Soc Choice Welfare (1991)8:97-169

Soeial Choiee Welfare

© Springer-Verlag 1991

Social Choice Bibliography* Jerry S. Kelly Department of Economics, Syracuse University, Maxwell Hall, Syracuse, NY 13244-1090, USA Received November 16, 1988/Accepted July 6, 1989

Abbreviations Adv Math: Advances in Mathematics Akad Nauk Ukr SSR Dokl. Ser A: Fiz-Mat Tekh Nauki Am Behav Sci: American Behavioral Scientist Am Econ Rev: American Economic Review Am Economist: American Economist Am J Polit Sci: American Journal of Political Sciences Am J Sociol: American Journal of Sociology Am Math Mon: The American Mathematical Monthly Am Polit Q: American Politics Quarterly Am Polit Sci Rev: American Political Science Review Am Scientist: American Scientist Ann Inst Natl Stat Stud Econ: Annales de l'Institut National de la Statistique et des Studes Economiques Ann Inst Stat Math: Annals of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics Ann NY Acad Sci: Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences Appl Math Optimization: Applied Mathematics and Optimization Archway Mag Art Sci NYU: Archway: The Magazine of Arts and Sciences at New York University

Atlant Econ J: Atlantic Economic Journal Avtom Telemekh (Automation and Remote Control): Avtomatika i Telemekhanika Behav Anal: Behavioral Analysis Behav Sci: Behavioral Science Br J Math Stat Psychol: The British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology Br J Polit Sci: British Journal of Political Science Bull Econ Res: Bulletin of Economic Research Cambr J Econ: Cambridge Journal of Economics Can J Econ: Canadian Journal of Economics Can J Econ Polit Sci: Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science Can J Philos: Canadian Journal of Philosophy Can Public Policy: Canadian Public Policy Commun ACM: Communicationsof the ACM Commun Monogr: Communication Monographs Commun Stat: Communicationsin Statistics Comp Politics: Comparative Politics Comput J: The Computer Journal

* My first debt is to Georges Bordes who sparked my obsession in 1975 by showing me a copy of his "Bibliographic: La Throrie de la drcision collective par le vote." Further thanks, for advice after reading earlier drafts of this bibliography, go to Mark A. Aizerman, Douglas H. Blair, Jean-Marie Blin, Steven J. Brains, Donald E. Campbell, Peter C. Fishburn, Wulf Gaertner, William V. Gehrlein, Hannu Nurmi, Edward W. Packel, Prasanta K. Pattanaik, Amartya Sen and especially to Maurice Salles.

98 Comput Math Appl: Computers and Mathematics with Applications Comput Oper Res: Computer and Operations Research Comput Stat Data Anal: Computational Statistics and Data Analysis Conf Semin Mat Univ Bari: Conferenze del Seminario di Matematica dell'Universit~idi Bari Control Cybern: Control and Cybernetics CR Acad Sci: Comptes Rendus de l'Acadernie des Sciences Creat Innov Network: Creativity and Innovation Network Cybern Syst: Cybernetics and Systems Decision Sci: Decision Sciences Defense Variety: In Defense of Variety Discrete Appl Math: Discrete Applied Mathematics Discrete Math: Discrete Mathematics Dokl Acad Nauk SSSR: Doklady Akademii Nauk SSSR Eastern Rev: Eastern Review Econ Appl: Economic Appliqute Econ Inquiry: Economic Inquiry Econ J: Economic Journal Econ Lett: Economic Letters Econ Philos: Economics and Philosophy Econ Plann: Economics of Planning Econ Polit: Economia e Politica Econ Rec: Economic Record Econ Scelte Pubbl: Economia deUe Scelte Pubbliche Econ Studies Q: The Economic Studies Quarterly Ekon Mat Metody: Ekonomika i Matematicheski Metody Ekon Mat Obz: Ekonomiko-Matematicheski Obzor Electoral Stud: Electoral Studies Enseign Math: LEnseignement Mathematique Environ Planning: Environment and Planning Estad Esp: Estadistica Espanola Eur J Combinat: European Journal of Combinatorics Eur J Oper Res: European Journal of Operations Research Eur J Polit Res: European Journal of Political Research Fuzzy Math: Fuzzy Mathematics Fuzzy Sets Systems" Fuzzy Sets and Systems G Econ Ann Econ: Giomali degli Economisti e Annali di Economica Gaz Math: Gazeta Matematica

