Neth Int Law Rev DOI 10.1007/s40802-017-0080-7 ARTICLE

The European World of Insolvency Tourism: Renewed, But Still Brave? Peter Mankowski1

 T.M.C. Asser Press 2017

Abstract Insolvency tourism and COMI migration have become key features in modern European international insolvency law. Fostered, in particular, by the ingenuity of the English insolvency industry. Yet it has not gone unanswered. The Recast European Insolvency Regulation introduces a not insignificant number of counter-measures as well as an antidote in the shape of a look-back period. Furthermore, as a prospective aftermath of Brexit, the race is on once more in the field of pre-insolvency restructuring measures. Keywords Insolvency tourism
European Insolvency Regulation (Recast)
Centre of main interest
COMI migration
Look-back period
Restructuring
Pre-isolvency measures
Scheme of Arrangement
Brexit

1 Introduction At long last not even mad cow disease could prevent the original European Insolvency Regulation (EIR) from entering into existence.1 This might appear to be an odd pun, but it refers to delicacies that really occurred in, and severely hampered, the genesis of the EIR. In 1995 and after some thirty years of prolonged negotiations the predecessor of the EIR, the European Insolvency Convention2 (the Convention), had finally reached the stage of a convention open for signature by the Member States of the then EC. Yet it required all the Member States to sign and ratify before it could enter into force. Simultaneously, mad cow disease broke out and prompted sanctions against the 1

Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings [2000] OJ L 160/1.

2

European Insolvency Convention of 23 November 1995.

& Peter Mankowski [email protected] 1

Universita¨t Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany

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United Kingdom. In turn, the United Kingdom declared that the lifting of these sanctions was a prerequisite for it to sign the Convention. And so, mad cow disease provided the ultimate coup de graˆce for the Convention.3 Fortunately, this was not the end of the story. The new (then) Community competence under Articles 61(c) and 65 of the renewed EC Treaty as introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam revitalised the stricken project, and the joint forces of Commission and Council brought forward the EIR which was based on the Convention but for a few slight alterations mainly related to the final clauses. The original EIR occupied centre stage amongst the first acts of Community legislation based on this new competence. In this regard it served as a political ground-breaker in the field of international procedural law and was an important pawn in the Commission’s game of occupying new territory. How quickly it became law in action came as something of a surprise, though. Apparently Europe had yearned for some international or supranational regulation on cross-border insolvencies for a long time, although it was not aware of this. Shortly after the original EIR entered into force on 31 May 20024 decisions by national courts began to flow, and this flood has not stopped ever since. There is no other area of international procedural law where such an intense dialogue and communication between the courts of the Member States can be detected. When was one able to witness a clash of judgments, for instance, between Italy and Ireland or between the UK, on the one hand, and Germany or France, on the other, and to see such a clash being commented upon in legal writing throughout Europe before the advent of the EIR? The original EIR made it happen. Fierce battles have been fought over issues of jurisdiction. The Centre of Main Interests and its acronym COMI have gained notoriety as the ground of jurisdiction for opening main insolvency proceedings which Article 3(1) of the original EIR promulgated. The case names of the famous European bankruptcies, both great and small, have become household names. Parmalat/ Eurofood,5 Rover,6 Daisytek,7 Collins & Aikman,8 Eurotunnel,9 Stojevic,10 BenQ,11 Brochier,12 PIN13 still make the experts lick their lips in sheer delight. 3

Cf. only Balz (1996), p. 948.

4

Pursuant to Art. 47(1) EIR 2000.

5

Case C-341/03 Eurofood IFSC Ltd. [2006] ECR I-3813.

6

Re MG Rover Deutschland GmbH, Neue Zeitschrift fu¨r Insolvenz- und Sanierungsrecht (NZI) 2005, 567; with note by Mankowski (2006b), p. 416.

7

Re Daisytek-ISA Ltd. [2003] BCC 562.

8

In the matters of Collins & Aikman Europe SA [2006] EWHC 1343 (Ch); noted by Mankowski (2006a), p. 623.

9

Cass. com. JurisData n 2009-048941; Cass. com. JurisData n 2009-019180; Cass. com. 30.6.2009, n 08-11.904; Cass. com. 30.6.2009, n 08-11.905; Cass. com. 30.6.2009, n 08-11.906; Cass. com. Bull. Joly Socie´te´s 2011, 426 with note d’Avout = Rev. socie´te´s 2011, 443 with note Mastrullo = Rev. proce´d. coll. 2011 comm. 174 Menjucq. 10 ¨ JZ) 2007, 325; OLG Wien 9 November OGH 30 November 2006, O¨sterreichische Juristen-Zeitung (O 2014, NZI 2015, 56 with note Paulus (2005a). 11

Rb. Amsterdam 31 January 2007, Zeitschrift fu¨r Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) 2007, 492; noted by Mankowski (2007).

12

AG Nu¨rnberg 15 August 2006, ZIP 2007, 81; noted by Duursma-Kepplinger (2007).

13

AG Ko¨ln 19 February 2008, NZI 2008, 257.

