The Psychological Record, 1980,30,447-458

THEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGY: WHERE IS IT HEADED? PARKER E. LICHTENSTEIN

The rapid growth of American psychology following World War II has contributed to the conceptual confusion currently characteristic of the field. While psychology is too diverse to be a completely unified science, a degree of unity could be attained through the adoption of a single metasystem. Metasystemic differences are exhibited through brief analyses of behaviorism, cognitive psychology, psychobiology, and ecological psychology.

Psychology has long aspired to the scientific respectability of the established sciences, and therefore it has been a constant source of embarrassment that there has been so much disagreement about psychological fact and theory. There has been little consolation in the observation that all facts are theory-laden and that theoretical conflict exists in every scientific domain for it seems quite clear that physics, chemistry, and biology do contain bodies of knowledge widely shared and relatively noncontroversial in nature. In recognition of this point Boring, Langfeld, and Weld (1935) edited Psychology: A Factual Textbook which was an attempt to demonstrate the maturity of psychology as a science through a presentation of well-substantiated facts which constitute the foundation of the discipline. They claimed to avoid the metaphysical presuppositions, theoretical discussion, and controversy characteristic of philosophical psychology, but the reader will observe that the book is filled with theory, some of it explicit but much implicit. Today the book seems dated, almost a curiosity, but it is scholarly, experimental, and scientific in character. Yet in a few short years after its publication psychology had moved hopelessly away from its goal of becoming a unified science and became a highly diversified, pluralistic profession. A few experimental and theoretical psychologists struggled against the rising tide, but their efforts were no match for relentless cultural forces. Pratt (1939), for example, warned against premature application and advised psychologists to remain in their laboratories and libraries for many years to come. All such warnings were in vain; psychology entered the marketplace, and it did so rather woefully unprepared for the responsibilities that were thrust upon it. Lacking a sufficiently established and accepted body of fact and theory, psychologists frequently turned to loose Requests for reprints should be addressed to Parker E. Lichtenstein, 130 Azalea Trail, Leesburg, FL 32748.

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ad hoc theorizing, hasty generalization, intuitions of inner experience, and vague analogy and metaphor. One result has been to make many psychologists, unhappy with the state of the discipline, search valiantly for a unifying theoretical position which might bring a semblance of order and scientific respectability to replace the current chaos. It is often heard that modern psychology is in crisis and apparently the crisis has existed for some time. Crisis, however, implies resolution; at a turning point a clear direction may be taken. Koch (1976) has long argued that crisis "is endemic to psychology" (p. 477) and that psychology cannot be a coherent discipline. He has pointed out further that psychology is more and more characterized by insularity among its many specialties and that fractionation of the field reduces the liklihood of unification. Koch suggests that psychology should be reconceived as the psychological studies, and presumably the messianic aim of unified theory should be abandoned as chimerical. One can readily agree with Koch that psychology cannot have a single, unifying, all-embracing theory given the diversity of problems, interests, and objectives requiring different methods, language, and so forth. In a sense, it is probably true that no science is ever completely coherent or unified. Nevertheless, psychology does seem to constitute a special case. While in limited areas, such as sensory psychology, knowledge has tended to be cumulative, this has certainly not been true of social psychology, personality, nor even to any marked degree of learning, to say nothing of imagination or creativity. Frequently the reason given for this state of affairs is that psychology is still a young science, but one might ask just how long such an account can suffice. Perhaps we should seek a better explanation along different lines. Disagreements in psychology may concern facts and methods. More often, however, they appear as matters of interpretation wherein different sets of assumptions may play a determining role. Since psychologists frequently operate within different metasystems, they lack the common ground shared by geologists, physicists, and chemists. The metasystem of the psychologist is frequently subjectivistic or idealistic. The natural scientist, however, takes the world to be objective and real. As Margenau (1950) has said, "Realism, usually in some inarticulate and non-specific form that is disturbed by finer distinctions, is the philosophy ofthe working scientist" (p. 457). Margenau goes on to attack realism and in doing so he reveals his commitment to nonnaturalistic assumptions stemming from a hoary psychology of mental processes. That the theoretical physicist, as distinguished from the experimentalist at work in the laboratory, should find himself enmeshed in such questions as the construction of the external world is simply evidence of the pervasiveness and power of traditional psychological constructs. We do not live within a unified cultural system. Naturalism and transcendentalism coexist with neither gaining a distinct upper hand. The road to a fairly consistent naturalism has been long and slow for the sciences and particularly so for psychology. The belief that with the coming of behaviorism psychology became naturalistic could scarcely be farther from the truth. The support for this statement is that most of the behaviorists, and certainly Tolman, Boring, Stevens, and Spence, were