J. S. Kelly George Washington Law Rev: George Washington Law Review Germ Econ Rev: German Economic Review Hofstra Law Rev: Hofstra Law Review IEEE Trans Autom Control: IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control IEEE Trans Comput: IEEE Transactions on Computers IEEE Trans Syst Man Cybern: IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics Indian Econ J: Indian Economic Journal Indian Econ Rev: Indian Economic Review Indian J Pure Appl Math: Indian Journal of Pure and Applied Mathematics Inf Sci Hum: Informatique en Sciences Humaines Inf Sci: Information Sciences Inst Probl Upravlinina Sbornik Trudov: Institut Problem Upravlinina. Sbornik Trudov Int Econ Rev: International Economic Review [nt J Game Theory: International Journal of Game Theory Int J Math Educ Sci Technol: International Journal of Mathematical Education in Science and Technology Int J Pol Anal Inf Syst: International Journal of Policy Analysis and Information Systems Int J Syst Sci: International Journal of Systems Science Int Logic Rev: International Logic Review Izv Akad Nauk CCCP: Tekh Kibern : Izvestija Akademii Nauk CCCP: Technicheskaja Kibernetica J Classific: Journal of Classification J Comb Theory: Journal of Combinatorial Theory J Conflict Resol: Journal of Conflict Resolution J Cybern: Journal of Cybernetics J Ecol Polytech: Journal de l'Ecole Polytechnique J Econ Behav Organiz: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization J Econ Lit: Journal of Economic Literature J Econ Theory: Journal of Economic Theory J Hist Ideas: Journal of the History of Ideas J InfOpt Sci: Journal of Information and Optimization Science J Law Econ: Journal of Law and Economics J Math Anal Appl: Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications J Math Econ: Journal of Mathematical Economics J Math Sociol: The Journal of Mathematical Sociology

Social Choice Bibliography J Philos: Journal of Philosophy J Polit Anal Manag: Journal of Policy Analysis and Management J Polit Econ: Journalof Political Economics J Politics: Journal of Politics J Public Econ: Journal of Public Economics J Quant Econ: Journal of Quantitative Economics J R Stat Soc: Journal of the Royal Statistical Society J Soc Indust Appl Math: Journal of the Society of Industrial and Applied Mathematics Jahrb National6kon Statist: Jahrb~cher f/Jr National6konomie und Statistik Jahrb Sozialwiss: Jahrbficher fiir Sozialwissenschaft Keio Econ Stud: Keio Economic Studies Litov Mat Sb: Litovskii Matematichewskii Sbornik Manag Sci: Management Science Manchester School Econ Soc Studies: Manchester School of Economics and Social Studies Mat Metody Sots Naukakh: Matematicheskie Metody v Sotsial'nyku Naukakh Math Intell: The Mathematical Intelligencer Math Mag: Mathematics Magazine Math Modelling: Mathematical Modelling Math Oper Res: Mathematics of Operations Research Math Program: Mathematical Programming Math Sci Hum: Math~matiques et Sciences Humaines Math Soc Sci: Mathematical Social Sciences Math Syst Theory: Mathematical Systems Theory Math Tables Aids Comput: Mathematical Tables and Other Aids of Computation Methods Oper Res: Methods of Operations Research Munich Soc Sci Rev: Munich Social Science Review Natl Civic Rev: National Civic Review Natl Westminst Bank Q Rev: National Westminster Bank Quarterly Review Nav Res Logist: Naval Research Logistics Naval Res Log Q: Naval Research Logistics Quarterly Newsletter C.V. Starr Center Appl Econ NYU: Newsletter, C.V.Starr Center for Applied Economics at NYU Not Am Math Soc: Notices of the American Mathematical Society Oper Res: Operations Research

99 Oxford Econ Papers: Oxford Economic Paper Pap Non-Market Dec Making: Papers in Non-Market Decision Making Philos Public Aft: Philosophy and Public Affairs Philos Sci: Philosophy of Sciences Policy Sci: Policy Sciences Policy Stud J: Policy Studies Journal Polit Methodol: Political Methodology Polit Q: Political Quarterly Polit Studies: Political Studies Polit Theory: Political Theory Portfolio Art News Annu: Portfolio and Art News Annual Prax Math: Praxis der Mathematik Presidential Studies Q: Presidential Studies Quarterly Probl Complex Control Syst: Problems of Complex Control Systems Proc Natl Acad Sci USA: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA Proc R Soc: Proceedings of the Royal Society Publ Secc Mat Univ Auton Barc: Pubblicacions de la Stccio de Mattmatiques. Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona Q J Econ: Quarterly Journal of Economics Q Publ Am Stat Ass: Quarterly Publication of the American Statistical Association Quality Quantitiy: Quality and Quantity RAIRO Rech Oper: RAIRO Recherche Operationelle Rech Econ Louvain: Recherches Economiques de Louvain Rev Econ Polit: Revue d'Economie Politique Rev Econ Stud: The Review of Economic Studies Rev R Acad Cienc Exactas Fis Nat Madr: Revista Real Academia Ciencias Exactas, Fisicas y Naturales de Madrid Riv Int Sci Econ Commerc: Rivista Internazionale di Scienza Economichee Commerciali Riv Mat Sci Econ Soc: Rivista di Matematica per le Scienze Economichee Sociali Rutgers Law Rev: Rutgers Law Review SA J Econ: South African Journal of Economics Scan Polit Stud: Scandinavian Political Studies Sci Am: Scientific American Sci Explor: Science Exploration SIAM J Algebr Discrete Methods: SIAM Journal on Algebraic and Discrete Methods

