contribute to this body by analyzing Iran’s social manipulation policies and their role in maintaining the social and political order. This paper is divided into three proceeding sections. The first section contains a brief theoretical discussion of social manipulation of the mind, body, and emotion as a strategy for the survival of non-democratic regimes. The second section discusses the IRI’s efforts to socially control its citizens, taking a closer look at Iranian strategies for the manipulation of mind, body, and emotion in Iran and discussing the institutions and social groups involved in their implementation. Finally, the conclusion will discuss the consequences of these policies for Iranian society and the durability of the Islamic Republic.

Social Manipulation and State Control: Power over Minds, Bodies, and Emotions Stability is a top priority for any political regime. In all regimes, the political elites often maintain power by identifying and neutralizing threats that might challenge or undermine the 1

Cultural engineering is a catchphrase of the Islamic Republic, and the name of a cultural policy of IRI. See Tavakoli-Targhi (2012).

Paralyzing the Masses in Post-revolutionary Iran

political order. These threats may be external or internal to the state. External threats include war and foreign intervention. There are two types of internal threats. The first is the Bthreat from above,^ which is the risk of a state takeover by dissatisfied elites through, for example, a military coup. The second variant is the Bthreat from below,^ which is the risk of a mass mobilization of the general public against the state that could lead to a social uprising or even regime change (Schedler 2012). Such popular uprisings are one of the most significant threats to non-democratic regimes (Vladisavljević 2014). The potential power of popular uprisings was made evident during the 2011 BArab Spring,^ which resulted in the toppling of dictators such as Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Zein al-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, and Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen. The Arab Spring unveiled the power of ordinary people to the Middle East and to the world: Popular uprisings have the potential to topple non-democratic regimes, and nondemocratic rulers are well aware of this reality (Achcar 2013). In light of such strong internal threats, non-democratic regimes must find and employ methods of survival. These efforts to prevent regime change can be classified as either cooptation or coercion (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006). For example, to nullify threats from above (e.g., coup), states use a variety of coup-proofing tactics to decrease the desire and ability of the armed forces to stage such action. These include: exploiting family, ethnic, and religious loyalties for coup-critical positions, creating a parallel armed force, developing multiple internal security agencies, and fostering expertise in the regular military (Quinlivan 1999). To neutralize threats from below (e.g., mass uprisings), non-democratic regimes employ several methods, including mass repression and the use of mass co-optation to buy citizen loyalty. Other methods include fear-mongering, propaganda, surveillance, and social distraction. Shadowy vigilantism, employed through civil militias and thugs, has also been used at various times, particularly to mobilize ideological support. Whereas some of these strategies focus on special social groups that are more important in sparking uprising, such as students or workers, other means of social control have been developed to control the minds, bodies, and emotions of the broader public (Parsa 2000; Rivetti 2013).

Manipulation of the Mind Manipulation of the mind, or the ability to indoctrinate a populace and shape public opinion, allows an authoritarian regime to expand its influence and subdue its citizenry to a political ideology. Manipulation of the mind is a process that consists of the manipulation of ideas, information, symbols, and language (De Vries 2006). The goal of these efforts is to prevent the citizen from exploring or expressing independent thoughts and to prevent individuals from asking questions. As Isaiah Berlin said: One way of preventing people from asking questions is by suppressing them. You give dogmatic answers, and if they do not accept them, you silence them. You don’t allow people to question rules or opinions or institutions — you eliminate the very habit of questioning as subversive. (Berlin and Jahanbegloo 1993, 141) For authoritarian leaders, the ability to shape the attitudes, outlooks, and opinions of their citizenry is an invaluable element of ensuring state control and the continuation of the regime (Byman and Lind 2010). Rulers usually try to use this mental manipulation to limit citizens’ desire and capacity to foment political change. The two most common methods of controlling ideas and information are propaganda and indoctrination. While propaganda tries to shut Bthe masses off from the real world,^

Golkar

indoctrination inculcates the citizenry with acceptance of the political order and the legitimacy of rulers (Arendt 1958, p. 353). Non-democratic regimes also attempt to control every source of information and censor sensitive data to distort citizens’ incentives for challenging the regime (Shadmehr and Bernhardt 2012). In doing so, an authoritarian state may oversee its own rhetorical self-glorification while simultaneously censoring the information that might undermine its legitimacy.

Manipulation of the Body Manipulation of the body is the second dimension of social control as a means of state power. Michel Foucault (1978) has written extensively about bio-power and body politics to show different techniques that have been implemented to subject bodies and control populations in the modern era. The body has become an important site of political intervention, and modern governments have increased their degree of bodily control as a means of controlling the body politic in the twentieth century (Shilling 1997). Thanks to modern technologies, some political regimes such as totalitarian states have tried to control their citizens, inscribing their power and discipline on the citizens’ bodies. States achieve this control by regulating citizens’ behavior with regard to their bodies in the private and public realms.

Manipulation of Emotions The manipulation of emotions is another dimension of social control through which political regimes control individuals to ensure that citizens do not challenge the state. Emotional manipulation refers to the state’s efforts to Bengineer^ the emotions of the masses in order to incapacitate potential dissidents and maintain political order. In recent literature, especially since 1980, emotion has been studied as an interplay between human thoughts and the body. While some scholars have tried to find the meaning of emotions, others have been eager to understand the function of the emotions. Here, the focus is on the actions or behaviors that emotions can cause, rather than on the feelings they can illicit (Åhäll et al. 2013). For example, political scientists have sought to explain the role of emotions in sparking political unrest.2 Others have focused on how political elites mange the people’s emotions to push their ambitions. For example, the incitement of fear among the public, or what some classify as the Bglue of fear,^ is a political tool particularly useful for scaring people away from any social and political change and maintaining the authoritarian status quo (Svendsen 2008). Regimes that employ this strategy attempt to create a climate of fear to silence groups and individuals (Bellin 2004). Another example of emotional control is what may be called the Bpolitics of hate,^ or the creation of animosity that is directed toward perceived internal and external enemies. By creating an enemy, the political elites can easily solidify the people and mobilize them in the name of elimination of a perceived enemy to implement their policies. In this context, the manufacturing of psychological depression and hopelessness among a citizenry is another form of the manipulation of emotions, one which I call the Bpolitics of sadness.^ Here, a state tries to make its people passive by creating an atmosphere of hopelessness and despair. It is generally accepted that the people who live under dictatorship 2

For example, see Pearlman (2013). Also Passarelli and Tabellini (2013)

Paralyzing the Masses in Post-revolutionary Iran

are sadder than those who live in democratic societies. Some scholars explain this as the negative social consequence of authoritarianism.3 Although this explanation has its merits, it underestimates the state’s role in manipulating the emotions of the masses in order to incapacitate potential dissidents and maintain political power. In some cases, like that of Iran, the state attempts to deliberately depress citizens as a way of keeping the people feeling hopeless. Here, the politics of sadness refers to the techniques that have been implemented by the state to manage people’s emotions in a way that renders them sad and desperate. In brief, the manipulation of minds, bodies, and emotions helps political regimes enhance their ability to control society and manage the citizen’s desire and capacity for change.

