JOEL I. FRIEDMAN

AN O V E R V I E W OF S P I N O Z A ' S E T H I C S *

INTRODUCTION It is generally acknowledged that the Ethics is Spinoza's greatest work. He is supposed to have completed it in 1675, less than two years before his death in 1677, although early drafts of various parts had been circulating among friends and intellectual peers as early as 1665.1 Spinoza even showed Leibniz the manuscript of his Ethics in 1676 when Leibniz visited him at the Hague. 2 Indeed, Leibniz owed a great debt to Spinoza, since in the Ethics we find so many characteristic Leibnizian doctrines, either explicitly or implicitly. For example, one finds an explicit version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, a special version of the Identity of Indiscernibles (P4, El), a version of the Principle of Plenitude (corresponding to Leibniz' Principle of Perfection), a distinction between logical and causal necessity, an implicit distinction between finitary versus infinitary analysis, hints of reflection principles, an implicit doctrine of unconscious perception, and hints of a relational view of space and time. All these doctrines were developed to a very great degree by Leibniz, but they can already be found in Spinoza's Ethics, in some form or other. One of the distinctive features of the Ethics is that it is written in the deductive style of Euclidean Geometry. Indeed, Spinoza was quite right to hold that the formal deductive apparatus of Euclidean Geometry could just as well be applied to substances, modes, and attributes as to planes, points, and lines. Thus, Spinoza starts out with axioms, definitions, and postulates, which contain his philosophical terms, and proceeds to deduce propositions, as well as give explanations, all in the manner of Euclid. However, the subject matter of the Ethics has very little to do with Geometry. While Spinoza's deductions are not that rigorous, I have shown in other papers ('A Formalization of Spinoza's Ethics, Part I' and 'Spinoza's Denial of Free Will in Man and God') that they can be formalized according to the standards of mathematical logic, provided that one is willing to supply quite a number of suppressed premises. 3 These premises, however, are in no way Synthese 37 (1978) 67-106. All Rights Reserved. Copyright © 1978 by D. ReMel Publishing Company, Dordreeht, Holland.

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foreign to Spinoza's system, and I believe most of them can be textually justified. In all fairness to Spinoza, the methods of mathematical logic were not available to him. Thus, he did the best he could with the deductive apparatus that was available to him. The Ethics is divided into five parts, and only Part IV deals primarily with ethics. Since Spinoza is a thorough-going naturalist, he thought he could deduce ethics from metaphysics, epistemology, and psychology, together with naturalistic definitions of ethical terms. Thus, he focused primarily on these other areas. Part I deals with God, Part II with mind and body, Part III with the emotions, Part IV with ethics, and finally, Part V with the power of reason over the emotions, and with human immortality. Let us begin with Part I.

I. OF GOD The primary notion of Spinoza's philosophy is substance, which he defines as "that which is in itself and is conceived through itself" (Ds, El). In other words, a substance is a self-contained, independent being, both ontologically and conceptually. Spinoza goes on to argue that a substance cannot be caused by anything else, otherwise it would not be in itself (Cor P6, El). Therefore, he concludes that it must be a cause of itself. I'regard this as a very questionable step, but Spinoza does make it. He then concludes that the essence of any substance involves existence (D~, El). Hence, a substance necessarily exists (PT,E1). This, in primitive form, is the Ontological Argument, which Spinoza subsequently applies to God, a very special substance. Spinoza defines 'God' as "the substance consisting of infinite [that is, infinitely many] attributes, each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence" (D6, El). Spinoza refers to God as "the absolutely infinite being" (D6, El). In other words, God is the maximal substance (my phrase). Thus, by Spinoza's full Ontological Argument, this maximal substance necessarily exists ( P l y , E l ) . It should be emphasized that Spinoza's Ontological Argument is given in two stages. Now one may question Spinoza's Ontological Argument. To our modern logical ears, it admittedly has a horrible sound. For, how can God be heard from Logic alone? Since Hume, we have heard, instead, that all purely a priori

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arguments for God's existence are fallacious. And since Kant, we have also heard that 'existence' is not a predicate, or more accurately, not a predicate which adds anything to the subject (even if it is technically a predicate). Moreover, since Frege and Russell, we have heard the theory of descriptions, and the corresponding critique of the Ontological Argument as involving a misuse of definite descriptions. Actually, using the techniques of mathematical logic, I have found a way to formalize Spinoza's Ontological Argument, without requiring 'existence' as a predicate, but only as an existential quantifier, and without requiring a misuse of definite descriptions. (See may paper, 'Was Spinoza Fooled by the Ontological Argument?'). Ironically however, my formalization has produced (at least) two versions of the Ontological Argument. One version is indeed deductively valid, but then its premises are not logically necessary. The other version has logically necessary premises, but alas, it is invalid. This however, is just what one would expect. God doesn't come from Nothing, out of Pure Logic or Semantics. What I maintain is that the versions I have arrived at are the result of a deep ambiguity in Spinoza's use of the phrase, 'cause of itselP (eausa sui). This can mean at least three things: (i) causally necessary (independent) being, (ii)logically necessary being, or (iii)metaphysically necessary being. Given the above distinctions, it is my view that Spinoza did essentially misuse modal concepts and did confound causal necessity with logical or metaphysical necessity, at least in the context of the Ontological Argument, though he did not essentially misuse existential concepts of definite descriptions. On the other hand, in note I of (P3~, El), Spinoza seems to have a clear idea of the distinction between logical and causal necessity. So he does not always confound these notions. Nevertheless, it is my thesis that Spinoza was fooled by the Ontological Argument (and so were a lot of other philosophers), primarily because of modal confusion. However, in mitigation, it should be stated that modern modal logic had not yet been invented. Thus, Spinoza had no way of knowing that certain axioms of modal logic hold for logical necessity but not for causal necessity. Moreover, it is very questionable, and indeed the issue turns on this, whether these modal axioms hold for metaphysical necessity, whatever that is. Going on with my overview, it should be mentioned that Spinoza also gives various alternative 'demonstrations' for God's existence, and in particular, he gives one which requires a very strong version of the Principle

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of Sufficient Reason, namely, "for the existence or non-existence of everything there must be a reason or cause". 4 Thus, according to Spinoza, any possible object which is not actualized must have a reason or cause for not being actualized, This implies that any possible object which has no cause or reason for not being actualized (or which is not prevented or hindered from being actualized) will in fact be actualized. He goes on to argue, in effect, that since nothing has the power to prevent or hinder the possibility of God from being actualized, it follows that God does exist. For those of us who do not see the necessity of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, the argument loses its force. Spinoza gives further alternative demonstrations of God's existence, but I will pass these over. Going further, Spinoza argues that there can be only one substance, namely, the maximal substance, God (Pta, El). For, any other substance would have to share some attribute with the maximal substance, which has all attributes (in Spinoza's sense of'attribute'). Thus, this other substance would be conceived through the maximal substance, which is impossible by the in-itselfness of substance. Hence, there could not be another substance besides God. This is Spinoza's monism. (It should be mentioned that Spinoza could just as well have defined 'substance' as 'that which is in itself' (a point proved by E. M. Curley). s For, it follows in his system that anything which is in itself is a cause of itself, and hence, by Axiom 4, Part I ("The knowledge (cognitio) of an effect depends upon and involves the knowledge of the cause"), it follows that this cause of itself is conceived through itself. Thus, anything which is in itself is conceived through itself, and is thus a substance). The upshot of all this is that according to Spinoza, there necessarily exists exactly one thing which is in itself, namely God. Nothing else can be in itself. There necessarily exists exactly one substance. It might be asked, 'What about bodies and souls, and a whole lot of other things?' Spinoza's answer is that all other things are not substances, but merely modifications of the one substance, God. Spinoza calls such modifications modes. Thus, bodies and souls are modes, not substances. They are modes under the attributes of extension and thought, respectively. It follows that all things (except God) are not in themselves, but in God. Moreover, God is also in God. Thus, everything whatever is in God (P1 s, El).

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Thus, God is the immanent and not the transcendent cause of all things (Ply, El). This is Spinoza's Pantheism. Since God is absolutely infinite, it follows that there must be infinitely many modes expressed in infinitely many ways, that is to say, expressed under tile infinitely many attributes of God. These modes follow necessarily from God (and his attributes) (P~ 6, El). For what could prevent God from having infinitely many modes, under infinitely many attributes? Nothing external could, because there could exist nothing external to God; and nothing internal, because these are all consistent with God's nature. Thus, according to Spinoza, God must necessarily have infinitely many modes under infinitely many attributes. A more direct demonstration of God's infinitely many attributes comes from (P9, El): "The more reality or being each thing has, the more attributes belong to it". Thus, since God has the maximum reality, he must have the maximum number of attributes, that is, infinitely many. If this sounds too Platonistic, then we can simply say that God must have more attributes than any finite number. The point is he could not have just two or three, or any other finite number of attributes. 6 Thus, (Pg, El), together with (P16, El), may be regarded as Spinoza's Principle of Plenitude. Now what is an attribute? Spinoza defines 'attribute' as "that which the intellect perceives of substance as (tanquam) constituting its essence" (D4, El). (Note that tanquam may also be translated, 'as it"; hence the difficulty). This definition has given much trouble to Spinoza scholars, so I would like to give my interpretation. We should regard an attribute as a concrete, objective, primitive property or power of God, which actively expresses God's essence, and through which that essence is perceived. Note that 'property' is being used here in its minimal logical sense, not in the classical sense of 'inhering' in an object. Still, attributes are not 'things', in Spinoza's sense. It seems absurd to regard an attribute as ontologically dependent upon the intellect, even though °attribute' is defined in terms of 'intellect'. For later on, Spinoza states that the intellect (whether finite or infinite) is a mode under the attribute of thought ((Psi, El) and its demonstration). Thus, any intellect is ontologically dependent on the attribute of thought. It should be clear that one must distinguish ontological from definitional dependency. Thus, attributes may be definitionally dependent on the intellect, but the