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SIAM J Appl Math: SIAM Journal on Appried Mathematics SIAM J Comput: SIAM Journal on Computing SIAM Rev: SIAM Review Soc Behav: Social Behavior Soc Sci Res: Social Science Research Soc Choice Welfare: Social Choice and Welfare Soc Res: Social Research Soc Sci Inf: Social Science Information Soc Sci Res : Social Science Research Soy J Autom Inf Sci: Soviet Journal of Automation and Information Science Sov J Comput Syst Sci: Soviet Journal of Computer and Systems Sciences Stat Neerl: Statistica Neerlandica Syst Anal Modelling Simulation: Systems Analysis, Modelling, Simulation Syst Control Lett: Systems and Control Letters Systems Control: Systems and Control

Theory Decision: Theory and Decision Tomkang J Manag Sci: Tomkang Journal of Management Science Trans Am Math Soc: Transactions of the American Mathematical Society Trans Proc R Soc Victoria: Transactions and Proceedings of the Royal Society of Victoria Two-Year College Math J: Two-Year College Mathematical Journal Villanova Law Rev: Villanova Law Review Virginia Law Rev: Virginia Law Review Wissen Leben: Wissen und Leben Yale Law J: Yale Law Journal Z Ges Staatswiss: Zeitschrift f/Jr gesamte Staatswissenschaft Z Nationalrkon: Zeitschrift fiir Nationalrkonomie Z Schweiz Stat Volksw: Zeitschrift fiir Schweizerische Statistik und Volkswirtschaft

Abdou J (1982) Stabilit6 de la fonction veto. Cas du veto maximal. Math Sci Hum 80:39-65 Abdou J (1987) Topological veto correspondences. Econ App140:5-33 Abdou J (1987) Stability of topological effectivity functions. Soc Choice Welfare 4:163-171 Abdou J (1988) Neutral veto correspondences with a continuum of alternatives. Int J Game Theory 17:135-164 Abdou J (1989) Convexity of integer veto elimination procedures. Soc Choice Welfare 6:63-70 Abel V, B6ge W (1979) The chairman's power in majority voting. Methods Oper Res 30:1-4 Abrams R (1973) Some conceptual problems of voting theory. Sage, Beverly Hills Abrams R (1976) The voter's paradox and the homogeneity of individual preference orders. Public Choice 26:19-27 Abrams R(1980) Foundations of political analysis: an introduction to the theory of collective choice. Columbia University Press, New York Abello JM (1985) Intrinsic limitations of the majority rule, an algorithmic approach. SIAM J Algebr Discrete Methods 6:133-144 Abello JM, Johnson CR (1984) How large are transitive simple majority domains? SIAM J A1gebr Discrete Methods 5:603-618 Acker P van: see Bezembinder T Afanas'ev VM, Lezina ZM (1982) Iterative auction methods of group choice (survey of the problem). Avtom Telemekh (Automation and Remote Control) 43:1105-1118 Affuso PJ: see Brams SJ Afriat SN (1987) Logic of choice and economic theory, Chap 1.3: Democratic choice. Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp 47-70 Aizerman, MA (1981) Dynamic aspects of voting theory (survey). Avtom Telemekh (Automation and Remote Control)42:103-118 Aizerman MA (1985) New problems in the general choice theory: review of a research trend. Soc Choice Welfare 2:235-282 Aizerman MA (1989) Review of Schofield's social choice and democracy. Soc Choice Welfare 6:85-86 Aizerman MA, Aleskerov FT (1983) The Arrow paradox in group choice theory. Avtom Telemekh (Automation and Remote Control) 44:127-151 Aizerman MA, Aleskerov FT (1983) Local operators in models of social choice. Syst Control Lett 3:1-6 Aizerman MA, Aleskerov FT (1984) Functional local operators in voting theory. Avtom Telemekh (Automation and Remote Control) 45:79-88

