Useful Friendships: A Foundation for Business Ethics

ABSTRACT. “Friendship”, for Aristotle, is a term with “focal meaning” which denominates relationships as casual as “fellow travelers on a voyage”, as permanent as spouses, and whose motives are as various as the commercial, military, religious, sexual, political and the virtuous. What can be said of all these relationships is that they involve a solidarity, a concordat, a reciprocity, which has its foundation in a common field between the parties and which produces common actions or exchanges. All friendships tend to equality in the sense that they do not insist on ‘what is due’ as an ultimate end; friendship, like equity, surpasses justice in the fulfillment of what is owed. Because friendship fosters solidarity and justice it is politically important as a virtue-context, according to Aristotle. Is it possible that friendship can function as a virtue-context within economic life as well? Aristotle’s notion of a type of useful friendship which functions through expectation of moral behavior will be shown to provide both motive and context for the performance of acts of virtue in a business setting. KEYWORDS: advantage, character, friendship, good will, virtue

In a recent article in the Business Ethics Quarterly,1 Charles Horvath argues for the suitability of the Aristotelian notion of virtue or excellence as a paradigm for doing business ethics, indeed for ending the ‘crisis’ in business ethics and

Dr. Mary C. Sommers is Associate Professor of Ethics and Director of the Honors Program at the University of St. Thomas in Houston, TX. She did her graduate work at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies and the University of Toronto. She has published articles on ethics and mediaeval philosophy.

Journal of Business Ethics 16: 1453–1458, 1997. © 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

Mary Catherine Sommers

answering the critics, like Andrew Stark,2 who have taken aim at the limitations of utilitarianism and deontology or, collectively, principle-based ethics. He reads Aristotle into business ethics, as do many others, through Alasdair MacIntyre’s studies of western ethical traditions. Among the difficulties arising from Horvath’s suggestion is that of how virtue is to make its entrance into the workplace. Aristotle, after all, holds that nothing but the well-ordered oikos (household) in the well-regulated polis (city-state) can nurture virtue in the human character. This is not, alas, the contemporary situation, where “relying on everyone’s home rearing or creating a lot of sticks to punish after the fact”, what Laura Nash calls “laissez-faire ethics”, 3 has been inadequate to prevent the erosion of moral standards in business. One can develop a list of virtues which would enable persons in their business life: honesty, integrity, etc.; it is more difficult to suggest how business might be a nursery of virtue. The two classic virtue-contexts, as Horvath notes in his exposition of MacIntyre, are contest and community. Because the possibility of a contest presupposes community, the study of corporations, and organizations in general, as communities is indispensable to understanding them as dispositive to virtue.4 Standing as an exemplar of the connection between virtue and its context is Aristotle’s concept of philia or friendship, the virtue which is a community or the community which is a virtue. Friendship, according to him, “is a virtue, or involves virtue, and besides is most necessary for our life.”5 Friendship is a term with “focal meaning”,6 which denominates relationships as casual as persons travelling together, as permanent as spouses, and whose motives are as various

1454

M. C. Sommers

as the commercial, military, religious, sexual, political, and the virtuous. What can be said of all these relationships is that they involve a solidarity, a concordat, a reciprocity of disposition, which has its foundation in a common field, and which produces common action or exchanges. All friendships tend to equality in the sense that they do not insist on ‘what is due’ as an ultimate end; friendship, like equity, surpasses justice in fulfillment of what is owed. Because friendship fosters solidarity and justice it is politically important as a virtue-context, according to Aristotle. 7 Is it possible that friendship can function as a virtuecontext within economic life as well? A friendship, for Aristotle, is intelligible in terms of the common field which motivates and sustains the relationship and whose disappearance will dissolve it. There are three types of “commons”, because there are three types of attractions: we are drawn to things, to actions, to events, and to persons on account of their promise of utility, pleasure or excellence.8 Persons, however, unlike things (wine, for example), can reciprocate the good-will or affection which arises in us on account of an attraction. Reciprocity is both stimulated by what is held in common and creative of it. Aristotle’s definition of friendship, then, has four parts: [1] “Friends must bear good will and good wishes, [2] they must reciprocate and [3] recognize their good will and good wishes, [4] and they must do so for the sake of their goodness, their usefulness, or their pleasantness.”9 There is necessarily a primary sense or instance of friendship with reference to which the other friendly relationships receive their name on account of similarity. This is the friendship between persons who are really excellent, not just appearing to be so, just on account of that real excellence.10 This friendship has all the characteristics of an excellent relationship: 1) it is based on actualities not appearances; 2) it is based on the highest actualities;11 3) it is, on account of 1 & 2, the most permanent, since the pleasant and advantageous are more subject to change than excellence; 4) it is ‘personal’, since it is based on what the friend is, rather than some-

