Original Article The Global Economic Crisis and Beyond: What Possible Future(s) for Development Studies? Andy Sumner Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton. E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract The context for ‘development’ – however defined – is changing, not only because of the global economic crisis, but also in light of broader changes. If the context for development is changing, then the study of this ‘development’ will also need to adapt to these changing circumstances. This article seeks to contribute to debates on the future of development studies (DS), and consider what the changing context for ‘development’ might mean for a new ‘operating system’ within DS. The article outlines two possible stylised futures to trigger debate, respectively based on a widening or a narrowing of the scope of DS: A future DS with a broader scope via global perspectives on inter-connected development (a ‘one-world’ DS); and a future DS with a narrower scope via attention to the needs of the poorest countries or the poorest people (a ‘bottom billion’ DS). Le contexte du ‘de´veloppement’ – quelqu0 en soit la de´finition – est actuellement en mutation. Ceci est vrai non seulement a` la lumie`re de la crise e´conomique mondiale, mais aussi a` cause d’autres changements plus ge´ne´raux de grande envergure. Si le contexte du de´veloppement e´volue, il est clair que l’e´tude de ce ‘de´veloppement’ devra, d0 une manie`re ou d0 une autre, s0 adapter a` ces changements. Cet article cherche a` contribuer a` la re´flexion sur l0 avenir des e´tudes du de´veloppement et a` examiner les implications des e´volutions du contexte du de´veloppement pour l0 e´mergence d0 un nouveau ‘syste`me d0 exploitation’ pour la recherche sur le de´veloppement. Nous pre´sentons deux possibles sce´narios stylise´s afin de provoquer un de´bat, base´ respectivement sur un e´largissement et un re´tre´cissement du champ de la recherche sur le de´veloppement : Une recherche dont le champ d0 analyse est e´largi a` travers des perspectives globales sur un de´veloppement interde´pendant (une recherche sur le de´veloppement d’un monde ‘dans son ensemble’) vis-a`-vis d0 une recherche dont le champ est plus e´troit, davantage centre´e sur les besoins des pays ou populations les plus pauvres (les e´tudes du de´veloppement focalise´es sur ‘le milliard du bas’). European Journal of Development Research (2011) 23, 43–58. doi:10.1057/ejdr.2010.56 Keywords: crisis; futures; poverty; development studies

Introduction The context for ‘development’ (however defined) is changing. This is not only in light of the global economic crisis and the end of a relatively benign period of reasonable growth, buoyant aid and relative stability, but also in light of wider major changes such as the ‘rise of the East’, climate change and demographic change that are likely to have a major impact on development at various levels. If the context for development is changing then the study of that ‘development’ will need, in some way, to adapt to these changing circumstances. The European Journal of Development Research has been a forum recently for discussing the future of development studies (DS) (see, for example, Chandhoke, 2009; Padayachee, r 2011 European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes 0957-8811 European Journal of Development Research Vol. 23, 1, 43–58 www.palgrave-journals.com/ejdr/

Sumner 2009; Woolcock, 2009). There have been calls for a radical rethink of DS or the: Transformation of development studies y with the design and implementation of an entirely new ‘operating system’. (Woolcock, 2009, p. 8)

The idea of an ‘operating system’ (OS) for DS evokes images of a computer. The OS is a set of system software programmes that shape the way application software programmes run and the ways the user interacts with the computer. If we extended this, an OS for DS could entail how studies about development are pursued in general – for example, types of disciplinarity and methods, how the software programmes – and the specific research questions – are pursued, and how the user – the researcher – interacts with the research, the ‘researched’ and the instruments of research. This article seeks to respond to the Woolcock call and consider, given the changing context for ‘development’, what might be some (not all) of the possible components of, or changes to, the ‘OS’ for DS. The article is structured as follows: the following section outlines a brief history of DS in so much as can be covered in a short space (readers are referred to the wider literature). The subsequent section asks what exactly is changing post-economic crisis and beyond; is it a structural break with the past; and what does it mean for ‘development’? The penultimate section focuses on what the changing context for ‘development’ might mean for the future study of development and the ‘OS’. The final section concludes. The audience for this article is those conducting studies about development – the researchers – in North and South.

DS 1.0 and 2.0 There has been a burgeoning literature on the nature of contemporary DS (for example, Harriss, 2002; Molteberg and Bergstrøm, 2002a, b; Loxley, 2004; Shaw, 2004; Bernstein, 2005; Kothari, 2005; DSA, 2006; Hulme and Toye, 2006; Box, 2007; Schmitz, 2007; Sumner and Tribe, 2008, 2009).1 If one extends the Woolcock operating system metaphor, one can hypothesise that the contemporary DS ‘OS’ could be thought to be composed of what the OS does, how the OS operates, and why the OS exists as follows: K

