J Ethics DOI 10.1007/s10892-017-9250-4
Why We (Almost Certainly) are Not Moral Equals Stan Husi1
Received: 29 October 2016 / Accepted: 27 February 2017 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017
Abstract Faith in the universal moral equality of people enjoys close to unanimous consensus in present moral and political philosophy. Yet its philosophical justification remains precarious. The search for the basis of equality encounters insurmountable difficulties. Nothing short of a miracle seems required to stabilize universal equality in moral status amidst a vast space of distinctions sprawling between people. The difficulties of stabilizing equality against differentiation are not specific to any particular choice regarding the basis of equality. To show this, I will provide a general diagnosis of the difficulty together with its application to the arguably best attempt at a solution, namely to ground moral equality in a form of subjectivity. In his recent book Equality for Nonegalitarians, George Sher advances the view that ‘‘we are moral equals because we are equally centers of consciousness. …The fact that we are equals in this respect—that each is a world unto himself— …explains why each person’s interests are of equal moral importance’’. Yet the worlds we are unto ourselves can no more withstand the force of differentiation than previous candidates suggested in the literature, and the reasons why run deeper than even some critics have recognized. The prospects for vindicating universal moral equality remain bleak. Keywords Egalitarianism Moral equality Moral rights Moral status
& Stan Husi
[email protected] 1
Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, P.O. Box 413, Milwaukee, WI 53201, USA
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1 Introduction Faith in the moral equality of people enjoys close to unanimous consensus in present moral and political philosophy.1 We habitually reiterate it; we expect morally decent people to endorse it, as the horror of discriminating societies remains vivid in memory as well as, sadly, current observation. As liberals, we choose the moral equality and freedom of individuals as the point of departure for further theorizing. Still, joining a small and not altogether comforting community of skeptics,2 faith in the equality of people strikes me as untenable. The search for the basis of equality, as John Rawls called the project of identifying ‘‘the features of human beings in virtue of which they are to be treated in accordance with the (egalitarian) principles of justice’’ (Carter 2011: 539 in reference to Rawls) encounters insurmountable difficulties. Nothing short of a miracle seems required to stabilize the universal moral equality of people amidst a vast distinction space sprawling between them. No satisfactory answer is forthcoming to the central question of ‘‘why, given the innumerable physical and mental differences that separate people, should we assign them all the same moral status?’’ (Sher 2015: 17) Seeking to establish equal moral status, for instance, via assertions such as ‘‘everyone equally has the power to develop and exercise moral responsibility, to cooperate with others according to principles of justice, to shape and fulfill a conception of their good’’ (Anderson 1999: 321, in reference to Rawls) are blatantly untenable.3 If ‘‘power’’ means capacity, then everyone evidently does not have equal capacities for the development of moral responsibility, cooperation according to principles of justice, and the formation of a conception of the good. As Rawls himself concedes, ‘‘individuals presumably have varying capacities for a sense of justice.’’ (Rawls 1999: 443) The difficulties of stabilizing equality against differentiation are not specific to any particular choice regarding the basis of equality, but generalize widely. People are (almost certainly) not moral equals.4 1
Many philosophers make this observation. Here are a few. ‘‘One of the rare points of agreement among moral and political philosophers is that, despite their innumerable physical and mental differences, all persons have equal moral standing (are moral equals, have the same natural rights, are owed equal concern and respect, etc.).’’ (Sher 2015: 74) ‘‘The principle that all humans are equal is now part of the prevailing political and ethical orthodoxy.’’ (Singer 2011: 16) ‘‘The idea that each person matters equally is at the heart of all plausible political theories.’’ (Kymlicka 2002: 4) And earlier: ‘‘Some theories … deny that each person matters equally. But such theories do not merit serious consideration.’’ (Kymlicka 1989: 40) ‘‘An equal consideration principle … would be accepted by almost everyone (with the exception perhaps of a few extreme racists).’’ (Miller 2007: 28) ‘‘We may therefore say that justice as fairness rests on the assumption of a natural right of all men and women to equality of concern and respect, a right they possess not by virtue of birth or characteristic or merit or excellence, but simply as human beings with the capacity to make plans and give justice.’’ (Dworkin 1997: 182)
2
Kekes (2006) provides useful references to more reputable skeptics, as well as defenders of egalitarianism.
3
‘‘Certainly false’’ is Carter’s verdict. (Carter 2011: 541)
4
As will become increasingly evident subsequently, the probabilistic element in the title of this essay is entirely deliberate. In fact, my overall argument has a decidedly probabilistic character throughout. In my view, the moral inequality of people does not reflect any necessary divisions in human nature or some cosmic rationale, as was customarily supposed in more blatantly anti-egalitarian schemes. There is no deeper rationale preventing people turning out moral equals as a matter of fact. It is just exceedingly unlikely, as I shall argue, and the low probability of universal equality can be ascertained once the totality of factors is fully brought to light needed to conspire to secure such an outcome.
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To show this, I will discuss the arguably best attempt at a solution, namely to ground moral equality in a form of subjectivity. In his recent book Equality for Nonegalitarians, George Sher advances the view that ‘‘we are moral equals because we are equally centers of consciousness.’’ (Sher 2014: 81) He writes: Although no two people have the same combination of abilities, physical traits, and psychological propensities, each is equally a complete and selfcontained center of thoughts, feelings, and experiences. It is, I will argue, precisely the fact that we are equals in this respect – that each is a world unto himself – that best explains why each person’s interests are of equal moral importance. (Sher 2014: 7) Yet the worlds we are unto ourselves exhibit no less cross-personal variation than abilities, traits, and propensities. Even our most inner subjectivity cannot withstand the force of differentiation, or so I will argue. The target of my argument is a specific and foundational version of egalitarianism, or a specific strategy of justifying egalitarian normative principles. Other versions and other justificatory strategies remain largely untouched. The version or strategy at issue traces back to Bernard Williams’ dictum of ‘‘securing a state of affairs in which men are treated as the equal beings which they in fact already are, but are not already treated as being.’’ (Williams 1997: 91, emphasis provided)5 William’s dictum clearly features two levels, pertaining to egalitarian treatment or egalitarian normative principles (such as equality before the law) and to equality in being or status respectively.6 Moreover, as Williams explains, equality in treatment is supposed to reflect, and receive support from, equality in moral status: ‘‘the point of the supposedly factual assertion is to back up social ideals and programmes of political action.’’ (Williams 1997: 92) The egalitarianism singled out by my argument incorporates precisely this structure: affirming the universal equality of people’s moral status in support of some equality in treatment or some normative egalitarian principle.7 My argument contests the soundness of this justificatory strategy by denying that people are moral equals. Since the focus rests on the justificatory strategy of egalitarian normative principles, and not on those principles per se, I will remain mostly silent on the substantive question of how best to construe those principles. Henceforth, I will use the term ‘‘egalitarian principles’’ as a placeholder for the best construal of normative egalitarian principles, their content, currency, (Cf. Sen 1979; Cohen 1989) distributive or relational character, 5
In his Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article, Arneson writes: ‘‘Egalitarian doctrines tend to rest on the background idea that all human persons are equal in fundamental worth or moral status.‘‘ (Arneson 2013: beginning)
6
The preceding sentences in Williams’ article states this explicitly: ‘‘The idea of equality is used in political discussion both in statements of fact—that men are equal—and in statements of political principle or aims—that men should be equal, as at present they are not. The two can be, and often are, combined: the aim is then described as that of securing a state of affairs …’’ (Williams 1997: 91) 7
And lest someone accuses Williams or me of committing some fallacy or other, the view under discussion maintains the justificatory relationship between status-equality and egalitarian principle to be contributory, rather than one of straightforward entailment or something comparatively strong. Statusequality would presumably lend support to egalitarian principles only with the assistance of other normative elements.
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(Cf. Forst 2014) basis in respect or consideration, their all encompassing or merely legalistic ambitions (equality before the law), etc. Philosophers eager to justify normative egalitarian principles must look elsewhere, and my argument does not preclude that they will not find what they are looking for.8 Some even consider the foundational strategy together with the quest for a basis of equality misguided from the very start. ‘‘Equality is a moral idea, not an assertion of fact,’’ writes Peter Singer, further elaborating: Like it or not we must face the fact that humans come in different shapes and sizes; they come with different moral capacities, different intellectual abilities, different amounts of benevolent feeling and sensitivity to the needs of others, different abilities to communicate effectively, and different capacities to experience pleasure and pain. In short, if the demand for equality were based on the actual equality of all human beings, we would have to stop demanding equality. … The principle of the equality of human beings is not a description of an alleged actual equality among humans: it is a prescription of how we should treat human beings. (Singer 1990: 3–7) In a sense, it is hard to disagree with Singer.9 His critical diagnosis of ‘‘factual’’ equality matches the argument of this essay.10 And regarding the idea of equality, there surely is a moral or normative version of it that is plainly not factual. A demand such as ‘‘everyone ought to receive equal protection before the law’’ or we 8
Cf. Hare (1981: ch. 3); Arneson (2015: 37–39); Rozeboom (2017). This includes Carter’s idea of opacity respect. (Carter 2011) Carter writes: ‘‘in order to respect persons we need to treat them as ‘opaque’, paying attention only to their outward features as agents.’’ (Carter 2011: 539) Whether respect does require opacity is unclear; it seems to conflict with the common assertion that respect requires not to exclusively fixate on outward features of persons but rather a genuine effort at attaining a more intimate understanding of them, as in Williams injunction that ‘‘each man is owed an effort of identification: that he should not be regarded as the surface to which a certain label can be applied, but one should try to see the world … from his point of view’’ and ‘‘one should respect and try to understand another man’s consciousness of his own activities.’’ (Williams 1997: 95) And truly appreciating where people are coming from is impossible in the absence of a clear sense of their characters, capacities, concerns, etc., precisely what Carter wishes to protect from judgment. Yet even if respect did require opacity, this would hardly settle the question about equality in moral status, but rather demand an agnostic attitude towards it. We presumably cannot, nay even may not, make such a determination. And a fortiori the reason why opacity is required cannot reside in any careful diagnosis of equality in moral status, as such a diagnosis would clearly violate ‘‘evaluative abstinence,’’ but must come from somewhere else. Thus, I share Arneson (2015) and Sher (2015) impression that Carter is sidestepping rather than resolving the problems facing the attempt to find a basis for equality.
