Front. Philos. China 2011, 6(4): 521–548 DOI 10.1007/s11466-011-0154-2

RESEARCH ARTICLE

DING Weixiang

Zhu Xi’s Choice, Historical Criticism and Influence—An Analysis of Zhu Xi’s Relationship with Confucianism and Buddhism © Higher Education Press and Springer-Verlag 2011

Abstract As a great synthesist for the School of Principles of the Northern and Southern Song dynasties, Zhu Xi’s influence over the School of Principles was demonstrated not only through his positive theoretical creation, but also through his choice and critical awareness. Zhu’s relationship with Confucianism and Buddhism is a typical case; and his activities, ranging from his research of Buddhism (the Chan School) in his early days to his farewell to the Chan School as a student of Li Dong from Yanping and then to his critical awareness of the Chan School, developed in his association with Wang Yingchen, set the entire course of his relationship with Confucianism and Buddhism. It fostered his antagonistic attitude towards the Chan School, which lasted his entire life. Zhu approached the Chan School mainly as an objective social and cultural phenomenon; his discrimination between Confucianism and Buddhism was from an epistemological point of view; and his refutation of the Chan School was mainly from the point of view of language and methodology, an antagonistic attitude of how to face learning. Therefore, his opposition to the Chan School not only directly fostered an awareness of the Confucians of the Ming dynasty against Buddhism, who simply viewed the latter as an external and objective existence, but to a certain extent resulted in the disappearance of the transcendence of the School of Principles, and caused a total change in academic direction during the Ming and Qing dynasties and the formation of the Qianjia Hanxue. What is more, such an opposition to Buddhism continues to influence people’s understanding of the School of Principles. Keywords Zhu Xi, choice, criticism, historical influence, relationship with Confucianism and Buddhism Received September 15, 2010 DING Weixiang ( ) Department of Philosophy, Shaanxi Normal University, Xi’an 710062, China E-mail: [email protected]

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1

Introduction

Lixue 理学 (School of Principles) during the Song and Ming dynasties can be essentially viewed as a reshaping of Confucianism in response to the transcendent pursuit of Buddhism and Daoism. This is how the thinkers of the School of Principles understood Buddhism and Daoism, and how this has become a sign of their own theoretical attainment. From this point of view, Zhu Xi’s discrimination between Confucianism and Buddhism and his critical awareness of Buddhism showed his system of heavenly principles that marked his theoretical creation and its essential qualities. Therefore, analysis of Zhu’s understanding of the relationship with Confucianism and Buddhism and his criticism of Fo Chan 佛 禅 (Buddhism) is precisely a mirror of his own transcendent pursuit and his metaphysical concerns. In addition, Zhu was the greatest synthesist of the School of Principles of the Song and Ming dynasties, as well as a vital part of the development and transformation of the School of Principles from the Song dynasty to the Ming dynasty. Zhu’s theories and critical awareness were significant to the development of the entire School of Principles and to people’s understanding of this school. If from this point of view, Zhu’s choice between Confucianism and Buddhism and his critical awareness of Buddhism is a standard for today’s people in their understanding of the School of Principles. Throughout Zhu’s life, his most important ideological decision was his rejection of Buddhism, his turning towards Confucianism and his critique of the Chan School. How Zhu criticized the Chan School has become a mirror of his own theoretical attainment and characteristics.

2

Zhu’s Learning of the Chan School

Zhu came from a family which had been “engaged in Confucianism” for five generations, so it seemed to be “destiny” to either be plunged into the practice and spread of Confucianism or into the study and discussion of fundamentals. But Zhu was born soon after the Southern Song dynasty was founded, therefore “seesawing battles” between Confucianism and Buddhism (the Chan School) at that time certainly placed him in touch with Buddhism. As a result, his understanding of the Chan School and his learning of Confucianism and the Chan School turned out to be fundamental for the maturation of his thought, i.e., the establishment of his perspective. Zhu lost his father when he was only fourteen years old, and he followed his father’s wish in formally acknowledging the three Masters from Wuyi 武夷 Mountain as his masters that same year. Zhu’s father hoped him to study the learning of the Cheng Brothers and then spiritually resist Qin Hui’s 秦桧 grabbing of power and endangering the nation. The three Masters from Wuyi

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were well known for their adherence to the learning of the Cheng Brothers. Due to the ethos of that time, however, two of the three Masters were actually mixed with Buddhism and Daoism. Under such a background, Zhu soon delved deep into Buddhism, too. Not long after he became a disciple of the three Masters, Zhu began his visits to Master Daoqian. See Zhu’s recollection of the three Masters: At the beginning, I learned from Pingshan 屏山 and Jixi 籍溪. Jixi, once a disciple of Hu Anguo and also an enthusiast of Buddhism and Daoism, held that Hu’s learning was sufficient to pursue the Dao. But unfortunately, Jixi did not reach the Dao, nor had he seen any quintessence of Buddhism or Daoism. Pingshan excelled in an imperial examination when he was young. During his tenure at Putian 莆田, he once met a Buddhist monk below a pagoda who could remain in meditation for days with one breath. Afterwards, Pingshan became involved with Daoism. Then, he returned home and studied Confucian classics, figuring that the fundamentals of Confucianism conformed to those of Buddhism. Therefore he wrote the Sheng Chuan Lun 圣传论 (On the Legacy of Confucian Saints). I was also interested in the Chan School when I was fifteen or sixteen. One day, I met a Buddhist monk where my sick father was staying. When I talked to him, the Buddhist monk merely prevaricated in response, not agreeing with or refuting me. Having retreated, he told Liu that I had grasped the ethos of the Chan School, which was enlightening, spiritual and transcendent. Later, Liu sent the monk’s remark to me, and I suspected that the monk was more profound than that. Therefore, I visited him and asked for more instruction, noticing that he was quite reasonable in his speech. As I took part in the imperial examination for the selection of officials, I talked such nonsense as he taught me. The censorship was not as rigid as it is today, and people are allowed to talk casually. The examiners were persuaded, and I thus passed the examination. (Li 1986, p. 2620) The first passage in the above quotations mentions that both Master Pingshan and Master Jixi embraced Buddhism and Daoism, too; and the second one describes how Zhu himself came in touch with the Chan School. Zhu was just 15 years old that year, and began studying the Chan School, which lasted for more than ten years. As for his “nonsense” in the imperial examination, it was likely self-mockery since he was selected in the examination. But Zhu began his study of the Chan School after that. Zhu turned towards the Chan School at that time mainly because he had been convinced that Master Daoqian was “more profound than that,” especially after

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Master Daoqian said that he “had also grasped the ethos of the Chan School, which was enlightening, spiritual and transcendent”—For Zhu who had primarily developed his intelligence, it demonstrated his inclusive spirit. As he recalled, “I used to be an omnivorous learner when I was young, interested in everything such as Buddhism, Daoism, writing, poetry and military science. I skimmed over numerous books at that time, consulting all schools on each subject” (Ibid., p. 2620). Judging from this self-portrait, Zhu’s choice of the Chan School at that time was out of intellectual preference rather than the pursuit of faith. After that, Zhu consulted Master Daoqian in many aspects, and the latter gave relevant replies and instructions. That led further to speculation, experience and knowledge in the tradition of the Chan School. After he passed the imperial examination, Zhu became more dependent on the Chan School because he reached the goal of “testimony” in the imperial examination with Daoqian’s “non-self.” Zhu awaited his post for five years after he had qualified as an official in the imperial examination. During these five years, he spent all his time reading, socializing and visiting learned scholars, except for one period of time when he went home to Maoyuan 婺源 to worship his ancestors. During this period, Zhu had shaken off the misgivings and burden of preparing for the imperial examination, so he could do whatever he chose, displaying his personal talent and inclination to the best of his ability. What did Zhu do during this spare time? According to the Zhu Xi Nianpu Changbian 朱熹年谱长编 (A Full-Ranged Chronicle of Zhu’s Life), the year 1150 witnessed when “Daoqian returned from Hengyang 衡阳 to Mi’an 密庵, Zhu paid frequent visits to Daoqian’s retreat deep in the mountains, consulting Daoqian about Buddhism day and night, and learning the thoughts of the Chan School by writing letters”; In 1151, Zhu “built a cottage named ‘The House of Cultivation,’ read all kinds of books including Confucian classics every day, cultivating himself earnestly”; In 1152, “Zhu paid a visit to Daoqian in Mi’an. Then, he traveled a long painstaking trip, reached Shunchang 顺昌 via Jianyang 建阳, stayed at Buddhist temples in mountains at night, and climbed up to pavilions erected on the lofty tops of mountains… He did not return until May” (Shu 2001, pp. 138–151). In a word, it is incontrovertible that Zhu was dedicated to the Chan School before he went to Tongan to assume the office responsible for literature and documents. Then, when did Zhu bid farewell to the Chan School? In fact, he had written an essay titled “Mu Zhai Ji” 牧斋记 (“A Record on the House of Herding”) long before he went to Tongan for his tenure. In that essay, he lamented that he had not been satisfactorily oriented in his academic career. Therefore, it is no wonder that he paid a visit to Li Yanping 李延平. It was during his consultation of the Dao with Li that he began leaning towards the Chan School.