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101

Aizerman MA, Aleskerov FT (1984) Functional local operators in voting theory, Part 1I. Avtom Telemekh (Automation and Remote Control) 45:105-114 Aizerman MA, Aleskerov FT (1984) Functional local operators in voting theory, Part III. Avtom Telemekh (Automation and Remote Control) 45:108-120 Aizerman MA, Aleskerov FT (1985) Theory of collective choice. In: Control systems - theory and technique. Institute of Control Science, Moscow, pp 27-38 Aizerman MA, Aleskerov FT (1986) Voting operators in the space of choice functions. Math Soc Sci 11:201-242 (Corrigendum: 13:305) Aizerman MA, Aleskerov FT (1987) Structural properties of voting systems. In: Caianiello ER, Aizerman MA (eds) Topics in the general theory of structures. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp 137-148 Aizerman MA, Aleskerov FT (1988) Synthesis of local models of collective choice. Sov J Autom InfSci 21:74-83 Aizerman MA, Malishevski AV (1981) Some aspects of the general theory of best option choice. Avtomat Telemekh (Automation and Remote Control) 42:65-83 Aizerman MA, Malishevski AV (1981) General theory of best variants choice: some aspects. IEEE Trans Autom Control AC-26:1030-1041 Aizerman MA, Malishevski AV (1986) Conditions for universal reducibility of a two-stage extremization problem to a one-stage problem. J Math Anal Appl 119:361-188 Aizerman MA, Zavalishin NV, Pyatnitsky YeS (1977) Global function of sets in the theory of alternative selection, Part I. Avtomat Telemekh (Automation and Remote Control) 38:111125 Aizerman MA, Zavalishin NV, Pyatnisky YeS (1977) Global function of sets in the theory of alternative selection, Part II. Avtomat Telemekh (Automation and Remote Control) 38:103113 Aldrich JH (1977) Dilemma of a Paretian liberal: consequences of Sen's theorem. Public Choice 30:1-22 Aldrich JH (1977) Liberal games: further comments on social choice and game theory. Public Choice 30:29-34 Aldrich JH (1983) A Downsian spatial model with party activism. Am Polit Sci Rev 77:974-990 Aldrich JH, Rohde DW (1982) The limitations of equilibrium analysis in political science. In: Ordeshook PC, Shepsle KA (eds) Political equilibrium. Kluwer-Nijhoff, Boston, pp 65-95 Aleskerov FT (1975) Local procedures for constructing collective decisions in the different classes of the space of choice functions. In: Data analysis and expert estimations in control systems. Institute of Control Sciences, Moscow, pp 62-69 Aleskerov FT (1980) Interval choice of alternatives and its decomposition. Avtomat Telemekh (Automation and Remote Control) 41:129-134 Aleskerov FT (1981) Interval choice. In: Modelling and optimization in complex control systems. Nauka, Moscow, pp 105-110 Aleskerov FT (1985) Collective decision making using voting procedures. Probl Complex Control Syst 2:357-366 Aleskerov FT, Baumann YeV, Vol'skiy VI (1984) Processing of internal expert scores. Avtomat Telemekh (Automation and Remote Control) 45:127-133 Aleskerov FT, Vladimirov AV (1986) Heirarchical voting. InfSci 39:41-86 Aleskerov FT, Vladimirov AV (1987) Quasilocal operators of social choice. Avtomat Telemekh (Automation and Remote Control) 3:127-140 Aleskerov FT, Zavalishin NV, Litvakov BM (1979) On decomposition of choice functions into a system of simpler functions. Avtomat Telemekh (Automation and Remote Control) 40:107118 Aleskerov FT, Zavalishin NV, Litvakov BM (1981) On decomposition of choice functions into a systems of interval choices. Avtomat Telemekh (Automation and Remote Control) 42:155160 Aleskerov FT: see Aizerman MA Ali Iqbal, Cook WD, Kress M (1986) Ordinal ranking and intensity of preference: a linear programming approach. Manag Sci 32:1642-1647 Allrn T (1988) The impossiblity of the Paretian liberal and its relevance to welfare economics. Theory Decision 24:57-76 Allingham MG (1975) Intertastes consistency in social welfare functions: discussion. In: Parkin M, Avelino RN (eds) Current economic problems. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 87-88

