Higher Laucation 3 (1974) 149-156 9 ElsevierScientificPublishingCompany,Amsterdam- Printed in the Netherlands

UNIVERSITIES AS SOCIAL CRITICS J. P. POWELL Education Department, University of Papua New Guinea, Box 4820, University Post Office, Papua New Guinea

ABSTRACT Should universities concern themselves with social criticism or should their intellectual role be conceived solely in terms of the preservation and extension of knowledge? It is argued that the claim that universities should act as centres of social criticism can be justified on two grounds: the nature of intellectual inquiry and the concept of higher education. Several current sources of opposition to this view are then examined and ways in which they might be resisted are outlined.

Introduction There is a great deal of uncertainty as to the range of responsibilities which it is proper for universities to shoulder and I wish here to focus upon the question of whether it is appropriate for them to criticize and make substantive recommendations with regard to the social values and policies pursued by the society which supports and encompasses them. For the purposes of this discussion I shall assume that such allied institutions as polytechnics and colleges for the training of teachers, insofar as these concern themselves with higher education rather than solely with vocational training, are indistinguishable from universities and that the members of their staffs are thus entitled (or not, according to one's view of the argument) to engage in social criticism in fulfilling their professional responsibilities. Universities are often viewed as centres in which an entire cultural tradition is developed and maintained. Oakeshott (1962), for example, defines a university as: " . . . an association of persons, locally situated, engaged in caring for and attending to the whole intellectual capital which composes a civilization." This "capital" is thought of not as a deposit of information but rather as a variety of modes of thinking each distineuished by characteristics peculiar to it. A similar position is taken by

149

Griffiths (1965) when considering what activities would be appropriate to a university when it is conceived of as a cultural centre: It would be a place where people pursue not only physics, but philosophy; not only philosophy, but music; not only music, but engineering (nobody can understand our world and be an all-round cultured man without a knowledge of the nature and problems of engineering); not only engineering, but theology. This c o n c e p t i o n characterizes universities in terms of the activities of scholarship and research, with the quest for knowledge and understanding, with the search for fuller and more accurate descriptions of the world. But this is not quite what m a ny people have in mind when they speak of the cultural role o f the university: while not necessarily denying the value of knowledge for its own sake they wish, where this is appropriate, to direct knowledge towards the illumination and resolution o f social problems. Leavis (1043), for example, construes " c u l t u r e " in terms of a tradition of thought and feeling which exercises a critical funct i on in relation to society at large: The universities are recognized symbols of cultural tradition - of cultural tradition still conceived as a directing force, representing a wisdom older than modern civilization and having an authority that should check and control the blind drive onward of material and mechanical development, with its human consequences. Leavis, drawing upon the work of D. H. Lawrence and George Sturt with their m y t h o f an ideal rural society destroyed by the evils of industrialism, appears to view the universities as embattled remnants defending a near-vanished way of life against the encroachments of modernity; a battle which seems impossible to win but which can never be finally lost as long as the universities (or at least one "anci ent university," namely, Cambridge!) hold out. This is strongly reminiscent of another of Leavis's sources, Matthew Arnold (1948), especially his elegiac description of Oxford as the h o m e of lost causes: We have not won our political battles, we have not carried our main points, we have not stopped our adversaries' advance, we have not marched victoriously with the modem world: but we have told silently upon the mind of the country, we have prepared currents of feeling which sap our adversaries' position when it seems gained, we have kept up our communications with the future. This view of the university as the last bastion of an enlightened and cultivated min o r i t y is of considerable interest at the present time because of its dependence u p o n a view of scholarly activity which sees it as being directly and intimately concerned with c o n t e m p o r a r y social issues and the more p e r m a n e n t realm of h u m a n values. Leavis is deeply troubled by the human consequences of industrialization and m o d e r n technology: the remedies which he proposes may not carry conviction but his concern that