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When I went to see Master Li, I could rattle on about many reasons and principles, and I had also been bent on the Chan School. Master Li asked me, “Why do you care for so many groundless propositions but pay no attention to things before your eyes? The Dao has nothing mysterious. Just keep it in mind in daily life and practices, you will certainly grasp it.” I came to understand what he meant afterwards, so I finally have the good fortune to know something about it today. (Li 1986, p. 2568) I did not meet Master Li until I went to Tongan for my tenure when I was already 24 or 25. When I spoke with Master Li, he simply disapproved of me. I was not aware of my mistake; instead, I doubted whether Master Li really knew what the Dao was. Therefore, I questioned him repeatedly. Master Li was a simple and solemn man, not good at expressing his thoughts. He merely told me to read the works by the great Confucians, so I temporarily put the thoughts of the Chan School aside. (Ibid., p. 2620) I was ignorant and relatively well-informed of the Chan School when I was young, but Master Li rebuked its flaws. When I reconsidered it afterwards, I found that it was Confucianism that was more profound. Whenever I made progress at one aspect, I would certainly regress at another point, and almost no trace of Buddhist cultivation can be found in me now. Buddhism is heresy after all. (Ibid.) The above passages are different recollections about the same event, that is, how he met Li Yanping for the first time. What Zhu embraced in his mind and depended upon at that time was what he had acquired in his years of studying the Chan School—that is, the so-called “rattle on about so many propositions.” But these “so many propositions” were denied by Master Li—from the first “disapproval” to the “rebuke,” the attitude was firm and unquestionable. For Zhu, it was an extremely heavy blow. At that time, however, neither Li’s academic attainment, nor his reputation in academia, and nor Zhu’s own confidence allowed him to despise Li’s criticism. Naturally, there came a period of repeated deliberation between the Chan School and Confucianism. At first, Zhu doubted whether “Master Li really knew what the Dao was,” but Li’s articulated “disapproval” and his “rebuff” were totally unquestionable. He assumed the mentality of putting it aside and keeping watch. It was in this condition that Zhu began his conversion from the Chan School towards Confucianism, which was slow and gradual but very steady. It is hard to tell the exact beginning and end of this course, for the transition of thought is not a scientific experiment, nor the solving of an equation. Even Zhu himself could not tell when he had realized his complete conversion from the

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Chan School to Confucianism. But there is some certainty: When he paid his first visit to Li Yanping, Zhu had already begun his transition from the Chan School to Confucianism. The completion of this was closely related to another event, which was Zhu’s formal acknowledgement of Li as his teacher. This marks the final end of the transition from the Chan School to Confucianism. As with this question, i.e., when did Zhu formally become one of Li’s disciples, it is an open question in the research of Zhu Xi since two different opinions were put forwards respectively by Huang Gan 黄干, one of Zhu’s best disciples, in his Zhu Wengong Xingzhuang 朱文公行状 (Biography of Zhu Xi) and Zhao Shixia 赵师夏, another outstanding disciple of Zhu’s, in his “Yanping Dawen Ba” 延平 答问跋 (“A Postscript to the Questions and Replies of Yanping”). After that, it seems that every researcher has had a different answer Therefore, Wang Maohong 王懋竑 revised the words “learned from Master Li from Yanping in 1153” into “met Master Li from Yanping for the first time” (Wang 1998, p. 9). That is to say, to meet Master Li for the first time does not mean to become one of Li’s disciples. But there has been no way to verify this answer, so different opinions exist as to when Zhu formally became Li’s disciple. Except for Zhao Shixia’ s belief that Zhu’s first visit to Li does not mean that he had necessarily become his disciple, which is commonly accepted in academia, there are many other opinions about when Zhu formally acknowledged Li Yanping as his teacher. For example, Qian Mu held that “The year 1155 (Zhu was 26 years old) was the time when Zhu was more resolved to return to Confucianism” (Qian 1986, p. 749); but as with when Zhu became a disciple of Li, Qian and Mou Zongsan unanimously argued that Zhu did not begin to “learn from Li” until the year 1161 (Zhu was 31 years old that year) (Mou 1969, p. 33; Qian 1986, p. 756)1; Shu Jingnan 束景南 held that the “Li Dongyou Dashu” 李 侗有答书 in 1157 (when Zhu was 28) should mark Zhu’s acknowledging of Li as a teacher, so Zhu’s “acknowledging Li Dong from Yanping as a teacher began this time” (Shu 2001, p. 224); and Chen Lai 陈来 believes that “Zhu’s ‘rejecting all the heresies that he had learned and became a disciple of Li’s’ in 1158 (when Zhu was 29) should be doubtless,” for it is consistent with Zhu’s change in thought when he “began to know Confucianism was the truth in the spare time when he performed his official duty in Tongan” (Chen 2000, pp. 42–43). Each of the above opinions has its own reasoning, of course. If we choose the year that he became a disciple of Li (when Zhu was 31) as the year when he bade his farewell to the Chan School, however, it indicates that the period from his first visit to Master Daoqian at 15 to his formally acknowledging Yanping as his teacher at 31 constituted the whole course of his transformation from his 1

Qian’s conclusion is that “The winter this year (1161), Zhu paid a visit to Li Yanping and began to learn from the latter.”

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interaction with and fondness of the Chan School to his doubts and then final farewell to it.

3

Zhu’s Understanding of the Chan School

The ages from 15 to 31 are the most important years for a man to learn and grow spiritually. What perspectives did Zhu gain from the Chan School in “the indulgence in Buddhism and Daoism for more than 10 years”? The Zhuzi Yulei 朱子语类 (Quotations of Zhu Xi) contains a special volume on “Buddhism.” These quotations are a record of Zhu’s teachings during his last 20 years, so remarks on “Buddhism” in this book represent his final opinion towards the Chan School. Taking this book as an example, therefore, we can see Zhu’s final understanding of the Chan School. In Quotations of Zhu Xi, Zhu analyzed the Chan School as a foreign culture that had to be refuted. He said: Buddhism entered China as Confucianism was at a low ebb. It is characterized with ideas about immensity, self-promotion, falseness and extinguishment, developing from Zhaijie 斋戒 (the borrowing of indigenous terms to simply express Buddhist ideas) to Yixue 义 学 (the comparative expression of Buddhist thoughts). For example, Buddhist monks such as Huiyuan 慧远 and Zhi Daolin 支道林 embraced Yixue, but what they held were merely a copy of Zhuangzi’s thought. The Zhao Lun 肇论 (Buddhist Monk Zhao’s Comments), which is popular today, is said to be the work of Master Zhao, and it promotes the idea of “four non-motions”… All these were the development of Zhaijie, but they had new perspectives. Afterwards, Dharma came to China and refuted many stereotypes, establishing the Chan School. More sophisticated and more ingenious than Yixue, the Chan School thinks itself a step closer to transcendence and immediate enlightenment. It is based on the theory of retribution for disasters and fortune, which is enough to fool and control the unintelligent multitude. As a result, the supreme rulers allocated farmlands to support them and select premises to house them. In this way, all people urged and followed each other to unconsciously entrap themselves into denying monarchs and fathers. The continuous spread of Daoism and Buddhism had completely deprived people of their true selves. In this case, despite the supreme rulers’ emphasis of and promotion of Confucianism, people, who were mere talkers, paid no attention to the system of selecting talent, the teaching method in schools or the measures for establishment and practices; instead, they thought that the Dao could not be found except in Buddhism and Daoism. Consequently, Confucianism was snubbed, and Buddhism and Daoism were esteemed and prospered. (Li 1986, p. 3009)