K

K

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What the OS does: The DS OS generates ideas and knowledge about ‘development’, meaning, to date, positive change in ‘developing’ countries, however both – ‘positive’ change and ‘developing countries’ – are defined (see for discussion on this issue, Cowen and Shenton, 1998; Gore, 2000; Hickey and Mohan, 2003; Chambers, 2004; Thomas, 2004). How the OS operates: The DS OS is based on certain ‘norms’ or ‘rules of the game’ for knowledge generation in DS with cross-disciplinarity being core, that is, DS is about more than the insights of one discipline – DS is not development economics nor development anthropology for example (see for discussion on these issues, Fine, 2002; Jackson, 2002; Kanbur, 2002; Hulme and Toye, 2006). Why the OS exists: The DS OS has an overall purpose of generating applied or instrumental research in the sense that DS is concerned with real-world issues even when theorising (see for discussion on these issues, Apthorpe, 1999; Molteberg and Bergstrøm, 2002a, b; Shaw, 2004; Mehta et al, 2006). Some in DS might add here that DS OS seeks to represent the interests of the non-powerful or poor and marginalised, r 2011 European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes 0957-8811 European Journal of Development Research Vol. 23, 1, 43–58

The Global Economic Crisis and Beyond but whether it is doing this is open to considerable debate (c.f. the post-development debate). However, this DS OS outlined above is relatively recent. DS has had a number of periods of palpable tensions, impasse and instability in ‘core’ ideas. One might observe how the intellectual health of DS measured in research funding, student numbers and a lack of intellectual crisis moments for periods of time (such as the post-development critique) and trends in overseas development assistance (ODA) volumes are associated (arguably because much of research funding for development research is from ODA and turning points or ‘crisis moments’ have tended to coincide to some extent in DS and ODA). Such turning points, of course, are also linked to discrete periods and turning points in history – the Cold War and its end in 1990; the post-9/11 period and the global financial crisis, for example. We could say DS 1.0 lasted from 1960 to 1990. DS had a boom period in terms of expansion of research institutes, research funding, taught courses and student numbers and this coincided with an expansion in ODA flows in absolute terms. The end of the Cold War, the intellectual impasse in DS at the end of the Cold War (c.f. Booth, 1985; Edwards, 1989) and the hard-hitting, post-development critique (c.f. Escobar, 1992, 1995; Sachs, 1992; Rahnema, 1997) left DS in the doldrums in the 1990–2000 period and also coincided with the decline in absolute terms of ODA. This time could be labelled as DS 2.0. DS 3.0 could then be dated from 2000. There was a large expansion in research funding and student numbers. This was at the same time as a large surge in ODA from 2000 and after the 9/11 attacks of 2002 in particular. This article argues, as a product of the post-crisis context, we are entering DS 4.0. This entails recognition of the shift in the nature of intellectual problems created by the end of a relatively stable period and the start of a period of greater instability or as Evan et al (2010) call ‘the long crisis of globalisation’. The crisis is a structural break because there is a ‘new normal’ of new actor configurations, radically changing power, the emergence of more middle-income countries and greater levels of instability inherent in climate change, volatile markets and so on. It is also likely this period will coincide with a decline in ODA volumes due to the fiscal squeeze in the North. A brief history of DS can say something about each DS OS starting with DS OS 1.0. However, when exactly DS emerged as a distinct field of enquiry is disputed – as Harriss (2005, p. 17) notes ‘quite when “development studies” began y is a matter for debate y [it] emerged in a particular intellectual and political context in the 1960s’. Whilst it is true the term DS only came into being as a teaching course title relatively recently – in the 1960s and 1970s largely during decolonisation processes in Africa – and many well-known institutions date from this time period as do many academic journals in development, DS has genealogy in the colonial era too.2 The issue of when DS emerged as a coherent and explicit subject area for study and research is, of course, more complex than identifying the first use of the term DS for teaching programmes or journal titles or in institutional names. The emergence of DS has traces in both colonial and post-colonial eras. Kothari (2005, pp. 47–48), for example, has argued that DS emerged out of colonial studies but that DS ‘rarely acknowledges [its] colonial roots y and the variety of ways in which the west produces knowledge about other people in other places’. There is certainly continuity between colonial studies, the period of colonial administration, and quite a number of the anthropological and r 2011 European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes 0957-8811 European Journal of Development Research Vol. 23, 1, 43–58

