Dao https://doi.org/10.1007/s11712-018-9613-y

Moral Artisanship in Mengzi 6A7 Dobin CHOI 1

# Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Abstract This essay investigates the structure and meaning of the Mengzi’s 孟子 analogical inferences in Mengzi 6A7. In this chapter, he argues that just as the perceptual masters allowed the discovery of our senses’ uniform preferences, the sages enabled us to recognize our hearts’ universal preferences for “order (li 理) and righteousness (yi 義).” Regarding an unresolved question of how the sages help us understand our hearts’ preferred objects as such, I propose a spectator-based moral artisanship reading as an alternative to an evaluator-focused moral connoisseurship view: the sages are moral artisans who refine their moral achievements, and people’s uniform approval of their achievements—firmly associated with “order and righteousness”—demonstrates our hearts’ same natural preferences for them. Furthermore, I argue that this chapter’s conclusion—we and the sages are of the same kind with natural moral preferences—implies the necessity of our transition from passive spectators to active moral performers for moral self-cultivation. Keywords Righteousness (yi 義) . Moral taste . Moral sentiment . Human nature . Sages

1 Introduction This essay investigates the structure and meaning of Mengzi’s 孟子 analogical inferences in Mengzi 6A7. In this chapter, he argues that the uniform preferences of our eyes, ears, and mouths analogously justify our hearts’ inherent moral preferences. Just as the perceptual masters allowed the discovery of our senses’ uniform preferences, the sages enabled us to recognize our hearts’ universal preferences. At the end, Mengzi

* Dobin CHOI [email protected]

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Ewha Institute for Biomedical Law & Ethics, Ewha Womans University, 52 Ewhayeodae-gil, Seodaemun-gu, Seoul 03760, Republic of Korea

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goes further to affirm that our hearts universally prefer “order (li 理) and righteousness (yi 義),” yet does not give a clear indication of how the sages help us understand our hearts’ preferred objects as such (Mengzi 6A7).1 Hence, for a thorough interpretation of this chapter, we need to clarify the sages’ role in ascertaining our hearts’ preferred objects. Treating the sages as competent moral judges, Hutton’s moral connoisseurship view assumes that the sages’ excellent moral judgment and knowledge would pinpoint what our hearts innately prefer. As an alternative to this evaluator-focused view, I propose a spectator-based moral artisanship reading. On the one side, this view regards the sages as moral artisans—rather than moral judges—who strive to produce and refine their moral items, including moral actions, feelings, judgments, knowledge, characters, virtues, and so forth. Taking a spectatorial perspective, on the other side, this view holds that our hearts’ same moral preferences are demonstrated by ordinary spectators’ uniform sentimental approval of the sages’ moral items, which are firmly associated with “order and righteousness.” Contrary to the moral connoisseurship view that analyzes Mengzi’s taste analogy within a dyadic relationship between the evaluating subjects and the evaluated objects, this moral artisanship view assumes a triadic relationship between creators, their offerings, and spectators. Just as people’s invariant approval of a master chef’s culinary creations attests to their uniform taste preferences, people’s unanimous “sentiment of approbation” toward the sages’ achievements justifies their hearts’ inherent preferences for “order and righteousness.”2 This sentiment-based spectatorial reading of Mengzi 6A7 offers several advantages. First, since sentiment is more closely associated with perceptual senses than judgment, this reading can be more coherent with Mengzi’s taste analogy. What we perceive through taste, hearing, and vision tends to lead directly to sentiments regardless of our reflective thinking. Second, this approach exhibits the theoretical consistency of Mengzi’s arguments for our inherent moral potentialities. I believe that our unanimous sentiment of admiration toward the sages has the same structural function as our universal compassion upon seeing a baby about to fall into a well in Mengzi 2A6. Just as the latter paves the way for Mengzi’s account of benevolence (ren 仁), the former substantiates his account of righteousness. Third, this chapter implies the actualization of internal righteousness. Sentiment entails an intentional object, and the object of spectators’ sentiments is that which the sages have presented to people. Given its relation to righteousness in the text, this chapter can be considered to involve a case of an outward manifestation of internal righteousness. Lastly, the motivational force of sentiment facilitates our performing virtuous actions, which is central in Mengzi’s teaching for virtue cultivation. In the first two sections, I reexamine Mengzis analogical inferences in Mengzi 6A7 and reveal the two available approaches to this chapter (and a general connoisseurship model) respectively from the sages’ and spectators’ viewpoints. Next, I argue that Mengzi’s taste analogy, seen from a spectatorial perspective, views the sages as moral 1

In this essay, I will mainly use Van Norden’s translation of the Mengzi (Van Norden 2008). I borrow the phrase of “sentiment of approbation” from Hume’s moral theory to suggest that Mengzi’s sentiment-based teaching of moral cultivation shares a parallel structure with Hume’s sentiment-based theory of moral evaluation. For Hume, this moral sentiment of approbation, the natural effect of our perceiving moral qualities, distinguishes virtues and morality. For example, Hume defines virtue to be “whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation” (Hume 1975: 289; original emphasis).

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artisans who produce and refine moral items incessantly. At the end, I argue that this chapter’s main conclusion—we and the sages are of the same kind with natural moral preferences—implies the necessity of our transition from passive spectators to active moral performers for moral self-cultivation.

2 The Heart’s Natural Preferences and Moral Connoisseurship In Mengzi 6A7, Mengzi presents an interesting analogy between our perceptions and hearts (xin 心): the universal preferences of our eyes, ears, and mouths analogously justify the same natural preferences of our hearts, and the discovery of such universal preferences is attributed to the perceptual masters and the sages. Based on this analogical structure, Mengzi confidently concludes that the sages first discovered what our hearts naturally prefer, which is “order and righteousness.” Given his reliance upon the sages in this analogy, Mengzi seems to claim that “the great accomplishment of the ancient sages consists in discovering the moral values that will please all people’s hearts” (Hutton 2002: 168). From the text, however, it is not clear how the sages were able to pinpoint the heart’s preferred objects as “order and righteousness.” To elaborate upon the sages’ role in determining our hearts’ preferred objects, I reexamine the structure of Mengzi’s taste analogy from ordinary people’s spectatorial perspective. This attempt will allow an alternative reading to Hutton’s moral connoisseurship view, taken from the sages’ agential perspectives. In Mengzi 6A7, Mengzi said: In years of plenty, most young men are gentle; in years of poverty, most young men are violent. It is not that the potential that Heaven confers on them varies like this. They are like this because of what sinks and drowns their hearts. Consider barley. Sow the seeds and cover them. The soil is the same and the time of planting is also the same. They grow rapidly, and by the time of the summer solstice they have all ripened. Although there are some differences, these are due to the richness of the soil and to unevenness in the rain and in human effort. Hence, in general, things of the same kind are all similar. Why would one have any doubt about this when it comes to humans alone? We and the sage are of the same kind. Hence, Longzi [龍子] said, “When one makes a sandal for a foot one has not seen, we know that one will not make a basket.” The similarity of all the shoes in the world is due to the fact that the feet of the world are the same. Mouths have the same preferences in flavors. Master Chef Yi Ya [易牙] was the first to discover what our mouths prefer. If it were the case that the natures of mouths varied among people—just as dogs and horses are different species from us—then how could it be that throughout the world all tastes follow Yi Ya when it comes to flavor? When it comes to flavor, the reason the whole world looks to Yi Ya is that mouths throughout the world are similar. Ears are like this too. When it comes to sound, the whole world looks to Music Master Shi Kuang [師曠]. This is because ears throughout the world are similar. Eyes are like this too. No one in the world does not appreciate the handsomeness of a man like Zidu [子都]. Anyone who does not appreciate the handsomeness of Zidu has no eyes. Hence, I say that mouths have the same preferences in flavors, ears have the same