9
But not completely. First, as I explicitly stated, the arguable collapse of one basis for egalitarian demands does not entail the unavailability of other bases. Second, the question of whether we should stop or continue demanding equality is a paradigmatically practical one, concerning the propriety of demanding equality, which inevitably depends on a plurality of factors beyond status-equality. In highly discriminatory societies, demanding greater equality might be the only effective way to rectify egregious injustices, and this could be so even if status-parity turned out untenable.
10 In his Practical Ethics, Singer adds: ‘‘The plain fact is that humans differ, and the differences apply to so many characteristics that the search for a factual basis on which to erect the principle of equality seems hopeless.’’ (Singer 2011: 17) And in his response to Arneson’s critical discussion, he writes ‘‘I am … delighted that Arneson’s search for a resolution of ‘the Singer Problem’ fails to achieve its goal.’’ (Singer 1999: 295) As Singer holds the ethically orthodox principle of human equality to be normative, his affirmation of it (or of animal equality) and his rejection of its factual basis are consistent.
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ought to ‘‘give equal weight in our moral deliberation to the like interests of all those affected by our actions’’ (Singer 2011: 20) obviously states a principle and not a fact. But the implicit critique of foundational egalitarianism is dialectically ill conceived. Foundational egalitarianism by no means fails to take note of a level of moral egalitarian idea, normative principles, demand or treatment, but recognizes it explicitly. Williams’ dictum betrays no basic confusion of principle with fact, but rather postulates a justificatory relationship between what he calls ‘‘the practical maxim of equality’’ and ‘‘the factual statement of men’s equality.’’ It is fine for Singer to give up on this justificatory approach, but the observation that egalitarian principles are prescriptive rather than descriptive does not show the approach misguided, let alone the request for justification of egalitarian principles to be obsolete. The question remains of what else to base the demand for equality on if not some ‘‘factual’’ equality.11 Paraphrasing Richard Rorty, to simply ‘‘abandon metaphysical accounts of what a right is while nevertheless insisting that everywhere, in all times and cultures, members of our species have had the same rights,’’ (Rorty 1991: 176) will not quite do.12 Of course, not every philosopher concedes the need for justification for egalitarian principles. Egalitarian slogans have gained so much the status of commonplaces that questions about their justification are rarely asked, much less answered, and occasionally even considered flat-out misguided. Isaiah Berlin remarked that ‘‘no reason need to be given … for an equal distribution of benefits— for that is ‘natural’, self-evidently right and just, and needs no justification.’’ (Berlin 1978: 83–84) This is a puzzling statement for several reasons. For one, the goal of 11
Could Singer retort that the allegedly ‘‘factual’’ claim itself is normative in character, that there is nothing in the area of equality that is not normative all the way down? In a posthumously published and unfinished article, Cohen has suggested that ‘‘we can distinguish between the view that you regard [other people] as equal to you because that is how you wish to treat them, where the goal is primary, and the standard view that you treat them as equals because you regard them as equals, which is the view that prompts the wild-goose chase for defining characteristics.’’ Accordingly, Cohen explains, ‘‘if my wife and I treat each other as equals, that is not because of some features common to us that we perceive, but rather it is because of the nature of the relationship that we seek, and value.’’ (Cohen 2013: 194) Relatedly, proposing a pragmatic foundation for egalitarian assumptions, Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote ‘‘that the dogma of equality applied … to individuals only within the limits of ordinary dealings in the common run of affairs. You cannot argue with your neighbor, except on the admission for the moment that he is as wise as you, although you may by no means believe it. … [And] you cannot deal with him … except on the footing of equal treatment, and the same rules for both.’’ (Holmes 2009: 41–42) For reasons of space I cannot adequately discuss the intriguing possibilities raised by Cohen and Holmes suggestions. Much would hinge on the details of the goal-based alternative. Ultimately, a normative or pragmatic approach would seem rather orthogonal to the present discussion. Rather than coming to the aid of the proposition that people are moral equals, it would seem to lead us in a different direction entirely. I briefly comment on a fictionalist rendition in the next section. 12 Moreover, as Sher convincingly argues, Singer too must accept some factual basis for equality: ‘‘Singer’s suggestion threatens to prove too much. If the empirical differences between persons and cows do not prevent cows from having the same moral status as persons, then the empirical differences between persons and cows on the one hand and trees and rocks on the other will not prevent trees and rocks from having the same moral status either. Singer, recognizing the threat, attempted to defuse it by pointing out that humans and cows are sentient, and thus have an interest in avoiding suffering, while trees and rocks are not and do not. However, this response, though eminently sensible, completely guts Singer’s proposal. If sentience, an empirical property, can be relevant to a being’s moral standing, there is no reason why other empirical properties may not be relevant too.’’ (Sher 2014: 75)
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reaching an allegedly ‘‘natural’’ distribution of benefits can easily be recruited to buttress drastic social interventions; it can easily come into conflict with other worthy goals, such as respecting free choices despite their tendency to upset egalitarian patterns, the pursuit of maximal social welfare, and many others. This quite naturally leads one to ask why we ought to adopt such a goal, or why we ought to place considerable weight on it in the first place. We better not do so as a result of being ‘‘consumed with egalitarian bitterness or envy’’13 or of being in the grip of some quasi-aesthetic fetish of social symmetries.14 Perhaps we should stress more the self-evidence and less the no justification component in Berlin’s statement. Perhaps egalitarian principles fall out of the most basic ethical principles regarding consistency or supervenience, such as, in Henry Sidgwick’s formulation, ‘‘it must be reasonable to treat any one man in the same way as any other, if there be no reason apparent for treating him differently.’’ (Sidgwick 1981: 417) Indeed, Berlin writes that ‘‘there is a principle of which the egalitarian formula is a specific application: namely that similar cases call for, i.e. should be accorded, similar treatment.’’ (Berlin 1978: 82) Unfortunately, this does not work. Similar (or equal) cases call for similar (or equal) treatment only under the proviso that they are indeed similar (or equal) cases, and this is precisely the point under contention.15 In conjunction with the substantive assumption of universal equality in moral status the quasi-formal principles Berlin and Sidgwick mention may indeed support substantive egalitarian principles, illustrating how the matter of ‘‘factual’’ equality in moral status can come to have substantive normative implications. But it also illustrates how principles of consistency and superveniece alone cannot complete the egalitarian program.16 Thus, it would seem rather premature to foreclose right away upon Williams’ very intuitive thought, namely that egalitarian treatment is fitting due to its reflection of a deeper equality in status, a thought of continual appeal. Thomas Nagel, for instance, puts it beautifully: If everyone matters just as much as everyone else, it is appalling that the most effective social systems we have been able to devise permit so many people to 13 Paraphrasing from Irving Kristol’s famous (Kristol 1972) polemic. It did not help placating the conservative suspicion that egalitarianism is driven by envy that Ronald Dworkin explicitly introduced ‘‘the envy test’’ into his conception of The Sovereign Virtue (Dworkin 2000), prompting conservatives to remark on ‘‘how extraordinary it is to elevate envy into the criterion of justice.’’ (Kekes 2001: 106) Yet to be fair, many progressive commentators balked at basing egalitarian concerns on envy, including Rawls, who dedicated an entire section on the ‘‘Problem of Envy,’’ in which he declared: ‘‘A rational individual is not subject to envy’’ (1999: 464). And Stanley Benn wrote: ‘‘Objections to a practice based purely on envy … would not be admissible, because avoiding the pangs of envy would not be an interest of a rational, prudent man.’’ (Benn 1997: 117) 14 Williams cautions against being ‘‘gratuitously egalitarian, aiming at equal treatment for reasons, for instance, of simplicity or tidiness.’’ (Williams1997: 92) 15 Aristotle is famously credited with the formal principle that equals must be treated equally, and unequals must be treated unequally, extrapolating from his statement in the Nichomachean Ethics (1131a) that ‘‘complaints arise either when equals receive unequal shares in an allocation, or unequals receive equal shares.’’ Aristotle 2004: 86 16 Louis Pojman dryly remarks: ‘‘inegalitarians simply claim that there is a good reason for unequal treatment of human beings. They are of unequal worth.’’ (Pojman 1997a: 283)
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be born into conditions of harsh deprivation which crush their prospects for leading a decent life, while many others are well provided for from birth. (Nagel 1991: 64) The view that all people are moral equals is entirely deserving of the ingenious attempts at a vindication that so many philosophers have dedicated towards it. A successful vindication would be occasion for celebration. Yet if the argument of this essay succeeds, the task has not been accomplished, and we might have to resolve ourselves to getting less than we were hoping for.