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Sumner economic studies, which were undertaken, for example, in British colonies in the late 1940s and 1950s with funding and other support from the UK Colonial Office (for example, Mayer, 1951; Lewis, 1953; Gulliver, 1957; Peacock and Dosser, 1958). Some of those who worked for the colonial administrations before independence became academics, development researchers and practitioners after independence. It has also been argued that DS is a product of the post-colonial period and of the decolonisation process in the 1950s and 1960s (Molteberg and Bergstrøm, 2002a, b; Loxley, 2004; Shaw, 2004; Bernstein, 2005). The 1960s also witnessed the first UN ‘Development Decade’ with the establishment of new UN institutions (such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development – UNCTAD) and the conversion of other institutions towards a more development-oriented role. In the 1960s and 1970s, economic aspects of development played a dominant role in the discourse and arguably still do (see for discussion, Jackson, 2002; Kanbur, 2002; White, 2002; Hulme and Toye, 2006; Woolcock, 2007; 2009) and there has been a tension between the technocratic (some say de-politicisation) in the purpose of DS towards instrumentality and the building of ‘high-theory’ and/or politicisation (Preston, 1996; Martinussen, 1997; Corbridge, 2005). As noted above, DS 2.0 might be dated to the 1980s/1990s impasse in DS and the postdevelopment critique. Since then there has also been a notable shift from a focus on industrialisation in the South to poverty reduction (see for discussion, Gore, 2000; Thomas, 2000, 2004; Kanbur, 2001; Chambers, 2004). The 1990 UNDP Human Development Report launch and associated work by Amartya Sen among others was one milestone (or set of milestones) in the evolution of DS on this pathway to ‘beyond economics’, as were the earlier publication of Seer’s The Meaning of Development (1969) and What are we Trying to Measure? (1972). In the 1990s, the purpose of DS and its ‘good intentions’ was strongly challenged by the post-development movement and others that critiqued DS as part of the ‘problem’ (for example, Alvares, 1992; Escobar, 1992, 1995; Sachs, 1992; Rahnema, 1997). As Corbridge (2005, p. 1) puts it: Development Studies has been accused in recent years of being irrelevant, of being hopelessly evolutionary, of being colonial in intent, of being masculinist, of being dirigiste and of being a vehicle for de-politicisation and the extension of bureaucratic state power. It stands accused of being the source of many of the problems of the so-called ‘Third World’.

However, DS has thrived and has expanded its role in spite of, or perhaps because of, responses (although uneven responses) to these criticisms (see for discussion, Scheyvens and Storey, 2003). Certainly, in terms of international policy interest, the volume of literature published, or in student numbers studying DS, the subject has not diminished in Europe at least (EADI, 2006). Part of the story is the evolution of DS from an area of enquiry where the norm is the dominance or ‘imperialist’ tendency of Economics (Fine, 2002) and ‘we’ in the ‘North’ study ‘them’ in the ‘South’ (Saith, 2007), towards greater cross-disciplinarity as the ‘norm’ and research partnerships that may be led or initiated by Northern researchers (funded by Northern funds), but increasingly seek to build non-hierarchical partnerships when and where possible (Mehta et al, 2006). Indeed, it is likely that increasingly knowledge generation in DS will shift to the South and to the Brazil, Russia, India, China (BRIC)/Brazil, South Africa, India and China (BASIC) countries in particular whose universities and institutes are well resourced and well placed to compete intellectually and financially with 46

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The Global Economic Crisis and Beyond OECD institutes and universities and are closer to the issues. The Hewlett Think Tank initiative to fund southern institutes is but one example of seeking to extend this further with a wider network of funded think tanks including 24 institutes in Africa. Southern-led collaborations and South–South collaborations are only likely to increase but the speed of this will be determined by research finance, personnel and capacity constraints and international funders’ appetite for such initiatives. The emergence of a much stronger DS sector in the South raises a number of questions for DS and the future of Northern research centres and their comparative advantage in a more contested market place. This is a debate already live and being discussed (see for discussion, Maxwell, 2003; Zingerli, 2010). In this article, however, we focus on the what (the DS OS does) question, rather than the how question or why questions previously noted. Any characterisation of DS is – of course – likely to be contentious. The word – ‘development’ – itself remains a major problem for some because of its associated baggage (see Corbridge, 2005) and others have called for the word to be rethought, reinvented or reclaimed (see for discussion, Haddad, 2006; Leach et al, 2007). In sum, DS has – like all areas of enquiry – been subject to considerable flux, but it has adapted with criticisms although certainly not to the satisfaction of post-development thinkers who would like to see the end of DS. Looking forward, such tensions that have been evident in DS are only likely to increase given the changing context for ‘development’ itself.

The Crisis and Beyond: A Changing Context for Development? The contention of this section is that the context for ‘development’ (however defined) is changing and that this is likely (but not certainly) a structural break. This is not only in light of the global economic crisis and the end of a relatively benign period if one uses the barometers, although dominant discourses, of reasonable growth, buoyant aid and relative stability, but also in light of wider major changes in areas such as shifting global power towards a multi-polar world as a result of development in the BRIC/BASIC countries, most notably China, as well as climate change and major demographic change that are likely to have a significant impact. This section posits that these changes mean DS needs rethinking to adapt to changing circumstances. First, what has the crisis actually changed in terms of ‘development’? Perhaps the most significant change is the dawn of a multi-polar world in global governance. As Jones et al (2009, p. 51) noted that ‘the era in which the seven major industrial economies could meet with Russia and act collectively to solve global problems is over’. The rise of the G20, and its institutionalisation, at the G20 Pittsburgh summit, as the global body for economic coordination marks a fundamental shift from the pre-crisis era in which the OECD countries were the primary drivers and decision makers in global economic affairs. The shift from the G8 to the G20 is certainly a positive one in terms of representation of some developing countries, but it’s less clear whether the impact on development itself will be immediately positive. A major shortcoming is the absence of representation via formal membership of low-income countries and Africa in particular in contrast to the strong representation of the Asia-Pacific countries (10 of the 19 countries). However, the mission and structure of the G20 will likely evolve. There are suggestions that the G20 should move towards a constituency-based system, which would in turn resemble the Bank/Fund boards’ model. Further, the G20 could expand to climate, health, and other issues likely to r 2011 European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes 0957-8811 European Journal of Development Research Vol. 23, 1, 43–58