thing incidental;12 5) what is given is the same as what is received, and so it satisfies the expectations of the friends; 6) it is a relation between equals;13 7) Further, these characteristics are all reflective of the self-love with which the good regard themselves.14 All other relationships will be termed friendly insofar as they possess one or more of these characteristics to some degree.15 John Cooper’s terminology for the three types of relationship conveys Aristotle’s meaning quite well: the primary instance of friendship is the characterfriendship, the secondary instances are advantage friendships and pleasure-friendships.16 As in other instances in Aristotle of focal meaning, the definition of the primary instance is implied in the definitions of the secondary instances, like the definition of ‘medical doctor’ is implied in the definition of ‘medical instrument’, but not vice-versa. 17 “Thus characterfriends are both pleasant and beneficial to one another, and pleasure-friends, though not necessarily beneficial, are, of course, pleasant to one another, while advantage-friends derive benefits, though perhaps not pleasure, from their association.”18 However, the focal connection of the secondary varieties of friendship to the primary type would seem to demand that those relationships also exhibit good-will pure and simple. “To a friend . . . you must wish goods for his own sake.”19 While it is clear that, between characterfriends, well-wishing is for the other person’s sake, it could be argued that in pleasure- and advantage-friendships one wishes one’s friend well for one’s own sake, or, in order to get pleasure or advantage for oneself. If this is so, it is difficult to see how pleasure- or advantagefriendships could serve as virtue-contexts, as character-friendships certainly do. Further, it is unclear that these secondary friendships are really friendships at all. It is not surprising, then, that in both the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle struggles to determine the exact nature of profitable or advantageous relationships. He distinguishes these relationships into two types: those which are nomike, governed by law or rules; those which are ethike, governed by the expectation of moral behaviour. The dilemma is this: while the

Useful Friendships rule-governed type, characterized by explicitly agreed-upon exchanges of services, etc., certainly fits the model of a profitable relationship, it is hard to see how the parties involved can be called “friends”, since it is not clear that any “goodwill” need be present; on the other hand, relationships in which the parties expect each other to show character or follow standards in their common business, while clearly “friendly”, seem somehow to have exceeded the boundaries of the advantageous relationship. In fact, it might be claimed that the very notion of a moral or character-based advantage-friendship is “unnatural” or that parties to relationships of this kind are “confused” about their own motives.20 But if community is the primary context in which moral virtue is nurtured, and business communities are, by definition, ‘advantageous’ or ‘for-profit’, then Aristotle’s strange hybrid, the advantage-friendship which operates through expectation of moral behaviour, offers a structure within which virtue might develop. If this is a distinct type of relationship and not simply an instance of trying to have your cake and eat it too, then it can be a real friendship and, so, dispositive to virtue. What will make it a real friendship? First of all, it is important to establish that not all profitable relationships are friendships. Partners in such relationships share activities and goals, they may have established roles and responsibilities within this shared experience; each might recognize the other and their relationship as ‘advantageous’. Without reciprocated, recognized good-will, however, there is no ‘friendship’ in the Aristotelian sense. However, Aristotle does mean to say that good-will exists in some advantage-friendships. While it is possible to interpret him as holding that good-will in the case of advantage-friendships is selfish, this is not consistent with his definition of eunoia [good-will] or his overall use of the term.21 When Aristotle says that advantage-friends wish each other well because of advantage, he does not mean that they do not wish each other well for the other’s sake, but that it is the other as advantageous that excites the well-wishing.22 In all profitable relationships, one wishes the other partner to be profitable; in a