The Islamic Republic and the Manipulation of Mind The control of minds, bodies, and emotions to ensure regime survival is not just theoretical. To control its people and maintain power, the IRI has invested heavily in the control of Iranian minds. According to Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, the Islamic government is an authority that takes responsibility for directing the minds of the masses. In this regard, the Islamic Republic’s massive ideology and propaganda machine is responsible for promoting and instilling Islamic ideology, justifying clerical rule as a Bholy regime^ (nezam-e moqaddas) and undermining political rivals. Iranian supreme leaders Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his successor Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei have both emphasized the important role of propaganda in maintaining the political order. According to Ayatollah Khomeini, the world rests on propagation, which is why the propagation of Islamic ideology must be of vital concern to the IRI (Tebyan.net 2012). Since its establishment in 1979, the Islamic Republic has utilized a pervasive propaganda apparatus. According to one Iranian scholar, BThe custodians of the Islamic Republic went into excruciating detail making sure not a single person waking up in the morning was not exposed to a bombardment of…propaganda before s/he goes back to bed^ (Dabashi 2011, p. 161). The result of this is that the Islamic ruling bloc has succeeded in maintaining its monopoly of power against all external and internal odds (Rahnem and Haideh Moghissi 2001). The Islamic Republic has distributed its propaganda through every possible venue, including through spaces such as state-endorsed public murals (Chehabi and Christia 2008). As one scholar writes, Bthe Islamic Republic’s propaganda programs had dominated public spaces, presenting government ideology in large-scale murals, banners, and posters that overtook the urban landscape^ (Rauh 2013, p. 1329). However, the most important and influential tool of state propaganda in Iran is mass media. Since 1979, the Islamic Republic has monopolized its control over the media using it to disseminate propagandistic messages through society. Iran’s information environment is largely dominated by the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), also known as the BVoice and Vision of the Islamic Republic.^ For Ayatollah Khomeini, the radio and television were more than mediums for reporting the news; they were meant to Bfeed the people nutritiously^ and Blead the people to a pure society^ (Chelkowski and Dabashi 1999, p. 262). The IRIB’s mission is to encourage public opinion and etiquette based on Islamic regulations and state interests. 3

For example, Abd al-Rahman al-Kawākibī, a Muslim scholar who studies the consequences of despotism (istibdād), explained that, Bthe despotic state not only denies people the right to be free and to live in dignity; it also strives to keep them ignorant^ (Tauber 2013, p. 27).

Golkar

With an increasing number of people who use satellite television in Iran, the Islamic Republic has tried to stop the flow of non-state approved information into the country. The IRI has banned the use of satellite dishes and has relentlessly tried to jam the satellites programs. With more than 35 TV channels (national and provincial) and 200 radio stations, the IRIB has a monopoly over production and broadcasting in Iran (Federation of American Scientists 2009). Since 2003, the IRI has frequently jammed attacks on Persian language satellite channels to maintain a stranglehold over the flow of information and communication inside the country (Small Media 2012). The police and the Basij militia have additionally combated the use of satellite TV by confiscating satellite equipment and arresting those caught in possession of it. The Islamic Republic has also attempted to block Iranian access to independent print media.4 Newspapers that are not state-endorsed are heavily censored and frequently shut down; books are censored or banned (Hejazi 2011). For example, according to a study conducted by Harvard University (2005), between 2000 and 2003, more than 110 daily newspapers and journals were closed down, 40 journalists were detained or arrested for criticizing the state, and an additional 50 journalists were called in for questioning by various state offices. The main organization responsible for the monitoring, controlling, and censoring of the media is the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance (MCIG). This ministry is Ban elaborate system of councils that regulate and monitor every sphere of artistic expression,^ including movies, music, cinema, theater, literature, poetry, books, 5 magazines, and newspapers (Article19.org 2006, p.7). The ministry also bans and censors cultural products that undermine the state or do not follow its worldview (Khalaji et al. 2011). It additionally supports and facilitates the production of artistic products that promote governmental propaganda. Monopolizing and controlling information and communication technologies (ICTs) has also been a key component of the IRI’s strategy of censorship. The state prevents the citizenry from accessing politically and religiously Bsensitive^ information and blocks the Iranian people from exposure to ideas deemed BWestern,^ such as democracy, freedom, and human rights. The Ministry of Communication and Information Technology is one of the most powerful censorship organizations in Iran. In addition to censoring and controlling the ICTs, the Iranian government has turned to the Internet as a way of proliferating official propaganda and has facilitated the presence of its own supporters on the Internet, encouraging them to propagandize in favor of the Islamic regime (Golkar 2011a). As one Iranian scholar points out, Bthe Internet became one of the most important tools for spreading of Islam, Shiism, and the ideas of the Islamic Revolution^ (Amir-Ebrahimi 2008). Through a number of special organizations designed to weave the state’s religious message throughout society, the IRI seeks to disseminate its ideologies and religious thinking in order to increase its legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry and hinder the formation of opposition. These organizations utilize a broad range of activities, including the training and dispatching of propagandists throughout Iran, the publishing of print materials, the production of strategic music and movies, and the training of a new generation of devoted artists for the Islamic Republic.6 4

For example, see Arash Hejazi (2011). Some examples include replacing the word Bwine^ with Bwater^ in books, even ones which are translated from other languages, and the covering of female bodies in photos. 6 A better illustration of this can be found in the Islamic Propaganda Organization, which is the backbone of the clerical establishment’s propaganda machine. The IPO has a specific extension called the Department of Art for Islamic Propaganda (Hoze-ye honari-e tablighat-e eslâmi), which produces movies, music, books, and other artistic products in a way that supports the persistence of the Islamic Republic. See Naficy (2012). 5

Paralyzing the Masses in Post-revolutionary Iran

The Islamic Republic also has a special propaganda agent that is responsible for spreading the state’s messages. It has deployed a professional network of clerics throughout the country to promote state propaganda. BThe importance of clergies as propagandists has been emphasized by both Iran’s supreme leaders, Ayatollah Khomeini and Khamenei^ (Rabbani and Ghasmi 2008, p. 132). Clergy members utilize face-to-face propaganda methods, which prove more powerful and influential than other forms of propaganda, to influence public opinion and mobilize the citizenry. Although the Islamic Republic does not announce the number of religious clerics employed in the aforementioned initiative, one expert on the contemporary clerical establishment estimates that this network includes at least 350,000 clerics (Khalaji 2011). To better understand the functioning of this network, it is useful to consider its structure. Iran’s Supreme Leader has a representative in each city, known as the Imam-e Jomeh (The Friday Imam). There are at least 530 Friday Imams deployed throughout Iran whose function is to deliver the state-endorsed religious sermon during each Friday prayer ceremony (Veisi 2012). As Iranian scholars points out, Bthe Friday prayer ceremonies are free and powerful propaganda forums at the disposal of conservatives, especially during national elections^ (Kamrava and Hassan-Yari 2004, p. 511) These Friday Imams also have a direct role in appointing the clerics of mosques in their cities and regulating the activities of an estimated 72,000 mosques (Jam-e jam 2013). While many of these mosques have a permanent Imam (Pishnamaz), some of them have a temporary Imam dispatched by the Islamic Propaganda office, or the Islamic Propaganda Organization. In collaboration with the Friday Imams, many clerics and seminary students are dispatched annually as temporary imams to villages and small cities for propagandistic purposes, especially during religious occasions like Ramazan and Moharram. To illustrate the scope of such an initiative, we see that in 2009, statistics show that more than 37,000 clerics had been dispatched as propagandists to underprivileged areas throughout Iran (Khamoushi 2010). In addition to mosques nationwide, the Islamic Republic has dispatched such clerics into schools, universities, and even kindergartens.7 Iran’s educational institutions (both K-12 and higher education) are largely regulated and controlled by the state and have played a crucial role in shaping youth mentality and spreading state ideology. Through educational institutions, the clerical establishment has tried to develop a Bnew Islamic man,^ characterized by his devotion to the Islamic regime (Mehran 1990). There are 20,000 clerics who work permanently in Iranian schools. These clerics are known as Rouhani-e Madrese. The IRI has additionally dispatched temporary clerics to 40,000 schools. According to a deputy at the Ministry of Education, more than 108,000 propagandists were dispatched to Iranian schools in 2009 to implement moral and religious classes during the year (Neday-e Enghlab 2013). The clerics also have a presence in universities and are considered the representatives of the Supreme Leader at their particular institutions. These clerics are mainly involved in implementing cultural and religious programs, including mourning ceremonies, in addition to teaching religious courses. Additionally, there are clerics in each state and governmental office who are responsible for implementing religious rituals in the bureaus. Two examples of their roles in these offices include implementing collective prayer (Namaz-e Jamaat) and enforcing the principle of Amr be Maruf va Nahy az Monkar (commanding the right and forbidding the wrong). The clerics 7

For example, The Islamic Republic has even increased the clerical presence in kindergartens, with the presence of religious propagandists who are called BUncle Cleric,^ or Amo Ruhan.