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preferences in sounds, eyes have the same preferences in attractiveness. When it comes to hearts, are they alone without preferences in common? What is it that hearts prefer in common? I say that it is order and righteousness. The sage first discovered what our hearts prefer in common. Hence, order and righteousness delight our hearts like meat delights our mouths.3 In the first two paragraphs, Mengzi presents two different analogies. A vegetative analogy in the first paragraph infers a general statement that “things of the same kind are all similar,” and Mengzi extends this statement to humans: “We and the sage are of the same kind (tonglei 同類).” The noticeable variation of the growth of barley is ascribed not to the nature of the plants themselves, but to such external factors as soil, rain, human efforts, and so forth. Likewise, the variation of human, at least physical, traits is not associated with the essence of human nature. Longzi’s comment regarding the similarity of body parts supports this categorical sameness of human nature in a physical and biological sense. This vegetative analogy, however, is yet unable to justify the sameness of our psychological minds. While body parts’ natural growth varies within a limited range, implied by the similar shape of a sandal, both perceptual and moral tastes appear to display wide individual variations due to their presumed sensitivity to the influences of external factors, such as a person’s environment, culture, education, wealth, and so forth. Mengzi is well aware of such influences upon our bodily senses and hearts. Eyes and ears are easily “misled by things” because “things interact with other things [eyes and ears] and simply lead them along” (Mengzi 6A15). Our varied perceptions from external influences would “sink and drown” our hearts so that we may have different individual aesthetic and moral preferences.4 Unless we use our hearts’ function of reflection (si 思), we may fail to discern proper perceptions at given situations.5 However, from these apparent variations of perceptual preferences, some would draw a skeptical view that claims the natural divergences of people’s psychological minds and thus moral preferences. The second paragraph would be prepared to refute this skeptical view. Mengzi emphasizes our naturally same perceptual preferences to justify that both we and the sages are of the same kind, not just in physical attributes, but also in the psychological minds. In the third paragraph, Mengzi moves on to pinpoint our hearts’ preferred objects as “order and righteousness,” but does not clearly explain the reason for his conviction about our hearts’ natural preferences for them. The first goal of this essay is to illuminate this reason, for which we need to delineate the correct structure of this taste analogy. Our structural analysis of this analogy begins with clarifying the corresponding analogues. Hutton’s moral connoisseurship view finds them in the link of the expertise

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I divided this chapter into three paragraphs, and the italics are my emphasis. In the remaining sections, I will quote the parts of Mengzi 6A7 without reference. 4 Mengzi admits that the heart is a thing of the most subtle kind that requires our reflection to control it. In Mengzi 1A7, he advises King Xuan 宣: “Measure it, and then you will distinguish the long and the short. Things are all like this, the heart most of all.” 5 Mengzi claims, “The function of the heart is to reflect” (xin zhi guan ze si 心之官則思) (Mengzi 6A15). I agree with Van Norden’s view that broadens the range of reflection beyond reasoning: “Reflection … is an activity that involves feelings, thoughts, and perception” (Van Norden 2008: 149).

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of the perceptual masters and the sages. By their excellent perceptual capacities and accumulated knowledge, Yi Ya and Shi Kuang were able to make accurate aesthetic judgments about general preferences in flavors and sounds. Likewise, the sages with moral knowledge were able to present correct moral judgments about what mattered ethically and socially and to point out that our hearts generally prefer “order and righteousness.” Implying that “the sages are above all connoisseurs of the human heart,” Mengzi’s taste analogy would regard the sages as moral connoisseurs who provide appropriate moral standards (Hutton 2002: 174). It would then be beneficial for us to comply with the sages’ moral judgments, since they would guide us to the most appropriate way to act morally in given situations. Aside from this plausible conclusion, we should note that this moral connoisseurship view basically takes the perspectives of evaluators—masters and sages—to determine what our senses and hearts innately prefer. Counterbalancing this evaluator-focused stance of a moral connoisseurship view, we can alternatively take a spectatorial perspective of “the whole world”: one who looks to the masters with regard to taste, sound, and beauty. Again, this taste analogy aims to demonstrate that an excellent chef, an outstanding musician, a handsome person, and the sages convince us that our mouths, ears, eyes, and hearts have the same natural preferences for flavors, sounds, beauty, and morality. Seeing this analogical structure from the viewpoint of “the whole world,” we can raise a different question: how could ordinary people approve of the masters’ excellences? As long as masters were not selfproclaimed experts, their excellences could be recognized through people’s perception and evaluation of what masters offered—cuisine, music, a beautiful face, and the sages’ virtues. In brief, people’s unanimous approval of masters’ offerings demonstrates our shared natural capacities for their apt evaluation.

3 Two Aspects of Connoisseurship in General Before analyzing the structure of Mengzi’s taste analogy from a spectatorial perspective, let us consider the significance of this spectatorial approach in general. In this section, I suggest that a connoisseurship model exhibits two general aspects, respectively observed from agential and spectatorial perspectives, and each aspect has different merits. A connoisseurship model is often exemplified by wine experts. Their refined taste and scrupulous reflective thinking enable them to discern the wine’s elements in detail and to make an immediate and accurate judgment about its quality; this is often done without deliberating how these elements are fused into that particular wine. Extending such a distinction to moral connoisseurship, Hutton calls the former “elemental connoisseurship,” in which a moral connoisseur “discerns only the elemental reasons for actions” (Hutton 2002: 167). The latter is labeled “conclusive connoisseurship,” in which a moral connoisseur perceives “not only the reasons for action, but also the overall conclusion to be drawn from them” (Hutton 2002: 167). Mengzi’s sages, according to Hutton, are akin to conclusive moral connoisseurs because they make decisive moral judgments based on their hearts and gained knowledge. In this approach, the sages are regarded as active judges, like sommeliers, who deliver their qualified judgments. When it comes to motivating people to do good actions or to begin self-cultivation, however, both elemental and conclusive connoisseurship models do not necessarily take

