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The Scandinavian International Society by Laust Schouenborg ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Laust Schouenborg (2013) The Scandinavian International Society, Primary Institutions and Binding Forces, 1815–2010, London: Routledge, pp 1–190., £80/$145, ISBN: 978-0415519236 International Politics Reviews (2013) 1, 49–62. doi:10.1057/ipr.2013.3

The Scandinavian International Society: a ‘generalizable’ or ‘exceptional’ international order Shogo Suzuki University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9PL, UK The English School approach to International Relations (IR) has long been associated with their unique blend of normative and empirical enquiry. Their ‘showcase’ concept was of course that of ‘International Society’, which (in the context of the Cold War) provided an alternative account of international politics, which was purportedly characterised by (timeless) anarchy and a struggle for survival. Since then, one of the core themes of research by English School scholars has included the analysis of the historical evolution of International Society. Key scholars such as Martin Wight and Hedley Bull engaged in the research of the origins of the Westphalian international order and its gradual expansion that resulted in the

emergence of global International Society. The culmination of this endeavour was the landmark study, The Expansion of International Society (Bull and Watson, 1984). One of the key criticisms to emerge from these works was the now familiar charge of Eurocentricity, which pointed out to the English School’s complacency with regard to the role that imperialism played in the expansion of International Society (Keene, 2002; Suzuki, 2009). One could also add to this the criticism of ‘tempocentrism’, which reconstructs ‘all historical systems so as to conform to a reified and naturalised present’ (Hobson, 2002, p.9). It could be argued that this has resulted in European International VOLUME 1 SEPTEMBER 2013 49

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Society being seen as the only international order that ‘matters’, with international orders before 1648 (before Westphalia and the emergence of the sovereign state system) being effectively ‘erased’ from international history. Much has evolved since the publication of these works more than three decades ago, and scholars today display much greater awareness of the Eurocentric and ‘tempocentric’ traps. Recent works have thus undertaken historical comparative studies of International Societies (Reus-Smit, 1999), or explored non-European international orders (Zhang, 2001). It is in this particular debate that Laust Schouenborg attempts to make a contribution in his new book, The Scandinavian International Society. As can be seen from this title, the author is heavily influenced by the English School – yet he differs from many other English School scholars in his commitment to a positivist social science, which ultimately aims for the construction of generalisable theories that can objectively explain social phenomena. Accordingly, the first part of Schouenborg’s book is primarily concerned with forwarding a framework that would allow us to identify and trace back the ideas that culminated in the emergence of International Societies. Drawing on Buzan’s idea of a functional approach to analysing international order, Schouenborg (2013, pp.16–17) comes up with five ‘functional categories’ (legitimacy and membership; authoritative communication; trade; international organisation; and regulating conflicts) that result in the emergence of primary institutions of International Societies. The author suggests that international orders – regardless of their geographical or temporal location – can be analysed in this light. His contribution thus lies in ‘establish[ing] the foundation for a typology, and in the longer term social science theory’ (Schouenborg, 2013, p.16). This generates a framework with wide applicability that allows researchers to identify the key normative and functional drivers that shape the structures of International Societies. This is also in accordance with the author’s philosophy of social science. The author then proceeds to ‘test’ this theory by analysing the Scandinavian case. While Scandinavia (consisting of Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland) is commonly identified as an integral part of the European International Society, Schouenborg argues that there actually exists a regional International Society that centres around the Nordic states. He states two reasons for this: first, there is a ‘remarkable absence of interstate and intrastate war in Scandinavia over the past 200 years’, which marks the region out from the rest of Europe. Second, the Scandinavian states have demonstrated ‘progressive internationalism or solidarist foreign policies’, which ‘in turn produced … comparatively more generous international aid policies and support for international law and the UN’ (Schouenborg, 2013, p.2). From this observation, Schouenborg (2013, pp.106–126) then claims

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that the Scandinavian International Society is characterised by a commitment to the welfare state as a key marker of ‘legitimate membership’; the provision of aid that promoted the elimination of socio-economic inequalities, as well as a belief in open markets (trade); a broad belief in the efficacy of multilateral and legal processes to resolve disputes (regulating conflicts); solidarity in foreign policy, which was to be democratically accountable (authoritative communication); and a belief in common social rights throughout the Nordic region (international organisation). There is much to like in Schouenborg’s book. Some may find that the author’s commitment to a positivistic social science effectively eradicates any space for engaging in normative enquiries that explore pathways to a better ‘international life’, which is arguably the very essence of the English School that differentiates it from other sociological theories of IR (Reus-Smit, 2002). Yet – and in spite of the book’s explicit commitment to positivistic social science – one is left wondering whether or not there is actually a normative strand running through this work, albeit implicitly. Given that the author is committed to the idea of the existence of a Scandinavian International Society, it goes without saying that he is (by default) also committed to the idea that the region is indeed ‘exceptional’ (cf Browning, 2007), in that it displays a commitment towards social equality, strives to be a ‘good’ international citizen and has eliminated war as a means of settling political disputes with its members. Such implicit normative beliefs do, however, give rise to a number of questions. Should we, for instance, be happy to see the expansion of this Scandinavian International Society? Interestingly, the author provides an analysis of the alleged ‘expansion’ of the Scandinavian International Society to the Baltic states, and concludes that this has been far from the case. But what if he had found evidence to suggest that an expansion had taken place? Given that all the qualities which characterise the Scandinavian International Society seem to be based on ‘good’ norms that one could hardly object to, the answer seems to be an inevitable one. Even though Schouenborg himself may try very hard to claim that he was merely making value-neutral, ‘objective’ empirical observations free from ‘value judgement’, it is essentially a foregone conclusion that he would most likely see the internalisation of Scandinavian political institutions by the Baltic states as signifying ‘progress’. These questions become more pertinent when we consider the existence of Greenland, which was until recently a Danish colony. It is important to note that the Baltic states are liberal democracies, and if they had chosen to insert themselves into the Scandinavian International Society, this would likely have been the result of a democratic choice, rather than being forced into it (like many nonEuropean states were in the late nineteenth century). Yet,

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one could argue that Greenland did not have much choice when it became part of the Scandinavian International Society in 1953, when the island was incorporated into Denmark. It is worth reminding ourselves that this exercise in establishing Danish sovereignty at times entailed the privileging of the Danish language and culture over local ones, as well as the forced migration of Inuit communities to towns such as Ittoqqortoormiit or Qaanaaq, which still suffer from considerable social problems (Gad, 2012, p.6). Given this past, it is perhaps not surprising that Greenlandic identity today is reported to be based on articulating an identity of a post-colonial polity (albeit essentialised), where traditional Inuit culture was hollowed out by the Danes (Gad, 2009, pp.142–144). A similar point could also be made about the Saami people, who were forcibly assimilated in the early twentieth century, adding to the long list of indigenous peoples whose cultures were erased in the name of ‘progress’ (Keal, 2003).1 In this sense, Schouenborg displays remarkable similarities – perhaps more than he is aware of – to the first generation of English School scholars. As O’Hagan (2002, pp.108–131) has demonstrated, Hedley Bull and Martin Wight were deeply committed to Western liberal values, which they regarded as having universal qualities. For them, the expansion of the European International Society characterised by ‘Western values’ was both an empirical ‘fact’ and a progressive development to be celebrated, as it entailed the adoption of Western political institutions and norms throughout the non-Western world. It is interesting to observe that in a similar manner to these scholars

