ISSN 10193316, Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2015, Vol. 85, No. 3, pp. 223–228. © Pleiades Publishing, Ltd., 2015. Original Russian Text © N.S. Bortnikov, 2015, published in Vestnik Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk, 2015, Vol. 85, Nos. 5–6, pp. 431–437.

General Meeting of the Russian Academy of Sciences DOI: 10.1134/S1019331615030065

Strategic Mineral Resources of the Russian Arctic Paper by Academician N. S. Bortnikov* Mineral raw material resources are necessary for each country to ensure its vital activity. In Russia’s economy, the mineral raw materials base plays a partic ular role, since revenues from subsurface use, primarily from the extraction and export of hydrocarbons, make up no less than 42% of federal budget profits. Russia’s role in geopolitics and the world economy in many aspects depends on the unit cost, quantity, and quality of mineral raw materials extracted from the earth. The value of metals from deposits located on Russian terri tory is mainly determined not by the contribution to the budget from their sale, but by the role in supplying the defense industry and supporting and increasing quality of life standards in the long term. All of this requires the improvement of modern high technologies. Since the Iron Age, the growth of civilization has in many aspects been shaped by the use of metals, including the creation of new materials. Despite the fact that today organic and organometallic synthetic materials (e.g., plastics, graphite, and silicon and composite materials) are serious competitors, the situ ation, at least in the foreseeable future, will not change substantially. Moreover, owing to an increase in demand for metals, their production increases twofold every 20–25 years. Thus, the total production of cop per over the whole history up to 2012 was, by expert estimates, 611 million tons, and the demand for cop per for 2013–2037 is predicted at 620–680 million tons [1]; i.e., for the next 25 years, it is assumed that the total amount of copper produced will be equivalent to that of its entire previous history. Scientific and technical progress and the develop ment of high technologies are leading to rapid growth in the number of metals used in various sectors of industry. If in the 1980s–1990s, 20 metals were suffi cient to manufacture a computer microchip, then the manufacture of a modern item requires as many as 60. A comparable amount is necessary to produce the newest medical equipment. It is also important that among the metals used for hightech products, trace metals (indium, germanium, tellurium, gallium, etc.) * Institute of Geology of Ore Deposits, Petrography, Mineralogy, and Geochemistry, Russian Academy of Sciences. email: [email protected]

play a significant role. As a rule, they do not form proper ore deposits—accumulation of metals, the mining and extraction of which for existing technolo gies is economically rational and profitable; they are extracted as accessory minerals when reprocessing ores of critical raw material. For example, germanium and indium are predominantly extracted in the repro cessing of zinc (sphalerite) ores. Even such a metal as silver is primarily mined as an accessory product of mining operations. Therefore, the production of trace metals depends on the profitability of mining the main components. As soon as production of the latter becomes economically unfeasible, it ceases, along with the accessory ore components. In addition to the increasing growth in consump tion and the involvement of rare or hardtomine met als, the state of the art of the global mineral raw mate rials branch is characterized by monopolization of the hightech raw materials market. Here are some exam ples. Brazil provides 92% of niobium; the United States, 90% of beryllium; China, 98% of rare earth metals (REM), 87% of light REM and antimony, and 85% of tungsten; and the Congo, 56% of cobalt. South Africa and Russia together provide 88% of platinum group metals (PGM), 61 and 27%, respectively. Chile and Australia provide 70% of the lithium market (48 and 22%, respectively) [2]. All these metals play a key role in the production of hightech goods. The question arises: it is possible in the current conditions to ensure society’s demand at the expense of continuing to develop explored mineral deposits and the predicted discovery of new ones? Recently, an analysis was conducted of deposits discovered in the second half of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st century [1]. It turned out that from 1950 to 2000, the number of discovered deposits increased, although over the entire time, drops and rises were observed. Each year, 20–30 economically feasible deposits were discovered, i.e., deposits with estimated reserves of copper of more than 1 million tons; gold, more than 1 million ounces; nickel, more than 100000 t; and uranium(VI) oxide–diuranium(V) oxide U3O8, more than 25000 t (in the 1980s, the main share (60–80%) came from gold deposits). In the 2000s, despite the increase in geological exploration