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Sumner be high on the future international agenda. Much will depend on how developing country blocs operate politically within these new international fora and governance reform at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. There is consensus that the two heads of the institutions should be selected in an open and transparent process not restricted to candidates from one country or region. Contention remains on the composition of quotas and board as these reflect voting strength and levels of access to resources (for greater discussion on IMF and World Bank change, see Eichengreen, 2009). The economic context has also been shaken by the crisis – both because of the uncertainties created by the unexpected shocks to finance and trade, and their knock-on effects on millions of lives, and the shaking of confidence in what were previously thought to be the certainties of economic theory and practice. The Washington Consensus has been declared dead (again), but the nature of the shift to what might be called a Chinese development paradigm or a ‘Beijing Consensus’ (meaning a greater role for state-led or state managed global integration) is, as yet, unclear.3 Certainly, the discussion of ‘global economic imbalances’ at the Pittsburgh G20, and the resulting agreement that governments have a role in directing markets in order to avoid ‘imbalances’ would have been an unthinkable break with the orthodoxy just a few years ago. If it opens up discussion of a wider range of policy instruments for development, then this has potentially huge implications. A further change is the continuing economic uncertainty caused by the crisis itself – it’s not clear when, or if, growth rates in the poorest countries will start to pick up, and whether the poorest people will benefit in time to prevent permanent damage to livelihoods and erosion of assets. Economic uncertainty in donor countries is also leading to declining public support for aid budgets. This is an immediate concern for over the next few years, but the impact of the crisis is likely to still frame the discussions over the next 5 years, and will be critical in determining the economic and social environment. In short, this combination of impacts of the global economic crisis marks the end of a relatively benign period for development and potentially the break-down of what existed of a global compact in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers albeit with critics who have argued such a consensus has done little ‘on-the-ground’ in some contexts. The forthcoming period is likely to be far less certain as countries faces multiple and inter-connected crises in climate, and energy, the end of an oligopolistic aid market with the emergence of new donors – the OECD (2009) estimated there are now over 400 donors and in some sectors in some countries there may be over 30 donors in one sector (for example, the health sector in Tanzania). Such uncertainties not only have the potential to impact adversely on levels of poverty, but also to change the context for doing development. Not surprising, as a result of the crisis and its aftermath, there have been numerous calls for a new development narrative/paradigm from developing countries, international civil society organisations and development agencies. Take for example, in the mainstream, calls from the World Bank, the UN and the Sarkozy Commission, respectively: [D]evelopment is no longer about the old paradigm of aid dependency or charity, or about the North teaching the South. It is about an investment in a stable and inclusive future. That requires including new voices at the table, boosting South-South partnerships, and accepting that the North must learn to learn from the South. (Statement by Justin Lin, Senior Vice President and Chief Economist, World Bank, November 2008) The impact of the global economic crisis is likely to be so severe in the least developed countries that ‘business as usual’ is no longer possible. This will necessitate a rethinking of the development 48

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The Global Economic Crisis and Beyond paradigm. The magnitude of the crisis offers both the necessity and an opportunity for change y new policy approaches are necessary to ensure that development after the crisis will be more resilient and more inclusive. (UNCTAD, Least Developed Countries Report, 2009, p. 1) [I]n this time of crises, when new political narratives are necessary to identify where our societies should go, [we] advocate a shift of emphasis from a ‘production-oriented’ measurement system to one focused on the well-being of current and future generations, i.e. toward broader measures of social progress. (Report by the (Sarkozy) Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, 2009, p. 10)