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Sometimes enormous amounts of money are at stake, and this made practitioners specialised in insolvency very interested in learning how to instrumentalise the EIR and its inherent opportunities and in developing ever new tactics. Particularly the Big Four14 dominating the insolvency business in the UK amply showed their ingenuity. London and the UK in general (but particularly England) have initially risen to some sort of European Delaware for the insolvency of groups of companies—with continental lawyers and courts not failing to develop counterstrategies. Secondary insolvency proceedings—so long a dormant beauty almost never to be kissed—get their fair share of fame as a very dangerous and effective weapon (and, in turn, strategies were developed to avoid them, primarily giving assurances to local creditors15 as has now become recognised in Article 36 EIR 2015). And the loaden and fraudulent natural persons look for the place to be declared bankrupt in order to obtain a discharge as soon or as comprehensive as possible, thus producing a genuinely new kind of cross-border insolvency tourism. Again the UK tells one important chapter of the story, and it has become quite common for debtors with foreign connections to come there to seek bankruptcy on their own petition.16 But France17 (and more specifically the De´partements BasRhin, Haut-Rhin and Moselle,18 all located in Alsace-Lorraine) gained the lead in this race for a while19 until a concerted effort by French20 and German courts downed the intentions of the fraudulent hopefuls. Finally, ‘merry old England’ regained the top-level of attraction.21 Puns abounded: ‘British Courts are satisfied, Continental Europe is not amused’22 or ‘Eurofood for thought’.23 Sometimes even today the plain non-recognition of English insolvencies or English discharges, on the grounds of COMI manipulation, is a brutal counter-device24 (albeit disregarding Eurofood25). COMI migration and in particular insolvency tourism shifting one’s COMI shortly before filing for insolvency from one jurisdiction to another has become a very prominent feature. So-called ‘insolvency planning’ has 14

The remaining Big Four of accountancy after the demise of Arthur Andersen, that is.

15

Omar (2015), pp. 437–438.

16

As acknowledged by Ch.D. 22 June 2007, no. 1338/2007, Zeitschrift fu¨r Verbraucherinsolvenz (ZVI) 2008, 168, 169 [12] (Ch.D., Registrar Baister). 17 The possibility of a faillite civile was extended beyond corporate debtors to freelancers only as recently as 2005 by Loi n 2005-845 de 26 juillet 2005, J.O. 2005, 12187, introducing Art. L 670-1 Code de commerce. 18

A detailed apprehension might be found in Delzant and Schu¨tze (2008), p. 540; Cornette (2013), p. 1115.

19

See Ho¨lzle (2007), p. 2.

20

Cour d’appel Colmar 15 March 2005, X c/Procureur de la Re´publique; Cour d’appel Colmar 31 January 2006, X c/Procureur de la Re´publique, Juris-Data n 2006-293873; Cour d’appel Colmar 11 April 2006, Revue juridique des entreprises (RJE) 2006, 66. 21

See the musing by Vallender (2008), p. 632.

22

Duursma-Kepplinger (2003), p. 182.

23

Cohen and Forbes (2012), p. 52.

24

Most recently BFH 27 January 2016, ZIP 2016, 2027, 2029 with note Fuchs (2016), p. 929 and note Paulus (2017), p. 84. 25

Case C-341/03 Eurofood IFSC Ltd. [2006] ECR I-3813.

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become big business, somewhere between basic routines (which have developed over time) and is now increasingly advancing into uncharted territory. In the company sector insolvency planning can rapidly prove itself to be rather costintensive and expensive. Advance planning in most cases requires taking advice, and the implementation of such advice might consume considerable sums, too. The most prominent example for this is the pioneer case26 of Schefenacker27 originally28 believed to establish a trend and to become the frontrunner for the migration of companies particularly from Germany to the United Kingdom. But, apparently, more than 40 million Euros in expenses for lawyers, other advisors and investment bankers29 severely clouded the result of reaching a Company Voluntary Agreement and proved too high a price eventually.30 Matters became somewhat out of hand. The copycats and fellow travellers learned and adapted. The Solvent Scheme of Arrangement became the rising sun.31 The initial age of confrontation might have gone, and an age of co-operation is said to have begun, but sometimes even what appears to be, at face value, an attempt to co-operate might turn out differently as some try to regain hegemony.32 Crossborder insolvency planning has developed as a branch of business that was previously unknown at least in the present dimension. A whole industry of lawyers and accountants live off it. Advertisements are placed in the WWW leering at the general public and promising any possible support including a search for accommodation, contacting official bodies and, if appropriate, establishing and registering a Limited or other corporate veil in order to reduce the amount of assets open for seizure by creditors.33 Within a few years in European cross-border insolvency one has seen the ‘ages’ of confrontation, of migration and of cooperation. It is an easy shot to predict that there are more ‘ages’ still to come. In short: the EIR has generated a veritable storm over Europe. At first glance, crossborder insolvency might seem to be a dry and dull topic which is remote from practice. The very opposite is true. Cross-border insolvency has emerged and redeemed itself as the most sparkling and most interesting area, as the boom area,34 of contemporary international procedural law.35 It is the ground for very deft and 26

See In re Schefenacker plc, CVA 1674 of 2007 (Ch.D.); Griffiths and Hellmig (2008), pp. 419 et seq.

27

For details of the migration element see https//www.companieshouse.gov.uk, Company No. 059063065.

28

See only Konecny (2008), p. 421.

29

‘Schefenacker trickst Insolvenzrecht aus’, Handelsblatt 3 May 2007, http://www.handelsblatt.com/ unternehmen/industrie/schefenacker-trickst-insolvenzrecht-aus;1262943. 30

Bork (2010), p. 398 with fn. 9 and 10.

31

See Sect. 5 infra.

