21

OMNIPOTENCE AND EVIL: AN INCOHERENT PROBLEM. G. SCHLESINGER. * i shall a t t e m p t to reply to two points raised in Mr. La P a r a ' s thoughtful 'Suffering, Happines and Evil'. (1) Mr. La P a r a is prepared to grant me most of my major p r e m i s e s , which entail, to put it v e r y crudely, t h a t on the one hand God will not satisfy our demands on His Benevolence until He h a s turned ours into the best of all possible worlds, and, on the other hand, that the best of all possible worlds is a logical impossibility (as far as the maximum happiness of all creatures is concerned). He challenges, however, the conclusion I was t r y i n g to draw from this. His first point is that as we have agreed to apply, s o f a r as possible, human ethical standards in our appraisal of Divine conduct, we should consider a comparable situation in human affairs: what is required from a human agent who can perform but a fraction of a given morally desirable act? Two cases must be distinguished. Case one is where the performance of a part of the act achieves nothing; case two where the p a r t i a l act brings partial benefit. All will agree t h a t in case o n e the agent is exempt from all action, for w h y should he be r e q u i r e d to do a n y t h i n g t h a t is of no value in itself? In c a s e two, however, even though he cannot accomplish the whole task since a part of it has some value too, he is not absolved from carrying it out. The situation facing God, says La Para, is of the s e c o n d type. Even if He cannot create a universe better than that which is not conceivable, He could have created a universe better than ours. In particular, He could have eliminated all suffering. (2) This in itself would represent a v e r y valuable advance upon our universe. God is b l a m e w o r t h y for not having accomplished it. * Australian National University, Canberra. (1) S O P H I A , July, 1965. (2) W h a t exactly La P a r a is demanding is not clear. T h e drying up of all mud pools would m a k e the pig i n t e n s e l y dissatisfied, whl~e t o Socrates the lack of opportunity to philosol~hize is a source of dissatisfaction. Perhaps h e insists on G o d satisfying t h e ,wants of all c r e a t u r e s according to t h e i r needs. B u t w h a t ~ r e l e g i t i m a t e n e e d s ? T h e y m a y .'be increased a n d d e c r e a s e d by an O m n i p o t e n t Being. T h e failure t o satisfy h i g h e r needs should not be m o r e excusable t h a n t h e reducing of c r e a t u r e s to a level w h e r e they do not possess such needs.

22 The reply to this v e r y briefly is: when the task is a finite one it is possible to accomplish it wholly and it is possible to accomplish it partially. W i t h an infinite task on the other hand, just as it cannot be wholly accomplished, it cannot partially be accomplished either. L e t me explain again. Imagine that prior to the present universe there was another one, populated by beings with vastly g r e a t e r stamina than ourselves, who often endured excruciating suffering m a n y times greater than any of us ever endured. B e y o n d a certain stage of misery people u n d e r w e n t v e r y strange physical transformations as well, and the d r e a d f u l experiences accompanying these - - dimly reflected in K a f k a ' s description of the man turning into an insect - - were not basically different from those associated with metamorphosis. To those who were horrified by God permitting His creatures to undergo such degradations and thus arguing against His benevolence or omnipotence, it was pointed out that they were moved by emotions r a t h e r than logic. N a t u r a l l y our attention is a t t r a c t e d by the awfulness of metamorphosis ; the best writers have reached their greatest heights when depicting the violent emotions associated zith it, etc. etc. - - logically, however, no experience has any special significance. Once we agree that the value of all moments of experience of each individual can fully be represented by points on a linear scale (of any two moments the one preferable to the other being represented by a point lying to the right of the point representing the other), it follows t h a t to be morally good is to cause everyone's pointer to lie as much to the right on his line as possible. Since the line extends indefinitely in both directions, God is equally blameless wherever He lets a n y b o d y ' s pointer rest. However, there was one philosopher (a previous incarnation of Mr. La Para, in fact) who nevertheless insisted t h a t God ought to eliminate at least all positive evil, by which he meant the moving of everyone's experience pointer perm a n e n t l y to the right of the 'point of no metamorphosis'. God could have silenced him by making him insensitive to the kind of evil he was complaining about. Instead He complied with his wishes and created our universe in which n o b o d y ' s pointer crosses to the left of the stipulated point. Mr. La P a r a is again dissatisfied. It is not surprising. A f t e r all, positive and negative parts of the line exist only relative to some zero point which may be situated a n y w h e r e and in the present situation we remain just as far from the infinitely remote right end of the line as before. La P a r a ' s second point is that if we agree that every universe God could create would necessarily be imperfect, it does not follow that it is of no moral consequence w h a t e v e r He