There is also considerable ferment on the understandings of ‘development’, ‘progress’, ‘poverty’ and ‘wellbeing’. Evidence of this is most visible in the recent Sarkozy Commission (cited above), chaired by Amartya Sen, Joseph Stiglitz and Jean-Paul Fitoussi, which has provided one of the latest and strongest signposts of all with its conclusion that there is a need ‘to shift emphasis from measuring economic production to measuring people’s wellbeing’ (2009, p. 10). The Sarkozy Commission regards its report as opening a discussion rather than providing the answers. There is further evidence in the OECD’s Measuring the Progress of Societies and the UNDP Human Development Report (UNDP, 2010) is rethinking current approaches to poverty, development and the goals of pro-poor policy as part of the 20-year review of human development in 2010.4 Such ferment and calls for new thinking are likely not only as a product of the crisis, but as a broader sense of major global and regional changes some of which the crisis has brought to light and were happening anyway.5 Such changes include, the rise of a multi-polar world, noted above due to industrialisation in China and the other BRIC countries emerging as new global actors (and new donors); major demographic change – population growth, differentiated demographic transitions, evolving age structures and changing labour markets; increasing environmental pressures and ‘tipping points’ – climate change leading to greater volatility in the weather and agriculture production; water scarcity; resource conflicts and the acceleration of technological change – the spread of existing technologies such as biotechnology and the development of new(er) technologies, such as industrial biofuel, information, communication technologies (ICTs) and nanotechnology. The conclusion of the US National Intelligence Council (US NIC) Report (2008, p. xii), based on a widespread and large academic consultation, is sobering: ‘trends suggest major discontinuities, shocks and surprises’. It is not the intention here to go into depth on the details each of these major changes (that has been done well by the US NIC (2008) report and others), but to ask what are the major changes in an aggregated sense and what do they imply for ‘development’ and its study? Of course, we cannot predict the future (something the crisis has shown). However, what we can do is identify factors likely to shape events rather than predict what will or will not happen. Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s (2007) has popularised the thesis of Black Swans – unexpected, unpredictable and high-impact events – such as the economic crisis itself. Taleb argued that human beings underestimate the likelihood and impact of hard to foresee events. However, we should not try and predict Black Swans but ‘invest in preparedness, not in prediction’ (ibid, p. 208). In short, we can seek to identify a relatively small number of variables or issues that will likely have a disproportionate influence over future ‘development’. r 2011 European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes 0957-8811 European Journal of Development Research Vol. 23, 1, 43–58

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Sumner For the sake of this discussion, we can start to ask what this means for the DS OS by first drawing together some of the debates into a few key ideas, institutions and interests. This is not intended to be a definitive list, rather illustrative enough to inform the next section of this article and its focus on a new OS for DS. Key issues include the challenge to the primacy of markets and international openness; the dispersal of intellectual authority; and perhaps the emergence of a ‘Beijing Consensus’ (that is, state-led, strategic global integration; strong social policy). There is also the decline of US/Western power/hegemony noted as economic power shifts, a shift likely to accelerate given debt trends in the North and there are a series of ‘moral crises’. For example, who pays for climate change adaption and mitigation; and the cost of the crisis bailout versus undelivered aid promises (notably the ‘missing’ US$20 billion/year promised in 2005) and the fiscal squeeze to pay for the crisis. Finally, there is some sense that the basic concept of a ‘developing country’ is becoming ever more unstable as a polarisation evolves with the emergence of a number of ‘emerging economies’ at the same time as the existence of a large number of ‘fragile’ or conflictaffected countries. In short, looking further ahead there are questions about adapting DS to the post-crisis context and bigger ‘game changers’.

Possible Future(s): DS 4.0? In the late 1990s, Apthorpe (1999) suggested, given the contemporary emphasis in DS on poverty reduction and policy, that ‘Poverty Studies’ or ‘Policy Studies’ would be more appropriate than DS (Apthorpe, 1999). This section argues that a similar junction is now evident in DS. This junction rests not on the poverty or policy orientations of DS, but on the breadth of scope of DS in terms of countries and what that implies for any DS 4.0. Many of the specific issues noted in the previous section are – of course – already under research.6 There are, however, implications for the DS OS beyond simply researching new issues because any of the above issues imply changes in the scope of DS and its focus to date, for the most part, on ‘developing countries’ (however defined). Such a concept of a ‘developing country’ was always unstable and over time it has become more and more so. The trends noted previously and the differentiation in what are/were ‘developing countries’ is only likely to accelerate this conceptual fragmentation. Historically, DS has focused on what was ‘the Third World’ – a term which has never been precisely defined. The term ‘Third World’ was coined by the French economist and demographer, Alfred Sauvy in 1952. It was based on the concept of the ‘Third Estate’ from the French revolution – a division of society between nobility, clergy and commoners. For Sauvy, ‘Third World’ was intended to reflect ‘exclusion’ rather than ‘inferiority’ (Scheyvens and Storey, 2003, p. 13). The term represented a loose grouping of newly independent countries in the 1950s and 1960s, which became associated with the ‘non-aligned movement’ (countries aligned to neither the United States nor the USSR in the Cold War) launched in 1955. The term ‘Third World’ has also been associated with the G77 (Group of 77), which was formed within UNCTAD in the 1960s.7 Of course, the term ‘Third World’ is dated by the Cold War, and by a time period when there was a First World (the industrialised countries) and a Second World (the communist block). 50