150

knowledge and understanding should make a difference to our feelings, values and actions places his idea of the university close to the centre of contemporary controversy regarding the nature of higher education. This is not to say that many of those who are concerned with the alleged failure of universities to involve themselves in social issues would be in s y m p a t h y with Leavis's claims for the pre-eminent value of the literary sensibility and the necessity to restrict its cultivation to a small minority. Marcuse (1968), for example, would scarcely be likely to share Leavis's retrospectionism but he holds strongly to the belief that universities should be committed to the defence of certain values of a nonacademic character and that their members should act in accordance with these values: "There is one general c o m m i t m e n t which I think every university should have, namely, the c o m m i t m e n t to values which protect humanity, peace, justice." This is phrased in such general terms that scarcely anyone is likely to dissent from it: only when its implications are spelt out in detail is such a claim liable to be seen as a challenge by defenders of "pure inquiry" and those groups in society who do not welcome any questioning of their value system or the suggestion that this ought to be modified. Those who adopt the latter stance tend to view the university as a social mirror rather than as a source of criticism and alternative values and it is not difficult to find recent examples of expressions of this viewpoint. Clark Kerr (1963) asks: "What is the justification of the modern American multiversity? History is one answer. Consistency with the surrounding society is another." Another example from the United States is provided by Noble (1968): " . . . the university is the servant of the dominant values of the culture and not their source." A charge which has frequently been directed against universities during the past decade has been that they have tended to reflect too faithfully the dominant values of their parent societies and have neglected their responsibility to subject these to vigorous criticism. The following claim by Hayden (1968) sums up very forcefully the opinions of m a n y students in North America: The main concern of the university should not be with the publishing of books, getting money from legislators, lobbying for federal aid, wooing the rich, producing bombs and deadly bacteria. Nor should it be with passing along the morality of the middle class, nor the morality of the white man nor even the morality of this potpourri we call "Western society"... Already, however, the parallels between the habits of the university and the habits of society are many. I have listed some; include with these: the parallels between our academic and financial systems of credit, between competition for grades and for chamber of commerce awards, between cheating and price rigging, between the statements "attendance is a privilege, not a right" and "we reserve the right to refuse service to anyone."

151

These are the opinions of an American student but that they are more widely held in the university community is evidenced by this extract from a speech by Corry (1968), the Principal of a Canadian university: The universities draw large numbers of questing idealistic students. Some of them have decided that the universities are the handmaidens of the establishment, of the business and corporate elite, not only serving the status quo but using the educative process and university resources to clamp its grasp more tightly on us . . . . . they find their university too much preoccupied with the mundane, the immediate and the practical. They are potential allies for defending the citadel of the free minds.

Why a Critical University We must now turn to the question of how the university's role as social and cultural critic can be justified: what reasons can be offered to support this as a legitimate function of universities? Let us begin by examining some of the other functions of universities in order to determine what these imply for the role which has been considered so far: an obvious starting point is offered by the activities of scholarship and research. The old ideal of academic freedom, the freedom to teach, to learn and to publish would appear to provide some form of justification since it places no restrictions upon what may be studied and what may be said. It rests ultimately upon a basic value built into the whole concept of scholarly activity, namely, that truth is only to be attained through patient inquiry into the facts, rigorous criticism of competing theories, and the deployment of arguments untainted by dogmatism and appeals to authority. It follows from this that the pursuit of truth cannot be confined to "safe" topics or guided by a desire to reach pre-determined conclusions: scholars must be able to follow their inquiries wherever these may lead regardless of possible conflicts with the orthodoxies of governments, taxpayers, business corporations and c o m m u n i t y pressure groups. But this is only an argument in favour of conducting research in a particular manner, it does not support a wider conception of research and culture which encompasses the deployment of knowledge and understanding as a base for social criticism and action. It does, however, suggest that insofar as universities are committed to the pursuit of truth across the whole domain of human knowledge then more than any other institution which we have created they are likely to offer a congenial setting for those who favour the open discussion of contentious social and political issues. An environment in which scholarship flourishes is also apt to encourage the formulation and expression of ideas, opinions and policies which reach

152

beyond the professional concerns of scholars. If we value well-informed and freely-expressed social criticism then we should seek to safeguard the independence of universities as centres for the generation of this form of critical thought however discomforting its results m a y be for sectional interests within the community. Another line of justification could be developed from the model of the university as a centre of higher education and, as was indicated at the beginning, this would also underwrite social criticism as a legitimate function of any other institution which was involved in the enterprise of higher education. The cogency of this form of justification depends entirely upon our conception of what higher education involves. If it relates only to the attainment of a certain level of proficiency in such disciplines as mathematics, history, philosophy and engineering then it implies nothing for the issue under discussion, but if the concept is broadened so as to cover the fostering of values and commitment to a wider range of human excellencies beyond those required for the pursuit of truth then it would seem to justify social criticism as a legitimate function of universities. I favour the latter view, although this is not the place to argue for its merits. It assumes that a high value should be attached to persons who are unafraid to express their own opinions, who make every effort to deliberate in a rational manner about moral issues, who will support policies which enhance human welfare, and who display such virtues as honesty, integrity, disinterestedness and respect for others. If higher education encompasses values such as these then not only must university teaching be conducted in such a manner as to foster them but institutional life must also be seen to display and honour them. It would seem to follow from this that the members of universities and allied institutions have an obligation to concern themselves, in a substantive rather 'than in a neutral "academic" manner, with issues which reach far b e y o n d those which arise from their professional involvement in mathematics, history or engineering.