Schouenborg does seem unable to overcome his own implicit (and perhaps complacent) belief in the inherent moral superiority of the Scandinavian states, despite his professed goals of generating a ‘value-neutral’ English School theory. He thus not only risks undermining his own philosophical commitments to ‘objective’ social science, but also becoming another English School scholar who unwittingly served as an apologist to imperial conquest and paternalism. Schouenborg’s book is a novel and interesting contribution to the English School approach of IR – but it also illuminates that the many normative difficulties which bedevilled the earlier works of the English School scholars remain just as salient today. Nevertheless, any work in social science (be it positivist or not) must always be judged by whether or not it successfully fulfils the research goals it sets itself, and here Schouenborg’s book cannot be faulted. As the author himself notes (Schouenborg, 2013, pp.12–29), it is true that there has been no consensus on what exactly the primary institutions of various International Societies are, and how one goes about identifying them (contrasting approaches to this problem can be found in Buzan, 2004 and Clark, 2005). Schouenborg’s approach thus helps provide a ‘common starting point’ that could contribute to a more systematic understanding of the evolution of International Societies, and this is in itself a valuable contribution.

Note 1 I am indebted to Ulrik Pram Gad for this point.

References Browning, C. (2007) Branding nordicity: Models, identity and the decline of exceptionalism. Cooperation and Conflict 42(1): 27–51. Bull, H. and Watson, A. (eds.) (1984) The Expansion of International Society. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Buzan, B. (2004) From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Clark, I. (2005) Legitimacy in International Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gad, U. P. (2009) Post-colonial identity in Greenland? When the empire dichotomizes back – bring politics back in. Journal of Language and Politics 8(1): 136–158. Gad, U.P. (2012) Greenland: A post-Danish sovereign nation state in the making. Unpublished manuscript. Hobson, J.M. (2002) What’s at stake in ‘bringing historical sociology back’ into international relations? Transcending ‘chronofetishism’ and ‘tempocentrism’ in international relations. In: S. Hobden and J.M. Hobson (eds.) Historical Sociology of International Relations. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp 3–41. Keal, P. (2003) European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: The Moral Backwardness of International Society. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Keene, E. (2002) Beyond the Anarchical Society:Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. O’Hagan, J. (2002) Conceptualizing the West in International Relations: From Spengler to Said. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Reus-Smit, C. (1999) The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity and Institutional Rationality in International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Reus-Smit, C. (2002) Imagining society: Constructivism and the English School. British Journal of Politics & International Relations 4(3): 487–509. Schouenborg, L. (2013) The Scandinavian International Society: Primary Institutions and Binding Forces, 1815–2010. London: Routledge. Suzuki, S. (2009) Civilization and Empire: China and Japan’s Encounter with European International Society. London: Routledge. Zhang, Y. (2001) System, empire and state in Chinese international relations. Review of International Studies 27(5): 43–63.

Acknowledgements I am indebted to Jeppe Strandsbjerg and Ulrik Pram Gad for their help in locating sources. Responsibility for any errors remain with me.

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A solidarist-inspired reading of Schouenborg Annika Bergman Rosamond Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Department of Political Science, Lund University, Box 52, 221 00 Lund, Sweden E-mail: [email protected] Introductory Observations One of the key premises of the English School (ES) is that co-operation between states is possible within the present anarchical order. This is because anarchy does not preclude the transformation of systems into international societies of states, sharing a ‘thin morality’ (Dunne, 1998, p.11). This insight has inspired a number of scholars to investigate the normative credentials of the ES, in particular the solidarist branch of the school that privileges justice over order (Bull, 1984; Dunne and Wheeler, 1998; Linklater, 1998; Lawler, 2005; Linklater and Suganami, 2006; Bergman, 2007). Schouenborg’s (2013) aim is not to evaluate the normative credentials of the ES though, but to develop upon Buzan’s (2004) structural ES framework, through an analysis of primary institutions, binding forces and regional international societies, in particular how well these concepts translate into a Scandinavian context. Yet, the book is not entirely divorced from normative deliberations as Schouenborg shows a clear interest in Scandinavian discourses of exceptionalism, with emphasis on peaceful conflict resolution (absence of intra- and inter-state war) and ‘progressive internationalism’, both of which have been significant elements in the constitution of Scandinavian international society and inter-Nordic solidarism. The exceptionality thesis pursued by the author emerges from existing research on the Nordic states, the majority of which is normative. In sum, the author traces the emergence of a Scandinavian international society by identifying the primary institutions and binding forces that keep that entity together, but avoids making judgments about the ethical underpinnings of that construction. While it is perfectly reasonable to produce a monograph that is not pronouncedly normative in fashion, the author should perhaps have justified his particular approach to a greater extent, which is a point that will be revisited below.

Key Contributions Schouenborg’s book makes a dual contribution. It adds to our understanding of the extent to which the international society thesis of the ES can be transposed to regional settings, and it adds to the corpus of scholarship on Nordic international relations (IR). As such, it furthers the analytical range of the ES by investigating the benefits of adding a

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pronounced agentic dimension to the theory. The book does so by placing the emphasis on the role of ‘non-great powers’ in the constitution of international societies (Bergman Rosamond, forthcoming). Traditionally, ES scholarship tends to place the emphasis on international society itself rather than the units that make up that construction. Through their membership of the ‘anarchical society’, states share a commitment to spoken and unspoken rules, international institutions, limited forms of co-operation, all of which help to maintain order in the international system (Bull, 1977). Key to this claim is that states have reached a minimum level of agreement on limitations of the use of violence, respect for property rights and diplomacy. These principles are guarded by international organisations and in the last resort just forms of war (Bull, 1977). Order is the most central element of what has been defined as the pluralist branch of the ES. In essence, it seeks to find a ‘more or less optimal solution to the problem of how to accommodate plurality of cultural values within a wellordered international system … which … embodies a “thin” morality’ (Dunne, 1998, p.11). Solidarists, on the other hand, tend to privilege justice over order in a fashion that is conducive to normative research. Schouenborg provides a careful analysis of the distinct institutions and binding forces that are key to the historical constitution of Scandinavian international society. These can be divided into two broad categories, those that relate to the Nordic welfare model and its universal underpinnings as well as the Scandinavian (or Nordic) preference for peaceful conflict resolution within and beyond borders. Both have inspired a distinct Nordic foreign policy tradition that is rooted in social democratic internationalism (Bergman, 2007). A number of scholars have sought to trace the connection between the Nordic welfare model and expressions of internationalism (Bergman, 2007; Browning, 2007; Kuisma, 2007), and Schouenborg contributes to such conversations. Yet, the author does not provide a thoroughgoing analysis of the Scandinavians as a collective political community that has values in its own right, but provides an account of the sum total of their national sentiments and norms. Schouenborg, nonetheless, offers new opportunities to study the co-constitutive relationship between the Nordic peace tradition and the region’s universal welfare model. The latter builds on a preference for ‘the process of politics’ (pp.186–187) as a way of resolving