Golkar

also serve as teachers holding short-term ideological and political education programs called BAmozesh-e zemne khedmat.^ With more than two million governmental employees, the Islamic Republic has implemented such ideological training for these people as a means of maintaining their positions and of being promoted. Furthermore, there is a clerical presence in all security and military establishments, including the army, the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) and the Basij militia. The office of the Representative of Supreme Leader of the Armed Forces is controlled by clerics who are responsible for supervising the distribution of state propaganda, regulating prayer, and directing the office’s employees. Many clerics also work as political and cultural aides within the military and security apparatus and hold ideological political training. These clerics are also responsible for answering questions concerning the IRI’s internal and international policies and justifying state policy to military personnel. For example, after the brutal suppression of the Green Movement proved to be an issue, the clerics have made an effort to explain and justify the state’s handling of the movement to the military. The Islamic Republic’s ability to manipulate the mind stems from the manner in which it uses Islam to promote a political ideology. The clerics have argued that they exclusively possess the authority to interpret Islam and are the medium between the Iranian people and God. Since the Islamic regime’s ideology aligns with the religious sentiments of much of Iran’s public, the clerics hold an important tool for mass manipulation: Islam itself. By using Islam, the clerical establishment maintains the ability to silence its critics with dogma. From a sociological point of view, religion has an important function in promoting acceptance and conformity (and submission) to political entities by appealing to the citizen’s religious perspective. Iran’s clerical establishment has not only used religion as a tool to legitimize the power of the state, but also to suppress opposition. For example, after the expansion of the Green Movement in 2009, state propaganda denounced this movement as liberal and secular, and therefore, it was comprised of nonbelievers. Propaganda depicted female participants in the Green Movement as being improperly and immodestly dressed and an insult against religious belief (Rahrovan-e Valyat 2013). Such accusations demonstrate how clerics are able to use a distorted version of Islam to alienate opposition groups and turn the country’s substantial conservative block against such movements. However, not all of the clergymen support the Islamic Republic and its core principle of the velayt-e faqih. There is a small group of dissident clergy that actively opposes the Islamic Regime and considers it neither Islamic nor republic. There is also a growing group of nonpolitical traditionalist clergy that is not active in opposition but advocates for the separation of state and mosque. However, these clergies are under pervasive control of the state and as such their influence has been limited. In fact, the Islamic Regime’s policies for controlling the clergy are more pervasive than those of the monarchical regime were. Different methods have been used to control the dissidents’ clergy and buy their allegiance including regulation, cooptation, and coercion. Centralization and bureaucratization of the seminary are a method employed by the IRI to train a new generation of clergy for the Islamic Republic. The state has Bcreated a vast administration to handle every aspect of clerical life, including health insurance, student housing, curricula, clerical credentials and more. The establishment now has very strict rules regulating admissions, the issuance of credentials and granting permission to wear clerical clothing^ (Khalaji 2011). Another method of co-opting the clergies is the selection of proregime clerics to operate the state machinery, paired with the exclusion of non-political and

Paralyzing the Masses in Post-revolutionary Iran

dissident clerics. Suppression is another main strategy for silencing and quelling dissident clergies in Iran. It has two main forms: direct coercion and structural coercion. To implement direct coercion, the IRI has established a group of clergies in the Basij militia and uses them to create an atmosphere of fear and suppress dissident and opposing clerics. At the same time, the Special Court for the Clergy (SCC) implements structural coercion. The SCC (Dadgahe Vizheh-ye Ruhaniyat), which works separately from Iran’s Judiciary, is overseen by the supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei. The SCC is the main tool for controlling and silencing both Sunni and Shia clerics who dare to criticize either the supreme leader or his policies (Künkler 2009). Through these methods, the IRI has trained a group of pro-regime clergymen and has silenced or suppressed others.

The IRI and Manipulation of Body Since its inception in 1979, The Islamic Republic has relentlessly tried to regulate the bodies of its citizens through various strategies, including the regulation of dress codes for men and women (Ashraf 1990). Immediately after its establishment, the IRI enforced the mandatory wearing of the hijab for all Iranian women. As an Iranian scholar wrote, BCoercively veiled in dark, neutral colors, women’s Islamic-clothed bodies were intended to be a reflection of a homogenized, disciplined Islamic whole where independent bodies, and minds, ceased to exist^ (Abdmolaei 2013, 5). One Iranian scholar also wrote that the importance of such Iranian regulations on dress stem from the regime’s efforts to enforce Bsartorial conformity as a visible sign of the regime’s continued commitment to the Islamization of society^ (Chehabi 2001, p.57). To manipulate the Iranian citizens’ bodies, the regime has passed many laws and regulations to additionally impose the chador (Hejab-e barter), a head-to-toe black covering of conservative shape, on women. The IRI has also been enforcing dress color, encouraging citizens to wear dark colors such as black, brown, and blue. This color systemization contributes to the atmosphere of despair and depression in society.8 The state’s intervention efforts regarding public dress codes has steadily continued throughout the past three decades. For example, the Promotion of Chastity and Modesty Law was passed in 2005, which intensified the Islamic Republic’s efforts to enforce women’s dress and codes of conduct. According to this regulation, wearing too much makeup demonstrates a lack of chastity and virtue, and as such, the Islamic Republic has actively tried to ban makeup and cosmetics. In the first decade after the revolution, political hardliners in some cases intervened and forcibly removed makeup from women’s faces. Today, the sentiment remains the same; for example, female students who wear heavy makeup can be stopped from entering their universities and schools and are sometimes forced to wash their faces of all cosmetics before entering the universities. In addition to regulating the bodies of Iranian women, the Islamic Republic has also sought to politically control the bodies of men. For example, in the aftermath of the 1979 revolution, the regime banned the tie, as it was seen as a sign of Western cultural invasion. The wearing of T-shirts and jeans in schools, universities, and governmental bureaus is also seen as improper and is often not tolerated. The growing of a mustache deemed Btoo big^ and tattoos are two 8

One Iranian poet described how the black color of Hijab makes him sad and depressed. The journal that published his poem was suspended by the authorities: BI got sad of this women group, that big group, the day of celebration, the morning of Eid, There was not a white dove among them, All black, all crow.^

Golkar

more examples of attire and appearances seen as inappropriate and not suitable for public spaces. In one case, a government bureau even issued regulations asking a particular employee to shorten his mustache (Student News Agency 2014). The Islamic Republic is also concerned with the regulation of youth hairstyles. Thus, they have provided guidelines for state-approved hairstyles and have promoted these styles to barbers and youth. According to this procedure, hairstyles featuring ponytails, mullets or spikes are banned (Singh 2010). These criteria undermine the individuality of Iranian youth: although such haircut regulations are not punishable by law, they hold implicit power as Balmost every official person had to meet these criteria in order to keep his job or to be promoted^ (Rafizadeh 2011, p. 143). The regulation of the body in Iran has also been implemented through gender separation, which has been an official standard in schools, universities, and public places since 1979. While schools are completely separated, universities Bwere responsible for monitoring and implementing Islamic regulations concerning the separation of men and women to avoid unnecessary mixing environments^ (Golkar 2012b, p. 3). Gender separation is also enforced in governmental bureaus and on public transportation such as buses. The regulation of Iranian bodies continues in numerous ways, such as through the state scholarship system or through employment norms. Moral policing is another method of regulating and disciplining the body of Iranian citizens. This is the task of Amr be Maruf va Nahy az Monkar (BCommanding the right and forbidding the wrong^), one of the Iranian regime’s most influential policies (Khatami 2009, p. 44). According to this principle, the Islamic code of behavior should be enforced. This code includes policies such as the wearing of a proper hejab by women, the limitations on cosmetics usage, the prohibition of male– female fraternization at universities, and the banning of co-educational activities. The Islamic Republic has used several agents to implement moral control over society, including the police. Iran’s police force, known as the NAJA, is one of the IRI’s agents that impose moral control over society. The Gasht-e Ershad (the Guidance Patrol) is a branch of the NAJA responsible for the moral policing of society. They are responsible for monitoring and arresting people deemed to be immodestly dressed or undermining the dress code, checking male–female fraternization and prohibiting women from wearing Bimmodest^ amounts of makeup, tight clothing, or short trousers. Consisting of male and female personnel, the force fosters a fearful atmosphere for youth, who are always anxious about the threat of arrest because of clothes or hairstyle. According to the Police commander in Iran, in 2013 alone, the Gasht-e Ershad gave more than three million oral guidances or verbal warnings (tazzakkor-e lesani) to people who demonstrated improper behavior or dress (Alef 2014). The Basij is another force that the IRI uses to regulate Iranian bodies. Since its establishment in 1980, the Basij has been one of the Islamic Republic’s main agents for regulating the bodies of Iranians as a type of morality police. A paramilitary group, the Basij, has more than five million members, and its influence extends to all corners of Iranian society, such as neighborhoods, schools, universities, bureaus, hospitals, and the military. In each of the Basij’s branches, a group of Basij members is organized into a moral policing team, called Nasehin teams (Golkar 2011b). According to Basij regulations, the Basij is responsible for policing the populace and punishing infractions of the Islamic Republic’s myriad of moral laws. Since the Islamic moral law or code of behavior is very broad, the array and scope of Basij activities are wide. For example, during the 1995 BBasij week^ alone, militia members issued verbal warnings to approximately 1,889,000 people throughout Iran, demanding that they follow the Islamic code (Khosravi 2008, p. 30).