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intellect is ontologically dependent on attributes, in particular, the attribute of thought. Again, the intellect may be definitionally prior to attributes, but attributes are ontologically prior to the intellect. Given these considerations, I do not regard the subjectivist interpretation of God's attributes as viable. Now the objectivist interpretation may be challenged as follows: why didn't Spinoza simply define 'attribute' as 'that which constitutes the essence of substance'? Why did he need to bring in intellect, if attributes do objectively exist independently of intellect? My answer is as follows: something would still have been left out of such a definition, namely, that each attribute is a way or means for the intellect to perceive God's essence. Thus, on my view, an attribute has two main characteristics. First, an attribute is objectively a part of God's essence. For, God is deft'ned as having infinitely many such attributes, and thus, any single attribute is only one among many. Secondly, an attribute is a way or means for any intellect to perceive God's essence. However, any attribute fully expresses God's essence (and thus 'constitutes' God's essence, in some sense of 'constitutes' (a point I owe to Donagan)), though an attribute is only a part of that essence and only one among many ways for any intellect to perceive that essence. According to my interpretation of Spinoza, it is logically impossible for any intellect, including God's intellect, to perceive God's essence wholly bare, shorn of all attributes. Rather, any intellect perceives God's essence through some attribute or other. In the case of God, He perceives His own essence through infinitely many attributes, simultaneously. Thus God has infinitely multiple perception. One more crucial feature of the attributes should be mentioned, namely, that all the attributes are parallel or isomorphic to each other, or in other words, identical in structure. This identity of structure is required, since all the attributes must express the same unique essence of God. Thus, no one attribute, including the attribute of thought, can have a privileged position. That is why, to anticipate Part II, "the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things" (see (PT, Pa, E2) and their demonstrations and scholia, as well as (A4, El)). Thus to summarize: God is the maximal substance, which necessarily exists. All other things are modifications of this one substance, and all such modifications fall under the infinitely many isomorphic attributes of God. All things are in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God.

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/

J \

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\

Fig. 1. Spinoza's metaphysical system presented thus far may be diagrammed as in Figure 1. I regard this as the basic" intuitive model of Spinoza's system. There is not more than one substance (as Gueroult sometimes hints at), v but exactly one such substance. There is not just one essential Attribute (as Hallett definitely states), 8 but there are infinitely many attributes, that is to say, more than any finite number (Pg, El). (Again, if this be doubted, consider that in (D6, El), it is much more natural to interpret "infinitis attributis" collectively, as 'infinitely many attributes', as opposed to distributively, as 'infinite attributes'; otherwise, Spinoza would be guilty of unnecessarily repeating himself with the phrase, "infinitam essentiam" in the very same definition (of 'God')). Nor is any attribute identical with the one substance (as Curley seems to hold). 9 How could that be, since there is exactly one substance but infinitely many attributes? Rather, I would say that each attribute may be said to have the same identical role as substance, in the realm of perception. (This point is made by Thomas Mark in his paper, 'The Spinozistic Attributes'). I would also add that attributes are not 'things', in Spinoza's sense, though they are of course 'second-order things', in the minimal sense intended by logicians. However, for Spinoza, only substance and its modes are things. He almost never uses 'thing' in connection with attributes.

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Some commentators have claimed that the one substance is identical to the totality or sum of the infinitely many attributes. This may be a viable interpretation, though it seems to me more like a reconstruction. I would prefer to interpret Spinoza as holding that a substance simply has or possesses attributes, though it is not identical with any one of them nor with the sum of them. All this, in spite of some of Spinoza's remarks in Letter 9.10 As stated above, I regard the above diagram as representing the basic intuitive model of Spinoza's system, not to be tampered with. I think it would be a failure of logical nerve to deviate from this basic model in the slightest, when interpreting the rest of Spinoza's system. For my own part, I would rather give up every other of my subsequent interpretations than give up any of these basic interpretations. This I take as a methodological rule. Continuing with Spinoza's metaphysics, all modes follow necessarily from God, either causally or logically. As I interpret Spinoza, with Curley's help 11, infinite modes follow from God with logical necessity, thus in finitely many steps (P23, El), whereas finite, mutable modes follow from God with causal necessity only, thus in infinitely many steps. That is to say, every finite, mutable mode follows from God only via an infinite causal series of finite modes (P28, El). For example, my body is a finite mutable mode under the attribute of extension. Thus it follows from God only via an infinite causal series of finite physical things. However, the whole physical universe is an infinite mode, also under the attribute of extension, and thus, according to Spinoza, follows from God with logical necessity. This may be interpreted to mean that the statement 'the physical universe exists' is logically (finitely) derivable from the statement 'there is an absolutely infinite substance (with extension as one of its attributes)', using perhaps definitions and even 'meaning postulates' (partial definitions, in Carnap's sense). How such a logical derivation is accomplished I have no idea, but apparently this is what Spinoza held. Similar remarks may be made about finite minds and God's infinite intellect, which is an infinite mode. Given these considerations, it follows that no finite, mutable mode can be logically derived from God. However, the whole infinite series does logically follow from God or his attributes. Now according to Spinoza, God is infinite, eternal, and immutable (D6,P19, Cor2P2o, El). Thus, derivatively, the infinite modes are also infinite, eternal, and immutable (P21,P22, El). However, finite, mutable

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modes are quite finite, temporal, and mutable. (Finite formal essences, regarded as finite modes, on the other hand, are eternal and immutable). The reason it is possible for there to be mutable modes is that they follow from God only causally, not logically, Moreover, as Spinoza points out in Part II, an infinite mode can preserve the same infinite and eternal structure, even though the finite modes composing it are temporal and mutable (see note to (L,, E2)). Another crucial difference between finite, mutable modes and infinite modes is that the essence of any finite, mutable mode does not involve its existence (P24, El), not even derivatively from God's essence, whereas the essence of any infinite mode does involve its existence, at least derivatively from God's essence. Here I am regarding derivativeness as finitary. Note Spinoza's connection with Leibniz here. Leibniz' distinction between contingent versus necessary truths is based on the distinction between infinite and finite analysis of these truths. 12 Recall that for Leibniz, all truths whatever can be determined as true upon analysis, even the most contingent truths. However, for such contingent truths, only God can perform the analysis, since it requires an infinite number of steps. 13 Thus, we see that true statements about Spinoza's finite, mutable modes correspond (though not perfectly) to Leibniz' contingent truths, whereas true statements about infinite modes (or of God and his attributes) correspond (again not perfectly) to Leibniz' necessary truths. However, if we are to glean the primary distinction here, it is not between contingent versus necessary truths (although see (D3, E4)), but rather between causally necessary truths versus logically necessary truths (see Note 1 of (P33, El)). It is on the notion of contingency that Spinoza differs so greatly from his student, Leibniz. According to Spinoza, contingency is due to a deficiency of our knowledge (again see note 1 of (P33, El)). Contingency is not in the nature of things. Not so for .Leibniz, who defines free will, both in man and in God, in terms of real contingency} a Spinoza also distinguishes two kinds of infinite modes, namely, those which are immediate and those which are mediate (see ( P 2 3 , E 1 ) a n d its demonstration). In Letter 64 to Schuller, Spinoza gives two examples of immediate infinite modes and one example of a mediate infinite mode. Thus, motion and rest is an immediate infinite mode under the attribute of extension, and God's infinite (immediate) intellect is an immediate infinite

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mode under the attribute of thought. Furthermore, the total form of the universe (facies totius universi) is a mediate infinite mode under the attribute of extension. This is simply the structured physical world. Spinoza does not give an example of a mediate infinite mode under the attribute of thought, though we can supply such an example without too much difficulty. Thus, the total form of the universe of ideas, that is to say, God's mediate intellect, is a mediate infinite mode under the attribute of thought. This is simply the structured mental world, which contains all mutable ideas. (Spinoza uses the phrase, 'God's infinite intellect' ambiguously, sometimes to refer to the immediate, and sometimes to the mediate, infinite mode of thought). 1 s Granted that this is not easy to understand, I would say that Spinoza regarded motion and rest as an immediate infinite mode because motion and rest is a universal property of all physical modes, and thus more immediate than the structured physical world, which itself derives from motion and rest. Also note that for Spinoza, universal properties cannot be abstract Platonic entities, and thus must be taken as infinite modes. Now just as the universe of ideas may be regarded as God's infinite intellect, so the universe of bodies may be regarded as God's infinite body. In other words, God's body is simply the entire physical world. (It was for such views that Spinoza was excommunicated from the Synagogue of Amsterdam). According to Spinoza, "All things are determined from the necessity of the divine nature to" exist and act in a certain manner" (Pzg, El). The main idea of the proof of this proposition is as follows: since God necessarily exists (PI1, El), and since all things are in God (P~ s, El), and since all things follow necessarily (whether causally or logically) from the nature of God (P16, El), it follows that all things are necessary, and determined by God, not only as to existence, but to action as well (P26, P27, El). Thus, God's necessity implies the necessity of things. This is Spinoza's strict determinism. Consequently, it is not surprising that Spinoza denies free will in man (P32,E1). What is surprising is that he also denies free will in God (CoriPa2, El), though he states that God is a free cause (Cor2P17, El). This is because the will of God is determined by the nature of God, rather than vice versa. (For a more detailed treatment of Spinoza's views on determinism and free will, see my paper, 'Spinoza's Denial of Free Will in Man and God'). Spinoza makes a crucial distinction between Natura naturans and Natura