2 Cautionary Remarks Begin with some cautionary remarks. The argument of this essay in no way contests or downplays the wrongness of past and present discrimination, exclusion and oppression, nor the irrelevancy of attributes commonly employed to rationalize such injustices. Nor does it downplay the crucial role the egalitarian ethos propagated from the enlightenment onward has played in combating discrimination, exclusion and oppression. Insisting on the equality of women and men, blacks and whites, homosexuals and heterosexuals, the elderly and the young is the proper response to the horrors of chauvinist, racist, and otherwise discriminating societies. Gender, race, sexual orientation, and age are simply irrelevant for moral status. Yet after stating a very similar point, Singer explains why it nonetheless does not fully placate his concerns: Although, it may be said, humans differ as individuals, there are no differences between the races and sexes as such. From the mere fact that a person is black or a woman we cannot infer anything about that person’s intellectual or moral capacities. This, it may be said, is why racism and sexism are wrong. … The existence of individual variations that cut across the lines of race or sex, however, provides us with no defense at all against a more sophisticated opponent of equality, one who proposes that, say, the interests of all those with IQ scores below 100 be given less consideration than the interests of those with ratings over 100. Perhaps those scoring below the mark would, in this society, be made the slaves of those scoring higher. (Singer 1990: 3) This prompts the troubling question of whether the denial of moral equality would not after all pave the way towards discrimination, exclusion and oppression, albeit in more ‘‘sophisticated’’ guise.17 Must we thus insist without any compromise on an egalitarian ethos to safeguard against enslavement at the hands of some moral nobility? Is the strict presumption of moral equality the only way to hold the line, permitting no relaxation lest evil seeps back in? If so, then unwavering support of 17
Setting aside the unpromising nature of the particular idea that IQ scores ground moral status. On this matter, Kant seemed to have gotten it exactly right in the famous opening remarks of his Groundwork (Ak 4: 393): ‘‘Understanding, wit, the power of judgment, and like talents of the mind, … are without doubt in some respects good and to be wished for; but they can also become extremely evil and harmful, if the will that is to make use of these gifts of nature, and whose peculiar constitution is therefore called character, is not good.’’ (Kant 2002: 9) Ted Bundy’s elevated IQ score hardly translated into his elevated moral status or dignity, but, if anything, only facilitated the corruption of his dignity.
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the egalitarian ethos might become morally required. The indispensable moral function of the egalitarian ethos cannot establish its truth or accuracy, of course, but it might mandate that those still plagued by doubts occupy a fictionalist stance towards it, propagating what would appear to them a noble lie. Yet philosophically, even if not rhetorically, Singer’s concern seems unfounded. The denial of moral status equality does not justify let alone call for discrimination, exclusion or oppression. It undercuts one justificatory avenue to egalitarian principles leaving others untouched. Yet even if those egalitarian principles solely depended upon status equality, the affirmation of status inequality would be entirely consistent with the recognition of robust moral rights blocking discrimination, exclusion, and oppression.18 If the Dalai Lama were to emerge the individual with the most elevated moral status alive, this would give him no license to mistreat, disrespect, let alone enslave, anyone else. He may simply not violate the rights of those of less elevated status. Interestingly, Singer quotes from a letter of Thomas Jefferson’s who therein disputes, albeit rather hypocritically, the justifiability of enslaving blacks on account of their alleged inequality: ‘‘but whatever be their degree of talent it is no measure of their rights. Because Sir Isaac Newton was superior to others in understanding, he was not therefore lord of the property or persons of others.’’19 (Singer 1990: 6) Perhaps it is too late to expose the fallacious attempt to rest mistreatment upon presumed inequality. Yet especially for animal rights advocates the dissociation of rights and equality may actually aid their case. Singer’s call for animal liberation is not thwarted by animal inequality. Even if not every animal is equal, cruelty to any animal is wrong.20 Those complicit in animal cruelty would have to cease citing various inequalities as justification. Nor must all animals enjoy exactly the same rights to enjoy robust rights. The right of a dog against cruel mistreatment is not diminished by the fact that humans enjoy additional rights, such as the rights associated with free speech and the exercise of religion, rights a dog cannot have for obvious reasons.21 Although I will argue at great length that meeting certain thresholds (sentience, rationality, subjectivity, etc.) cannot establish equality, what I will call the threshold-strategy seems entirely adequate to establish moral restrictions, claims or rights. Without forecasting the larger argument, the reason why the strategy works for rights but not for equality is simple: equality is inherently comparative, but rights are not. Whether one individual or animal is equal to another depends upon how they compare, but whether one has rights or claims against another does not.22 18 A more skeptical position on the separation of moral rights and moral equality is presented in Pojman (1992). 19
Jefferson’s letter is to Henry Gregoire from February 1809.
20
Regan (2004) is the classic case for animal rights.
21
Steinhoff makes a very similar point in Steinhoff (Steinhoff 2015a: 155–158), aptly criticizing many theorists of rights who focus on only one or a limited set of principles or rationales grounding rights or moral status at the exclusion of other candidate sets of rights or moral status, paying insufficient attention to the possibility that whatever equalization in rights or moral status is accomplished through principles ABC might be compromised through principles DEF. 22 I thus disagree with Arneson’s characterization of ‘‘the basic equality idea’’ when he writes: ‘‘Put vaguely the idea … is that each person just in virtue of qualifying for personhood status possesses certain substantial moral rights.’’ (Arneson 2015: 31) Again, we should separate the non-comparative (and true) claim that persons possess certain rights simply in virtue of their personhood from the comparative (and false) claim that all persons are moral equals. That these issues can be separated is implicitly or explicitly
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Meeting a critical threshold may lock in rights, but it cannot lock in equality. We may speak of every animal equally having a right against cruel mistreatment, but this language uneasily conjoins inherently comparative and non-comparative elements. We can also speak of every person equally having a nose, but having a nose is not a comparative affair.23 The second cautionary point is that the denial of equality in moral status in no way entails a lack of concern for, let alone an embrace of, various current inequalities, such as rising economic inequalities.24 Economists such as Thomas Piketty have helped us gain a better understanding and appreciation of present trends towards inordinate inequalities in income and especially in wealth.25 We’re reaching fast the inegalitarian apogee of the Gilded Age or Belle E´poque, with a tiny portion of society controlling most of the wealth.26 In Simon Blackburn’s vivid depiction, ‘‘Four hundred people control the same amount of wealth as the poorer half of the nation. To put this last figure in perspective: each of those 400 has wealth equivalent to that of nearly 400,000 fellow citizens: enough to fill five of the largest football stadiums.’’ (Blackburn 2014: 98) To this portrayal of intra-national inequality, Oxfam adds a recent 2016 report on global inequality27: ‘‘The richest 1% now have more wealth than the rest of the world combined’’ and ‘‘in 2015, just 62 Footnote 22 continued denied by many, for instance by Jeremy Waldron who writes ‘‘the general assumption … that the idea of rights involves a commitment to equality and that it is profoundly antithetical to racist and sexist conceptions of human value is now beyond dispute.’’ (Waldron 2007: 752) Yet the unquestioned entanglement of rights with equality and equality with the rejection of racism and sexism does not aid moral analysis. If rights and equality differ structurally in their comparative presuppositions, then such an entanglement at least requires an argument. (Steinhoff 2015a: 153–154) 23 It merely entails a universal claim. Yet there is a second respect in which the popular language of ‘‘equal rights’’ is infelicitous. For instance, Allen Buchanan writes: ‘‘To ascribe a set of rights to all persons, regardless of their membership in this or that group … is in itself a recognition of equal status.’’ (Buchanan 2010: 685) But this statement characteristically blurs the distinction between ‘‘there are some rights everyone possesses’’ and ‘‘everyone possesses the same rights.’’ The proposition that certain rights are held by anyone (or ascribed to everyone) is fully compatible with the proposition that not everyone has equal (=exactly the same) rights, as some rights may be held by anyone while others may not. My example of the dog illustrates the point. For another one, Steinhoff imagines an unjust attacker set to kill his innocent victim. The victim has the right to kill the attacker (in self-defense), but the attacker does not have the right to kill the victim. (Steinhoff 2015a: 152) Moreover, as Steinhoff points out, even the proposition that everyone has exactly the same rights could fall short of securing any robust egalitarianism. Suppose the one and only right held by everyone is to enslave the vanquished (or against enslavement without a fight). The resulting slaveholding society would hardly satisfy egalitarian sentiments. As Steinhoff correctly notes, in addition to the strict universality of any right held by anyone, the rights would need to have certain contents. (Steinhoff 2015a: 154) 24 Harry Frankfurt stresses the same point: ‘‘I categorically reject the presumption that egalitarianism … is an ideal of any intrinsic moral importance. This emphatically does not mean that I am inclined generally to endorse or to be indifferent to prevailing inequalities, or that I oppose efforts to eliminate or to ameliorate them. In fact, I support many such efforts. What leads me to support them … is a more contingent and pragmatically grounded belief that in many circumstances greater equality … would facilitate the pursuit of other socially or politically desirable results.’’ (Frankfurt 2015: 65–66) 25
Cf. Piketty (2014).