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Amar AR (1984) Choosing representatives by lottery voting. Yale Law J 93:1283-1308 Andjiga NG, Moulen J (1988) Binary games in constitutional form and collective choice. Math Soc Sci 16:189-201 Anscombe GEM (1976) On frustration of the majority by fulfilment of the majority's will. Analysis 36:161-168 Apynis A (1986) Rules of majority on a set of ballots. Litov Mat Sb 26:595-601 Aranson PH (1987) Calculus and consent. In: Rowley CK (ed) Democracy and public choice. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pp 60-65 Aranson PH, Hinich M J, Ordeshook PC (1974) Election goals and strategies: equivalent and non-equivalent strategies. Am Polit Sci Rev 68:135-152 Aranson PH, Ordeshook PC (1972) Spatial strategies for sequential elections. In: Niemi RG, Weisberg HF (eds) Probability models of collective decision making. Charles E. Merrill, Columbus, Ohio, pp 298-331 Archibald GC (1959) Welfare economics, ethics and essentialism. Economica 26:316-327 Arkhipoff O (1975) Le problrme de l'agrrgation dans la mesure de la qualit6 de vie: reformation et grnbralisation du th6orrme d'Arrow. Ann Inst Natl Stat Etud Econ No 18 Arkhipoff O (1980) Introduction to axiomatics of procedures of aggregation. Math Soc Sci 1:6983 Armbruster W, B6ge W (1983) Efficient, anonymous and neutral group deicision procedures. Econometrica 51:1389-1405 Armstrong RD, Cook WD, Seiford LM (1982) Priority ranking and consensus formation: the case of ties. Manag Sci 28:638-645 Armstrong TE (1980) Arrow's theorem with restricted coalition algebras. J Math Econ 7:55-75 Armstrong TE (1985) Precisely dictatorial social welfare functions. J Math Econ 14:57-59 Arrow KJ (1950) A difficulty in the concept of social welfare. J Polit Econ 58:328-346 Arrow KJ (1952) Le principe de rationalit6 dans les drcisions collectives. Econ Appl 5:469-484 Arrow KJ (1958) Utilities, attitudes, choices: a review note. Econometrica 26:1-23 Arrow KJ (1959) Rational choice functions and orderings. Economia 26:121-127 Arrow KJ (1963) Social choice and individual values, 2nd edn. Wiley, New York Arrow KJ (1967) Public and private values. In: Hook S (ed) Human values and economic policy. New York University Press, New York, pp 3-21 Arrow KJ (1967) The place of moral obligation in preference systems. In: Hook S (ed) Human values and economic policy. New York University Press, New York, pp 117-119 Arrow KJ (1967) Values and collective decision-making. In: Laslett P, Runciman WC (eds) Philosophy, politics and society, vol 3. Blackwell, Oxford, pp 215-232 Arrow KJ (1969) Tullock and an existence theorem of politics. Public Choice 4:105-111 Arrow KJ (1973) Formal theories of social welfare. In: Wiener PP (ed) Dictionary of the history of ideas. Scribner's, New York, pp 277-284 Arrow KJ (1973) Some ordinalist-utilitarian notes on Rawl's theory of justice. J Philos 70:245263 Arrow KJ (1974) General economic equilibriium: purpose, analytic techniques, collective choice. Am Econ Rev 64:253-272 Arrow KJ (1977) Extended sympathy and the possibility of social choice. Am Econ Rev 67:219225 Arrow KJ (1977) Current developments in the theory of social choice. Soc Res 44:607-622 Arrow KJ (1978) Extended sympathy and the possibilityof social choice. Philosophia 7:223-237 Arrow KJ (1978) Nozick's entitlement theory of justice. Philosophia 7:265-280 Arrow KJ (1979) Values and collective decision-making. In: Hahn FH, Hollis M (eds) Philosophy and economic theory. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 110-126 Arrow KJ (1983) Contributions to welfare economics. Brown EC, Solow RM (eds) Paul Samuelson and modern economic theory. McGraw-Hill, New York, pp 15-30 Arrow KJ (1983) Collected papers of Kenneth J. Arrow. Vol 1: Social choice and justice. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Arrow KJ (1987) Arrow's theorem. In: Eatwell J, Milgate M, Newman P (eds) The new Palgrave dictionary of economics, vol 1. Macmillan, London, pp 1245-126 Arrow KJ, Raynaud H (1986) Social choice and multicriterion decision-making. MIT Press, Cambridge d'Aspremont C (1985) Axioms for social welfare orderings. In: Hurwicz L, Sehmeidler D, Sonnenschein H (eds) Social goals and social organization: essays in memory of Elisha Pazner. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 19-76

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d'Aspremont C, Gevers L (1977) Equity and informational basis of collective choice. Rev Econ Stud 44(2):199-209 d'Aspremont C, Jacquemin A, Mertens J-F (1987) A measure of aggregate power in organizations. J Econ Theory 43:184-191 d'Aspremont C, Peleg B (1988) Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees. Soc Choice Welfare 5:261-279 Atkinson AB (1987) Original Sen. New York Rev Books 34:41-44 Aumann RJ, Kurz M, Neyman A (1983) Voting for public goods. Rev Econ Stud 50(4):677-693 Austen-Smith D (1979) Fair rights. Econ Lett 4:29-32 Austen-Smith D (1981) Party policy and campaign costs in a multi-constituency model of electoral competition. Public Choice 37:389-402 Austen-Smith D (1982) Restricted Pareto and rights. J Econ Theory 26:89-99 Austen-Smith D (1983) The spatial theory of electoral competition: instability, institutions and information. Environ Planninging C: Government Policy 1:439-459 Austen-Smith D (1984) Two-party competition with many constituencies. Math Soc Sci 7:177198 Austen-Smith D (1986) Legislative coalitions and electoral equilibrium. Public Choice 50:185210 Austen-Smith D (1987) Parties, districts and the spatial theory of elections. Soc Choice Welfare 4:9-23 Austen-Smith D (1987) Interest groups, campaign contributions and probabilistic voting. Public Choice 54:123-139 Austen-Smith D (1989) Sincere voting in models of legislative elections. Soc Choice Welfare 6:287-299 Austen Smith D (1990) Credible debate equilibria. Soc Choice Welfare 7:75-93 Badger WW (1972) Political individualism, positional preferences and optimal decision-rules. In: Niemi RG, Weisberg HF (eds) Probability models of collective decision making. Charles E. Merrill, Columbus, Ohio, pp 34-59 Baigent N (1980) Social choice correspondences. Rech Econ Louvain 46:125-138 Baigent N (1981) Decompositions of minimal liberalism. Econ Lett 7:29-32 Baigent N (1981) Social choice and merit goods. Econ Lett 7:301-305 Baigent N (I 984) A reformulation of Chichilnisky's impossibilitytheorem. Econ Lett 16:23-25 Baigent N (1985) Anonymity and continuous social choice. J Math Econ 14:1-4 Baigent N (1987) Metric rationalisation of social welfare functions according to principles of social choice. Math Soc Sci 13:59-65 Baigent N (1987) Preference proximity and anonymous social choice. Q J Econ 102:161-169 Baigent N (1987) Twitching weak dictators. Z Nationalrkon 47:407-411 Baigent N, Huang P (1990) Topological social choice: reply to Le Breton and Uriarte. Soc Choice Welfare 7:31-38 Bailey MJ (1979) The possiblity of rational choice in an economy. J Polit Econ 87:37-56 Balinski ML, Young HP (1975) The quota method of apportionment. Am Math Mon 82:701730 Balinski ML, Young HP (1977) Apportionment schemes and the quota method. Am Math Mon 84:450-455 (Addendum 84:542) Balinsky ML, Young HP (1982) Fair representation. Yale University Press, New Haven Balinsky ML, Young HP (1985) The appointment of representation. In: Young HP (ed) Fair allocation. AMS, Providence, pp 95-108 Banaschewski B, Nelson E (1982) Completions of partially ordered sets. SIAM J Comput 11:521-528 Bandelt H-J (1985) Networks with Condorcet solutions. Eur J Oper Res 20:314-326 Bandelt H-J, Labb6 M (1986) How bad can a voting location be? Soc Choice Welfare 3:125-145 Bandyopadhyay T (1982) Threats, counterthreats and strategic manipulation for non-binary group decision rules. Math Soc Sci 2:145-155 Bandyopadhyay T (1983) On a class of strictly non-manipulable collective choice rules. Math Soc Sci 4:79-86 Bandyopadhyay T (1983) Manipulation of non-imposed, non-oligarchic nonbinary group decision rules. Econ Lett 11:69-73 Bandyopadhyay T (1983) The impossiblity of a weakly path independent Paretian liberal. Econ Lett 11:319-325

