Sophia, Voi. 40, No. 1, June 2001. Copyright 9 2001 Ashgate Publishing Limited.

A NOTE ON THE LAW OF CONTRADICTION A N D H U M A N FREEDOM JAMES P. DANAHER

Department of Philosophy Nyack College, Nyack, N.Y. USA God's sovereignty is explicitly set forth in several places in Scripture. For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brethren. Moreover whom he did predestinate, them he also called: and whom he called, them he also justified, them he also glorified. (Romans 8:29-30 KJV) Equally, however, since God's communication to us is intended as a directive or a communication that anticipates a response on our part, there is the obvious implication that those to whom God is speaking are free agents capable of responding to God's communication out o f their own will9 Herein lies a contradiction9 If God is sovereign and determines all things, there is no room for another free agent and human beings are not free. But Scripture implies that we are free. Thus, God's word seems to lead to a contradiction. Many have tried to resolve this contradiction by redefining freedom or sovereignty. Others have used the contradiction to show the inconsistency o f Scripture. My inclination is to think that there is something wrong with our idea o f a contradiction. Aristotle, who formalized the laws o f logic, including the law o f contradiction, thought the law o f contradiction was controversial and had to be argued for, which he did (Metaphysics, IV, 4). But there have been many from Hericlims to Hegel who have leveled powerful arguments against it. Even Plato, who is a defender o f the law, shows us in several places throughout the dialogues (most especially in the Euthydemus) that it is a law that is not easy to understand or apply. A square circle is certainly a contradiction, but Socrates can both be a father and not be a father at the same time. Believing that the law o f contradiction was the cornerstone o f all thought and that which is most certain, Aristotle was interested to explain the conditions under which the law o f contradiction did and did not apply. Basically, it does not apply to relations but only attributes. Thus, Socrates can be a father to his two sons but not be a father to a dog because father is a relation rather than an attribute. Additionally, a contradiction occurs only when an attribute is and is not attributed to the same subject at the same time and in the same respect9 9 such a principle is the most certain of all; which principle this is, let us proceed to say. It is, that the same attribute cannot at the same time belong

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JAMES P. DANAHER and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect. (Aristotle,

Metaphysics, IV, 3, 18-20) And, it is impossible that contrary attributes should belong at the same time to the same subject... (Aristotle, Metaphysics,IV, 3, 25-26) 9

This law of contradiction, however, is not as basic as Aristotle had thought and it is in fact based on another of Aristotle's principles which concerns the way we formulate our concepts or ideas of species9 According to Aristotle, our idea of a species is best conceptualized by uniting the genus of a species or kind with its differentia or the characteristic that differentiates that species from the other members of the genus (Metaphysics VII. 12.8-40 & Post. Analytics II. 13). To establish a clear concept of the species 'man,' we combine the genus 'animal' and the differentia or that characteristic which distinguishes man from other animals - for example, that he is rational. Thus, the species 'man' is conceptualized as, 'rational animal.' It may be true that our clearest concepts are those which proceed from, and are members of, a single genus. That is, in order for our concepts to be clear and precise each concept of a species must be a member of one and only one genus or greater concept which units species the way species unit individual things. Aristotle's model for conceptualizing species has been enormously influential and Western thought has very closely followed his formula. In biology we classify and understand species under a single lineage whereby each concept of a species or kind belongs to only one genus. Every family of living things belongs to only one order, and every order belongs to only one class, and every class to only one phylum and kingdom. Such ordering gives us neat and clear concepts and satisfies our desire to conceptualize things in as simple and clear a way as possible. But the platypus does not fit neatly into a single genus or more precisely into the class designated as 'mammal.' Indeed, many species do not seem to fit such a neat Aristotelian model, and might better be conceived if we understood them to belong to more than a single genus. Of course, this Aristotelian model for conceptualizing species does not apply merely to biological species. In fact, we attempt to conceptualize all of our experience in a similar fashion, and in a similar fashion much of our experience seems to resist such classification. But in spite of the fact that many of our concepts might be better conceived if we understood them as descending from multiple genuses, the Aristotelian model of concepts which descend from a single genus is deeply entrenched in our thinking. Furthermore, it is this model that makes the law of contradiction work as consistently as it does. Indeed, on another model in which concepts are thought to descend from multiple genuses, the law of contradiction often does not hold because, as members of more than a