Paralyzing the Masses in Post-revolutionary Iran

Using the police, Basij and other vigilante groups, such as Ansar-e Hezbollah, regulate people’s bodies by enforcing modes of correct Islamic conduct, the IRI has placed severe pressure on the population, most especially on women and youth (Rubin 2001). These policies simultaneously increase Islamic regime popularity among more conservative and religious parts of society, who perceive improper hejab as a moral sin that corrupts and erases the purity of society.

The Islamic Republic and the Manipulation of Emotion Depression and disappointment seem to be the defining characteristics of contemporary Iranian life. Many Iranian psychologists have noticed in their patients a widespread sense of hopelessness, discontent, and depression. Although there are no official statistics, according to one study, only 3 % of people in Iran describe themselves as being Bvery happy,^ while another report shows that between 30 and 70 % of Iranians are depressed (Khabar Online 2012; Qods 2013). The 2013 World Happiness Report ranked Iran as the 115th happiest among 156 countries in the world or, in other words, the 41st least happy in the world (Helliwell et al. 2013). Other studies also show that Iranian people are among the most depressed people in the world, including a 2011 Forbes study that ranked Iran in 97th place among 110 sampled countries (Dewey 2013; Hellman 2011). There are several explanations for the pervasiveness of depression in Iran, but most important thus far have been the psychological, cultural, and sociological explanations. Some scholars have focused on social origins of popular depression in Iranian society, relating it to social anomia in which traditional and religious values and norms have been broken down and new values and rules have not been created or accepted. Others have focused on the centrality of sadness and grief in Iranian culture and ethos. For instance, Good and Moradi wrote: BSadness for Iranians is associated with maturity and virtue. A person who expresses happiness too quickly often is considered socially incompetent^ (Good et al. 1985, p. 384). The ubiquity of grief and sadness in Iranian life can even be seen in Persian poetry, which often reflects themes of sadness and despair. BThese feelings of pain and suffering Iranians hold within themselves are collective as well as personal. For as the individual has suffered, so has the nation^ (Oksnevad 2012, p. 417). On a sociological level, religious scholars have explained and emphasized the significance of mourning and grief in Shia Islam as an important element of Iranian culture. Mourning has been a central part of Shia culture since its inception in the seventh century (Halm 2007). The Shia mourning culture and ritual began after the massacre of Imam Hossein, Prophet Mohammad’s grandson and his family at Karbala on 10th Muharram 680 AD. Since then, minority Shia followers have commemorated the incident and mourned their suffering and martyrdom. The tragedy of Karbala and the martyrdom of Imam Hossain have shaped the Shia collective identity against the majority Sunni. The lamentation and mourning ritual, which has its roots in the Middle Ages, intensified after the emergence of the Safavid Dynasty, which converted Iran to a Shia country in the sixteenth century. Since then, mourning and lamentation have been a central part of Shia culture. According to one scholar, BOne of the principal religious activities of Shiite Islam, the form commonest in Iran, is mourning for the death of the Imams^ (Bateson 1979).

Golkar

Although each of these explanations has its own merits, studies have ignored the state’s role in the production and expression of a special Bregime of emotion.^ Since its establishment, the Islamic Republic has invested heavily in depressing Iranian society. These policies, which I call Bthe politics of sadness and grief^ (Siasat-e gham va gosseh), refer to the techniques that have been implemented by the state to manage people’s emotions, rendering them sad, desperate, and incapable of challenging the political status quo. For the Iranian government, public lamentations and depression are more politically advantageous than public joy. Ayatollah Khomeini always insisted that Bwe are the nation of political crying,^ and that fun has no place in Islam (Raja News 2010). As he said, mourning (azadari) has heavily influenced the progress of the Islamic Revolution and has empowered and kept Islam alive. Although the mourning ceremonies have been held since before the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Islamic Republic has since dramatically increased its time and monetary investments in public mourning ceremonies. In the past three decades, the number of mourning ceremonies in Iran has increased, becoming an inevitable part of life in the Islamic Republic. In fact, the victory of the Islamic Revolution was the result of sequential demonstrations in which each wave of protesters denounced the deaths of those lost in the previous manifestation. Thus, the Islamic Regime of Iran was born in an atmosphere of mourning. Before the Islamic Revolution, religious mourning ceremonies were limited to a few days in Moharram and Ramazan, and two ceremonies for the first and third Shiite Imams (Ali and Hossein). However, in the past three decades, the clerical establishment has dramatically increased the numbers of ceremonies for several Imams. Right now, official Iranian calendars mark the martyrdom of Imam Ja’far Sadeq (the 6th Imam) and the anniversary of the death of Ayatollah Khomeini as holidays. Another example is the addition of the 20-day mourning ritual and ceremony in honor of the sufferings and death of Fatima, the Prophet’s daughter (Amanat 2009). Of additional interest is the IRI’s decision to recognize and replace the national holiday that used to commemorate the birthday of Imam Reza (the eighth Shia Imam) with one that instead commemorates his martyrdom. As Asef Bayat has explained, BThe Islamic Republic’s calendar became a testimony to the official sanction of grief over joy. While the authorities commemorated fully the deaths, or Bdeath days,^ of religious and political figures, their birthdays were widely ignored^ (Bayat, 299, p.142). Only three official birthday commemorations exist in Iran, as opposed to ten official death days. The regime has even chosen to commemorate the death date over birthday of Ayatollah Khomeini, the architect of the Islamic Republic. In addition to these ceremonies, many weekly recitation and mourning programs are held in schools, universities, and governmental offices, peppering each week allotted with time to mourn. Doaye Tawasol (the supplication of resort) is recited on Tuesday nights, Doaye Kumayl (supplication of Kumayl) is recited on Thursday nights, and Doaye a Nodbe (supplication of lamentation) is recited on Friday mornings (Thurfjell 2006). During these ceremonies, participants are called to remember the tragic events known as Mosibat (Tragedy), which commemorate sorrowful occasions in the lives of imams. Clerics claim that participating in these rituals and shedding commemorative tears will bring Shia followers closer to Imams, prophets and God. While the clergy claims participation in these ceremonies will help pious Shia experience spiritual purification and emotional relief, in reality, the Islamic Republic has used these ceremonies to propagate its interpretation of Islam and ultimately its legitimacy. According to David Thurfjell (2012), Bwhen religious leaders who are sanctioned by the system of velayt-