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methodological behaviorists, and methodological behaviorism preserved mentalism or metaphysical dualism by allowing the mind to live in repose to be resuscitated later by the cognitivists and cognitive behaviorists. The point to be made is that there would be much more unity in psychology if psychologists operated within a single metasystem. As things now stand it is obvious that all of the pieces of the giant psychological jigsaw puzzle will not fit together because they do not belong to the same puzzle. Fortunately. psychologists do a fair job of keeping the pieces of different puzzles separate, but when two psychologists are talking about a single topic, each working with a different set of assumptions, they inevitably talk past one another. As long as this situation continues Koch's contentions will hold true. While the trend of science has for centuries been increasingly naturalistic (not necessarily mechanistic or materialistic), it may not be possible to place psychology within the framework of natural science. One possibility is that it simply does not belong; it does not fit. Another, however, is that the assumption of mind and consciousness is too deeply embedded in the fibers of our culture to be abandoned. The recent revival of the mind in psychology lends considerable credence to this view. It is clear at this point in time that many psychological questions were either evaded by behaviorism or were handled in a crude and unconvincing manner which invited criticism and seriously undermined the behavioristic revolution. The fundamental questions raised by the resurgence of mentalism should remind psychologists of the fact that for a long time metasystemic issues were impatiently brushed aside as metaphysical and therefore were incapable of being resolved empirically. If psychologists do not attempt to handle questions of subjectivity, of behavior and experience, of personal identity and the like and do so in a convincing manner, they will simply be turning them back to philosophy. The flourishing philosophy of mind is evidence that to a degree this is what has already happened. The recovery of at least as much unity in psychology as behaviorism once provided may be a worthwhile goal in spite of the difficulties which Koch (1976) has emphasized. There is much to be gained from a pedagogical standpoint as well as the promise of a boost in morale for the whole enterprise. It may be that although Boring, Langfeld, and Weld (1935) and Pratt (1939) were dead wrong as far as predicting the future course of psychology was concerned, they were right in a normative sense. That is, had psychology remained relatively small and manageable, academic and research-oriented, there is a good chance that psychology as science might be more advanced today. There is, however, no turning back. What psychology can do is to refocus on broad theoretical issues in an effort to remove at least some sources of divisiveness. For those wro would disparage theory on the grounds that their practical concerns or research interests do not require it, it should be pointed out that pure inductivi&m is a myth. The question is simply whether we are to be satisfied with bad theory or will seek something better.