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investments, the number of discoveries decreased down to 10–20 deposits per year. Hence it follows that the prospects at least for relatively easy discovery of new deposits have significantly decreased. Acknowledgment of the significance of mineral resources for national security has spurred the govern ments of a number of countries to begin developing concepts on strategic and/or critical minerals. Strate gic mineral raw materials include types that form the basis of leading hightech branches of production for the military and economic security of any state—min erals that are absent or are not reprocessed in the country in the necessary amounts and the reserves of which are insufficient to satisfy production in wartime or essentially depend on the purchase of raw materials abroad. In 1996, a Russian Government statute on strategic metals included uranium, manganese, chrome, copper, nickel, lead, molybdenum, tungsten, tin, zircon, tantalum, niobium, cobalt, scandium, beryllium, antimony, lithium, germanium, rhenium, heavy REM, gold, silver, PGM, titanium, diamond, bauxite, and piezo quartz. In the United States, the concept of critical minerals has been actively devel oped since 2006 [3]. Critical and strategic mineral resources differ, although there is no distinct boundary between these two groups. Strategic resources include those used in producing armaments, and critical resources include those necessary to obtain ecologically clean energy [4, 5]. In the EU, the United Kingdom and Austria usu ally use the concept of critical minerals and deem par ticular minerals as critical based on the state of national reserves, economic significance, and risks related to extraction and delivery [6, 7]. Thus, developed countries are concerned with how the quality of life and national security depend on the state of the national mineral raw materials branch, and they constantly monitor this. Let us see how this per tains to the Russian Arctic. In the subsoil of Russia’s Arctic territories is con centrated a significant diversity of genetic types of deposits that formed at different times, beginning approximately 2.5 billion years ago, in different geo dynamic and geological settings, such as: • magmatic copper–nickel deposits with PGM in layered intrusions of basic and ultrabasic rocks; • magmatic REE deposits in alkaline massifs and carbonatites; • diamond deposits in kimberlite tubes; • rare metal pegmatite deposits; • granitoidmagmatismrelated hydrothermal deposits of gold, silver, copper, molybdenum, tin, and tungsten, including porphyric; • epithermal gold, silver, and antimony deposits;

• escalationsedimentary lead and zinc deposits; and • gravel deposits (including ancient, buried). In the Russian National Register, deposits are clas sified according to 23 types of metals: ferrous (iron, manganese, chrome, titanium), nonferrous (alumi num, tin, tungsten, copper, nickel, molybdenum, lead, zinc, mercury), rare (tantalum, niobium, zircon, REE), and precious (gold, silver, and platinoids). Strategic metal deposits in the Arctic zone have been successfully exploited or they have been pros pected in other countries. In the United States (Alaska), 19 such deposits have been found; in Can ada, 22; in Denmark (Greenland) and Norway, 6 each; in Sweden, 9; and in Finland, 3. Twentyfour deposits have active mines, and 41 are potentially industrial objects: some of them are already being prepared for exploitation; others are finishing up detailed surveys. The majority of Arctic deposits are complex; i.e., they contain a significant amount of accessory, poten tially extractable metals. It is also noteworthy that the ferrous, nonferrous, precious, and rare metal deposits in the Arctic zone contain the most volumesignificant strategic metal reserves (nickel, cobalt, REM, PGM, tantalum, niobium, lithium, and to a lesser extent, gold and tin) in Russia. These deposits also contain the lion’s share of Russian strategic metal mining. Let us consider the situation with the production of each in more detail. Russia holds first place in the world in mining and reserves of nickel. The chief source of the metal is mag matic sulfide copper–nickel ores of the Norilsk (85%) and Pechenga (10%) ore regions. They provide around 97% of mined nickel, including the Norilsk (~80%) and Pechenga (17%) ore regions. Despite significant reserves, there is a large share of lowgrade ore in the structure of these deposits; therefore, it is necessary to replace reserves of highgrade solid and brecciated ores, which constitute more than 85% of what is mined today. An overwhelming amount of domestic cobalt is available and mined in the Arctic zone, 75 and 85%, respectively. Cobalt is mainly obtained as a byproduct extracted from copper–nickel ore of deposits in the Norilsk region, 5.8% of world production (3.3% of active world reserves); to a lesser extent, from copper nickel ore of the Zhdanovsk deposit in Murmansk oblast. However, copper–nickel deposits rich in cobalt in Norilsk will be processed only over the next 12– 15 years [8]. The world’s largest tin mineral raw materials base is concentrated in Russia’s Arctic zone. There are two unique alluvial tin ore regions: North Yanskii (Yaku tia) and Pyrkakaiskii (Chukotka). Despite this, pro duction of this metal in Russia has been steadily drop ping, which has caused a reduction in export and the