Paralyzing the Masses in Post-revolutionary Iran

e faqih (guardianship of juris) ask people to cry for Hossein, they don’t only offer a possibility for emotional relief, but create a situation in which their own authority is anchored in the very body of those who listen.^ As such, when powerful clerics encourage the Iranian populace to partake in these mourning rituals, they solidify their authority over the populace. The burial of the Bunknown martyrs^ is yet another example of the politics of sadness and grief (Siasat-e gham va gosseh). In addition to creating a cult of martyrdom marked by mourning during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), the Islamic Republic used the martyrs and their funeral ceremonies as a way to cement state control in that the fear and fascination elicited by death mobilized the people against an enemy and in support of the IRI (Khosrokhavar 2005). Rasool Naficy (1992), an Iranian scholar, labeled this the Bpolitics of the corpse,^ as the Islamic Republic appeared obsessed with death. As he explained, BThe clergy, aware of the numbing effects of death and the fear and fascination evinced by martyrdom, uses this psychological game quite effectively. In this context, death becomes the rule, while life, as stated frequently by the clergy, is just a transitory stage, meant for purification of the soul^ (Naficy 1992, p. 119). Following the effectiveness of this policy in mobilizing people to support the IRI, the funerals of martyrs have continued, even 25 years after the end of the Iran– Iraq war. There are several annual funerals during which the IRI displays unknown martyrs throughout Iran. During these ceremonies, the IRI encourages citizens to participate and to remember their revolutionary and religious values. These martyrs are then buried in public places, such as recreational landmarks or universities, to remind people of martyrdom and death (Elling 2009). The most recent example of such an event was the massive burial ceremony of 175 Iranian divers who were allegedly buried alive with their hands tied during the Iran-Iraq War (Karami 2015). Through this massive campaign that focuses on ceremonies mourning martyrs, the IRI has induced a wave of melancholy among Iranians, including people who are critics to the regime. More importantly, the Islamic Republic uses the high participation rates at these ceremonies as a symbol of the Islamic Republic’s popularity and legitimacy. As illustrated by the continued commemoration of martyrs and the according praise of the regime that comes with such ceremonies, the IRI manufactures and exploits sadness among its people to cement regime legitimacy and decrease individual or collective desire to rebel. Moreover, informal mourning institutions exist to demonstrate the pervasiveness of sadness in Iranian culture. Informal institutions, such as mosques and mourning associations (hayat-e azadari), also play an important role in spreading the culture of depression among people. Mourning associations have spread throughout Iran. Currently there are approximately 81,000 mourning associations, and 15,000 of these are located in Tehran alone (Melimazhabi 2013; Fayyaz and Rahmani 2006). Another example of the politics of sadness and grief is the Islamic Republic’s opposition to any happy events in Iran. For example, the IRI publicly denounces the Chaharshanbe Suri festival, or the BFestival of Fire,^ which is a jubilant ancient Zoroastrian celebration held the last Wednesday before the Iranian New Year. Citizen arrests also demonstrate the IRI’s intolerance towards certain forms of amusement in the public sphere, such as the 2011 arrest of a group of Iranian youths who played with toy water guns in public (Haaretz 2011). Iran’s educational system is another means of promoting the social internalization of despondency (Hashemi et al. 2014). According to Saeid Payvandi, an Iranian educational sociologist, the Iranian curriculum is one of the saddest curriculums in the world. Payvandi argues that Iran’s curriculum demonstrates the Islamic Republic’s determination to inculcate

Golkar

the youth in a manner that leaves no room for the creation of a happy learning atmosphere or the promotion of the idea of personal satisfaction in life (Peyvandi 2013). The banning of music and dancing instruction in schools and even kindergartens illustrates yet again the IRI’s promotion of sadness and grief over happiness and diversion. Such activities are additionally constrained throughout broader society. Ayatollah Khomeini declared that music dulls the mind because it involves pleasure and ecstasy, which act like a drug (Article19.org 2006). Dance and music have been banned as a symbol of Western cultural invasion and are thus rejected. Instead, the focus has been on religious training through, for example, the promotion of Quranic kindergartens and Quranic universities. To aid this goal, the Basij militia has established more than 2,000 Quranic kindergartens since 2010, which now constitute 25% of all kindergartens in Iran (VOA News 2015). The arrests of a group of Iranian youths who made a short video to the song BHappy^ is perhaps the most recent example of the IRI’s politics of sadness. Iran’s police announced that they identified and arrested those responsible for the making of the clip, claiming that the youths involved undermined Iran’s Bpublic chastity.^ The arrested youth were forced to confess to their Bcrime^ on public television. Many Iranians tweeted in response to the arrest and confessions, worrying that this is a sign that being happy is a crime in Iran, or that depression has become a lifestyle in Iran. Even the mass media is involved in the politics of sadness and grief. Iranian television and radio programs are widely known for their depressing content. As one backpacker noted in a Lonely Planet guide, BIran offers very little in the way of organized entertainment or nightlife. …. Iranian television is so uninteresting…^ (Webb 2005, p.111). State-run mass media in the IRI has been widely criticized for its programs that aim to make people sad (Aftab Online Network 2013). In addition to the clerics who are involved in fostering a sentiment of depression throughout society, the maddahan or eulogists, religious reciters, or singers are another important group involved in the manipulation of emotions in Iran. Individuals from this group usually accompany clerics in religious ceremonies, and they became noticeably more influential socially and politically after the emergence of political hardliners in 2005. The eulogists’ social status and public influence has increased among poor and young people in recent years (Zimmt 2014). The maddahan are not clerics, in the sense that they usually do not study in seminaries and do not wear traditional clerical attire. However, they often possess strong public speaking and rhetorical skills and their performances frequently arouse enthusiasm among their audiences. The employment of emotional manipulation seems to be a key element of such performances. There is no precise statistic on the number of maddahan in Iran, but one estimate states that there are about 200,000 religious singers around the country (Ilna News Agency 2015). Using new methods of mourning, the maddahan arouse zeal, especially among the youth and urban underclasses, and mobilize audiences in favor of the Islamic Republic. For example, after the expansion of 2009 Green Movement, the maddahan used the tragedy of Karbala to denounce the new opposition. During Ashura in 2009, they mobilized several religious clubs to go the streets and suppress the protesters. They accused the protesters of insulting Moharram and the Imam Hossein (Raja News 2011). Through such activities, Iran’s maddahan produce a power structure by involving the people in religious rituals. In sum, the Islamic Republic of Iran has engaged in the purposeful manufacture of sadness and depression among its people, which has resulted in the creation of a passive populace that does not exhibit a popular desire to rise up against repression. Mourning ceremonies, which

Paralyzing the Masses in Post-revolutionary Iran

have become a staple element of everyday Iranian life, serve the twofold purpose of depressing the population and bolstering the regime’s popular perception against its enemies. The regime has also worked to expand this strategy to the education system by creating a depressing curriculum, banning joyous activities such as dancing and crafting. With the 2014 arrest of several youths who created a music video to the song BHappy,^ the IRI displayed its politics of sadness and grief to the world, going almost as far as to criminalize happiness. The state-controlled mass media outlets only work to increase the pervasiveness of the depressing content, further rendering the Iranian populace submissive and stripping it of the desire to foment political change.

Conclusion In addition to the threats of coup and war, authoritarian regimes face political threats from below—their people. The IRI has controlled and silenced individuals through the manipulation of minds, bodies, and emotions of Iranian citizens. Although this social manipulation has pacified the religious and conservative arms of society, it has faced some discontent and resistance from the more educated and less ideological arm of society. The social manipulation satisfies the more religious and conservative sections of society that shape the core of the Islamic Republic’s social base. Since the regime uses Islam as a cornerstone of its political ideology, less educated and aware citizens cannot resist it, as the political ideology propagated by the government is consistent with their religious values (Geddes and Zaller 1989). Such citizens perceive the IRI’s policies as religious and Islamic policies intended to promote and protect a pious social order and to defend Iranians against Bcorrupt^ Western cultures. These citizens support the suppression of Bdeviant groups,^ or are at least indifferent to the suppression of other parts of society. From a differing perspective, these policies have led to increased frustration and confusion among more educated and less ideological social strata. Many of those who do realize the extent of suppression in Iran leave the country. Many Iranians, especially youths, are departing Iran, immigrating to new countries in which they can find places to live freely. One Iranian girl explained: BI want to leave Iran,… I feel I am in prison here even when I am sitting in the park^ (Bayat 2009), p. 123). This flood of youths leaving Iran has led to the creation of the world’s most severe brain drain (Motevalli 2014). According to the ex-minister of Iran’s higher education, about 150,000 Iranian students emigrate annually from Iran (Donya-e Eqtesad 2015). Many of these immigrants are not even political activists; they are ordinary people searching for a place in which the state will not interfere in their private lives. Since immigration is not possible for everyone, social resistance is another response to the state’s manipulations. As Foucault wrote, resistance can be seen whenever power exists. As has been thoroughly studied, resistance to social control in Iran has appeared in a number of different spheres, even though success in fomenting change is limited. In an effort to confront state efforts to control the minds, bodies, and emotions of individuals, the battle for control of oneself has arisen among Iranian citizens. For example, in challenging the monopoly of state propaganda, Iranian citizens have been increasing their use of satellite programs. Satellite televisions are widely used in rural eras, even when the possession, sale, and use of directional satellite antennae and receivers has been legally banned. As one scholar wrote, Bthe presence of reception dishes in Iran means that non-conformity is registered in the public space. This challenges the cultural and religious uniformity so highly valued by the Islamist government^ (Barraclough 2001, p.44).