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WHAT HAPPENED TO BEHAVIORISM? By the 1930s behaviorism was dominant and solidly entrenched in American psychology. Of course, there were the competing views of Tolman, Hull, Guthrie, and Skinner, but the belief was widely held that eventually one would emerge as superior. In the '4Os it seemed that Hull might be a clear winner with his hypothetico-deductive approach which seemed to bring to psychology needed rigor and precision. Hullian papers abounded at professional meetings and in the journals so that the young and older psychologists alike felt that in order to be abreast of the times they must master the somewhat esoteric Hullian symbols. From the very outset, however, Hull's approach was subjected to severe criticisms by reviewers who saw the system as pretentious and premature. Then there appeared a devastating critique by Koch (1954) which considered not only the early Hullian position but also the later efforts at correction and reformulation. Koch mentions that the keynote of this period of psychological thought was "the belief in the imminent feasibility of comprehensive theory, having an unrestricted range of application to the major phenomena of organismic behavior" (p. 3). Koch was generous in his praise of Hull's contributions, but the reader could not overlook the generally negative impact of the critique. Koch (1964) again attacked, this time behaviorism in general, although he seemed to exempt Skinner at least in part from his onslaught. Koch Sf
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complete as that of logical positivism within philosophy. All of this is much too cavalier. If it is proclaimed often enough that behaviorism is dead, there are those who will believe it. Unfortunately, we have expected too much of psychological theories and when they have failed to provide adequate comprehensive coverage of the field we have tended to write them off in spite of their considerable merits. The errors of behaviorism have been many, but they are not errors which cannot be corrected. The behavioristic metasystem strikes many as absurd but the perception of absurdity often stems from deeply embedded dualistic assumptions. It is very likely that the metasystem of radical behaviorism does need a clearer and more convincing statement than it has yet received, but this certainly does not mean that it should be abandoned. In addition to the scientific and practical contributions of contemporary behaviorism we should welcome- Skinner's contributions to behaviorism as philosophy. One may disagree with Skinner but at the same time be ready to admit that Skinner has provided provocative suggestions regarding the larger role of psychology in the modern world. A lasting contribution of behaviorism has been the demonstration that a science of behavior can be constructed at a behavioral level, i.e., that behavioral laws need not embody either mentalistic or physiological constructs. Critics express dissatisfaction with behavioral laws as purely descriptive whereas mentalistic and/or physiological theories are explanatory. This contention raises fundamental questions concerning the nature and goals of scientific theory which demand more careful attention than they have yet received. The continued vitality of the experimental analysis of behavior and of behavior modification indicate that behaviorism is alive and well. Recent excursions into ethics (Krapfl and Vargas, 1977) make it clear that behaviorists are not neglecting difficult questions in related areas. At the same time it may be said that, particularly in view of recent developments in cognitive psychology and in psychophysiology, behaviorists should be paying more attention to perception, cognition, attention, and memory than they typically have in the past. As we shall see, these topics show promise for extensions of behavioristic thinking which may allay some doubts as to its general applicability.

THE COGNITIVE ALTERNATIVE Today psychology stands in the middle of a serious and powerful counterrevolutionary movement called cognitive psychology. Certainly the aim of the cognitive approach, to find mental processes by means of which we can explain behavior, aligns it with an ancient psychology. What makes it different is its reliance upon experimentation and data which are primarily, if not exclusively, behavioral. The general tendency to ignore introspection as a method makes it possible to differentiate cognitive psychology fairly well from phenomenology as well as traditional introspectionism.

