Michalos and the Theory of Ethical Theory

ABSTRACT. The paper replies to Professor Alex Michalos’ keynote address, “Ethics Counsellors as a New Priesthood”. Michalos argues that an intractable diversity of opinion about fundamental issues in ethical theory precludes substantive, well-founded ethical counselling. However, Michalos has inappropriately modelled his understanding of an acceptable structure and application for ethical theory on natural scientific theory. For we may countenance a less severe understanding of theory for ethical theory than in the hard sciences. In particular, instructive moral reasoning may tolerate a degree of disagreement across human beings in their conception of moral good. On condition that such variance is not so considerable as to undermine a necessary commonality of language on ethical matters, there will be an adequate basis for warranted theory-construction in ethics and effective moral counselling underwritten by such theory. And, on the available historical evidence, such a condition can be met.

In an unusual, but deeply important, turn on a keynote address for the theme of teaching business ethics, Professor Michalos has undertaken the role of spectre at our feast. For he has insightfully and forcefully argued a position of moral scepticism on the prospect of a reasoned, well-founded ethical counselling of anyone, including business practitioners. In order for such counselling to be so grounded, the principles of ethical theory warranting the counselling must Bernard Hodgson is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Trent University in Peterborough, Ontario. Dr. Hodgson has been a Visiting Fellow at the University of Cambridge, and is the author of papers on the philosophical foundation of economic theory, and Economics as Moral Science (accepted for publication by SpringerVerlag).

Bernard J. Hodgson

be adequate to the task; however, in examining such theory, Michalos argues that “there is simply such diversity of opinion about so many fundamental issues that most ethical appraisals, especially in committees, are probably very shallow and barely warranted.”1 Put in an equivalent way, there is no genuine moral knowledge for ethical experts to disseminate to actual human beings in need of it when perplexed by concrete and significant moral decisions. The best that can be said of those who persist in giving ethical advice in such epistemic circumstances is that they proceed as Don Quixotes of the priesthood – respectable, well-intentioned souls who are nonetheless “doomed to failure” in exercising the heroic, but hopeless, office of ethical counsellor. Clearly, Michalos’ perspective is a fundamental challenge to the whole point of moral reasoning with profoundly disturbing consequences for any credible objectives for moral education. Is there anything that can be said to mitigate such moral scepticism? I think so, even though I can only put forth a few summary remarks in this paper. Not surprisingly, I take my cue from Aristotle, who, in commencing his own inquiry into ethics cautioned that “we must be content in speaking of such subjects and with such premises to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about such things which are only for the most part true, and with premises of the same kind, to reach conclusions that are no better.”2 In short, it will become evident that I find Aristotle’s reservations on the construction and use of ethical theory sound but not unduly debilitating, whereas Michalos’ modus operandi is flawed in its resistance to such Aristotelian moderation in one’s expectation for theoryconstruction and application in matters ethical.

Journal of Business Ethics 29: 19–23, 2001. © 2001 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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In Mind and the World Order, the American pragmatist philosopher, C. I. Lewis, cogently explained the extensive degree to which traditional epistemology reflected the “historical shadow of Euclidean geometry.”3 So, more particularly, let me charge that Michalos has modelled his understanding of “an acceptable moral theory” too closely on an acceptable scientific theory and where the epistemology of the latter has been conceived “in the shadow of Euclidian geometry.” In support of my claim, I turn first to Michalos’ specification of “adequacy conditions” for an acceptable ethical theory.4 For my purposes, two conditions are especially critical, condition 1) that an ethical theory be true, and 7) that such a theory be internally and externally coherent. Let us assume, as I am sure Michalos would, that an acceptable scientific theory would likewise have to satisfy these conditions. Seen through traditional lenses, this would require, with respect to truth, that the theory be consistent with experimental observation; with respect to internal coherence, that its hypotheses be mutually consistent and that its lower-level theorems be derivable from its axiomatic principles; it is not entirely clear what Michalos intends by “external coherence”, but I shall take this condition to mean that a legitimate scientific theory be consistent with other true scientific theories. Taken together, it is crucial to observe that these three criteria would imply a Euclidian singularity in scientific theoryconstruction – viz., in its strongest version, only one scientific theory would provide a warranted explanation/prediction of a particular empirical phenomenon, or, at least, in a weaker version, no two acceptable scientific theories would imply inconsistent experimental observations of a particular event. In my understanding of Michalos, it is primarily the failure of ethical theory-construction to measure up to the scientific exemplar in satisfying the preceding criteria that traps moral reasoning in the scepticism that undermines the integrity of ethical counselling. More precisely, let me suggest that the methodological rub lies most critically in the fact that an intractable diversity of opinion on which member of a traditional set of moral theories is acceptable leads