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disagreements and disputes, rather than coercion understood as brute force. In the author’s words, ‘the repudiation of political violence – an in a sense of coercion as a binding force – was very much part of … the welfare state ideology of social harmony, solidarity and equality’. This tentative insight might indeed lead ‘normative scholars interested in improving the state of international affairs’ (p.187) to undertake further research on the nexus between different welfare models and expressions of internationalism, whether social democratically informed or liberally constituted. It should be added though that the Nordic preference for peaceful conflict resolution endogenously and exogenously has been studied in great detail by others such as Archer and Joenniemi (2003) and Bergman (2004) and Schouenborg’s contributions to that particular branch of Nordic IR are perhaps somewhat underdeveloped. He, nonetheless, provides a historically rich account of the early periods of Nordic co-operation that is carefully argued, with emphasis on such things as the peaceful settlement of the Åland crisis in the early twentieth century. Yet, there is room for more engagement with contemporary developments in Nordic security co-operation not the least the states’ shared commitment to Arctic security and peace. A more contemporarily situated analysis would also include the pressures placed upon the Scandianvian states to participate in solidarist-inspired interventions in international society both for the purpose of saving strangers (Wheeler, 2000) and as a way of curbing the threat of international terrorism. The Scandinavians states, for example, opted for different responses to Operation Iraqi Freedom with Norway and Sweden objecting to that intervention while Denmark supported it. It might be worth asking what impact such variations could have on the stability of Scandinavian international society? Another development that might have long-term effects on the sustenance of Scandinavian international society is what we might define as the neoliberalisation of the Scandinavian welfare model. Far-reaching privatisation processes of public services have taken place in the Scandinavian states, and they might have dual effects on the social fabric of national society as well as a broader Scandinavian societal construction. Despite offering a thorough analysis of the Nordic welfare model, Schouenborg does not fully address the implications of its shortcomings for the future of Scandinavian international society.

Normative Trajectories As has emerged from the discussion above, the book provides some good potential for developing the ES and casting light on Scandinavian international society. Yet, there is room for a more thorough discussion of the justice-order dialogue that defines much of contemporary debate on the ES. In many ways, the ES provides a more progressive

account of IR than often assumed and opens up for the analysis of normative considerations in global politics, in a manner that takes account of states’ endeavours to overcome the constraints of anarchy in favour of the establishment of international order, justice and new transnational loyalties. In its more recent variations, it takes the idea of solidarity in IR seriously even if it does not promote a wholesale transformation of global politics. This remains an underdeveloped line of thought in Schouenborg’s book though. Despite his scholarly interest in the exceptionality of the Scandinavian states, and how it might help to constitute their shared sense of society and loyalty, there is little effort to situate the analysis within normative considerations. This is somewhat problematic as so many of the features that have been closely associated with Scandinavian international society are obviously normative in description and application. Furthermore, studying the institutions and binding forces that hold a group of states together is a normative exercise in its own right, even if it this is not the primary research task of the book. As noted above, it is somewhat surprising that the international society thesis, that constitutes the backbone of the Schouenborg’s book, has not been situated more obviously within debates on the tension between order and justice within the ES. This is particularly so as societies, whether national, regional or international, are mediated and constituted within the dialogue between discourses and practices of justice and order. In his later work, Hedley Bull begun to seriously consider this relationship by pointing to their mutual constitution. As Makinda (2002, p.367) has noted, ‘Bull’s exploration of justice in his later years reflected his concern with human rights problems and with inequalities in wealth and power between the global North and the South’. Nordic welfare policies and commitments to overseas development assistance are historically premised on redistributive justice and the book would have benefited from a more in-depth analysis of how such justice-based normative arguments are omnipresent in the construction of a collective Scandinavian regional identity and sense of solidarity, and how this in turn provides a normative platform for the Scandinavian societal edifice. The dual commitment to the welfare of nationals and non-nationals is in part an expression of the Nordic states’ support for a progressive transformation of international society, and building their own regional branch of that entity on universalism and justice within and across borders. Here, Schouenborg would have had an excellent opportunity to explore how their endeavours as local agents of a world of common good (Bull, 1984) might differ from those of great powers, who suffer from such things as a colonial past and a quest for world dominance. To this, one might also add that such non-great powers, whose self-image is that of good international citizens, should not be regarded as innately benign forces for VOLUME 1 SEPTEMBER 2013 53

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good, but as actors that both enable and disable certain ethical agendas within the international society of states. One significant dimension of this ethical agenda, which is lacking in Schouenborg’s book, is the role of gender equality in the construction of the Nordic welfare states as well as conceptions of good international conduct. Gender equality within and beyond borders then is a key attribute of Scandinavian international society and one might have expected the book to deal with this to some extent. The Scandinavian welfare regime (and Nordic) builds on women’s full participation in the public life and to provide affordable daycare facilities to this effect.

Similarly, support for women’s human rights have come to define the Scandinavian states’ self-identities as good international citizens. The author has therefore reproduced the gender blindness that defines the ES more broadly. The last point here is that promoters of the international society thesis need to critically take on board the gendered criticism raised by True (2004, p.157) that ‘gender relations are a dimension of struggle and injustice in world politics’; however, ‘from an international society perspective their struggles are invisible. Only to the extent that groups share Western norms of sovereignty, do their struggles register on the agenda of international relations scholars’ (ibid.).