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impossibility of satisfying domestic demand, allevi ated by importing it from China. In the 1990s, mining of tin from ore and alluvial deposits in these regions exceeded 10000 t per year, but today, just like tungsten mining, it has ceased. On the whole, Russian tin deposits are estimated at more than 2.2 million tons, 1.5 times exceeding the reserves of China, the world’s largest producer of this metal [9]. Meanwhile, tin min ing in Russia in 2013 produced in total 300 t, whereas in China, it was 100000 t [10]. The share of tin reserves in Russia’s Arctic zone is around 50% of the country’s total reserves. In the north of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia), more than a third of these reserves are concentrated, with another 11.5% in cassiterite–tourmaline ores of the Deputat deposit. The Pyrkakaiskoe tin–tungsten deposit is the largest in Russia. The tin reserves here are estimated at 347000 t (16% of Russia’s reserves). Nevertheless, it is believed that, without changing the state of the world market for raw tin ore and increasing demand in domestic industry, exploitation of Arctic tin deposits will prove difficult. It should be added that tin ore deposits are also important for producing trace metals. In the Soviet Union, significant amounts of indium were extracted, although this metal is commonly obtained in the reprocessing of zinc (sphalerite) ores. Indium is widely used in the production of sensor panels and screens, medical equipment, and other areas of electrical and electronic technologies. In the opinion of a number of experts, the demand for indium can double or triple by 2030 [11]. Back in 2009, of the 470 t of total indium produced in the world, Japan used 240; the United States, 110; and China, 50 [12]. In 2013 Russia pro duced only 13 t. Obviously, for a country striving to become a developed hightech power, this level of pro duction is insufficient to satisfy the possible domestic demand, and it is hardly worthwhile to import a metal that is in short supply. In Russia’s production of other strategic nonfer rous metals—copper, tungsten, molybdenum, zinc, and lead—the Arctic territories play a lesser role. We should also note the substantial contribution of the magmatic copper–nickel deposits of Norilsk and Pechenga to the production of copper, 54% of the total production volume. The share of tungsten reserves in Russia’s Arctic zone is not large: 5.1%. This metal is concentrated in the tin–tungsten ores of the Pyrkakai skoe and Odinokoe deposits, and alluvial deposits of the Odinokoe deposit, where 123 t of bismuth and 5 t of indium are concentrated as accessory metals. There are 21200 t of tungsten reserves in Chukotka, where there are quartzcassiterite ore networks embedded in the roof of an unexposed granitoid massif. The share of Arctic molybdenum reserves has increased to 4.7% after the discovery of the Peschanka copper–porphyry deposit in Chukotka. Zinc reserves in the Arctic make HERALD OF THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

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up 13% of the total Russian reserves, and production is limited to 3.25%; production of lead is even less, 4.3%. The Arctic’s contribution to lead and zinc production can change owing to the discovery on Novaya Zemlya of the Pavlovsk stratiform lead–zinc deposit with explored reserves of 1.9 million tons of zinc and 0.5 million tons of lead, which makes up more than a fourth of Russia’s zinc resources and a fifth of its lead resources [9]. There are also 672 t of silver. The explored reserves of PGM on Russian territory are estimated at 15400 t, which make up onesixth of the global volumes of these metals. According to this indicator, Russia occupies second place in the world after South Africa, in the subsoil of which is concen trated no less than 62000 t PGM [9]. Russia is the chief producer of palladium and holds 40% of the world market. In contrast, Russia’s share in the world production of platinum is only 14%. An overwhelming part of the reserves and volumes of production are from the Norilsk ore deposits located in the Arctic zone: more than 98% of explored reserves and 95.4% of production. Although the PGM reserves in Norilsk are estimated to last more than 40 years, it is impossi ble to ignore the existing problems in exploiting these ores [9]. Here ores rich in copper (4.8%), nickel (1.9%), and platinum (11.8 g/t) are selectively pro cessed. The average contents are as follows: copper, 1.7%; nickel, 0.84%; and platinum, 4.7 g/t. A rapid reduction in reserves of rich ores and their complete processing may make exploitation economically unfeasible. One possible solution may be a transition to separate reprocessing of heavy and impregnated ores, which will increase extraction of PGM. Orienta tion of Russia’s platinummining industry only toward Norilsk deposits is considered by specialists to be unpromising [13]. The increase in PGM reserves in Russia is related to the discovery of lowsulfide plati noid ores in the Arctic zone, namely, in Murmansk oblast. PGM ores have also been explored in the East Pansk, Volchetundra, Monchetundra, and Fudorovtundra massifs and other regions; on the whole, there reserves reach 1000 t [14]. D.A. Dodin and colleagues estimate platinum reserves in Russia’s Arctic zone of up to 12000 t. Thus, available explored and hypothetical PMG reserves in the Arctic can ensure Russia leading positions in world production and completely satisfied domestic demand. Reserves and production of gold in the Arctic zone make up 11.2 and 9.75% of total Russian volumes. These values significantly exceed the share of the Arc tic in contemporary world production and world gold reserves, 2.87 and 3.25%, respectively. In Russia, gold is concentrated both in gold ore deposits proper and in copper–nickel deposits as an accessory metal (Norilsk). The Oktyabr’skoe and Talnakhskoe depos its are among the ten largest Russian gold deposits with reserves of 273.4 and 196.7 t, respectively. In 2013, the Vol. 85