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This analysis sketched a clear historical outline of the development of Chinese Buddhism from its introduction, transformation and to its evolution into the Chan School, and naturally it was the course in which Buddhism gradually took the place of Confucianism. Zhu took a Confucian standpoint indeed, but this analysis probed into Buddhism and its spread as an objective social and cultural phenomenon. It was soaked with his indignation. He had specifically perceived this phenomenon as the evolution of society and culture. It is the most conspicuous characteristic of Zhu’s analysis of Buddhism and its spread. As with the internal development of Buddhism, Zhu held that the spread of Buddhism in China had experienced the three stages of Zhaijie, Yixue and Chanxue 禅 学 (the Chan School)”; the learning of Chan was the most sophisticated and profound, and thus the most harmful. As for its specific evolution, it simply developed from “talking mere emptiness” to “talking motion and stillness” and to the cultivation of Chan, actually practicing by “not depending on words but sitting solemnly in silence.” Its theory was extremely simple, but it was the most menacing. For example: Buddhism spoke of emptiness at first, then it adopted the concepts of motion and stillness; later, it got so complicated that Dharma began to promote the independence of words, stressing that one could calm his mind and see the principles merely by sitting solemnly in silence. This idea dwarfed all the Buddhist theories that existed before, and even Daoism. Today’s Buddhism has been extremely prosperous. (Ibid., p. 3010) The Chan School is most vicious to the Dao. The thoughts of Laozi and Zhuangzi are not insulated from righteousness or principles, but Buddhism completely abandons ethnics and human relations. When it comes to the learning of the Chan School, it denies many aspects of the righteousness and principles once again. From this point of view, the Chan School has done the most harm. (Ibid., p. 3014) Buddhism reached its summit not only when it developed from early Buddhism to the Chan School during the Song dynasty, but also when “Daoism cannot withstand it anymore.” More than that, the Chan School was a combination of Buddhism and Daoism; therefore it was destructive to human ethics. In other words, it was a great problem for Confucianism. Now that Zhu viewed Buddhism as an absurdity, how did he epistemologically disclose its absurdity? Zhu had systematic opinions indeed. He commented for example: Buddhism polishes the mind very delicately, however. It treats the mind as if it

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peels a thing. It peels the thing again and again until there is nothing to be stripped of anymore. When the mind is stripped naked and finely polished, Buddhism views it as nature; but it does not know that this mind is simply the mind that is named by the saints. Therefore, Xie Liangzuo 谢良佐 commented, “The so-called nature in Buddhism is just the mind in the saints’ vocabulary; while the mind in Buddhism is merely intentions to the saints.” The mind should contain such principles. Buddhists are ignorant of such principle; therefore they view perception and movements as nature, including seeing, hearing, speaking and appearance. For a saint, however, seeing is based on the principle of seeing, hearing is based on the principle of hearing, speaking is based on the principle of speaking, motion is based on the principle of motion, and thinking is based on the principle of thinking. Qizi 箕子 had explained this as “the faculty of seeing, the faculty of hearing, obedience, respect and intelligence.” In contrast, Buddhism holds what can see, hear, speak, think and move is nature. (Ibid., p. 3020) Confucians cultivate benevolence, righteous, propriety and intelligence, while Buddhists develop only seeing, hearing, speaking and motion. For Confucians, the whole naturally contains many varying principles, which involve both the right and the wrong. Both the given physical world and the bestowed inner life contain these principles. In contrast, Buddhists view all things ambiguously, with no distinction between right and wrong. To Buddhists, what is horizontal is right, what is vertical is right, what is true is right, and what is false is also right; likewise, seeing improperly is out of this nature, seeing by principle is also out of this nature. But soon it will be found impractical in every aspect, so it is upside-down and is seldom right. (Ibid., p. 3022) In these two passages, Zhu first analyzed the Buddhist way of thought, arguing that Buddhism “treats the mind as if it peels a thing. It peels the thing again and again.” It is a characteristic of Buddhism to deeply analyze the spiritual phenomena of mankind. But in Zhu’s eyes, such analysis mainly provided a foundation for viewing perception and motion as nature, asserting that “The so-called nature in Buddhism is just the mind in the saints’ vocabulary; while the mind in Buddhism is merely intentions to the saints,” “Buddhism holds what can see, hear, speak, think and move is just nature,” and that means to “view perception and movements as nature.” Second, the nature and principles in Confucianism have specific meaning such as “benevolence, righteous, propriety and intelligence,” while Buddhism simply includes them into a subject’s “seeing, hearing, speaking and motion,” placing it into the situation “without any distinction between right and wrong. To Buddhists, what is horizontal is right, what is vertical is right, what is true is right, and what is false is also right.” In

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Zhu’s view, it completely emptied the concrete aspects of Confucianism such as “both the given physical world and the bestowed inner life,” thus becoming “enlightening, spiritual and transcendent” “emptiness” in Buddhists’ eyes. With the teaching of the Chan School shown to be an absurdity, why were people so fond of it? Why did well-educated scholar-bureaucrats admire it so much? In Zhu’s opinion, it was because the Chan School used a set of appealing parlance, for instance, it “polishes the mind very delicately” and critics of Buddhism did not understand this, thus leading to the prosperity of the Chan School. For example: Somebody asked, “Why are today’s scholar-bureaucrats all attracted and persuaded by the Chan School in their later years?” The Master replied, “It is because it is at the same level as you. The numerous books and essays you have read and learnt by heart all your life for the sake of benefits, payment and reputation are no use here, so you are pulled down by it. What it promotes is at your level, and is convenient, so why not approach it pleasantly? Wang Anshi 王安石 has read many books and spoken of many reasons; but finally he donated his residence, rebuilding it into a Buddhist temple and inviting two monks to run it. But he only invited the monks’ sneers. (Ibid., p. 3036) Many people have tried to refute Buddhism after the Cheng Brothers, but nobody has ever convincingly refuted it because they didn’t hit at the heart of Buddhism. Buddhism itself holds that it has seen the truth of mind and nature, but why can’t it be spread and put into practice? The reason is that it separates nature from its functions. The Dao of the saints, however, definitely specifies nature and adheres to it, and all teaching on cultivating the Dao must stick to it. Therefore, although the functions are available throughout the universe, there is nothing beyond nature. It is not that Buddhism does not see nature, yet it holds that there is nothing that cannot be done when it comes to the point of functions. Consequently it abandons monarchs and fathers and commits to the most extremes. That rests in its separation of nature and functions. (Ibid., p. 3039) Here, the first paragraph describes why people were attracted to the Chan School. “What it promotes is at your level”; then, it continues with “The numerous books and essays you’ve read and learnt by heart all your life for the sake of benefits, payment and reputation are no use here, so you’re pulled down by it,” confirming that Buddhist did have its attraction, have its responses to real life, and be capable of seeing through much vanity—the fact that Wang Anshi ingratiated himself with Buddhism in his later years was evidence that it was able to attract and persuade people. The second paragraph analyzed the epistemological source

