The Philosopher in the Workplace

ABSTRACT. This paper offers a series of reflections on the movement of philosophy beyond its traditional locus in colleges and universities into business settings. This movement is characterized as a variation on a persistent theme in the western tradition beginning with Socrates and running throughout modern (Spinoza, Hume, Locke and Berkeley) and recent philosophers (Kierkegaard, Marx, Nietzsche, Sartre and Russell) who held no full time academic appointment. Increasingly philosophers are addressing the concerns of scientists, lawyers, and engineers on the job rather than in the classroom. To what end? As one of the liberal arts, philosophy expands our horizons by locating immediate concerns within a broader historical cultural context and provides conceptual tools and techniques for analyzing problems. Teaching ethics in a board room rather than graduate seminar can still serve to raise students' consciousness, clarify conflicting values, sharpen moral reasoning and help identify moral truths. Yet as the philosophers' role shifts from teacher and researcher as traditionally defined to agent provocateur, revolutionary, moral conscience or confidante, novel problems arise for philosophers that are long familiar to social and applied scientists. The traditional prerogatives of acaaemlc' " freedom are modified through new institutional arrangements that demand loyalty and confidentiality rather than neutrality and the dissemination of knowledge.

Frederick A. Elliston is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Hawaii. He has published books on crime, women, sex, policing and whistIeblowing as well as four collections in phenomenology and existentialism on HusserI, FIeideggerand Sartre.

JournalofBusiness Ethics 4 (1985) 331-339. © 1985 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.

Frederick Elliston

I. The locus o f philosophy The title of m y paper has an odd ring to many people, philosophers included. For philosophy is traditionally conceived o f a s an academic discipline par excellence. It is a text and course o f instruction offered by college and university faculty to undergraduate and graduate students. Etymologically its roots go back to the love (philo) o f wisdom (sophia). By definition it is concerned with erudition not economics. But it is sanguine to recall that it was not always so. The first philosophers, the sophists, served as paid tutors to other citizens and distributed their wares according to the principle o f the marketplace - selling their services for a fee. And the 'godfather' o f philosophers, Socrates, engaged his interlocutors in discussion in the streets o f Athens as he walked about the agora. Philosophy in the academic sense was born when Plato retreated tO the groves o f academe. There it became a course of instruction, a process whereby the enlightened enlightened the unenlightened. But it did not remain exclusively so. Throughout the Western tradition there has been a strong undercurrent that runs against the mainstream. Indeed, major impetus for change has come from philosophers with little or no academic affiliation. In the modern period there was Spinoza the lens grinder, Bacon a lawyer active in politics, Hume the librarian, Locke a political appointee and Berkeley a bishop. Montesquieu was at one time the mayor o f Bordeau, and Rousseau serves as a seminarist, music teacher, itinerant footman and tutor. In the 19th century Marx was employed as a newspaperman, Kierkegaard lived o f f his inheritance, Nietzsche

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resigned his university post as a linguist to write his major works without the distraction of students. In the 20th century, many major figures had a tenuous if not tragic relation with universities: Pierce was ostracized from Harvard, Wittgenstein and Russell had only episodic academic careers; and in the continental tradition some of the main figures were not teachers at all -Sartre, Camus and De Beauvoir.

II. Applied philosophy Over the past decade there has been a remarkable change in the scope and locus of philosophical activity. 1 Increasingly philosophers have become much more active in courses and programs off campus. Under the rubric 'applied philosophy' or 'professional ethics', 2 they have become involved in the affairs of business and industry as observers, critics and participants. 3 A special issue of Teaching Philosophy published two years ago illustrates the breadth of this change.4 Professor Howard Cohen, Associate Dean at the University of Massachusetts, Boston, taught police ethics to police academy instructors as part of a Law Enforcement Trainers Institute for four years. He covers a wide range of topics like corruption, police power and authority, the role of the police in a democratic society, use of deadly force and affirmative action. Professor Michael Pritchard, Chairman of the Philosophy Department at Western Michigan University, conducted a series of philosophical discussions for young children at several local libraries. The philosophy of the child is a recent topic, and he has been pleasantly surprised to discover many budding metaphysicians among the younger generation. Mr. Pete Self, a graduate student at the University of Florida at GainesviUe, has worked for several years with other students to teach philosophy to prisoners. He has found his students often brighter and livelier than regular undergraduates. The prison administration has welcomed the program on the grounds that teaching ethics may make prisoners more ethical. There is little empirical evidence to substantiate