1455

profitable friendship, one wishes the other to be profitable for his own sake as well as for one’s own. According to Cooper, this make the motive for friendship “at least as much retrospective as prospective; the well-wishing and well-doing are responses to what the person is and has done rather than merely the expression of a hope as to what he will be and may do in the future . . . .”23 Advantage-friendships, then, are distinguishable from both other profitable relationships and from other types of friendship whose ground and motivation is not profit, but pleasure or character. These distinctions can be illuminated by examining a simple business transaction between two persons: four different reciprocity structures suggest four types of relationship could exist between the parties. (1) The first would be that no return for money or services would be asked or expected: this would be the hallmark of character-friendships, which produce advantages for the partners, but are not based on advantage. (2) The second would be a reciprocity governed by explicit agreements, where neither the terms nor the execution of the agreement are influenced by good-will between the parties. This is clearly an advantage-relationship, but is ‘friendly’ only in the sense that it is an association into which the persons have entered knowing or believing it to be to their mutual profit; it is merely nonexploitative. (3) The third would be a reciprocity based on explicit agreement, but where the execution of the agreement could be influenced by good-will, modest concessions or postponements, etc. Few would argue that this was not still essentially an advantage-relationship.24 (4) Lastly, there is a reciprocity which is not substantially governed by explicit agreements, but where a return for money or services is expected, because each trusts the other to honor the basic nature of the relationship, which has been set up for mutual advantage or profit. While relationships and advantageous transactions of the first kind are clearly possible and desirable within a corporate setting, they could not be normative. The parameters of such character-friendships: persons of moral virtue, roughly equal in status and talents, wishing to share everything and spend their time together,

1456

M. C. Sommers

make them uncommon; and their connection with business matters is accidental. They are essentially about something else. Relationships of the second and third kinds could encourage virtue to the extent that the laws, rules or professional standards to which they conform are just, or to the extent that performing the agreed upon exchanges requires courage, temperance, etc. These virtues, however, are neither the end nor the ordinary means involved in this type of profitable relationship. Relationships of the fourth kind, however, which are essentially advantage-oriented, nevertheless require virtue as a means. This is what makes them friendships. There are clearly differences between the character-friendships, which are in themselves virtues, since virtue is both the purpose for which the relationship exists and the means by which it is sustained, and the advantage-friendships where virtue, along with other means, sustain profitable relationships. However, in this kind of advantageous relationship, mutual good-will promotes choices which recognize the ‘other’ as person; and good choices make good habits. One examines the reciprocity or exchange for what is owed to the other person (the right thing) and, then, one fulfills one’s obligations out of a sense that the other person expects it, or, better, has a right to expect it (right reasons). Further, one begins to relax one’s own just claims: one initiates, or agrees to, acts, which are more than what is owed, out of goodwill to the other and out of a desire that the relationship should continue and that both partners should profit. Upon examination, then, the advantagefriendship which functions through expectation of moral behaviour can be seen to exhibit those marks mentioned above25 of the primary sense of friendship, which is character-friendship: 1) It is based on actualities not appearances. Any relationship could operate mistakenly through the appearance of character or the appearance of profitability. 26 Cooper is right, however, to point out the retrospective quality of the motivation involved in any type of friendship. A partner in an advantage-friendship may reason: ‘She has always reciprocated our consulting services with equipment orders, so I can offer such services with confidence in the future’.