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effect. Connoisseurs’ qualified capacities and excellent judgments do not always stimulate our desire to act based upon their advice, though we might believe that our compliance with their judgments would be beneficial to us. An expert’s aesthetic judgment on a wine does not always make those who are less interested in wine tasting desire to develop their connoisseurship. In order to encourage beginners’ taste cultivation more effectively, a wine expert would consider their level of tasting to figure out how to make them sympathize with his or her taste perception of a wine. When beginners fully experience the excellent taste of a wine that the expert praises, they become more eager to reexamine actively the delicacy of their taste judgments rather than accommodate passively the expert’s judgments. Conceived within a dyadic relationship between connoisseurs and aesthetic objects, both elemental and conclusive connoisseurship models overlook the existence of ordinary spectators. This evaluator-focused connoisseurship model is suited to making evaluative judgments about aesthetic and moral issues, but not to the pedagogical goal of motivating people’s active participation for their self-cultivation. By contrast, when we view a connoisseurship model from a spectator’s perspective, its two additional aspects are revealed: exemplarist and sensibilitist.6 When we meet experts, we may recognize not only the greatness of their achievements but also the natural capacities that we share with them. Our admiration of masters attests to the ability to discern their well-cultivated exemplary capacities, and our ability to approve a connoisseur’s favored wine demonstrates our sensibility to detect its essential elements, the blend of which eventually determines its aesthetic value. For example, some wine-tasting novices may notice a wine’s delicate taste instantly, but they would savor it more distinctively after an expert has described it in more sensuous detail. Their instinctive grasp of a wine’s delicate taste first convinces them that they share a natural taste sensibility with the expert. Once the novices begin their wine tasting practice, however, they will soon realize the amount of effort required to achieve such consistent connoisseurship in wine tasting. Thus, they would be motivated, partly from their feelings of admiration for the expert’s achievements, to model themselves on exemplary sommeliers. To enliven this motivational role of excellent masters, a connoisseurship model should incorporate its sensibilitist and exemplarist aspects seen from ordinary people’s viewpoints. 6

These exemplarist and sensibilitist aspects indicate two underlying conditions of a connoisseurship model. Both aspects are viewed as two versions of its naturalist assumption: our natural abilities to perceive the approximate values of both evaluating subjects (exemplarist) and evaluated objects (sensibilitist). By exemplarist connoisseurship, I mean spectators’ natural capacities to discern exemplars’ excellences. The term “exemplarist” is taken from Zagzebski’s exemplarist virtue theory, in which the moral notions of the good, the right act, and virtue are “defined by reference to exemplars, which are identified directly through the emotion of admiration” (Zagzebski 2010: 41, note that her explication also depends on spectators’ emotion). As Olberding properly attempts to explain, an exemplarist approach would crystalize the notion of Confucian virtue: “While acknowledging that Confucius never forwards a full account of ren, we must also recognize that the Analects does indeed clearly and unambiguously point to ren. Ren is Confucius himself. It is just that” (Olberding 2008: 636). However, this agent-focused exemplarist account of Confucian virtue is not thoroughly applicable to Mengzi’s spectator-centered account for virtue cultivation. Mengzi would admire the agentfocused exemplarist virtue of ren, but his teaching would depart from spectators’ sensibilities and sentiments to encourage their own moral self-cultivation. The term “sensibilitist” stems from the “sensibility theory” in contemporary metaethical discussion that David Wiggins and John McDowell have endorsed. For instance, Wiggins reinterprets Hume’s moral sentiments and says, “x is good/right/beautiful if and only if x is such as to make a certain sentiment of approbation appropriate” (Wiggins 1998: 187; original emphasis). This sensibility theory admits both the subjective and objective foundations of moral values. Moral qualities exist in the objects, but are not independent of subjective sensibilities. I agree with Liu’s approach to Mengzi from a standpoint of sensibility theory (see Liu 2002).

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Given their natural abilities to evaluate what they perceived properly, people’s acquaintance with masters and their valuable items would drive them to cultivate their own abilities by the aroused desires to emulate the masters, to sharpen indistinct judgments, and to extend the feelings of elevation. Moreover, once novices recognize masters’ worth for their own selfimprovement, they consider connoisseurs’ elemental and conclusive judgments as more credible. This sketch indicates that connoisseurs’ persuasive force by and large depends upon our sensibilities to recognize what is valuable, including masters’ excellences. Otherwise, skeptics would prevail, with a claim that one ought not to argue about taste.7 Our natural sensibilities can declare the skeptics’ conclusion erroneous, as it is inferred from the mere appearance of people’s variant tastes without considering the sameness of human nature. People’s common failure to appreciate an object’s proper value does not necessarily mean that they have no shared natural ability to discern its due value. In such a case, their natural sensibilities could be hampered by the influences of one’s habitually acquired traits—perhaps “overgrown with brush and weeds” in one’s heart (Mengzi 7B21)—and situational factors which would “sink and drown” one’s heart. However, people can tell which dish is delicious in general, even though many have peculiar personal preferences habitually formed from their background experiences.8 Similarly, people have the inherent sensibilities to discern what is good and who is excellent, though their diverse cultural experiences and different environments may hinder them from responding appropriately. One of the best-known ways to weed out such acquired obstacles is to follow an exemplary person’s advice along with one’s reflective deliberation. In sum, seen from ordinary people’s perspective, a connoisseurship model reveals its ultimate foundation of their natural sensibilities for moral and aesthetic evaluation, and their sentimental responses to the excellent connoisseurs would prompt people to begin their self-cultivation. Throughout his dialogues, Mengzi places the priority on persuading people into selfcultivation over making accurate moral judgments. In this regard, his primary concern would be how to stimulate people to cultivate their virtue more effectively. This suggests that his appeal to the sages also serves this goal of teaching virtue cultivation, and that he would take ordinary people’s perspective to increase his teaching’s persuasive force. However, acknowledging the apparent variety of individual preferences, Mengzi would design this taste analogy to draw a general agreement regarding our universal possession of natural moral sensibilities.

4 Moral Artisanship: The Sages as Moral Performers Previously, we raised a question about how masters discovered people’s same perceptual preferences, and presumed that their unanimous responses to masters’ offerings 7 With an aesthetic connoisseurship model in his essay “Of the Standard of Taste,” David Hume attempts to answer this skeptical view on aesthetic taste, which endorses the ancient proverb, “There is no disputing about taste (De gustibus non disputandum est)” (Hume 1987). For an introduction of Hume’s aesthetic standard, see note 17. 8 One’s liking of the mediocre over the good does not disprove our natural propensity to discern the good by perception. Those who relish junk food may not instantly savor top-notch cuisine (but they can learn how to gain pleasure from it). This horizontal comparison of two extreme taste preferences is provocative in common sense, but it does not impair our understanding of universal taste preferences. Rather, this naturalist view is supported by a vertical comparison of our diverse taste preferences. A person’s special liking of the taste of a cheap fast-food burger does not rebut the general preference for a well-prepared burger with better ingredients. If that person adheres to such a vulgar taste, its primary cause is rather assigned to his or her environmental and habitual influences.