this hope, and even some to disconfirm it - a fact that creates pedagogical, political and moral problems. I was particularly pleased to include a paper in this collection by Professor Donald Jones of Drew University on his program at Allied ChemicalS: it allowed me to succinctly summarize the first four papers as covering innovative educational programs for cops, kids, crooks and capitalists (though some of these categories overlap). His audience was middle level executives at one of the largest petrochemical firms in the country, and dealt with broad issues of corporate responsibility. The final paper is this special issue described the work of Dr. Kenneth Kipnis of the University of Hawaii. With the support of several foundations, he organized an intership at the Kapiolani children's Hospital, where he found himself functioning as a sort of ethical clearing house. Some of the problems I shall discuss later especially the problem of confidentiality - a r e particularly acute in a hospital where life and death decisions are made daily, indeed hourly. Other programs deserve honorable mention. For the past year a philosopher held an internship in the Connecticut Department of Corrections, where he served as a catalyst for discussions of ethical, legal and social issues. Dr. Michael Bayles, previously the Director of the Westminster Institute has developed a specialized program in business ethics for purchasing agents that deals with conflict on interest, bribery, the disclosure of confidential information and other issues. And internships comparable to Dr. Kipnis' have been instituted in hospitals in Louisiana, New York and other locales. But whatever the locale or the audience, what is it that philosophers have to offer? I shall divide my answer to this question into three parts: the first appeals to the value of a liberal education, the second focuses on philosophical methodologies and the third on systematic areas of philosophy.

III. The usefulness of

philosophy

What does philosophy have to offer employees

The Philosopher in the Workplace and employers? Clearly it can bake no bread, and for some the situation is worse: philosophy is a handicap - it makes one think when one should be acting. Or, to make the objection more focused, business ethics is a handicap: it introduces extraneous and distracting considerations into decisions that should be made primarily on economic and financial grounds. Is philosophy a hindrance or a help ?

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How useful and appropriate are these methods and techniques? They can help to avoid semantic confusions that can otherwise mislead corporate decision makers. The ability to analyze ideas clearly and precisely provides a more secure foundation for executive action and corporate policy. And the phenomenological or existential approach to the organizational decision making process can provide an appreciation of alternative perspectives and complementary viewpoints.

A. The liberal arts Before offering a precise answer to this question, let me mention - without elaborating - a vaguer answer. As one of the so called 'liberal arts', philosophy has a value that is hard to pinpoint. It is the value of a liberal education. As such philosophy places one's immediate concerns in a broader humanistic perspective. It helps one to see personal and occupational problems as reflective of human nature and the human condition. There was a time, now passed, when those who would rule the empire would first study the classics. Immersing oneself in a text by Homer or Cicero was thought to sharpen one's appreciation of the drama of life and the backdrop of society and nature against which it is lived. The technical orientation of business and public administration programs today is a measure of our distance from the classical ideal. But we have lost an ancient truth in out preoccupation with technique, and I mention the value of the liberal arts as a first defense for philosophy in the workplace.

B. Conceptual tools and techniques As a second defense of philosophy in the workplace, I would mention a variety of methodologies. Philosophy cultivates a form of understanding by breaking things down into components to learn how the parts fit together. What is analyzed may be ideas (conceptual analysis), words (linguistic analysis), propositions (logical analysis), experience (phenomenological analysis) or existence (existential analysis).

C. Systematic philosophy To what extent is philosophy as a discipline useful in addressing the concerns of professionals in the workplace? Three areas of philosophy are worth mentioning in answer to this question. Logic, as a form philosophical inquiry, distinguishes the various relations among the meaning and truth values of statements. Formal logic sharpens one's ability to discriminate between valid and invalid arguments, between sound and unsound inferences. A course in informal logic enables one to pick out fallacious forms of reasoning. As a prophylactic, logic safeguards the pursuit of truth and provides a measure of protection against specious forms of reasoning. The study of ethics, or moral reasoning, serves to identify the first principles and ultimate value commitments of individuals, organizations or entire societies. Such clarity enables one to locate if not resolve conflicting value judgments more readily. Social philosophy deals with man in society, and the constellation of organizations through which our social life is structured. Whether the organization be a public agency or a private business, social philosophy identifies the fundamental principles on which it is based and its relation to other institutional arrangements.