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Bandyopadhyay T (1983) Coalitional manipulation and the Pareto rule. J Econ Theory 29:359363 Bandyopadhyay T (1983) Multivalued rules and conditional nonmanipulability. Two possiblity theorems. Econ Lett 13:37-44 Bandyopadhyay T (1983) Limited resolutness and strategic voting: the case of linear sincere preference orderings. Math Soc SCI 6:109-117 Bandyopadhyay T (1984) On the frontier between possibility and impossibility theorems in social choice. J Econ Theory 32:52-66 Bandyopadhyay T (1985) Pareto optimality and the decisive power structure with expansion consistency conditions. J Econ Theory 35:366-375 Bandyopadhyay T (1986) Resolution of paradoxes in social choice. In: Samuelson L (ed) Microeconomic theory. Kluwer-Nijhoff, Boston, pp 99-120 Bandyopadhyay T (1986) Rationality, path independence and the power structure. J Econ Theory 40:338-348 Bandyopadhyay T (1987) Manipulation of voting mechanisms. In: Holler MJ (ed) The logic of multiparty systems. Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp 79-96 Bandyopadhyay T (1988) Extension of an order on a set to a power set: some further observations. Math Soc Sci 15:81-85 Bandyopadhyay T, Deb R (1983) Strategic voting for weakly binary group decision functions: the case of linear individual orderings. In: Pattanaik PK, Salles M (eds) Social choice and welfare. North Holland, Amsterdam, pp 227-238 Bandyopadhyay T, Deb R, Pattanaik PK (1982) The structure of coalitional power under probabilistic group decision rules. J Econ Theory 27:366-375 Bandyopadhyay T, Denicol6 V (1986) Teoremi di impossibilit~ per funzioni di scelta sociale debolmente coerenti. Econ Polit 3:303-309 Banerji D (1964) Choice and order: or first things first. Economica 31:158-167 Banks JS (1985) Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control. Soc Choice Welfare 1:295306 Banks JS, Bordes GA (1988) Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules. Soc Choice Welfare 5:31-44 Banks JS, Gasmi F (1987) Endogenous agenda formation in three-person committees. Soc Choice Welfare 4:133-152 Banzhaaf JF III. (1965) Weighted voting doesn't work. Rutgers Law Rev 19:317-343 Banzhaf JF IlL (1968) One man, ? votes: mathematical analysis of voting power and effective representation. George Washington Law Rev 36:808-823 Banzhaf JF III. (1968) One man, 3.312 votes: a mathematical analysis of the electoral college. Villanova Law Rev 14:304-332 Banzhaf JF IIL (1976) Multimember electoral districts - do they violate the "one man, one vote" principle? Yale Law J 75:1309-1388 Barbara D, Garcia-Molina H (1987) The reliability of voting mechanisms. IEEE Trans Comput 36:1197-1208 Barberh S (1977) Manipulation of social decision functions. J Econ Theory 15:266-278 Barber~t S (1977) The manipulation of social choice mechanisms that do not leave too much to chance. Econometrica 45:1573-1588 Barberh S (1978) Nice decision schemes. In: Gottinger HW, Leinfellner W (eds) Decision theory and social ethics. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp 101-118 Barberh S (1979) Majority and positionalist voting in a probabilistic framework. Rev Econ Stud 46(2):379-389 Barber~ S (1979) A note on group strategy-proofdecision schemes. Econometrica 47:637-640 Barberh S (1980) Stable voting schemes. J Econ Theory 23:267-274 Barber~t S (1980) Pivotal voters: a new proof of Arrow's theorem. Econ Lett 6:13-16 Barber~ S (1983) Pivotal voters: a simple proof of Arrow's theorem. In: Pattanaik PK, Salles M (eds) Social choice and welfare. North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp 31-35 Barber~i S (1983) Strategy-proofness and pivotal voters: a direct proof of the GibbardSatterthwaite theorem. Int Econ Rev 24:413-428 Barber~t S, Barrett CR, Pattanaik K (1984) On some axioms for ranking sets of alternatives. J Econ Theory 33:301-308 Barber~t S, Dutta B (1986) General, direct and self-implementation of social choice functions via protective equilibria. Math Soc SCI 11:109-127