32

See Mankowski (2009b), p. 451 on Re Nortel Networks SA [2009] EWHC 206 (Ch).

33

Pel (2008), p. 153.

34

Hau (2007), p. 101.

35

That also holds true at the level of the national legislation of the Member States with for instance Germany and Belgium introducing new Acts dealing with cross-border insolvency with regard to nonMember States in recent years. For judicial developments in the same area see Cambridge Gas Transport Corp. v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2006] UKPC 26, [2006] 1 All ER (Comm) 695 (P.C.) in an Isle of Man-USA case (with note by Chee Ho Tham (2007), p. 129).

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intricate, sometimes even delicate planning36 and manoeuvring.37 It is the ground for intriguing cross-border dialogues and discussions with imminent practical consequences. A whole new world has opened up.38

2 Freedom of Establishment and Insolvency Tourism As regards companies in particular, COMI shifting evidently touches upon the freedom of establishment, notably one of the fundamental freedoms of primary law.39 Why should re-establishing in another Member State be restricted and not be recognised in every possible respect? Why should ingenious planning not be rewarded insofar as it formally complies with that freedom? Yet some decisive and guiding insights into the relation between the freedom of establishment of companies in particular and insolvency tourism40 might be gained from the CJEU’s recent decision in Kornhaas.41 True, Kornhaas directly touches ‘only’ upon the relation between the freedom of establishment of companies and rules of insolvency law countering pseudo-foreign companies by imposing personal liability on their directors. But Kornhaas positively sanctioned that. Kornhaas can very well be understood as deviating from the high-water mark of the said freedom as it was once pronounced in Centros,42 U¨berseering43 and Inspire Art44 around the turn of the new millennium.45 That high-water mark of liberty and liberalism appears to be a thing of the past, a construct of a bygone age.46 The creditors’ legitimate expectations deserve, if not outrightly demand, protection against manipulation. Now this has been fully recognised as a legitimate and legitimising reason to limit the freedom of establishment.47 Resorting to personally favoured restructuring, liquidation or discharge processes has to be balanced against that, and legitimate control can no longer be said to denature the freedom of establishment (if that could

36

See the facts underlying the transfer of the COMI of a holding company from Luxembourg to Cologne preceding the opening of proceedings in the PIN case, AG Ko¨ln 19 February 2008, NZI 2008, 257 (with note by Paulus (2008), p. 531). There was parallel planning regarding the German subsidiaries, see AG Ko¨ln 1 February 2008, NZI 2008, 254; Knof and Mock (2008a), p. 253; Knof and Mock (2008b), p. 499; Frind (2008), p. 261; Mankowski (2008), p. 355. 37

McCormack (2014b), p. 815.

38

Cf. Enriques and Gelter (2006).

39

See only Mucciarelli (2013), p. 185; Koutsias (2015), p. 228.

40

Discussed rather inconclusively by Ringe (2008), pp. 608–612.

41

Case C-594/14 Simona Kornhaas v. Thomas Dithmar ECLI:EU:C:2015:806, paras. 25–28.

42

ECR

Case C-212/97 Centros Ltd. v. Erhvers- og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] ECLI:EU:C:1999:126, paras. 24–38. 43 Case C-208/00 U¨berseering GmbH [2002] ECR I-9919, ECLI:EU:C:2002:632. 44

I-1459,

Case C-167/01 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd. [2003] ECR I-10155, ECLI:EU:C:2003:512, paras. 95–105, 131–143.

45

Mankowski (2016b), pp. 284–285; Bolle´e (2016), p. 2029.

46

Mankowski (2016b), pp. 284–285; Bolle´e (2016), p. 2029.

47

Case C-594/14 Simona Kornhaas v. Thomas Dithmar ECLI:EU:C:2015:806, paras. 25-28.

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ever have been said).48 Imposing protection for creditors by law is both the more important and the more legitimate since the creditors do not have sufficient instruments to protect themselves by agreement.49

3 The Recast and the Look-Back Period The next chapter in the saga of the EIR is the Recast of 2015,50 becoming effective as of 19 June 2017. It does not extinguish nor substantially tarnish the freedom to relocate the COMI. But of course it had to answer and counter the unwarranted and all too well known phenomenon of insolvency tourism. It raises the threshold and introduces new safeguards. But it does not alter the concept of COMI as such. The fundamental yardsticks remain the same. What has been said with regard to Article 3 EIR can be transferred to Article 3 EIR 2015 virtually tel quel. The major alteration consists of the introduction of a so-called look-back period (alternatively: a suspect period or suspension period51) or pe´riode suspecte by virtue of Article 3(1) subpara. 2 2nd sentence EIR 2015 for companies, by virtue of Article 3(1) subpara. 3 2nd sentence EIR 2015 for individuals in their professional capacities, and by virtue of Article 3(1) subpara. 4 2nd sentence EIR 2015 for other individuals. The lookback period encapsulates the 3-month period prior to the request for the opening of insolvency proceedings, except for other individuals which are subject to a 6-month period. In particular the latter greatly reduces the potential for ex ante opportunism and strategic manipulation.52 Consumer insolvency tourism by near-bankrupt or fraudulent individuals posed a challenge,53 the more so since consumers do not have establishments and thus secondary proceedings do not offer a possible counterdevice.54 The European legislator might not have exactly tackled the issue at its roots,55 but it answered this challenge. Of course, 3 or 6 months are to a certain extent decisionistic and arbitrary. No one in his right mind would set out to defend why it should not be 4 or 7, or 6 and 9 months or generally 3 months for all kinds of debtors56 (and why not a full year?57). The solution found and legislatively 48

But cf. Omar (2015), p. 433.