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Historically, cognitive psychology appears to be deeply indebted to Piaget and Chomsky whose novel approaches to thought and language suggested that mental processes may be seen as qualitatively different from behavior. The general thrust of such thinking has been to revive the mind as an acceptable psychological construct. In one or more senses cognitive psychology is mentalistic. Mentalism is a term with many meanings. It has been taken to mean Berkeley's doctrine that objects exist in the mind of a perceiver, and it is fair to say that few, if any, cognitive psychologists wish to defend this position. (What is not so clear is why, given their assumptions, they should not.) More commonly, mentalism is the view that psychology is concerned, at least in part, with studying the mind or consciousness. At this point the definition of mind becomes crucial, and the question arises as to whether naturalism must be abandoned. Probably most cognitive psychologists support the identification of mind with brain and take mind-brain identity theory to be a satisfactory escape from dualism. A third meaning of mentalism is that behavior may have mental causes. It is this version of mentalism as expressed in cognitive psychology to which Skinner objects most strenuously. Those who, like Hebb, see thought as the integrative activity of the brain are understandably impressed by information-processing and computer models. Cognitive psychologists should recognize, however, that they run the risk of regarding the mind as homunculus with all of the difficulties which such a position entails. One of the great strengths of cognitive psychology is the fact that it corresponds fairly closely to the commonsense psychology of the layman. Defenders of mentalism have been encouraged by support from humanists of various stripes, mystics, and spiritualists but more importantly from physical scientists and philosophers of science. Skinnerian behaviorism, by denying causal efficacy to thoughts and feelings has antagonized intellectuals in many fields. While Skinner's position with respect to cognitivism is thoroughly consistent with his radical environmentalism, it amounts to little more than a bald statement of metasystemic differences. It is easy to be impressed by the variety of research studies carried out within cognitive psychology and the ingenuity of its researchers. From the point of view of theoretical psychology, however, the contributions of cognitive psychology have been much less impressive (Neisser, 1976). One may be struck by the lack of any significant unifying constructs beyond the computer-processing analogy. Neisser (1976) seems to be reaching out beyond this position for a theory which will embrace the Gibsons' work on perception, which is perhaps best described as ecological. It is difficult to see how cognitive psychology can move in this direction, however, without a major reorientation regarding its basic assumptions, but it is just such a reorientation which might well lead to a reunification of psychology. Neisser's recent efforts are at least promising as they move toward the organismic and the ecological positions. Cognitive psychology can find a natural ally in psychobiology. The mind-body identity theory widely accepted by both cognitive psychologists and psychobiologists serves nicely as a connecting link. Because of the rapid rise of psychobiology and its implications for psychological theory, it must be given brief consideration.

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MIND AND BRAIN "The secrets of the mind are locked up in the brain." It would be difficult to find any proposition which would be more widely accepted by psychologists and non-psychologists alike than this one. Here is a theoretical statement loaded with assumptions but generally regarded as little more than a truism. Beyond doubt there are many who regard behavioral psychology as a temporary stopgap which will assume a position of reduced significance once we have discovered the ways in which the brain carries out those physiological functions which will explain the mind. Currently we are seeing a number of discoveries about brain function which many believe promise to bring psychology quickly to such a goal. Work on neurotransmitters, endorphins, the limbic system, split brains, and so forth-all are impressive. Theories involving holography, lateralization, short-term and long-term memory show increasing sophistication but leave several unanswered questions. One might ask, for example, whether any amount of knowledge of brain function can disclose the fundamental nature of perception or thought. Neither Sherrington nor Adrian could believe that physiology would ever solve the mystery of the connection between mind and brain. Historically psychobiology has emerged from mind-body dualism, so much so, in fact, that writers such as Sperry, Popper, and Eccles support a position which appears very close to, if not identical with, the interactionism of Descartes. More popular today than other mind-body positions is mind-body identity theory which provides a verbal escape from dualism, if nothing more. By reducing mind and body to a single realm a significant simplification is supposedly achieved. It can be argued that all mind-brain theories are essentially mystery views. How, for example, can color, pain, or sound be either generated or mediated by the brain? If in some manner they are so generated or mediated, how do we get to the external world? Must we run the risk of solipsism? Physiological psychology has traditionally been linked to the causal theory of perception, secondary qualities, and specific nerve energies, all of which pose profound philosophical questions which psychological science might do well to avoid, if possible. Possibly the finest and most comprehensive treatment of psychobiology is that of Uttal (1978). Yet, in spite of the wealth of data and the richness of theoretical discussion, one gains the impression that there is much dogma ("neural activity is the sole basis and only significant concomitant of mental activity" according to Uttal, 1978, p. 685); yet there is a recognition of the tentativeness of psychobiology ("I am now convinced that much less is known than I thought when I embarked on this enterprise. Many of the empirical foundation stones of physiological psychology accepted only a few years ago have turned out to be equivocal," ibid, p. 694). A clear indication of the mind-body assumptions of psychobiology is seen in the following statement with which Uttal (1978) concludes: "The unsolved mind-body problem thus remains the 'world knot'. Because of