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The Global Economic Crisis and Beyond When the Cold War ended, the ‘Third World’ label became questionable and the number of new terms mushroomed (each with critiques): For example, developing countries (too counterfactual?); less developed countries (too patronising a term – strongly suggesting inferiority?); low income countries (too economically determinist?); the South (not geographically perfect but the term used by both the 1980 Brandt Commission and the 1990 South Commission); post-colonial societies (too historically determinist – are countries that have had independence for, in some cases, hundreds of years, still framed by that colonial experience?), and non-OECD countries (those countries which are not members of the OECD – the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development – the body which essentially represents the economic interests of the industrialised countries, but includes some middle-income developing countries). The net result is some ambiguity over the scope of DS. If DS is the study of development, is it development in the North (not traditionally an interest of DS), or all countries in the North and the South? Or should DS focus only on countries in what was the Third World (for example, perhaps with attention to the North on aspects which they impact directly on the South such as European Community (EC) trade policy)? We can propose two stylised scenarios for DS. If DS was asked to make some choice over its scope, there might be at least two options and directions – either to broaden or to narrow the scope. Broadening the scope might mean a focus on all countries, and a global, systemic perspective, as many of the meta-trends are global in nature. Alternatively, the scope could be narrowed to the poorest countries (however defined – but typically by low income, high poverty and weak states perhaps) with a rationale of those countries that are most ‘in need’ of study. The discussion here does not presuppose these are the only futures nor that one or the other is more desirable. The rather crude split is intended merely as a device to consider a discussion of possible futures for DS: A future DS with a broader scope via global perspectives on inter-connected development (a ‘One-World’ DS); and a future DS with a narrower scope via attention to the needs of the poorest countries or the poorest people (a ‘Bottom Billion’ DS). If we broaden the scope to ‘One-World’ DS or ‘Global’ DS (see for a range of discussions, Maxwell, 1998, 2005; Haddad 2006; Mehta et al, 2006; Saith, 2007), the scope could be all countries and the interconnectedness of development, poverty, wealth and wellbeing in North/West and South/East. It would be based on the rationale that ‘development’ would be (even) more about the inter-connectedness of North/West and South/East over the next 30 years. The global financial crisis and food and fuel price rises have demonstrated the extent of North-South, East-West global inter-connectedness in markets. We could identify similar inter-connections in climate change, migration and demographics, technology or conflict/governance/security. Further, all countries are developing in some sense and there is wealth and poverty in both North/West and South/ East. Many development problems and their solutions are neither the preserve of the North/West nor the South/East alone and given international migration; wellbeing in North/West and South/East is increasingly connected via transnational identities and remittances. Mehta et al (2006, p. 5) have argued for this type of DS: Development research should reinvent itself to address the increasing interconnectedness between North and South, local-global linkages, the pedagogy of the powerful, social change in the north and more genuine interdisciplinarityy Our view is that development research cany emerge as a way of learning about development and exclusion in both rich and poor countries, and lead the way in terms of forging new approaches in connecting global and local issues, policies, solutions and researchers. r 2011 European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes 0957-8811 European Journal of Development Research Vol. 23, 1, 43–58

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Sumner As Maxwell noted some time ago: The argument [for comparatives] rests not on levels of living, so much as on the economic, political and social characteristics of different groups of countries and on the tools of analysis deployed to study them. (1998, p. 25)

What kind of changes would such a scope imply for the DS OS? In terms of foci and approach, it might require a common understanding of ‘progress’ or wellbeing which presumably would be beyond absolute poverty and be possibly about relative poverty, social inclusion/exclusion, and/or inequality because these concepts are applicable in both South/East and North/West. ‘One-World’ or ‘Global’ DS would fit with the changing context because it would have explicit global dimensions of analysis and thus address directly many of the issues in the changing context for ‘development’ noted above. Indeed, the purpose of ‘Global’ DS would be to directly address systemic inter-related global issues of which poverty is one in itself, and strongly influenced by others such as climate change. Further, that such a purpose would be pursued with a new model of research based on co-generation of knowledge by researchers in the North/West and the South/East. Rather than just the North studying the South, the South would study the North and the South would study the South. This would thus entail a radical decentralisation of the research process and the building of more equitable relationships between northern and southern researchers. A ‘Global’ DS approach would also imply greater cross-disciplinarity as many systemic issues are at the interface of physical and social systems. Post-positivism (and/or complexity theory) are two emergent bodies that DS might draw on to make such connections (see for further discussion, Ramalingam and Jones, 2008; Sumner and Tribe, 2008). Postpositivism is a recent formation that (perhaps surprisingly) demonstrates parallels between the (contentious) field of quantum physics in the Physical Sciences and aspects of postmodernism theory in the Social Sciences. It argues that knowledge acquisition should be based on the establishment of probabilistic propositions rather than on certainty; for relative objectivity rather than absolute objectivity; and for the achievement of approximate truth rather than of ‘total’ truth. In contrast, if we narrow the scope to ‘Bottom Billion’ DS, this would draw on Collier’s (2007) thesis that development policy and implicitly DS should be about a smaller set of around 60 countries which are the poorest countries. Collier’s focus on the poorest countries or ‘fragile states’ has been acted upon by a number of donors such as DFID and the World Bank, for example, in terms of priorities chosen and programmes funded. Take for example, the UK DFID’s (2009, pp. 71, 129) White Paper, which allocated half of all new bilateral country funding to be spent on fragile states and noted the closing down of nine country offices between 2007 and 2010, thus echoing Collier (2007, p. 3) that development agencies should stop aid to countries on a path to sustained growth and focus on the core problem of countries that are ‘falling behind and often falling apart’. The number of the poorest countries is falling on some estimates and definitions. For example, over the last 10 years the number of officially classified low-income countries, based on a consistent threshold has fallen from around 60 in the mid-1990s to just 39 in the most recent data just released for FY2011 by the World Bank (see Table 1). In light of this ‘Bottom Billion’ DS is one possible future for DS. This would mean much more focus on those remaining low-income countries given that many (but not all) middle-income countries typically have substantial domestic resources as measured by aid 52