References Archer, C. and Joenniemi, P. (2003) The Nordic Peace. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. Bergman Rosamond, A. (forthcoming) Non-Great Powers in International Politics: The English School and Nordic Internationalism. London: Routledge. Bergman, A. (2007) Co-constitution of domestic and international welfare obligations: The case of Sweden’s socially democratically inspired internationalism. Cooperation and Conflict 42(1): 73–97. Bergman, A. (2004) The Nordic militaries: Forces for good? In: L. Elliott and G. Cheeseman (eds.) Forces for Good Cosmopolitan Militaries in the Twenty-First Century. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. Browning, C. (2007) Branding nordicity: Models, identity, and the decline of exceptionalism. Cooperation and Conflict 42(1): 27–51. Bull, H. (1977) The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Bull, H. (1984) Justice in International Relations. Hagey Lectures Ontario, Canada: University of Waterloo. Buzan, B. (2004) From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Dunne, T. (1998) Inventing International Society: A History of the English School. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Dunne, T. and Wheeler, N. (1998) Good citizenship: A third way for British foreign policy. International Affairs 74(4): 847–870. Kuisma, M. (2007) Preface. Cooperation and Conflict 42(1): 5–7. Lawler, P. (2005) The good state: In praise of classical internationalism. Review of International Studies 31(3): 427–449. Linklater, A. and Suganami, H. (2006) The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary Assessment. Cambridge, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. Linklater, L. (1998) The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Makinda, S. M. (2002) Hedley Bull and global governance: A note on IR theory. Australian Journal of International Affairs 56(3): 361–371. Schouenborg, L. (2013) The Scandinavian International Society Primary Institutions and Binding Forces, 1815–2010. London: Cambridge University Press. True, J. (2004) Feminism. In: A.J. Bellamy (ed.) International Society and Its Critics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wheeler, N. (2000) Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Norden exceptional? Yes – but originated from traditional power calculation Hans Mouritzen Danish Institute for International Studies – DIIS, Oestbanegade 117, DK-2110 O̷ , Copenhagen, Denmark E-mail: [email protected]

The focus of this volume does not appear crystal clear: the geographical scope fluctuates between Scandinavia and Norden (Scandinavia plus Finland and Iceland). Furthermore, is the volume about Norden as a security community (the ‘Nordic peace’), about Nordic common foreign policies in general or about common traits of Nordic societies (the ‘Nordic model’)? In fact, it is all three as understood through its major thesis: Norden from about the mid-1930s

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was exceptional as a regional international society by being held together by belief – internalised common values – rather than by coercion or calculation.1 The alleged reason for this was the emergence of the welfare state in Scandinavia about this time and the consensual way in which it was brought about. Coercion being an unthinkable tool corresponds to the well-known definition of a ‘security community’.2 Previous

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literature has tended to see the emergence of such a community in Norden as dating back at least to its earliest socalled ‘non-wars’ – conflicts where use of armed force could have been expected in ‘normal’ international politics. These were Norway’s secession from the Sweden-led Union in 1905 and the Finnish–Swedish conflict over Åland in the early 1920s. The author documents, better than has previously been done, that war was in no way unthinkable in these situations and that at least 1905 was a ‘close call’. The exceptionality claim is argued in relation to such examples of regional international societies as revolutionary America/France of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, the fascist regimes in Europe and Asia of the 1930s and 1940s, the socialist bloc in the twentieth century and finally the EC/EU (‘predominantly portrayed as anomalies or exceptions in the IR discipline’, p.69). All are filtered through the English school vocabulary, including the coercion/calculation/belief typology, and it turns out that they are held together mostly through coercion or calculation – not by belief as in the Nordic case. Norden, thus, is an exception among the exceptions. As it has often been formulated, policymakers need not justify Nordic solutions; rather, they need to justify, when they are not chosen (as with NATO or EC memberships, for instance). Moreover, politicians have sometimes felt a need to compensate non-Nordic solutions with Nordic ones (SAS for the security policy split in 1949 or the Nordic Council of Ministers for the NORDEK failure). Whereas most of the above comparisons amount to pushing in open doors (few would have thought of comparing them with Norden), the comparison with the EC/EU is obviously pertinent. The author reasonably concludes that whereas coercion has disappeared from Europe as a cohesive instrument, the EU is based on calculation rather than on belief. In other words, member-states’ Europe policies have been driven by interest-based calculation rather than any ‘Europe ideology’. It could be added that the security community that has apparently come to exist in the EU has developed top-down rather than bottom-up; it seems to have trickled down from strong institutions to the populations rather than growing up from below. Although by and large agreeing with the exceptionality claim, I doubt the alleged main reason for it. ‘Something happened during the 1930s which did not seem to be predetermined by structural factors of the past’ (p.145). This something is argued to be the welfare state and its adoption as national ideology in the Scandinavian ‘core countries’. ‘Before the crisis agreements of the 1930s political violence [also vis à vis Nordic neighbours, presumably] was thinkable, after those events it was largely unthinkable … this change coincided with the welfare state national ideology’ (p.128). The link between the welfare state and the security community is mostly temporal and inductive, in other words.

The Limits of Induction The author’s conception of science is crucial. As defined at the outset, science is ‘the systematic study of patterns and their degree of stability in time and space’ (p.1). No reference to philosophy of science literature is made and maybe for one good reason: no one in this branch would today advocate such a conception. Irrespective of school affiliation, the view today would be that science, whether natural or social, should be more than the mapping or description of patterns, even as a beginning. Its core task is to explain, in other words provide answers to ‘why questions’ rather than description or prediction. Moreover, it cannot reach that goal by starting from the unbiased observation of patterns. In this sense, the author is more Gallilean than Newtonian in his orientation. Again, the welfare state thesis is not theory derived, but inductively established: ‘It could be that the former helped facilitate/cause the latter or that the causal relationship was in fact the other way around’ (p.128). There is no apriori formulated theory saying why peace and equality at home (the welfare state) should entail peace among the Nordic states or lead to foreign policies aiming at global peace and equality (progressivity). Moreover, indeed, given the traditional elitist (non-democratic) nature of most foreign and security policy, such a theory would be highly questionable. English school vocabulary does not contribute to theory applicable in the author’s context. ‘Coercion/calculation/ belief’ is a typology very useful for comparative purposes in substantiating the exceptionality claim, but hardly more than that.3

Nordicity Calculation It is possible to question the exceptionality (belief) thesis to some extent. Nordic belongingness has been highly useful (and probably calculated) in three settings: all Nordic countries as a group in multilateral diplomacy, one or two countries in multilateral diplomacy and single countries bilaterally in dealing with a great power (Mouritzen, 1995). In the first setting, the UN primarily, the Norden group identity has undoubtedly bolstered the influence capability of each individual country. In the second setting, Denmark and Norway at several occasions drew the ‘Nordic card’ in NATO (the Nordic Balance involving Finland) in order to avoid NATO bases or nuclear weapons on their territories, even though their real motivations were mostly bilateral vis à vis the Soviet Union (non-provocation). In the EC, Denmark played the role as ‘bridge-builder’ to the other Nordic countries, also gaining advantages for itself from this self-proclaimed role. Regarding the third setting, Denmark benefited from its Nordic identity vis à vis Germany 1935–1940 and even during the Occupation 1940–1943. As expressed by foreign and later prime minister Scavenius in private: ‘there are limits to what Germany can do to an old Nordic nation’ VOLUME 1 SEPTEMBER 2013 55

