Front. Philos. China 2009, 4(3): 322–342 DOI 10.1007/s11466-009-0021-6

RESEARCH ARTICLE

ZHU Renqiu

The formation, development and evolution of Neo-Confucianism ― With a focus on the doctrine of “stilling the nature” in the Song period © Higher Education Press and Springer-Verlag 2009

Abstract The formation of the discourse of Neo-Confucianism1 in the Song period was a result of the interactions between many social and cultural trends. In the development of the Neo-Confucian discourse, the Cheng brothers (Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi) played key roles with their charismatic thoughts and impelling personalities, while Zhu Xi pushed Neo-Confucian thought and discourse to a pinnacle with his broad knowledge and precise reasoning. In the warm discussions and debates between different schools and thoughts, the Neo-Confucian discourse proceeded towards completion and perfection, and evolved as contemporary topics and thinking modes changed. The essay argues that “ding xing 定性 (stilling the nature)” was an important Neo-Confucian topic during the Song period. The doctrine of “stilling the nature” involves much central Neo-Confucian discourse such as the definition of xing 性 (human nature), the interior and exterior aspects of human nature, nature and qing 情 (feelings, sentiments), nature and xin 心 (mind, heart), nature and ren 仁 (benevolence, humanity, humaneness) and yi 义 (righteousness), nature and shi 事 (affair) or wu 物 (thing, object), the practice of preservation and cultivation, etc. Therefore, an examination of the formation, development and evolution of Neo-Confucianism is of great importance to the study of its early history. Keywords Song period, Neo-Confucianism, discourse，stilling the nature， 1

Translator’s note: Sometimes also called the School of Dao (道学). “Neo-Confucianism” in this paper refers to the branch of Li Xue, or the School of Li (principles), represented by the Cheng Brothers and Zhu Xi, as different from Xin Xue, or the School of Xin (mind), represented by Lu Jiuyuan and Wang Yangming. Translated by Liu Huawei from Zhexue yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Researches), 2008, (1): 47–55 ZHU Renqiu ( ) Department of Philosophy, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China E-mail: [email protected]

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discourse analysis 摘要 宋代道学话语的形成，是众多社会文化思潮互动的结果。在道学话语创立的 过程中，二程（程颢、程颐）的思想魅力和人格感召起了关键的作用，朱熹以其博 学多识和精密论证把道学思潮和话语推向一个高峰。在不同学派、不同思潮的相互 交锋中，道学话语也在不断走向丰富和完善，并随着时代主题和思考模式的变化而 变化。 “定性”作为宋代道学的一个重要话语，关涉到性为何物、性之内外、性与情、 性与心、性与仁义、性与理、性与事（物）、存养工夫等道学核心话语。因此，探讨 “定性”这一话语的形成、发展与转折，是研究早期道学史的一个重要课题。 关键词 宋代，道学，话语，定性，话语分析

1 Mingdao’s letter on “stilling the nature”: The introduction to “stilling the nature” The concept “stilling the nature” first appeared in Cheng Hao’s A Letter in Reply to Master Hengqu on Stilling the Nature (Cheng 1981). Trying to clear up Zhang Zai’s question — “Stilled nature cannot be free from activities and still troubled with exterior things”, Mingdao’s (Cheng Hao is also called Master Mingdao) reply finally became the famous Letter on Stilling the Nature in Neo-Confucianism. The Letter put forward the Neo-Confucian discourse on “stilling the nature” for the first time in which a number of fragments, such as nature and feeling, nature and mind, dong 动 (motion, activity; motional, active) and jing 静 (calm, tranquility; motionless, tranquil), the training of being stilled, etc., made up a system of discourse. In The Letter on Stilling the Nature, Mingdao proposed a methodology that raised two important points: “nature that did not differentiate between interior and exterior” and “forgetting both the interior and exterior”. Zhang Zai was mainly puzzled by how to shut out external distractions and attain internal calm. Mingdao’s answer is focused on stillness: Stillness leads to calm, and to the state of “forgetting both the interior and exterior”, and to a spiritual state in which one is broad-minded and impartial, spontaneously reacting to things that come. Mou Zongsan points out that “What Zhang Hengqu said is a case of passive practice, stressing the mind’s being restricted by sensibility. Mingdao’s reply is a case of active practice, stressing the substantial mind itself” (Mou 1968, p. 226). For Mingdao, “stilling the nature” is a process of self-cultivation, the accomplishment of which leads one to a higher spiritual level. Mingdao pointed out: By “stilling” we mean to rest in a state of stillness whether in activity or tranquility, not intentionally pursuing it, and not distinguishing between

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interior and exterior. If you take exterior things as something outside (your nature) and drive yourself to follow them, you are dividing your nature into interior and exterior aspects. Then, as nature is on the outside, what is here within? When you think about cutting out exterior temptation, you forget that the nature cannot be divided. For if interior and exterior aspects are separate, how can we talk about stillness?2 Stillness does not mean no mental activities at all, much less no reaction to exterior things. It refers to the stability and permanence of the substantial mind, which does not distinguish between activity and tranquility, or of interior and exterior; tranquility does not necessarily suggest stillness, and activity does not mean non-stillness. If one takes exterior things as something outside, it must be inferred that when he deals with exterior things, he drives his ego to go after the movements of exterior things — does it mean his nature is outside himself? If his nature moves with exterior things, then what is the nature within? When one tries to resist the temptation of exterior things, he has already taken the nature as outside. On the contrary, if he takes the nature to be within himself, how is he able to sense exterior things and react to them? Therefore, whether he places the nature inside or outside, he will not find the stilled nature. It must be realized that interior and exterior have merged and there is no such distinction. By thoroughly understanding that human nature cannot be distinguished between interior and exterior, the mind will no longer move with things and be disturbed by exterior things. Since human nature is beyond activity-tranquility or interior-exterior distinctions, “stilling the nature” is not concerned with substantial nature; the effort of stilling the nature mainly involves the stillness of the mind as “an expression of nature” (Cf. Mou 1968, p. 235)3. Therefore The Letter on Stilling the Nature, although entitled “Stilling the Nature”, actually talks about “stilling the mind” (Cf. Cai 1984, p. 340). Mingdao’s method of stilling the nature is “forgetting both the interior and exterior”. The point is to keep the human mind from being blinded by selfishness 2 Translations of The Letter on Stilling the Nature throughout this paper consulted Wing-tsit Chan 1963, pp. 525–526. 3 Mou’s conclusion is based on his position toward Xinxue. His understanding is worthy of our consideration. At the beginning of Neo-Confucianism, Mingdao and Zhang Zai undoubtedly had different understandings of xing (human nature), but they did not have a concept such as “substantial nature”. If the nature could not be stilled, the discourse on stilling the nature would be baseless. In fact, understanding nature is the key to the discourse on stilling the nature. Both Mingdao and Zhang Zai had tried to explain human nature with qi 气 (vital force): qi leads to goodness or evil in xing. To still the nature is to let nature rest in perfect goodness. The stillness of the mind is just an exterior expression of a stilled nature. Zhu Xi most clearly stated this point; his development of the theory of stilling the nature is mainly based on his understanding of xing.