IV. The role of the

philosopher

The value commitment in logic is hardly problematic: everyone recognizes it is good to be

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rational, or at least to seem so to others. Indeed it would be difficult to defend irrationality without contradicting oneself by appealing to some kind of argument. So philosophers can enter the workplace as the representative of reason without needing to justify their presence. The philosopher's role is then to help people make more rational decisions - decisions that are consistent with each other and with their basic principles. The philosopher's role is to help people become clearer about the meaning of what they say, and the logical implications of the positions they take. What the philosopher stands for is rationality, consistency and coherence. But with respect to other values, the philosopher is removed and uninvolved: like the neutral observer in social science, the philosopher takes no stand on the controversies that may surround him. However, there are alternatives. What is the range of options available to philosophers, specifically the roles they can play and the institutions within which they can operate ? One traditional role is embodied by Socrates - that of the gadfly. The modern social version is the agent provocateur. As such, the philosopher's task is to prick the conscience of the community, to provoke people into thinking about their actions and beliefs. The modern form for corporations is the philosopher in residence who acts as a corporate conscience. He serves to remind executives of their duties to both other members of the corporation and the public at large. A more radical version of this role was envisaged by Marx - the philosopher as the revolutionary. Whereas traditional academic philosophy had taken as its goal the task of understanding things, Marx asserted that the point of philosophy is to change them. On this view, it is not sufficient that the philosopher remind people of the difference between right and wrong: the philosopher must take an active role in redressing wrongdoing and ensuring that what is done is right. The religious version of this proactive role is the missionary who stands in contrast to the neutral observer of the social sciences. Here it is

the challenge of the philosopher not just to remind others of their duty, and to help them do it, but to see to it that justice is done. In an institutional context this would mean not just helping senior executives formulate fair and equitable policies but seeing to it that the policies are carried out in a fair and equitable fashion. Another role that the philosopher can play, and one that Dr. Kipnis found assigned to him, is that of the confidante. Though not quite a confessor, the philosopher may - if he has the trust and confidence of others - become one in whom others can confide about incidents, issues and actions that trouble them. Each role places different demands on the philosopher. To be a gadfly one must identify problems precisely and attack them pointedly. To be a revolutionary one must be willing to assume responsibility - not only for one's own actions but the actions and fates of others. To be a confidante, one must be absolutely trustworthy, and guard that trust assiduously by never divulging secrets.

V. Some dilemmas for philosophers To what extent do these new roles, and the new arrangements with business and industry that they represent, limit or otherwise affect the traditional prerogatives enjoyed by philosophers under the rubric 'academic freedom'? Are the problems that philosophers face different from those confronting other academics who act as consultants to business and industry? In the case of bio-engineering, universities have had to negotiate novel working relations with private industry that curtailed traditional freedoms to publish and disseminate the results of their work. Comparable limitations are involved in new working relations with philosophers and the private or public sector. Consider the case of a philosopher employed as a speech writer for the head of one of the components of the Bell System. Suppose he is asked to develop a rationale for the company policy on affirmative action, whichhe personally believes is not aggressive enough. Should he

The Philosopher in the Workplace comply? Should he state his opposition openly or keep his divergent views to himself? Should he use his skills to defend a policy he personally finds inadequate and flawed, or would such a course be a kind of intellectual prostitution? There may be no general answer to these questions ? Perhaps each must answer for himself. Yet standard moral principles provide a measure of guidance. The injunction to honesty requires that he not misrepresent the company policy as his own position. If asked whether he agrees with the policy, the injunction to truthfulness requires that he state he is opposed to it. Anyone who becomes involved in the decision making process of large organizations is likely to become privy to private information. In some cases, the information will be about wrongdoing that has been or will be committed. Should the philosopher disclose the wrongdoing? To what extent is the philosopher bound by commitments of confidentiality, and under what conditions (if any) can such an obligation be overridden? More generally, how free are philosophers to act on their personal or professional values - especially when these conflict with those of his new employer? Within an academic setting, the values of the individual and the organization are fairly congruent, though there are notable exceptions (Bertell Ollman, a marxist political scientist, is one example). Generally, the freedom to pursue one's intellectual interests is seen as an important component in the mission of the university to advance the frontiers of knowledge and cultivate the intellectual skills of its members. But in a business context, matters of the mind are secondary to matters of the marketplace. This new preeminent value imposes constraints on the latitude members of the organization enjoy to pursue their own initiatives and to act on their own principles. Personal growth, though not entirely denied, must serve the purpose of monetary growth. If one adopts a satisficing model of corporate behavior, according to which a level of profit is necessary but only one of several goals, then the philosopher has an entrd. Corporations recognize that in addition to maintaining their long term financial viability, they also want to