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Feldman AM (1979) Nonmanipulable multi-valued social decision functions. Public Choice 34:177-188 Feldman AM (1979) Manipulation and the Pareto rule. J Econ Theory 21:473-482 Feldman AM (1980) Strongly nonmanipulable multi-valued collective choice rules. Public Choice 35:503-509 Feldman AM (1980) Welfare economics and social choice theory. Martinus Nijhoff, Boston Feldman AM, Kee K-H (1988) Existence of electoral equilibria with probabilistic voting: J Public Econ 35:205-227 Feldman AM, Weiman D (1979) Envy, wealth and class heirarchies. J Public Econ 11:81-91 Felsenthal DS (1989) On combining approval with disapproval voting. Behav Sci 34:53-60 Felsenthal DS, Maoz Z (1988) A comparative analysis of sincere and sophisticated voting under the plurality and approval procedures. Behav Sei 33:116-130 Felsenthal DS, Maoz Z, Rapoport A (1986) Comparing voting systems in genuine elections: approval-plurality versus selection-plurality. Soc Behav 1:41-53 Felsenthal DS: see Brams SJ; Rapoport A Ferejohn JA (1977) Decisive coalitions in the theory of social choice. J Econ Theory 15:301-306 Ferejohn JA (1978) The distribution of rights in society. In: Gottinger HW, Leinfellner W (eds) Decision theory and social ethics, issues in social choice. D.Reidel, Dordrecht, pp 119-131 Ferejohn JA, Fiorina MP, Weisberg HF (1980) Nonequilibrium solutions for legislative systems. Behav Sci 25:140-148 Ferejohn JA, Fiorina MP, Packel EW (1978) Toward a theory of legislative decision. In: Ordeshook PC (ed) Game theory and political science. New York University Press, New York, pp 165-190 Ferejohn JA, Fishburn PC (1979) Representation of binary decision rules by generalized decisiveness structures. J Econ Theory 21:28-45 Ferejohn JA, Grether DM (1974) On a class of rational social decision procedures. J Econ Theory 8:471-482 Ferejohn JA, Grether DM (1977) Weak path independence. J Econ Theory 14:19-31 Ferejohn JA, Grether DM (1977) Some new impossibility theorems. Public Choice 30:35-42 Ferejohn JA, Grether DM (1982) On the properties of stable decision procedures. In: Ordeshook PC, Shepsle KA (eds) Political equilibrium. Kluwer-Nijhoff, Boston, pp 107-117 Ferejohn JA, McKelvey RD (1983) Von-Neumann-Morgenstern solution social choice functions: an impossibility theorem. J Econ Theory 29:109-119 Ferejohn JA, Packel EW (1983) Continuous social decision procedures. Math Soc Sci 6:65-73 Ferejohn JA, Grether DM, Matthews SA, Packel EW (1980) Continuous-valued binary decision procedures. Rev Econ Stud 47(4):787-796 Ferejohn JA, Grether DM, McKelvey RD (1982) Implementation of democratic social choice functions. Rev Econ Stud 49(3):439-446 Ferejohn JA, McKelvey RD, Packel EW (1984) Limiting distributions for continuous state Markov voting models. Soc Choice Welfare 1:45-67 Fine BJ (1975) A note on "Interpersonal aggregation and partial comparability". Eeonometrica 43:173-174 Fine BJ (1975) Individual liberalism in a Paretian society. J Polit Econ 83:1277-1281 Fine BJ, Fine K (1974) Social choice and individual ranking I. Rev Econ Stud 41(3): 302-322 Fine BJ, Fine K (1974) Social choice and individual ranking II. Rev Econ Stud 41(4):459-475 Fine K (1972) Necessary and sufficient conditions for representative decision on two alternatives. Econometrica 40:1083-1090 Fine K (1973) Conditions for the existence of cycles under majority and non-minority rules. Eeonometrica 41:888-899 Fine K: see Fine BJ Fiorina MP, Shepsle KA (1982) Equilibrium, disequilibrium, and the general possibility of a science of politics. In: Ordeshook PC, Shepsle KA (eds) Political equilibrium. KluwerNijhoff, Boston, pp 49-64 Fiorina MP: see Ferejohn JA Fischer D, Schotter A (1978) The inevitability of the "paradox of redistribution" in the allocation of voting weights. Public Choice 33:49-67 Fishburn PC (1969) Preferences, summation and social welfare functions. Manag Sci 16:179-186 Fishburn PC (1970) The irrationality of transitivity in social choice. Behav Sci 15:119-123 Fishburn PC (1970) Arrow's impossibility theorem: concise proof and infinite voters. J Econ Theory 2:103-106