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and use one’s knowledge of the human mind so as to raise the spiritual state: Human feelings are usually blinded in this way or that and therefore cannot be in accordance with the great Dao. The problem lies in selfishness and exercise of cunning. Being selfish, one could hardly take his actions as instinctive reactions to things. Exercising cunning, hardly could he take bright awareness as spontaneous. Trying to attain a state of perceiving nothing, however, with disinclination to exterior things, is like seeking a reflected image on the back of a mirror. The Book of Change said: “When one’s resting is like that of the back, and he loses all consciousness of self; when he walks in his courtyard, and he does not see any (of the persons) in it” (“Gen gua” in the Book of Change). Mencius also said: “What I dislike in wise men is their forcing reasoning” (“Li lou xia” in the Mencius)4. Instead of preferring the interior to the exterior I would rather forget both of them. Forgetting both means no more bothers. No more bothers is stillness, and then brightness. To a man of brightness, will reacting to things be any trouble? To be free from the disturbance of external things, one should get rid of the bad habit of being selfish and exercising cunning. Selfishness implies an awareness of ego; it belongs to the interior. The exercise of cunning implies an awareness of things; it belongs to the exterior. It is because of selfishness and the exercise of cunning that human beings will never attain the state of stillness where one will be “broad and impartial and spontaneously react to all things that come”. It’s like a mirror. A mirror is bright and empty, with no awareness or feelings or intention at all; it simply reflects everything it comes upon. If the holder, however, out of his selfish dislike of external things, reverses the mirror to reflect a place of nothing (as a result of exercising cunning), he will not see anything. Mingdao highly valued the spirit of “resting in what is right” (“Gen gua” in the Book of Change) that the gen hexagram taught. He claimed that the hexagram text “when one’s resting is like that of the back, and he loses all consciousness of self” implied egolessness or forgetting the interior, and “when he walks in his courtyard, and he does not see any (of the persons) in it” implied otherlessness or forgetting the exterior. The two aspects together tell the real spirit of his doctrine of stilling the nature — forgetting both the interior and the exterior. To be brief, selfishness and exercise of cunning divided the world into two: the interior and the exterior, ego and non-ego. The inability to unify them impeded our pursuit of the Dao and we are not able to get rid of interior desires and exterior temptations. It is only by forgetting both can we become free from bothers and attain mental 4

Translations of the Confucian Four Books and Five Canons throughout this paper consulted James 1992.

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stability and permanence. Mental stability and permanence leads to the integration of nature and man. In such a state of total brightness, how could the interior mind be disturbed by external things? The state of “stilling the nature” in Mingdao’s words is the state of Heaven and Earth, or the state of the Sage. He said: The constant principle of Heaven and Earth is that their mind is in all things, and yet they have no mind of their own. The constant principle of the Sage is that his feelings are in accord with all creation, and yet he has no feeling of his own. Therefore the learning of the superior man is nothing more than to become broad and extremely impartial and to react spontaneously to all things that come. The state of Heaven and Earth is the state of mindlessness. The Heaven and Earth nourish all things with no consciousness of “self”. They are broad and extremely impartial, therefore they are mindless. The state of the Sage is the state of feelinglessness. The Sage accords his feelings with all creation, with no personal feelings of his own. They just react to things that come, therefore they are feelingless. The key points in the learning of the superior man are to learn the mindlessness of Heaven and Earth and the feelinglessness of the Sage, in other words, to eliminate personal awareness and selfishness, and to dissolve personal feelings and wills, so as to attain a state of stillness in which one is “broad and extremely impartial and spontaneously reacts to all things that come”. This is actually the state of the harmonious and joyous “integration of nature and human” that Mingdao repeatedly advocated: “A man of ren 仁 (benevolence) integrates himself with the Heaven, Earth and all things into one body” (Cheng 1981). Therefore, to “become broad and extremely impartial and respond spontaneously to all things that come” (Li 2007, Vol. 95) is not only a guiding principle of The Letter on Stilling the Nature, but also the objective of the doctrine of stilling the nature. No sooner was the discourse of stilling the nature established than it became a classic of Lixue 理学 (the school of li or principles). It was included in a number of compilations including Reflections on Things at Hand (compiled by Zhu Xi and Lü Zuqian, South Song), Essentials of Lixue (compiled by Geng Jie, Qing), Basics on Nature and Principle (complied by Ran Jinzu, Qing Dynasty) and deeply influenced intellectuals in the Song and Ming periods. Successive Neo-Confucian and Xinxue Confucian scholars unexceptionally used it to expound on their own theories. He Xiang, a Xinxue scholar in the Ming Dynasty, in his painstaking research on nature and principles, came upon Mingdao’s On Recognizing Ren and The Letter on Stilling the Nature, and was immediately