26
Cf. Piketty (2014).
27
https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/bp210-economy-one-percent-taxhavens-180116-en_0.pdf.
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individuals had the same wealth as 3.6 billion people—the bottom half of humanity.’’28 Such excessive inequalities are surely problematic for societies, especially democratic societies, as well as an increasingly globalized world. Its adverse effects include the concentration of power and influence; the capture of the political process; the reshaping of our institutions to serve the privileged few, becoming less inclusive and more extractive;29 the institutional repatrimonialization and political decay30; social stratification and unrest; choked social mobility; etc. etc. As the late Milton Friedman wrote: [The] greatest problem facing our country is the breaking down into two classes, those who have and those who have not … We really cannot remain a democratic, open society that is divided into two classes. In the long run, that’s the greatest single danger. And the only way I see to resolve that problem is to improve the quality of education.’’ (Friedman 2012: xii) If Milton Friedman starts to worry about economic inequality, something is up.
3 Moral Status and its Ground Let’s turn to our dialectical situation, naming the opposing views first: Status-parity: All persons enjoy the same moral status.31 Formally: (Vx)(Vy) {[Person x & Person y] . [moral status(x) = moral status(y)]}. Status-disparity: Not all persons enjoy the same moral status. Formally: (Ax)(Ay) {[Person x & Person y] & [moral status(x) = moral status(y)]}. Status-parity and disparity present mirror images of each other. What separates them semantically is not. They thus share essentially the same conceptual liabilities, namely the availability of an intelligible and morally significant notion of moral status supplying a basis for comparison. The shared nature of this liability is not always fully recognized. A common reaction to the disparity thesis is a hyperdifferentiating attitude towards the notion of moral status: ‘‘What exactly is the sense in which people are supposedly not equal? Surely the fact that they are not equal in various respects, and are accordingly to be treated differently in certain ways, is beside the point. Every egalitarian would concede as much. Law-abiding citizens properly receive different treatment than criminals. So in what sense does
28
Both statements are in the opening of the report.
29
Cf. Acemoglu and Robinson (2013).
30
Cf. Fukuyama (2014).
31
In the essay, I ignore another source of possible variation in moral status, the variation across different temporal stages of a person’s life, proceeding with the simpler model of moral status being temporally invariant. This model, though commonly presupposed, is vulnerable to a similar argument as the one presented against status-parity. (Cf. Wittwer 2015)
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disparity challenge moral equality?’’32 The answer is, of course, in precisely the sense in which status-parity asserts it. It is dialectically disingenuous to press whatever difficulties may arise for specifying such a sense unilaterally against the disparity thesis, as if it was not just as much an issue for parity. The willingness of many philosophers to cut the parity thesis some slack cannot save it from confronting the very same conceptual difficulties and the need to specify a sense of moral status in regard to which people supposedly compare universally as equals.33 Not all philosophers acknowledge the availability of an intelligible and morally significant notion of moral status. Those who do not may have little stake in this debate, and may regard it even a pseudo-debate. This may be true of many pure consequentialists who mostly are preoccupied with the less controversial notion of moral interests.34 Whether abandoning the notion of moral status altogether would retain our ability to accommodate many central ethical convictions would have to be seen. For instance, there is the immensely plausible thought that it is in virtue of certain mental and agential capacities that people are to be treated differently than rocks and trees, and it is fair to ask how to spell out this thought without running into something equivalent to moral status. The simple point to recognize here is that the notion of moral status plays a role outside the egalitarian debate with correspondingly larger ramifications. While I cannot attempt a full-fledged defense of the centrality of the notion of moral status here, having to resort to providing a serviceable construal momentarily, it is worthwhile to pause and ask how the blank dismissal of the notion of moral status would play out for our present debate, to the extent to which it would not completely annihilate it. Defenders of parity and disparity alike could hope to salvage something from their prior positions even after ditching moral status. How much would depend on 32 For instance, Thomas Christiano writes: ‘‘Basic moral equality holds among persons even when they have done things that make morally relevant distinctions between them. When one person voluntarily acts wrongly, he may come to deserve harsh treatment. That this person deserves harsh treatment and others do not does not imply that he has a lesser basic moral status. … So differential deserts, benefits, and obligations can be compatible with basic equality.’’ (Christiano 2015: 54–55) Fair enough. But then the egalitarian ought avoid getting distracted by orthogonal differences and cut right to the chase and elucidate the relevant respect in which people are presumably moral equals and why. The discussion could then proceed and focus on this, the relevant, egalitarian claim. 33
Cf. Steinhoff (2015a).
34
Consequentialist may chose to join in the talk of moral status and standing, as they have occasionally done with talk about rights, as a fac¸on de parler, tapping into a fashionable idiom to advance an agenda that really has no business with rights or standing. If moral standing just reduces to enjoying moral interests, all attention would correspondingly shift to the assessment of the differential weight of interests, rendering the moral comparison of persons an afterthought at best. While one could still maintain that each person’s interests count equally, the reasons for this would have nothing to do with persons per se or their standing, but just reside in the principle that if interests are all that counts, and if there is no relevant difference between two interests a and b, it is simply arbitrary to prioritize one over the other. Focusing entirely on interests, Singer’s requirement that we ‘‘give equal weight in our moral deliberation to the like interests of all those affected by our actions’’ (Singer 2011: 20) would seem reasonable, until, that is, persons, their projects, relationships and commitments remerge anew. Speaking again of noses, if two noses have the same mass then they have the same ‘‘weight,’’ regardless of what person they happen to be attached to. Their ‘‘equality’’ is entirely extrinsic to the personhood of their hosts, and I believe this is roughly how Singer would think about interests. In sum, as Arneson notes: ‘‘Utilitarians can dispense with a theory of human equality.’’ (Arneson 1999: 117)
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their ambitions. The defender of dis-parity could maintain his denial of moral equality, not in the sense that people are positively unequal but merely in the weaker sense that it is not the case that people are equal. And the defender of parity could maintain that political egalitarians were correct in opposing all the mad supremacists of the past, along with their intrinsic superiority and inferiority claims; they were correct in opposing oppression in the various forms of marginalization, status-hierarchy, domination, exploitation, and cultural imperialism based on such phony claims.35 But not because people are in fact moral equals. As an analogy, nobody enjoys greater e´lan vital than anyone else, but not because we are all equals in regards to e´lan vital. The adequate response to some would be e´lan vital supremacist is not to insist that actually, all have equal amounts of it. Rather, it is to insist that there’s just nothing against which one can measure up equally or unequally. The supremacist’s claim is literally groundless.36 Stanley Benn has advanced an egalitarian view in this spirit, ‘‘the egalitarian would deny that there is any such criterion [establishing prior claims]; … neither a white skin, male sex, Aryan ancestry, noble birth, nor any other whatsoever, would entitle a man to move to the head of every queue.’’ (Benn 1997: 115)37 Yet this defensive posture would hardly satisfy common egalitarian ambitions. Debunking the phony schemes of supremacists would seem only a preliminary goal. The grander ambition of egalitarianism is usually to go on the offensive and to provide justification and support for substantive egalitarian principles with potentially wide-ranging implications for social policy.38 Going forward I proceed on the assumption that a notion of moral status is available, concentrating on the effort to say something helpful about it. The notion clearly exhibits a distinctive deontological character, incorporating the presumption that there is something about persons that matters morally in a distinctive way.39 Many philosophers have suggested that moral status is the counterpart to a distinctive kind of respect, such as Stephen Darwall’s recognition respect, the fitting response to dignity 35
Cf. Anderson (1999: 312 in reference to Young).