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naturata in the note to (Pag, El). First, Natura naturans is literally Nature

naturing, that is, the active, creating part of Nature, which Spinoza identifies with substance and its attributes, in other words, God. On the other hand, Natura naturata is Nature natured, that is, the created part of Nature, which Spinoza identifies with the modes. Thus, Natura naturata is created by Natura naturans, though not in any temporal sense. For Spinoza, God's will or intellect is a part o f N a t u r a naturata (P3 ~, El). Thus, God's will or intellect (indeed, any will or intellect) is completely determined by Natura naturans, which is the active nature of God. Hence Spinoza's denial of free will in man and God. On the other hand, the active nature of God determines itself, and indeed, creates the will of God, though not in any temporal sense. Hence, God is a free cause. Thus, God's will is not free, because it does not determine itself (similarly for God's intellect). However, God's nature is free, because it does determine itself. On the other hand, neither man's will, intellect, nor nature are free, in any absolute sense, since they do not determine themselves. However, man is partially free in a sense to be discussed later. Here, I find Spinoza admirably consistent and logical. Spinoza compares God's will and intellect to God's motion and rest (Cor2P3~, El). Since all are modifications of God, then God's will and intellect have no privileged place over God's motion and rest. In Part II, Spinoza shows that God's will does not cause any motion and rest, nor do motion and rest affect God's will. Rather, there is a perfect parallelism between the two. There cannot be any causal interaction, since each attribute must be conceived through itself (P1 o, El). As a final expression of Spinoza's strict determinism, we come to his famous (P33, El): "Things could have been produced by God in no other manner and in no other order than they have been produced". This may be interpreted .as saying that there is only one possible world, namely, this one. However, Spinoza gives a rather restricted notion of "possible" (see his (D4, E4). For our purposes, we may explicitly distinguish (though Spinoza did not) between 'causal possibility' and 'logical possibility' (or even 'metaphysical possibility'). ~6 Ironically, Spinoza did distinguish between 'causal impossibility' and 'logical impossibility', as well as between 'causal necessity' and 'logical necessity'. See Note 1 of (P33, El). In that note he gives disjunctive definitions of 'impossibility' and 'necessity'. Similarly, one

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can also give a disjunctive definition of possibility (= causal or logical possibility), though Spinoza does not do so. We can then interpret (P3~, El) as saying that there is only one causally possible world. (It is only true at the cosmic level that there is only one logically possible world, for Spinoza). Spinoza's proof of (1733, El) may be sketched as follows: if things were different, then the nature of God would be different, since all things have necessarily followed (logically or causally) from God's nature (P16, El), and have been determined (logically or causally) to existence and action in a certain manner (P29, El). But it is logically impossible that the nature of God be different than it is. Otherwise, by (Pt 1, El), there might be two Gods, which is absurd. With the previous distinctions made, we may interpret (P33,E1) as follows: all things, whether finite or infinite, couldn't (causally impossible) have been produced differently. However, only infinite things and finite formal essences couldn't (logically impossible) have been produced differently, Finite, mutable things could (logically possible) have been produced differently. (This was Leibniz's thesis) Though Spinoza never made this last statement, I believe it is consistent with everything he said. In my paper, 'Spinoza's Denial of Free Will in Man and God', I showed that P33 can be proved from suitable premises, according to the standards of mathematical logic. Thus, P33 can be symbolized in a formal language and then proved in the Modal Quantifier Logic, with the help of several Spinozistic premises (suitably symbolized), together with the following interesting lemma (which can also be symbolized): "there is exactly one possibility of substance". This very same lemma may be used to give an alternative proof of (PI 1, El) ("God necessarily exists"). Thus, we see a deep connection between (Ply, El) and (P3~,E1), that is, between Spinoza's Ontological Argument for God's existence and his argument for the existence of exactly one possible world. A single crucial lemma may be used, together with other premises, to prove both. Thus, the question of God's necessary existence cannot be separated from the question of free will, whether in man or in God. As a final expression of Spinoza's Principle of Plenitude, we have (P3 s and P36, El): "Whatever we conceive to be in God's power necessarily exists" and "Nothing exists from whose nature an effect does not follow". I interpret (P3s, El) as follows: every causal possibility is a necessity, that is, every

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causal possibility is necessarily actualized. Moreover, by (P36, El), as well as (P2s, El), every causal possibility so actualized carries with it an infinite causal series, forwards and backwards. However, I do not think Spinoza is required to hold that every logical possibility is necessarily actualized. He is often interpreted that way, but I think that is not the best interpretation. I think Spinoza may consistently be interpreted as allowing for unactualized possibilities. Here, I follow Donagan's Leibnizian interpretation of Spinoza x7 (as should be clear from the above), which I think is quite plausible and attractive, though somewhat shocking. Admittedly this is a controversial issue. Throughout Spinoza's system, a great deal of theological language is used, but in spite of this, it should be emphasized that God, the maximal substance, is not a person, but Nature itself. God is Nature. Consequently, God acts according to the laws of Nature, which are identical with the laws of his nature or essence. Moreover, God's mind is nothing like a human mind. Spinoza was against any anthropomorphic conception of God. Indeed, he devotes most of the Appendix to Part I attacking anthropomorphism. In brief, he holds that we should not project onto Nature or God such human qualities as "good and evil, merit and sin, praise and blame, order and disorder, beauty and deformity, and so forth". Of course, Spinoza is open to the charge of atheism, or mysticism, but in my view, these are all rather loose charges. My own view is that Spinoza blurred the borderline between atheism and theism and that he rationalized mysticism, both magnificent achievements. II. OF THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND As noted before, God has the attributes of extension and thought, as well as infinitely many other attributes, according to Spinoza (P1, P2, E2; D6, El). Thus, God thinks infinitely, God extends infinitely, and indeed, God X's infinitely, for any other attribute X. Similarly, a person thinks (A2, E2), but only finitely; a person extends (A4, E2), but only finitely; and indeed, a person X's, but only finitely. However, whereas God knows that he X's, and knows that every person X's, no person can know or perceive that he X's, for any other attribute X, according to Spinoza. For, human minds know only physical things and ideas, nothing else (As, E2). In other words, only God has

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infinitely multiple perception of things. We have only a dual perception of things. [ will now state the central thesis of Part II: "the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things" (PT, E2). This is Spinoza's doctrine of strict psychophysical parallelism. Spinoza is quite definite about this, for he says in the note to Pv, % mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing expressed in two different ways". Thus, my finger and the idea of my finger are the same mode, expressed in two different ways, that is to say, under the attributes of extension and thought, respectively. Moreover, there is a complete parallelism between my finger under the attribute of extension and my finger under any other attribute X, A more precise way of interpreting Spinoza is as follows: my finger and the idea of my finger may be regarded as two distinct modal expressions, expressing the same underlying mode. Thus, my finger is a modal expression of the underlying mode, under the attribute of extension. Again, the idea of my finger is a modal expression of the underlying mode, under the attribute of thought. Under this interpretation, the same underlying mode can be under all the attributes, but each modal expression of this mode can be under one attribute only. I think this is the best way of interpreting Spinoza, though he is sometimes equivocal here, using the term 'mode' when he really means 'modal expression' (this is my phrase). However, so long as one realizes what distinction Spinoza had in mind, no difficulty should result. According to Spinoza, the human mind is a complex idea of the human body (P13, P1 s, E2). Thus, the mind is not a substance having ideas. Rather, it is a complex idea composed of ideas. Here Spinoza rejects Descartes' claim that the mind is a thinking substance. Moreover, the complex idea of the human body is completely isomorphic to the human body (PT, E2). As above, we may say that my mind and my body are both modal expressions of a single underlying mode, namely me. Thus, again, Spinoza would disagree with Descartes. I am much more than a thinking thing. I can be expressed in infinitely many ways, as a mental thing, as a physical thing, as an X-thing, for any other attribute X. However, I only know myself under two attributes, according to Spinoza. With this doctrine of strict parallelism, Spinoza can claim to solve the

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mind-body problem posed by Descartes. The mind and the body are united, not through any mysterious causal interaction, but simply by being isomorphic modal expressions of the same underlying mode. My mind cannot cause bodily action nor can my body cause mental action, according to Spinoza (Ps, P6, E2). Indeed, no modal expression under one attribute can ever be a cause of any modal expression under another attribute. For, each attribute, like substance, must be conceived through itself (alone)(P, o, El). Thus, my mind, being an idea, can only produce or cause other ideas or mental modal expressions (Ps, E2). Thought is in itself. Similarly, my body can only produce or cause other bodies or physical modal expressions. Again, extension is in itself. Actually, there is only one underlying system of causes, the modes themselves, now perceived under this attribute, now under that attribute (see note to (PT, E2)). This is Spinoza's answer to Descartes. If one takes this parallelism seriously, then it should be clear that the attribute of thought has no special or privileged position in Spinoza's scheme of things. The attribute of thought has no special properties which the other attributes do not have correlates of. Let me emphasize this in the strongest possible terms. Nothing can occur in the mind of God which does not have a correlate in the body of God, and which does not have a correlate in the total-X-mode of God, for any attribute X. Thought has no privileged place among the attributes, given Spinoza's doctrine of parallelism. And yet, one can find commentator after commentator giving the attribute of thought a special position.18 It is true that there are passages in Spinoza which tempt one to do this. But really, it is not only logically impermissible, but even quite unnecessary, in my view. It represents a loss of logical nerve to give up Spinoza's strict parallelism. Indeed, I hope to show that if one can maintain one's logical nerve, to the very end, then the rewards are great, since then Spinoza's doctrines become even more interesting than before. As an example of what I mean, consider Spinoza's problem of 'other minds'. According to Axiom 5, Part II, "no individual things are felt or perceived by us except bodies and modes of thought". Thus, we have no perception of other modal expressions, besides the physical and mental. However, it may be asked whether this is just a brute empirical fact, or whether it can be derived from other Spinozistic premises. In the Ethics, it is given as an axiom. However, in Letter 64 to Schuller (in 1675), Spinoza gives a more derived view. Here Spinoza argues, "the essence of the Mind