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of the popularity of Buddhism. All generations of Confucians had misunderstood the distinction between Confucianism and Buddhism, and were entrapped in the “secondary sense” in rebuking Buddhism, thus favoring the popularity of the Chan School. Zhu thus analyzed: Today’s critics of Buddhism all rebuke it from the point of view of righteousness and benefits, but it is in a secondary sense. Such people resemble the Tang dynasty, which believed that Korea could not successfully defend the natural moat of the Yalu River, but the Koreans managed to anyhow. Today’s critics of Buddhism are just like this. Buddhism holds emptiness as its basic insight into the world; now that its primary premise is wrong, all that it embraces is incorrect, then why take the trouble to refute it from the point of view of righteousness and benefits?! I used to be doubtful when I studied it. As I learnt about Master Li’s comments, I did not believe it at first, holding reservations and taking a wait-and-see attitude. Later, I came to see its speciousness as I matured over the years. (Ibid., p. 3040) As for those who could not dismiss Buddhism from their minds, however, what they set their minds to must be like or even more than that. How can it be easily refuted with a tongue? In my humble opinion, we should promote our academic career so as to find the truth, and then we can certainly find out why they had set their minds to Buddhism instead of Confucianism. As right and wrong was distinguished in their minds, it would be all right to comment on their deviation from natural rules and human ethics, and it would not be necessary to take it as a standard anymore. (Zhu 1996, p. 1266) Zhu’s above-mentioned analysis of Buddhism as a social and cultural phenomenon was relatively objective. Having turned from the historical spread of Buddhism to refuting Buddhism, however, Zhu did his utmost to give prominence to epistemological elements, arguing that Buddhism spread because “What it promotes is at the same level as you, and is convenient, so why not approach it pleasantly,” and the critics of Buddhism had entrapped themselves in the “secondary sense” and had missed the point for generations, thus accelerating the spread of Buddhism. Therefore, the problem of Buddhism is an epistemological one rather than one of human values. For example, “Buddhism holds emptiness as its basic insight into the world; now that its foundation is wrong, all that it embraces is incorrect, then why take the trouble to refute it from the point of view of righteousness and benefits?!” Therefore, in Zhu’s opinion, if only one could tell the right and the wrong of Buddhism, “it would be all right whether we comment on their deviation from natural rules and human ethics, and it would not be necessary to be a standard anymore.” In other words, if the

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absurdity of Buddhism was epistemologically disclosed, it would not be necessary to refute Buddhism’s values. Zhu’s basic conclusion in his research of Buddhism was the understanding and orientation of Buddhism through methodology.

4 Zhu Xi’s Distinguishing between Confucianism and Buddhism Why did Zhu summarize scholar-bureaucrats’ flattering of Buddhism as an epistemological issue? It was mainly because of the angle of his research into the Chan School and his understanding of Confucianism and Buddhism thereof. As mentioned above, Zhu’s study of the Chan School was mainly out of his own interest rather than any pursuit of human values. Therefore, he approached the Chan School from the angle of rational speculation. In the atmosphere in which Zhu grew up, he did not wish to become a Chan monk, nor did he recognize any of the values of the Chan School. Not only his family tradition, but also his personality and his father’s bureaucratic experiences constrained his choice. The reason he approached Master Daoqian in his early days was because he had confirmed that he “had also grasped the ethos of the Chan School, which was enlightening, spiritual and transcendent” rather than any intention to study the ultimate truth of the Chan School. His visits to Daoqian continued because he “suspected that the monk was more profound than that.” Zhu had approached the Chan School with a critical eye, and he thus understood it the same way. That was the reason for his motives. However, approaching the Chan School with rational speculation does not necessarily mean understanding it from the same standpoint—Monk Zhao of the Northern and Southern dynasties took “metaphysical understanding” to approach Laozi, Zhuangzi and Mahayana Buddhism. He approached both Laozi and Zhuangzi by exploring the “kernel” of human life in his pursuit of “metaphysical understanding,” and made for Mahayana in his seeking of the “measures to ease the mind and lift the burden,” his pursuit therefore contained all the elements of faith in human life. This was not the case for Zhu Xi, however. At first, Zhu “suspected that the monk was more profound than that,” and later studied the Chan School as a part of his academic career. He remained like this until he paid a visit to Li Yanping. He “could rattle on about many reasons and principles…care for so many groundless propositions” at that time, and he was still “indulged in lectures given by others” even after he formally became Yanping’s student. All this showed that he had not only researched the Chan School in an academic manner, but he had also questioned Li Yanping in the same way.

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If we can say that Zhu’s choice of Li Yanping as his teacher fundamentally solved the problem of his choice between Confucianism and Buddhism, then his association with Wang Yingchen 汪 应 辰 on the other hand showed discrimination between Confucianism and Buddhism. It revealed basic opinions about why the Chan School was popular and why scholar-bureaucrats flattered Buddhism. In Zhu’s intellectual development, Wang was not only the most important driver, but also cast an important influence over his political and academic activities. As for Zhu’s company, the most influential in academic pursuit was Li Yanping, of course, for Li had played a decisive role in Zhu’s turning from Buddhism towards Confucianism. With respect to the field of politics, Zhang Jun had the highest position. In spite of this, Wang Yingchen was the person who combined political and academic activities and thus exerted great influence on Zhu. Wang was a famous statesman who advocated the School of Principles and a teacher of Lü Zuqian 吕祖谦. Wang, as the minister of the department in charge of the administration of nationwide officials, was sent to Fuzhou Prefecture. “When he traveled via Jian’an 建安 and met Zhu Xi, Wang praised Zhu as a talented man with great expectations, so immediately recommended the latter to the court.” The next year, Wang “took the office of director of the imperial library, and recommended Zhu to supersede him” (Shu 2001, pp. 284–299). It showed that Wang thought highly of Zhu’s administrative talent. But his greatest influence over Zhu was not by promoting him, nor pushing him forward in his academic career; rather, it was his influence in accelerating his anti-Buddhist positions and the latter’s rapid maturation in terms of the discrimination of Confucianism and Buddhism—In the Zhu Wengong Wenji 朱 文 公 文 集 (Collected Works of Zhu Xi), the first among all the letters on learning is the “Da Wang Shangshu” 答汪尚书 (“A Letter in Reply to Wang Yingchen”), and then are the letters between Zhang Shi and others. Such an arrangement suggests that his association with Wang Yingchen had catalyzed Zhu’s maturation of thought. Yanping had been dead for some time and mentally, Zhu was like a “poor man in a homeless condition.” In this situation, Wang entered Zhu’s world, and pushed forward Zhu’s maturation in thought through a series of discussions, questions and answers, helping to form Zhu’s thoughts on discrimination between Confucianism and Buddhism. Wang was 12 years older than Zhu, and their relationship was that between a tutor and a disciple as well as that between friends. But as an academic elder, Wang played his role not by giving guidance to Zhu, but by holding discussions with Zhu through letters. For example, “A Letter in Reply to Wang Yingchen” is about Wang’s questioning Yang Shi 杨时 and Xie Liangzuo for their casual adoption of the Buddhist language. Zhu defended these two saying, “Forms and matter are just nature, it is not that there is nature otherwise beyond forms and

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matter, therefore it is explained by saying that matter is immediately emptiness. In a passage repeatedly mentioning emptiness in his Yu Jie 语 解 (Commentaries), Yang said, ‘By analogy in general, there is no difference between forms and matter and nature, and nothing in the world is not empty.’ I suspect that those people were simply explaining Confucianism by the analogy of Buddhism, and they did not really think Confucian principles the same as Buddhist theories” (Zhu 1996, p. 1264). “I guess that Xie Liangzuo was just borrowing the steps of Buddhist practice likewise to explain the cultivating process of Confucianism when he mentioned Buddhist terms zhi 止 (stabilizing meditation) and guan 观 (clear observation). For example, can 参 (to be involved in study) in Buddhism is thought to be similar as zhi zhi 致知 (to acquire knowledge) in Confucianism, and zhi and guan are said to be equivalent to the Confucian term keji 克己 (self-abnegation). In reference to their collected remarks, it is clear that these people did not equate zhi and guan with keji… It is like Confucius saying that the availability of barbarians’ monarchy was not a patch on the unavailability of monarchy in China. Does it really mean that Confucius admired the barbarians? Cheng Hao once paid a visit to a Buddhist temple during their meal time, and exclaimed that the admirable manners of the three dynasties were all demonstrated there. Does it mean that Cheng really wanted to join the forest? When Hu Anguo took the Shurangama Sutra and the Sutra of Perfect Enlightenment, it is also because he thought that there was something useful in Buddhism, not that we Confucians should choose it to promote our learning” (Ibid., p. 1266). These arguments and explanations indicate that Zhu had taken a firm position against Buddhism but he did not criticize his predecessors’ borrowing of Buddhist theories and terms, nor did he denounce them as toadies of Buddhism when they used Buddhist quotations. In his letters in reply to Wang Yingchen, Zhu not only specified the difference between Confucianism and Buddhism in terms of cognitive psychology, but also analyzed the psychological reason why scholar-bureaucrats flattered Buddhism. He pointed out: Generally speaking, recent Confucian moralists have failed in their task by setting their minds too high. They often take pleasure in simplicity, transcendence and bypassing necessary steps when reading books or promoting their teaching. They ignore, dislike and discard unexceptionally all points that are complicated, delicate, tiny and demanding and thus worthy of more attention, thinking that they are coarse, superficial and trivial and do not deserve any trouble. Therefore, even well-informed people cannot fully understand the fundamentals of the world…. Not fully understanding the principles of the world, and being unavoidably perplexed inside, they do not reflect upon themselves or seek the truth from things around them; instead,