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maintain a high level of employee morale, a positive image in the eyes of the public, and a stable relation to other organizations including regulatory agencies. These alternative goals open the door for some practical proposals about what philosophers can do in the workplace.

VI. Some concrete proposals

Employee morale can be enhanced if employees are treated in a fair and equitable fashion. Accordingly, enlightened corporations are properly concerned with the rights of employees, and attempt to develop just procedures for adjudicating and redressing violations of their rights. It may be that employees who are treated properly will take more seriously the interests of the corporations. But whether or not it pays for corporations to be moral in their relations with their members, employee rights may receive due consideration as a legitimate (even if not a primary) concern. 6 Philosophers, at least moral philosophers, have traditionally, been concerned with determining what rights are, what moral rights people have in different contexts, and how they can be protected. These concerns can be translated readily into concrete proposals - a workshop, seminar, training program which could be as short as a day or as long as a term. Such a workshop could deal both with the abstract question 'What is a right ?' and with very specific examples 'Does an employee have a moral right to blow the whistle without first reporting the wrong to his or her superiors ?' 7 Another proposal, from the director of a business ethics institute, is for a hot-line. Just as one can subscribe to services that will provide expert legal advice on technical matters of law, one could for a fee subscribe to a service that would provide expert ethical advice on matters on morals. Another proposal is for a national symposium that addresses industry wide problems. At the Center for the Study of Ethics in the Professions of liT, we developed a proposal funded by EVIST to study moral issues in Organizational

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Development (OD). Many of the ethical problems have been grappled with by social scientists, and the fruits of their labors may ease the burden of consultants. The disclosure of confidential information has received considerable attention among lawyers. Whether or not one wants uniformly to adopt their new Model Rules proposal on whistleblowing (generally it is permitted only if someone's life is in immediate danger), one can use their debate to identify pertinent moral consideration. Similarly, risk assessment and the paramountcy of public safety, has been treated extensively in engineering ethics, and can be similarly used to address comparable problems in the insurance field (as well as parole practices in criminal justice and medical decision making).

VII. The contribution of philosophy What is it that philosophy has to offer business and industry? What can it contribute to professionals working in organizational contexts? I have repeatedly argued for a very close relationship between professionalism and ethics: to be a professional is to be a moral philosopher, and failure to be a moral philosopher is a failure to be a professional. I shall merely provide the outline of the argument here to show that what moral philosophy achieves is essential to one's conduct as a professional. Let me begin by asking about the nature of ethics or moral philosophy, terms I shall use interchangeably. The recent series by the Hastings Center on the Teaching of Ethics in Higher Education will serve as a useful point of departure. 8 According to its authors, the teaching of ethics can have several different goals. At the most modest level, it can serve to raise one's moral consciousness. Sensitizing people to the language of morals makes them aware of a moral point of view that is quite different from a prudential, aesthetic, epistemological or political perspective. Equally important, ethics can make people aware of their own moral judgments and decisions. Such a self consciousness is the first

step to self knowledge, and a necessary condition for responsible behavior. Closely related to this first objective is a second: values clarification. After one realizes that good-bad or right-wrong can be used in a moral sense, one can begin to discover what that moral meaning is. Whereas the first task was to teach the moral point of view, the second is to teach the precise meaning of moral terms. Such terms are used to advance claims, for which one offers arguments. Accordingly, a third task in teaching ethics is the analysis of moral arguments. The general principles of formal and informal logic come into play here. The analysis of such arguments will reveal the very fundamental principles on which our moral value judgments rest. A full defense of these principles requires a complete ethical theory that integrates them in a coherent and consistent fashion. Such a theory would provide a clear understanding of the difference between ethical and non-ethical disputes, the meaning of the moral terms involved and the strength of the arguments offered. Most important, it would allow us to resolve these disputes, and proclaim one position the correct one. As a fourth and final goal, teaching ethics may serve to offer one defensible solution to moral problems and teach these solutions as moral truths. These are the four purposes on the teaching or study of ethics. I want now to argue, on the basis of these, that to be a professional is to be an ethicist.