36
Some commentators have read Thomas Hobbes to hold such a view, on the basis of his statement that ‘‘the value or worth of a man is, as of all other things, his price—that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his power—and therefore is not absolute but a thing dependent on the need and judgment of another.’’ (Hobbes 1994: 51, Ch. 10) 37
Benn continues: ‘‘every man is entitled to be taken on his own merits; there is no general disqualifying condition.’’ (Benn 1997: 116) ‘‘An egalitarian would deny that any property could confer an automatic general priority of claim.’’ (Benn 1997: 117) 38 Defensive egalitarians could object to discrimination motivated by supremacist assumptions as ill founded, showing that nothing backs up the nobility’s claim to superior entitlements. But could they also object to un-motivated and randomly generated forms of discrimination? Suppose the government assigns arbitrary legal roles and distinctions by the sheer roll of the dice, bestowing legal privileges to ‘‘Masters’’ while denying it to ‘‘Servants,’’ carefully adding the proviso: ‘‘The resulting discrimination reflects no judgment whatsoever of unequal worth. It is entirely coincidental.’’ This measure would surely offend egalitarians, yet it remains unclear on what basis defensive status-egalitarians could object. The example of the difference between non-racist ancient slavery versus racist modern slavery is often brought up in similar contexts. A society permitting enslavement by drawing straws would surely violate most basic egalitarian assumptions without, however, incorporating any judgment of unequal worth. 39
Carter also considers the ‘‘egalitarian moral perspective to be deontological.’’ (Carter 2011: 540)
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having worth but no price.40 Much Kantian moral philosophy is devoted to elaborating this approach, yet I recommend we resist tying the notion of moral status too closely to it. We should not rest the availability of the notion of moral status on the prospects of Kantian philosophy, nor should we exclude non-Kantian moral philosophies that share a commitment to the moral equality of people from discussion. Instead of trying to identify a common core to the notion of moral status, I propose we proceed by somewhat operationalizing the notion, taking our point of departure in its broad functional role. I believe this gives us enough to continue the argument. The notion of moral status is clearly devised to play an important justificatory role, to make a genuine moral difference.41 The question then becomes how to envisage this difference-making capacity of moral status. Here, then, is one way of thinking about it that has a broadly contractarian flavor, corresponding to familiar ways of modeling fundamental egalitarian premises.42 It is inspired by Isaiah Berlin’s idea of having a voice in settling the destinies of one’s society, perhaps in some idealized original contracting position.43 Enjoying moral status then is envisaged tantamount to having a voice in this special setting, and the question of equality in moral status turns into the question of equality in voice. Now supposing everyone has a voice, possibly even a vetoing voice regarding certain matters (also known as rights44), the question is whether everyone must necessarily have an equal 40 Darwall contrasts recognition respect from appraisal respect, a kind of ‘‘esteem that is merited or earned by conduct or character.’’ (Darwall 2006: 122) Recognition respect is ‘‘an acknowledgment of someone’s standing to address and be addressed second-personal reasons rooted in the dignity of persons.’’ (Darwall 2006: 126) In relation to the issue of equality, Dawall writes: ‘‘According to morality as equal accountability, to be a person just is to have the competence and standing to address demands as persons to persons, and to be addressed by them, within a community of mutually accountable equals. This second-personal competence gives all persons an equal dignity, irrespective of their merit.’’ (Darwall 2006: 126) Dawall’s egalitarian claims would have constituted an alternative target for my argument. Why variations in the competence to address and be addressed do not result in variations in dignity would be among my chief questions. Darwall might respond that recognition respect simply does not permit this kind of differentiation, perhaps even as a matter of definition. [‘‘there can be no degrees of recognition respect for [persons]...’’ (Darwall 1977: 46)]. Yet the substantial question of equality cannot be settled by the provision of intriguing concepts. Should recognition respect be egalitarian by definition, then my argument would correspondingly contest that there is (any basis for) recognition respect. Thus, in response to the impression that my argument is concerned with matters of appraisal respect not recognition respect, I would say that it’s very point is to show how recognition respect ultimately collapses into appraisal respect, or how Darwall’s intended substantial distinction turns out untenable. In a sense, then, it would be fair to characterize my conclusion as holding every intelligible kind of respect to be a kind of appraisal respect. (Cf. Steinhoff 2015a: 156–158) 41
Mary Ann Warren characterizes this difference-making capacity thus: ‘‘To have moral status is to be morally considerable, or to have moral standing. It is to be an entity toward which moral agents have, or can have, moral obligations. If an entity has moral status, then we may not treat it in just any way we please; we are morally obligated to give weight in our deliberations to its needs, interests, or well-being. Furthermore, we are morally obligated to do this not merely because protecting it may benefit ourselves or other persons, but because its needs have moral importance in their own right.’’ (Warren 1997: 3) 42
Rawls framework is the obvious case in point. Sher also alludes to such a model in a footnote. (Sher 2014: 81) The model is also very close to broadly Kantian approach. Thomas Hill writes: ‘‘Everyone is, as it were, an equal co-legislator in what Kant calls ‘a kingdom of ends.’’’ (Hill 2000: 97) 43
Cf. Berlin (1978: 83).
44
Connecting to my remarks from section I, combining the imperative to respect basic rights with nonrights-based principles beyond offers a package many philosophers find attractive.
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voice on every single issue. As people weigh in the task of selecting the foundational moral principles for our society, are they to weigh in equally? Suppose at certain junctures in the process, we face choices between principles reasonably acceptable to everyone (no rights are violated) yet not equally preferred by everyone. Suppose, for instance, it is reasonably acceptable to shape the priorities of our educational system in a number of different ways, some of which favored by people with exceptional moral attributes while disfavored by people without such attributes, concerning, for instance, the provision of advanced moral appreciation classes. Suppose nothing else is at stake, and that we have exhausted all appropriate procedures aimed at resolving the electoral tie. The strictly egalitarian position would deny either side a special claim for accommodation and would call for some impartial decision-procedure such as flipping a coin. The inegalitarian alternative would contest this restriction, and permit exceptional moral attributes to accord some people a special voice, hence elevated moral standing. It would permit departures from rules such as one-person-one-vote and permit certain attributes to constitute a genuine reason for special accommodation.45 If such is the broad functional role of moral status, it is virtually irresistible to regard moral status as a higher-level phenomenon grounded in more basic features. Moral status is what glues justificatory potential and difference-making capacity to more basic features. My attempt at operationalizing moral status couldn’t help introducing ‘‘exceptional moral attributes’’ as the ground for enjoying a special voice. It is conceivable, of course, that moral status is without any ground, metaphysically freefloating, a form of primitive glow, such as a halo attached to our heads, a jewel shining forth in our breaths, or a soul inherent in our bodies. If so, the argument of this essay could not get off the ground. Nor, would it seem, could any other argument for or against equality. The distribution pattern of moral status, as it spreads evenly or unevenly, uniformly or spottily over individuals, would simply be a cosmic fluke. If two people alike in virtually any significant characteristic happen to end up with different status, with different voice in my original position, endowed with halos or jewels or souls shining with different luminous intensity, then that would be that. One might hope for a more serendipitous egalitarian spread; but basing egalitarianism in such hope hardly inspires much confidence. Nor would it explain why equality mattered, given the questionable moral significance of free-floating properties. Primitive moral status represents not an attractive position, and the only way to avoid conceding the grounding assumption seems to construe moral status in relational terms. Such a construal would most likely have religious overtones. If people were equally beloved by a supreme God, as his children, and if it was indeed self-evident that all men are created equal, each endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights, we might have a vindication for status-parity without worrying about equalizing grounds. I say ‘might,’ since James Buchanan raises a valid reservation when he writes: ‘‘Thomas Jefferson might have avoided much confusion had his deism 45 In any plausible version of such a decision scenario, there would be other reasons applicable as well, perhaps of a consequentialist nature. After all, we permit only the relevantly gifted to pursue expensive medical training. Still, the claim that moral status can provide reasons for principle-selection is not incompatible with the claim that other considerations can provide reasons as well. Only the denial of moral status providing reasons is, and that’s the issue.
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allowed him to make a slight variation in his statement. Had he said ‘to their creator, all men are equal,’ rather than ‘all men are created equal.’’’ (Buchanan 1975: 17) The latter notion of all men are created equal renders God superfluous for our dialectical context, since what is created equal presumably turns out equal simpliciter, returning us to the question of exactly how they are equal. And the former notion of to their creator, all men are equal, representing a version of perspectivalism, raises the question of whether equality in the eye of a beholder, even as comprehensive a beholder as God or an ideal spectator, should suffice to secure genuine status-parity. Would we, unable as we are to take such a comprehensive perspective, nonetheless be rationally compelled to defer to it in our practical and moral enquiries? We are not usually compelled to defer to other perspectives. For God, the Mona Lisa and a cockroach might be equally beautiful, but this would hardly command the complete recalibration of our aesthetic sensibilities.46 Thus, one can wonder why, even if God has invested His creative love in each of us, it must really behoove us to treat all others in a way that reflects that status. (Waldron 2007: 752, in reference to Locke) In any case, a theological answer, even though one might suspect it to bear unique responsibility for faith in moral equality, has its own costs. In conclusion, groundless approaches are unattractive for they threaten to entangle us in queer metaphysics while also leaving it mysterious why free-floating or perspectival properties ought to orient moral and practical concerns. Let status-parity hinge, then, on the identification of an acceptable ground. We can think of the package of all relevant factors collectively determining moral status as the ground of moral status. The issue is whether there is such a package that equalizes moral status in every pair of persons. For analytical purposes, it helps to tease apart the conditions a package must meet to accomplish this task. There are four specifically. (1) The factors the package contains must have proper relevance or significance. (2) The package must not exclude factors that have proper relevance or significance. (3) The package must contain a set of factors securing universal equalization. (4) The package must not contain a set of factors compromising universal equalization. Conditions (1) and (2) capture relevancy,47 (3) and (4) capture the collective or toti-resultant determination relationship of status by factors. Teasing apart these four conditions helps to illustrate how packages can meet some while failing others, thereby bringing to the fore the true difficulty of meeting all four conditions simultaneously. For example, the package containing the factor taller than an inch would satisfy (3), but fail (1) by lacking proper significance to ground a voice, or to merit or command recognition respect.48 The package containing the factor ‘‘being able to experience pleasure and pain’’ would arguably satisfy (1) and (3), but not (2). Only the most ardent hedonist would deny that other things matter too. Yet it is condition (2) in combination with (4) that presents the 46 As Cupit asks in a different context, ‘‘Why should merely looking equal, when viewed from a particular point of view, entail that justice requires we be treated as equals?’’ (Cupit 2000: 115) 47
Moral relevancy is a difficult subject of ethical theory, but the debate between status-parity and disparity does not in the first instance hinge on it. The arguments presented and considered in the essay do not rely on controversial assumptions about relevancy. 48
Arneson uses the example of being physically embodied to make the same point. (Cf. Arneson 2015: 41) Both examples would also fail (3), of course.