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they turn to heresies, and then draw more absurd inferences in the impenetrable field. By doing so, they remain befuddled all day long and ponder over meaningless words, dreaming of a sort of thorough enlightenment. These people do not know that things can be known only after they are observed, and that principles can be understood only after they are examined.… They view themselves as thoroughly enlightened; now that they are still muddled in this matter, what can they employ to enlighten themselves?… Why not concentrate on our Confucian teaching, follow the sequence of peculiar learning and then universal understanding, discuss the teaching with their mouths and reflect upon it in their minds, put it into practice and spare no effort to find the truth? In doing so, one should prefer complexity to simplicity, the preliminary things to the advanced ones, shallowness to profundity, and awkwardness to artfulness. Having working on it patiently and keeping it in mind for long, one would come to understand the principles thoroughly, knowing that it completely indicates all the extremes of the great, the mean and the right and contains all the heavenly principles and human affairs, and that it is really transcendent and unparallel. Meanwhile, he could perceive all early signs and handle human affairs easily. Even if in the face of the most formidable task and the stickiest situation, he could cope with it at ease, how could there be any hesitation or inadequacy of qi?… In comparison with the so-called thorough enlightenment of the non-Confucian learning, one will come to know that Confucianism has revealed the oneness of the world and that Buddhism is to the contrary even though he is not sure which is superior and which is inferior. (Ibid., pp. 1268–1269) That is Zhu’s distinguishing of Confucianism and Buddhism, and it is characterized by discriminating these two with practicality and impracticality. Furthermore, the problem of Buddhism mainly rested in its wholly depending upon “thorough enlightenment.” It can be viewed as having only understanding but not peculiar learning; in contrast, Confucianism must make people “perceive all early signs and handle human affairs easily. Even if in the face of the most formidable task and the stickiest situation, he could cope with it at ease.” As for the Confucian scholar-bureaucrats flattering Buddhism, it was because “they take pleasure in simplicity, transcendence and the bypassing of necessary steps when reading books or promoting their teaching.” Therefore, the remedy is “follow the sequence of peculiar learning and then universal understanding, discuss the teaching with their mouths and reflect upon it in their minds, put it into practice and spare no effort to find the truth? In doing so, one should prefer complexity to simplicity, the preliminary things to the advanced ones, shallowness to profundity, and awkwardness to artfulness. Having working on it patiently and keeping it in mind for long, one would come to understand the principles thoroughly, knowing

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that it completely indicates all the extremes of the great, the mean and the right and contains all the heavenly principles and human affairs, and that it is really transcendent and unparallel.” Despite this, there were still many toadies of Buddhism among the scholar-bureaucrats. Why was this? Zhu said, “Some people still sink into Buddhism though they are aware of the difference between Confucianism and Buddhism. Why is that? The reason is that some Buddhist preachers reason with these people by saying what you are seeking from the Confucian classics is merely the knowing of nature and the knowing of the Heaven, but if you take our way, you will be able achieve desirable effects without any painstaking effort; in addition, Buddhism can help you find absolute truths more than Confucianism can. These people are enticed because they are fond of expedient shortcuts and instant benefit and are not wary of such heresies; even worse, those who are bent on officialdom are often burdened with official affairs and indulged in physical pleasure and social benefits thus spend less energy in seeking the Dao, so they would rather take a chance in Buddhism although they are aware that there would be no way to seek the extreme Dao except for the Confucian classics” (Ibid., p. 1271). That is to say, although the Confucian reason for peculiar learning and universal understanding was simple and evident, Confucian scholars “are fond of expedient shortcuts and instant benefit and are not wary of such heresies,” they therefore “would rather take a chance in Buddhism although they are aware that there would be no way to seek the ultimate Dao except for the Confucian classics.” Viewed from this point, Zhu’s opposition to Buddhism was mainly focused on the practice of peculiar learning, on the idea that “things can be known only after they are observed, and that principles can be understood only after they are examined.” Compared with Buddhism, the difference between these two was that “Confucianism has revealed the oneness of the world and that Buddhism is on the contrary.” But in order to rectify the trend of flattering Buddhism among the scholar-bureaucrats, one must firmly stick to peculiar learning; in comparison with “a single stroke upwards” in Buddhism, that was what was meant by preferring “complexity to simplicity, the preliminary things to the advanced ones, shallowness to profundity, and awkwardness to artfulness.” Apparently, Zhu’s opposition to Buddhism seems to be for the sake of opposition itself. In their discussion, Wang Yingchen consistently held that one could really start with “simplicity” and “practicality” only if he “has insight first, then is thus able to approach plainness and simplicity” in his Confucian cultivation. This is a correct opinion that was generally recognized by Confucians. But in Zhu’s view, that was the very psychological source of scholar-bureaucrats’ falling into Buddhist traps. Their discussion about the relationship between Confucianism and Buddhism immediately turned out to be Zhu’s criticism of Wang. Zhu

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argued: In my humble opinion, you seemed to suggest in your letter that one has an insight first, then is thus able to approach plainness and simplicity. That seems to be something like the Chan School, which I cannot but express my suspicion. Confucianism promotes universal understanding based on peculiar learning; it starts its exploration and discussion from the plain and simple points, requiring people to keep things in mind and reflect upon them repeatedly and carefully; after long, one will gradually have his achievements and find the ultimate principle profound and limitless day after day. Master Chengs (Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi) said that a person who was good at learning must start his academic activities from things around himself, otherwise he could not be viewed as a good learner. What Master Chengs meant is simply the same as I do here. Now you assert that things cannot be reached by means of language or consideration, and that one must have an insight first, then is thus able to approach plainness and simplicity, it is to place the priority to the universal understanding rather than peculiar learning. It is like seeing newly grown hair before finding mountains, or lifting extremely heavy things before surpassing a single young… Actually it means to confine oneself first from learning and thinking, sitting there to expect a sudden idea without reason. Is it not the same as idling all day and dreaming of any success? Even if he can achieve something in the beginning, it still has nothing to do with heavenly principle, human minds, ethics, social orders, life goals or destination. What is achieved this way is for the sake of self-interest and can serve only this purpose. That is why Buddhism has poisoned society so widely that it cannot be stopped, and why people of insights are concerned and wanted to burn Buddhist books. (Ibid., pp. 1280–1281) In fact, Wang’s view is not completely unreasonable, and his theory is based on the priority of values: Its very source rests in the “sincerity” and the “enlightenment” thereof, both of which comes from the idea that “sincerity and thus enlightenment” in Zhongyong 中庸 (The Document of the Mean)—the course of “exploring nature at first and then reaching the stage of knowing all principles.” Because of his extreme repugnance of the idea of universal understanding in the Chan School, Zhu blindly insisted on his opposition. It thus became an antagonistic activity for its own sake, which confronted universal understanding with peculiar learning. Therefore, in Zhu’s view, the opposition between Confucianism and Buddhism was actually whether the beginning was universal understanding or peculiar learning. Zhu’s association with Wang Yingchen happened at a critical point in his mental maturation, so his distinguishing between Confucianism and Buddhism developed in his discussion

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with Wang and became a foundation in his academic criticism of the Chan School.