A. Moral consciousness raising

It is important that each professional recognize the limits of his or her professional competence. If to be a professional is to possess a certain expertise, one must appreciate where that expertise begins and ends. Such discrimination is particulary important among professionals because of the enormous power they wield. Failure to draw a line at the limits of their competence leads to a misuse and abuse of power. Let me give an example.

The Philosopher in the Workplace in the field of criminal justice administration, a careful distinction between the ethical and the professional must be drawn. Just as public administration generally serves the public good, criminal justice administration serves the end of justice. But the nature of justice is an ancient philosophical question, as old as Plato's Republic. Public administrators in this field must likewise be careful to distinguish between the technical questions their training equips them to ask and the philosophical questions that fall outside their particular expertise. Failure to do so can lead to a misuse of their power and a subversion of the goal they seek.

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experience conflicts in their obligations - to their employer, to their colleagues, or to their family. One of these dilemmas has become familiar under the rubric 'whistleblowing'. 9 Upon learning of wrongdoing by one's superior, one has to make a decision whether to report it or not. One must carefully weigh the strength of one's allegiance to the organization, to one's code of professional conduct, to the public and to oneself. The philosopher can help such professionals become clearer on their station and its duties.

C. Moral reasoning B. Values clarification The contrast between ethical and professional judgments, though critical, is not always easy to discern. Some terms like 'person', 'guilty', or 'good' slide almost imperceptibly back and forth between these two domains. Only through a careful examination of the context can one determine which sense is operative. The study of ethics can help a professional become clear on the meaning of moral discourse. He can then distinguish between guilty in a moral sense and guilty in a legal sense. It can also help him to become clearer on the conflicting values that come into play in the workplace. Let me give two examples. The criminal justice system serves several different purposes. It has a punitive function to mete out the offenders their 'just deserts'. It has a protective function - to keep society safe from dangerous offenders. It has a rehabilitative function - to teach criminals to mend their ways. These objectives can easily conflict: the habitual pick-pocket, having served his time, still poses a threat to society, yet ought to be released. The punitive environment of prisons compromises the trust and confidence necessary for effective therapy. One of the tasks of philosophy is to sort out these value conflicts, and thereby facilitate the work of the professional, who would otherwise lack an integrated and coherent approach. All professionals, to one degree or another,

When professionals confront a moral dilemma, they confront a series of arguments. The resolution of the argument requires a decision about which dilemma are good and which are bad. The philosopher, as a logician, can appraise these arguments against the canons of consistency, coherence, validity and soundness. He can point out fallacies in reasoning that easily lead one astray. He can explain what makes an argument valid and what makes it sound, and identify invalid and unsound arguments according to their logical form. He can dispel some disputes as verbal - merely differences in the use of terms. And he can help to locate the ground on which the battle must ultimately be waged - the ultimate value judgments on which the others depend. By bringing a measure of rationality into disputes both within and among professionals, the moral philosopher keeps professionals from being led astray by spurious reasoning. In so doing he has not necessarily led them to the truth, but he has at least led them away from irrationality and error.

D. Moral truth As noted earlier, one of the tasks of the professional is to seek the social good. It follows from this that one cannot be a professional unless one knows what the social good is. Accordingly, one's very status as a professional requires that

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one possess at least this moral truth. But it requires more, for each profession seeks the social good in a different form, according to its particular expertise. The lawyer, for example, seeks the social good in the form of justice. The doctor seeks it in the form of health. And the engineer seeks the social good in the form of safe, efficient buildings. Each profession must know its form of the social good - the nature of justice, health and safety. Without such a knowledge it will be impossible for them to perform their professional tasks. Moral truths are not only part of the goal of the different professions. They also enter in as constraints on the means that can be used to achieve these goals. Good ends can be subverted by illegitimate means, and an overemphasis on efficiency can compromise one's professional status. Thus the lawyer who conceals evidence about wrongdoing by senior executives jeopardizes his standing as an agent of the court, 1° and the engineer who fails to blow the whistle on a faulty brake design calls into question his commitment and that of his peers to public safety. 11