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The Global Economic Crisis and Beyond Table 1: Number of countries in each World Bank category Data basis

Year

Low income Lower-middle income Upper-middle income High income

FY90

FY95

FY00

FY05

FY10

FY11

1988

1993

1998

2003

2008

2009

48 51 26 41

58 66 37 40

61 56 36 50

60 55 37 55

43 55 46 67

39 60 50 71

Note: Definitions of Low Income Country (LICs) and Middle Income Country (MICs) are consistent over time in real terms. Source: World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/a-short-history).

Table 2: Selected MICs and poor people, net ODA, aid dependency and Forex reserves Country

China India Indonesia Nigeria South Africa

Number of poor people (under $1.25, million, 2007)

Net ODA ($ billion, 2008)

Aid dependency ratio (49% GNI=high, 2008) (%)

Forex reserves (2008–2010, $ billion)

207 559 455 830 47 002 88 592 11 528

1.5 2.1 1.2 1.3 1.1

0.0 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.4

1953.3 279.0 71.8 53.0 42.0

Source: World Bank – World Development Indicators (WDI); GDF; IMF and Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU).

dependency ratios and/or foreign exchange reserves (see Table 2). One issue is the poor increasingly live in middle income countries (see Sumner, 2010). For Collier (2007, p. 3), the core ‘problem’ of ‘development’ should be 58 (unnamed) countries that are, ‘falling behind and often falling apart’. ‘Bottom Billion’ DS would thus focus solely on this or similar set of 60 countries (however defined – which would be contentious) that relate to the billion or so people living in the poorest countries or ‘fragile states’. What kind of changes to the ‘OS’ would this imply for DS? Collier argued that the MDGs’ focus has been misleading because 80 per cent of the world’s poor live in countries, which are making progress and growth should be the focus.8 The oft-cited estimate is that one-third of the world’s dollar-a-day poor live in fragile states (OECD, 2009) although a search for the actual data this figure is based on has proved fruitless (resonating with the recent focus on challenging the figure that 70 per cent of the world’s poor are women and earlier Ravallion’s revisiting of the figure that 70 per cent of the world’s poor are rural (respectively, Ravallion et al, 2007; Chant, 2008). Sumner (2010) estimates 23 per cent of the world’s poor live in fragile states. How does this fit with the changing context for ‘development’? ‘Bottom Billion’ DS would resonate clearly with the global changes discussed previously because there is such a huge diversity in what was once the ‘Third World’. There are, on the one hand, a group of accelerated ‘developers’ in the BRICs, the Brazil, Russia, India, China, Eastern Europe and Turkey (BRICETS) (add Eastern Europe and Turkey), and the Goldmans Sachs r 2011 European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes 0957-8811 European Journal of Development Research Vol. 23, 1, 43–58

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Sumner N11 or E7 emerging economies. Does it make sense to study all countries in this changing context? ‘Bottom Billion’ DS would narrow the focus. Global changes may increase the inequality between and within countries, and a focus on a priority set of countries that ‘need’ studying more than others might be more fruitful than studying all developing countries as currently defined. The rationale for ‘Bottom Billion’ DS would be the smaller scope of DS which would (hopefully) mean greater success in achieving ‘progress’ in the world’s poorest countries. ‘Bottom Billion’ DS would certainly imply a narrower focus on 60 or so countries and more focus on growth and governance as Collier suggests. This might also imply less need for expanding cross-disciplinarity (perhaps economic and politics are enough). In short, a question about the scope of DS can be developed into two possible stylised futures. This does not mean to discount other futures, but is merely to trigger debate on the scope of DS.

Conclusion The context for ‘development’ (however defined) is changing. This is not only in light of the global economic crisis and the end of a relatively benign period of reasonable growth, buoyant aid and relative stability, but also in light of wider major changes such as the ‘rise of the East’, climate change and demographic change that are likely to have a major impact on development at various levels. If the context for development is changing, then the study of development will need to, in some way, adapt to these changing circumstances. Further, there are at the same time a range of countries which do not fit the ‘developing country’ category if, indeed, the category ever made sense as all countries are developing – no country is static. On the one hand, there are the BASIC or BRIC countries and N11 or E7. On the other hand, the numbers of poorest are declining and global poverty is be concentrated in middle-income countries, many of which have substantial resources. In light of these changes, this article has argued that the scope – broader or narrower – is a crucial debate for the future of DS. The article has outlined two possible futures based on a widening or narrowing of the scope of DS: A future DS with a broader scope via global perspectives on inter-connected development (a ‘One-World’ DS); and a future DS with a narrower scope via attention to the needs of the poorest countries or the poorest people (a ‘Bottom Billion’ DS). DS has gone through considerable changes to date, towards greater cross-disciplinarity; a stronger emphasis on normative research (even when theorising) and towards a broader foci with a poverty focus in the mainstream. Looking to the future, DS faces a changing context for ‘development’ over the next 30 years. The US NIC (2008) report noted previously talks of ‘demographics of discord’, ‘scarcity amid plenty’ and ‘growing potential for conflict’ as some of its chapter titles. If we use the analogy of the ‘OS’ we can discuss what these changes might mean for the study of ‘development’. In this article, the discussion has focused primarily on the question of what the OS does in terms of focus. We can say DS has had more than one dominant OS already (if we stretch the metaphor we could say there are, of course, numerous competing OSs and one becomes visible in its dominant position). DS OS 1.0 was arguably more focused on economic development, GDP growth and industrialisation, and development economics dominated. DS 2.0 and 3.0 was perhaps more focused on poverty and 54