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demonstrate such natural preferences. In this section, considering masters as artisans who produce refined items rather than connoisseurs, I elucidate the conceptual link between their excellences and the proof of our same preferences. Our investigation on Mengzi’s descriptions about master chef Yi Ya will elaborate this analogy’s triadic relationship between masters, their offerings, and spectators. As a result, this spectatorial reading leads us to regard the sages as moral artisans who cultivate their virtue unblemished. Two interesting remarks about Yi Ya attract our attention in the second section of Mengzi 6A7. The master chef is “the first to discover what our mouths prefer” and regarding flavor “the whole world looks to (qi 期) Yi Ya.” In these remarks, we notice two different perspectives: Yi Ya and “the whole world.” We do not yet know how Yi Ya discovered the same taste preferences and what the whole world expects (qi 期) from the chef. Taking Yi Ya as an evaluative connoisseur, we may suppose that it was through his accurate aesthetic judgment that he discovered people’s common taste preferences. Also, people’s recognition of his connoisseurship would have induced them to follow Yi Ya’s advice regarding flavor. However, this connoisseurship model, taking masters as aesthetic judges, leaves some logical chains unexplained: how Yi Ya’s taste judgment could be justified as a general statement, or how people could recognize his excellence in taste, or what they expected from him. To deal with these questions, we can take an alternative perspective of “the whole world” and examine people’s experiences with regard to masters. Taking a spectatorial perspective structurally presupposes that people as spectators perceive something being offered by masters. Upon these objects—which masters produced, and people perceived—is then placed the central point of this analogical inference. Yi Ya’s culinary creations must have been so delicious that “the whole world” was eager to savor them.9 Given people’s unanimous approval of his dishes, it is reasonable to assume that they have the same taste preferences in general. It is Yi Ya’s culinary creations, which all would find delicious and pleasurable to eat, that made him renowned as “the first to discover what our mouths prefer.” Likewise, Shi Kuang’s ZHU Xi 朱熹 comments on Mengzi 6A7: “Everyone in the whole world finds the taste of what Yi Ya cooked to be beautiful” (my translation). Hutton aptly points out the analogical position of Yi Ya’s creation, too: “Mengzi starts from the empirical premise that all people find one set of flavors most pleasing, namely those created by Yi Ya. … Mengzi thinks that this similarity among people, namely that they would all like Yi Ya’s cooking … can only be explained as the result of human nature” (Hutton 2002: 170). However, Hutton fails to assess this analogy’s implication appropriately, perhaps because of an unwitting tendency to impose a heavy burden of justification on Mengzi’s premises. Hutton evaluates Mengzi’s view as “not a very good assumption to make because it could equally be that observed similarities between the things of the same kind are not due to their nature, but rather to the environment alone” (Hutton 2002: 171–172; more about this tendency, see note 22). Environmental influences are enormous to agents, yet this does not mean that a moral theory—which does not aim at a scientific demonstration—should seriously consider such exceptional cases, in which the causes of our sentiments are entirely derived from external and habitual sources. Above all, Hutton’s criticism ignores the significance of the preceding vegetative analogy, which emphasizes the sameness of our physical nature. As a support to his negative assessment of Mengzi’s assumption about our natural preferences, Hutton suggests a counterexample: “Even if everyone happens to drive on the right side, it would not entitle us to conclude that a preference for the right side is innate” (Hutton 2002: 171). However, this general tendency of driving on the right side—entirely derived by habits and norms, and connected not to human nature but only to social customs—is already ruled out by the precondition of the sameness of our physical nature. Mengzi would begin his teaching with the vegetative analogy to strengthen the validity of the forthcoming taste analogy for our same perceptual preferences. Given that our perceptions through eyes, ears, and mouths are made at the junction of body and mind, the same responses through the same bodily organs, including our hearts, prove the sameness of our psychological minds. 9

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music and Zidu’s good looks must have caused people to feel uniformly pleasing sentiments, from which they could acknowledge the same natural preferences of their ears and eyes. A formal explanation will assist us in clarifying this analogical structure. In this analogy, the item X that master M presented caused the uniform pleasing sentiment S of people Ps through their sense perception. No doubt, S is the mental effect of a person P’s perceiving X. This means that two causes are responsible for S: X’s features and P’s senses and mind. As this chapter of Mengzi 6A7 implies, all X’s qualities were outstanding due to M’s excellences, and all P’s responses were fixed as agreeable S. With the fixed cause of outstanding X in this double causal relation, the same effect S then proves that the remaining cause of Ps’ senses and minds is also invariant in general. Of course, the particular traits of P’s mind might be individually varied from the environmental and habitual influences toward P. Yet, this does not necessarily mean that there is no similarity in Ps’ minds by nature. P’s perception of M’s excellent X can penetrate the cluster of varied acquired traits in P’s mind—perhaps the main causes for P’s immoral responses—to reach the natural constitution of P’s mind, shared with others, and yield the same S. In short, the same effect of Ps’ unanimous S toward M’s X demonstrates the universal presence of such natural constitution in Ps’ senses and minds. As M’s excellence enabled outstanding X, we can also say that the natural sameness of Ps’ minds is proven by M. Hence, through X that arouses Ps’ uniform S, M becomes the first to discover what Ps’ senses and minds unanimously prefer. On the surface of this analogy, we see a triadic relationship between M, X, and P: P’s perceptions of X provided by M arouse P’s uniform S. In this picture, the structural pivot is placed on X. Masters, connected with spectators as providers of X, appear more like producing artisans than evaluating judges. This spectatorial understanding rearranges the primary role of the sages who “first discovered what our hearts prefer in common.” Just as Yi Ya was the first to provide something pleasurable to people’s palates, the sages were the first to achieve something delightful for people’s hearts.10 Both Yi Ya’s and the sages’ outstanding offerings would arouse people’s similar positive responses, and this also means that people have the natural sensibilities to appraise them in unison. The evaluative force is assigned to people’s sentimental responses, since their sense perceptions from savoring, hearing, and seeing are more straightforwardly linked with feelings and emotions than understanding and knowledge. In other words, Mengzi’s taste analogy directs us to the exemplarist and sensibilitist aspects of a connoisseurship model rather than its elemental and conclusive aspects. Just as people’s equal passions for his cuisine accredit to Yi Ya the discovery of our uniform taste, their same feelings upon perceiving the sages’ virtue reveal the heart’s universal moral preferences. Thus, from the same effect of people’s uniform approval, we can generally infer the same natural preferences of mouths and hearts.11 10

The meaning of de 得 is not confined to epistemic discovery as in Van Norden’s translation, since it can also mean to achieve something. 11 Hutton claims that Mengzi takes two distinctive steps to conclude that “the heart has an innate preference for morality as part of human nature” (Hutton 2002: 170). The first is to argue that “the heart has innate preferences” and the second is that “these preferences are indicated by the preferences of the sages” (Hutton 2002: 170). The first step is fine, but the second is obscure. Hutton seems to assume that the sages’ preferences are indicated through their rational judgments, but their characters, actions, and other traits can reveal them, too. Above all, his interpretation cannot show how the sages’ preferences can acquire consensus to form a general statement about natural taste preferences.