49

In detail see Mankowski (2010), p. 1376.

50

Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings (recast) [2015] OJ L 141/19. 51

Ringe (2016), Art. 3 EIR notes 3.78 et seq. prefers the latter.

52

Frind and Pannen (2016), p. 400.

53

See only Walters and Smith (2010), p. 181; Wright and Fenwick (2012), p. 45; Hoffmann (2012), p. 461.

54 Note from the Polish, Hungarian, and Croatian delegations to the Working Party on Civil Law Matters (Insolvency), Doc. 10312/14, p. 3. 55

Ringe (2016), Art. 3 EIR note 3.142.

56

As was proposed by European Parliament, Committee on Legal Affairs, Report (20 December 2013), A7-0481/2013. 57 As was proposed by INSOL Europe, the European organisation of professionals who specialise in insolvency, business reconstruction and recovery; Proposal of INSOL Europe for the revision of the European Insolvency Regulation of 20 June 2012, pp. 43–44.

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established appears to be Solomonic and has not been subject to severe criticism. It will have to stand the test of future practice, though. One can only guess which ingenuities the clever and smart will instrumentalise in order to circumvent it. But on paper it looks good and right—and already that is quite something. Remarkably, in the case of individuals reference has not been made to a malign intention to obtain a quicker discharge although just this had been discussed.58 If the debtor had already contracted a duty to file for insolvency under the law of his old COMI before he shifted his COMI (legally if seen in isolation), he cannot successfully escape from that duty anyway as the shift of COMI exacts effects only ex nunc and not ex tunc.59 The look-back period is a new entry60 which had not even been envisaged in the early phases of the recast process.61 This is deplorable insofar as there is no Commission Memorandum extending a helping hand for its interpretation and application. COMI did not feature amongst the burning issues.62 Yet Hess in the Heidelberg-Luxembourg-Vienna Report prominently considered introducing a lookback period (after INSOL had tabled a respective proposal63 which could claim bragging rights64)—but rather turned it down for perceived incompatibility with Articles 45 and 49 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).65 Nowadays such scepticism should no longer stand in light of the turn towards stricter regulation and limiting free establishment66 made by Kornhaas.67,68 Furthermore, with Article 3 EIR 2015 now expressly codifying the look-back period it enjoys, and entails itself of, the general principle69 that primary law ought to respect and uphold secondary law wherever possible. The introduction of the look-back period has important repercussions for the overall system. By implication, it finally and unmistakably rules out any recourse to a general concept70 of abuse of law.71 Insofar as the European legislator sensed a possible abuse of law, it 58

See in particular Eidenmu¨ller (2009), pp. 152 et seq., on the one hand, Gruber (2015), pp. 687–688, on the other.

59

Weller (2010), p. 439; Gruber (2015), p. 689.

60

See only Ringe (2016), Art. 3 EIR note 3.79.

61

See European Parliament Resolution of 15 November 2011 with recommendations to the Commission on insolvency proceedings in the context of EU company law (2011/2006 (INI)), P7_TA(2011)0484, A-7 0355/2011. 62

Frind and Pannen (2016), p. 399.

63

Proposal of INSOL Europe for the revision of the European Insolvency Regulation of 20 June 2012, pp. 43–44. 64

Ringe (2016), Art. 3 EIR note 3.80.

65

Hess (2014), para. 480 fn. 232.

66

Weller and Hu¨bner (2016), p. 225; Schall (2016), pp. 291 et seq.; Mankowski (2016b), pp. 284–286; d’Avout (2016), pp. 521–522; Jault-Seseke (2016), p. 156; Mock (2016a), p. 242; Paefgen (2016), p. 371.

67 Case C-594/14 Simona Kornhaas v. Thomas Dithmar ECLI:EU:C:2015:806, paras. 25–28. See also Case C-295/13 H ECLI:EU:C:2014:2410, paras. 23–24. 68

Supra Sect. 2.

69

See only Nettesheim (2006), p. 753; Tscherner (2012), pp. 297–298.

70

As intensely and in-depth discussed e.g. by Schneider (2015); Reuß (2011), pp. 231–318.

71

Eidenmu¨ller (2014), p. 1204.

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has subjected this to abstract control by a special means.72 However, moving within the look-back period does not per se automatically and irrefutably discard the alleged new COMI.73 Only the hurdles which the debtor has to overcome have been elevated.74 The look-back period is a lean or soft one, not a strong one (as was proposed by INSOL Europe75).76 For practical purposes, in some instances it might not be so easy to ascertain the precise point in time when the COMI was transferred, though. The look-back period is modelled on Article R 600-1 Code du commerce.77 Additional backing might be found in the look-back periods which many of the domestic laws of the Member States have established in the context of claw-back actions.78 Recital (31) EIR 2015 unmistakably spells out the underlying purpose: to prevent fraudulent or abusive forum shopping by relocating the COMI immediately before filing the request for opening insolvency proceedings. The consequence is throughout that the presumption identifying the COMI with the respective connecting factor does not apply if the respective connecting factor has been moved to another Member State within the look-back period. One has to read this carefully. The lookback period is a soft, not a hard one.79 The consequence is not to negate any relocation in a wholesale manner and in each and every respect possible. The new COMI is not per se or automatically disqualified and ruled out.80 The consequence is only to declare the presumption inoperative.81 The presumption as a tool to facilitate matters is put aside. But still the pretended new COMI can be assessed as the new COMI in reality82 but this has to be proven by any interested party alleging it to be in the State where the request has been filed. This implies the weighing of contacts and a full and reasoned evaluation of the facts of the concrete case.83 Relocations might still muster (some) support from the quarters of the freedom of establishment84 although testing the merits should not be reduced to targeting only abusive, harmful COMI shopping.85 It is important to note and emphasise that any such restriction has not been introduced and 72

Mankowski (2016a), Art. 3 EuInsVO 2015 note 12.