Reflection on past experience goes some way in ensuring that one is working within a context of mutual well-wishing for the sake of profitability. 2) To be sure, this type of advantage-friendship is not based on the highest actualities. It does not exist for the sake of virtue or character, but it requires character or at least qualities and actions which are conducive to virtue. 3) The advantage-friendship has, on account of 1 and 2, a certain stability, if not the permanence, which character-friendships exhibit. One of the weaknesses which this kind of relationship suffers under is that clearly what is ‘advantageous’ or ‘profitable’ is subject to change, while virtue or excellence has a greater cultural toughness. Yet, since this type of profitable relationship gets its special character from its expectation of virtuous acts, e.g., of loyalty, generosity, etc. it can acquire the stability needed to nurture excellence. 4) The advantage-friendship is also ‘personal’, since it is acknowledges and depends upon what the friend is. There are limits, certainly, to the personal quality of these relationships, the same as the limits to the good-will which characterizes them. One wishes an advantage-friend well as possessing qualities, as engaging in activities which one recognizes as profitable. One need not acknowledge or appreciate every aspect of the other person to have genuine good-will; nor ought these relationships be despised because of their admitted limits. 5) Further, what is given in the advantagefriendship is the same as what is received, and so it satisfies the expectations of the friends. What friends expect is that each should wish the other’s prosperity and promote it actively within the context of their dealings with each other. What each desires is a stable relationship of mutual advantage, where advantage depends upon the good moral character of each partner and the confidence of each in the character of the other. 6) This type of friendship is, as well, a relation between equals in some meaningful sense. While these friendships would flourish most easily between co-workers or members of the same profession, they can also exist between profes-

Useful Friendships sionals and clients, suppliers and customers, managers and subordinates, etc. where measures of equality might be more difficult to apply. What is crucial is that, in the pattern of exchange of services or benefits, there is a mutual recognition that the advantage of each is partly a function of the other’s personal excellences and endeavors. 7) Finally, the advantage-friendship which functions through expectation of virtue is a relationship which is reflexive of good, imitable characteristics and acts. In other words, we become conscious of our own talents and excellences through these friendships and we find models of professional behaviour as well. According to Aristotle the highest form of justice is friendly.27 Within the political community, to the extent that the citizens are friendly, the demands of justice are more easily and willingly met. Analogously, the ethical demands of the workplace are less strenuous to fulfill insofar as the employees, managers, suppliers, customers, etc. come together in profitable friendship. The mechanics of such relationships cannot be examined here. However, it is clear that they can emerge out of ordinary business exchanges through the easing and suspension of stringent reciprocity in favor of stable profitable relationships. This involves a recognition of the existential and moral priority of human agents to their business actions. In response, one acknowledges and cultivates the person whose talents, experiences and goals make them advantageous within the business context. This friendliness or goodwill provides both motive and context for the expectation and performance of acts of virtue. Notes 1

Charles M. Horvath: 1995, ‘Excellence v. Effectiveness: MacIntyre’s Critique of Business’, Business Ethics Quarterly 5, pp. 499–532. 2 Andrew Stark: 1993, ‘What’s the Matter with Business Ethics?’, Harvard Business Review, May/June, pp. 38–48. 3 Laura L. Nash: 1993, Good Intentions Aside: A Manager’s Guide to Resolving Ethical Problems (Harvard Business School Press, Boston), p. 17.