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This prerequisite of the sages’ offerings gives an answer to our main question: how Mengzi pinpointed the heart’s preferred objects to be “order and righteousness.” Upon perceiving the sages’ offerings through our senses, imagination, reflective thinking, reasoning, and so forth, we would unanimously feel the sentiment of admiration. Its intentional object would be considered as the sages’ supreme virtue that embodied “order and righteousness.”12 Mengzi would have inferred that our hearts naturally prefer “order and righteousness,” based on our unanimous approval of the sages’ manifestation of them through actions, characters, judgments, verdicts, narratives of life, and so on.13 In addition, this spectator-based approach fills out the unexplained links in an agentbased connoisseurship reading. The connoisseur-sages’ judgments might lead people to a conviction about their innate preferences, but hardly propose their general foundation in an empirical sense. Even the sages’ moral authority is unable to generalize their excellent judgments, but people’s overall experiences can form a general statement regarding taste and morality.14 For Mengzi’s articulation of the universal moral potentialities in human nature, both the sages and ordinary people are indispensable. The sages first present excellent virtues that prove the perfection of human moral potentialities, and people’s unanimous admiration of the sages provides the source for generalization of our possession of natural moral potentialities.15 In fact, this triadic structure is hardly in harmony with a moral connoisseurship model, which aims at making proper evaluative judgments within a dyadic relationship It is difficult to explicate the exact meanings of “order and righteousness,” though we can reveal their position in the structure of Mengzi’s taste analogy. CHENG Yi 程頤 sees li 理 and yi 義 as two manifestations of the same entity: “In a thing, it is the ‘Pattern.’ In dealing with things, it is ‘righteousness’” (Van Norden 2008: 151). 13 Though this spectatorial reading focuses on our exemplarist sensibility to admire the sages, our desire to know would make us wonder what the detailed state of the achieved sages looks like. I believe that Ni’s concept of “cultivated spontaneity,” an ideal of Confucian freedom, well explicates the sages’ inner state: “A state of having dispositions to do what the moral norms require effortlessly” (Ni 2002: 123). This state includes “developed benevolent tendencies … and ritual habits guided by the rich knowledge and wisdom of how to apply them” (Ni 2002: 123). I believe that Mengzi’s idea would be that the sages’ “cultivated spontaneity” stems from the natural moral potentialities that all members of human kind share. (I am grateful to one of the referees for suggesting this point.) 14 This spectatorial reading clearly answers the other questions I raised earlier—how people recognized Yi Ya’s excellence in taste, or what they expected from him. From Yi Ya, people expected his outstanding dishes, and his excellence was recognized through people’s savoring them. 15 There is an inevitable question in this sentiment-based approach to morality, in which moral sentiments are regarded as the general effects of our natural moral potentialities. What are such moral potentialities? Can we know what they are, or justify our assertion about them? Mengzi’s four sprouts are not an exception from this structure. We may have to admit that these questions are very difficult to answer. However, especially when the theoretical goal is practical, we can proceed to construct a moral theory safely upon an assumption of this necessary connection between human nature and moral sentiment. Hume’s sentiment-based theory of moral evaluation gives a remarkable example. His method for determining virtue and vice is simple: “When you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean … that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it” (Hume 1978: 469). Hume assigns the cause for moral sentiment to the constitution of our nature, which is almost inexplicable. However, he does not bother with its inexplicability because he believes that a Newtonian scientific theory of moral evaluation is built only from his concentration on the mental effects of moral sentiments. In like manner, Mengzi could form a practical theory of moral cultivation without explicating what the moral potentialities are in human nature. I believe that Mengzi’s first concern is not clarifying them but cultivating one’s virtue with one’s recognition of such moral potentialities. (Explicating such natural potentialities are no longer avoided. I believe that contemporary ethics try to reveal what they are and how they function by enhanced empirical scientific approach and meta-ethical analysis; I am indebted to one referee’s comment for this point.) Elsewhere, I discuss how to compare the moral theories of Mengzi and Hume in more detail (see Choi 2019a.) 12

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between the evaluating subjects and the evaluated objects.16 Rather, it is reminiscent of the taste connoisseurship model pursued by British empiricists. For example, against the de gustibus skeptics on taste and sentiments, Hume seeks a standard of taste from the joint judgments of well-qualified taste connoisseurs.17 Of course, Mengzi’s sages must be competent connoisseurs. In contrast to Hume’s true judges, however, they would not always intend to give their verdicts about what is morally proper for individuals to desire and act upon. Instead, the sages would be primarily concerned with performing virtuous deeds and leading people into moral self-cultivation. For Yi Ya, maintaining the superb flavor of his culinary creations would take priority over 16

From Hume’s account of taste, Railton suggests a relational and naturalist account of aesthetic value, which is determined in a “match,” the relation of conformity, between the object and the subjective mind. Also, Hume’s empirical observation of the occurrences of this match in taste can mean that “there is sufficient underlying similarity among humans to permit the existence of … the infrastructure for a suitable field of value” (Railton 2003: 94; original emphasis). Mengzi’s teaching begins with this belief that the uniform infrastructure for morality is by nature engraved in the human heart. 17 In his essay “Of the Standard of Taste,” David Hume (1711–1776) seeks “the true standard of taste and beauty” in the “joint verdict” of aesthetic connoisseurs, in his term “a true judge” (Hume 1987: 226–241). In the domain of taste, our common sense seems to champion the de gustibus skeptic’s view claiming that it is “fruitless to dispute concerning taste” (Hume 1987: 230). To argue against such excessive skeptics, Hume refers to another countervailing common sense: “Whoever would assert an equality of genius and elegance between OGILBY and MILTON, or BUNYAN and ADDISON, would be thought to defend no less an extravagance, than if he had maintained a mole-hill to be as high as TENERIFFE, or a pond as extensive as the ocean” (Hume 1987: 230–231). Most readers praise the elegance of Milton’s poems from their common sentiment of approval, just as the whole world preferred Yi Ya’s superb culinary creations. Passing the test of time like Homer’s poems, masterpieces that cause our uniform approbation disprove this skeptic’s ground that there is no natural similarity in our taste, and demonstrate our sharing “the original structure of the internal fabric” by nature (Hume 1987: 233). Conversely, people’s general approval of masterpieces informs us of the existence of a general standard of taste. We can argue for this point: it is empirically justified that a masterpiece X yields a uniform S in general. When particular P’s taste fails to bring up the same S, then P’s taste can be determined as “absurd and ridiculous” (Hume 1987: 231). Hence, we can say that there is a standard of taste. A remaining question is how to flesh out such a standard that is practically applicable. Hume seeks it from the judgments of aesthetic connoisseurs with valuable characters of “Strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice” (Hume 1987: 241). Hume also recognizes “the general rules of art” (Hume 1987: 232) as a good standard, but chooses the judges’ verdict as the conclusive standard of taste, since in his sentiment-based taste theory the first criterion of aesthetic evaluation is a person’s sentiment (for further discussion about Hume’s double standard of taste, see Wieand 1984; Shelley 1994; Costelloe 2007). Like Hume, British empirical moral theorists cannot but involve the judgments of well-qualified connoisseurs for the evaluative standard. Given that pleasure is the cornerstone of their moral theory, the standard should be connected with one’s lively pleasing sentiments. J. S. Mill (1806–1873) also calls for competent judges to answer a question of “which is the best worth having of two [higher and lower] pleasures” (Mill 2001: 11). Of course, their verdict must be that it is better to pursue higher pleasures derived from our intellectual improvement and “to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied” (Mill 2001: 10). We should note that the role of judges for a moral standard has been gradually changed by the development of the empirical scientific mind. Since Jeremy Bentham’s (1748–1832) quantitative calculation of individual pleasures, judges’ general knowledge on empirically calculated social utility becomes much more important than their feeling pleasing sentiments from perceiving the objects in question. From a utilitarian point of view, the values of higher and lower pleasures are already determined through a social consensus by the scientific minds so that an agent should concede the advantage of pursuing higher pleasure. In contrast, Hume’s and Mengzi’s naturalist point is placed on the fact that humans have the natural propensities to feel both higher and lower pleasures, and that the masters’ creations function as an indirect proof of our shared natural propensities for higher values. The sages as moral connoisseurs would do the same work of evaluation as Hume’s true judges, but as teachers of virtue cultivation, they must consider the methods for moral motivation beyond making moral judgments. (I am grateful to one referee’s suggestion to consider Mill’s view for deeper understanding of Mengzi’s taste analogy.)