5 Zhu Xi’s Confronting the Chan School and Its Negative Effects After that, Zhu thus formed his foundation in grasping the relationship between Confucianism and Buddhism, especially in determining whether a scholar-bureaucrat was a toady of Buddhism; Zhu’s confronting of the Chan School became an accusation of the presumption of a certain scholar’s sinking into the Chan School rather than a critique of the Chan School itself. For example, Pingshan and Jixi of the three masters from the Wuyi Mountain had been viewed as “fond of Buddhism and Daoism” by Zhu, but neither of these two had ever been questioned in their Confucian views except by Zhu. Pingshan’s behavior at the end of his life was an irony to Zhu’s remark about his being “fond of Buddhism and Daoism.” For instance, Pingshan, “at the end of his life, told Zhu in detail the sequence of his life’s learning, imparted the thought of ‘returning not until far way,’ wrote the ‘Yixun’ 遗训 (‘Posthumous Instruction’) for his disciples, assigned Zhu to write a letter to Zhang Jun and urged Zhang in the general planning for the resistance against the Kin Kingdom and the restoration of China” (Shu 2001, p. 109). The “general planning for the resistance against the Kin Kingdom and the restoration of China” could not be a consideration of a Buddhist; therefore Zhu’s assertion that Pingshan was “fond of Buddhism and Daoism” proves that Zhu’s standard for the fondness of Buddhism and Daoism needs to be reconsidered. From Zhu’s comments, however, one can also see another implication for his fondness of Buddhism and Daoism, that is, being “fond of Buddhism and Daoism” or “mixed with Buddhism and Daoism” does not necessarily mean that a certain person had become a Buddhist or a Daoist; rather, it indicates that he had borrowed the language or methodology of Buddhism or Daoism. In a word, Zhu would view anyone who stressed universal understanding and who did not show his emphasis on the efforts of peculiar learning through the particular observation of things or the acquirement of knowledge as a supporter of the Chan School. In this matter, Lu Xiangshan 陆象山 showed a tinge of the Chan School. Lu specialized in universal understanding, promoting “the enlightenment of the original mind” and “the establishment of the fundamental first”—the so-called dispute between Zhu and Lu arose against this background. Zhu asserted that Lu preached the “learning of the Chan School” even before he contacted the latter. For instance, in a letter he wrote to a friend he said: I have heard of Lu Xiangshan’s good reputation for long, but it seems that he

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intends to bypass words and approach the ultimate principle directly. I wonder how he would interpret the idea to “think and distinguish, and then go all out for practices” in the Doctrine of the Mean. (Zhu 1996, p. 2291) Recently I have heard of Lu Xiangshan’s remarks, which are all of the Chan School, and all he does is change the vocabulary. People have been rushing to learn from him, but I’m afraid it would poison young people. It is a pity that I do not have the chance to know Lu and thus his theory, so I simply express my doubts here. (Ibid., p. 2293) The above-mentioned comments were all criticisms that Zhu made before he contacted Lu, and the reason he made such criticism was Xiangshan’s learning had “intended to bypass words and approach the ultimate principle directly.” “Bypassing words” was the same as the “wordless teaching,” which had been recognized by Confucianism; and “approaching the ultimate principle directly” was equivalent to the “chengyi” 诚意 (to have honesty) and “shendu” 慎独 (to remain prudent even when alone) stressed in The Document of the Mean and Daxue 大学 (The Great Learning). In Zhu’s eyes, however, because of his “excessively impractical goal of theory,” and his suspicion of “bypassing words,” Lu’s learning had become that of the Chan School. Judging from this criticism, Zhu viewed Lu’s learning as the Chan School merely because the latter had borrowed the methodology of the Chan School, or to say, Lu’s practices was somewhat similar to that of the Chan School. If Lu was really a follower of the Chan School, would he take the trouble to engage in a long dispute with Zhu? Aware of Zhu’s refutation of the Chan School, we can understand his criticism of Lu’s learning. Essentially, however, Zhu pointed out that Lu’s thoughts shared some similarity with the Chan School; for example, many comments by Lu in the Quotations of Zhu Xi are like this: Now Lu Xiangshan’s learning is really that of the Chan School, Zhang Shi and Lü Zuqian do not read Buddhist books, so they fail to see him through, but I know its features anyhow. Skim over Buddhist scriptures such as the Shurangama Sutra and Sutra of Perfect Enlightenment, and one can largely make out the outline of Buddhism. In general, Buddhism promotes that all sins and crimes would be cleared away once one saw it through. Such learning is really a shelter for rebels and traitors. (Li 1986, p. 2973) I once noticed how Lu Xiangshan discussed Buddhism with Wang Shunbo 王 顺伯. Lu asserted that Buddhism had the same insights as Confucianism, and the only difference rested in righteousness and benefits and that of public interest and self-interests. This opinion is wrong. If that were the case,

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Confucianism would have shared the same fundamentals as Buddhism. If that were the case, how does the dispute concerning righteousness and benefits arise? In fact, Confucianism is different from Buddhism in its very fundamentals: Confucianism views all principles as real, and Buddhism argues that all principles are of emptiness. (Ibid., p. 2976) Such comments are everywhere in the Quotations of Zhu Xi and the Collected Works of Zhu Xi, but to most, these remarks merely argued that there were too many similarities between Lu and the Chan School, i.e., that “our Confucianism would have shared the same fundamentals as Buddhism” if in Zhu’s own words. In Zhu’s view, that was absolutely unacceptable, therefore he set Confucianism completely against Buddhism. If such an absolutely antagonistic mode was taken to distinguish Confucianism from Buddhism, however, Lu’s learning was be bound to lean towards the Chan School. In this way, Confucian concepts such as “universal understanding” and “original mind” would certainly be eradicated from Confucianism; and the relationship between Confucianism and Buddhism would become an externally antagonistic one. Impersonally, such discrimination between Confucianism and Buddhism is not an objective standard to distinguish Confucianism from Buddhism; and methodologically, it is not a good method to criticize the Chan School or promote Confucianism. Zhu, however, had insisted on such external opposition to distinguish Confucianism from Buddhism, and thus systematically criticized the learning of the Chan School. In this way, his so-called discrimination between Confucianism and Buddhism turned out to be a severe constraint on the construction of his own theory. For example, Zhu systematically criticized the Chan School on three levels: The first level was the so-called language and words, the second was methodology, and the third was the seeking of learning. Zhu’s criticism of Pingshan and Jixi’s being “fond of Buddhism and Daoism” belongs to the first level, of course, mainly accusing Pingshan and Jixi of being fond of Buddhist scriptures or their works being a mixture of Buddhist terms; as for Zhang Wugou and Wang Shunbo’s being entrapped in the Chan School, it obviously involved the second level, i.e., their casual exertion of the theory and methods of the Chan School; but with respect to Lu Xiangshan, his thoughts were not only mixed with terms from Buddhism and Daoism, but also employed their theories and methods. What is more, Lu’s concepts of “the exploration and enlightenment of the original mind” were almost a copy of the teaching method for universal understanding in the Chan School, therefore Zhu remarked that Lu’s theory was “clearly the Chan School,” “really the Chan School” and “completely the Chan School.” In fact, when he confronted the Chan School with such a standard, both its ultimate criticism and its side effect would unavoidably be targeted as Confucianism.

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Zhu’s greatest contribution to Confucianism was his construction of a stately system of heavenly principle. Many of his concepts were about the transcendence and universality of the heavenly principle, such as “This principle pre-existed the Heaven and the Earth anyhow” and “This principle would remain the same even if the whole earth collapsed” (Ibid., p. 1). All these concepts were about transcendence and the universality of the heavenly principle, and they were all the theoretical basis of Confucianism, and a foundation for Confucians to comport themselves. But because “Confucianism views all principles as real, and Buddhism argues that all principles are of emptiness,” Zhu was resolved to demonstrate the heavenly principle with the particular course of natural genesis and evolution, and tried to realize the awareness of the heavenly principle by means of outwards cognition, that is, “observe one thing today, and another the other day.” Originally, in reference to Mencius’ theory that “forms and matter are just nature,” one should be able to grasp the universality of the heavenly principle immediately either through “following nature to act” or “returning to self to have honesty,” but as Zhu directed the way to the heavenly principle toward the external observation of objects and the external exploration of principles, it would result in the phenomenon of “being muddled by setting one’s mind to particular objects.” In fact, that would likely degrade the transcendent moral reason into the physical principles of particular things, so no wonder Zhu also had to exclude such phenomenon: “What sort of learning would it be? If one expected to achieve something in this way, he would be cooking sand for a meal” (Zhu 1996, p. 1792). He wanted to grasp the heavenly principle through physical cognition while exemplifying the heavenly principle through natural genesis and evolution.2 Consequently, the degeneration of the School of Principles would be inevitable. Another example is the issue of human nature. The inaugurators of the School of Principles picked up Mencius’ theory of goodness of human nature because they were planning to establish an ontological basis for the transcendence of human life and point out an ideal direction for human life. The idea that “nature is just principle” had become a hinge in the theory of the oneness of heaven and human beings in the School of Principles of the Song and Ming dynasties. But in order to avoid the universal trend of the Chan School, Zhu was resolved to embody human beings’ ultimately good nature with their physiological qualities; in this way, human nature as the ultimate good in Confucianism degenerated into an abstraction of a certain physiological quality of human beings. Zhu remarked, 2

Zhu’s emphasis on observing objects and acquiring knowledge was completely contrary in nature to his judgment of the idea that “all principles are of emptiness,” but is also consistent with it to a certain extent: He orientated the Chan School epistemologically, and meanwhile gave prominence to Confucianism; as for the difference between them, it merely existed between “universal understand” and “peculiar learning.”