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convinced. His two-volume Commentaries on Recognizing Ren and Stilling the Nature was thus commented on by Comprehensive Catalogue and Collected Abstracts of the Siku quanshu: “Xiang’s learning can be traced back to Yao Jiang (Wang Yangming); most arguments in this book are justifications of Xinxue” (Abstracts of Imperial Siku quanshu, Vol. 96). Liu Zongzhou, a master in the Ming Dynasty, complied Guiding Classics of the Sacred Learning in which he gave detailed commentaries on key classics including Zhou Dunyi’s Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate and Explanations, Zhang Zai’s Eastern Inscription and Western Inscription, Cheng Hao’s On Recognizing Ren and The Letter on Stilling the Nature, Zhu Xi’s On Middleness and Harmony, Wang Yangming’s Questions and Answers on Conscience, etc. (Ibid., Vol. 93). On the other hand, among the Neo-Confucian scholars who annotated The Letter on Stilling the Nature in the Southern Song period are famous figures like Zhu Xi, Ye Cai5 and Zhen Dexiu. Their creative elucidations greatly enriched Mingdao’s doctrine of stilling the nature.

2 Zhu Xi’s teaching on “stilling the nature”: The development of the discourse on “stilling the nature” The unfolding of the discourse on stilling the nature is closely related to how much attention Zhu Xi gave it. He praised The Letter on Stilling the Nature saying that it “flows out of the chest as if something behind is compelling and chasing; it was written without any consideration.” He remarked: “Mingdao’s writing is so smooth that when I read it for the first time I did not get the sense; I just neglected it. However, with a careful regard, I found that the paragraphs were coherently joined. The letter was written when he was in Yu, then quite a young man” (Li 2007, Vol. 95). He claimed that The Letter “is so neat in logic” (Words and Deeds of Famous Chancellors of Song, Outer Collection, Vol. 2), and “there exists a thread of thought throughout it” (Li 2007, Vol. 95). According to Zhu Xi, The Letter on Stilling the Nature not only has solid logic and penetrating thought, but also reflects Mingdao’s sage-like quality 6 — leisurely, joyous, modest, free and easy. Zhu Xi extensively discussed The Letter with his disciples7 5

In his Collected Explanations of Reflections on Things at Hand, Ye Cai gave a line by line commentary of The Letter on Stilling the Nature. As one of Zhu Xi’s students, Ye’s thoughts resembled that of Zhu’s. 6 Hu Anguo abridged The Letter on Stilling the Nature by deleting tens of courtesy words from the beginning and the end. Zhu Xi thought that although the abridgement did no harm to the meaning, it lessened Mingdao’s “sage-like quality” (“Yu Liu Gongfu”, Zhu 1989). 7 For detailed discussions between Zhu Xi and his students, please see Li 2007, fifteen terms in Vol. 95, each one in Vol. 73 and 93.

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and wrote Explaining the Letter on Stilling the Nature and Teaching on Stilling the Nature8 as further elucidations of the theory on stilling the nature. There are two paths for a literal explanation of “stilling the nature”: Emphasizing “stillness” usually leads to a theory of cultivation, whereas emphasizing “nature” is likely to slide into a theory that emphasizes effect. Unlike Mingdao’s emphasis on stillness, Zhu Xi adopted an approach that emphasized nature. He said: By stilling the nature we mean to attain what our nature originally was through efforts of preservation and cultivation. Once the nature is stilled, activity and tranquility become the same, and interior and exterior have no division. Isn’t it stillness that constitutes the reason for Heaven and Earth to be Heaven and Earth, and the Sages to be the Sages? The learning of a superior man is nothing but attaining stillness (Ding xing shuo 定性说 (Teaching on Stilling the Nature), Zhu 1989, Vol, 67). Mingdao’s The Letter on Stilling the Nature was mainly about how to become stilled, focusing on the way and process of preservation and cultivation; while Zhu Xi emphasized the effects of being stilled. He thinks that the accomplishment of the efforts of preservation and cultivation leads to the acquisition of what the nature originally was, or the substantial body of the nature, which is pure good. Zhu Xi defines stillness as the state “nature originally was”. Evidently, he completely agrees with Mingdao’s theory that nature does not differentiate between interior and exterior. But they take different approaches. Zhu Xi thinks that the reason Heaven and Earth are Heaven and Earth, and the sages are sages lies in the fact that they are in a state where activity and tranquility become the same, and interior and exterior have no division. The way to get to this destination is that “ren 仁 becomes erected and yi 义 prevails”: Therefore broadness and impartiality is the reason for benevolence’s being the form. Spontaneous reaction is the reason for and function of righteousness. When ren becomes erected and yi prevails, one’s nature will be stilled and the 8

According to Hui’an ji 晦 庵 集 (Collected Works of Hui’an), volume two of Other Collections, Zhu Xi wrote in his letter to Cheng Yunfu: “Reflections on Things at Hand has been finished but is still on the way. When it arrives, I will send to you at once. As nobody transcribed The Doctrine of the Mean and I have only one copy, I dare not send it over such a long distance; furthermore, as it is still to be settled, I prefer not to circulate it. Explaining the Letter on Stilling the Nature is on another paper, and I hope you won’t show others” (Zhu 1989). It is clear that Explaining the Letter on Stilling the Nature was finished at the same time as Reflections on Things at Hand. According to Chronicle of Zhu Xi, Reflections was finished in the second year of Chun Xi; that is, Explaining was finished in 1175. Sadly, it disappeared long ago.