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production from these ores was 4.5 t, i.e., 2.3% of the total volume of metals produced in Russia (237.8 t according to [15]). Chief gold production in Russia’s Arctic zone is from gold ore deposits proper in the Chukotka Auton omous District. One of the important producers of this metal is the Kupol epithermal gold–silver deposit [16]. In 2013, 15 t of gold was extracted from its ores; overall, it has produced more than 100 t over seven years of exploitation. This deposit, located in a caldera 10 km wide in the boundary part of a volcanotectonic depression filled with a bimodal volcanogenic com plex, contains ten years’ worth of reserves. Quartz– adularia veins, mineralized breccia, and frameworks have formed in the hydrothermally magmatic system as a result of boiling and mixing of magmatic and meteoric fluids [17]. Development of the Kupol deposit confirms the significant prospects of the Okhotsk–Chukotka volcanoplutonic belt as the most important goldore metallogenic structure. This gold and silverbearing structure is of no less world impor tance than the Andean and Balkan–Carpathian met allogenic belts, where many large precious metal deposits are concentrated. There are every grounds to hope that in the longterm study of known ore mani festations on its territory, epithermal ore deposits will be discovered, similar to what occurred in recent years in the Pacific Ore Belt in Indonesia, Peru, Japan, Chile, Argentina, and Papua New Guinea. The increase in production of precious metals in the Chukotka Autonomous District is related to the commissioning in 2013 of an enrichment plant in the Maiskoe orogenic gold ore deposit. The ores of this deposit are embedded in black slate columns, and their formation is related to granitoid magnetism and contactmetamorphic processes that generated large volumes of aqueouscarbonic fluids that migrated along transcrustal faults and outlying large deposits of goldsulfide ores [18]. The Maiskoe is a worldclass deposit with gold reserves of around 230 t and is one of the largest in Russia. A specific feature is that its ores are “stubborn,” hard to extract; therefore, its intro duction into exploitation is evidence of success that Russia can develop technology in the near future for a whole series of similar deposits, including in adjacent regions, e.g., Nezhdaninskoe in Yakutia and Natalkin skoe in Magadan oblast [19–22]. Experts believe there are significant prospects for developing the goldproduction industry in Russia’s Arctic zone via exploitation of the Peschanka copper– porphyry deposit. It is located in the boundary zone of a multiphase pluton in a linear (with a thickness of up to 25 km and extent of up to 200 km) overlap zone of the Okhotsk–Chukotka volcanic belt on the Omo lonsk microcontinent. The framework is tied to the stock of quartzmonzonitic porphyry and series of dikes. Ore formation is related to the activity of the