Golkar

To confront the politics of sadness, Iranian citizens have engaged in different forms of Bpolitics of fun,^ in which Iranian youth take every opportunity to have fun. Mix parties and underground music are two ways to confront the depressive atmosphere in Iran (Bayat 2009). According to one Iranian scholar, youths Bhave created innovative ways to meet members of the opposite sex, engage in wild parties with alcohol, gambling, and premarital romance^ (Cohen and Abbas Milani 2005). The Bparty-going subculture^ is one specific element of Iranian youth subcultures that has been shaped in response to the politics of sadness (Shahabi and Golpoush-Nezhad 2015). There are many reports on mix parties in big cities such as Tehran, where the people try to forget societal pressures with the aid of drugs and alcohol. As one young boy explained, "With so much pressure from the outside, sometimes you need to find a way to immigrate, at least internally" (The Guardian 2014). Another example of the politics of fun is the transformation of religious and mourning rituals Binto occasions of glamour, sociability, and fun^ (Bayat 2009, p. 143). For example, Muharram has recently evolved into a sort of carnival or socializing parade for mingling with the opposite sex, especially in big cities such as Tehran (Khosravi 2008). The Ashura ceremonies have been labeled as BHossein parties.^ According to one Iranian scholar, BHundreds of teenagers created a spectacle of defiance in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Boys (and) girls going up and down eyeing (each others)… They stayed out late, marched in the parade, returned to the school and stuffed their sensual selves with the free food, the courtesy of the Hossein Party!^ (Yaghmaian 2002). The Hossein Party is only one example of transforming a sorrowful ritual to more joyful activity. The body has also become a site of resistance in today’s Iran. While the Islamic Republic has pushed for veiling and creating an Islamic society, citizens, especially youth, are moving in an opposite direction. In fact, the imposition of a strict Islamic code of dress and conduct has alienated many not only in urban areas, but also in poor and conservative parts of the country. While the IRI has propagated and forced women to wear the Chador (a black drape that covers the entire body, with the exception of the face and hands), women have instead opted for more fashionable clothing. In fact, women have transformed the veiling to fashion. For example, instead of chador, many women wear leggings under their short manteaux, which allow their bodies to be seen (Moaveni and Parvaneh 2013). As Ali Banuazizi (1995) pointed out, BIn the symbolically important realm of the dress code and veiling, for example, their method of subverting the rules has been to use the head-cover as a means of personal adornment rather than concealment, thus turning an object of control into one of protest.^ Engaging in different forms of sexuality has become another method of confronting the social control of the body. Many scholars have written extensively on the topic of sexual revolution in Iran, in which evolving sexual habits such as premarital sex have become a form of passive resistance (Mahdavi 2007; Shahi 2013). In spite of the Islamic Regime’s relentless efforts to propagate virginity as a value and to denounce male–female relations, studies have shown a rise of premarital sex in postrevolutionary Iran since the 1979 revolution. In this regard, Azal Ahmadi (2015) explained the pervasiveness of Hymenoplasty surgery in Iran, as a stealthy form of resistance against socio-culturally and ultimately politically prescribed sexual inegalitarianism. While social resistance has increased among youth and more educated parts of society, especially in the large urban centers, these efforts have not been completely

Paralyzing the Masses in Post-revolutionary Iran

successful. For example, despite the increasing use of satellite television in Iran, many Iranians, especially citizens in rural areas, still rely on IRIB broadcasts as a main source of information. Statistics demonstrate that with satellite usage, dependency on the IRIB is on the decline, but is nevertheless still prominent. For example, a 2005 study concluded that over 90 % of Iranians nationwide acknowledged that the IRIB is their primary source of news and information (Blout 2012). This number decreased in 2013, with 52 % of respondents claiming they watch IRIB programs regularly and 40 % claiming they watched the IRIB programs sometimes but not regularly (Sadeghi 2013). Even among Iranians with access to satellite television programs, many still rely on the IRIB’s news broadcasts. According to a study in 2014, more than 51 % of respondents in Tehran claimed that they do not use satellite programs as a news source (ISNA News 2014). Many of these social and cultural resistances, which have been romanticized, do not threaten the political system. According to Banuazizi (1994), BThese different forms of resistance to the Islamic Republic do not have as their main goal a regime change, but seek to end abuses of official power, violations of fundamental individual rights, and the creation of space within which people can pursue their own lives and work without official encroachments^ (p. 575). In fact, the Islamic Republic has eventually tolerated some of these forms of resistance because they either do not threaten the political order, or have no specific political claim (Sreberny‐Mohammadi and Mohammadi 1990). Many of these practices of social resistance have been tolerated, as long as they have not become the symbols of resistance. Moreover, some of the social resistance practices are embodied inside the Islamic regime’s paradigm and ultimately reproduce the Islamic political order. For example, the popularity of Maadah session compared to clergy sermons in mosques has been seen as a manifestation of hatred toward clergy, but participation in Maddahi and mourning ceremonies has ultimately helped the clergy instill Islamic values into Iranians’ minds, ultimately reproducing the Islamic order. Another example is the Hossein party, which many perceive as a social resistance. However, by participating in these ceremonies, wearing black clothes, and performing the rituals, the people are ultimately reproducing the Islamic order and playing into the same game supported by the clerical establishment. In fact, as Lisa Weeden pointed out, authoritarian systems of governance generate obedience partly by involving citizens in the promotion of state objectives. By participating in such political rituals and employing the language and rhetoric of the regime, individuals accidentally become accomplices of the state, generating their own subordination (Wedeen 1999). While the IRI has turned a blind eye to some cultural resistance efforts, it has suppressed those that do threaten the political order. For example, jamming attacks on Persian language satellite channels and filtering the Internet increased dramatically during the mass uprising following the disputed 2009 presidential election, when it was especially important for protestors to access information. In brief, through manipulation of the minds, bodies, and emotions of Iranian citizens, the Islamic Republic has killed two birds with one stone. These policies have satisfied and pleased the religious and conservative blocs of society while distracting, silencing, and suppressing the less ideological and more educated ones. The result has been resilience and persistence of the Islamic Republic for more than 35 years, despite massive popular discontent.

Golkar Acknowledgments The author would like to thank Ahmad Ashraf, Shaul Bakhsah, John DeBlasio, Nader Hashemi Abbas Milnai, and Bill Obenshain for their support and two anonymous reviewers for insightful comments and feedback, which led to significant improvements of previous drafts of this article.