Sources of Opposition If social and cultural criticism is indeed one of the several functions proper to universities then we need to recognize that it is the one most likely to be resented and attacked. The pursuit of mathematical or historical truth threatens n o b o d y but it would not be surprising if groups and agencies outside of universities tend to be unsympathetic toward the expression of views and values which conflict with their own. Examples of attempts to undermine this role of universities are depressingly familiar:

153

student meetings have been banned, lecturers have been threatened or dismissed, publication has been prohibited, financial support has been reduced or withheld, the range of what might be taught has been restricted, entire institutions have been closed-down for periods of time. Two recent examples of such outside pressures must suffice as illustrations. It was reported in the "Chronicle" (1969) of Minerva that G. Mangakis, a lecturer in penal law at the University of Athens, had been suspended for six months because: "his conduct has proved that he has not the qualities needed by a university teacher and had not adapted himself to the rules and ideas of the present political and social regime." Student behaviour in Greece is governed by "Legislative Decree No 93, on the Rights and Duties of the Students in the Universities" (1970) which states that a student will be punished if he: 9 aims at the implementation o f ideas having as their obvious goal the o v e r t h r o w by whatever means of the existing social regime or tries to convert in favour o f their imposition, or propagates such ideas in whatever way or by whatever means... Despite their seriousness as threats to the independence of universities such external constraints must rank second in importance to internal factors which tend to undermine the role of universities as social and cultural critical centres, since without a commitment to truth and criticism within the academic c o m m u n i t y the reaction from outside would lose its point. Unfortunately, as many student commentators have stressed, such a c o m m i t m e n t cannot always be relied upon. Careerism, the eagerness to obtain research funds regardless of source, internal politics and power-seeking, nepotism, the patronage of the professoriate, intellectual incompetence, all of these combine to weaken the critical role of the universities and to make it increasingly hazardous for individual academics to express unpopular views or to avoid compromising their integrity. Nevertheless, the university is still the only institution we possess which is capable of generating well-informed social criticism and of providing an environment within which students can acquire both the attitudes and the knowledge which responsible criticism demands 9 Despite pressures from governments, occasional dismissals of faculty members and the conformism of many students and academics, most universities continue to function as foci of opposition to political, religious and cultural dogmatism. As Wolff (1969) has said in relation to universities in the United States: 9 . . a great m a n y colleges and universities are m u c h freer, m u c h more c o n d u c i v e t o serious q u e s t i o n i n g and o p e n debate, m u c h more c o m m i t t e d to h u m a n values, than any o t h e r i n s t i t u t i o n in the United S t a t e s . . . It is in universities that o p p o s i t i o n to the V i e t n a m e s e war started and flourished.

154

There, if anywhere, new and deeper attacks on the evils of American society will be mounted. Here again, the opposition role of the university flows from its very nature as a centre of free inquiry. Against all the pressures from the larger society, colleges and universities in the United States have for half a century been in the van of progressive social reform and social criticism.., so those of us who still sustain a concern for the partial amelioration of social evils must rely upon the actual institutions which offer us the most assistance. In America today, the university clearly heads that list.

References Arnold, M. (1948). Culture and Anarchy. Edited by J. Dover Wilson. Cambridge: The University Press, pp. 61-62. "Chronicle", (1969). Minerva 7 : 776. Corry, J. A. (1968). "Universities' Only Security is in Public Opinion," Univ. Aft. 10 : 18. Griffiths, A.P. (1965). "A Deduction of Universities," in Archambault, R.D. ed., Philosophical Analysis and Education. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, p. 198. Hayden, T. (1968). "Student Social Action: from Liberation to Community," in Adelstein, D.ed., Teach Yourself Student Power. London: Radical Student Alliance, p. 48. Kerr, C. (1963). The Uses of the University. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, p. 45. Leavis, F. R. (1943). Education and the University. London: Chatto and Windus, p. 16. "Legislative Decree No. 93, on the Rights and Duties of the Students in the Universities." (1970). Minerva 8 : 1 1 1 - 1 2 . Marcuse, H. (1968) "The Father of Student Rebellion?" The Listener, 17 October, p. 499. Noble, H. C. (1968). Book review inRelig. Educ. 63 : 408. Oakeshott, M. (1962). Rationalism in Politics. London: Methuen, p. 310 Wolff, R. P. (1969). The ldeaI of the University. Boston: Beacon Press, pp. 56-57.

155