Sci Eng Ethics (2012) 18:601–603 DOI 10.1007/s11948-012-9420-5 EDITORIAL
On the Use of the Concept of ‘‘Fairness’’ in Ethics Raymond E. Spier
Received: 1 February 2011 / Accepted: 9 November 2012 / Published online: 23 November 2012 Ó Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2012
It is both convenient and conventional to appeal to authorities or persons with certain powers that individuals or groups be dealt with fairly. What is meant by this supplication? The word ‘‘fair’’ has its origin in the old Nordic-Medieval English languages where it has various spellings. It is often associated with the terms, equitable and just. The former term leads to the notion that all dealings should have an element of equality about them. This is rarely achieved and indeed if it were, on occasion, achieved it would not necessarily deliver fairness. To relate fairness to justice (or the absence of injustice) is to express a tautology which does not advance the argument. The Oxford English Dictionary has the ‘‘absence of bias or fraud’’ as a meaning of fairness. This does not work either as we can assume that bias is a necessary component of all human dealings and the banishment of fraud does not ensure that a fair deal will be in the offing. Not withstanding this situation, it is necessary to recognise that the nature of the bias or fraud may or may not be appropriate in a particular situation. Let me take another tack. Many of the non-ethical uses of the words fair or fairness are in relation to that which is beautiful, pleasing to look at, aesthetically appealing or something which is highly valued by the user of the term. This may be transliterated into a meaning of fair which implies valued. Value results from the ethic that provides the basis for decisions on how we should behave. As our words are tools that humans have developed (in the last 150,000 years or so) to enhance their survival and as our ethics are verbal expressions that are used with the intention of controlling our behaviour, it follows that ethics are verbal tools that we use to seek to enhance our chances of survival through attempts to control the behaviour of other humans. It follows from this that values are calibrated by how close they come to achieving this personal, familial, social or species R. E. Spier (&) 6 Parklands place, Guildford, Surrey GU1 2PS, UK e-mail:
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survivability—the level of the application of the principle depends on the pertaining circumstances. It is therefore, not unreasonable, to associate the qualities of beauty, fitness for purpose, comeliness, loveliness, wholesomeness and the like to that which may be thought to make a positive contribution to survival. It is possible to construe notions of beauty as models or teaching devices that depict that which is most likely to have the greatest survivability. This enables the elaboration of the meaning of the word fair as that condition which promotes or achieves the maximum enhancement of the survivability of people or societies. The first uses of the term, fair, occur in the home between siblings or their friends and then in the playground of the junior school (let’s say 4–6 year olds). Here, appeals to fairness require all parties to the ‘‘negotiation’’ to come away happy. This does not involve a situation in which the cake is ‘equally’ divided but rather an equitable solution in which all can agree without loss of face. That agreement is achieved without recourse to physical force and it promotes a group spirit that is conducive of the enhanced survivability of the individuals and the group. So, when people rise up and seek to create a new social regimen that is based on fairness, what they are seeking is a society wherein all its members are given a value (dignity and hence the right to respect) through work which enables and justifies their existence or survivability. They are not looking for equality but they require that the laws under which they live are administered in such a way that the survival of all the people in the society is promoted, progressed or furthered. That ‘‘justice has to be seen to be done’’ is a provision that means that people may accept the fairness of judicial decisions based on laws that seek to enable the operation and hence survivability of the society. But notions of justice and fairness do not stop in the playgrounds and courts. The public media are replete with data and comments on the ways in which the efforts of people to make a contribution to society through work and putting themselves in the way of danger to protect and defend other citizens are rewarded. How hard and physical is the work? How much brain power is required with what regimen of sacrifice of the good life to achieve training and education? How much risk to health and well being is put in jeopardy? How and what skills in encouraging others to ‘‘give of their best’’ are required? How much responsibility is required in keeping secrets and dealing with others in ways that respect the dignity of people who are less fortunate and are in distressful situations? Is there a limit to the rewards that may accrue to a person who puts his own resources at risk and accepts a responsibility for the deployment of the wealth of others? And how much knowledge and skill is required to wheel and deal in monetary transactions? There is not a published calculus that will enable society to determine the rewards that are associated with each of the above activity areas. So, society resorts to the ‘‘market’’. Here people barter their work for reward. Or they buy and sell goods, money and services for what they can get. In developed countries there is a civil service and activities that are controlled by the government such as the armed services, health services (some countries) and education (some areas or institutions) [in the UK some 45 % of employed people are paid by the government]. Manufacturing industry that accounted for 15 % of the economy in the UK in 2010
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operates in a similar way in that the majority of people who are the workers do not have a financial stake in the outcome of their efforts. In structured work situations it is possible to delineate levels of responsibility or capability that enable the construction of a hierarchy of worthiness. It is also possible to regulate the span of the reward system such that the ratio of the highest paid to the lowest paid can be fixed. Where this happens, as in some Scandinavian countries, a ratio of 20:1 is generally regarded as ‘‘fair’’ by media commentators and, it seems, the public in general. Ratios that approach or exceed 200:1 are regarded as unfair and greedy. And when people who deal with other people’s money such as bankers and bond traders—who do not have their own funds at risk—take home salaries 1,000 times higher than the lowest paid in their institution, society is understandable in its rage. For our societies to work effectively with generally contented inhabitants, the issue of the way in which fair systems of justice and payments for work and effort are established and implemented will have to be addressed. Should a society fail in this, it is likely to impugn its survivability as a coherent body of people that can live and work together to their mutual advantage.
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