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(Nissen, 1983). Correspondingly, Finland played on a Nordic identity towards the Soviet Union of the form: ‘we should not be treated like other East European countries; we share the traditions of Norden’. In both cases, ‘Nordic’ sounded less provocative than ‘Western’ – the opposite camp. Finland as ‘Nordic’ was, though, a problematic classification given its recent Civil War, notably. Violence against fellow countrymen should entail that it was also thinkable against Nordic neighbours. In addition, Finnish Social Democracy had not a strength comparable to its Scandinavian sister parties (‘White Finland’ of the inter-war years). Finland was poorer than Scandinavia and hardly a welfare state, it was linguistically deviant (apart from the Fenno– Swedes) and in the middle of a Finnish–Swedish language strife. Despite these unfavourable odds, it is telling that Finland still asked for (and was accepted for) participation in Nordic foreign minister meetings from 1935. This indicates that high politics (calculation, fear of coercion from outside) overruled the lack of belief (Nordic ideology). Norden was from then on a high-politics shield that after World War II may have had some efficiency in relation to its big Eastern neighbour. The above crucial examples of top-level calculation (fear of external coercion) notwithstanding, there is no doubt that ‘bottom-up’ belief has been a facilitating factor. Bottom-up, however, does not exclude it from being geopolitically motivated: if rumours florish that bandits are attacking a villa neighbourhood, it is hardly surprising that villa owners consult each other about surveillance, and they may take a cup of coffee and learn each other better to know in the process; nothing makes neighbours look more moral and sympathetic, as when compared with bandits rumoured about. In addition, we should not neglect the objective factor of a linguistic and thereby cultural community: Scandinavia plus the Fenno–Swedes. Combined with the external stimulus of the mid-1930s, a ‘bottom-up’ belief in Nordicity was reinforced.

‘Bigger Sweden’? Apart from the above driving forces, the volume downplays the sensitive factor of regional leadership.4 Although the successful creation of a security community and a model for the world is very much a self-reinforcing process comparable to snowball rolling, somebody must form the snowball in the first place – in my view Sweden (Mouritzen, 2001). As Denmark, Norway and Finland in the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century were preoccupied with more immediate concerns of their own – licking war or occupation wounds or striving for full independence – they could not cultivate the ‘luxury interests’ that Sweden with its protected geopolitical position could do. In the climate of opinion permitted by geopolitical fundamentals, there were niches for the strong

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and internationally oriented workers’ movement and for the influence of the ‘free churches’. The latter contributed to a moralistic climate of debate, and the state church became a forerunner in ecumenical work, foreboding the Social Democratic ‘world conscience’ in the political realm. These ideological and clerical peace orientations got their rationalistic and scientistic counterpart, as Alfred Nobel decided to award one of his prizes to the promotion of peace.5 Sweden could have won military short-term benefits in 1905 and regarding Åland, but abstained. During the Cold War, Sweden – and Olof Palme in particular6 – skillfully made a deed out of its geopolitically conditioned need to keep apart from the East–West conflict by imbuing neutrality with a special peace-loving implication and by playing the role of world conscience. Although surely made out of belief, the ideological support for African National Congress (South Africa) and anti-colonial liberation movements together with criticism of the Vietnam war could also underpin the credibility of Swedish neutrality. The other Nordic countries participated more or less in these profilations, although they had different high-politics agendas.

Export across the Baltic Sea? Given the author’s stressing of the welfare state as crucial to the Nordic international society, he investigates its occurrence in the post-Cold War Baltic states and finds that it has not spread across the Baltic Sea. He also finds very little transnational solidarity. Baltic leaders may have paid lip service to Nordicity (pp.165–166), as some of the Nordic countries were instrumental in their gaining EU and NATO memberships, but hardly more than that (although the book cover presentation asserts the opposite). This may well be so, but how surprising is that? Returning to geopolitical fundamentals, one could expect no more Nordicity in the Baltic countries than one could from ‘White Finland’ of the 1920s. One could hardly expect other concerns than nation-building and security to be top priorities, although some Nordic politicians and IR scholars did exactly that in the 1990s – even a Baltic Sea region replacing the Nordic one. As here conceived, a serious diffusion of Nordicity will presuppose a much more relaxed geopolitical situation. The absence of a linguistic community is a further hindrance, although Estonia has framed itself as Nordic with Finland as a linguistic and substantial facilitator. I guess, the author would see this as a ‘no go’. The Future The model may even be endangered in its core, in spite of relative economic success compared with Southern Europe. As Sweden follows the multicultural path, Denmark’s may be labelled ‘modified monoculturalism’. Can so

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different paths in a fundamental issue be contained within one and the same model? It would be interesting to hear the author’s assessment of this issue. Taken together, the volume has the ‘down-to-earth’ quality of solid historical work, but at the same time it takes on some ‘big picture’ discussions characterising international relations as a discipline. It is strong on description, comparison and several interpretations of patterns, but weak on theory and thereby the driving forces of developments – both the external ones and the question of regional leadership.

Notes 1 On this typology, cf. Buzan (2004, p.130). 2 Cf. Wiberg (2000), for instance.

3 While the English school labelling of war, diplomacy, balance of power and so on as ‘institutions’ is a burden to the non-initiated reader. 4 Although the author recognises the importance of Marquis Child’s book Sweden: The Middle Way from 1936 for creating the PR success for the Swedish (and indirectly Scandinavian) model in the United States (pp.106–107). 5 Paradoxically (and amusingly), Alfred Nobel is also the founding father of a significant Swedish weapons export, sometimes clashing with its moralistic public opinion. 6 His omission from the volume here at stake is a mistake. The same applies to Gro Harlem Brundtland, who was able to propagate ‘Nordicity’ skilfully at the global level.

References Buzan, B. (2004) From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Childs, M. (1936) Sweden: The Middle Way. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Mouritzen, H. (1995) The Nordic Model as a Foreign Policy Instrument. Journal of Peace Research 32(1): 9–23.

Mouritzen, H. (2001) Security communities in the Baltic Sea Region: Real and imagined. Security Dialogue 32(3): 297–310. Nissen, H. (ed.) (1983) Adjusting to German domination. In: Scandinavia During the Second World War. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Wiberg, H. (2000) The Nordic security community: Past, present, future. In: B. Heurlin and H. Mouritzen (eds.) Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2000. Copenhagen, Denmark: Danish Institute for International Studies.