73

Lienau (2016), para. 234.

74

Lienau (2016), para. 235.

75

Proposal of INSOL Europe for the revision of the European Insolvency Regulation of 20 June 2012, pp. 43–44. 76

Ringe (2016), Art. 3 EIR note 3.80.

77

Legrand (2015), p. 10; Mankowski (2016a), Art. 3 EuInsVO 2015 note 33.

78

Fritz (2015), p. 1885; Mankowski (2016a), Art. 3 EuInsVO 2015 note 33.

79

Ringe (2016), Art. 3 EIR note 3.90.

80

Mankowski (2016a), Art. 3 EuInsVO 2015 note 37.

81

Garcimartı´n (2015), p. 711; Bolle´e (2015), p. 2042; Mankowski (2016a), Art. 3 EuInsVO 2015 note 37; Leandro (2016), p. 223. 82

Mankowski (2016a), Art. 3 EuInsVO 2015 note 37; Ringe (2016), Art. 3 EIR note 3.90.

83

Wenner and Schuster (2015), Anh. I note 11; Wimmer (2015), Anm. 1 sub II 3; Mankowski (2016a), Art. 3 EuInsVO 2015 note 37; Leandro (2016), p. 223; see also Commandeur and Ro¨mer (2015), p. 989; Bogdan (2015), p. 6; Garcimartı´n (2015), p. 711; Weiss (2015), p. 201. 84

So far to the same no avail Leandro (2016), p. 223.

85

Insofar contra Leandro (2016), p. 223.

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that the look-back period has not been made dependent on, and does not operate on, this material but complicated notion. Conversely, the look-back period employs a very workable approach, an intelligent compromise between flexibility and clear orientation marks. A parallel to Article 9 Brussels IIbis Regulation86 is not drawn,87 however. Advisors can still try to become case placers.88 COMI shopping and forum shopping have not been banned and dismissed wholeheartedly. There is still some place for strategic manoeuvring and transaction planning. But the effort which is necessary for successful case placing has been raised. The threshold has become higher. Striving for a short-term gain is discouraged. Insolvency planning has become a mid-term business. To benefit from regulatory arbitrage has become more difficult. Creditors have more time to observe COMI shifting as negative signalling and to launch their first strike. Insolvency planning might be natural89—but it is definitely not admitted limitlessly. The look-back period mechanism places an important limit on it.

4 Brexit and Its Consequences for International Insolvency Law Of course, the Recast is not the end of the story. Another twist is added by the (future) Brexit. Once Brexit will become effective, the stakes are set afresh. The story of the EIR 2000 has mainly been a story of the creations and inventions of the English insolvency industry. London was the centre of attraction. London was the insolvency hub of the EU, or depending on one’s personal likings, the insolvency brothel.90 This could be about to cease in the future. After Brexit the UK will no longer be a Member State of the EU and of the EIR.91 Although some confidently predict that the EIR will continue to have a substantial effect on UK insolvency and practice,92 there is ample room for speculation. The ensuing throwback to the English PIL rules for insolvency might add additional complexity and thus make considering the UK as the insolvency forum less attractive.93 Even worse for the English insolvency industry, the UK will no longer enjoy the benefits of the automatic free circulation of judgments in the entire EU under each version of the EIR or under the Brussels Ibis Regulation.94,95 Life could become more complex, 86 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No. 1347/2000 [2003] OJ L 338/1. As it was proposed by Cornette (2013), p. 1123. 87

Mankowski (2016a), Art. 3 EuInsVO 2015 note 37.

88

On the phenomenon of case placing by advisors e.g. Frind and Pannen (2016), p. 405.

89

Omar (2015), pp. 431–432.

90

See Moya (2010); Sakoui (2010); Herman (2010).

91

Hess (2016), p. 411.

92

Rajak (2016), p. 162.

93

Van de Graaff et al. (2016), p. 175.

94

Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2012] OJ L 351/1. 95 Korch (2016), p. 1885; Freitag and Korch (2016), p. 1854; Van de Graaff et al. (2016), p. 174; Basedow (2016), p. 572.

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more expensive, more time-consuming and less promising.96 The English insolvency industry has rightly feared this consequence of a Brexit in advance and in not so eager anticipation.97 COMI-based forum shopping to the UK is predicted to become severely hampered in the post-Brexit future by the loss of access to such cross-border recognition tools.98 The EIR will no longer constitute a link between the UK and the continent, and any shift to merely national English rules on international insolvency law will affect the fundament.99 Yet one can be assured, looking at past experiences, that the ingenuity of the insolvency industry will come up with some solution. It might be at the level of bilateral treaties on recognition and enforcement with Member States of the EU which had long been forgotten in the age of the Brussels I Regulation,100 EIR, and the Brussels Ibis Regulation, but might be revitalised in the post-Brexit future.101 New life might be inflated into these treaties. They might be obsolete, the brainchildren of a long bygone age, but they are extant.102 What had long been relegated to an ever more distant past might get a new lease of life. The bilateral treaties will come alive again, like the Rome Convention,103 or rather the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990 will be revitalised in the UK’s PIL of contracts, courtesy of Article 24 Rome I Regulation,104 and like the Brussels Convention105 will again govern the free movement of judgments in civil and commercial matters between the UK and the EU.106 A core question needs to be answered in the affirmative, though:107 namely that the bilateral treaty between the UK and the respective EU Member State really covers insolvency matters, too. This is far from being guaranteed and has to be checked very carefully and separately for every single bilateral treaty. Cross-border insolvency became a major issue only around the late 1970s/1980s, decades after most of those treaties had been concluded without paying too much attention to insolvency and bankruptcy or, where they did, expressly excluding it. For instance, the Convention between the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany for the Mutual Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, done and signed at Bonn on 14 July 96

Bennett and Ramel (2016), p. 205.

97

Smits (2016), p. 13.

98

Parker and Hood (2016), p. 177; Lehmann and Zetsche (2016), p. 1016.

99

Lehmann and Zetsche (2016), p. 1016; see also Bennett and Ramel (2016), p. 203.

100

Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L 012/1. 101

Basedow (2016), p. 572; Hess (2016), p. 413; Lein (2015), pp. 40–41.

102

Lein (2015), pp. 40–41.

103

Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations, Rome, 19 June 1980 [2005] OJ C 334/1 (consolidated version). 104 Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) [2008] OJ L 177/6. Hess (2016), p. 417; Dickinson (2016), pp. 203–204. 105 Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, Brussels, 27 September 1968 [1998] OJ C 27/1 (consolidated version). 106

Dickinson (2016), pp. 204–205. Contra Hess (2016), p. 413.

107

See generally Basedow (2016), p. 572.

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1960,108 does not encompass insolvency matters but expressly excludes them by virtue of its Article 2 (2).109 However, if no bilateral treaty governs, the privilege of automatic recognition evaporates, and the recognition of British insolvency measures is at the mercy of the domestic international insolvency law of the EU Member State where recognition is sought.110 Germany, for instance, has in principle copied the original EIR 2000 into its domestic international insolvency law, but with some alterations and additions, mainly at the level of substantive law. For a successful recognition, § 343(1) 2nd sentence pt. 1 InsO requires the British courts to have jurisdiction according to German yardsticks, applying the (in) famous Spiegelbildprinzip as a check on sufficient links and connections with the State whose courts have rendered the judicial measure at stake.111 Greece, Poland, Romania and Slovenia have implemented the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency.112 The risk of non-recognition might pitch the momentum towards EU Member States which offer a modern environment and a credible alternative to what had been formerly done in the UK.113 Restructuring might be a separate treat anyway insofar as it takes place outside formal insolvency proceedings.114 The Commission has initiated legislative steps after issuing a roadmap115 towards European measures in this field116 and has sparked an in-depth discussion.117

5 Restructuring, Pre-Insolvency Matters and COMI Migration Insolvency law has seen a shift of focus to restructuring measures and rescuing in recent years, away from traditional liquidation. Rescuing has become the paradigm of modern insolvency law.118 Insolvency law has increasingly become a focal point of economic law,119 a pivot and, simultaneously, a testing case for the regulatory function of economic law.120 Second chances are the dish of the day.121 Pre108

BGBl. 1961 II 301.

109

Reinhart (2013), Vor §§ 335 ff. InsO note 71.

110

Weller et al. (2016), p. 2382; Freitag and Korch (2016), pp. 1853–1854.

111

Freitag and Korch (2016), p. 1854.

112

Marshall et al. (2016), p. 150.

113

Marshall et al. (2016), p. 151.

114

Marshall et al. (2016), p. 151. See in detail infra Sect. 5.

115

Inception Impact Assessment, Initiative on Insolvency, DG JUST (A1), 2016/JUST/025, Insolvency II (3 March 2016). 116 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventive restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures and amending Directive 2012/30/EU, COM (2016) 723 final (22 November 2016). 117

See only Mock (2016b), p. 977; Jacobi (2017), p. 1; Thole (2017), p. 101.

118

Fro¨lich (2015), p. 192.

119

Thole (2011), p. 771; Paulus (2013), p. 797.

120

Paulus (2010), p. 361.

121

See Commission Recommendation of 12 March 2014 on a new approach to business failure and insolvency, COM (2014) 1500 final, para. 30; Paulus (2005b), p. 309.

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insolvency rescuing and restructuring are clearly on the march forward in Western legal orders.122 Chapter 11 US Bankruptcy Code, famously enough, paved the way and pioneered. Rescue culture is on the March throughout Europe. Pre-Packs, Solvent Schemes of Arrangement, Creditors’ Voluntary Agreements, sauvegarde, concordato preventivo, Schutzschirmverfahren have become very prominent phenomena. A virtual regulatory competition amongst national legislations ensued in this regard. Mirror, mirror on the wall… How does this relate to COMI migration? The answer depends on the degree of intrusion which one allows the EIR into the area of pre-insolvency restructuring measures. English (solvent) Schemes of Arrangement have blossomed on the assumption that the EIR does not have any sway. Jurisdiction was mainly founded on rules of English national law.123 The recognition of judicially confirmed Schemes in other Member States came under the Brussels I/Ibis Regulations, not under the EIR.124 After massive interventions by practitioners’ organisations,125 the UK government took pains to leave it that way in the Recast negotiations.126 Its insistence kept Solvent Schemes of Arrangement127 eventually out of the Recast.128 Recital (16) 2nd sentence EIR (Recast) suggests that proceedings based on general company law not designed exclusively for insolvency situations are not even eligible for inclusion in the Annex of the EIR (Recast). This aims precisely at English Solvent Schemes of Arrangement.129 The English restructuring industry rejoiced.130 COMI did and

122

See only Madaus (2015), p. 183 referencing major European jurisdictions.

123

Re Tele Columbus GmbH Ch.D. 14 December 2010; Re Rodenstock [2011] EWHC 1104 (Ch), [2011] BusLR 1245, [2012] BCC 459 (Ch.D., M. Briggs J.); Re Primacom Holding GmbH [2012] EWHC 164 (Ch) (Ch.D., Hildyard J.); Re Monier Group Services GmbH [2013] EWHC 3919 (Ch.D., Hildyard J.); Re Apcoa Holdings GmbH [2014] EWHC 3849 (Ch.D., Hildyard J.); Re Van Gansewinkel Groep BV [2015] EWHC 1599 (Ch) (Ch.D., Snowden J.). 124

Tyrell et al. (2007), pp. 1697 et seq; Sieg and Blum (2007), pp. 50 et seq.; Schaloske (2009), pp. 27 et seq.; Mankowski (2009a), p. 712; Mankowski (2011), p. 1201; Mankowski (2012), p. 313; Petrovic (2010), p. 269; Leible (2011), Art. 32 Bru¨ssel I-VO note 10; Laier (2011), p. 254; Eidenmu¨ller and Frobenius (2011), p. 1217; Westpfahl and Knapp (2011), p. 2045; Paulus (2011), p. 1080; Paulus (2012), p. 429; Thole (2012), p. 619; Bork (2013), pp. 143–144; Schopper (2013), p. 1100; Burger (2015), p. 782; Sax and Swierczok (2016), p. 1946; see also Re Rodenstock GmbH [2011] EWHC 1104 (Ch) [73] et seq.; Re Primacom Holding GmbH [2011] EWHC 3746 (Ch) [65] et seq., [2012] EWHC 164 (Ch) [18] et seq.; Kropholler and von Hein (2011), Art. 58 EuGVVO note 1b. Contra Schnepp and Janzen (2007), p. 1059; Gebler (2010), p. 668; Lu¨ke and Scherz (2012), pp. 1108–1109.

125 E.g. the [UK] Insolvency Lawyers’ Association, http://www.ilauk.org/docs/ila/ila_responseinsolvency-regulation_copy.pdf. 126

Doc. 12007/14 ADD 16.

127

Based on ss. 895 et seq. Companies Act 2006. Explained e.g. by O’Dea et al. (2012); Payne (2014).

128

Bayer and Schmidt (2015), p. 1737; Bewick (2015), p. 177; Brinkmann (2014), pp. 386–387; Eidenmu¨ller (2016), p. 146; Fritz (2015), p. 1884; Garcimartı´n (2015), pp. 700–701; Lenzing (2015), para. 22; Kindler and Sakka (2015), p. 461; Madaus (2015), p. 190; Mansel et al. (2016), p. 4; McCormack (2016), pp. 128–129; Mu¨ller (2016), Art. 1 EuInsVO 2015 note 21; Parzinger (2016), p. 65; Prager (2015), p. M5; Prager and Keller (2015), p. 805; Reith (2015), p. 759; Vallender (2015), p. 1514; Vallens (2015), p. 18; Weiss (2015), p. 196; Freitag and Korch (2016), p. 1852.

129

Mu¨ller (2016), Art. 1 EuInsVO 2015 note 21; Van Zwieten (2016), Art. 1 EIR note 1.26.

130

Omar (2014), p. 24; Cohen et al. (2015), p. 120; Van de Graaff et al. (2016), p. 175.

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does not bother business.131 A connection with the UK under s. 221 Insolvency Act 1986 is still deemed to be sufficient.132 Even a subsequent choice of English law in the incumbent contracts lifts above the threshold.133 Schemes of Arrangement have developed into a true, pre-empting alternative to shifting COMI.134 Hence, practically a need to shift COMI did not arise, and consequently the phenomenon of COMI migration did not transmigrate into this field of preinsolvency matters. The past run by continental, in particular German-based, companies on Solvent Schemes of Arrangements might possibly continue, but careful reconsideration is commended once Brexit becomes effective, even though concepts akin to Solvent Schemes of Arrangement have recently been reflected in plans135 at the European level.136 To which extent the execution of Brexit will hamper the Commission’s recent initiative137 (or, conversely, speed it up once the self-interested voice of British industry needs not to be listened to anymore138) remains to be seen in the more general picture.139 The recognition of Solvent Schemes of Arrangement will likely become more burdensome and complicated once the UK has effectively exited the Brussels Ibis Regulation as a throwback to national rules on recognition will occur as the logical consequence.140 At least in Germany, the discussion has never stopped about the feasibility and admissibility of using an English law instrument for restructuring the debts accrued by originally German-based companies.141 Furthermore, since the English courts must be satisfied before they exercise their discretion to sanction a Scheme so that the Scheme will be recognised in the other jurisdictions concerned, even obtaining

131

See Albrecht (2015), p. 1078; Bayer and Schmidt (2015), p. 1737; Brinkmann (2014), p. 387; Kindler (2014), p. 29; McCormack (2014a), p. 48; McCormack (2016), pp. 128–129; Mu¨ller (2016), Art. 1 EuInsVO 2015 note 21; Parzinger (2016), pp. 65; Prager and Keller (2015), p. 806; Thole (2014), p. 47; Thole and Swierczok (2013), p. 551. 132 Re Rodenstock GmbH [2011] EWHC 1104 (Ch) [20], [65] et seq.; Primacom Holding GmbH v. Cre´dit Agricole [2013] BCC 201; Re Seat Pagine Gialle SpA [2012] EWHC 3686 (Ch) [11]. 133

In the matter of Apcoa Parking (UK) Ltd. [2014] EWHC 997 (Ch) [39] (Ch.D., Hildyard J.); Re Apcoa Holdings GmbH [2014] EWHC 3849 (Ch) [250]-[251] (Ch.D., Hildyard J.); Re DTEK Finance BV [2015] EWHC 1164 (Ch) [15]–[16] (Ch.D., Rose J.). 134

Roedig (2015), pp. 264–265, 282–284.

135

See Commission Recommendation of 12 March 2014 on a new approach to business failure and insolvency, C(2014) 1500 final paras. 15–26; Communication of 30 September 2015 from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union, COM (2015) 468 final. 136

See Gottwald (2016), p. V; Sax and Swierczok (2016), p. 1945.

137

See http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/commercial/insolvency/index_en.htm.

138

See Nu´n˜ez Lagos (current President of INSOL Europe) according to Parker and Hood (2016), p. 177.

139

Freitag and Korch (2016), p. 1849.

140

Korch (2016), p. 1885; Sax and Swierczok (2016), p. 1951; see also Van de Graaff et al. (2016), p. 174. 141 Most profoundly Swieczok (2014); Kusche (2014). Most recently Hoffmann and Giancristofano (2016a), p. 1151; Hoffmann and Giancristofano (2016b), p. 1951; Sax and Swierczok (2016), p. 1945.

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a judicial sanction of a Scheme in the UK might be put in jeopardy.142 The Brussels Convention, revitalised and the successor to its own successors the Brussels I and Brussels Ibis Regulation, might become the true joker.143 To revert to the 2007 Lugano Convention144 would first require the United Kingdom’s accession to the European Economic Area.145 ‘EEA plus’,146 certainly worth being discussed, might not conform to the political goals underlying Brexit. Hence, the so-called ‘Swiss solution’147 might not be too attractive in the eyes of the British rulers. But a feasible alternative might be for the United Kingdom to follow the Danish lead and to conclude a bilateral treaty with the EU, in substance extending the Brussels Ibis regime to the relation between EU and UK.148 This would avail the United Kingdom of the advantages which Brussels Ibis brought about compared to Brussels I.149 Another conceivable option would be to provide expressly and specifically for the Brussels Ibis Regulation to be still effective in the European Act executing Brexit.150 The 2005 Hague Choice of Courts Agreements Convention is too limited in its ambit in order to become a saviour.151

6 Re´sume´ Insolvency tourism and COMI shopping were very present features. In fact, they were the dominant phenomenon in the early years of the original EIR. But the cards have been dealt afresh, on three counts. First, Article 3 EIR 2015 has introduced a look-back period as a sensible counter-device. Second, creditors’ interests have been recognised as legitimate reasons for limiting the freedom of establishment. Thirdly, the UK, the favourite target state of COMI shifts, is on the verge of Brexit becoming effective. ‘Pre-insolvency tourism’ looking for options for rescue and restructuring has emerged as a very interesting option at the beginning of the Europe-wide age of a rescue culture. It has to take different hurdles than insolvency tourism as it does not necessarily imply shifting COMI.

142

See Parker and Hood (2016), p. 177.

143

See Dickinson (2016), pp. 204–205; Lein (2015/2016), p. 38. Indecisive Aikens and Dinsmore (2016), pp. 906–910. Contra Hess (2016), p. 413.

144 Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, Lugano, 30 Oktober 2007 [2007] OJ L339/3. See Van de Graaff, Declerc and Morris (2016), p. 175. 145

Parker and Hood (2016), p. 177.

146

Baudenbacher (2016), p. 498.

147

Further explained by Epiney (2017), p. 77.

148

Wiedemann and Kopczyn´ski (2016), p. 2.

149

Wordsworth (2016) p. 701.

150

All options are discussed in a panoramic manner by Ungerer (2017), p. 297.

151

But cf. Matthews and Oehm (2016), p. 641 and more generally Mukarrum (2016), p. 989.

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Peter Mankowski is full Professor, Chair of Private Law, Private International Law, International Procedural Law and Comparative Law, University of Hamburg; Director of the Institute of Private International Law and International Procedural Law, University of Hamburg; Managing Director, Seminar of Private Law, University of Hamburg; Institute of Private International Law and International Procedural Law, University of Hamburg, Rothenbaumchaussee 33, D 20148 Hamburg, Germany. E: [email protected]; T: ?49/40/42838-4595.

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