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real hard nut to crack.49 Equal moral status is not secured by identifying a set of factors shared by everyone while also enjoying proper significance. In addition, there must NOT be a further relevant differentiating factor effecting moral differentiation. Richard Arneson states that the chief difficulty for defending status parity ‘‘lies in identifying a property that persons possess that is both (a) equally possessed by all persons and (b) the sort of thing that qualifies a being as being significantly morally considerable, the basis for ascription of worth and dignity.’’ (Arneson 2015: 41) Arneson’s conditions (a) and (b) correspond to my conditions (1) and (3). His failure to mention (2) and (4) exemplifies the incompleteness of the task descriptions many egalitarians set themselves. Egalitarians have not finished their business with the identification of a set of shared relevant factors; they must also provide support for the contention that no further relevant differentiating factor is around the corner. Even if a property such as conceivably ‘‘being able to experience pleasure and pain’’ turned up to meet Arneson’s (a) and (b), it would be too early to celebrate, as further relevant differentiating properties might very well spoil the party. In the words of Geoffrey Cupit, ‘‘even if … some suitable equality [has been] identified, the egalitarian will only have reached first base…. If we are equal in some things, unequal in others, it seems to follow that all things considered we are unequal’’ (Cupit 2000: 112).
4 The General Argument The reason why status-parity almost certainly cannot be grounded in a respectable package of factors is that it is virtually impossible to keep the lid on differentiation. Advocates of status-parity tend to prematurely declare victory after having identified a set of equally shared relevant factors, worrying insufficiently about disruptive differentiators. Yet it is absolutely essential that they avoid a situation, as Carter put it, where ‘‘the comparison of persons as equal in just one morally relevant respect … would be combined with, and probably overwhelmed by, all the other morally relevant comparisons according to which they are unequal.’’ (Carter 2011: 550) This presents a serious challenge indeed. To begin with, for any set of equalizing factors, we can never rule out with certainty that there are not also differentiating factors of different kinds. The multitude and diversity of potentially relevant factors is vast. If a sense of justice matters, what about a sense of beauty, meaning, or spirituality? If the ability to give meaning to one’s life matters, what about the ability to give meaning to the social community, nature, or the cosmos? If the capacity to form and execute a rational life plan matters, what about a capacity to empathize, to connect with people, animals, or nature? As Arneson observes, ‘‘if several of these … capacities were relevant to moral status, one must possess all to be at the top status, and [if] some individuals possess more and others fewer of the relevant capacities, a problem of hierarchy … would emerge anew.’’ (Arneson 1999: 119) The defender of status-parity must defend a negative claim of considerable scope, namely that there is 49 Pojman (1992; 1997a), Kekes (2003), especially in chapter 5, and Steinhoff (2015a) press similar concerns.
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no differentiator out there that could compromise whatever equalizing effects are realized through some set of shared factors. The multitude of potentially relevant factors gives the opponent of status-parity a dialectical advantage. While it is difficult to demonstrate that all relevant factors have been accounted for, permitting the defender of status-parity to marshal a provisional defense at best, the opponent needs no complete accounting. All he needs is identify one differentiator to rest his case. Regardless of whether the differentiator identified is the only one, or is accompanied by yet further unidentified differentiators, disparity would almost certainly beat parity. The presence of exactly one differentiator could not but disrupt universal equality; and while a multitude of differentiators could conceivably cancel each other out, the likelihood of such an effect occurring for each and every pair of persons out of approximately 24 Quintillion pairs (that’s with 18 zeros) alive is miniscule.50 Moreover, as I will argue, opponents of parity can relatively easily support the contention that a differentiating factor is apt to accompany any plausible equalizing factor, by offering instructions for how to locate a differentiating factor in the neighborhood of any equalizing factor being proposed. By meeting the demand of significance, any potentially equalizing factor already possesses differentiating potential: it differentiates subjects falling within personhood moral status from subjects falling without. The factor must thus be powerful enough to push persons into a privileged realm of consideration, and once empowered, it is hard to prevent it (or its close neighbors) from pushing some persons farther still. The defender of status parity must simultaneously boost some factor yet downplay its potential (or its close neighbors’ potential) for differentiation. And the common strategies for blocking such unwelcome differentiation effects are unlikely to succeed. For factors that inherently admit of degrees, this is relatively easy to demonstrate. By virtue of their gradual nature, they would seem to effect considerable differentiation. The most common strategy for blocking such differentiation is to turn the relevant factor from a scalar into a binary property, usually by defining some critical threshold, or some range within the relevant scalar spectrum. Once a threshold is defined, everything either does or does not posses the property, and, moreover, everything that does possess the binary property does so fully and equally. This procedure is always technically available, and we can call it the threshold-strategy. The problem is that the threshold strategy is a poor prop for status-parity. The reason why does not depend on which particular property we consider. For illustration, then, consider rationality, the prime choice at least since the Stoics. People plainly possess rationality to different degrees. It’s a scalar property. Now apply the threshold-strategy. Define some threshold, rationality beyond X, and voila`, we have a binary property, X-rational. Nobody pushed by X-rationality into some privileged circle would be pushed just a little bit farther. Why not ground status-parity in X-rationality? Any answer to this question must 50
The formula is: n!/(r!(n-r)!). Plug in 7 billion, and a powerful calculator is needed to generate the huge number of combinations. And this does not even include past and future generations! And if people were supposed necessarily, not merely contingently, equal the numbers would become completely unmanageable.
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face another one: If it is such a big deal to have rationality to degree X, why is having it in excess of X not also a big deal?51 The threshold-strategy is effectively committed to the implausible position that the transition from rationality (X-n) to X makes a huge difference for moral status, but the transition from rationality X to (X ? n) makes no difference whatsoever. Wherever one decides to locate the dividing point along the relevant spectrum, it strains credulity to believe that what’s to the left of it matters while what’s to the right of it does not at all, despite being essentially the same thing. As Arneson formulates the problem, ‘‘if the capacity for rational agency is a capacity that varies continuously in magnitude, one wonders how one picks out some threshold level of the capacity such that variations in rational agency capacity above the threshold do not generate corresponding differences in fundamental moral status.’’ (Arneson 1999: 3)52 The chief problem stems from the ill-conceived structural design of founding a relevant binary superstructure on a scalar substructure while also disregarding that substructure. As Carter puts the point, ‘‘If the basis of a range property is more fundamental than the range property itself, why not concentrate directly on the more fundamental scalar property (or set of properties)? For what reason should we concentrate on the less fundamental, supervening property?’’ (Carter 2011: 549) What we observe is the resurgence of the scalar sub-structure, its revenge against the attempt to suppress it. On the face of it, the threshold-strategy appears a purely formal maneuver, but formal maneuvers are poor props for statusparity. In sum, as Sher observes, ‘‘no one has offered a convincing explanation of why, if a person’s moral standing depends on his having a given empirical property, two people with very different amounts of that property can have the same moral standing as long as each surpasses some threshold’’ (Sher 2014: 84). The crucial defect of the threshold-strategy may seem to reside in the arbitrariness it invokes, raising ‘‘the problem of how to draw a non-arbitrary line on a continuum and hold all beings on one side of the line full persons and all beings on the other side of the line lesser beings,’’ (Arneson 1999: 119) but it is not essentially arbitrariness that sinks the strategy. It could not save parity even if a nonarbitrary threshold could be identified. The point can be best illustrated by focusing exclusively at the binary level, at the level of all-or-nothing properties. Continuing our supposition that in X-rationality, we have a binary property equally possessed by everyone, we must recognize that X-rationality is not the only binary property in the rationality field. It surely has some up and downstairs neighbors: Y-rationality, rationality in excess of Y, and W-rationality, rationality in excess of W, with W \ X \ Y. What the defender of status-parity must explain is a curious combination of equalization and differentiation, or of difference making and no 51
John Rawls’ proposal about range-properties (Rawls 1999: 508) is similar and faces similar problems. It is true that all points within a circle are equally inside that circle despite their varying coordinates. Yet if it’s such a big deal to be in the circle, or in the range, would one not rather want be at the center than at the periphery? And to anticipate the deeper failure of the threshold strategy outlined shortly, points are not located within a given single circle only, but within numerous circles, raising the question of why, accepting the assumption that inclusion in a given circle discriminates in favor of certain points, does the inclusion in yet further ‘‘more inner’’ circles not also discriminate in favor of certain points? 52
Cf. also Arneson (2015: 36–38) and Cupit (2000: 110).