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The Global Economic Crisis and Beyond social development and was more cross-disciplinary in approach. DS OS 4.0 could take quite different forms. It could place the focus on all countries or just the poorest countries. The former might imply approaches that were much more cross-disciplinary across social and physical sciences as many of the major global and regional trends imply a need for this. The latter might imply politics and economics are sufficient. In sum, DS faces quite differing possible futures. Of course there is considerable overlap – is the study of commodity markets and how they impact on developing countries a one-world issue or a bottom billion issue? Surely both. Ditto anything related to conflict, security and global public goods like climate. Perhaps the most fertile area for the future of DS is at this overlap point. Sketching in more detail this interface of one-world and bottom billion DS requires more attention if DS is to respond and adapt to a changing world.

Acknowledgement The author acknowledges three anonymous referees who contributed to the shaping of this article via their comments. Parts of this article draw on and develop discussions of Sumner and Tribe (2009; Chapter 2).

Notes 1. 2.

3.

4. 5.

See also the EADI Development Studies Dossier at www.eadi.org/programmes/dossiers/dossieron-development-studies.html. For example, the Institute of Development Studies at the Nairobi University, Kenya and the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies in Dhaka, the Institute of Social Studies in the Hague, and Institute of Development Studies at Sussex University, all date to this time period as do the Journal of Development Studies – 1965; Development and Change – 1970; World Development – 1973. Noting, for example, the IMF’s recent spat with Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and claim and counter claim on both organisations’ homepages as to the content of IMF programmes: Weisbrot et al (2009, p. 4) argue that in 31 of 41 countries, the IMF’s crisis agreements contain pro-cyclical fiscal or monetary macro-economic policies (and both in 15 countries) that might be expected to worsen recessions. For example, in sub-Saharan Africa although IMF crisis agreements have included expansionary fiscal policy in 4 countries (Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique and Niger), there has been contractionary fiscal policy in a further 9 (Burkino Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Mali and Senegal – ibid, p. 9). One might also note the 5-year, multi-country research of both the Wellbeing in Developing Countries network as well as the Oxford Poverty & Human Development Initiative that have stimulated academic debate. There are various ongoing projects seeking to make sense of such ‘meta-trends’ and their complex interactions. Take, for example, the US National Intelligence Council’s (US NIC) 2020 Project and related Global Trends 2010, 2015 and 2025 and the EADI European Development Cooperation 2010 and 2020 projects (see, respectively, www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2020_ project.html and www.edc2020.eu). For those who like a long-term view, the University of Denver’s Pardee Centre for International Futures may be of interest. Available via their website is a long-term integrated modelling system covering demographic, economic, energy, agricultural, socio-political and environmental subsystems for 182 countries interacting in the global system. One can download the software and explore alternative future scenarios oneself. The centre conducts work for the US NIC, EC and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). It is currently estimating development in the mid-twenty-first century and beyond (see www.ifs.du.edu/). r 2011 European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes 0957-8811 European Journal of Development Research Vol. 23, 1, 43–58

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Sumner 6.

7. 8.

One might note as evidence, although from a UK-lens, the recent review of UK university research in development studies which noted many of the themes commented on above as emerging areas of enquiry: ‘Emerging fields [in development studies] include identity (notably religion); conflict and security; migration and refugees; the specialist study of children; the Asian drivers of development (notably China); value chains, corporate enterprises and CSR; new problems of urban development – together with new kinds of comparative research across regions, new applications of methods from developing countries to advanced ones (e.g. participation, and development ethnography) and work focusing on change in advanced countries of relevance to developing ones’ (Research Assessment Exercise Development Studies Panel, 2008, p. 7). The Group of 77 has since grown to 131 countries but retains its original name. For Collier, the foci and purpose would be to prioritise growth and governance. Collier (2007, p. 11) does ‘not share the discomfort about growth’ felt by many people caring about development, he argues that the problem of the Bottom Billion is that ‘they have not had any growth’, rather than the ‘wrong type of growth’ and he claims that ‘growth usually does benefit ordinary people’. His diagnosis is clear: ‘the failure of the growth process in these societies simply has to be our core concern, and curing it the core challenge of development’ (Collier, 2007, p. 11).

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