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single genus, a concept could contain contradictory attributes which it inherited by being a member o f two distinctly different genuses. O f course, there are not a lot o f examples o f concepts that descend from multiple genuses, but that is largely due to Aristotle's enormous influence. Some examples, however, do exist. In the Symposium, Socrates pictures love (eros) as such a concept. He tells us that the species love (eros) does not originate from or belong to a single genus, but has a dual origin which he allegorizes with a story about the birth of Eros. On the day of Aphrodite's birth the gods were making merry, and among them was Resource, son of Craft. And when they had supped, Need came begging at the door because there was good cheer inside. Now it happened that Resource, having drunk deeply of the heavenly nectar - for this was before the days of wine - wandered out into the garden of Zeus and sank into a heavy sleep, and Need, thinking that to get a child by Resource would mitigate her penury, lay down beside him and in time was brought to bed of Love. So Love became the follower and servant of Aphrodite because he was begotten on the same day that she was born... Then again, as the son of Resource and Need, it has been his fate to be always needy; nor is he delicate and lovely as most of us believe, but harsh and arid, barefoot and homeless, sleeping on the naked earth, in doorways, or in the very streets beneath the stars of heaven, and always partaking of his mother's poverty. But secondly, he brings his father's resourcefulness to his designs upon the beautiful and good, for he is gallant, impetuous, and energetic, a mighty hunter, and a master of device and artifice. (Plato, Symposium 203bl-203d7) Thus, love or eros is not a species which belongs exclusively to a genus of desire or want, but neither is it exclusively a species of satisfaction and contentment. Eros is instead understood as somehow in the middle. It is a species o f desire or want, and, at the same time, it is a species of satisfaction or contentment. Plato also mentions in the same text that the philosopher, or lover o f wisdom, also has a parentage or descent from both wisdom and ignorance (Plato, Symposium, 204b), and thus is both ignorant (otherwise he would not have to seek wisdom) and wise (otherwise he would not know what to seek) simultaneously, and in the same respect. With both these examples it is not that we go back and forth between the two genuses and are at one moment wise and at another ignorant, or in one respect wise and in another ignorant. Rather it seems that we share in both genuses simultaneously and in the same respect. With this genealogical model and the idea of descent from multiple genuses we can conceptualize genuine contradictions existing within a concept simultaneously and in the same respect. Take for example our concept of race. Imagine that my mother was black and my father white. The attributes of both races would be present simultaneously and in the same respect. It is not that I have black attributes at one time and white attributes at another, or that I am in one respect black but in

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another respect white. I am both black and white simultaneously, and in the same respect. If you think, 'but it is in different respects that we are black or white,' that is a good indication o f how deep a hold Aristotle has on our thinking. There are other examples but perhaps the best example and the place where this genealogical model and its idea o f descent from multiple genuses is most appropriate is in regard to our conceptualization o f human nature and the kind o f freedom that Scripture seems to attribute to human beings. Indeed, unlike the Aristotelian model according to which a concept descends from a single genus, and therefore man cannot be free and not free simultaneously because o f the law o f contradiction; a genealogical model would allow us to conceptualize man as descending from two very different genuses. I f one genus is free and the other not free, then human nature could be conceptualized as both free and not free simultaneously and in the same respect. Such a way o f conceptualizing seems very appropriate for a Scriptural understanding o f human nature, since Scripture not only implies that man is both free and not free, but equally seems to point to the fact that man is in fact a member o f two very different genuses. We are creatures o f the earth and o f an animal genus (Job 25:6). But in addition to being members of the animal genus, we are also made imago dei (Gen. 5:1) and thus have a divine descent as well. I f we are members o f two genuses - one free and another not free - it is possible to conceptualize our nature as possessing a freedom which we have inherited by being a member o f one genus and an absence o f freedom which we have inherited by being members o f another genus. As with the other examples, it is not that in some respects we are free and in other respects not free, or that at one moment we are free and at another not free. If our nature is understood as having a genealogical descent from two very different genuses, it could well be that we are, in the same respect, free and not free simultaneously. Of course, we do not conceptualize our nature in such a way, but instead follow an Aristotelian model which gives us simple concepts which descend from a single genus. Such concepts are attractive became they give us a simple and neat conceptual understanding, but such concepts, although appealing to our understanding, do not fit well either with the human condition as we experience it, or with what we find in Scripture. If, on the other hand, we were to accept a genealogical model for conceptualizing human nature, rather than the one Aristotle gives us, we could conceive that human beings are both free and not free simultaneously and in the same respect, as both our experience and the Scripture seems to indicate. Certainly there may be moments or respects in which our freedom seems very meager, while at other times our freedom is very apparent. The truth, however, is that we are never completely free, just as we are never completely without freedora. That is because our freedom is always convoluted within an enigmatic human nature that is the result o f a descent from two very different genuses. Thus, human freedom and God's sovereignty do not stand in contradiction. The contradiction rather exists within human nature itself.

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Bibliography/References Aristotle. Metaphysics. Ed. Richard Mckeon. The Basic Works of Aristotle. New York: Random House, 1941. --, Posterior Analytics. Ed. Richard Mckeon. The Basic Works of Aristotle. New York: Random House, 1941. Plato. Symposium. Trans. Michael Joyce. The Collected Dialogues of Plato. Eds. Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns. Princeton, N J: Princeton University Press, 1989.