References Abdmolaei, S. (2013). (Re) Fashioning the body politic: women and the politics of dress in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Unpublished Master thesis, Concordia University. p.5. Abghari, S. (2007). Political economy of political power of the Islamic regime in Iran. Journal of Third World Studies, XXIV(1), 247–266. Abrahamian, E. (2009). Why the Islamic Republic has survived. Middle East Report, 39(250), 10–16. Achcar, G. (2013). The people want: a radical exploration of the Arab uprising. Berkeley: University of California Press. Aftab Online Network (2013). We make you cry at any price. Tehran, July 31, 2013, retrieved from: http://goo.gl/qEUv75. Åhäll, L., Thomas, A., & Gregory, T. A. (2013). Security, emotions, affect. Critical Studies on Security, 1(1), 117–120. Ahmadi, A. (2015). Recreating virginity in Iran: hymenoplasty as a form of resistance. Medical Anthropology Quarterly Alef (2014). NAJA, Three million verbal warning in the last year. Tehran, retrieved from Alef website: http://alef. ir/vdcfced0cw6d0ya.igiw.html?227188. Amanat, A. (2009). Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shi’ism. London, GB: I.B. Tauris. P. 226. Amir-Ebrahimi, M. (2008). Blogging from Qom, behind walls and veils. Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 28(2), 235. Arash Hejazi, A. (2011). You don’t deserve to be published: book censorship in Iran. LOGOS; Journal of the World Publishing Community, 22(1), 53. Arendt, H. (1958). The origins of totalitarianism (p. 353). Cleveland: The World Publishing Company. Article 19 (2006). Unveiled: Art and Censorship in Iran. Retrieved from Article 19 website: ARTICLE 19, London, 2006, P.7, http://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/publications/iran-art-censorship.pdf. Ashraf, A. (1990). Theocracy and Charisma: new men of power in Iran. International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 4(1), 135. Banuazizi, A. (1994). Iran’s Revolutionary impasse: political factionalism and societal resistance. Middle East Report, No. 191, 1994, pp. 2-82-8. Banuazizi, A. (1995). Faltering legitimacy: the ruling clerics and civil society in contemporary Iran. International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, 8(4), 563–578. Barraclough, S. (2001). Satellite television in Iran: prohibition, imitation and reform. Middle Eastern Studies, 37(3), 25–48, p. 44. Bateson, M.C. (1979). BThis figure of tinsel^: a study of themes of hypocrisy and pessimism in Iranian Culture. Daedalus, 108(3), 108(No. 3), Hypocrisy, Illusion, and Evasion (summer, 1979), pp. 125–134. Bayat, A. (2009). Life as politics. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press. Bayat, A. (2010). Tehran: Paradox City. New Left Review, 66, 99–122. Bellin, E. (2004). The robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: exceptionalism in comparative perspective. Comparative Politics, 36(2), 139–157. Berlin, I., & Jahanbegloo, R. (1993). Conversations with Isaiah Berlin. New York: Halban, 2011. Blout, E. (2012). Strategy, security, influence: Content analysis of the anti-semitic rhetoric of Iran’s supreme leader. Retrieved from: http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/academy/content/pdf/participant-papers/2013acdusa/Strategy,-Security,-Influence-Content-Analysis-of-the-Anti–Semitic-Rhetoric-of-Iran's-SupremeLeader-Emily-Blout.pdf Byman, D., & Lind, J. (2010). Jennifer Lind, Pyongyang’s survival strategy: tools of authoritarian control in North Korea. International Security, 35(1), 44–74. Chehabi, H. E. (2001). The political regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran in comparative perspective. Government and Opposition, 36(1), 48–70. Chehabi, H. E., & Christia, F. (2008). The art of state persuasion. Persica, 22, 1–13. Chelkowski, P. J., & Dabashi, H. (1999). Staging a revolution: the art of persuasion in the Islamic Republic of Iran. New York: New York University Press. Cohen, J.A. & Abbas Milani, A. (2005). The passive revolution. Hoover Digest 3 Dabashi, H. (2011). The Green Movement in Iran (p. 161). New Brunswich: Transaction Publishers. De Vries, M. (2006). The spirit of despotism: understanding the tyrant within. Human Relations, 59(2), 195–220.

Paralyzing the Masses in Post-revolutionary Iran Dewey, C. (2013). A stunning map of depression rates around the world. Retrieved from Washington Post website: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/11/07/a-stunning-map-of-depressionrates-around-the-world/?tid=sm_fb. Donya-e Eqtsad (2015). When Iran’s GDP cut in half? Retrieved from Donya-e Eqstad website: http://www. donya-e-eqtesad.com/news/873994/. Elling, C.R. (2009). Bring in the dead: martyr burials and election politics in Iran. Middle East Report. Available at: http://www.merip.org/mero/mero031909. Entessar, N. (1999). Student unrest and Iran’s military. Journal of Iranian Research and Analysis, 15(2), 120–123. Fayyaz, I., & Rahmani, J. J. (2006). Mourning rituals and discourses of Karbala in religiosity of urban poor. The Quarterly of Iranian association of cultural studies and communication, 2(6), 57–80. Federation of American Scientists (2009). BStructure of Iran’s State-Run TV IRIB. Retrieved from the website of Federation of American Scientists (FAS): http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/osc/iran-tv.pdf. Foucault, M. (1978). The history of sexuality. New York: Pantheon. Gandhi, J., & Przeworski, A. (2006). Cooperation, cooptation, and rebellion under dictatorships. Sage Public Administration Abstracts, 33(3), 132–192. Geddes, B., & Zaller, J. J. (1989). Sources of popular support for authoritarian regimes. American Journal of Political Science, 33(2), 319–347. Golkar, S. (2011a). Liberation or suppression technologies? The internet, the green movement and the regime in Iran introduction ICTs: emancipatory or repressive technologies. International Journal of Emerging Technologies and Society, 9(1), 59. Golkar, S. (2011b). Politics of piety: the Basij and moral control of Iranian society. The Journal of the Middle East and Africa, 2(2), 207–219. Golkar, S. (2012). Cultural engineering under Authoritarian regimes: Islamization of Universities in Postrevolutionary Iran. Digest of Middle East Studies, 1–23. Golkar, S. (2012b). Organization of the oppressed or organization for oppressing: analysing the role of the Basij Militia of Iran. Politics, Religion & Ideology, 13(4), 455–471. Good, B., Good, M.-J., & Moradi, R. (1985). The interpretation of Iranian depressive illness and dysphoric affect. In A. Kleinman & B. Good (Eds.), Culture and depression. Studies in the anthropology and cross-cultural psychiatry of affect and disorder (p. 384). Berkeley: University of California Press. Haaretz (2011). BIran cracks down on water play in public.^ Retrieved from Haaretz website: http://www.haaretz. com/news/middle-east/iran-cracks-down-on-water-play-in-public-1.382707. Halm, H. (2007). The Shi’ites: a short history (p. 16). Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers. Harvard University (2005). BOpenNet Initiative, Internet Filtering in Iran in 2004–2005. 5,^ http://dash.harvard. edu/bitstream/handle/1/2794837/Internet%20Filtering%20in%20Iran.pdf?sequence=2. Hashemi, S.Z., Mohammad Rezaei, M., & Asepideh akbarpouran, S. (2014). BHappiness in Students’ Everyday Life.^ Social Studies and Research in Iran, 3(3). Hejazi, A. (2011). You don’t deserve to be published: book censorship in Iran. LOGOS; Journal of the World Publishing Community, 22(1), 53. Helliwell, J.F., Layard, R., and Sachs, J. eds. (2013). BWorld Happiness Report 2013.^ New York, NY: UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network. Available at: 2013. http://unsdsn.org/files/2013/09/ WorldHappinessReport2013_online.pdf. Hellman, C. (2011). BThe World’s Happiest (And Saddest) Countries. Retrieved from Forbes website: http:// www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2013/10/29/the-worlds-happiest-and-saddest-countries-2013/. Ilna News Agency (2015). BInterview with the head of the Maddahan association,^ June. Retrieved from Ilna website: 11, 2015 http://bit.ly/1GIxKHi. ISNA News Agency (2014). BWhat is the extent and pattern of the press usage in city of Tehran? Tehran, retrieved from^ ISNA news agency website: http://goo.gl/VcU2IT. Jam-e jam (2013). BMosques in the mirror of statistic.^ Tehran, No3773, p.11, August 24, 2013, retrieved from Jam-e Jam website: http://www.jamejamonline.ir/NewsPreview/1169201829878711238. Kamrava, M., & Hassan-Yari. (2004). Suspended equilibrium in Iran’s political system. The Muslim World, 94(4), 495–524. Karami, A. (2015, May 21). Return of 175 Iranian bodies from Iraq stirs painful memories, May 21, 2015. Retrieved from al-monitor website: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/05/iran-175-martyrs-iran-iraq-war.html. Keddie, N. R. (1995). Iran and the Muslim world: resistance and revolution. New York: New York University Press. Khabar Online (2012). BOnly three percent of Iranians are very happy.^ Tehran, retrieved from Khabar Online: http://www.khabaronline.ir/detail/247616/society/fun. Khalaji, M. (2011). Iran’s regime of religion, In Inside the authoritarian state. Edited by El Baradei, Mohamed. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 65(1), 131–147. Khalaji, M., Robertson, B., Aghdami, M. Bronwen, R., & Maryam, A. (2011). BCultural Censorship in Iran; Iranian Culture in a State of Emergency.,^ Retrieved from Small Media website: http://smallmedia.org.uk/censorship.pdf.