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making aesthetic judgments through his excellent taste. Similarly, for Mengzi’s sages, active accomplishments of virtue through their moral actions would take precedence over their passive moral evaluations. Given this central point of promoting moral achievements, the sages gain an identity of moral artisans.18

5 The Merits of Moral Artisanship View There are some merits to this spectator-based moral artisanship view. It proposes a textually coherent and contextually consistent reading of Mengzi 6A7. Furthermore, it structurally reaffirms the role of sentiment for Mengzi’s demonstration of universal moral potentialities in human nature and theoretically suggests the actualization of internal righteousness. First, the structural pivot of masters’ offerings resolves some lingering questions about their identities. For a connoisseurship view, Hutton depicts Yi Ya and Shi Kuang as “two sagely connoisseurs” who “show exactly what our mouth and ears innately desire” (Hutton 2002: 171), but has to append two points: “Yi Ya is portrayed as quite un-virtuous” and “it is less clear that Zidu was ever really considered a sage” (Hutton 2002: 183). Indeed, these figures are far from virtuous people. History says that Yi Ya steamed his own child to curry his lord’s favor, and handsome Zidu shot an arrow that killed a person.19 In defense of Mengzi, who would have had “no awareness of these stories,” Hutton suggests that “he intends us to regard Yi Ya as a sage who developed his nature to the highest degree and whose preferences therefore indicate our natural preferences” (Hutton 2002: 183). From a spectatorial artisanship view, however, this defense is unnecessary. Our same taste preferences are justified by our uniform approval of Yi Ya’s excellent cuisine, of which flavor would be less relevant to his individual virtue. Also, handsome Zidu needs neither sage-like traits nor Li Lou’s “clear vision” that a connoisseurship model evidently demands (Mengzi 4A1). Zidu’s beauty is sufficient to validate Mengzi’s analogical inference. This spectatorbased reading agrees with Hutton’s suggestion that Zidu’s case is just to “note that there is something which everyone regards as beautiful,” but gives priority to this point rather than masters’ sagely connoisseurship (Hutton 2002: 183). Second, this spectator-based reading forms a good alliance with other taste analogies in Book 6. In Mengzi 6A4, Mengzi attempts to justify the internality of righteousness by comparing it with our uniform savoring of a roast.20 This analogical refutation of 18

This moral artisanship view can be substantiated by another story regarding the music master Shi Kuang, who was the first to discover what our ears naturally prefer. Even with his excellent auditory capacity, the master Shi could not “set the five notes” unless hearing was “used with the six pitch-pipes” (Mengzi 4A1). If he were satisfied with the status of a magnificent connoisseur of sound, Shi would not feel the necessity to refer to an external objective standard such as the six pitch-pipes. Although masters such as Li Lou 離婁 of clear vision, Gongshuzi 公輸子 of skillfulness, and Shi Kuang of delicate hearing might have accomplished perfect products with their excellent perceptual capacities, they did not entirely rely on their superior perceptual capacities but sought standard instruments to enhance the qualities of their creations. The masters’ use of standard instruments indicates that they were more concerned with creating perfect products than with making aesthetic evaluations, for which their excellent perceptual capacities would have been sufficient. 19 According to the Guanzi 管子, Yi Ya served his child to the Lord of Huan 桓 of Qi 齊 in order to satisfy the lord’s unfulfilled desire to taste a steamed infant (see Rickett 2001: 430–431). Zidu was not accused of murder thanks to an authoritative person’s defending him, perhaps because of his handsomeness (see Yang 1960: 263). 20 Mengzi seems confident about the force of his taste analogy, as he closes the debate with a simple reply: “Savoring the roast of a person from Qin [秦] is no different from savoring my roast…. Is savoring a roast, then, also external?” (Mengzi 6A4)

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Gaozi’s 告子 view is similar to Gongduzi’s 公都子 rebuttal of external righteousness in Mengzi 6A5. He does not even mention complicated taste but merely refers to bodily likeness, which rather leans toward the vegetative analogy in Mengzi 6A7.21 These analogies obviously underscore the uniformity of human nature rather than developed connoisseurship. Moreover, in Mengzi 6A10, Mengzi aligns the precedence of righteousness over life with his immediate choice of a more valuable object in matters of taste. Though both fish and bear’s paw are equivalently savory to his taste, Mengzi would definitely choose more valuable bear’s paw. In this case, the point is not that connoisseurship is necessary to discern the more savory, but that our mouths have the natural sensibility to make a spontaneous evaluative distinction. In short, Mengzi’s taste analogies consistently emphasize the heart’s innate preferences through taste’s natural preferences without referring to connoisseurship, and Mengzi 6A7 is not an exception. Third, this spectator-based reading elaborates on the coherent structure of Mengzi’s sentiment-based moral project. Mengzi’s taste analogies attempt to show that all human hearts have the same moral preferences by nature. We do not need to treat this assertion as a strict universal statement because our general agreement with its plausibility is sufficient for Mengzi’s practical goal of moral cultivation.22 We should note, however, that the possibility of people’s feeling of pleasing sentiments toward both the sages’ achievements and Yi Ya’s cuisine is structurally parallel to our general consent to the arousal of compassionate feeling upon seeing a baby in danger. While Mengzi seeks to indicate that all humans have moral predispositions to be good to others in Mengzi 2A6, he aims to demonstrate that all humans have natural predispositions for moral distinction in Mengzi 6A7.23 In other words, our unanimous sentiment of Gongduzi also ends his debate with a simple rhetorical question: “On a winter day, one drinks hot broth…. So are drinking and eating external too?” (Mengzi 6A5). It is almost impossible to draw a connoisseurship model from this passage. 22 In his examination of Mengzi’s assertion about human nature—“All humans have a non-callous heart towards humans” (Mengzi 2A6; in King 2011: 278)—King treats it as a universal statement that lacks a sufficient justification. Given Mengzi’s goal of practical moral cultivation, King’s treatment seems too stringent. A few quotations from Hume can advocate Mengzi to avoid such criticism that “he is operating without a concept of proof” (King 2011: 291). In the matter of justification, King differentiates Hume from Mengzi because Hume separates “the rational force of empirical science” from our natural moral force (King 2011: 278). However, Hume’s approach to our natural moral force is not much different from Mengzi’s. In fact, Hume does not feel the need to justify a universal statement about the arousal of moral sentiments. For its proof, we can just appeal to an inexplicable natural cause of the mind for such uniform moral sentiment, for instance, “the original fabric and formation of the human mind” (Hume 1975: 172), which would have a similar function with “order and righteousness” in Mengzi 6A7. As I have mentioned in note 15, Hume believes that generally agreed-upon statements regarding the effects of moral sentiment suffice to construct a practical theory of moral evaluation: “It is needless to push our researches so far as to ask, why we have humanity or a fellow-feeling with others. It is sufficient, that this is experienced to be a principle in human nature” (Hume 1975: 219). Hume also has no problem in assuming that even an extremely selfish person “must unavoidably feel some propensity to the good of mankind…” (Hume 1975: 226). What is commonly controversial is “the degrees of these sentiments,” yet “the reality of their existence … must be admitted in every theory or system” (Hume 1975: 226). King’s two points—that Mengzi’s assertion is unjustifiable but practical—are correct. These points, however, are the unique features not of Mengzi’s moral theory, but of “those who would resolve all moral determinations into sentiment” (Hume 1975: 171). 23 In this taste analogy, Mengzi would firmly believe that “it is by virtue of certain predispositions of the heart/ mind we can tell that certain forms of behavior are proper” (Shun 1997: 109). If these predispositions are inferable from Mengzi 6A7, it is safe to say that our uniform sentiment through our moral taste has the same role as our universal compassion to a baby in danger in Mengzi 2A6. 21