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(Proposition XIII, Part II) consists only in this, that it is the idea of a Body actually existing. Therefore the mind's power of understanding only extends to those things which this idea of the Body contains in itself, or which follow from the same. But this idea of the Body neither involves nor expresses any other attributes of God than Extension and Thought". Thus, a human mind cannot by its very nature perceive more than mental or physical things. But then a very interesting problem arises, which indeed was raised by this same Dr. Schuller. Wouldn't it follow that there were infinitely many other kinds of minds besides human minds, such that for each attribute X, there would be a kind of mind which could perceive only mental things and X things, and nothing else? If this were so, then it would seem that the attribute of thought indeed has a special position among the attributes, since for every bodily modal expression, with its underlying mode, there would have to be infinitely many kinds of minds which perceive that underlying mode, under the attribute of X, but not under the attribute of extension. In my view, this problem can be solved in a way which still preserves the perfect parallelism between the attributes. Moreover, the solution logically forces us to take seriously God's infinitely multiple perception, along with its various consequences. I will merely sketch such a solution. Corresponding to any modal expression with its underlying mode, there are indeed infinitely many different kinds of minds which perceive that mode. But this corresponds to God's infinitely multiple perception of that mode. Thus, for example, consider my body, which is a modal expression of me, the underlying mode. According to Spinoza, my mind is an idea of my body. But ~God's idea of my body must be infinitely multiple. He must be able to perceive me, not only under the attribute of extension, but also under every other attribute. Therefore, my mind in only a facet of God's idea of my body. God's idea must have an infinite complexity, with infinitely many mental marks which represent the infinitely many attributes under which I may be perceived. Moreover, by perfect parallelism, my body, in all its splendor, must also have an infinite complexity, with infinitely many physical marks which represent the infinitely many attributes under which I may be perceived. Similarly, for all the other full modal expressions of me. This is admittedly only a sketch of a solution to Spinoza's problem of 'other minds', and from this sketch a number of rather strong consequences follow: (1) God has infinitely multiple perception of things, (2) each human

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mind is a mere facet of an infinitely complex finite mind, with marks which represent all the attributes under which the underlying mode may be perceived, (3) each human mind has only dual perception of things, (4) each human mind must share that infinitely complex finite mind with infinitely many other mind facets, and finally, (5)by perfect parallelism, each human body (and any corresponding modal expression) also is a mere facet of an infinitely complex physical body. I fully admit that I have introduced a complication into Spinoza's system, but I found it necessary in order to preserve the perfect parallelism between the attributes, yet still give an answer to Spinoza's problem o f ' o t h e r minds'. Perhaps there is an easier way out. I don't know. I should also add that the above sketched solution also answers another difficult question in Spinoza's system, namely, how can each attribute truly express the essence of God, when no attribute can conceptually involve any other attribute, yet it is part of God's essence to have infinitely many attributes? In other words, how can any one attribute express the infinitely many other attributes, given that each attribute is in itself? I believe that my above sketched solution to Spinoza's problem of 'other minds' goes a long way to answering these questions also. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to go any further into these difficult matters. Going on with Spinoza's metaphysics, he not only asserts a strict parallelism between mutable modes and their ideas, but also, he asserts a strict parallelism between their formal essences. Thus, for example, the formal essence of my body is completely parallel or isomorphic to the formal essence of my mind. This at least is how I interpret (P~, E2). As I will argue later, we might as well identify the ideas of non-existing things with formal essences, contained in the attribute of thought. Now the notion of formal essence is central to Spinoza's philosophy, yet it is not very easy to understand. So let us try our best to understand it. Corresponding to any finite mutable mode there is a formal essence, which however, is eternal and immutable. Moreover, the correspondence is more than abstract. Indeed, each formal essence forms part of the mutable mode it corresponds to. When that mutable mode ceases to exist, however, the formal essence remains, since it is eternal. This doctrine is the basis for Spinoza's theory of immortality, dealt with in Part V. In my view any formal essence is thoroughly individual. My formal essence

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is different from your formal essence. No formal essence is common to a set of contemporaneous, mutable modes, although it is not entirely clear whether two mutable modes existing at different times might not have the same formal essence. In other words, it is not so clear whether Spinoza's doctrine of formal essence excludes reincarnation. Formal essences should be distinguished from common essences. The latter are general whereas the former are individual. Moreover, common essences are known by reason, the second kind of knowledge, whereas formal essences are known by intuition, the third kind of knowledge (see Note 2 of (P4o, E2)). Spinoza's theory of knowledge will be dealt with later. According to Spinoza, the formal essence of anything is logically contained in an attribute of God. And since the attributes are eternal (P19, El), so is any formal essence eternal. As I interpret Spinoza, he defines eternity as logically necessary existence (Da, El). Thus, a formal essence exists with a logical necessity, derivative from the logical necessity of the attributes. Again to take a concrete example. My body exists as a temporal, mutable mode in the infinite order of Nature. It is quite determinate, finite, and perishable. However, the formal essence of my body is not a mutable mode, though in some sense, it is part of my body. When my body perishes, however, the formal essence of my body will remain, for it is logically contained in the attribute of extension, and therefore, is eternal and immutable, even though finite. This formal essence is, as it were, an eternal 'blueprint' for the mutable body. By strict parallelism, the formal essence of my mind is also logically contained in the attribute of thought, and therefore, it is eternal and immutable also, even though my mind is temporal and perishable, and even though this formal essence is a part o f my mutable mind. Still, when the mind perishes, its formal essence will remain. This is how I interpret Spinoza's doctrine of immortality, to be dealt with more thoroughly when we consider Part V. Thus, we see that the two formal essences are strictly parallel, just as my mind and body are. As stated before, Spinoza asserts that my mind is the idea of my body. Hence, it follows that the formal essence of my mind is identical with the formal essence of the idea of my body. Now what is the formal essence of this idea? It must be the clear and distinct part of this idea. Moreover, this

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clear and distinct part is again an idea, indeed, an adequate idea. But what is its object? Clearly not the body, itself. For, according to Spinoza, we can never have an adequate idea of the body, or any physical part of it (P24,CorP29, E2). It must therefore be an adequate idea of the formal essence of the body, which is a 'part' of the body in a different sense from 'physical part'. Thus, we have reached the following equation: the formal essence of the idea of the body = the idea of the formal essence of the body. In other words, the formal essence of the mind = the idea of the formal essence of the body. This is just what we should expect, since the formal essence of the mind is strictly parallel to the formal essence of the body, and thus, the one should be regarded as the idea of the other, or that other should be regarded as the object of that one. It should be pointed out that Spinoza is not very explicit here, and thus my equation is an interpretation of what I believe is implicit in his statements. The novelty of my interpretation is that it is quite natural to identity the idea of a formal essence with the formal essence of an idea. This represents a great simplification, though I hope not an oversimplification. Returning now to Spinoza's theory of mutable minds and bodies, he has a long discussion about the nature of bodies, following much of Descartes' physics and physiology (see the special axioms and lemmas after (P1 a, E2)). However, the reason for such a long discussion about bodies, in Part II, which after all is entitled, 'Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind', is that any knowledge of the body will yield a corresponding knowledge of the mind, just because of the perfect parallelism between mind and body. Indeed, Spinoza is thus able to distinguish a human mind from any other idea by distinguishing the corresponding human body from any other body. As Hans Jonas points out in his paper, 'Spinoza and the Theory of Organism', a human body is not, for Spinoza, a merely mechanical thing. Rather, it is distinguished from other mechanical bodies by the "range and variety of reciprocal communication with things, or, the manner of being part of the whole while yet being something apart from the whole" (in Grene's, Spinoza: a Collection of Critical Essays, page 266). We now turn to Spinoza's theory of knowledge. He divides knowledge into three kinds (see Note 2 of 0?4o, E2)). First, there is knowledge of the first kind. This is just sensation, opinion, and imagination. It is not adequate knowledge. Note that Spinoza uses the Latin term, 'cognitio', which

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translates as 'knowledge' or 'conception'. Secondly, there is knowledge of the second kind. This is reason and deductive knowledge. Spinoza has in mind here also the common notions and axioms of mathematics. Such knowledge is adequate, according to him. Finally, there is knowledge of the third kind. This is intuitive knowledge (scientia intuitiva). According to Spinoza, this is the highest kind of knowledge. It is obtained, by "advancing from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things" (in Note 2 of (P40, E2)). Apparently, this advancement takes place in one holistic (finitary) process. For Spinoza, as we shall see, intuitive knowledge is ultimately our only salvation, both on earth, and after our mutable mind perishes. According to Spinoza, we do not have adequate knowledge of our bodies (P 19, P2 ~, E2), nor of our minds (P23, P29, E2), nor of external bodies or external minds (P2 s, P26, E2), nor of any modifications of these bodies or minds (P2 a, P29, E2), nor finally, of the duration of any of these things (P30, P31, E2). For, all such things occur in the context of infinite causal series. And thus, to adequately know these things, we would have to adequately know the infinite series in which they occur. However, this is impossible for a finite mind. Thus, we can have no adequate knowledge of anything occurring in the temporal order of Nature (see (Cot Pt 1, E2)). Spinoza gives two definitions of 'adequate idea'. The official definition states that an adequate idea is "an idea which, in so far as it is considered in itself, without reference to the object, has all the properties or internal signs (denorninationes intrinseeas) of a true idea" (D4, E2). In other words, an adequate idea is a clear and distinct idea, with the mark of truth, so to speak. This is the official definition. According to Spinoza then, we can never have a clear and distinct idea whose actual object is a mutable thing. All our ideas of things in the external world do not have the mark of truth. (Recall Descartes' evil genius, who might always be deceiving us about the external world or about any mutable thing. It could all be a dream). As regards the second, unofficial definition of 'adequate idea', this is much more 'workable'. Here it is stated that an adequate idea is an idea in God's mind in so far as "He is manifested through the nature of the human mind, or in so far as he forms the essence of the human mind" (Cor P1 i, E2). In other words, an idea is adequate in us (in this second sense) when God does not have to go outside the human mind to perceive it adequately (in the first