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Fishburn PC (1970) Intransitive individual preference and transitive majorities. Econometrica 38:482-489 Fishburn PC (1970) Comments on Hansson's "Group preferences". Econometrica 38:933-935 Fishburn PC (1970) Suborders on commodity spaces. J Econ Theory 2:321-328 Fishburn PC (1970) Condition for simple majority decision with intransitive individual indifference. J Econ Theory 2:354-367 Fishburn PC (1971) Should social choice be based on binary comparisons? J Math Sociol 1:t33142 Fishburn PC (1971) The theory of representative majority decision. Econometrica 39:273-284 Fishbum PC (1971) The theorem of the alternative in social choice theory. Oper Res 19:13231330 Fishburn PC (1971) A comparative analysis of group decision methods. Behav Sci 16:538-544 Fishburn PC (1972) Conditions on preferences that guarantee a simple majority winner. J Math Sociol 2:105-112 Fishburn PC (1972) A location theorem for single-peaked preferences. J Econ Theory 4:94-97 Fishburn PC (1972) Lotteries and social choices. J Econ Theory 5:189-207 Fishbum PC (1972) Even chance lotteries in social choice theory. Theory Decision 3:18-40 Fishburn PC (1972) Mathematics of decision theory. Mouton, The Hague Fishburn PC (1972) Social choice functions in group decision theory. In: Lesser A (Jr) (ed) Decision and risk analysis: powerful tools for management. Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, N J, pp 161-195 Fishburn PC (1973) A proof of May's theorem P(m,4) = 2P(m,3). Behav Sci 18:212 Fishburn PC (1973) Transitive binary social choices and intraprofile conditions. Econometrica 41:603-615 Fishburn PC (1973) Voter concordance, simple majorities and group decision methods. Behav Sci 18:364-376 Fishburn PC (1973) The theory of social choice. Princeton University Press, Princeton Fishburn PC (1973) Summation social welfare functions. Econometrica 41:1183-1196 Fishburn PC (1974) Social choice functions. SIAM Rev t6:63-90 Fishburn PC (1974) Single-peaked preferences and probabilities of cyclical majorities. Behav Sci 19:21-27 Fishburn PC (1974) On the sum-of-ranks winner when losers are removed. Discrete Math 8:2530 Fishburn PC (1974) Majority voting on risky investments. J Econ Theory 8:85-99 Fishburn PC (1974) Simple voting systems and majority rule. Behav Sci 19:166-176 Fishburn PC (1974) Subset choice conditions and the computations of social choice sets. Q J Econ 88:320-329 Fishburn PC (1974) Paradoxes of voting. Am Polit Sci Rev 68:537-548 Fishburn PC (1974) Impossibility theorems without the social completeness axioms. Econometrica 42:695-704 Fishburn PC (1974) On collective rationality and a generalized impossibility theorem. Rev Econ Stud 41(4):445-457 Fishbum PC (1974) Choice functions on finite sets. Int Econ Rev 15:729-749 Fishburn PC (1974) Aspects of one-stage voting rules. Manag Sci 21:422-427 Fishburn PC (1975) Three-valued representative systems. Math Syst Theory 9:265-280 Fishburn PC (1975) A probabilistic model of social choice: a comment. Rev Econ Stud 42(2):297-301 Fishburn PC (1975) Semiorders and choice functions. Econometrica 43:975-977 Fishburn PC (1976) Dictators on blocks: generalizations of social choice impossibility theorems. J Comb Theory Ser B 20:153-170 Fishbum PC (1977) Condorcet social choice functions. SIAM J Appl Math 33:469-489 Fishburn PC (1977) Models of individual preference and choice. Synthese 36:285-395 Fishburn PC (1978) Acceptable social choice lotteries. In: Gottinger HW, Leinfellner W (eds) Decision theory and social ethics. D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp 133-152 Fishburn PC (1978) Axioms for approval voting: direct proof, J Econ Theory 19:180-185 Fishburn PC (1978) A strategic analysis of nonranked voting systems. SIAM J Appl Math 35:488-495 Fishburn PC (1979) Symmetric and consistent aggregation with dichotomous voting. In: Laffont J-J (ed) Aggregation and revelation of preferences. North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp 201218

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