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activities of tianxia 天下 (All-Under-Heaven) will be unified. It should be noted that the “substantial body of nature” that Zhu Xi mentioned is “the substance of ren 仁 (benevolence), yi 义 (righteousness), li 礼 (propriety), zhi 智 (wisdom)” (“Da Lin Dejiu”, Zhu 1989, Vol. 61), as he writes: “Ren, yi, li, zhi are all human nature” (Zhu 1983a). In the four virtues of ren, yi, li and zhi, ren is the fundamental one, which is derived from as well as contains the other three. Yi is appropriateness or judgment, ren is the form or the reason for what it is. Ren and yi could cover li and zhi: “The four sprouts are actually four virtues. Individually speaking, each has its own boundary; separately speaking, they can be classified as ren and yi.” “Zhi Qin said: The reason why only ren was specifically mentioned in the Six Canons is that ren covers all four sprouts. The reason why only the pair of ren and yi were stressed instead of li and zhi is that ren covers li, and yi covers zhi” (Li 2007, Vol. 6). In other words, ren and yi constitute a substantial part of nature, and “seeking ren and following yi” will lead to stillness of nature. In this way, the learning destined for “seeking stillness” is transformed into a learning of “seeking ren and following yi”. Accomplishment of this will lead to the state of stillness that Mingdao had been seeking — “to be broad and extremely impartial and to react spontaneously to all things as they come.” However, Zhu Xi refers “the substantial body of nature” to li 理 (principles): “The substantial body of nature is nothing other than the li” (Zhu 2001, Vol. 36). He assumes that ren and yi are no more than spontaneous manifestations of tian li 天理 (heavenly principles): “Ren and yi are spontaneous manifestation of tian li. The reason we rely on ren and go along with yi is that according to tian li we can’t help it” (Ibid., Vol. 26). Therefore, “what nature originally was”, or the substantial nature, which is acquired through stilling the nature, is li 理. Once the last obstacle is broken and tian li is exhausted, “our knowledge about all things will not miss anything from appearances to the innermost, from details to outlines, and the immense functions of our mind will be completely discovered” (Zhu 1983b). Therefore, “forgetting both the interior and the exterior” and “stilling the nature” will not do without li 理: Forgetting both the interior and the exterior does not mean actually forgetting everything; it means to follow li and not to prefer the interior over the exterior. Once the discrimination is overcome, you are already impartial and reactive — what will continue to burden you? Joy and anger of a sage, as results of impartiality and spontaneous reaction, are the ultimate of tian li; whereas joy and anger of a common person, as results of selfishness and exercise of cunning, reflect blazing human desires. For a common person, forgetting anger leads to impartiality, and observing li leads to spontaneous reaction. These are

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two ways of introspection which help to prevent blindness (Ding xing shuo, Zhu 1989, Vol. 67). Forgetting both the interior and the exterior does not actually mean to forget; instead, it means to behave according to li and to be impartial and selfless, hence to get rid of external disturbances. A common person’s feelings — joy, anger, sadness, happiness, etc. — are unavoidably influenced by external things; when faced by the temptations of material desires, he cannot get rid of selfishness and the exercise of cunning. On the contrary, a sage’s state of impartiality and selflessness, which are spontaneous reactions to things that come, embody the ultimate of tian li. You won’t attain a state of stillness where you can be impartial and spontaneously reactive until you really forget your anger and begin to view things through li. However, in order to attain such a state, you must explore your innermost; that is, through introspection. This is noticed by Zhu Xi when he answers his disciple’s question: The Master quoted the following passage (from The Letter on Stilling the Nature): “among human feelings that are easy to arise and hard to control, anger is the most typical one. If we can forget our anger at the very moment we are angry, and view right and wrong through li …” I used to view right and wrong through li. When I found that I was right and the other was wrong I would contend even harder. Later I knew that I was wrong, just like what Mencius said: “I must have been wanting in ren.” I must examine myself until I can be sure that I have nothing to blame in ren. If the perversity and unreasonableness of the other are still the same, then I could say: “This is a man utterly lost indeed” (Li 2007, Vol. 95). To “view right and wrong through li” does not mean to prove that “I was right and the other was wrong”; instead, it means reflect upon oneself. By self-examination and exploration into the innermost, one can find the principle of Heaven that has always been in his heart. The principles are within the mind; it won’t appear without the self-conscious activity of the mind. “Generally speaking, there’s no other li than this one. It cannot be acquired from outside.” Probably because of his emphasis on introspection, when Zhu Xi replied to Shun Bi’s assertion that The Letter on Stilling the Nature was difficult to understand, he said: “It’s not so difficult. Maybe the term ‘stilling the nature’ seems strange. This ‘nature’ means xin 心 (mind)” (Ibid.). Zhu Xi’s philosophy rarely uses xin to understand nature. The xin here mentioned, radically different from the ontological xin in Xinxue, “is merely a realistic and empirical concept, referring to the xin that perceives through senses. There does not exist a xin as noumenon that is independent of empirical consciousness or realistic perception;

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neither is there a xin beyond arising and ceasing except the ever changing xin” (Chen 2000, p. 249). As for how to understand this “xin”, Huang Mianzhai, a disciple of Zhu Xi, said: “The essay can be divided into seven paragraphs. In the first paragraph, ‘stilling the nature’ can be replaced by ‘stilled xin’ — if one makes distinctions between interior and exterior parts of xin, it is not only that he cannot understand stillness, but he also does not understand xin” (Jiang 1987). Xin does not distinguish between interior and exterior, like nature; therefore one can get rid of the temptation of external things and attain inner tranquility. This is a further development of Mingdao’s thought. Although Mingdao did not clearly state that “stilling the nature” was “stilled xin” in The Letter on Stilling the Nature, his answer to Chi Guo’s question still deserves a more thorough examination: Chi Guo said: “Daoist masters talk about three ‘restings’: resting xin leads to resting qi; resting qi leads to resting shen 神 (spirit). They call this ‘storing three and guarding one’.” Master Bochun (another appellation of Mingdao) said: “As for these Three, rarely can people be without leaving them. The key is to take back the lost mind” (Cheng 1981). According to Mingdao, to keep xin, qi, and shen away from the disturbance of external events, the most important thing is “to take back the lost mind”. In Posthumous Writings of the Cheng Brothers, among their answers to their disciples’ questions on how to maintain inner calmness are “to have domination within (the mind)” (Ibid., Vol. 1), “maintain firm the will” (Ibid.), “make yourself the master of the mind” (Ibid., Vol. 15), “erect your mind” (Ibid.), “let the mind have a master” (Ibid.), all of which, with no exception, focused on the mind. These answers reveal that this question had much significance in the school’s early development, and that Mingdao’s penetrating answer was a model.