hydrothermal magmatic system and the separation of fluids during magma crystallization. The deposit is complex: in addition to gold and silver with deposits estimated at 450 and 6000 t, respectively, it contains 7.9 million tons of copper and 138000 t of molybdenum, as well as rhenium and platinoids. The discovery of such a unique gold–copper–porphyry deposit fundamentally changes the notion of the region’s metallogenic poten tial, since it is now possible to forecast the discovery of such deposits, which play the main role in the global production of gold, copper, molybdenum, and rhenium. Arctic territories are of interest from the viewpoint of rare metals production. The Lovozerskoe loparite ore deposit, related to a nepheline syenite pluton (Mur mansk oblast), remains one of the most important sources of tantalum ore in Russia. The deposit makes up 36.2% of balance reserves, 57.5% of predicted resources, and 65% of total Russian production. This deposit is also the only source of niobium in Russia. Interest in PGM has increased since they have become irreplaceable components in many hightech items, including magnets, batteries, automobiles, tele visions, computers, turbines, and medical technology; they are used in communication systems, the defense industry, and as catalyzers. The main source of PGM is China (around 95%), whose reserves make up around 50% of global reserves [23]. In PGM, Russia occupies second place in the world (19–21%) [23], but it produces only 2% [10]. Russia’s main reserves of REM are concentrated in deposits located in the Arctic zone. They are accessory components and are extracted from loparite ores of the Lovozerskoe deposit, the average content of total rare earth oxides in which is 1.12% (loparite is a rare earth titanate enriched in niobium (Ce, Na, Sr, Ca)(Ti, Nb, Ta, Fe+3)O3). Explored REM deposits of the Lovozer skoe deposit, primarily represented by cerium group metals, makes up more that 25% of total Russian reserves; production is 2500 t of REM oxides. More than 40% of Russian REM reserves are con centrated in apatite–nepheline ores of the Khibinsk group deposits, which have been developed for phos phor, but REM here are not extracted; instead they are stored in milltailing plants. In 2011, 80100 t of REM trioxides were produced. Two deposits of the Khibinsk group, Partomchorr and Olenii Ruchei, continue to be exploited. The commissioning of a pilot project to extract REM from apatite concentrate is planned at the Olenii Ruchei deposit [9]. Yet another REM deposit is in the carbonatites of the Tomtorskoe deposit (Yakutia). Presently, the Tom torskoe deposit is not being developed, since it is located in a hardtoreach, little explored region; only the Burannyi sector has been surveyed, whose share of the total Russian reserves are not as large as the depos its in Murmansk oblast (0.7%). However, this sector is

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unique owing to the exceptionally high content of REM trioxides: 9.53% (12.8% in weathering crust and up to 7.98% in crustal ores). The main ore compo nents are niobium, REM, and scandium. For compar ison, the Bayan Obo deposit (China), the rare earth production of which is 97% of the world market, con tains ores with REM trioxide concentrations of around 10%. In Tomtorskoe ores there are other stra tegic minerals: niobium (6.71% Nb2O5), yttrium (0.595% Y2O3), and scandium (0.048% Sc2O3). In the Arasha deposit in Brazil (on the order of 80% of global niobium production), ores contain 2.5% of nio bium(V) oxide: the ores of the Tomtorskoe deposit are no worse in quality than the chief world producers. Lithium is another metal whose value in recent years has considerably increased due to use in high tech branches in the production of alternative energy sources, accumulators for the automobile industry, and batteries for portable electronic devices. Accord ing to experts from the United States and the Euro pean Union, lithium is not a critical metal, since its supply from Chile and Australia is not associated with risk. In Russia, the main lithium reserves are concen trated in the Kolmozerskoe, Polmostundra, and Voron’etundra deposits of spodumene pegmatites (Murmansk oblast). The ores of these deposits are complex: they contain tantalum, niobium, and beryl lium, which can be extracted as accessory compo nents. It is believed that 750000 t of ore per year can be strip mined at the Kolmozerskoe deposit, including 2000 t of lithium carbonate, 30 t of tantalum pentaflu oride, and 38 t of niobium pentafluoride over the course of more than 65 years. Zirconium is also one of the metals whose demand in Russia is stably increasing: demand for zirconium oxide may reach 60000–75000 t by 2015 [14]. Raw zirconium in Russia is mined at the Kovdorskoe deposit in Murmansk oblast only as an accessory min eral from complex brazilite–apatite–magnetite ores, in which 5.4% of Russia’s total zirconium reserves are concentrated [9]. Note that, in terms of zirconium dioxide reserves, Russia occupies third place in the world behind Australia and South Africa, but in terms of production level, it lags: less than 1% of world vol ume. The uniqueness of Kovdorskoe ores lies in the fact that they consist of brazilite (natural zirconium dioxide) and are economically feasible due to the low unit cost of obtaining compounds of this metal. Hafnium is extracted from them as an accessory com ponent. The value of Kovdorskoe ores is also great because the complex zirconium–tantalum–niobium ores of the Katuginskoe deposit in Zabaikalskii krai and the UlugTansekskoe deposit in the Tyva Republic (32 and 30% or Russian reserves) are laborintensive and their production is unprofitable. In Russia’s Arctic zone and adjacent regions, there are two large diamondbearing kimberlite provinces: HERALD OF THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