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sense). Thus, the notion of 'human adequate idea' (in the unofficial sense) reduces to the notion of 'God's adequate idea' (in the official sense). We can never go outside our own minds, but God can. When we have an idea which does not require God to go outside our minds to perceive it clearly and distinctly, then that idea is adequate in us (in the unofficial sense). When God does have to go outside our minds to perceive an idea clearly and distinctly, then that idea is inadequate in us (in the unofficial sense). These two notions of 'adequate idea' may be regarded as extensionally equivalent. Thus, any of our ideas with the 'mark of truth' do not require God to go beyond our minds in order to perceive them as having that mark of truth, and conversely. From this unofficial definition of adequacy, it should be clear that to be an adequate idea in us is equivalent to being an idea adequately caused by us. Thus, we are the adequate cause of all our adequate ideas, and all our adequate ideas have us as an adequate cause. (See (Dl, E3)). It should also be clear that any idea of any mutable thing is inadequate in us (in the unofficial sense, and therefore, in the official sense, by the above considerations), since God has to perceive the infinite order of Nature, that is, the infinite causal context in which this mutable thing occurs, in order to have an adequate perception of that mutable thing. For, the knowledge of any mutable thing must depend upon and involve its causes (A4, El), and since there is an infinite series of such causes (P2s, El), an adequate knowledge of this mutable thing must involve a knowledge of this infinite series of causes. No finitary process can serve as a full substitute. As regards the question of our knowledge of time itself, Spinoza argues that such knoMedge is due primarily to the imagination (see note to (P44, E2)), and hence is inadequate knowledge. Spinoza seems to be saying that temporal order depends on the human mind. Is Spinoza therefore a Kantian? To answer this question, it should first be emphasized that Spinoza does regard the causal order of things as independent of the human mind (P28, El). I also think he regards duration as similarly independent, if 'duration' be taken to mean, 'continuation of existence', as opposed to, 'indefinite continuation of existence', which is his official definition (see (Ds, E2)). However, time as measured duration or fndefinite duration is dependent on the imagination. Thus, Spinoza is a partial Kantian, or more accurately, Kant is a partial Spinozist. In any case, we can have only an inadequate knowledge of time or duration, since our ideas of time or duration

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require that God go outside our minds to perceive the time or duration of things (or the modal basis underlying these things). Given the above considerations, Spinoza seems to have a very sceptical theory of knowledge. Yet there is a way out of this scepticism, via the theory of formal essences. According to Spinoza, we can have adequate knowledge of these formal essences through reason and intuition. In general, we can have adequate knowledge only of eternal things, which include, besides the formal essences of things, the essence of God and the universal properties of mutable things (those properties which are in the whole and in the parts), as well as all those things and properties which logically follow from the formal essences, the essence of God, and the universal properties. Of all these eternal things, we can have adequate knowledge, according to Spinoza (again see Note 2 of (P40, E2)). Let us see how this works. In the first sense of adequacy, our ideas of these eternal things must have the mark of truth. Apparently, when you have such ideas, they shine with truth, or perhaps there is a little mark of 'T' on them. Philosophical joking aside, it is hard to demonstrate adequacy (in the official sense) to one who does not have such adequate ideas. However, the unofficial sense of adequacy is more workable. First, according to Spinoza, we can have adequate knowledge of the essence of God (P47, E2). This can be seen as follows: since all mutable things involve this essence, including our own mind, God does not have to go beyond the human mind to have a clear and distinct idea of his own essence. Apparently, nothing outside the human mind would convey any additional essential information about the essence of God. That essence must therefore exhibit itself synoptically in each thing, including the human mind. Another way to see this is as follows. According to Spinoza, the essence of God is his existence (P2o, El). Thus, an idea of any existing thing (existing as such, independent of temporal considerations) gives an adequate idea of God's existence. This is a rather amazing view, but I think Spinoza held it. To repeat: an idea of any sample of existence (as such) gives an adequate idea of God's existence (-- God's essence), since God manifests himself, as a whole, through each of his modifications. Secondly, given that we can adequately know the essence of God, we can also adequately know the essences of the attributes of God (D4, El), since each attribute expresses the essence of God.

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Thirdly, we can adequately know the common notions and universal properties of mutable things, since these are in the whole and in the parts of these mutable things (P38, E2). To see this, consider that any idea we may have of a universal property is such that God does not have to go outside our minds in order to perceive that property clearly and distinctly. For, there would be no additional essential information to obtain. He would simply see more of the same property, since this property, by hypothesis, is in the parts and in the whole of everything. Thus, no new relationships could be discovered that would pertain to this property. That is why we can have only adequate ideas of universal properties (P38, E2). Fourthly, we can adequately know the formal essences of things, since these logically follow from the essence of God (via perhaps the universal properties of things). Finally, anything else which logically follows from the essence of God, the universal properties of things, or the formal essences, can also be adequately known. A word here should be said about Spinoza~s theory of universals. As regards such universals as 'horse', 'man', or 'tree', ideas of such can only be confused and inadequate. Such ideas are the result of imagination. For example, an idea of 'house' is simply the result of confounding together all the particular ideas of houses we may ever have seen. Thus, any idea of a universal which arises from sensation, opinion, or imagination, that is, from the empirical world, must be confused and inadequate, according to Spinoza. (See Note 1 of (P4 o, E2)). However, not all ideas of universals are inadequate. Those arising from the second and third kinds of knowledge are adequate. Thus, any universal, such as, for example, 'triangle', which arises from universal properties and common notions in mathematics, is adequately known. As I interpret Spinoza, all universals which are adequately known are logically contained in the attributes of God or the immediate modes of God. Thus, such universals are concrete and not abstract. Spinoza is a nominalist, not a Platonist. Thus, no universal is to be taken as a Platonic entity. Substance (and its attributes), as well as the modifications of substance, and all that is involved in these, are all that is. There can be no room for abstract entities or Platonic universals. Anything that resembles such an abstract entity must ultimately be reducible to those entities which Spinoza does allow in his system. Take

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for example, the universal property of motion and/or rest. Every physical body has this property, both in the parts and in the whole. Now it might be thought that motion and/or rest is a Platonic universal, but this would be a mistake, within Spinoza's system. Rather, Spinoza regards motion and/or rest as an immediate infinite mode under the attribute of extension (see Letter 64 to Schuller). He must concretize all such properties. Otherwise, they would become as Platonic universals. In this manner, I believe we should regard all such universal properties, or universals arising from them, as infinite modes or parts of such. In this way, Spinoza can retain his nominalism. All this is possible because God and his modification are actually infinite, not merely potentially infinite. We saw above that human minds can have adequate knowledge of the formal essences of mutable things, but not of the mutable things themselves. This was Spinoza's answer to his own scepticism. However, it should be emphasized that God has adequate knowledge, not only cf the formal essences of mutable things, but also of the mutable things themselves. This is because God can always perceive the infinite causal series involved in any mutable thing. However, not even God can finitely deduce the properties of mutable things from his essence. That requires an 'infinite deduction'. However, he can perform such an infinite deduction, whereas human minds cannot do it, in principle. Still, human beings can, in principle, and often do, finitely deduce the properties of formal essences from the essence of God, according to Spinoza. Thus, it is always possible to adequately know any mutable mode, under the form of eternity (sub specie aeternitatis).19 Consider the following definition: DEFINITION. Any given mutable mode is known under the form of eternity if and only if the formal essence of that mode is known adequately. Given that I can never have an adequate knowledge of you as a mutable thing, I may have an adequate knowledge of you, under the form of eternity, that is to say, I may adequately know your formal essence. Indeed, I may very well be able to deduce or intuit certain essential things about you, which at first might seem contingent, but which are really necessary because they follow from your formal essence. As an extreme example of such adequate knowledge, consider Spinoza's

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explanation of certain paranormal phenomena to his friend, Peter Balling, in Letter 17 (in Wolf's edition of The Correspondence of Spinoza): Thus a father (to take an example similar to your case) so loves his son that he and his beloved son are like one and the same being. And since (according to what I have proved on another occasion) there must necessarily exist in Thought the idea of the states of the essence of the son, and their consequences, and since the father, because of this union with his son, is a part of the said son, the soul of the father must necessarily participate in the ideal [formal] essence of the son, and in its states and their consequences, as Ihave proved elsewhere more fully. Further, since the soul of the father participates ideally in those things which follow from the essence of the son, he (as I said) can now and then imagine one of the things which result from the son's essence as vividly as if he had it before h i m . . . It seems that Spinoza is trying to explain the precognition that a father might have toward his son, by invoking the formal (or ideal) essences of the father and son. It must be admitted that this is one of the more far-out doctrines of Spinoza's philosophy. It shows how particular and detailed may be our adequate knowledge of formal essences. As regards Spinoza's theory of truth, there is good textual evidence for subsuming it under his theory of adequacy. (I owe this point to Thomas Mark. 2° First, it should be noted that Spinoza gives as an axiom,as opposed

to a definition, the following: "A true idea must agree with its object (cure suo ideato)" (A6, El). This, 1 repeat, is an axiom, not a definition. What seems to be more of a definition of truth occurs in Part II. Spinoza states, "A true idea in us is that which in God is adequate, in so far as He is manifested by the nature of the human mind" (Dem of (P4 3, E2)). But this is just the unofficial definition of 'adequate idea' (Cot P~ ,, E2). Thus it follows that a true idea is that which is an adequate idea in us. Even if this is not a definition of 'true idea', still, 'true idea' and 'adequate idea' may be regarded as extensionally equivalent. However, going further, consider (P34,E2): 'every idea which in us is absolute, that is to say, adequate and perfect, is true'. It is worthwhile to quote the entire demonstration: When we say that an adequate and perfect idea is in us, we say nothing else than (Corol. Prop. 11, pt. 2) that an adequate and perfect idea exists in God in so far as He constitutes the essence of the human mind, and consequently (Prp. 32, pt. 2) we say nothing else than that this idea is true - Q.E.D. Aside from the addition of the honorific term 'perfect', Spinoza seems to