3 Xishan’s argument on “stilling the nature”: The maturation and evolution of the discourse on “stilling the nature” Zhen Dexiu (1178–1235), also known as Master Xishan, studied under Zhu Xi’s disciple Zhan Tiren. He was a successor to Zhu Xi’s learning after the Song Dynasty’s Jia Ding period (1208–1224). According to Quan Zuwang, “after those great figures in Qian Dao and Chun Xi periods, no one else ever won greater fame than Xishan, who was praised by thousands of scholars as the representative of right learning” (“Xishan Zhen shi xue an”, Huang 2007). Xishan privately took Zhu Xi as his remote tutor, but held Cheng Mingdao, who showed an inclination to the school of mind, in esteem. In his A Visit to the

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Reading Room of Master Cheng Mingdao, he recalled that he began reading Mingdao’s writings in his childhood, and his admiration grew with age. He thought Mingdao’s writings could help us discover secrets concealed from human beings for thousands of years and would awaken tens of thousands of future generations from ignorance. Such praise was rarely given to Zhu Xi (Cf. Jia 1979, p.3513). Following Mingdao and Zhu Xi’s academic approaches, Xishan commented on The Letter on Stilling the Nature, in which he elucidated his understanding of “stilling the nature” from an ontological aspect. He brought forward two important arguments: “Li 理 (principles) settled within” and “li is no other than shi 事 (thing, affair) and shi is no other than li”. He said: “Stilling the nature” suggests that with li settled within, we will not be puzzled by shi. With li settled within, we are in stillness not only in tranquility, but also in activity. We neither pursue shi nor move prior to the motion of shi. That is, there is “no intentional pursuit of it”. Li goes out from within and applies to shi, and shi comes in from outside and conforms to li. Li is no other than shi and shi is no other than li. That is “beyond distinction of interior and exterior” (Reading Notes in Xishan Mountain, Vol. 2). Xishan argues that the essence of “stilling the nature” is to have “li settled within”. With “li settled within”, nothing will confuse our mind. The premise of Xishan’s argument is “xing 性 (nature) is no other than li”, an idea that Cheng Brothers and Zhu Xi consistently held. Xishan’s argument was: As li is beyond distinction of activity and tranquility, so is the nature; as li is beyond distinction of interior and exterior, so is the nature. Xishan claims that the heavenly principle is stationed in our mind. An awareness of this makes us free from exterior disturbance; we can keep ourselves in stillness whether in activity or tranquility; we will not move prior to other thing’s motion. This is what Mingdao calls “unintentional pursuit”. Li rests within us. Once it flows out, it nourishes all things. At the center of turmoil of all things, we maintain leisureliness and cope with all things according to li. Thus li is within shi and shi is within li; everything is in spontaneous harmony. This is a state that Mingdao calls “beyond distinction of interior and exterior.” Furthermore Xishan points out: “It is the subtle function of xin to be either stilled or reactive, either silent or sensational. What makes it possible is human nature. If you take stillness and silence as right, and reactiveness and sensationalness as wrong, you are making a distinction between the interior and exterior of human nature. As things come, they react with li; just like wherever a mirror is hung, nothing in front will escape from being reflected. The mirror will never pursue an object to reflect it, how can we say that nature pursues things

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outside it? Therefore, the nature that is still not in touch with anything is exactly the same as the nature that is already in touch with things; the former is like a mirror that was originally empty, and the latter one that is reflecting objects. How could there be two bodies in human nature divided as interior and exterior?” (Ibid.) The human mind can be still or reactive, silent or sensational. Human nature is the li that makes things the things. The mind cannot be divided into interior and exterior, neither can nature. It’s like a mirror reflecting objects. When it is not in touch with any object, there is nothing in the mirror; that is the nature of the mirror. When it is in touch with the objects, it shows the images of the objects; that is also the nature of the mirror. (If the mirror cannot reflect objects, the mirror loses its nature.) The nature of the mirror stays the same; we cannot tell the interior and exterior apart. Recognizing this will make our xinxing 心 性 (mind-nature) free from disturbance by external things and help us maintain internal peace and steadiness. But, how should we understand his argument that “li is no other than shi and shi is no other than li”? Xishan inherited and developed Zhu Xi’s theory of ti 体 (form, or substance) and yong 用 (function), which he used to explain such pairs as li and shi, Dao (the Way) and qi 器 (instruments), xin (mind) and wu 物 (things). In his intellectual world, by “li is no other than shi and shi is no other than li”, he firstly refers to a non-identical but inseparable relationship between metaphysical principles and physical things: “Li is metaphysical; shi is physical. Where there is such a li, there is such a thing. Where there is such a thing, it has such a li. The two are inseparable. When there was nothing, it seems you may describe the world as nothingness; however li is already there. Can you call it nothingness?” (Derivative Significance of the Great Learning, Vol. 1 & 3) Sometimes, it also means that the Dao is within instruments, or the principles are within the things: “The Dao is li and instruments are wu; they are different in being fine or rough; however, li never left objects for a single moment” (Ibid., Vol. 5). Of course, essentially, “li is no other than shi and shi is no other than li” refers to the ti-yong 体 — 用 (substance-function) relationship between the principles and affairs or objects. He said: Generally li isn’t anything other than shi. Heresies speak of li without mentioning shi; their defect is uselessness. Bureaucrats talk about shi without consideration of li; their defect is baselessness. Only the learning of the sages takes li as the substance of shi, and takes shi as the functions of li. It regards the two of them as interdependent instead of separate. That’s why it has no defect (Collected Writings of Xishan, Vol. 18). Xishan criticized Buddhists and Daoists (heresies) for their empty talk that was far removed from reality, leading to uselessness. On the other hand, when