The Power (Politics) of Scandinavian International Society Anders Wivel University of Copenhagen, Department of Political Science, O̷ ster Farimagsgade 5, DK-1353K, Copenhagen, Denmark

Scandinavian international relations have been studied from a number of theoretical perspectives. Constructivist analyses have pointed to the importance of national discourses on state and nation, whereas liberal analyses have reminded us of how variations in economic structures have produced variations in domestic interest group pressure for particular policies, and realists have noted the interaction of Nordic geopolitics and global power structure. However, these studies usually centre on aspects of Nordic policies (for example, EU policies or security and peace making) rather than exploring the nature of Nordic international relations as such.1 Thus, as noted by Laust Schouenborg in the introduction of The Scandinavian International Society: Primary institutions and binding forces, 1815–2010 (Schouenborg,

2013a, p.4), whereas we have a number of very detailed multi-volume histories of individual state foreign policies, there are very few books dealing with the history of Scandinavian international relations. Laust Schouenborg’s book aims to fill this gap from an English School perspective. So far, little work has been done on Scandinavian international relations from an English school perspective. This is odd, because of the relatively prominent status of the English School in Scandinavia and the close personal and institutional links between the British and Scandinavian IR communities. It is also unfortunate for at least two reasons. First, intra-Nordic relations seem to correspond closely to Karl Deutsch’s original definition of a security community (not surprisingly, Deutsch and his collaborators concluded VOLUME 1 SEPTEMBER 2013 57

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that the three Scandinavian countries constituted a security community), that is, confidence among members that they will not be attacked militarily by any member of the security community, a shared sense of community among members resulting in extensive transactions and the construction of common institutions, responsive and predictable behaviour with each member acknowledging the needs of the others and compatible value systems (Deutsch et al, 1957, pp.5–8, 65–69). This interest in political community among states and the sensitivity of national political communities to each other’s interests and values correspond well with the analytical focus of the English School and invites dialogue between the two theoretical starting points. Second, Nordic internationalism may be viewed as an attempt to export the values of Scandinavian international society to other states and regions, or to global institutions such as the UN, or even to expand Scandinavian international society beyond the Nordic region. Schouenborg analyses the attempt to expand Scandinavian international society to the Baltic States and finds that it was largely unsuccessful (Schouenborg, 2013a, pp.165–183), but in general Nordic foreign policies may be regarded as successful, as Nordic states have consistently been ‘punching above their weight’ during the Cold War and after. Notwithstanding the normative challenges of this ‘value expansionism’ (cf. Shogo Suzuki’s contribution to this symposium), this calls for an exploration of the primary institutions of Scandinavian international society in order to identify how and why this group of Northern European states successfully created such a strong international ‘brand’ (cf. Browning, 2007). Schouenborg’s book presents us with a rich account of Scandinavian international relations based on a strong claim about the nature of these relations and the process resulting in their particular character: Norden started to differentiate itself from the rest of international society (in particular, European international society) when a unique primary institution – the welfare state principle of legitimacy – started to emerge from the 1930s. The consensual societal processes leading to the construction of the Scandinavian welfare state and the nature of the welfare state itself have since provided a strong normative base for Nordic foreign policies. The ambition of the volume is twofold. The first part of the book constructs a theoretical framework allowing us to understand the emergence of international societies. Starting from Barry Buzan’s functional approach to analysing international order, Schouenborg (2013a, pp.16–17) identifies five functional categories conditioning the emergence of primary institutions of international societies: legitimacy and membership, authoritative communication, trade, international organisation and regulating conflicts. The second part of the book applies this theory in order to understand the emergence of Scandinavian international society.

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It is argued that commitment to the welfare state is a necessary condition for legitimate membership of Scandinavian international society and the basis of what we have come to regard as exceptionalist Nordic internationalism characterised by democratically accountable foreign policies (authoritative communication), free trade (trade), common social rights within the Nordic region (international organisation) and a strong commitment to multilateral conflict resolution (regulating conflicts). Schouenborg differs from many (probably most) of contemporary English School scholars by his commitment to positivist social science. His theory is general and applicable across time and space, and his ambition is to objectively explain the world ‘out there’. However, his approach is thick description rather than theory testing. He is a great storyteller and his style is easily accessible. For these reasons, he represents a return to some of the virtues of the classical English School literature by Watson and Bull. In general, Schouenborg provides us with an original and theoretically informed interpretation of Scandinavian international relations. The book does not tell you everything you ever wanted to know about Scandinavian international relations, and it is by no means the definitive work on its subject matter (in fact, the subject matter will be unclear to many readers from the Nordic region as the book does not make a clear distinction between Scandinavia and Norden, that is, Scandinavia plus Finland and Iceland). However, Schouenborg provides us with a useful, and at times provocative, starting point for a renewed debate on the alleged exceptionalism of Scandinavia in international relations. Still, his book suffers from a at least three limitations: the limited temporal focus of the book, the lack of attention to power politics and the downplaying of the eighteenth- and nineteenth century origins of Scandinavian international study. Considering the temporal focus of The Scandinavian International Society: Primary institutions and binding forces, 1815–2010, one could argue that a more fitting subtitle would have been ‘Primary institutions and binding forces, 1945–1989’ as the bulk of evidence on the importance and viability of Scandinavian international society is situated within this time period. The period after 1989 is hardly analysed (except for the failed expansion of Scandinavian international society to the Baltic States) with Schouenborg assuming rather than showing that Scandinavian international society survived the end of the Cold War. The period 1815–1919 is explicitly treated as a ‘prologue’ (although analysed in the same detail as the Cold War period) with Schouenborg (2013a) arguing that ‘one can only really start to talk about a Nordic international society from the 1930s on’ (p.73). This is not unique to Schouenborg’s work as the Cold War may be considered the golden years of Nordic internationalism, but analysing mainly the golden years is a problem for Schouenborg,

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because of his ambition to create generalisable preposition about international relations. Looking at the origins of Scandinavian international society in the eighteenth century and the transformation of Scandinavian foreign policies since the end of the Cold War illustrates the limitations of Schouenborg’s temporal focus if he is to fulfil his theoretical ambition and provide more than ‘just’ an interesting and theoretically informed history of Cold War Scandinavian international society. There has been no inter-state war in the Nordic region since 1815, and the Nordic region has been characterised by a number of so-called ‘non-wars’, that is, situations when the Nordic states chose not to fight even though we would expect a high likelihood of war. Schouenborg is well aware of these facts that are analysed and documented in the literature on Nordic international relations and security (for example, Archer and Joenniemi, 2003). However, given his general theoretical ambitions and starting point in the English school, nineteenth-century Scandinavian movement plays a surprisingly marginal role in his analysis (cf. Schouenborg, 2013a, pp.76–77). On the basis of national romanticism of the cultural elites of the early nineteenth century, political Scandinavism later in the century was inspired by the German and Italian unification movements. Initiated by Danish and Swedish university students, the movement achieved a broader public appeal and eventually a more inclusive Nordic profile after the First World War, as the political and ideological movement promoting Nordic cooperation gradually resulted in attempts at establishing formally organised cooperative arrangements, mostly on issues of low politics and providing the starting point for so-called ‘cobweb integration’, a complex network of cooperative arrangements between the Nordic countries (cf. Andrén, 1967). Although there is little to suggest that nineteenth-century Scandinavism should replace the welfare state as the primary marker of legitimacy and membership of Scandinavian international society, a closer inspection of the complex patterns of interaction between the largely shared liberal-egalitarian ideological roots of the welfare state and Scandinavism would have strengthened the main argument of the book and provided a sounder basis for comparative studies with other European welfare states with similar foreign policy profiles (for example, the Netherlands), as well as comparisons between Scandinavian international society before, during and after the Cold War period. Closer scrutiny of the post-1989 period would have helped to enhance the usability of the book, theoretically as well as empirically.2 Nordic reactions to the post-Cold War