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both its importance and its complexity, it still represents what many, including myself, consider to be the most exciting and important issue in contemporary science" (p. 695). Vttal's doubts may contain the seeds which upon germination will give rise to a new psychobiology (that is, if we can believe that the accumulation of anomalies will eventually lead to a Kuhnian paradigm shift). It may be suggested that if there is no mind in the traditional sense to be substituted for or undergirded by the brain, the role to be played by the brain in psychological theory can change quite radically. Kantor (1947) has subjected conventional psychobiology to a critical review and offered as an alternative the position that the brain is in no sense a psychological organ or seat of psychological events but rather it participates in the psychological which is a larger event field or interbehavior. As things stand, in spite of the valuable contributions of psychobiology it remains from a theoretical point of view no more than a promissory note. While its alliance with cognitive psychology makes a formidable combination, it does not provide a coherent picture of organism-environment relationships. For a more promising approach to this important area we must, it seems, look in a different direction. ECOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY The ecological approach to psychology owes a great debt to the pioneering contributions of Gibson (1979). In the course of fifty years spent trying to understand vision Gibson was led to radical departures from traditional approaches and theories. Gibson's psychology of visual perception is a great achievement, but it is one that could not have been possible without a willingness to discard time-honored postulates and to tackle intriguing perceptual problems within the framework of a realistic metasystem. Central to Gibson's thinking is the theory of affordances which states that affordances are what the environment offers an animal. The environment provides information to the organism which can fully specify the environment's characteristics. The basic affordances of the environment are not only perceivable but are usually directly perceivable without a great deal of learning. The environment is taken in a commonsense way as simply there. Here Gibson is like Skinner in regarding organism and environment objectively. Skinner attributes to the environment the power to shape and control behavior, but his environment is thin and abstract in comparison with the rich and detailed affordances of Gibsonian theory. What should be noted, however, is the basic compatibility of the two approaches. Gibson treats perception as biologically adaptive, and his position is readily harmonized with evolutionary theory. The senses are viewed as perceptual systems and not simply as specialized channels. Taken as a whole, ecological psychology, while an independent development, appears to have much in common with Kantor's (1959) interbehavioral psychology. Both are realistic in the sense that they take organism and environment as existent, interacting realities. The realistic metasystem is consistent with all working science and stands in sharp contrast to the idealistic metasystem of

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traditional perceptual theory and modern cognitive psychology. There is no reason for believing that the Gibsonian approach cannot be successfully extended on a realistic and behavioral basis to include such topics as thinking and remembering. (No attempt has been made to assess the contributions to current theoretical psychology of psychoanalysis, phenomenology, or humanistic psychology. Such contributions are not to be taken lightly, but they raise more complex questions than can be handled in a brief account. They must, therefore, receive separate treatment.) Ecological psychology is a much broader movement than the above discussion would indicate. It certainly includes the work of Barker and his associates and of Shaw and Bransford and several of their colleagues. Bya slight extension one could include the work of Egon Brunswick, J .R. Kantor, and such contextualists as Sarbin and Mancuso. As this group is extended it tends to suffer by becoming somewhat amorphous. As the movement grows attention will be given increasingly to the development of a theoretical statement to which all ecological psychologists might assent. An interesting step along this line has been taken by Shaw and Bransford (1977) in their introductory chapter. They bring out clearly how the ecological approach contrasts with the information-processing model and supports the hypothesis that perception is direct. Information-processing models with their implied or stated homunculi almost inevitably are linked with hypotheses of indirect perception. THE FUTURE OF THEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGY Are there discernible trends in theoretical psychology which may give an indication of future developments? If so, what are they? Answers to such questions may reflect hopes as well as objective appraisals of the evidence. The following predictions may, therefore, be taken as a somewhat biased account. What actually will occur is likely to depend as much upon political and general cultural factors as it is upon the work carried out in our laboratories and libraries. 1. Behaviorism should continue to give life and substance to mainstream psychology. Emphasis upon animal research will probably decline somewhat as behaviorism absorbs the insights of ecological psychology and becomes more fully interactional in approach. The behavioristic metasystem will be strengthened through the increased sophistication of behaviorists in handling the philosophy of science. It may well be, although it may appear somewhat paradoxical, that behaviorism will in the long run be considerably strengthened by the abandonment of methodological behaviorism. 2. Cognitive psychology will continue to draw support just as long as it can produce interesting results and theories of heuristic value, particularly in areas which have suffered from neglect at the hands of behaviorists, ecological psychologists, and others. Cognitive psychology will also continue to attract support from philosophers wedded to mentalistic constructs and from psychobiologists, who are very often addicted to mind-brain identification. Such support can operate as a barrier to the naturalistic metasystem which could effectively transform cognitive psychology. In