Golkar Khamoushi, S.M. (2010). BThe meeting of Dr khamoushi with Ayatollah Janati.,^ Rokhdad Magazine, Tehran, 50, 18. Available at http://old.ido.ir/myhtml/epub/rokhdad/50.pdf. Khatami, A. (2009). The Islamic Republic’s failed quest for the spotless City. Middle East Report, 250, 44–49. Khosravi, S. (2008). Young and defiant in Tehran. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Khosrokhavar, F. (2005). Suicide bombers: Allah’s new martyrs. (London: Pluto). Künkler, M. (2009) The Special Courts of the Clergy (Dadgah‐e Vizheh‐ye Ruhaniyyat) and the Repression of Dissident Clergy in Iran, Social Science Research Network, May 13. available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1505542. Mahdavi, P. (2007). Passionate uprisings: young people, sexuality and politics in post-revolutionary Iran. Culture, Health & Sexuality, 9(5), 445–457. Mahdi, A. A. (1999). The student movement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Journal of Iranian Research and Analysis, 15(2), 5–32. Mehran, G. (1990). Ideology and Education in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education, 20(1), 53–65. Melimazhabi Website (2013). BHow much is the expense of religious association in Tehran.^ Retrieved from Melimazhabi website: http://goo.gl/QMqTM5. Moaveni, A., & Parvaneh Masoumi (2013). Leggings and their discontents in Iran. Retrieved from Iran Wire website: Iran wire website, August 28, 2013, http://en.iranwire.com/features/2309/. Motevalli, G. (2014). Brain drain blights Iran’s economy as investors wait in wings. Retrieved from Bloomberg website: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-28/brain-drain-blights-iran-s-economy-as-investorswait-in-wings.html. Naficy, R. (1992). Education and the culture of politics in the Islamic Republic of Iran. In S. K. Farsoun & M. Mashayekhi (Eds.), Iran: political culture in the Islamic Republic (p. 1992). London, GB: Routledge. Naficy, H. (2012). A social history of Iranian Cinema. Durham: Duke University Press. Neday-e Enghlab (2013). Holding more than 104,000 religious classes for school students. Retrieved from, website of Neday-e Enghlab: http://www.nedayeenghelab.com/vdciuza3.t1avz2bcct.html. Oksnevad, R. (2012). BMB discipleship: an investigation into the factors leading to disharmony within the Iranian churches in the diaspora. St Francis Magazine, 8(4), 397–434. Parsa, M. (2000). States, ideologies, and social revolutions: a comparative analysis of Iran, Nicaragua, and the Philippines. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Passarelli, F. & Tabellini, G. (2013). Emotions and Political Unrest. CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4165. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2243459. Pearlman, W. (2013). Emotions and the Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings. Perspectives on Politics, 11, 387–409. Peyvandi, S. (2013). Andohbary-e nezam-e Amozishi dar Iran, sadness of educational system in Iran. Retrieved from Radio-e Zamaneh website: http://www.radiozamaneh.com/23521#.Us26TtJDvz4. Qods Newspaper (2013). BThe Qods online’s report about a social problem. Retrieved from,^ March 12, 2013, http://bit.ly/1dpTQyb. Quinlivan, J. (1999). Coup-proofing: its practice and consequences in the Middle East. International Security, 24(2), 133. Rabbani, A., & Ghasmi, V. (2008). The effectiveness of propaganda in the defense of Islamic revolution. Journal of Panzdeh-e Khordad, 30, 125–154. Rafizadeh, M. (2011). The new social order: the Islamic republic of Iran and Foucault. Yonsei Journal of International Studies, 3(1), 141–146, P143. Rahnem, S., & Haideh Moghissi, H. (2001). Clerical oligarchy and the question of Bdemocracy^ in Iran. Monthly Review, 52(10), 28–40. Rahrovan-e Velyat (2013). BThe signs of women and girls in 2009 sedition. Retrieved from http://www. jonbeshnet.ir/news/22437. Raja News (2010). Imam Khomeini, we are the nation of political cry. Retrieved from Raja News website: http:// www.rajanews.com/detail.asp?id=71797. Raja News website (2011). Saeid Hadadian in an interview with Raja news. Retrieved from Raja News website: http://rajanews.com/detail.asp?id=108896. Rauh, E. L. (2013). Thirty years later: Iranian visual culture from the 1979 revolution to the 2009 presidential protests. International Journal of Communication, 7, 1316–1343. Rivetti, P. (2013). The control of Dissent in Iranian Universities, ECPR General Conference, September, Bordeaux, http://www.ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/7775073a-f1b8-48ba-bbef-77ed63a83e94.pdf. Rubin, M. (2001). Into the shadows: radical vigilantes in Khatami’s Iran. Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Sadeghi, F. (2013). The breaking the monopoly, the road map of the establishment of Private TVs. Tehran, retrieved from: Khabr online website: http://khabaronline.ir/detail/310173/culture/book.

Paralyzing the Masses in Post-revolutionary Iran Schedler, A. (2012). BThe politics of uncertainty: sustaining and subverting authoritarian regimes^ (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.pol.gu.se/infoglueCalendar/digitalAssets/1777226548_BifogadFil_ Schedler%20Politics%20of%20uncertainty%202012%2004.pdf. Shadmehr, M., & Bernhardt, D. (2012). A Theory of State Censorship. APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2105407. Shahabi, M., & Golpoush-Nezhad, E. (2015). Rap music and youth cultures in Iran: serious or light? In C. Feixa, C. Leccardi, & P. Nilan (Eds.), Youth, space & time: Agoras in the global City (pp. 248–276). Brill: The Hague and Boston. Shahi, A. (2013).Erotic Republic; Iran is in the throes of an unprecedented sexual revolution. Could it eventually shake the regime? Retrieved from Foreign Policy, May 29, 2013. http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/29/ erotic-republic/. Shilling, C. (1997). The body and social theory. London: Sage. Singh, A. (2010). Iran government issues style guide for men’s hair. The Telegraph, July 05, 2010, retrieved from The Telegraph website: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/7873621/Irangovernment-issues-style-guide-for-mens-hair.html. Small Media (2012). Satellite jamming in Iran: a war over airwaves. Retrieved from PBS website: http://wwwtc.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/SatelliteJammingInIranSmallMedia.pdf. Sreberny‐Mohammadi, A., & Mohammadi, A. (1990). Hegemony and resistance: media politics in the Islamic republic of Iran. Quarterly Review of Film and Video, 12(4), 33–59. Student News Agency (2014). A letter for proper mustache, the student news agency. Retrieved from: January 04, 2014, http://snn.ir/NSite/FullStory/News/?id=284546&Serv=13&SGr=1514. Svendsen, L. (2008). Philosophy of fear (p. 19). London: Reaktion Books. Tabyan (2012). Propagation; Wise Sayings of Imam Khomeini. Retrieved from http://english.tebyan.net/ newindex.aspx?pid=204050. Tauber, E. (2013). BAbd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi.^ In The emergence of the Arab movements. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis. Tavakoli-Targhi, M. (2012). The emergence of Clerico-engineering as a form of governance in Iran. Iran Nameh, 27(2–3), 4–37. The Guardian (2014). Tehran—the secret party town, the Guardian newspaper, April 17, 2014, retrieved from The Guardian website: http://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2014/apr/17/tehran-the-secret-party-town. Thurfjell, D. (2006). Living Shi’ism: instances of ritualisation among Islamist men in contemporary Iran. Leiden: Brill. 34–35 Thurfjell, D. (2012). Emotion and self-control: a framework for analysis of shi‘ite mourning rituals in Iran, in Ridgeon, Lloyd V. J. Shi’i Islam and identity: religion, politics and change in the global Muslim community. London, GB: I.B. Tauris. Veisi, M. (2012). The Friday prayers Imam, who take the same. Radio Farad website, http://www.radiofarda. com/content/b17-friday-prayer-iran/24666283.html. Vladisavljević, N. (2014). Popular protest in authoritarian regimes: evidence from communist and postcommunist states. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 14(2), 139–157. VOA website (2015). The Basij has two thousand kindergartens. Retrieved from http://ir.voanews.com/content/ iran/2753588.html. Webb, D. (2005). BOn mosques and malls: understanding Khomeinism as a source of counter-hegemonic resistance to the spread of global consumer culture. Journal of Political Ideologies, 10(1), 111. Wedeen, L. (1999). Ambiguities of domination: politics, rhetoric, and symbols in contemporary Syria (p. 76). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Yaghmaian, B. (2002). Social change in Iran: an eyewitness account of dissent, defiance, and new movements for rights. New York: State University of New York. Zimmt, R. (2014). The Return of the Eulogists to the Political Arena in Iran. Iran Pulse, 64. http://humanities.tau. ac.il/iranian/en/previous-reviews/10-iran-pulse-en/279-iranpulseno64.