American world order have been surprisingly accommodating with all Nordic states contributing actively to promoting the basic values of this order, that is, liberal democracy, rule of law and human rights. In addition to general accommodation to the new order, Nordic internationalism has shown greater diversity than earlier. Today, the Nordic foreign policies promote different views on the importance of the legalisation of world politics, territoriality, and most fundamentally the Nordic states differ on what international order it is that they are willing to defend. Starting from Schouenborg’s English School argument about the pivotal importance of the Scandinavian welfare state, accommodation to the American world order as well as the important differences between post-Cold War Nordic internationalisms are surprising. To the realist, they are not. Scandinavian international society was well integrated into, and to some extent conditioned upon a European security order based on US military power, which allowed the Nordic states to focus on issues beyond the preservation of their short-term national security: Scandinavian international society was a ‘luxury good’ enjoyed by a group of privileged Nordic states allowed to free-ride on the security order created by others (Wivel, 2013). An increased focus on the great powers that conditioned the order, which allowed for the construction and flourishing of Scandinavian international society would help to qualify Schouenborg’s arguments and increase the empirical validity of his account. In addition, attention to the particular norms and values that characterises the international society nourished by these great powers will help us understand the complex interaction between Scandinavian, European and global international societies. In this regard, increased attention to the liberal aspects of the nineteenth century liberal-egalitarian foundations of the Scandinavian welfare state will provide a missing piece of the puzzle of Scandinavian international society. Strong elements of missionary liberalism are characteristic of the Scandinavian welfare state, at home and abroad as well as of US society and foreign policy and what we have come to know as the American world order. Perhaps, the reintegration of Scandinavian international society into a larger European or even American international society is not such a big surprise after all.

Notes 1 However, see Browning (2007) for an interesting collection of analyses on Nordic internationalism. 2 For Schouenborg’s analysis of this period, see Schouenborg (2013b).

References Andrén, N. (1967) Nordic integration. Cooperation and Conflict 2(1): 1–25.

Archer, C. and Joenniemi, P. (2003) The Nordic Peace. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.

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Browning, C. (2007) Branding Nordicity: Models, identity, and the decline of exceptionalism. Cooperation and Conflict 42(1): 27–51. Deutsch, K.W. et al (1957) Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Schouenborg, L. (2013a) The Scandinavian International Society: Primary Institutions and Binding Forces, 1815–2010. London: Routledge.

Schouenborg, L. (2013b) Nordisk diplomati: I det skandinaviske internationale samfunds tjeneste? Samfundskøkonomen, Juni 2013 – nr.2: 218–223. Wivel, A. (2013) Birds of a feather flying apart? Explaining Nordic dissonance in the (Post)-Unipolar world. In: A.S. Dahl and P. Järvenpää (eds.) Northern Security and Global Politics: Nordic-Baltic Strategic Influence in a Post-Unipolar World. London: Routledge.

A Guarded Positivist Response Laust Schouenborg Department of Society and Globalisation, Roskilde University, Denmark E-mail: [email protected]

Reply by Laust Schouenborg This forum has its origins in a book launch at the Danish Institute for International Studies in the fall of 2012. There I had the great opportunity to discuss the book’s findings with an eminent group of scholars whose research interests cover both International Relations (IR) and English School (ES) theory, as well as the Nordic/Scandinavian1 region. It is a privilege to be able to continue our conversation in this journal. The contributors raise more issues (all relevant) than it is possible address in this short reply and I shall therefore focus on those that I deem to most important for understanding the purposes of the book and its contribution. These are: implicit normative commitments (Suzuki, Bergman Rosamond), my understanding of science (Mouritzen, Suzuki) and the contemporary relevance of the argument for Scandinavian international relations (Mouritzen, Wivel, Bergman Rosamond).

Normative Commitments Traditionally, ES theory has been characterized by normative commitments. Scholars have asked questions about ‘what is’, but crucially also about ‘what ought to be’. In the book, I consciously distanced myself from this tradition. Yet, as Suzuki perceptively notes, there appears to be an implicit notion in my description of the Scandinavian international society that it represents a set of universally attractive values and that its possible expansion to the Baltic States in the aftermath of the Cold War could be labeled ‘progress’. In this sense, my analysis runs parallel to some of the earlier works in the ES which explicitly thought of the expansion of European Westphalian International Society to the rest of the globe as a fortunate development. One consequence of this was that the struggles of indigenous peoples were left out of the narrative. Suzuki intimates that I more or less do the same with the Inuits in Greenland

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and the Saami of northern Scandinavia. None of these receive detailed attention in the book. When I was writing the thesis, from which this book is derived, I used to joke with my graduate school friends that it was really about Scandinavian supremacy! They too detected an underlying normative current in my work and in the whole framing of the narrative. I am certainly committed to the welfare state as a citizen of a Scandinavian country, but in good old positivist fashion I do think I am able to detach myself (to an extent) from these commitments as a scholar. What first drew me to Scandinavia as an analytical object was that it seemed to be a good fit with the concept of a ‘regional international society’ (Buzan, 2004) and how it might impact adjacent regions. In other words, it was a theory-informed choice. Moreover, it would be hard to identify any normative commitments to the historical regions that I am currently researching: Central Asia, tropical Africa and Polynesia. It is true that a particular analytical focus will always throw light on some elements of the real world while leaving others in the dark. The Inuit and Saami peoples did not get a lot of attention in the book because they were not central to the argument I wanted to make. If I had been compelled to compile a sort of balance sheet of the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ dimensions of the Scandinavian international society, the eugenics agenda, which appeared to be closely tied to the welfare state ideology of moral perfection and social engineering, would have had to be included on the list of ‘bads’.2 The same applies to gender policies – a ‘good’ – which only received a brief mention in the chapters dealing with the Baltic States. Yet, this was not my intention with the book. My idea was to explore Scandinavia as one possible example of the wider phenomenon of regional international society and the analytical framework (and narrative) was constructed for that purpose. Other scholars are welcome to take up the ES discussion of order versus justice in this context or explore the ‘progressive’ impact of Scandinavia on world politics.

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The Question of Science This brings me to the question of science and the position with regards to it adopted in the book. Mouritzen, in his contribution, claims that my understanding of science, as ‘the systematic study of patterns and their degree of stability in time and space’ (Schouenborg, 2013a, p.1), is outdated and reflects a Gallilean as opposed to a Newtonian stance. He argues that the consensus view of science today is that it should be concerned with explanation, with answering the ‘why-questions’. This is then used to show that I fail to identify the ‘drivers’ of Scandinavian exceptionalism – according to Mouritzen, particularly external pressure and Swedish leadership. I am not sure that Mourtizen and I are as far apart as he lets on. My position on science is basically rooted in the covering law model, which to the best of my knowledge is still the consensus view among positivists. It holds that to explain an event is to show that it is a particular instance of a general pattern or law. To put it in formal terms, if we can observe some initial conditions (C) and we know based on experience that these are generally (the law part: L) followed by an event (E), then E is explained with reference to L. The purpose of science is to look for those patterns that make up L. Hence, ‘the systematic study of patterns and their degree of stability in time and space’.3 Yet, it is probably worth emphasizing that I am quite sceptical about the possibility of demonstrating stable patterns that we can place faith in as explanations in the social sciences – and we are very far indeed from anything approximating the stability of the laws of physics. I would therefore be extremely careful about claiming, for example, that the Scandinavian international society was caused by Swedish leadership or external pressure. You can certainly develop a set of hypotheses around these claims and test them empirically, but I doubt you will arrive at very strong patterns. Furthermore, you would have to show that other possible explanatory factors were not equally correlated with the emergence of the Scandinavian international society. While the book mostly skirted the issue of explanation and focused more on the basic empirical establishment of patterns of various kinds, it did engage one explanation related to the so-called Nordic Peace. Here I tested whether the past experience of peaceful change in a number near miss conflicts or non-wars in Norden led to subsequent expectations of peaceful change. For example, the introduction of the constitutional monarchy in Denmark in 1848, the break-up of the Swedish-Norwegian union in 1905 and the Åland crisis between Sweden and Finland in the 1920s. In general, I did not find support for this thesis. The political leadership only started to disregard violence (intrastate and interstate) as a viable policy option in Norden in the 1930s and there was little evidence to suggest that this had anything to do with the past experience of peaceful change. Something happened in the 1930s that

perhaps cannot be summed up to more than a remarkable process of politics: these years were characterized by large cross-class and cross-political comprises in all five Nordic states. I am not saying that these compromises necessarily are the explanation, only that the ‘expectations-thesis’ appears light on substance. The reason why I got into this whole discussion about political violence in the book in the first place was that I, like Mouritzen, was interested in finding out whether there was anything that could account for Scandinavian exceptionalism, for the rise of the Scandinavian international society. Again, here one could explore the role of Sweden or the role of external ‘systemic’ pressure. One could also go further back in history and look at the ideology of Scandinavianism or some structural factor prior to the 19th century as Wivel suggests in his contribution. I think these are all worthwhile inquiries to pursue, but I must say that completing this particular study has only confirmed my hesitance about making broad causal claims in the social sciences. Perhaps we will never know what ‘caused’ Scandinavia – or what will make it unravel. What I do think I have proven in this book is that Scandinavia can be conceptualised as a regional international society and compared to other concrete examples of this type. The ‘functional categories’ for primary institutions elaborated in the theory chapter is also a key contribution in this respect: they allow systematic trans-historical comparisons of regional international societies. This may not satisfy those who are looking for hard explanations, but it may be enough for those of us who are mainly driven by a basic curiosity about social phenomena in general and those pertaining to International Relations in particular.

The Scandinavian International Society Post-1989 The final issue I would like to address is the one about the contemporary relevance of my findings. As several of the contributors note, the basic configuration of the Scandinavian international society was kept constant in the book post-1989. The reason for this was that I wanted to focus on the possible expansion of this society to the Baltic States. Yet, it is entirely legitimate to question whether it in fact made sense to speak of a Scandinavian international society in this period, both due to changes within Scandinavia itself as well as in its wider international environment. I am happy to report that these ‘objections’ prompted me to conduct such an analysis in a recent piece in the Danish journal SamfundsO̷ konemen (Schouenborg, 2013b). I particularly looked at the extent to which the welfare state was still present as a core principle of legitimacy in the Nordic region. There was plenty of evidence to support this view. It has to be said, though, that it had become less exceptional compared to other welfare regimes around the world, especially with respect to the VOLUME 1 SEPTEMBER 2013 61

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overall generosity of welfare provisions. I also found that the rest of the institutional assemblage identified in the book (development assistance, diplomacy, war etc.) remained intact in its essence. The only real exception to this was the primary institution of war, where Danish practices (a form of ethical militarism) diverged significantly from those of the other Nordic states and as well as those present pre-1989. I am not sure whether this is surprising or not. Wivel, adopting a realist position in his contribution, thinks that it is not. According to him, the Scandinavian international society was a ‘luxury’ enjoyed by these states during the Cold War due to the security guarantee provided by the United States. In the post-Cold War era, new geopolitical agendas emerged and forced the individual Nordic states to adopt different foreign policy positions as a response. This is no doubt a parsimonious explanation, but is it plausible? In the book (Schouenborg, 2013a, p.109, footnote 1), I discuss a version of this argument in the Cold War context (Kaspersen, 2006). It holds that the welfare state was a conscious strategy to remain somewhat aloof from the ideological contest between capitalism and communism. While it may also have served that purpose, this does not explain why a particular version of the welfare state emerged in Scandinavia and not in the rest of

Western Europe (which equally enjoyed the US security guarantee). Furthermore, it is based on the questionable assumption that political communities are, above all, concerned with their own security. This is not to disregard the issue of power, there is plenty of scope for that in an ES analysis, but only to caution against mono-causal explanations. That said, I do think Wivel’s contribution highlights an important issue which only received superficial treatment in the book: the role of the great powers in shaping the European international society as well as the more narrow Scandinavian international society. Such an analysis would sit well with the one suggested by Bergman Rosamond, namely the Nordic states’ impact as ‘non-great powers’ on world politics.

Notes 1 These two terms will be used interchangeably to refer to the five states of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. 2 The forced sterilization of ‘genetically questionable’ citizens continued in Sweden up to the mid-1970s. 3 For a critique of this position from an IR perspective, see Suganami (2008).

References Buzan, B. (2004) From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kaspersen, L.B. (2006) The formation and development of the welfare state: Decisions in the state of exception. In: J.L. Campbell, J.A. Hall and O.K. Pedersen (eds.) National Identity and Varieties of Capitalism: The Danish Experience. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.

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Schouenborg, L. (2013a) The Scandinavian International Society: Primary Institutions and Finding Forces, 1815–2010. London and New York: Routledge. Schouenborg, L. (2013b) Nordisk diplomati: I det skandinaviske internationale samfunds tjeneste? Samfundsøkonomen 2. Suganami, H. (2008) Narrative explanation and international relations: Back to basics. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 37(2): 327–356.

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