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ordinary bureaucrats talked about facts without consideration of the great Dao, they aimlessly wandered. Only the learning of the sages, taking li as the substance and shi as the functions, viewing the two as non-identical but inseparable, was satisfactory and without any defect. One point that deserves our attention is Xishan’s inclusion of both human beings and affairs in the category of wu 物 (thing, object). He especially emphasized: “Those that fill the space between heaven and earth are all objects. Men are objects. Shi are objects. Where there is an object, there is the principle” (Derivative Implications of the Great Learning, Vol. 5). It is clear that Xishan’s thought “li is no other than shi and shi is no other than li” is developed from Cheng Yi’s theory “ti and yong sharing one origin and xian 显 (the evident aspect) and wei 微 (the subtle aspect) being inseparable” (“Yi zhuan xu”, in the Cheng’s Commentary to Zhou Yi) and Zhu Xi’s theory “li is the substance of shi” (Li 2007, Vol. 98). Although Xishan claimed that li and shi are never separated, he referred li (principle), like Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi, to the substantial principle that existed prior to affairs or objects. His philosophical approach is the same as that of Cheng and Zhu. Xishan did not develop his own methodology for stilling the nature in his commentary of The Letter on Stilling the Nature, but his writings revealed his desire of “fostering mind with Dao” or “fostering mind with li”: However, how is he to calm his will? The answer is: Nothing but Dao. Dao is the appropriate principle for the human mind. To foster the mind with Dao, material desires won’t arise and man stays joyous and peaceful; this is called quietness (Derivative Implications of the Great Learning, Vol. 31). (In early ancient time) there were methods of Nurturing either in activity or in rest. Now, they are all obsolete except for nurturing the mind with principle and justice (Ibid., Vol. 30). The exhaustion of li is based on mind. In order to be the foundation of exhaustion of li, one should hold himself with respect and control his mind, and keep out selfishness and evil thoughts. Once the mind is properly controlled, he should exhaust principles from all affairs and objects before he can make the best out of the mind. With the purpose of exhausting the principles, however, without the knowledge of holding respect to nurture the mind, one will be confused and dazed and have no idea of righteousness and principles. Knowing about nurturing the mind but with no awareness of exhausting the principles, the mind, although clear and quiet, will be nothing more than a hollow object. Without the many principles to control the mind, one will not behave properly in their affairs, as Buddhists and Daoists do.

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Xishan paid much attention to the control of human mind by principles. He maintained that one could not attain freedom from selfishness and evil thought until he was able to control himself with the principles and act in accordance with the principles. During the process of mind cultivation, “domination by one” and “holding with respect” are two indispensable training methods. “By ‘domination by one’ we mean to maintain oneness whether you are in tranquility or in activity. In normal leisure time, when you are not doing anything, let the mind be dominated by one; thus you have respect in tranquility. When you are busy coping with routine affairs, let the mind be dominated by one; thus you have respect in activity. Respect in tranquility makes you clear-headed, and respect in activity makes you behave properly. In this way, the substantial mind is kept constantly. This is the foremost thing in the course of learning” (“Wen jing zi” 问敬字 (“Inquiring the word ‘respect’”), in the Collected Writings of Xishan, Vol. 31). “Domination by one” means to concentrate the mind on one point, absent of any selfish ideas. It enables the mind to be free from temptation and the influence of exterior objects. It is the foremost thing in the course of learning. “Domination by one” implies “respect”; through the former one can attain the effect of having respect both in tranquility and in activity and getting rid of the disturbance of exterior objects. According to Xishan, it is not sufficient to know how to cultivate the mind without knowing how to exhaust principles. Mind cultivation may help one keep a clear and tranquil interior. But with a hollow interior, if not dominated by the principles, one’s behavior will hardly accord with tianli 天理 (heavenly principles) and easily slip towards Chan. Therefore, it is important to pay more attention to one’s self-cultivation in righteousness and principles: “Any advance in righteousness and principles means a certain reduction of material desires. After much effort, there will be pure principles of righteousness as material desires naturally fade away” (Ibid., Vol. 5, “De sheng yu shen hou xing zhuang”). Awareness of pure principles leads to extinguishing material desires. The world is constantly changing, but I can maintain internal steadiness and peace. Xishan’s thoughts on “principles settled within”, “mind-fostering by the Dao” and “mind-fostering by the principles” emphasize the purity and supremacy of the principles; it pushed the theory of stilling the nature to its extremity. The discourse on stilling the nature had to develop a new approach in order to make a breakthrough. In fact, Zhu Xi had left enough space for the discourse to turn to Xinxue 心 学 when he interpreted “stilling the nature” as “stilled mind”. Although Zhu Xi tried his best to make a distinction between the mind and the substantial mind, the scholars of Xinxue, on the contrary, were making an opposite effort. To the question of how the substantial mind could get rid of the disturbance of exterior objects, Lu Xiangshan gave a prescription of “gathering up the spirit and dominating yourself” (“Quotations”, part II, Liu 1989, Vol. 35).