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admiration toward the sages has an identical function with our uniform compassion at seeing a baby in danger to prove our natural moral predispositions. Just as the latter paves the way for Mengzi’s practical methods for developing benevolence, the former substantiates his teaching for cultivating internal righteousness.24 Fourth, the structural pivot of the sages’ offerings suggests for us the actualization of Mengzi’s internal righteousness. Given that our moral preferences for righteousness were discovered through the sages’ offerings, they would involve a prominent actualization of righteousness. Unlike other-regarding virtue of benevolence—which others can presume upon seeing one express feelings and perform actions—this virtue of righteousness is difficult to notice, especially when it is considered “internal” (nei 內) to the subjective heart (Mengzi 6A4). A skeptical view could emerge about the actuality of unnoticeable internal righteousness and quickly find the source of righteousness outside the human heart. This move would correspond to Gaozi’s account of external righteousness, against which Mengzi argued in the earlier chapters in Book 6. This taste analogy contains critical evidence for his refutation of Gaozi, as it suggests that the sages’ achievements externally manifest the actualized internal righteousness, confirmed by people’s uniform sentiments of admiration.

6 The Meaning of the Categorical Sameness of Human Nature In the previous sections, we examined how Mengzi pinpointed our hearts’ common preferences for “order and righteousness” through the sages’ achievements. Considering both vegetative and taste analogies, however, it is reasonable to think that in this chapter Mengzi ultimately emphasizes the categorical sameness of human nature: “we and the sage are of the same kind” both in the physical body and the psychological heart. This central message raises another question about its theoretical role for his teaching of moral self-cultivation: what was Mengzi’s aim in underlining our natural sameness with the sages? In this section, I argue that this message is intended to assist in our performing moral actions persistently. Considering Mengzi’s teaching for virtue cultivation, more adjacent to promoting virtuous deeds, we gain another lesson from this taste analogy established on a triadic relationship between creators, their creations, and spectators. For moral self-cultivation, we need to switch our stance from passive spectators to active performers. Those who desire to be a good chef should not simply admire Yi Ya’s dishes but apply themselves to becoming an industrious cook. Likewise, moral agents who desire to lead a good life should not stay merely as spectators of the sages but become moral performers who produce their own moral items.25 Given the necessity of performing moral actions, the remaining problem is how to transform people from spectators to performers, especially without relying on the motives from the interests either 24

Elsewhere, I argue that Mengzi’s dialogue in Mengzi 2A2 shows the method for cultivating righteousness (see Choi 2019b). 25 This analogical structure can imply that we should provide others with our moral items that satisfy their natural moral preferences. For instance, a king must govern benevolently, but if his subjects’ responses are not genuinely pleasant, it evinces that his governing is not benevolent (I believe that Mengzi 1A3 partly tells this point).

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for oneself or for caring others.26 What does Mengzi consider as the motivational source for people’s conversion? This chapter of Mengzi 6A7 seems to imply that the sages empower people to change themselves into moral performers. More precisely, this spectatorial view suggests that people’s sentiment of admiration after perceiving the sages’ virtue accounts for the initial motivational force. This sentiment can influence the will to emulate what people perceived from the sages, virtues and actions.27 However, it may not last long enough to stimulate people’s desires fully, though they may be able to extend its duration by recollecting and imagining its intentional objects. As we have discussed, external influences prevent people from maintaining the initial sentiment securely, and in order to avoid such hindrances they should proceed to activate their hearts’ function of reflection. However, it is also questionable what prompts people to engage in this indispensable step of reflection.28 People’s perplexed perceptions, caused by their sunken and drowned hearts, would offset the intensity of their moral sentiments so that they might be unable to find any strong reason for activating their sincere reflection. They might remain puzzled and heartless. In this situation, Mengzi’s message of the categorical sameness can serve as a kickstart to stimulate reflective thinking by providing a belief about their same moral potentialities with the sages. Even when the external influences render people’s initial sentiment too faint to motivate moral actions, their knowledge about the categorical sameness would encourage them to infer a conviction that they can do what the sages did as well.29 This belief, when combined with recollected moral sentiments toward the sages, would direct people more vigorously to emulate the sages and perform virtuous actions.30

As is well-known, Yangists find the motivational force from self-interest for “being ‘for oneself’ (weiwo 為 and Mohists seeks the source of motivation from the interests of others for “impartial caring (jian’ai 兼 愛)” (Mengzi 7A26). 27 We can find an example of this sentiment-based motivation from Hume, who famously argues: “Reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will,” and reason “can never oppose passion in the direction of the will” (Hume 1978: 413). 28 I am indebted to one of the referees for this question of the motivational source for self-transformation. 29 This belief of the categorical sameness also functions as the motivational source in the process of gentlemen’s self-cultivation. Gentlemen’s lifelong concern is that their cultivation would not be sufficient to make them virtuous like the sages despite their being of the same human kind. Gentlemen’s hearts of shame would initially stimulate them to accelerate cultivation, and the practical solution is simply to emulate what Shun 舜 did: “How does he deal with this concern? By trying to be like Shun” (Mengzi 4B28). 30 Hutton’s moral connoisseurship view reconstructs Mengzi’s analogical argument as follows: “Given that the sages’ preferences are the fullest expression of their nature, and that everyone shares this same nature, then the moral standards of the sages can be regarded as what the hearts of everyone innately prefer” (Hutton 2002: 172). Hutton believes that his reconstruction leads to a normative conclusion; “we should follow their moral standards, because we will ultimately find them most satisfying” (Hutton 2002: 171). This view looks like a utilitarian conclusion since one’s reason to follow the sages’ standards is one’s maximized satisfaction. This utilitarian view is plausible, but less related to Mengzi’s message in this chapter of Mengzi 6A7 than the sentiment-based reading, which argues that one’s motivation to follow the sages is derived from one’s eagerness to achieve what they manifest. (I am not claiming that their desires from feeling sentiments form the sole source of motivating actions. Moral knowledge, social rules of conduct, and rituals can also drive people to act morally. However, I believe that the initial and primary motivational source for Mengzi is moral sentiment, as exemplified by the four sprouts.) 26

我),”