to a failure of “external coherence” prescribed by condition 7. That is to say, distinct moral theories do not cohere with each other, such that two theories could, and do, lead to inconsistent ethical appraisals of the same action, person, motive, institution, etc. It is instructive that the problem is not the same one as the much discussed issue in the philosophy of science of the “under-determination of theory by data” wherein two competing theories are both consistent with the observable data. Indeed, an analogous situation would be more than welcome in ethical analysis and counselling, that is to say, where two rival theoretical commitments led to the same moral judgment of a particular issue: a Hitler condemned by both natural law and social contract remains a Hitler usefully condemned. Rather, in moral inquiry, we seem to be faced with an irresolvable and frustrating “flip” of the scientific case, that is, the “underdetermination of data by theory”, where distinct theories give conflicting appraisals of the same moral problem. Our ethical textbooks are replete with standard examples of such “moral dilemmas”, as, for instance, with illustrations of conflicts between the application of Kantian and Utilitarian theories to the same situation: should a supplier unilaterally break his contract with an agricultural distributor if he believes the type of seeds he is supplying will harm consumers? For some situations, there is simply no basis, in sound logic, for insisting that, upon sufficient reflection, ethical counsellors will reach the same conclusion, even though reasoning from different theoretical principles. Nevertheless, encouraged by Aristotle, I part company with Michalos in his belief that the structure of this state-of-affairs eviscerates the logical integrity of ethical theory-construction such that, with minor mollifications, “ethics counsellors are indeed doomed to being a new priesthood in the pejorative sense of this term.”5 In private communication with Michalos, I sought to moderate his pessimism in a certain way, and would like here to return to the substance of that Aristotelian therapy, however resistant Alex’s psyche was to it on its first application. I had suggested that if one takes a close look at the various ethical theories listed by

Michalos and the Theory of Ethical Theory Michalos with an eye to commonalities to allay the debilitating diversity, two basic normative considerations surface – practical consistency or impartiality, and what one might call “eudaemonist” consequentialism. Foregoing detailed explanation, Michalos’ list indicates that a good deal of moral deliberation and reasoning is directed toward constructing imperatives which, if followed, would bring about general human “well-being”, and which do so with practical consistency – viz., most critically, the imperatives do not permit the agent to make an exception in his own favour. In my judgment, the consistency or impartiality criterion is most convincing when understood as an extension of our basic intuitive repugnance to avowing a logical contradiction, (x is M and not M), to practical contexts bearing on the avower (Action A is obligatory/impermissible for any other person B in circumstances C, but not for me in C). Most importantly, if we can wed good social consequences to practical consistency, it is likely, pace Michalos, that an invidious “diversity of opinion” will not scuttle moral reasoning or its application in ethical counselling. And let me further claim that there are many contexts where such a symbiosis between consequences and impartiality prevails.6 Admittedly, there is a large assumption that is implicit in this claim – namely, that there is sufficient communal agreement as to the content of good consequences for those affected by particular actions, but I believe that the denial of such agreement is simply empirically false. However, it is just this crucial assumption that Michalos has challenged in the final version of his paper. In his own terms, If the determination or real agreement among a set of moral judgments is contingent upon real agreement in the estimated consequences for human well-being in general, then the former probably never occurs because the latter probably never occurs. That is to say, consequentialist appraisal is probably never rigorously carried out by anyone, and if it were no one would be able to certify it as such because there is no general agreement or rule book about its exact requirements.7

But there is a fallacy of equivocation here: Human beings engaged in moral choice can and

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do estimate the comparative consequences of alternative actions without “rigorously” doing so, and can do so on the basis of a decision-procedure that does not need a “rule book about its exact requirements”. Moreover, the critical terms “rigorously” and “exact” reveal that Michalos is by-passing Aristotle’s wise advice that we look for “precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject permits.”8 In particular, it strikes me that Michalos is modelling a decision-procedure for moral choice as if ethics were an engineering science, wherein the underlying theoretical principles could be applied to give exactly measurable consequences – as we use the laws of physical mechanics to predict the final relative position of rocks in a landslide. And, no doubt, such modelling is a recipe for irredeemable frustration in the moral appraisal of alternative action-choices. Clearly, in order to succeed in the moral enterprise, we need to accept a looser sense of theory than one patterned after a Euclidian search for precise algorithms of decision. But what would a useful basis for decision be in the moral context? Here I think we need to invoke what John Stuart Mill reminded us we actually do invoke – namely, the experience of the tendencies of action of “the whole past duration of the human species”.9 Of course, if such an appeal itself testified to a considerable disagreement among human beings as to what constituted human good or bad, leading to a pervasive incompatibility in the principles of moral theory we construct on our conception of the good, then Mill’s proposed basis for reflective moral choice would also be a recipe for defeat in moral reasoning and counselling, although in a different manner than a search for algorithmic decision principles. We may grant that there is some diversity of opinion across history, cultures, and different individuals as to fundamental conceptions of moral good. But, of course, the operative condition in my perspective is whether such variance is sufficiently “considerable” such that the communality of language on ethical matters required for instructive theory-construction, and the counselling backed by it, is beyond our reach. But, on the available historical evidence, I cannot