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the Yakutsk and Arkhangelsk [8, 14]. The Sakha Republic (Yakutia) is the chief producer of diamonds: 84% of reserves and 99% of production in Russia, with 47 deposits, 17 of which are native and 30 are placer deposits, with reserves of over 1.1 billion carats. The majority of placer deposits and industrial diamond bearing pipes are concentrated in the Arctic zone. Two diamond deposits are well known on the territory of Arkhangelsk oblast: the M.V. Lomonosov and V. Grib deposits. The total diamond reserves are estimated at approximately 310 million carats. However, problems are coming to a head in the diamondmining industry, linked to the possible transition to underground min ing of raw material, which will lead to a rise in costs and reduction in profitability [24]. CONCLUSIONS Strategic metal resources in the circumpolar zone play an important role in the structure of Russia’s min eral raw materials base, ensuring the largest supply to the domestic and international market. Russia’s Arctic zone has unique reserves and diversity of strategic metal deposits, which can for many decades satisfy the demands of hightech production, an innovation econ omy, and a system for maintaining national security. Analysts believe that big deposits are not just big money: significant ore volumes assume longterm exploitation of deposits and, as a result, stable development of the region and an increase in, or at least retention of, jobs. In recent years, the Russian and international mining industry has been paying increasing attention to Arctic resources, which manifests itself in the revival of mining surveys in new regions (Chukotka, Taimyr, Alaska, Nunavut, Greenland) and is accompanied by an increase in mining volumes, mainly of gold, copper, nickel, and zinc at active works, as well as by renewed mining of lead–zinc and tungsten ores at mothballed deposits. In unexplored regions of the circumpolar zone, of greatest interest are, first, Norilsktype nonferrous metal deposits (nickel, cobalt, copper, PGM); second, large lead, zinc, and silver SEDEXtype deposits (Red Dog in Alaska, Pavlovskoe on Novaya Zemlya); third are precious metal deposits (bonanza epithermal gold and silverbearing deposits (Kupol, Dvoinoi, etc., in Chukotka), gold–sulfide impregnated deposits (Maiskoe in Chukotka), gold deposits associated with granitoid intrusions (Fort Knox, Pogo, Kensington in Alaska), gold–quartz deposits in turbidites (Karal’veem in Chukotka), gold deposits in greenstone belts (Meadowbank, Nunavut, and the Northern Ter ritories of Canada), and large gold and PGM placers (alluvial and coastalmarine, like in the Yukon, Nome, and Chukotka)); finally, the fourth group of deposits are rich in copper–molybdenum, copper–gold, molybdenum–tungsten, and tin ores suitable for obtaining indium as well as in uranium and REM. Vol. 85

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The prospects for exploiting Arctic strategic metal deposits, in addition to the volumes and diversity of their ores, are determined in many aspects by proxim ity to the Northern Sea Route and navigable rivers, which significantly increases the economic feasibility of mining works. The environmental risk is the main factor hindering the construction of new mines in the Arctic (the Pebble and Donlin ore giants in Alaska). Today, the door to the Arctic’s natural resources is barely open; only a small part of the minerals here are used, mainly because there is no demand in domestic industry for many of these strategic metals. Therefore, in estimating the geological and economic prospects of a particular region, it is necessary to answer the fol lowing questions: • Are there sufficient volumes of mineral resources? • In this region, is it possible to mine ores and extract useful components from them at the current state of the art? • It is possible to mine and reprocess ores without damage or with minimal risk to the environment and population? • Will raw material production be economically feasible in the region? ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The work was financially supported by the program of the RAS Presidium “Exploration Basic Research in the Interests of Developing the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation.” REFERENCES 1. R. C. Schoodde, Recent trends in mineral explora tions—are we finding enough?. http://www.minexcon sulting.com/publications/nov2011.html. Cited April 29, 2015. 2. Study on Critical Raw Materials at EU Level: Final Report 2013 (2013). 3. T. E. Graedel, R. Barr, T. E. Chandler, et al., “Method ology of metal criticality,” Environ. Sci. Technol. 46, 1063 (2012). 4. Minerals, Critical Minerals, and the U.S. Economy (National Academy Press, Washington, 2008). 5. US Industrial College of Armed Forces: Spring Report 2012 (2012). 6. M. Brehmer, F. Smulders, and D. P. Peck, “Critical metals: A research agenda for production develop ment,” in Proc. International Association of Societies of Design Research, the 4th World Conference on Design Research (Delft Univ. of Technol., Delft, 2011). 7. T. E. Graedel, G. Gunn, and L. T. Espinoza, “Metal resources, use, and criticality,” in Critical Metals Hand book (John Wiley & Sons, Oxford, 2014).

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HERALD OF THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

Translated by A. Carpenter Vol. 85

No. 3

2015