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be saying that adequacy and truth are intensionally equivalent, not merely extensionally equivalent. Thus, truth may be defined in terms of adequacy. This would make sense of Spinoza's (P43, E2): "he who has a true [adequate] idea knows at the same time that he has a true [adequate] idea, nor can he doubt the truth [adequacy] of the thing". Also, consider, "truth is its own standard" (note to (P43, E2)). It makes more sense if this means, "adequacy, that is, self-evidence, is its own standard". Thus, (A6,E1) becomes an axiom of faith: "every self-evident idea agrees with its object". On the other hand, a false idea lacks this positive agreement. Spinoza says, "In ideas there is nothing positive on account of which they are called false". If truth is equivalent to adequacy, then falsity is equivalent to inadequacy. Thus, a false idea will be inadequate, and in two senses: (i) a false idea will not be clear and distinct, not self-evident, and (ii) a false idea will be confused and mutilated, and thus God would have to go outside our minds to have the corresponding adequate idea. This then is Spinoza's theory of truth and falsity, as I see it. Finally, in Part II, Spinoza argues that, "the will and the intellect are one and the same" (Cor P4 9, E2). This is the last proposition of Part II. It must be admitted to be a very confusing proposition. Does Spinoza mean literally that every human will is identical with the corresponding intellect? I think We can get a better idea of Spinoza's view by considering his demonstration. He argues as follows: every particular volition essentially involves a particular idea (A3, E2); and conversely, that particular idea essentially involves the volition, because an idea always contains an affirmation or negation of its object. An idea is not a passive thing. Hence, every particular idea and its corresponding volition essentially involve one another. But Spinoza goes on to say that they are therefore one and the same. This seems a very questionable inference: x and y essentially involve one another: .'. (x =y). Perhaps Spinoza is implicitly using Occam's Razor here. Why not identify ideas with their corresponding volitions, just because it is unnecessary to multiply entities which are invariably thus paired? In any case, Spinoza goes on to argue from the identity of ideas and volitions to the identity of the intellect and the will. For Spinoza, there can be no separate faculties of intellect and will, above and beyond the individual ideas and volitions themselves. Spinoza rejects any reification of faculties. With his doctrine of the identity of will and intellect, Spinoza thus

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attempts to refute Descartes' doctrine of will versus intellect. Spinoza rejects Descartes' theory that error is due to the will's going beyond the intellect. In the Appendix to Part If, Spinoza considers the various arguments of the Cartesians in greater detail, and he offers various objections to these arguments. However, I shall skip over this topic. This completes my treatment of Parts I and II of the Ethics. My treatment of Parts III and IV, which deal with Spinoza's psychology and ethics, respectively, will be considerably condensed. I realize that I am committing somewhat of an injustice to Spinoza's philosophy, but in mitigation, let me say that one of my primary purposes in this Overview is to illuminate the more difficult parts of the Ethics, and I believe that for most readers, Parts III and IV are considerably easier than the other parts. In keeping with the above, I shall give a fuller treatment of Part V.

III. OF THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS Here we see Spinoza, the astute psychologist. According to him, clear and distinct perception makes the mind active (Pa, E3). However, ordinarily, we are not active due to the passions, that is, due to those emotions which are passive (P3, E3). Thus, passions are negative emotions, for Spinoza. Spinoza defines emotion in terms of bodily modifications which increase or decrease our power of action, together with the corresponding ideas. Thus, an emotion has a physical and a mental component. There are three primitive emotions, according to Spinoza, and all the others can be defined from them. The three primitive emotions are joy, sorrow, and desire (see 'Definitions of the Emotions', end of E3). The physical components of these three emotions are as follows: pleasurable excitation, painful excitation, and bodily appetite. Spinoza goes on to define 45 different emotions on the basis of the three primitive ones, a remarkable achievement. For example, he defines love, hatred, hope, fear, confidence, remorse, contempt, envy, compassion, humility, repentance, pride, shame, courtesy, ambition, avarice, and lust, to name a few. Consider his definitions of 'love' and 'hatred': "love is joy with the accompanying idea of an external cause"; "hatred is sorrow with the accompanying idea of an external cause" (Defs VI and VII, end of E3). Spinoza defines joy and sorrow in terms of an increase and decrease, respectively, in a person's power of acting. Most important, Spinoza defines

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desire as the essence of man. Indeed, he asserts as a proposition: "the effort (conatus) by which each thing endeavors to persevere in its own being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself" (PT, E3). (This is psychological egoism generalized to everything). This effort or conatus must have a mental as well as a physical component (which is bodily appetite). In my paper, 'Spinoza's Denial of Free Will in Man and God', I argued that actual essence = actualized formal essence. From this I concluded that this provides evidence that formal essences, as well as actual essences, are individual, not general, since conatus is individual, and conatus = actual essence. Later on, Spinoza offers a proposition which provides more evidence for this thesis. He says, "the emotion of one person differs from the corresponding emotion of another as much as the essence of the one person differs from that of the other". Since emotions between people do differ (numerically speaking), therefore essences between people also differ (again, numerically speaking). Thus, essences are individual. In my above-mentioned paper, I also argued that actual essence is eternal and therefore conatus is eternal, and desire also. What this means {s that the primitive desire of each person is part of his formal essence and is therefore eternal. 'Primitive desire', as I am using the phrase, thus denotes the formal essence of ordinary desire in the temporal world. In other words, one's eternal desire, which is part of one's formal essence, is itself the formal essence of one's ordinary desire. Given these considerations, it is not preposterous to hold that eonatus and desire can be eternal. (See also the note to (P4 s, E2)). According to Spinoza, the mind habitually imagines well-being in the body (Px2,PI3,E3), as part of its effort to persevere. Also, Spinoza asserts a principle of association for the emotions (P14, E3). Moreover, there is a certain irrationality, or shall we say, spontaneity of the passive emotions (Cor P l s , E 3 ) . One emotion may be associated with another due to accidental connections. For example, you don't like Jane because she has brown eyes, which you don't happen to like. Thus, always there are mixed emotions (P17, E3), as well as mixed strivings or efforts, that is, conflicting desires. But these are all mutable emotions and desires, in the temporal world. Eternal emotion and desire cannot be in conflict with anything. That is because all formal essences are in harmony, in Spinoza's scheme of things. Nevertheless, in the temporal world, we may hate and love the same thing

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(PI 7, E3), or desire two opposing things. Also, love or joy may arise from hatred (P2 o, E3), and hatred or sorrow may arise from love (P~ 9, E3). What we feet at any one time is no doubt the resultant of all these mixed emotions. It is implicit in Spinoza, I believe, that we are not always conscious of each and every emotion that we do have. We may be conscious only of the total resultant. Spinoza, however, never says this explicitly. Spinoza asserts a very important psychological principle of projection (P2~, E3), namely, that we are affected by any emotion which affects a person like us. Thus, we cry at Greek tragedies. Also, his psychological egoism takes on a hedonistic form (Pe 8, E3), namely, everyone tries to maximize joy or pleasure and minimize sorrow or pain. As a consequence of these psychological principles of projection and hedonism, men (and women) are very other-directed hedonists (P~ 9, E3); their joys, sorrows and desires are very much tied up with others' joys, sorrows, and desires. In particular, men (and women) try to make others love what they love and hate what they hate (Cor P3 l, E3). And anyone they love they try to make love them (P33, E3) (and even perhaps try to make love to them). Yet Spinoza asserts a very Christian principle: "hatred is increased through return of hatred, but may be destroyed by love" (P4 3, E 3 ) Spinoza also explains the nature of national and class prejudices via his theory of emotions, in particular, his theory of non-rationally associated emotions (P4 6, E3). It follows from Spinoza's philosophy that the mind habitually strives towards active (as opposed to passive) emotions, even though it often simultaneously and habitually wallows in passions.

IV. OF HUMAN BONDAGE; OR OF THE STRENGTH OF THE EMOTIONS For Spinoza, suffering arises from passivity (P2, E4). He is well aware of the suffering caused by obsession and neurosis (P6, E4). And though Spinoza is a rationalist, he is no rationalizer. For, the only way to rid oneself of a powerful emotion is through another more powerful emotion (PT, E4). Spinoza asserts a rationalist version of ethical egoism. A person is said to act virtuously when he acts for what is truly profitable to him (P2o, E4). Self-preservation is, for Spinoza, the foundation of virtue (P22,E4). However, it turns out that what is truly profitable or self-preserving is what

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conduces to understanding (especially via the second and third kinds of knowledge) (P26, E4). This is what is good, at least relative to man. Spinoza gives both a relativist and naturalist definition of 'good' (D~, E4). Consequently, it follows that to act virtuously is to act for what conduces to understanding. Moreover, the highest good or profit is the knowledge of God (P28, E4). This is the greatest understanding possible. Thus, the highest virtue is to know God (or Nature) (P28, E4). It is by such considerations that Spinoza's ethical egoism is made compatible with ethical altruism. He says, "when each man seeks that which is most profitable to himself, then are men most profitable to one another" (Cor 2 P3 s, E4). Note that Spinoza is not talking about a business ethic here. Indeed, Spinoza's view is understood more clearly if one considers that there is always enough of God or Nature to go around. Still, it must be said that Spinoza's views about animals are somewhat disappointing, at least to animal lovers. He seems to be saying that we can do with them what we will for our own profit, since their nature is so radically different from ours (see the long Note 1 of (P37, E4)). In any case, with regard to humans, Spinoza expresses the very Christian principle of turning the other cheek (P46, E4). For, hatred can never be good (P4s, E4). Yet strangly enough, he does not regard pity, humility, and repentance as first-rate virtues (Ps o, Ps 3, Ps 4, E4), though these are usually regarded as essential Christian virtues. Still, he does allow that these may often lead to good, and thus may be regarded as derivative (or second-rate) virtues. Spinoza also does not put much stock in hope, which he claims can never be good of itself (P47, E4). Spinoza would certainly have agreed that, 'hope is the leash of despair'. According to Spinoza, reason may always replace passion as a motive for action (doing) (Ps 9, E4). Especially if one realizes that local desires are not truly profitable for the whole m a n (P60, E4), whereas desires arising from reason can never be in excess (P6 ~, E4). It is interesting to note that Spinoza also holds that, "cheerfulness can never be excessive, but is always good" (P42, E4). I do not know whether cheerfulness is an emotion arising from reason, but in any case, Spinoza puts a high value on it. Spinoza has some interesting things to say about the free man. Remember that freedom can only be a matter o f degree in man, since God is the only truly free being. Nevertheless, a person is free to the extent that his actions follow from his own nature alone, that is to say, to the extent that he is