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for example, “The qualities of physical composition are the nature of the Heaven and the Earth, only that such nature of the Heaven and the Earth goes that way. Good nature is like water, and the nature of physical composition is like sauce and salt: they taste likewise” (Li 1986, p. 68). On the other hand, knowing human nature had to depend upon the nature of physical composition. Zhu thus argued, “In general, a human being’s acquirement of such shape and qi thereof marks the availability of this principle in such shape and qi, and this principle thus available is called nature. The very mention of nature immediately involves life and physical composition, which cannot be viewed as the original form of nature. The original form of nature, however, is never mixed anyhow. Therefore, one needs to see the oneness and purity of the original form therein” (Ibid., p. 2430). In this way, human nature was embodied through natural genesis and evolution and meanwhile was known by exploring principles in particular objects, just as the heavenly principle was. More importantly, the concept of human nature was put forward as an ontological foundation of human life, so it was bound to be manifest in human minds and through the seeing, hearing, speaking and motions of human beings. Zhu, however, intentionally avoided the idea of the Chan School that “nature is indicated through functions”; consequently, the heavenly principle could not but be embodied at the abstract level of human nature. As a result, human nature could not be understood through the internal experience in ethical life anymore, which equated the mind with nature; instead, it must be explored by the external understanding of objects one by one. Zhu’s assertion that “one is required to understand through it that its original form does not separate from it and is not mixed” was a typical indication of the object cognition and abstract grasp of human nature. Based on this, because external cognition—from observing things and thus acquiring knowledge to have honesty and rectify mind—faces both the “problem of relation between dreams and awakeness” and the “problem of relation between human being and spirit,” whether the way of outward exploration could lead to the self-consciousness of human nature, i.e., to have honesty, had completely become a question of probability. In this way, Zhu’s intentional avoidance and external repulsion of the Chan School had become a constraint against the construction of his own theory, and as late as three hundred years later, this constraint was discovered by Wang Yangming, who revealed its effects one by one. Wang Yangming grew up under the pressure of Zhu’s learning, but because of his indulgence in writing skills in his early years and because of his fondness for Buddhism and Daoism, through his repeated failure in the imperial examination, he clearly saw the deficiency of his predecessors’ understanding of Buddhism and Daoism and the various defects in their opposition to Buddhism:

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Wang Jiaxiu 王嘉秀 asked, “…Daoists and Buddhists are largely the same as Confucians when they gain their ultimate achievements, only that they have the upper level but neglect the lower one, so they are not as complete as the saints; but it is undeniable that they have the same upper level as Confucians. Subsequent generations of Confucians have acquired only the lower level, thus splitting Confucianism and deviating from the truth. As a result, Confucianism has degenerated into the reciting of lines, the seeking of utility, and the commentary of classics. So the previous orthodox has now inevitably fallen into a heresy… Confucian scholars do not have to exclude Daoists and Buddhists; rather, they should be committed to the learning of saints. Where the learning of saints is clearly interpreted, Daoism and Buddhism will die out. Or otherwise, what one learns from Confucianism may be despised by Daoists and Buddhists. Is it not difficult when he wants the latter two sorts of people to learn from him? That is my humble opinion, and I wonder what you the master would think about it.” The master replied, “What you said is largely correct, only that the so-called ‘upper half’ and the ‘lower half’ are also a fallacy. As with the Dao of the saints, which suggests grandeur, the mean, perfectness and correctness, there is only the great coherence and the oneness, then how can there be the ‘upper half’ and the ‘lower half’?” (Wang 1992, p.18) Zhang Yuanchong 张元冲 asked in a boat, “Buddhism and Daoism are very similar to the learning of saints, which means the three have all acquired something about nature and destiny, but Buddhism and Daoism involve self-interest in their theories about nature and destiny, so they are far from the truth. Now we’ve noticed that both Buddhism and Daoism are also useful to us, I just wonder if we have to adopt them, too?” The master replied, “It is wrong to say ‘adopting them, too., The saints had exhausted nature and destiny and acquired the ultimate principle, so what do they not include into their knowledge? And what do they need to adopt from those two? All the uses of Buddhism and Daoism are the uses of Confucianism: The cultivation of bodies under the ultimate principle of nature and destiny in Confucianism suggests Daoism, and the freedom from worldly burden under the ultimate principle of nature and destiny in Confucianism is equivalent to Buddhism. The subsequent generations of Confucians, however, do not see the whole of the saints’ learning, and thus divide it into two parts and attribute them respectively to Buddhism and Daoism. Just take a house as an example. A hall consists of three rooms, which serves as a whole. Confucians do not know that these three rooms are all for our use; when they meet Buddhists, they give away one room to Buddhists; when they see Daoists, they give another room to Daoists; and then, they hold the middle room. Consequently,

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these Confucians as well as Buddhists and Daoists all hold partial ideas and remain ignorant of the rest. The saints share the same form as the Heaven, the Earth, man and all the things in the world, viewing all Confucianism, Buddhism and both Laozi and Zhuangzi’s thought as useful, so their teaching is called the great Dao. Buddhists and Daoists have their bodies due to self-interest, so they embrace only the small Dao.” (Ibid., p. 1289) These two passages can be viewed as Wang Yangming’s formal conclusion of his predecessors’ opposition to Buddhism. Wang Jiaxiu alluded to Zhu’s opinion of Buddhism and Daoism when he said that “Daoists and Buddhists are largely the same as Confucians when they gain their ultimate achievements, only that they have the upper level but neglect the lower one, so they are not as complete as the saints anyhow,” and as he remarked, “Subsequent generations of Confucians have acquired only the lower level, thus splitting Confucianism and deviating from the truth. As a result, Confucianism has degenerated into the reciting of lines, the seeking of utility, and the commentary work on classics, so the previous orthodox has now inevitably fallen into a heresy,” he described an unpleasant consequence that Zhu’s learning could avoid. Meanwhile, Wang Yangming’s rhetorical question, “As with the Dao of the saints, which suggests grandeur, the mean, perfectness and correctness, there is only the great coherence and the oneness, then how can there be the ‘upper half’ and the ‘lower half’” was directly made about Zhu’s antagonistic attitude toward Buddhism, therefore the idea of preferring “complexity to simplicity, the preliminary things to the advanced ones, shallowness to profundity, and awkwardness to artfulness” which Zhu had stressed was the opinion that “Subsequent generations of Confucians have acquired only the lower end, thus splitting Confucianism and deviating from the truth,” as criticized by Wang Jiaxiu. As with the latter passage, Wang Yangming used his famous “three room” imagery to criticize Zhu and his followers’ opposition to Buddhism.