23 does. On the contrary, the impossibility of a p e r f e c t w o r l d imposes upon H i m the obligation to do specifically one thing and one thing alone: not to create anything. Now La P a r a is a w a r e of the f a c t t h a t the absolute absence of a n y creation cannot be r e g a r d e d as the best of all possible world, and just as there are infinitely m a n y kinds of universes t h a t represent a worse state of affairs t h a n complete void, so there are infinitely m a n y which are better. Nevertheless by employing again a h u m a n analogy, he claims t h a t even if creating a n y world in which there are living beings God r e n d e r s I t i m s e l f b l a m e w o r t h y if He r e f r a i n e d f r o m all such creation, He should be free of all blame. He says: " . . . imagine that astrologers really can foretell w h a t the consequences of our actions will be. Suppose, further, t h a t their f a m i l y a s t r o l o g e r tells a m a n and wife t h a t if they so choose, they will conceive a child on March first. But this child, while he would have no effect on the happiness or suffering of his contemporaries, would himself lead a wretched life, one filled with physical and psychological torment. Alternatively, if the couple so choose, they will conceive a child on M a r c h second. Now this child, who also would not effect the happiness of those around him, would himself e n j o y a life of sublime contentment arid pleasure. I f this couple decide to conceive a child on March first, t h e y are obviously open to m o r a l reproach. If, however, they decide to conceive a child on M a r c h second, they c e r t a n l y would not be open to reproach. B u t if they decide to r e f r a i n a l t o g e t h e r f r o m h a v i n g children, have they incurred ally blame? Not at all. I t would be ri.diculous to say this to the couple, " Y o u are evil, for by r e f r a i n i n g f r o m conceiving a child on M a r c h second, you failed to bring about as m u c h happiness in him as you might h a v e " Similarly, if an o m n i p o t e n t being once created a world, he could then be r e p r o a c h e d for failing' to m a k e it as good a world as he m i g h t have. B u t it is ridiculous to imagine t h a t an omnipotent being m i g h t be m o r a l l y reprehensible because he r e f r a i n e d f r o m creating ar a l l . " (3) L e t us not question La P a r a ' s a p p r a i s a l of the m o r a l choices open to the y o u n g couple. Be it as it may, it is h a r d to escape the impression t h a t he subscribes to the a b s u r d i t y t h a t in infinitely m a n y instances w h a t in more desirable is less desirable. A f t e r all, he has agreed t h a t there are infinitely m a n y peopleduniverses which represent more desirable states of affairs, t h a n (3) Ibid., pp. 1~16.

24 t h a t in which nothing exists. Yet, he claims, t h a t in any of these situations God is b l a m e w o r t h y , while when p e r m i t t i n g a less desirable situation to prevail - - the existence of nothing - - l t e is free of blame. Possibly L a P a r a has an answer to this. I t e m a y p e r h a p s wish to explain a w a y tile seeming contradiction of his position by claiming' t h a t m o r a l obligations do not exist as such b u t only in relation to some subject. F o r e v e r y X, if X is a living c r e a t u r e m y obligation t o w a r d him is to cause his 'welf a r e p o i n t e r ' to be shifted as much to the r i g h t as I can. F o r a non-existent X, however, there is no one t o w a r d whom I m a y be said to h a v e m o r a l obligations. Thus, even if it is a cert a i n t y t h a t for some X, by bringing X into being I can guarantee a life in which e v e r y m o m e n t is p r e f e r a b l e to a state of non-existence, no one binds me to bring X into being. I f so, then it should be pointed out t h a t the s t a n d a r d of Divine conduct, while it m a y resemble in m a n y ways the s t a n d a r d of h u m a n conduct, is not completely identical with it. I t has c o m m o n l y been eonceded t h a t such specific Divine goals as the creation of conditions which allow the exercise of compassion, c h a r i t y and justice, and in which beings, capable of c o n t e m p l a t i n g moral values and asserting their free will, existed, m i g h t be legitimate Divine goals. W h a t m a n y philosophers h a v e s t r o n g l y u r g e d is t h a t these goals did not require the universe to be as it is. N o b o d y could argue, however, t h a t t h e y did not require a n y universe at all.