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self-determined. Note that it is not incompatible to hold that a person is both determined by outside causes and is, at the same time, self-determined, at least in regard to particular actions. What this means is that a person may determine particular actions from his own nature alone, yet still be determined by outside causes. In other words, when particular actions are determined through a person, then that person may be said to be acting freely, no matter what the other determining causes acting on that person. Thus, when a great number of actions are determined through a person, then that person is self-determined or free, to a great degree. There are other extensional equivalences worth noting. 2 ~ Thus, a person is free to a certain degree if and only if that person is an adequate cause to that degree (DI, E3), if and only if that person has adequate ideas to that degree (Cor P11, E2), if and only if that person acts for what is most profitable fol his self-preservation to that degree (P26, E4), if and only if that person acts from virtue to that degree (P22, E4). Given these equivalences, it should be clear why Spinoza states the following: "a free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is not a meditation upon death, but upon life" (P6 7, E4) (pace Heidegger). In my view, one of the most profound propositions in all the Ethics is the following: "if men were born free, they would form no conception of good and evil so long as they were free" (P68, E4). In other words, freedom is beyond good and evil, to use Nietzsche's phrase. Thus we see that Spinoza is an ethical relativist. Yet ironically, a free man is still a social animal (P73, E4), if not a morally preoccupied animal. For, though a free man's actions may flow from his nature, they best do so when they flow in harmony with other men's actions, according to the guidance of reason. Thus, though Spinoza's free man is beyond good and evil, he is nevertheless a naturally ethical creature. One of the most difficult propositions about the free man is the following: "a free man never acts deceitfully, but always honorably" (Pv 2, E4). Given what Spinoza says in the note to this proposition, it is clear that it should be interpreted quite strictly. Thus, according to Spinoza, the free man will never betray a trust, not even to escape from the danger of instant death. Consequently, reason could never counsel anyone to act deceitfully or betray a trust, according to Spinoza. The real difficulty with this proposition is that it seems to be inconsistent with a previous proposition, namely, "no virtue

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can be conceived prior to this (the endeavor, namely, after self-preservation)" (P2 ~, E4). Again, we seem to have a conflict between altruistic and egoistic principles. Can Spinoza get out of this seeming inconsistency? I will not attempt to resolve this question myself. I will note however that an interesting and quite involved solution is offered in Mark Boman's paper, 'Egoism and Altruism in Spinoza's Ethics'. 2 2 The basic idea is that the formal essences of human beings could never be in conflict, yet this would be required if reason counseled anyone to betray a trust. I will conclude by saying that in my view, most people do not act freely, in Spinoza's sense, during danger of instant death. Indeed, I would say that most people can certainly rely on their passions to counsel them and on their reason to fail them, during such danger. That is why so few people are in fact free.

V. OF THE POWER OF THE INTELLECT;OR OF HUMAN FREEDOM Spinoza reasserts his doctrine of psychophysical parallelism. "As thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and connected in the mind, exactly so are the modifications of the body or the images of things arranged and connected in the body" (P1, E5). (Note that 'image' for Spinoza has a technical meaning and always refers to a special ('representative') bodily modification). Can there really be any doubt that Spinoza does mean what he says, that he does mean to assert a strict psychophysical parallelism? Spinoza also asserts a principle of detachment as a remedy for suffering (P2, E5). Here he is very close to Buddhist and other Oriental thought. Again, he asserts a principle of sublimation, namely, that a passion can always be transformed into an active emotion (P3, E5). Here he has some connection with Freud. Spinoza states a principle of bodily awareness, namely, that the mind can always form some clear and distinct conception of any bodily modification (P4, E5). This may be done by perceiving the formal essence of the bodily modification. No doubt, if this is true, it would be very helpful for achieving detachment and sublimation. According to Spinoza, freedom from suffering may be obtained through the understanding of the necessity of things (P6, E5). Such understanding amounts to a rational acceptance of things, and thus the mind is turned away

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from sorrow. This process of understanding is especially effective when sustained over time (PT, E5). The passive emotions are thus the sole stumbling block to freedom or action (P~o,E5). Spinoza asserts what may be called the principle of God-intoxication, namely, that "the mind can cause all the modifications of the body or the images of things to be related to the idea of God" (P~ 4, E5). In other words, the mind can become intoxicated with the idea of God, his power, his activity, his in-himselfness. Such intoxication has a soothing effect on the mind, and indeed, may lead to genuine peace of mind. However, according to Spinoza, the love of God is not obtained by ignoring or repressing the self. On the contrary, self-knowledge gives rise to this love of God (P1 s, ES), and conversely. Given all these considerations, it should be clear that Spinoza puts a priority on the love of God (P~ 6, E5). To summarize, Spinoza holds that detachment, sublimation, bodily awareness, sustained understanding (and rational acceptance), God-intoxication, and self-knowledge are all remedies for the passions, and even all the remedies there are. He says, "I have, in what has preceded, included all the remedies for the emotions, that is to say, everything which the mind, considered in itself alone, can do against them" (see note to (P2 o, E5)). Even though the love of God has primacy for Spinoza, still, he thoroughly rejects anthropomorphism. He states unequivocally, "He who loves God cannot strive for God to love him in return" (P19, E5). This is not resignation on Spinoza's part. Rather, it is the simple recognition that God can have no mutable emotions such as love. However, God can have the formal essences of such mutable emotions. Thus, God can have intellectual love, which is eternal. This leads us to a consideration of Spinoza's most mystical/metaphysical doctrines. These are concerned with immortality as well as intellectual love of God. However, given my previous treatment of formal essence, these doctrines should now be more comprehensible. Spinoza states, "In God, nevertheless, there necessarily exists an idea which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the form of eternity" (P22, E5). This is just the idea of the formal essence of the human body, or by my previous equations (see my treatment of Part II), the formal essence of the mind. Since this formal essence is logically contained in the attribute of thought, it is eternal. Thus we have Spinoza's thesis of

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immortality, namely, "The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but something of it remains which is eternal" (P23, E5). What I am saying is that this eternal something is simply the formal essence of the human mind. Each human mind is temporal and mutable, but its formal essence is eternal and immutable. Given Spinoza's doctrine of exact psychophysical parallelism, it follows also that the human body cannot be absolutely destroyed with the mind, but something of it remains which is eternal. Though Spinoza does not explicitly draw this conclusion, it should be obvious, given his parallelism. Now with the doctrine of formal essences, we can say what this eternal something is. It is simply the body's formal essence, which remains and is eternal. To perceive the body under the form of eternity is just to perceive its formal essence. Returning now to the human mind, I would argue that the formal essence of each mind has an adequate idea of itself. This may be shown as follows: the temporal mutable mind has an (inadequate) idea of itself (P23, P29, Cor P29, E2). However, the formal essence of that inadequate idea of the mind is an adequate idea of (and in) the formal essence of the mind (by reasoning similar to that given in my treatment of Part II). Hence, the formal essence of each mind has an adequate idea of itself. Thus, we may conclude that the eternal part of each mind is self-conscious, although it has no memory, imagination, or passions (P2 i, P~4, E5). It has only adequate knowledge. Our immortality consists of this eternal, adequate knowledge, which Spinoza regards as the most valuable part of our mind, anyways. Given these considerations, I do not think that Spinoza has a diluted conception of immortality, as some commentators would have it. Granted that not much of a person remains without memory, imagination, or passions, still, the better part of that person does remain, namely, his eternal, self-conscious, individuated essence. (For a discussion of how formal essences are individuated, see my paper on Spinoza's denial of free will). I would say that a conscious individual does remain, though not a person. As I interpret Spinoza, our immo.rtality is individual, not personal. Moreover, not only does our formal essence remain; it always was, is and will be. (Our eternity is also sempiternal. As I interpret Spinoza, eternity is extensionally equivalent to sempiternity). However, we can have no memory of any previous existence. Given the above, it follows that the formal essence of any human mind exists both before and after the mutable mind itself. Thus, we have the

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problem of understanding the relationship between the mutable mind and its eternal formal essence. I would say that when a person is born or dies, his formal essence changes only in its external relation to that person. When he is born, his formal essence becomes actualized in duration, and is actually a part o f his mind. (I have argued elsewhere that such an actualized formal essence may be called conatus). However, when a person dies, his formal essence becomes de-actualized in duration, though internally it undergoes no changes whatever. It should be pointed out that the term, 'actual', does not always mean 'temporal' or 'enduring'. Indeed, just as with the term, 'existence', the term, 'actual', also has a double meaning for Spinoza. Thus, every actual thing exists in duration or under the form o f eternity. Consequently, formal essences are always actual, in an important sense for Spinoza. Here is what he actually says: Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways - either in so far as we conceive them to exist with relation to a fixed time and place or in so far as we conceive them to be contained in God and to follow from the necessity of the divine nature. But those things which are conceived in this second way as true or real we conceive under the form of eternity, and their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of G o d . . . (note to 0P2 9, ES)) 1 should also mention that definition:

P29

provides a justification for my previous

DEFINITION. Any given mutable mode is known under the form o f eternity if and only if the formal essence o f that mode is known adequately. Spinoza flows on with his most mystical/metaphysical doctrines. "The intellectual, love of God which arises from the third kind of knowledge is eternal" (P33, ES), "God loves Himself with an infinite intellectual love" (P3 s, E5), " . . . the intellectual love of the mind toward God is part o f the infinite love with wbich God loves HimselF' (P36, E5), and finally, the breathtaking corollary, "the love o f God toward men and the intellectual love of the mind toward God are one and the same thing" (Cor P36, E5). Thus, man's intellectual love of God is God's intellectual love of man. With the doctrine of formal essence already developed, I believe I can make sense out o f all this.

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First, consider (P33, E5): "The intellectual love of God which arises from the third kind of knowledge is eternal". As mentioned before, Spinoza defines 'love' as "joy with the accompanying idea of an external cause" (D6, end of E3). Moreover, 'joy' is defined as "man's passage fi'om a less to a greater perfection" (D2, end of E3). Thus, love and joy are both mutable emotions, with bodily components. On the other hand, intellectual love is not an emotion and certainly has no mutable bodily component. What then is intellectual love? I would say that the intellectual love of God is just the formal essence of the (emotional, mutable) love of God. The intellectual love of God is simply our love of God conceived under the form of eternity. Given this interpretation, it follows that intellectual love is eternal, since every formal essence is eternal. Secondly, consider (P3s, E5): "God loves Himself with an infinite intellectual love". Recall that God's intellect is simply the structured totality of all ideas. Similarly, God's intellectual love may be regarded as the structured totality of all particular intellectual loves, that is, the structured totality of all the formal essences of individual loves. Since there are infinitely many of these formal essences, there is good reason to say that God loves Himself with an infinite intellectual love. The argument may be made even more precise. Consider the structured totality of the formal essences of all the joys there are. This may be identified with God's infinite and eternal joy. Moreover, this joy is accompanied by an eternal idea of God as a cause. Therefore, by the definition of love (transferred to formal essences), this joy is God's love, and God may be said to love Himself with an infinite intellectual love. Thirdly, consider (P3 6, E5): " . . . the intellectual love of the mind toward God is part of the infinite love with which God loves Himself". To see this, consider that each formal essence of a particular joy is accompanyed by an eternal idea of God as a cause. Thus, each such formal essence is an instance of intellectual love. Therefore, God's infinite intellectual love is proved to be the structured whole of all the particular intellectual loves. Consequently, the particular intellectual love of the mind toward God is part of God's infinite intellectual love. It all fits together so nicely. It should be emphasized that God is no person and his love, as a whole, is radically different from our love, both in essence and in existence. Otherwise, we are back to anthropomorphism.