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difference making in relation to moral status, and the tension this creates would remain even if we were to suppose that W, X, and Y-rationality all mark nonarbitrary thresholds. The curious combination would be this. X-rationality, the grand ultimate equalizer, would need to differentiate vis-a`-vis W-rationality; but Y-rationality, the unwelcome differentiator, would need NOT to differentiate visa`-vis X-rationality. Yet whatever reasons support the difference-making capacity of X-rationality over W-rationality also potentially support the same capacity of Y-rationality over X-rationality, and whatever reasons downplay the differencemaking capacity of Y-rationality over X-rationality also potentially downplay the same capacity of X-rationality over W-rationality. We can model the situation after a staircase, where each stair marks a significant and non-arbitrary transition. Of two people standing on different stairs, it is true that both have equally taken the first stair, neither any more nor any less so than the other. They are equal first-stair-takers. Yet the equality this engenders is immediately compromised by the fact that one but not the other has ascended yet another stair. Hence the threshold strategy could not save equality even if it worked. It is simply not enough to establish a non-arbitrary threshold that everybody happens to surpass; meeting conditions (1) and (3) is not enough. The threshold must be strictly singular, as any additional threshold that some but not others happen to surpass threatens to immediately undo the original equalizing effect. Conditions (2) and (4), regarding the absence of further differentiating factors, vigorously reinsert themselves again. A critical result of the discussion of the threshold strategy and its failure is that the admission of degrees need not be inherent to factors or properties themselves to become detrimental to the parity thesis. The metaphysical menace for the thesis is not necessarily a universe of nothing but gradable properties, but simply a universe rich in properties together with denizens instantiating them. Moreover, given the close similarity of many properties to each other, relevancy itself is hard to contain. Earlier I remarked on the implausibility of holding the transition from lower to higher ends of a spectrum to matter for moral status but not the transition to yet higher ends, such as the transition from (X-n) rationality to X rationality but not the transition from X rationality to (X ? n) rationality. But it would hardly be any more plausible to hold the acquisition of some property to matter while the acquisition of another very similar property not at all, such as the acquisition of X-rationality but not Y-rationality. The relevancy of a property would likely infect its very close neighbors. Thus, even if all properties were of an all-or-nothing character, and no individuals would ever possess properties to a greater or lesser extent but simply possess or not possess them, the prospects of all individuals possessing all the same relevant properties seem incredibly low in a relatively densely populated universe such as our own.
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5 The Specific Argument and Subjectivity Let me shift attention from the general and structural challenges status-parity faces to the specific proposal for grounding equality with the arguably greatest credentials. If the general problems discussed in the previous section were to reemerge in relation to the best proposal on offer, this would lend some form of inductive support for my general skepticism about universal equality in moral status. And as we shall see, this is precisely what happens. The proposal centers on subjectivity. Bernard Williams has urged egalitarians to adopt as their point of departure ‘‘the proposition that men are beings who are necessarily to some extent conscious of themselves and of the world they live in.’’ (Williams 1997: 95) Williams did not elaborate in sufficient detail how subjectivity can ground status-parity, but more recently, George Sher has taken up the task. Like Williams, Sher holds as pivotal the fact that each of us ‘‘occupies a point of view from which the world appears a certain way, certain things appear to matter, and certain courses of action appear to be open. … Each person is a world unto himself.’’ (Sher 2014: 80) He then marshals an impressive argument for why subjectivity can accomplish what no other candidate previously could, to supply a basis for equality in moral status, in the process defending the view against various objections. Subjectivity is an excellent candidate. ‘‘That each has a private reality which is accessible to him alone, which for him is suffused with meaning and value, and which, when it disappears, will entirely distinguish his world’’ (Sher 2014: 86) is ‘‘exactly the right sort of fact,’’ (Sher 2014: 80) for the ground of moral status. On this we are in complete agreement, and no further space needs to be dedicated on this uncontested assumption. The pertinent question is whether subjectivity is a viable candidate for the ground of equal moral status. A chief reason for doubt is that subjectivity appears to be a scalar property too, and that it cannot evade the difficulties facing the threshold strategy. Sher struggles mightily against this reservation, and while he succeeds in fending off some of its initial instantiations his position ultimately succumbs to the deeper problems associated with the threshold view. Even if there is a distinct kind of subjectivity each of us equally occupies, the kinds of subjectivity each of us occupies need not be equal. (Sher 2014: 84) To arrive at this result, it helps to briefly recast some recent objections to Williams’ original suggestion along with Sher’s defense. We will see then how both Sher and his critics have not completely appreciated the true gravity of the problem. After advancing the proposition anchoring equality on consciousness, Williams immediately proceeds to qualify himself, stating that ‘‘this proposition does not assert that men are equally conscious of themselves and of their situation,’’ (Williams 1997: 96) falling back on the not entirely transparent notion of potential consciousness. Williams appears to be plagued by the suspicion that subjectivity itself may admit of degrees, jeopardizing equality all over. Ian Carter immediate seizes on this potential weakness: The property identified by Williams – consciousness of one’s own place in the world and of one’s own activities, intentions, and purposes – may indeed
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constitute a plausible basis of respect of a certain kind, but there are reasons for doubting that it will constitute a basis for equal respect (of that kind). … [A]s an empirical capacity, it appears, … to be possessed in different degrees by different individuals. People are more or less conscious, and more or less able to be conscious, of their own activities, of their own future, of their own life plan, of the world around them and the options it makes available to them. (Carter 2011: 574) As an initial response, Sher takes issue with Carter’s identification of consciousness as an empirical capacity, asserting that subjectivity is no empirical factor and is not amenable to empirical investigation. The point of this reply would seem to protect subjectivity against differentiation as the result of empirical investigation. Sher accordingly maintains ‘‘the claim … that we are moral equals because we are equally centers of consciousness is in principle invulnerable to refutation through appeals to empirically discoverable differences.’’ (Sher 2014: 81)53 Yet regardless of whether Sher’s Nagelian assertion proves correct, and I am not sure it does, the pertinent question is not the empirical or non-empirical accessibility of subjectivity. Sher and Carter appear to assume some kind of association between the empirical and the gradable, but such an assumption is untenable. Even if everything empirical admits of degrees—and Arneson’s example of physical embodiedness suggests rather otherwise—it is certainly not true that everything admitting of degrees must be empirical. Cartesian dualists need not deny degrees of mentality. In fact, the arithmetic constructions and other abstract scales commentators usually employ for the purpose of representing gradability, including those of this essay, exemplifies how a prototypically non-empirical domain can be intrinsically gradable. The pertinent question, thus, concerns the presence of absence of relevant differences emerging in the subjectivity field, whatever the method of investigation, empirical or otherwise, and this question is certainly amenable to philosophical investigation if nothing else.54 Thus, even if we conceded for the sake of argument Sher’s empirical irrefutability assertion, the ‘‘equal center of consciousness’’ claim would not be safe just yet and may still founder on philosophically discoverable differences. More substantially, Sher charges Carter to miss the most plausible target. While he concedes Carter’s objection would succeed against the attempt to ground equality in the particular mental abilities or contents of people, it does not defeat a more promising version of Williams’ proposal centering on ‘‘the fact that each person is equally a subject with such contents.’’ (Sher 2014: 80)55 As Sher elaborates: 53
Cf. also Sher (2014: 7).
54
As Sher acknowledges when he observes ‘‘the structure of human consciousness has been explored in great depth by philosophers from Kant through the phenomenological movement.’’ (Sher 2014: 82) 55
Sher’s employment of the phrase ‘‘each person is equally a subject with’’ strikes me as suspiciously convenient, evoking the appearance more of a linguistic maneuver than a substantial move in support of status-parity. As an analogy, consider the statement that each of us is equally a subject with some money in our bank account. This provides little comfort to someone with only two cents in their bank account, let alone ground a claim to pecuniary equality. Thus, the statement can no more conceal the substantial variation in bank balances than the statement that each person is equally a subject with a mind or subjectivity can conceal substantial mental or subjectival variations. This is loosely reminiscent of J.R.
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If the reason we are moral equals is simply that each of us has (is?) subjectivity of a certain sort – that each occupies a point of view from which the world appears a certain way, certain things appear to matter, and certain courses of action appear to be open – then any variation in the contents of our beliefs and aims … will drop out as irrelevant. … Each person is a world unto himself. (Sher 2014: 80) Sher’s strategy is to isolate immaterial differences in mental abilities or contents from the decisive factor of having subjectivity, a factor stubbornly retaining its invariant and all-or-nothing character, despite the fact that ‘‘some people are far more aware, both of what is going on in their minds and of the options with which the world presents them, than others, and [that] such differences are often due to deeper differences in intelligence, imagination, or other innate abilities.’’ (Sher 2014: 79)56 Sher presents his account as a hybrid, acknowledging certain empirical and variable features to underpin subjectivity and consciousness, while ingeniously separating their inherent variability from their capacity to sustain a non-scalar subjectivity. Once the features manage to sustain a subjective perspective, we have all that matters, and, crucially, we have a non-scalar basis for equality, unperturbed by any remaining differences in mental contents and capacities. What matters, subjectivity, remains equal, even though what explains it may differ. Subjectivity simply turns out multiple-realizable. The strategy is brilliant yet ultimately unsuccessful. The reason why does not essentially reside in problems facing Sher’s identification of a non-gradable kind of subjectivity. Carter and Sher are so preoccupied with establishing the scalar or nonscalar nature of consciousness that they are missing the deeper problem facing status parity, stemming not primarily from finding an equalizing factor but from ruling out differentiating factors.57 To appreciate this problem, we can once more concede a central premise of Sher’s argument, admitting a kind of subjectivity both relevant and equally possessed by all persons. The concession cannot secure parity, however, since it would meet only conditions (1) and (3), but not (2) and (4), leaving the job incomplete. And without keeping the lid on differentiation, the job cannot be completed. Unfortunately for Sher’s proposal, it is not too difficult to find differentiating factors to linger in the neighborhood of his distinct subjectivity. His subjectivity is not the only kind. For starters, that his distinct subjectivity has neighbors is not a point Sher would be in a position to contest, given what else he acknowledges in the course of his argument. Downstairs, we have Singer’s sentience. And despite not being the only relevant factor, pace what some overly enthusiastic Utilitarians would maintain, it Footnote 55 continued Lucas ridicule of the inference from all ‘‘numbers are equally numbers’’ to ‘‘all numbers are equal.’’ (Lucas 1997: 106) Even if everyone is equally a subject, it does not follow that everyone is an equal subject. 56
That these differences are immaterial is a possible further point of contention, of course. I do not pursue it, however, since I believe I have a more effective way of contesting Sher’s central argument. 57 Carter emphasizes empirical properties to dissociate plausible egalitarian bases from the ‘‘Kantian solution that … relies on a conception of the self that we have good reason to reject.’’ (Carter 2011: 544) Yet if my argument succeeds, there is another way to respond to the Kantian ‘‘solution’’ Carter neglects.
