HUMAN

EVOLUTION

Vol. 3 - N.

5 ( 4 1 1 - 4 1 3 ) - 1988

Sociobiology and Epistemology edited by James H. Fetzer. (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985, pp. 282, Dfl. 120 - L. 33,25, ISBN 90 - 277 - 2005 - 3).

< is a collection of twelve papers on the conceptual, theoretical and epistemological aspects of sociohiology. The chapters are grouped into two parts: sociobiological conceptions and epistemological reflections. In the prologue, Lumsden and Gushurst contrast < sociobiology from the seventies with the new theories on gene-culture coevolution. They argue that much of human culture is sustained by gene-culture (rather than by pure cultural) transmission, in which innate epigenetic rules discriminate among multiple < and are more likely to use some rather than others. Part I begins with a chapter by Hanna who states that claims about the extent of genetic determinism are not based on an adequate epistemology. Where on often loosely speaks of <, Hanna's analysis focuses upon the terms < and <. In the next paper Brandon deals with genetic inheritance and phenotypic transmission. In his view, the ecological conditions that favour cultural transmission also favour phenotypic plasticity and hence a decreased degree of genetic determinism. So, two common criticisms of human sociobiology (<~culture makes man unique)), <~genetic determinism is wrong))) are here interconnected. One implication is that the central tenet of sociobiology - - the behaviours that evolve are those that maximize inclusive fitness - - does not necessarily hold true of a cultural species. One of the chapters that explore the implications of sociobiology for philosophy - rather than examining sociobiology from the perspective of philosophy - - is Masters's. Discussing five fundamental biological concepts, this author suggests that Aristotelian ethics and the dialectical traditions from Plato to Hegel appear to be reinforced by biological theories, while positions like those of the Sophists (~simple relativists~)) or the English empiricists (favouring the tabula rasa view of the mind) are challenged. In the next paper, Thomas argues that there is no reason to suppose that evolutionary biology is hostile to morality. He endeavours to show that the attitude of respect which morality requires of us comes in the wake of parental love. Part II, ~Epistemological reflections~, begins with a chapter on the <~unit of selectiom~ problem. Richardson contends that a priori arguments favouring genic selectionism as an acceptable explanation of evolutionary changes are inadequate. On the other hand, criticism of genic selectionism fails when it concludes to higher-level units of selection from the mere existence of context-dependence of genic effects. That sociobiologists are up against the problem of describing the units which face selection, is underlined by Rosenberg. Greater sophistication about what a ~part~ is, is desirable: How are organisms to be carved up into parts which face selective forces as 9

Editrice I1 Sedicesimo - Firenze

ISSN 0393-9375

412

REWEW

units? For the rest, Rosenberg's paper defends adaptationist (in his parlance adaptationalist) programs against criticism by Lewontin and Gould. The latter authors - - two of the most cited in this book, by the way - - reproach adaptationalists for maintaining <~thenear omnipotence of natural selection in forging organic design and fashioning the best among possible worlds)~, just as Voltaire's Dr. Pangloss found that the nose has its shape to enable us to wear glasses. Rosenberg replies that the methodological imperative to search for adaptations everywhere, is an essential feature of the type of theory which natural selection theory is. <~There is no alternative to adaptationalism short of surrendering the theory of evolution itsel6~. In sociobiological arguments, behaviourist assumptions are at work. This is argued by Sober, who firstly defends methodological behaviourism (i.e., the thesis that inner states need not be postulated to explain behaviour) as a technique, though probably not the technique, for explaining behaviour. In so far as an important style of evolutionary model building provides insights by abstracting away from the details of proximate mechanism, evolutionary theory is a context in which the strategy of methodological behaviourism is pursued. The author compares the common-cause explanation with the explanation in terms of separate causation. The first is the standard sociobiological pattern of explanation, e.g., incest avoidance as a behavioural homology or parallelism in human beings and other species. The second is highlighted by the critics of sociobiology, e.g., ~slave making~ in ant species and human beings as merely analogous or convergent. The last two chapters of Part II offer analyses of the logical structure and epistemic standing of sociobiological theory. According to Thompson, the methodological criticisms of sociobiology indicate a problem with the application of sociobiological theory to certain phenomena (especially human behaviour) and not one with the theory itself. What we need, are theories - - quite independent of sociobiological theory - - that relate human behaviour to physiology in order to apply sociobiological theory to human behaviour. He prefers the <~semantio) view of theory structure to the more familiar ~syntacticab) conception of theories. The first accomodates the complexities of applying theories to phenomena because it distinguishes between theories and the application of theories. Fetzer considers both the standard and the semantical conception to be inadequate and adopts a conception of scientific theories as first advanced by C~Vn'BELL (1920). He formalizes the basic assumptions underlying sociobiology to illustrate their logical structure. In his view, there appears to be no reasonable criterium of demarcation -- concerning logical structure, theoretical vocabulary, or empirical testability - - that sociobiology is not able to fulfill. The epilogue explores, once again, the implications of sociobiology for philosophy, especially epistemology. According to Ruse, Edward Wilson is right to say that Darwinian evolutionary theory is relevant to our understanding of knowledge. The logic and methodology of science emerge as the products of epigenetic rules (innate dispositions in development), and these have supposedly be en forged in the evolutionary struggle for survival and reproduction. Scientists and proto-humans are linked by the same epigenetic rules. One epigenetic rule (or set of rules) directs us to think causally. The same applies to our valuation of simplicity and unification. As regards the philosophical predecessors: ~Wilsonian evolutionary epistemology is Hume's philosophy viewed through the lens of neo-Darwinian sociobiology~. Admittedly, I did not feel able to judge the merits of each paragraph in this volume. While reading, once or twice I doubted whether I perceived an extremely elegant explanation or rather a dubious simplification. In any case, this book offers interesting reading, not really hindered by the many, but minor, printing errors. While some chapters

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focus upon topics which are sociobiological rather than philosophical (especially human sociobiology, e.g. gene-culture coevolution, evolutionary origins of moral attitudes), others analyze the epistemological status of sociobiology (problem of falsifiability, logical structure, analyses of primary concepts, etc.), and a third category explores the philosophical consequences of sociobiology (ethics, epistemology). Thus, the reader gets a clear idea of the various themes on the philosophy-sociobiology borderline. While the volume as a whole offers a view of the present discussions taking place on this interface, the papers themselves certainly are contributions to the discussion. The useful indices of names and subjects run to 16 pages. FRANK ZEISS

Dept. o] Biology, Hogeschool Midden-Nederland, Utrecht, Netherlands.

Direttore responsabile: Prof. BRUNETTO CHIARELLI Stampato a Firenze dalla Tipografia ~I1 Sedicesimo~ - Febbraio 1989 Autorizzazione de1 Tribunale eli Firenze del 2 maggio 1986, n. 3457