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see that this is the case. Most particularly, those factors which Mill characterized as making a difference to the “groundwork of our existence”10 are positively valued as a matter of the common experience of mankind, since they are the sine qua non for the realization of any other goods – for instance, such factors as our life and its health, material property and educational resources, sufficient freedom to pursue more particular desires and purposes, and mutual trust in the honesty of personal interaction. It is significant that viewing such goods from the perspective of a via negativa reinforces our recognition of their invariance across human beings: consider, for instance, the uniformity with which human beings from diverse cultures condemn not only the use of arbitrary power, such as violence, for private gain at the expense of others, but even the breaking of promises as it thwarts someone’s expectations of goods to be received from others. Let me propose then that as long as we tolerate, as we should, a more relaxed understanding of theory for ethical theory than in the hard sciences, such a degree of congruence among human beings on our “primary goods” will enable us to construct theoretical principles functioning as premises in moral reasoning that meet Aristotle’s condition that they be “for the most part” true and thereby lead to conclusions of the same modest, but serviceable, veracity. In this light, the basic consideration is that the adequacy conditions for ethical theory so understood are not as severe as in Michalos’ analysis. In particular, the “external coherence” criterion of condition 7) is not as exacting. Some degree of what we have called the “underdetermination of data by theory” can be permitted: distinct theories may issue in incompatible answers to a concrete moral problem as long as this is “the exception rather than the rule” – although it would be inconsistent with what I am arguing to expect that a precise statistical measure can be provided for this distinction. For that range of moral reasoning where human beings tend to agree on the content of good consequences, or distinct theoretical perspectives provide consistent answers to particular moral issues, ethical counsellors can play a straightforward positive

role in specifying the morally relevant consequences of actions for agents and institutions, and in clarifying the theoretical principles, even the distinct ones, grounding these consequences. In that narrower range of moral inquiry where different theoretical principles prescribe incompatible responses to a moral problem, ethical counsellors are still not precluded from offering significantly useful advice. Most critically, their explanation of the specific indeterminacy involved can enlighten agents as to the daunting, but unavoidable, demand to make choices between first principles for such circumstances – moral thinking provides no escape from the regular exigencies of life.

Notes 1

A. C. Michalos, “Ethics Counsellors as a New Priesthood”, p. 16. 2 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. by David Ross, rev. by J. L. Ackrill and J. O. Urmson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 3. 3 C. I. Lewis, Mind and the World Order (New York: Dover Publications, 1929). The phrase comes from p. 241 and makes special reference to the role of a priori truth; but see all of Chapters VII and VIII for the full explanation of such Euclidean modelling. 4 A. C. Michalos, “Ethics Counsellors as a New Priesthood”, p. 7. 5 Ibid., p. 9. 6 Of course, I agree that this is not always the case. And when it is not, we get the “hard cases” of intractable “diversity” in moral reasoning and counselling. Most critically, there are plausible examples where doing the impartial social good would be a lesser good for me (where it would be better for me to exercise practical inconsistency – to make an exception in my favour). This classic problem arises in social contract theories with the issue of “compliance”: sure, as a matter of general practice, it is better for each person to follow a set of communal rules; but why, on a particular occasion, should I comply with a rule to which I have feigned assent if it is better for me not to do so for that occasion, and it is evident that no one will know of my non-compliance. In short, the most corrosive source of the problem of “moral diversity” is that of the traditional Platonic conumdrum of morality and rational self-interest: convince me that I should do moral action A, if, on

Michalos and the Theory of Ethical Theory the evidence, doing not-A is more conducive to my advantage. This problem, has very special relevance for the ethical couselling of businessmen, where it is clear that the vast majority of the analysis and counselling aims at showing the business agent (employee or corporation) that doing the morally right thing will ipso facto redound to his/its economic self-interest. But there can be no guarantee (a priori or empirical) that this will uniformly be the case. 7 A. C. Michalos, “Ethics Counsellors as a New Priesthood”, p. 14. 8 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, p. 3. 9 J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism (1861), ed. by George Sher (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 1979), Chap. 2, p. 23. 10 Ibid., Chap. 5, p. 53.

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References Aristotle: 1980, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. by David Ross, rev. by J. L. Ackrill and J. O. Urmson (Oxford University Press, Oxford). Lewis, C. I.: 1929, Mind and the World Order (Dover Publications, New York). Michalos, A. C.: October 1999, “Ethics Counsellors as a New Priesthood”, Sixth International Conference Promoting Business Ethics, Niagara University. Mill, J. S.: 1979, Utilitarianism (1861), ed. by George Sher (Hackett, Indianapolis, IN).

Department of Philosophy, Trent University, Peterborough, Ontario, Canada, K9J 7B8, E-mail: [email protected]