VII. Conclusion

Philosophers have a contribution to make to corporate life. By raising the moral consciousness of employees and employers, by clarifying the meaning of moral terms, by analyzing moral arguments and by teaching moral truths they can help people do their jobs better. By 'better' here I mean that each will have a clearer idea of the kinds of value judgments they are making, both moral and non-moral, that they will be more precise in the ethical language they use, that they will be better equipped to appraise moral arguments, and that they will be in a stronger position to defend the actions they take. In speaking thoughout of philosophy and philosophers, I may have given the erroneous impression that they are a breed apart. This would be a mistake. Any polarization which would place the philosophers on one side and the professionals on the other should be avoided. Such terms refer to social roles. Just as one

person can be both a father and an employee, one person can be both a philosopher and a professional. Indeed, it is only when the two roles are combined that the demands placed on each are most likely to be met. In the Republic Plato saw two solution to the problem of justice: philosophers could become kings, or kings could become philosophers. So too, those who shape the quality of life in the workplace can become more philosophical or philosophers can become more enmeshed in corporate life. These are two paths to the same end - enhancing the moral quality of the workplace.

Notes 1 A brief listing of books published since the early 70s illustrates the expansion in the subject matter of philosophy which now covers sex, feminism, crime, violence, and war. See, as examples, the following: Philosophy and Sex, ed. Robert Baker and Frederick Elliston (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1975); Feminism and Philosophy, ed. Mary Vetterling Braggin, Jane English and Frederick Elliston (Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield Adams, 1977); Ethics, Public Policy and Criminal Justice, ed. Frederick Elliston and Norman Bowie (Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1982); Violence, ed. Jerome Shaffer (N.Y.: David McKay, 1971). War and Morality, ed. Richard Wasserstrom (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1970); and War and Moral Responsibility (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973). 2 Prentice Hall has introduced a series entitled 'Occupational Ethics' that will include a volume on doctors, lawyers, engineers, business, government officials and members of other professions. One of the best and earliest works in medical ethics is Moral Problems in Medicine, eds., Samuel Gorovitz et al. (Englewood cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976). See Robert Baum and Albert Flores, ed., Ethical Problems in Engineering (Troy, N.Y.: Human Dimensions Center, 1980). For a more theoretical treatment, see Alan Goldman's The Moral Foundations of Professional Ethics (Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield Adams, 1980). And for a comprehensive treatment of several professions, see Michael Bayles, Professional Ethics (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1981), a Three books worthy of note are Ethical Theory and Business, eds. Tom Beauchamp and Norman Bowie (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1979); Ethical Issues in Business, eds. Thomas Donaldson and Patricia

The Philosopher in the Workplace Werhane (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1979); and Business Ethics, Manuel G. Velazquez (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1982). 4 See Teaching Philosophy 6 : 3 (Summer, 1983). s An earlier version of this paper is included in his useful book Doing Ethics in Business (Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1982). It describes a number of innovative programs. 6 See, for example, Thomas Donaldson's Corporations and Morality (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 1982). T For a survey of the literature on whistleblowing, see ProfessionaIDissent, edited James Bowman, Frederick Elliston and Paula Lockhart (New York: Garland Publishers, 1983). s See The Teaching of Ethics in High Education: A Report by the Hastings Center (Hastings-on Hudson, N.Y.: The Hastings Center, 1980). For an application to lawyers, see Frederick Elliston, 'Ethics, Professionalism

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and the Practice of Law', Loyola University Law Journal (Spring 1985). 9 See the two volume study WhistlebIowingand Whistleblowing Research, Frederick Elliston, John Keenan, Paula Lockhart and Jane van Schaick (New York: Praeger, 1985). 10 Kenneth Kipnis provides an astute analysis of this situation in his forthcoming book Legal Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1986). 11 The case of Kermit Vandivier is described in numerous business ethics texts. For a more philosophical discussion of safety problems, see Designing for Safety, ed. Albert Flores (Troy, NY: Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 1982).

Department o f Philosophy, University o f Hawaii, 2530 Dole Street, Honolulu, HI 96822