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surely is relevant. Cows have different status than rocks. Cruelty is possible and problematic only in relation to subjects-of-a-life.58 Next, sentience is invariant (or plausibly taken to be if subjectivity is). Cows, chimpanzees, and humans all fully and equally enjoy sentience (or so we assume for the sake of argument).59 Yet, cows, chimpanzees, and humans are not moral equals, Sher correctly maintains, despite their equal sentience. This is due to a further differentiating factor, namely a distinct kind of subjectivity humans but neither cows nor chimpanzees enjoy. Finally, the differentiating effects sentience enjoys vis-a`-vis rocks and subjectivity vis-a`-vis cows remain entirely unaffected by their non-scalar, all-or-nothing character. The inclusion of chimpanzees was meant to highlight that sentience and subjectivity must have an intermediate neighbor, given the plausible difference in moral status between cows and chimpanzees, and it is not hard to speculate about the broad contours of this intermediate: a subjectivity that involves a degree of selfawareness, a diachronic dimension, together affording individuals a sense of identity over time, furthermore some emotional connection with other individuals, as beautifully documented by close observers such as Jane Goodall and Frans De Waal.60 And as Mark Rowlands has convincingly argued, chimpanzees can act for moral reasons even though they are not fully-fledged moral agents.61 It is a kind of subjectivity broadly along these lines differentiating them from cows, which allegedly only enjoy a purely episodic subjectivity, living moment by moment.62 Yet whatever it may be, and despite its all-or-nothing character securing its presumptive equal possession by all great apes alike, including humans, it still fails to equalize humans and chimpanzees due to the differentiating effects of a further kind of subjectivity possessed by humans only, returning us to Sher’s distinct subjectivity. And thus in relation to that distinct kind of subjectivity, we have produced with relative ease two of its downstairs neighbors, prompting the question of how hard it could be to produce some upstairs neighbors as well? To answer the question, we need to look more closely at the inherent structure of Sher’s distinct subjectivity. Sher outlines a number of fundamental assumptions characteristic of it: These include, but are far from exhausted by, the assumptions that the world is temporally as well as spatially ordered, that the person himself is an embodied subject who has existed in the past and will exist for at least some time in the future, that various courses of action are open to him, that the world gives him reason to do some things and refrain from doing others, and that he is, within limits, capable both of finding out what reasons he has and of acting on them. (Sher 2014: 82) 58
Cf. Regan (2004).
59
That there are in fact degrees of sentience is not implausible.
60
De Waal beautifully documents the capacity of chimpanzees to engage in diachronically extended forms of reciprocity. (De Waal 2009: 42–44) 61
Cf. Rowlands (2012).
62
Cf. Velleman (1991).
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Let us provide a name for Sher’s distinct subjectivity meeting all his fundamental assumptions: D-subjectivity. As he explicitly stresses, his openended description is not meant to be complete. In fact, it arguably would need further elements to differentiate normal human from chimpanzee consciousness.63 Yet since my argument does not depend on the completeness of any list, but just on there being a list, so to speak, we can proceed with Sher’s description. My chief point is that by adding (or subtracting) further elements to Sher’s list, we can easily construct other distinct kinds of subjectivity, with many of them no less plausibly entailing differentiating effects than D-subjectivity. Consider the subtraction case first. Could there not be a kind of subjectivity including the temporal and special order of one’s world, the embodied self existing in the past and future, the openness of courses of action, but not reason-sensitivity? Many philosophers would certainly think so, holding it to roughly characterize the subjectivity of chimpanzees. Call it D-minus-subjectivity. D-subjectivity differentiates vis-a`-vis D-minus-subjectivity because reasons-sensitivity makes a genuine difference—a result again completely unaffected by the all-or-nothing character of either kind of subjectivity. But adding elements is no harder than subtracting them. Curiously, the worldonto-oneself Sher identifies with his distinct kind of subjectivity does not explicitly include other subjects. Yet the capacity for inter-subjectivity surely generates a very distinct kind of subjectivity as well. Call it D-plus-subjectivity. The interface with other subjects, the capacity to develop genuine affections and attachments,64 to form intimate relationships, share experiences, crave mutual recognition, empathize with65 and genuinely care for them is no minor part of the kind of subjectivity many of us enjoy. But not all of us; psychopaths characteristically do not. They enjoy invariant D-subjectivity but not D-plus-subjectivity. Simon Baron-Cohen has very helpfully marked the contrast between the two kinds of subjectivity in terms of single and double-mindedness.66 He uses the term single-minded to describe the condition of systematic social solipsism characteristic of psychopathy. Psychopaths never cross Buber’s line from I to thou. To them, others are like soda-machines; sometimes nuisances, since they tend to bump into one as the self-propelled objects they are; sometimes godsends, since they can be so easily manipulated into servitude. But there’s no connection, no empathy, no love, no care. Nothing exists in the in world of the psychopath to reach out to, nothing exists to reach back; it is all dark and lonely, nobody’s there. When witnessing a gruesome accident, the psychopath’s experience resembles our experience of a falling tree. As researchers such as Robert Hare and Baron-Cohen have documented
63 The chief point of contention will presumably be reasons-sensitivity. If Rowlands (2012) is correct, some animals, including chimpanzees, can display such sensitivity. 64 Immediately after listing the capacity to feel pain as an obviously relevant factor, Williams emphasizes ‘‘the capacity to feel affection for others’’ as a relevant factor too. (Williams 1997: 92) 65
Sher stresses the significance of empathy: Sher (2014: 86).
66
Cf. Baron-Cohen (2011).
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extensively, the part of the world most important to us, the social world, the world of shared love and concern, is simply blank to psychopaths.67 Yet it strains credulity to admit D-subjectivity to have the capacity to differentiate vis-a`-vis D-minus-subjectivity while to deny D-plus-subjectivity the same capacity vis-a`-vis D-subjectivity. Return to my proposal at operationalizing moral status in terms of enjoying a voice in some original position. Would we find it reasonable to accord equal voice on every issue to subjects with D and D-plussubjectivity alike? I rather doubt it. To pick a sample issue, non-psychopathic individuals would strongly militate in favor of social arrangements that create space for and protect the development of intimate relationships, even at considerable costs in terms of economic convenience, say. Psychopathic individuals would remain unburdened by such other-regarding obsessions. Would we need to reach for a compromise that afforded equal consideration to psychopathic and non-psychopathic voices? For instance, a grand bargain that permitted less legal protection to intimate familial ties than we would wish to settle for in the absence of the goal to accommodate the psychopathic constituency? I do not think so. While psychopaths clearly enjoy a robust set of rights, for instance having the power to veto measures that would systematically deny employment opportunities to them by requiring all job applicants to pass a psychopathy test, they would nonetheless not get to weigh in equally on societal arrangements with important bearings on the space we permit for the development of human relationships. The case of psychopathy exemplifies how constructing more restrictive kinds of subjectivity by adding further elements to Sher’s original list turns out no more difficult than generating less restrictive kinds by subtracting elements. I chose to concentrate on the inter-subjective dimension, but the argument could have been developed in different directions as well. Instead of portraying a kind of subjectivity characterized by its intimate relation to other subjects, the focus could have rested on kinds characterized by a special aesthetic appreciation, or a special connection to nature, or a special sensitivity for social harmony, or a special sense of meaning and spirituality, and on and on. Perhaps a distinct kind of subjectivity could be devised to match each of Howard Gardner’s multiple intelligences.68 Moreover, corresponding to each kind of subjectivity, one could easily conceive a special decision scenario in the original position calling for weighing different voices differently. Philosophical imagination is boundless. The attempt to contain differentiation is doomed to fail. And thus let me close with a question Arneson posed some time ago still awaiting a satisfactory answer: Suppose someone asserts that the difference between the rational agency capacities of the most perceptive saints and the most unreflective and animalistic villains defines a difference in fundamental moral status that is just 67 As is well know, psychopath can be very dangerous for this reason. Robert Harris, a classical psychopath, brutally and gratuitously murdered two teenagers. When this made his brother upset, he laughed and called him a sissy. Then, as if nothing had happened, he proceeded to eat his victims’ hamburgers. When eventually being executed for his crime, his fellow death row inmates celebrated. (Cf. Watson 1987) Hare (1999) provides many more examples. 68
He lists at least eight in Gardner (2006).
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as important for morality as the difference between the rational agency capacities of near-persons and marginal persons. What mistake does this claim embody? (Arneson 1999: 122)69
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