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Finally, consider (Cor P3 6, E5): "the love of God toward men and the intellectual love of the mind toward God are one and the same thing". This may be seen by noting that God's love toward men is that part of God's infinite intellectual love which manifests itself through the essence o f the human mind. But this must be identical with man's intellectual love toward God (see (Cor PI i, E2)). In other words, God's eternal love of us is identical with our eternal love of God. (Compare: the tree's 'love' of the leaf is identical with the leaf's "love' of the tree). This could never be true if God were transcendent. It should be clear that for Spinoza, intuitive knowledge, together with the intellectual love it gives rise to, is our only real salvation, since not only does it provide a remedy for the passions, but it constitutes our individual immortality. Indeed, it may be said that our individual immortality is the only permanent remedy for the passions. It may be wondered whether everyone has this individual immortality. I would say that everyone has a formal essence, which is eternal. Hence, everyone is immortal, in a sense. However, the same may be said about rocks and trees. The main point here, I think, is that not all formal essences are equal. Some formal essences have adequate ideas of themselves, and others do not. Thus, not everyone is consciously immortal. Consider what Spinoza says, "He who possesses a body fit for many things possesses a mind of which the greater part is eternal" (P3 9, E5). Now what about an infant who dies? Such an infant does not possess a body as fit for as many things as an adult. Hence, the mind o f such an infant will not have a very great eternal part. It will hardly be conscious of itself. (Spinoza actually states this in the note to (P3 9, E5).) Thus, tile formal essence of the mind of an infant is much less than the formal essence of the mind of an adult (unless, I suppose, that adult is totally corrupt). 2 3 Finally, the Ethics concludes with, "Blessedness is not the reward o f virtue but is virtue itself; nor do we delight in blessedness because we restrain our lusts, but, on the contrary, because we delight in it, therefore are we able to restrain them" (P4 2, E5). Thus virtue is its own reward.

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* This paper was delivered, in part, before the University of California, Davis Tercentenary Spinoza symposium, in March 1977. See Letter 23 to Blyenbergh, written in 1665, in which Spinoza mentions his unpublished Ethics. However, it is by no means clear that this is a final draft or even a draft containing all five parts. See Wolf's account in The Correspondence of Spinoza, pp. 46-4"/. 3 In my original formalization of Part I of Spinoza's Ethics, I used 165 extra premises. However, I would say that only about 32 of these were non-analytic premises (that is, not logically necessary). In the Appendix to my second mentioned paper, I used only 15 extra premises, as well as (P~, El) to obtain (Ply, P33, El). Moreover, many of these premises were generated by a more general principle. Given these considerations, I believe my original formalization of Part I can be considerably simphfied and made more elegant. 4 See first alternate demonstration of (P~ ~, El). s See his, Spinoza's Metaphysics. 6 George Kline has written an interesting paper, 'On the Infinity of Spinoza's Attributes'. I'm not sure how to interpret his thesis about 'systematic' versus 'non-systematic' uses of the term 'infinitum' in Spinoza. If his thesis implies that there could be two or three attributes only, then I think it has to be wrong. But if it merely implies that the systematic notion of infinity contains no numerical meaning, then the thesis has more merit. I would still say, however, that even though the systematic notion contains no numerical meaning, still, it carries a logical implication of numerical import. 7 See Donagan's footnote 41 in 'Essence and the Distinction of Attributes in Spinoza's Metaphysics' in Grene's Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays. Donagan cites both Gueroult and. Lewis Robinson as proponents of this view, though this is subject to interpretation, as Donagan points out. 8 See Hallett's 'Substance and its Modes' in Benedict de Spinoza, reprinted in Grene's Spinoza collection, p. 160. Hallett says, "In Substance the Attributes are identical; in the perspective of intellect they are absolutely diverse, and each must be conceived through itself as constituting the perceived essence of Substance". This relativist, subjectivist interpretation of the attributes I utterly reject, for reasons given in this paper. Q See Curley's book, Spinoza's Metaphysics, Chapter 1, p. 17. He says, "Even after he (Spinoza) had changed the definition of 'attribute' to what it is in the Ethics, he regarded these terms as two names for the same thing". The terms Curley is referring to axe 'substance' and 'atttribute'. In another place, Curley seems to say that substance is to be identified with the sum total of its attributes. This is a more plausible view, though I still disagree that this is what Spinoza meant. 10 Spinoza states, "By substance I mean that which is in itself and is conceived through itself, that is, whose conception does not involve the conception of some other thing. I mean the same by attribute, except that it is called attribute with respect to the inteUect, which attributes such and such a nature to substance". Let me say first that it is passages such as these that give Curley and Hallett's views their plausibifity. I myself think Spinoza is using careless language here. He isn't so careless in the Ethics, or his published works. Also, this Letter 9 was written in 1663, hardly representative of the more mature Spinoza.

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One last philosophical remark about this. Even if Spinoza "means the same", it doesn't follow that he would be willing to say that attribute is identical with substance. 1 i Ibid,, Chapter 2. Curley deserves much credit for interpreting Spinoza's system as a kind of Logical Wholism, as opposed to Logical Atomism. 2 See Leibniz', 'Necessary and Contingent Truth', in Smith and Grene (1940). 3 Ibid. 4 See Leibniz', Discourse on Metaphysics, Open Court edition. Also, the Theodicy. 1 s In Letter 64 to Schuller, he is referrring to God's immediate intellect, which is the sum of all the formal essences of ideas. However, in (Cor P1 ~, E2), he is referring to God's mediate intellect, which is the sum of all mutable ideas (and perhaps the formal essences of these, also). 16 On one notion of 'metaphysical possibility', it is simply any statement not analytically contradictory, but containing metaphysical terms essentially. On another notion, it is simply any statement consistent with true metaphysical principles. Besides these two notions of 'metaphysically possible', there are others, but I shall not consider this any further. 7 See his, 'Spinoza's Proof of Immortality', in Grene's Spinoza collection, p. 249. ~ Donagan is guilty of this in ibid., p. 254. Fortunately, this does not affect the rest of the article, which is superb, in my view. Curley is also guilty of this in ibid., Chapter 4, p. 149. Surely Hallett is also guilty. They are all guilty of giving the attribute of thought a privileged position. 9 See Part V, especially, (P4, P29, E5). o See his 'Truth and Adequacy of Spinozistic Ideas', read before the UC, Davis Spinoza Symposium, March 1977. ~ See Arne Naess, 'Equivalent Terms and Notions in Spinoza's Ethics' in Inquiry. 22 This is an tmpublished paper, which is part of a dissertation now in progress. 23 It is hard to determine from Spinoza's writings whether the formal essence of the mind of a drunkard or lecher is no better than that of the mind of an infant. In any case, I would conclude by saying that in Spinoza's philosophy, immortality is not Micky Mouse, but rather, even Micky Mouse is immortal, though in a very mousy sense. Blessed human beings, however, have a conscious immortality, and that is what distinguishes their immortality from others, as I interpret Spinoza.

REFERENCES Curley, E. M., Spinoza's Metaphysics, Cambridge, Mass., 1969. Donagan, Alan, 'Essence and the Distinction of Attributes in Spinoza's Metaphysics'~ and 'Spinoza's Proof of Immortality' in Grene (ed.), 1973. Friedman, Joel I., 'A Formalization of Spinoza's Ethics, Part I' (1978), to appear. Friedman, Joel I., 'Was Spinoza fooled by the Ontological Argument?' (1978), to appear in Philosophia Friedman, Joel I., 'Spinoza's Denial of Free Will in Man and God', (1978), to appear in Spinoza's Philosophy of Man: papers presented at the Scandinavian Spinoza Symposium, 1977, in press. Friedman, Joel I., 'Some Set-theoretical Partition Theorems Suggested by the Structure of Spinoza's God', Synthese 27 (1974), 199-209.

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Friedman, Joel I., 'The Universal Class has a Spinozistie Partitioning, Synthese 32(1976), 403-418. Grene, Marjorie (ed.), Spinoza: A Collection o f Critical Essays, Garden City, New York, 1973. Hallett, H. F., Benedict de Spinoza, London 1957. Kline, George, 'On the Infinity of Spinoza's Attributes', abstract given at the Scandinavian Spinoza Symposium, 1977. Leibniz, G., Basic Writings, Open Court edition, 1962. Mandelbaum, M. and Freeman, E. (eds.), Spinoza: Essays in Interpretation, La Salle, 1975. Mark, Thomas, 'The Spinozistic Attributes', and 'Truth and Adequacy of Spinozistic Ideas', delivered before the UC, Davis Spinoza Symposium, in March 1977. Naess, Arne, 'Equivalent Terms and Notions in Spinoza's Ethics', mimeograph, undated. Naess, Arne, Freedom, Emotion, and Self-subsistence, Oslo, 1975. Spinoza, B., Ethics, edited by J. Gutmann, New York, 1949. Spinoza, B., Spinoza Opera, edited by C. Gebhardt, Heidelberg, 1925. Smith, T. V. and Grene, M. (eds.), From Descartes to Locke, Chicago, 1940. Wolf, A. (ed.), The Correspondence of Spinoza, New York, 1927 (new impression, 1966).