4

1457

Robert Solomon affirms the same priority when he remarks that “Competition may be the theoretical basis of the marketplace, but friendship is a far more substantial foundation for much of what goes on in business life.” 1994, Above the Bottom Line: An Introduction to Business Ethics (Harcourt Brace, Forth Worth, Philadelphia, etc.), p. 468. 5 Aristotle, 1985: Nicomachean Ethics VIII, 1, 1155a3–5; trans. by, Terence Irwin (Hackett Publishing Co., Indianapolis). 6 v. Joseph Owens: 1989, ‘An Ambiguity in Aristotle, EE VII 2 1236a23–24’, Apeiron 22, pp. 127–137. Focal connection exists where multiple usages of a term are intelligible with reference to one of those usages, taken as primary, e.g. ‘A low-fat diet is healthy’, ‘Having a yearly medical check-up is healthy’, etc. are intelligible in terms of a primary usage ‘The organism is healthy.’ 7 NE VIII, 1, 1155a26–31. 8 The immediate source of the triadic pattern of friendship in VIII, 2, 3 is Plato’s Lysis. 9 Paul Schollmeier: 1994, Other Selves: Aristotle on Personal and Political Friendship (SUNY Press, Albany), p. 35. 10 NE VIII, 3, 1156b6–7. 11 For 1&2, v. NE VIII, 3, 1156b21–25; cf. 2, 1155b21–27. 12 For 3&4, v. NE VIII, 4, 1156b9–12. 13 For 5&6, v. NE VIII, 6, 1158b1–6, where Aristotle argues for the similarity of advantage- and pleasure-friendships to the primary instance on these grounds. 14 NE IX, 4, 1166a10–33. 15 NE VIII, 4, 1157a29–32. 16 John M. Cooper: 1980, ‘Aristotle on Friendship’, in Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics (University of California), pp. 301–340. 17 Eudemian Ethics 7, 2, 1236a15–35. 18 Cooper, p. 309; v. NE VIII, 4, 1156b35– 1157a3; 3, 1156a27–28. 19 NE VIII, 2, 1155b31. 20 A. W. Price: 1989, Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle (Clarendon Press, Oxford), p. 156. 21 Cooper, p. 310. “Aristotle’s use of the word elsewhere seems to show that he always understands by it ‘well-wishing for the other person’s sake.’ There is no doubt that this is how eunoia is understood in his official account of it in the NE 9.5, and in the corresponding passage of the EE 7.7 (1241a1–14) Aristotle actually denies that eunoia exists in pleasureand advantage-friendships at all, precisely on the ground that ‘if one wishes for someone what is good because he is useful to oneself, one would not wish

1458

M. C. Sommers

this for his sake but for one’s own, while eunoia is for the sake not of the well-wisher himself but for that of the person to whom one wishes well.’ ” (1241a5–8) 22 Cooper, p. 312. 23 Cooper, p. 311. 24 This corresponds to Aristotle’s rule-governed advantage-friendship. 25 v. supra p. 2. 26 Price claims that in all advantage-friendships which operate through expectation of moral behavior there is only a “pretence” of moral behavior, and so only a “pretence” of friendship. One partner is mistaken about the motives of the other and the other is, at least unconsciously, deceptive. This leads to the conclusion “that the moral friendship of utility is ‘unnatural’.” op. cit., p. 156. His proof for this lies in a misreading of NE 1163a1–6, where Aristotle makes the general point that we may be mistaken about who is a friend, since another person may have been unwilling to enter a relationship with us, or to enter it on the terms we understand. This remark is not limited to advantage-friendships. So, this text does not serve to prove that Aristotle’s designation of the moral advantage-friendship as ‘unnatural’ in the Eudemian Ethics is repeated in the Nicomachean Ethics. 27 NE VIII, 1, 1155a28.

References Aristotle.: 1985, Nichomachean Ethics, VIII, 1 (trans. Terence Irwin. Hackett Publishing Co., Indianapolis), 1155a3–5. Cooper, John M.: 1980, ‘Aristotle on Friendship’, in Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics (University of California), pp. 301–340. Horvath, Charles.: 1995, ‘Excellence v. Effectiveness: MacIntyre’s Critiquie of Business’, Business Ethics Quarterly 5, pp. 499–532. Nash, Laura L.: 1993, Good Intentions Aside: A Manager’s Guide to Resolving Ethical Problems (Harvard Business School Press, Boston). Owens, Joseph.: 1989, ‘An Ambiguity in Aristotle, EE VII 2 1236a23–24’, Apeiron 22, pp. 127–137. Price, A. W.: 1989, Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle (Clarendon Press, Oxford). Schollmeier, Paul.: 1994, Other Selves: Aristotle on Personal and Political Friendship (SUNY Press, Albany). Solomon, Robert.: 1994, Above the Bottom Line: An Introduction to Business Ethics (Harcourt Brace, Forth Worth, Philadelphia, etc.). Stark, Andrew.: 1993, ‘What’s the Matter with Business Ethics?’, Harvard Business Review, May/ June, pp. 38–48.

University of St. Thomas, 3800 Montrose Blvd, Houston TU 77006, U.S.A. E-mail: [email protected]