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Mengzi’s message also informs us that the sages’ achieved excellences are originated from the same moral potentialities as ordinary people’s.31 As Yi Ya would have concentrated on his natural taste preferences to check every relevant feature of his culinary creations, the sages would have contemplated all relevant conditions from their initial feelings to their actions’ estimated effects based on their inherent moral preferences. As Mengzi frequently stresses, we can do all of these.32 We can feel moral sentiment, examine its appropriateness, and act accordingly. We should note that virtue cultivation is accomplished through our performing proper moral actions, just as masters’ virtuosity is perfected through their unceasing promotion of excellent items. If we desire to achieve virtue, then we have to convert ourselves into active performers and thereby become moral apprentices to the sages. This spectatorial approach to Mengzi 6A7 reassigns the sages’ principal role to moral motivation rather than to moral evaluation. Their motivational role is critical in a sociopolitical sense, too. In Mengzi’s moral theory, governing people’s achievement of virtue is paramount because their genuine virtue fulfills the society’s actual well-being, as is derived from “benevolent governing (renzheng 仁政)” (Mengzi 4A1). Then, the sages as the central figures in Mengzi’s moral theory are primarily to help people commence their virtue cultivation.33 Given that virtues are grown through extending the sentimental heart and sentiments can motivate actions, arousing people’s moral sentiments is a more fundamental method to launch their selfcultivation than giving verbal instructions.34 After inspiring people’s transition to performers, the sages would instruct them regarding the right path for virtue achievement in terms of their judgment and knowledge. If people’s feelings of admiration drive them to emulate the sages at the outset, its arousal can be assured in proportion to the refined quality of its main intentional object, the sages’ supreme virtue. The more forceful the sages’ virtue, the more acutely it would penetrate through the overgrown “brush and weeds” in people’s hearts to hit upon their natural moral predispositions (Mengzi 7B21). This point partly accounts for the reason why the sages’ virtue exhibits different degrees and why gentlemen should continuously “examine

31

Our belief of the categorical sameness not only encourages our self-cultivation, but also emphasizes the greatness of the sages. They became prominent from others of the same kind. All humans have the moral potentialities but only a few can become exemplary people. In Mengzi 2A2, Mengzi applauds the greatness of Confucius by citing You Ruo’s 有若 comment: “The sage is also of the same kind as other people. But some stand out from their kind” (Mengzi 2A2). These two aspects may be evolved from a chapter of the Analects: “Human beings are similar in their natural tendencies (xing 性), but vary greatly by virtue of their habits” (Analects 17.2; Ames and Rosemont 1999: 203). 32 For example, see Mengzi 1A7, 7A15. 33 Helping people achieve virtue is involved in the sages’ jobs: “The Distinguished Sovereign [the sage Yao 堯] advised, ‘Work them [his subjects] … rectify them, help them, make them practice, assist them, make them get it themselves (shi zi de zhi 使自得之), and thus benefit them’” (Mengzi 3A4). 34 This sequence of the sages’ moral motivation is parallel to the method of extension in Mengzi 1A7. Mengzi renders King Xuan to recollect his moral sentiment by recounting the anecdote of sparing a sacrificial ox out of compassion and asks him to reflect upon what he felt and did at that time. I believe that what the king should do afterward is to perform similar benevolent actions toward his people while preserving his natural moral potentialities intact.

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themselves (zifan 自反)” (Mengzi 4B28).35 Thus, the sages are concerned with improving their virtue’s forcefulness by producing moral items—benevolent actions and thorough knowledge—as moral artisans to bring about people’s desire for moral self-cultivation.36

7 Conclusion This essay proposed a moral artisanship view that regards the sages’ primary role in Mengzi 6A7 as cultivating their moral items for motivating people. Taking a spectatorial perspective, Mengzi believes that the sages’ virtues and actions, related to “order and righteousness,” caused people to recognize the heart’s natural moral preferences through their sentimental responses. Just as people’s approval of Yi Ya’s cuisine proves the same pattern in taste to discern what is flavorful, their uniform admiration of the sages demonstrates that human hearts have the same pattern to discern what is of moral value. The first task of the sages and gentlemen is to enhance their excellences through their reflections and moral actions, just as master artisans endeavor to perfect their aesthetic items. The sages’ excellences would cause the consistent arousal of spectators’ moral sentiments, and thus lead them to embark on self-cultivation. In like manner, this taste analogy’s triadic relationship reveals Mengzi’s wish for our self-transition from passive spectators to active moral performers. From our admiration of the sages, we gain an initial motive to act virtuously, and it is preserved and fortified by our awareness of the categorical sameness of human nature. Also, our continuous reflection keeps the heart’s natural moral potentialities unblemished from external influences. As a final step, we should act after contemplating based on our natural moral preferences. We can do all this because we are of the same human kind as the sages with good natural potentialities. 35

In Mengzi 5B1, Confucius is metaphorically likened to an archer who has both the skill and the strength to hit the target. Other sages, who have no skill but only strength, would be considered as those whose virtue is strong enough to reach others’ hearts but not sophisticated enough to resonate with them. Moreover, gentlemen examine themselves when people are harsh on them, partly because they are concerned that their virtue is not powerful enough yet to penetrate the weeds in the hearts of those who are harsh on them. When gentlemen’s strong virtue and devotion still cannot change a person’s harshness, however, they would judge that person as “simply lost” and “an animal” (Mengzi 4B28). 36 To support the sages’ role for moral motivation, it is helpful to clarify the relation between knowledge and action for self-cultivation, which is “the central concern of the Confucian tradition” (Huang 2014: 105). According to Huang, the Cheng brothers emphasize the importance of knowledge over acting “according to proprieties established by sages” (Huang 2014: 108). The importance of knowledge, however, does not mean that the sage’s role, especially in Mengzi 6A7, is ultimately to deliver moral knowledge to people. What the sages can do for people is to motivate their moral actions. As the Cheng brothers claim, “sages can make people perform actions, but they are unable to make them have knowledge” (Huang 2014: 110). This view would correspond to Mengzi’s assertion, “a carpenter or a wheelwright can give another his compass and Tsquare, but he cannot make another skillful” (Mengzi 7B5). One’s genuine knowledge, like an artisan’s skillfulness, must be achieved through one’s constant moral practice to “get it by oneself (zide 自得)” (Mengzi 4B14; Huang 2014: 113). I believe that the sages, if they want to promote moral practice, should concentrate on motivating them, for which providing their refined moral items would be practically more effective. This spectator-based artisanship reading also believes that Mengzi focuses on action to initiate ordinary people’s self-cultivation in general, while the Cheng brothers would have emphasized knowledge to present to the qualified gentlemen the highest end of “knowledge of/as virtue,” which is “internal knowledge coming from inner experience” and cannot be “communicated by words” (Huang 2014:113). (I am grateful to one of the referees for this significant point.)

Dobin CHOI Acknowledgment This paper was presented at the 12th Midwest Conference on Chinese Thought at The University of Chicago, March 2016 and at the ISCWP panel at the Pacific APA meeting in San Francisco, April 2016. I am grateful to the audience of both conferences, and especially to Stephen C. Angle, BACK Youngsun, and XIAO Yang for their comments on the earlier version of this essay. I deeply appreciate the insightful and critical suggestions of anonymous referees. Moreover, I always thank my proud friend YOON Sunghoon for resolving my philological and historical questions in reading classical Chinese texts. Above all, I would like to dedicate this essay to my late professor YU Jiyuan who always inspired me with admiration. It is the greatest fortune in my life to have had the opportunity to apprentice myself to such a master.

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