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contrast, ecological and contextual emphases emerging within cognitive psychology (Shaw & Bransford, 1977) appear to be moving it toward union with ecological psychology and perceptual realism. 3. Ecological psychology will extend its coverage to embrace most of the areas of cognitive psychology and the psychology of action. One result of this development will be to bring about a thorough reexamination of many traditional concepts including experience, consciousness, and environment. The realistic assumptions of ecological psychology could prove to be revolutionary and should attract support from behaviorists. Trends already discernible within cognitive psychology mean in essence that cognitive psychology, behaviorism, and ecological psychology can all be assimilated within a contextual or interactional framework. Kantor (1959) has stated the essentials of such a position. First, he defines the metasystem as "more or less formally delineating the foundations and specifications of particular psychological systems" (p. 71). He then elaborates the interbehavioral metasystem through seven metapostulates. "Metapostulate l. Homogeneity. Psychology is homogenous with all other sciences" (p. 72). Each science isolates some aspect of the complex manifold of events we call nature for its special object of study. "Metapostulate 2. Independence. Psychology is a relatively independent science" (p. 72). Although the sciences are interrelated since they all draw from the same manifold of events, they may be relatively independent. Psychology has its own subject matter and accumulation of facts. "Metapostulate 3. System Foundation. An interbehavioral system of psychology departs from all traditional epistemological and ontological systems" (p. 73). All traditional philosophies implying a split between mind and matter are rejected as are doctrines of consciousness and inner experience. In contrast, the data of perceiving, thinking, remembering, and so forth are extremely important and cry out for naturalistic treatment. "Metapostu~ate 4. System Adequacy. A psychological system should achieve a comprehensive coverage of events, operations, and theory constructions" (p. 73). An adequate psychological system cannot be built on a limited range of data as, for example, animal learning. Complicated human events must be dealt with in their full complexity even when this means studying events which cannot always be handled in the laboratory. "Metapostulate 5. System Orientation. System construction requires adequate orientation with respect to systemological problems" (p. 73). Goals, priorities, and criteria should be examined carefully. Adequate system building implies a grasp of issues normally included within the philosophy of science. Here, however, an important caveat should be entered since the philosophy of science typically carries a heavy overload of conventional ontology and metaphysics. "Metapostulate 6. System Irreducibility. A psychological system IS not reducible to any other type" (p. 74). The possibility of eventually reducing thinking and remembering, for example, to activities of the brain is rejected. Reductionism is programmatic at best while at worst it involves a neglect of the specificity of the original events studied.