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He believed that “one who understands such principles is the dominator. A real dominator will never be moved by exterior objects and be puzzled by evil sayings” (Ibid., Vol. 1, “To Zeng Zhaizhi”). That is, once the internal consciousness of the subject is erected, the substantial mind or the conscience comes to dominate the ego, and the mind and will can resist evil words and exterior temptations. Yang Cihu, one of Xiangshan’s renowned disciples, maintained that all daydreams and faults originated from the human will; to extinguish these faults and maintain internal peace and steadiness, it is essential to “trigger no will”. “Trigger no will does not mean to handle no affairs at all. It means to handle affairs according to principles. Selfish will is not allowed” (“On the Mean”, in the Posthumous Writings of Cihu, Vol. 13). “No need to learn to be stilled. You are stilled only if no will is triggered.” He claimed that “triggering no will” is a higher state than stillness. By “triggering no will”, he meant eliminating the slightest selfish thought and letting the substantial mind present itself spontaneously, hence to attain interior tranquility. Wang Yangming pointed out from an ontological view: “Stillness is the root-and-trunk (noumenon) of the mind. Activity and tranquility is merely the occasion of encountering. The root-and-trunk of the mind has nothing to do with activity and tranquility. The principles never move; if so, they turn to desire. If the principles are followed, however busy one is, his mind is never away from tranquility” (“Replying Lu Jingyuan”, part II, Complete Writings of Yangming, Vol. 2). Regarding this, Chen Lai thinks that Yangming’s claim that “stillness is the noumenon (root-and-trunk) of the mind” is important for two reasons. On the one hand, activity and tranquility are specifications on the level of consciousness phenomenon. They cannot be applied to noumenon; the noumenon of the mind has nothing to do with activity or tranquility. On the other hand, that tranquil and disturbance-free state is what the mind originally was (Cf. Chen 1991a, p. 79). This is an excellent analysis. Once we are in a state of stillness which is the noumenon of mind, one will keep internal tranquility even he is occupied with myriad affairs. This is a state that Mingdao pursued. Among the successors of Yangming, Nie Shuangjiang and Luo Nian’an were also followers of this thought (Cf. Lin 2005, pp. 515–537). The attention paid upon “stilling the mind” by the scholars from Xiangshan and Cihu to Yangming and his successors tells us that it is a common topic of both Neo-Confucianism and Xinxue to seek interior tranquility through internal mind-nature cultivation and control of the mind by heavenly principles. The difference between Neo-Confucianism and Xinxue lies only in their approaches. Mingdao’s The Letter on Stilling the Nature had pushed forward a dialogue between them in an imperceptible way. Xinxue’s interest in the problem of “stilling the nature” also enriched the discourse on stilling the nature with new features of the epoch.

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Conclusion: Some considerations

The Letter on Stilling the Nature is a classic Neo-Confucian text. It put forward the discourse on stilling the nature, which has deeply influenced the intellectual history of Neo-Confucianism. The discourse has taken on different versions in different historical stages, and many propositions that exceed the significance discussed in this essay were developed. It is a cultural phenomenon that deserves deeper consideration. (1) From Mingdao and Zhu Xi to Xishan, the development of the discourse on stilling the nature has been a process of purification that gradually shaken off Buddhist and Daoist influences. Early Neo-Confucianists, including Mingdao, had close relationships with Buddhism and Daoism. Zhu Xi said: “Mingdao read Buddhist books” (Li 2007, Vol. 93). In The Letter on Stilling the Nature, Mingdao advocates an approach of “forgetting both the interior and exterior”, which continues Mencius’ thought of the “unperturbed mind” and absorbs Buddhist psychological self-cultivation experience (Cf. Chen 1991b, p. 85). A detailed analysis discovers that, between “stillness” in the discourse on stilling the nature and Buddhist meditation, between “heaven and earth of no mind”, “sages of no feeling” and the Daoists claim “to submit to creations feelinglessly” and Chan school’s “to give rise to the mind while resting on nowhere”, between the way of getting rid of external temptations by stilling the nature and Daoist opposition against the “mind enslaved by material objects”, there are subtle relationships. No wonder Ye Cai said: “In my understanding, Hengqu’s effort to free himself from the disturbance of external objects was close to Buddhism. That’s why Master Cheng diagnosed his problem as being similar to Buddhism. It is in selfishness that it is like Buddhism; as for exercise of cunning, it resembles Daoism. Both want to unburden themselves of exterior objects” (Ye 2006, Vol. 2). Zhu Xi transformed Mingdao’s teaching into practice which emphasizes “benevolence being erected and righteousness prevailing” and pays attention to “the noumenon of nature”, advocating Confucian values. Xishan repeatedly stressed “fostering the mind with the Dao,” “fostering the mind with li,” “principles settled within” and “principles are affairs and affairs are principles,” keeping the theme of dominance by the principles and opposition between the principles and human desire. Besides these, Zhu Xi and Xishan also criticized Buddhism and Daoism. Their opposition is evident in their view of ethical order and ritual institutions. Zhu Xi said: “The followers of Laozi and Zhuangzi destroy ritual and legal systems” (Li 2007, Vol. 40). “It is easy to know the mistakes of Buddhists and Daoists without much argumentation. Abandoning the san gang 三纲 (three cardinal guides) and

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the wu chang 五常 (five constant virtues) is already a serious accusation, not to say others” (Ibid., Vol. 126). He attacked the cornerstone of Buddhism — the theory of emptiness: “Buddhists take emptiness as an insight. Since this is wrong, thus all are wrong” (Ibid.). Xishan also criticized the uselessness of Buddhists and Daoists’ empty words: “Heresies speak of principles without mentioning affairs, whose defect is uselessness” (“Royal lecture notes on november the eighth”, in the Collected Writings of Xishan, Vol. 18). “They take affairs and objects as rough print, and the emptiness as a delicate function” (Derivative Significance of the Great Learning, Vol. 13). His “A Distinction between Our Dao and Heresies” (in the Reading Notes of Xishan, Vol. 35 and 36) focuses on the learning of Buddhism, Laozi, Yang Zhu and Mozi and protecting the status of Confucianism. (2) The formation, development and transition of the discourse on “stilling the nature” is a continually unfolding process as well as a process of continuous philosophicalization, noumenonization and enrichment. The chain of discourse is an integrated process consisting of a series of discourse fragments. Generally speaking, the evolution of thought is realized through the efforts of thinkers of different generations interpreting, enriching and deepening the fragments. From Mingdao’s The Letter on Stilling the Nature to Zhu Xi’s doctrine on stilling the nature, until Xishan’s teachings on stilling the nature, the discourse went through a gradually deepening process from a theory of cultivation to a theory that emphasizes effect and to ontology. The discourse, at first merely consisting of segments of nature and feeling, nature and mind, activity and tranquility, cultivating stillness, developed into an integrated discourse which included the discourses of benevolence, righteousness, principles, and affairs. Zhu Xi and Xishan’s creative interpretations reflect the subjectivity, epochal character, creativity and independence of interpretation and the correlation between discourse study and real life. They constitute a new foundation and a wider platform for the future development of thought. Of course, discourse interpretation is closely related to the values and life experiences of the interpreter. From this perspective, Zhu Xi’s rage over Hu Anguo’s revision of The Letter on Stilling the Nature and his repeated argumentation reveal Zhu Xi’s admiration for the Cheng Brothers and his complex desire to guard the Dao. When his disciples expressed suspicion that Mingdao’s opposition to selfishness and cunning resembled Buddhist teaching, Zhu Xi, besides admitting the common points, stressed the boundary between Confucianism and Buddhism: “Someone asks that he is afraid that those lines on selfishness and exercising cunning is the same as the selfishness that Buddhists also argue against. Zhu Xi said: Common people’s private will and Buddhist selfishness are both selfish, but Mingdao discussed it in a wider sense, not limited to selfishness in Buddhism”

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(Ye 2006, Vol. 2; also Li 2007, Vol. 95. Abridged in Ye Cai’s quotation). Furthermore, Zhu Xi’s emphasis on benevolence and righteousness and the noumenon of nature is also purported to defend Confucian values and stance. Understanding is not only an individual act, but also an epochal act. Xishan’s advocacy of the heavenly principle — the highest noumenon and the realistic principle — reflected the characteristics of that time. Xishan lived in a time when Zhu Xi’s teaching was prohibited as “false learning” and society was disoriented: “Literati and officialdom admire fame and gain instead of probity and integrity, honor ranks instead of virtue, relish soft beauty instead of justice and uprightness, respect mediocre persons instead of superior men. The whole society is accustomed and content with such an atmosphere. The reason is that few are still living in the esteemed elder generation and those prestigious and influential figures are not holding offices. Without correct and effective orientation, young scholars lost their direction and are unable to influence the society in a positive way” (“An epitaph for Liu Gexue”, Collected Writings of Xishan, Vol. 43). In this situation, Xishan assumes the responsibility of saving civilization. He spared no effort to advocate the sages’ learning through writing and lecturing, and finally revived Neo-Confucianism and made it an orthodoxy. Knowing this helps us understand Xishan’s position of upholding the banner of the heavenly principle and repressing the two heresies. Finally, we must also take notice of alterations in the key discourses in the discourse chain and their relationship with other discourse chains. A transition in the theme of a discourse usually marks a turn in social thought. As we can see, when the theme — nature — of the discourse on stilling the nature was replaced by mind, the discourse changed radically. The theory on stilling the nature became a theme of Xinxue, indicating a transition from Neo-Confucianism to Xinxue. (3) The unfolding of the stilling the nature discourse is based on daily life, emphasizing the conformity of cognition and action. This agrees with the basic principle of discourse analysis, and verifies the priority of the methodology of discourse analysis in Neo-Confucianism, and even in the study of the history of Chinese philosophy. Mingdao’s talented reply to Zhang Zai’s puzzle became a classical doctrine — the doctrine of stilling the nature. When Mingdao wrote, By “stilled” we mean to rest in a state of stillness whether in activity or tranquility. No intentional pursuit of it. No distinction of interior and exterior. He was not giving theoretical instruction; instead, he was giving directions on how to act in social practice, that is, the key point is actualizing cognition. Zhu Xi emphasized that “to attain what our nature originally is through training in

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preservation and cultivation.” There must be “preservation and cultivation”; and only by “training” for a long time could we “attain” — its premise is action, not merely cognition. Xishan maintained that “substance” did not exist without “function”, and that “to foster the mind with the Dao”, “to foster the mind with principles”, his emphasis on “function” and “fostering” is evident. To be brief, grasping the Dao in daily life and interpersonal relationships, knowing the Dao with the aim of practicing it — these are permanent teachings of Confucianism. Similar to such a position, discourse analysis pays close attention to the relationships between discourse and historical and current daily life. “The radical purpose of discourse analysis is to give analysis to a discourse chain or a mess of intermingled discourse chain in its historicity or its relationship with reality. At the same time, it must give prudent explanation to the future development of the discourse chain” (Yeager 2005, p. 145). The basic problem of discourse analysis is the relationship between discourse and context; the content and way of our discourse are closely related to our ordinary life world. Discourse relies on this world; its significance is decided by its context. The same discourse may have different significance in different contexts. Similar to the Confucian tradition of “unity of cognition and action”, discourse analysis is not merely theoretical analysis, it aims at social practice; or, in a sense, it is a kind of social action itself. In a relationship with the context and the world, according to B. Johnstone, discourse analysis should pay attention not only to the discourse spoken, but also to the discourse that is not spoken or cannot be spoken. Discourse is the foreground, and silence is the background (Johnstone 2002, p. 152). If we further examine what is hidden behind the whole set of discourses on stilling the nature, we will find, through Mingdao, Zhu Xi, and Xishan’s texts, that there is a rejection of Buddhism, eagerness for Confucian values, and an effort to ease and lift the mind. This reflects the tradition of metaphor using in discourse and “sublime words with deep meaning” in Chinese philosophy. Although discourse analysis has already shown an inclination toward avoiding the study of abstract or idealistic structure, I still think that compared with the method of category and system construction prevailed in contemporary Chinese philosophy, discourse analysis is a priority. Chen Lai points out that the category-system way of study “can reveal differences in the general characteristics of categories and systems between Chinese philosophy and European philosophy. However, if category study is not assisted by discussions on specific problems and the significance of categories and concepts are not understood through practical discussions, our conclusion will remain on a level of common sense and general outlines; we will not be able to deepen our understanding of the basic concepts and specific discussions” (Chen 2003, p. 25). “Specific problems” here refers to “specific context”. Philosophical discourses cannot be understood without considering specific contexts. Only by interpreting

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philosophical concepts and categories against a specific context, i.e., specific time and specific social situation, and disclosing their deep meaning, can we really understand the basic concepts and grasp the internal spirit of Chinese philosophy. In this sense, the method of discourse analysis undoubtedly has greater applicability and flexibility.

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