6 The Historical Influence of Zhu Xi’s Antagonistic Attitude towards the Chan School Zhu’s lifelong opposition to Buddhism contained many defects, but due to his position in the School of Principles of the Song dynasty, his opposition to and antagonistic attitude towards Buddhism became a “tradition” for the School of Principles. Therefore, although Wang Yangming had clearly revealed the defects of Zhu’s opposition to the Chan School, Yangming’s disclosure was still viewed as a plunge into Buddhism and Daoism by subsequent generations of Zhu’s followers. For example, Luo Qinshun, a scholar official who was Wang Yangming’s contemporary and respected as “an influential successor of Zhu’s

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learning,” continued to oppose Xinxue 心学 (Learning of Mind). Therefore, generations of scholars engaged in the Learning of Mind since the time of Zhu have been driven away from the Chan School by Luo Qinshun 罗钦顺. In fact, it is equivalent to saying that the learning of mind and nature is the learning of the Chan School, and all the scholars of the School of Principles who promoted the learning of mind and nature were the “true successors” of Dharma. Here are some critical remarks that Luo made about the learning of mind, which was actually a branch of the School of Principles: In Lu Xiangshan’s learning I see nothing but the thought of the Chan School, but you my younger brother thought it was “like the Chan School.” The word “like” suggests that it is not. In my opinion, however, Buddhism has insight to the mind, but not nature, so it was with Lu Xiangshan. What they called the extreme Dao is no more than quick consciousness, and there appears to be no difference at first sight, so is it like Buddhism? (Luo 1990, p.114) Chen Xianzhang presented expressions such as “no learning thus no enlightenment,” “no beating no shouting,” “metal needles,” “clothes and bowl (legacy),” and “the bursting forth of true appearance,” which were all Buddhist terms. Did he think the Confucian classics inefficient and had to be made up with these Buddhist things? (Ibid., p. 150) Zhan Yuanming 湛元明 often held two sides in his debates. I once compared him to Yang Xiong; what is more, was he not a true successor of Xiangshan’s school? (Ibid., p. 115) …yet vilified Mencius and degraded him to the level of Dharma, destroying costumes and eradicating vital sources. The mention of such things would fill one with extreme abhorrence. It may be all right if they did harm only to themselves, but the fact is that countless ambitious learners have been misguided. (Ibid., p. 154) The above-mentioned comments involve almost all the scholars engaged in the Learning of Mind after Zhu’s time. Their criticism ranges from language and words to the methodology for enlightening the mind and understanding nature. To this extent, if we can say that Zhu was satisfied with attributing the teaching method of “universal understanding” to the Chan School, in Luo’s eyes, then, all learning of the mind was a legacy of the Chan School, and the so-called opposition to Buddhism meant returning the learning of the mind to the Chan School.

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Luo’s opposition to Buddhism indicated a mentality of “pure Confucianism,” but has given away all Confucian “rooms” to the Chan School in clear terms. After “mind and nature” and “enlightenment and self-consciousness” which were originally owned by Confucianism were given away to the Chan School, what else was left for Confucianism to preach? Luo remarked, “Buddhism views nature as enlightenment, and we Confucians hold that nature means principles, so it is self-evident who is right and who is wrong” (Ibid., p. 33). In other words, Confucianism and Buddhism both contained the same nature, but their difference rested in the terms “principle” and “enlightenment.” Buddhists were indulged in enlightenment, whereas Confucians stuck to the principle in nature. What did the School of Principle adhere to after “mind and nature” and “enlightenment” were eliminated? Now that Luo was viewed as the one who had “refuted Buddhism most clearly and thoroughly and defended the Dao (Confucianism) most effectively since the Tang dynasty” (Ibid., p. 178), the School of Principle that Luo had explained and promoted naturally became the orthodoxy of Confucianism. Then, what does his so-called “principles” refer to? Luo explained as such: What are principles on earth? In fact, there is only the qi which connects the Heaven and the Earth and has prevailed from the past to the present. Qi is characterized with oneness, and it circulates endlessly by moving and remaining still, coming and going, gathering and scattering, and ascending and descending. Developing from slightness to conspicuity and then returning from conspicuity to slightness, it is the law of four seasons, the life process of plants, the daily use and human relations of human beings, and the success, failure, gains and losses in human affairs. Being orderly despite variety and complexity, and being so without being known why, that is how the principle is. It is not that there is an independent thing at the beginning; rather, it depends on qi to exist, and clings to qi to circulate. (Ibid., p. 4) That was the heavenly principle according to Luo, and the theory thus established the purest learning of the School of Principles, which was not mixed with Buddhism or Daoism. Such principle was no more the heavenly principle known for its transcendence and metaphysical character, which Zhu had promoted by saying, “This principle existed before the Heaven and the Earth” and “This principle would remain the same even if the whole earth collapsed”; instead, it became the principle as “the law of four seasons, the life process of plants, the daily use and human relations of human beings, and the success, failure, gains and losses in human affairs.” Such learning of the School of Principles was based on the “coming and going or gathering and scattering of qi,” thus becoming the learning about the qi-based genesis and evolution, or the

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physical knowledge of particular objects on the basis of “qi-based genesis and evolution.” Such knowledge of particular objects certainly has its own value, but the question is when did the School of Principles become opposed to the Chan School and take the peta-physic knowledge about particular objects as its own highest guideline, making it the living embodiment of Zhu’s idea of preferring “complexity to simplicity, the preliminary things to the advanced ones, shallowness to profundity, and awkwardness to artfulness”? But was it the fundamental purpose of the School of Principle in its opposition to Buddhism and Daoism? If Luo’s theory is matched with Zhu’s criticism, was not the physical knowledge of particular objects on the basis of “the order of qi,” the learning that had been criticized by Zhu as “being muddled by setting one’s mind to particular objects” and “cooking sand for a meal”？All these were extensions of Zhu’s ideas on peculiar learning, but its opposition to the metaphysical direction of the School of Principles is also undeniable. If viewed as the development of the School of Principle, it was actually destructive. Therefore, with respect to Luo’s theory on the School of Principles, which was advanced through the discriminating mind and nature and refuting the Chan School, Liu Jishan commented, “Luo Qinshun resolvedly discriminated Confucianism from Buddhism by the concepts of mind and nature, taking the learning of mind into the Chan School, so he would rather talk about nature by abandoning the concept of the mind and separating them into a rigid dichotomy. By doing so, he laid his learning between the non-external and the non-internal, presenting an alternative view of mind, which was physical knowledge in general after all. … To this extent, both Zhu and the Cheng Brothers’ learning were also spoiled, and their theories will keep a learner away from the Dao all his life…” (Liu 1985). “Luo threw away the apple because of its core, separating the whole learning into a rigid dichotomy. By doing so, he could see through the defects of his rivals, indeed, but he had also thrown away his own treasure” (Ibid.). That had been the representative trend of the School of Principles in opposing Buddhism and Daoism after Zhu, and was the necessary destination of the external opposition to Buddhism from language and words to methodology. From Zhu to Luo, their opposition to Buddhism and Daoism was necessary to gain dominance over the Chan School in Chinese philosophy. One of their missteps was that they only externally confronted the Chan School. Another mistake was they almost took the theory of the Chan School as a standard to clear alleged toadies of Buddhism within the School of Principles. Consequently, the more resolvedly they opposed Buddhism, the stronger the destructive effects they brought to the School of Principles. Therefore, Qianjia Hanxue formed in the direction of the learning of qi of the Ming dynasty, aiming to return to Confucianism during the Han dynasty, but also holding a banner of Hanxue to argue against the learning during the Song dynasty. That is equivalent to saying

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that the spread of Buddhism in China and 800 years of communication between China and India since the Han dynasty was a historical mistake which should not have taken place. And that Buddhism, which originated from India, had brought nothing but the mysterization and defilement of Confucianism to Chinese Culture. In fact, it had been reduced to cultural nationalism and populism, which were narrow-minded. That is a very important historical lesson, and it was rooted in the external opposition to Buddhism, in its parochial cultural nationalism and populism. A nationalist needs to stick to his national standpoint, indeed, but cultural nationalism should never take the repulsion of foreign culture as its own cornerstone. Likewise, a populist should insist on the purity and popularity of his national culture, but he should never guarantee his popularity and purity by opposing a transcendent pursuit or a metaphysical concern. If, in the School of Principles, the opposition to Buddhism from Zhu Xi to Luo Qinshun might have been justified somehow, we would be merely repeating their mistakes as cultural integration between China and the West occurs, clinging to “pure Confucianism” of Hanxue to research and interpret the School of Principles. This is the conclusion that we can draw from the opposition to Buddhism from Zhu to Luo.

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