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"Metapostulate 7. System Relativity. Psychological systems are relative and subject to continual corrective reformulation" (p. 74). All "systems are subject to verifying tests and are, therefore, tentative and relative to the state of investigation of given data" (p. 74). As Jenkins (1977) puts it, "For the contextualist, no analysis is 'the complete analysis'. All analyses eventually 'sheer away' from the event into more extensive contexts." Yet while there is no single, unified account of anything, what makes an analysis good "is its appropriateness for our research and science and its utility in our pursuit of understanding and application" (p. 416). Interbehavioral psychology and contextualism are scientific and pragmatic. It appears to the writer that current trends are moving psychology toward such a metasystem as Kantor suggests and this is said with full cognizance of strong countermovements. Kantor (1959) has defined psychology as the study of "the interactions of organisms with objects, events, or other organisms as well as with their specific qualities, and relations" (p. 84). While Kantor prefers the term interbehaviorism, he may be regarded as an early contextualist. Recently Sarbin and Mancuso (1980) have referred to Kantor as one who has provided a base for building contextualist models and they have linked him with Egon Brunswick, George Kelly, George Herbert Mead, and Stephen Pepper. Sarbin and Mancuso's contextualist interpretation of schizophrenia is a good example of the applicability of the model and is one which brings out very nicely the contrast with the organism-centered medical model. 4. Psychobiology will provide an increasingly powerful, countervailing force against the major behavioral trend. The idea that the brain is the seat of the mind is too deeply embedded in the culture to be given up. The impressive growth of knowledge of the brain will reinforce existing beliefs even though there is no assurance that greater understanding of the brain will ever resolve psychological issues. Reductionism is largely programmatic as applied to psychology, but it cannot be dismissed as an impossibility. This issue is not likely to be resolved for some time. Those who expect a great breakthrough which will put psychology on an entirely new footing frequently find the most exciting challenges in the reductionistic possibility. It may be expected that a few psychobiologists will adopt a more organismic or holistic perspective regarding the role of the brain in the adjustments of the organism. If such a perspective should eventually prevail, it would do much to bring about the desired metasystemic unity of psychology. REFERENCES BORING, E. G., LANGFELD, H. S., & WELD, H. P. 1935. Psychology: A/actual textbook. New York: Wiley. BORING, E. G. 1950. A history 0/ experimental psychology (Rev. cd.). New York: AppletonCentury-Crofts. BOULDING, K. E. 1956. The image. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. CHOMSKY, N. 1959. Verbal Behavior by B. F. Skinner. Language, 35,26-58. GlBSO N, J. J. 1979. The ecological approach to visual perception. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. JENKINS, J. J. 1977. Remember that old theory of memory? Well, forget it! In R. Shaw & J. Bransford (Eds.), Perceiving, acting, and knowing: Toward an ecological psychology. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum.

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KANTOR, 1. R. 1947. Problems of physiological psychology. Chicago: Principia Press. KANTOR, 1.R. 1959. Interbehavioral psychology (Rev. ed.). Chicago: Principia Press. KOCH, S. 1954. Clark L. Hull. In W. K. Estes et aI., Modem learning theory. New York: Aoo1eton-Centurv-Crofts. KOCH, S. 1964. Psychology and emerging conceptions of knowledge as unitary. In W. T. Wann (Ed.), Behaviorism and phenomenology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. KOCH, S. 1976. Language communities, search cells, and the psychological studies. In W.1. Arnold (Ed.), Nebraska symposium on motivation, 1975. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. KRAPFL, 1. E., & VARGAS, E. A. (Eds.). 1977. Behaviorism and ethics. Kalamazoo, Mich.: Behaviordelia. MARGENAU, H. 1950. The nature ofphysical reality. New York: McGraw-Hill. MILLER, G. A., GLANTER, E., & PRIBRAM, K. H. 1960. Plans and the structure of behavior. New York: Holt. NEISSER, U. 1976. Cognition and reality. San Francisco: Freeman. PRATT, C. C. 1939. The logic of modem psychology. New York: Macmillan. SARBIN, T.R., & MANCUSO, 1.C. 1980. Schizophrenia: Medical diagnosis or moral verdict? New York: Pergamon Press. SHAW R., & BRANSFORD, 1. (Eds.). 1977. Perceiving, acting, and knowing: Toward an ecological psychology, Hillsdale, N.1.: Lawrence Erlbaum. SKINNER, B. F. 1977. The experimental analysis of operant behavior. In R. W. Rieber & K. Salzinger, The roots of American psychology: Historical influences and implications for the future. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 291. UTTAL, W. R. 1978. Thepsychobiologyofmind. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum.