HUMANEVOLUTION

Vol. 8 - N. 1 (43-60)- 1993

BOOK REVIEW

Giinter Br~iuer & Fred H. Smith (Eds.): Continuity or Replacement: Controversies in Homo sapiens evolution. (Rotterdam: A.A. Balkema Publishers, pp. 315, H.fl. 150.- / $ 85.-, ISBN 90 61 91 149 4). reviewed by Paul Storm, Henri Duparcplantsoen 25, 2551 XT, The Hague, The Netherlands

The question of the origin of modem Homo sapiens has rece~ltly raised much interest. Since 1984, several major scientific volumes have been dedicated to this topic (e.g., Smith & Spencer, 1984; Mellars & Stringer, 1989; Trinkaus, 1989). This volume is the latest addition to this series. It is largely the outcome of a symposium on "Controversies in Homo sapiens evolution" held in Zagreb in 1988, and reflects the opinions of twenty five scientists, in twenty one chapters. The hardback book is nicely laid out, produced on smooth paper, equipped with an author index and a subject index, and illustrated with tables, figures, and photos. Confronted with so much attention, as this book does, for the origin of just one species, the naive outsider might expect an enormous amount of insight in that origin. Unfortunately, this is not really the case. Science appears not even to be able to give a satisfactory definition of the species under discussion. J.H. Kidder, R.L. Jantz and F.H. Smith, for instance, give a multivariate approach to defining modem humans. They provide the reader with data (results of a multivariate technique, the Mahalanobis distance) and a discussion on fossil hominids from Europe and Southwest Asia. According to the authors, providing an unequivocal definition of modem humans is an exceedingly difficult undertaking. E. Trinkaus examines the application of cladistic methods. One might well wonder whether it is a matter of methodology. The whole discussion on our origin as a species is largely focused on the question: continuity or replacement? Accordingly, hypotheses appear to fall into two competing groups: emphasizing replacement ("Single Origin Model"), and emphasizing (local) continuity ("Multiregional Evolution Model"). In its extreme interpretation, the first model proposes that all modem humans derive from a single common ancestral population that replaced all other archaic hominid populations in other regions. The second model proposes that modem humans evolved locally in different parts of the world from dissimilar archaic ancestors. Variants of both extreme models allow gene flow to explain the present human variation. One might well wonder whether, beside these models, people do consider still other options, or whether the anthropological world is frozen in a "matter of prestige" between the two models. Not all researchers investigating the above questions take part in the dispute, some only providing the munition, derived from palaeoanthropology, archaeology and genetics, and others cautiously proposing their preferred model. In the media, however, much attention is given to the "real gladiators" with their clear and unambiguous viewpoints. Unfortunately, nuances threaten to become lost. The attractiveness of the present volume is that these nuances are provided; therefore the reader must accept that not all authors show an obvious standpoint in the controversy. Palaeoanthropology is clearly the main subject of this volume, and many authors focus on craniological arguments. Features of postcranial remains from South Africa are discussed by A.G.

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Morris and by G.E. Kennedy. Besides palaeoanthropology the volume focuses on archaeology and F.B. Harold bridges the two subjects. He gives a general discussion about the linkages between morphological changes and their behavioral implications. One example of a typical archaeological chapter is that of F.T. Masao who gives an overview of the Middle Stone Age, concentrating on Tanzania, dated between 130,000 and 20,000 years BP. The remaining theme, genetics, is represented by two chapters, one by R.L. Cann, who focuses on mitochondrial DNA, and the other by G. Lucotte, who treats Y-chromosome DNA haplotypes in African Pygmies. The volume does not only pay attention to well known hominid fossils and sites, but also to new finds. F. Facchini and G. Giusberti give a description of Homo sapiens remains from Kania on the island of Crete, dated at approximately 50,000 B.P., comparing them with those from Neandertal Man and modem humans. The chapter by G. Br~iuer, R.E. Leakey and E. Mbua, gives a description of a partly preserved cranium (KNM-ER-3884) from Ileret (East Turkana, Kenya). There is some uncertainty about its age, but interestingly some features might point to certain affinities with archaic Homo sapiens. The fossil hominid remains from two well known South African sites play an important part in the debate about modem human origins, and both are represented by one chapter. A.G. Morris focuses on biological relationships between Upper Pleistocene and Holocene populations in southern Africa, especially on new postcranial material from Border Cave, dated between 65,000 and 95,000 years ago. In an archaeology-oriented chapter, H.J. Deacon and R. Schuurman review the evidence of the South African Klasies River site that yielded fragmentary remains of modem humans, dated around 100,000 years B.P. For more than half a century hominid remains from Southwest Asia have because of its productive hominid sites and its geographical position, between Africa and Eurasia played an important role in the discussion of the appearance of Homo sapiens. The last few years this discussion has flared up again because of the startling recent thermoluminescence and ESR dates. An updated summary of stratigraphical and archaeological observations pertaining to this area is given by O. Bar-Yosef. Ever since the beginning of palaeoanthropology, Neandertal Man and his relationship with modem humans fascinated scientists and novices alike. This volume is no exception. O. Softer examines the record of the transition from Neandertal to modem humans, dated between 100,000 and 30,000 years ago, for the Russian plain and Crimea. Besides the hominid remains and recent, genetic data, cultural remains play an important role in the discussion on the transition to modem humans. J.F. Simek treats the Middle to Upper Paleolithic transition and the (spatial) relationship of three well known European "cultures", which are often discussed in the light of the relationship between Neandertal Man and modem humans, i.e., the Mousterian, the Chatelperronian and the Aurignacien. The "Single Origin Model" (also named: "Noah's Ark Model" or "Tree Model", "Garden of Eden", "Out of Africa Model", "Recent African Speciation/Replacement Model" or "Black Eve Model") has until recently largely been defended by scientists coming from two different scientific quarters: palaeoanthropology and mitochondrial DNA studies. C.B. Stringer gives a palaeoanthropological evaluation of his "Out of Africa Model". R.L. Cann provides a mitochondrial perspective on the same question, at the end of the chapter referring to African genetic roots of modem humans. G. B~uer gives his view of Africa's place in the emergence of modem humans. According to him, Africa played a central role in the origin of modem humans, although he does not exclude some hybridisation between the archaic-modem boundary as expressed by his "African Hybridisation and Replacement Model". The "Multiregional Evolution Model" (also named: "Local Continuity Model", "Candelabra Model" or "Neandertal Phase Model") is defended largely by palaeoanthropologists. M.H. Wolpoff

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discusses the theories of modem human origins in a broad, worldwide sense, and concludes that the ',Single Origin Model" is wrong. According to F.H. Smith, who looks at the role of continuity in modem human origins, palaeoanthropological data do not support the recent African speciation/ replacement model. D.W. Frayer concentrates on Europe. According to him the persistence of Neandertal features in post-Neandertal Europeans suggests a degree of continuity in this region. Although in recent years interest in Australasia is increasing and research from this area could provide rewarding results, there are only two chapters dedicated to this region. R. Jones gives an overview of the human colonization of Australia, paying attention to topics like the Asian hominids, well known sites from Australia and Papua New Guinea and limitations of dating methods. P.J. Habgood discusses and evaluates the origin of modem humans in East Asia, focusing at some allegedly regional cranial features. According to him, neither of the two competing models can fully explain the morphological pattern observed in East Asia. Continuity or Replacement does not cover all the issues concerning our origin and evolution, and apparently there still lies a major task ahead for those who wish to work on that fascinating puzzle: modem human origins. The volume, however, gives a satisfactory overview of various subjects and present main controversies in the evolution of modem humans. It provides the reader with new discoveries and interesting ideas. For those who are fascinated by the origin and evolution of hominids, and especially the emergence of modem humans, this volume is a real acquisition and can be recommended.

C. Barlow (Ed.): From Gaia to Selfish Genes. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1991, xi+ 273 Pp., n.p. ISBN 0-262-02323-7 reviewed by Michael Ruse, Department of Philosophy, University of Guelph, Canada N1G 2W1

This is a collection of extracts from recent biological writings on and around what I can only describe as some catchy or trendy topics. We go from the so-called "Gaia hypothesis", which claims that the earth is in some sense a living being, fight through to the ideas of Richard Dawkins, who suggests that somehow the genes are "selfish". Along the way, we cover such topics as individuality; holism; hierarchical thoughts about the organic world; the application of game theory to animal and human behaviour and the evolution of co-operation therefrom; and so finally to Dawkins and on to a few of his wise reflections. To be quite candid, this is not the kind of book I much like. Complete with large pages and glossy pictures, it is as close to a Coffee Table book as its distinguished academic publishers are likely to get. I am simply not sure that much is added to the content by giving us a picture of Iwo Jima, along with a discussion of Hamilton's models of altruism. Nor again do I find it very helpful to have the half-baked reflections that we get at the end. I simply don't know what it means to say, as one writer claims, that science writing is "Abrahamic", where this supposedly means that such writers are "powerless like Abraham who in the Bible reports to the people not what God said but what Moses told him God said" (p. 239). Apart from everything else, unless my Biblical knowledge is totally messed up, Moses came significantly after Abraham. Are we supposed to read some deep significance into the fact that the Pentateuch is supposedly written by Moses? If so, the subtle depths altogether escape me.

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I think that modem evolutionary biology in particular, and, for that matter, modem biology generally, is a very exciting area. I think that one can have good popular science writing about this, like one gets from Stephen Jay Gould in his essays. But snipping out bits from various writings in the way this volume does seem to me not the way to achieve progress in popular knowledge of biology. I suppose the book might have some place in a public library, but I would hate to think that any student would be introduced to modem biology through such a half-baked hodgepodge. It seems to me that this book in its appearance gets close to false advertising. For instance, on the cover we are told that one of the very contributors is Stephen Jay Gould; but all we get are three isolated paragraphs, and at that, taken right out of context, thus truly saying little about Gould's ideas. The same is true of others. Quite frankly, if I bought a book on the strength that Gould was a contributor, I would want a lot more than we are offered here.

Portmann, Adolf: A Zoologist Looks at Humankind. English translation by Judith Schaefer of Biologische Fragmente zu einer Lehre vom Menschen. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. ISBN 0-231-06194-3. Price unknown, 174 pp. Illus. Notes. Commentary. Index. reviewed by Earl W. Count, 2616 Saklan Indian Drive, Walnut Creek, CA 94595, USA

Adolf Portmann's European eminence as a zoologist has served him but slightly in the English-speaking world. His works, however major, have rarely been translated. This is unfortunate, so it makes the present one all the more welcome. In this book, he turns his long-wrought conclusions upon man: at once his vertebrate placement and his transcendent superlatives within that placement. The plot of the book (after an Introduction) follows human ontogenesis as a morphological proposition, i.e., starting with the neonate; thereupon the first year postpartum; growth and development thereafter, which is elaborated in three sections. Here Portmann touches upon bipedalism, language acquisition, child behavior, sexual development, and senescence. He compares man throughout with other vertebrates, mainly alloprimates; his methods are somatometric where feasible. Confessedly, his treatment of the brain strikes me as a little arbitrary--but then I remember that he is presenting only Biologische Fragmente. Portmann was a great teacher, a popular lecturer and broadcaster in the good old Thomas Huxley tradition. His discoveries ranged from coelenterates and molluscs to fishes and birds. Understandably, in mammalian matters-- particularly alloprimates and man--he had to borrow the data of others. At this point I must confess to scruples in writing this review. For (a zoologist erstwhile, an anthropologist eventually) I cannot avoid the impression that in this later essay time has touched his ways of thinking and doing. For some years Portmann has been gone: he is defenceless against my assertions. Per contra the dwellers in the Elysian fields--Aristotle, Galileo, Newton, Darwin, Einstein--have not therewith gained immunity to questioning. In defence, on the other hand, of Portmann's opus--it appeared first in 1944, and brought to anthropology a much-needed expansion of perspective. A second edition (1951) enlarged the data. Eventu-

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ally, a third and final edition appeared in 1968, which furnished the present translation. Some background will lend point to what follows. It happens that over the recent four decades or so the fundamental sciences have been experiencing probably the most drastic Umw/i lzung of thought since Copernicus and Galileo. In the biological sciences (including bioanthropology) our strategies of comparative morphology (this I know from experience) have been losing their adequacy for several decades. Now, Portmann is not a reductionist----comparative morphology does not furnish opportunity for that anyway--but by 1968 neither had he appropriated the holistic armamentarium of cybernetics and systems theory. Let us pause for a moment to consider the "biography" of any science. It begins inductively, empirically. It gathers raw data, analyzes them, orders them---obviously a necessary thing that will continue as long as there are fresh data to gather. It reflects nevertheless the "immature" stage that all sciences must pass through. The science achieves maturity when at last it has the capacity for deductive theory or principles. Zoology seems to be struggling to achieve this capacity. (I follow F.S.C. Northrup, 1947, 1983 here.) Is Portmann's book in the forefront of this struggle? Biologische Fragmente zu einer Lehre yore Menschen, Portmann's own title, has a genteel modesty. Do the "Fragmente" promote a "Lehre vom Menschen"--a man-science still unborn? I am constrained to consider some of his examples. Birds hatch in nests. Some species (genera) remain dependent--nidicolous--for a relatively prolonged time. Others nidifugous--leave earlier. This seems to reflect respective nervous developments in ovo. Portmann generalizes this nesting-behavior, for he transfers its principle to mammals, including the various alloprimate infants and the human neonate. There must be some point to this analogy, but it is not enhanced if we note that intraoval and intrauterine gestations followed by appropriate parentalisms make difficult comparisons. My puzzlement is not diminished by Portmann's remarks that he draws more enlightenment from comparing the wings of birds with those of bats than from comparing the avian wing with the reptilian forelimb. Since I decidedly do not, it dawns on me that he is more interested in analogies whereas I am in homologies. Elsewhere he devotes considerable effort to demonstrating that cerebral "indices" (what are they?) of mammals are roughly related to their body size. Unfortunately, to me, this introduces more confusion than clarification. Portmann asserts that while man definitely is related evolutionarily to the alloprimates, he has put a great distance between him and them in their respective ways of life; yet he makes no attempt to account for the evolution of "culture" (my term). But suddenly, shifting from nesting birds and human postpartum living to this enormous discontinuity between biological and sociocultural man, it occurs to me that Portmann continues to draw a line between Naturwissenschaften and Geisteswissenschaften. I think that he and I would have had an endless, though undoubtedly amiable, discussion about this point, i.e., apropos of a Lehi'e vom Menschen. In conclusion Portmann asserts more than once that biology is duty-bound to demonstrate man's animal affinities; and this is feasible via a sheerly inductive comparative morphology. This is familiar to us, ever since Darwin wrote The Descent of Man. But he exploits analogy rather than homology. I find, for example, his efforts to make the nesting ways of birds relevant and insightful to the postpartum mother-and-child relations of mammals (especially man) rather strained; the reader, of course, will judge for himself. This is not his most felicitous book (cf., e.g., his 1976 Einfii hrung in die vergleichende Morphologie der Wirbeltiere). Yet, I think Chapter 7 redeems in large measure the shortcomings of what has gone before. In it, he protests the facile adoption by many of the notion that, because man is an animal, his values at long last cannot be more than animalistic. Warfare, in particular, becomes thereby merely an exaggerated animalism that defies devaluation. He insists that high intelligence requires group living if it is to have opportunities to realize its potential capabilities-a sine qua non, incidentally (but it is his mentioning), that gives to archaeology its tremendous

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significance. But what is man (he too uses this phrase--see p. 153) will issue only from the combined workings of "all creative genius, musing, dreaming, going beyond the experiential ... the powers of artistic and, especially, of religious experience no less than the powers of pure reason" (ibid.). Portmann's methods may be of yesterday but his vision is of tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow.

References Northrop, F.S.C. 1947. The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities. New York: Macmillan. Portmann, Adolf. 1976. Einfii hrung in die vergleichende Morphologie der Wirbeltiere. Basel & Stuttgart: Schwabe & Co.

Corballis, Michael C. The Lopsided Ape. Evolution of the Generative Mind. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. 366 pp. ISBN O-19-506675-8. $24.95. reviewed by Elsie S. Harper, 1530 South Lumpkin St., C-2. Athens, GA 30605, U.S.A.

In The Lopsided Ape, Michael Corballis (Professor of Psychology, University of Auckland, New Zealand) targets two central issues of human evolution: discontinuities with other primate species, particularly their communication systems, and our neurobiological and behavioral continuities with them. Human anatomic, neural and behavioral asymmetries are discussed from the perspective of a Neo-Behaviorist, cognitive neuropsychologist. Corballis attempts to combine within a generalized theoretical framework of human and language evolution (i) the anatomic, genetic, behavioral and communicational features we share with extant apes and extinct hominids, and (ii) the discontinuity of our uniquely lateralized lefthemispheric functions for speech and language. Extrapolating from the generative aspects of speech and sign language, and in lieu of the Chomskyan explanation of a Language Acquisition Device (LAD), Corballis proposes a left-hemispheric Generative Assembly Device (GAD) as the neural source from which exaptations for culture and language evolved from previously acquired motoric adaptations. According to this hypothesis, ontogenetic lateralization of neural functions in phylogeny was not the result of genetic reshuffling for language, or a spin-off from some other evolved hominid feature. It was rooted in the emergence of handedness and neural controls for praxis skills. It developed from adaptations for visual-gestural communication, similar to that used by nonhuman primates. The linguistic features of recursiveness, duality, hierarchical order, infinite productivity, minimal grammatical units and a limited number of rules to order them, co-evolved gradually and progressively with the advancing complexities of socio-economic and communicative needs of Homo sapiens sapiens. The twelve chapters of the book are independent units, each with their own set of notes and extensive references, the latter combined in alphabetical form at the end of the book. Most comprehensive, of course, are the chapters dealing with brain structures and functions, righthanded and footedness, right-ear auditory preference, right-field image generation, self-conscious-

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ness and the precursor praxis skills from which it is postulated GAD evolved. Included are discussions on heterochronic growth gradients, neoteny, critical developmental periods, and biosocial consequences of extended leaming time, all of which are threaded throughout the chapters. Written for the nonspecialist, the book offers useful topical reviews, illuminated with literary, philosophical, behavioral and psychological extracts and comments. Opposing theories are presented with clarity and economy. The selection of research reports and helpful diagrams augment the usefulness of the work. Only a few typos mar an otherwise nicely produced volume. Corballis argues that generative specialization of the left hemisphere itself is the hallmark of our species, not just speech and language. For his evolutionary model, he draws upon Annett's genetic explanation for asymmetries of the human brain, and upon studies of split-brain behavior and neural pathology which helped identify specific neural functions and their locus, as well as offer evidence of hemispheric equipotentialities and competition. Annett (1985) postulated a right-shift (RS+) gene to account for the evolutionary trend toward left hemispheric specializations in human evolution. He linked differentials of hemispheric growth gradients to its expression. He explained ambidexterity and left-handedness as an expression of its recessive (RS-) form, or as weak expression of the gene in ontogeny. Bilateral neural and behavioral symmetries, typical of most mammals including nonhuman primates, were attributed to absence of the positive allele. He suggested that in evolving populations, particularl:y among homozygotes for the gene, biased development of the left hemisphere would have resulted in a balanced polymorphism of neural functions. This hypothesis of a mutant RS+ gene negates the Chomskyan mentalist postulation of left hemispheric adaptations for a species-specific faculty for language. In the opinion of this reviewer, however, lumping together the affectively-rooted, creative sociopsychological cognitive functions of language with neural mechanisms of motor and perceptual functions obscures important keys to understanding the direction and forces of canalization of human evolution. Corballis notes that interpretations of the clinical data vary, as do conjectural explanations for particular lateralized specializations. Even which hemisphere in evolution was the affected one appears to be in dispute. Evidence from fossil skulls of neural asymmetries is not clear. Corballis argues that functional lateralization of the brain became possible through development of erect posture, which freed the hands for activities other than locomotion. He dates these adaptive changes to the Pliocene, unfortunately a moot period for hypothesis testing since the Pliocene is noted for its fossil gap between the 'dental' apes of the Miocene and hominid forms of the Pleistocene. Corballis attributes to the proto-hominids a communication system of visually-based gestures supplemented with expressive vocalics, which was continued in use by Australopithecines, Homo habilis and H. erectus. Only with the emergence of H. sapiens were exaptations for a fully vocal-auditory system in place. Speech and language, as we know them, developed much later with Homo sapiens sapiens, and in tandem with nuclear family organization, food-sharing, cooperation, complex tool industries, agriculture and a sedentary way of life. The chapters on primate and human evolution are admittedly "painted with a broad brush." Less detailed, they also carry some misleading statements, e.g., that the earliest known mammals were "in fact" primates (p. 31), or that monkeys evolved from prosimians (Ciochon and Chiarelli, 1985). Focusing on upright posture, Corballis entertains, but does not incorporate, Morgan's (1985) aquatic theory as an explanation for human bipedality. To this hypothesis and other controversial ones discussed in the work, Corballis takes a tentative approach, suggestive of free choice between them, as if different habitats and ecological roles did not implicate fundamentally different selectional pressures affecting both adaptation and exaptation.

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With a progressive view of the evolutionary nature of GAD, Corballis loosely assembles the conventional elements from human evolution scenarios, e.g., arboreal ancestry, descent to an open, savanna life-style, a meat-eating diet, scavenging, cooperative hunting, out-migrations from Africa, tool-making, and increased complexity of social organization and communication. Studies in all these areas have produced voluminous literatures, most of which are still embroiled in great controversy. Understandably, Corballis disclaims expertise in all these overlapping fields. Nonetheless, it is their findings upon which viable evolutionary reconstructions depend, despite interpretative disagreements. The interdisciplinary requirements in reconstructing human and language evolution pose a major obstacle to theorists. The models must be capable of integrating rapidly developing new information and changing conclusions. Yet without some unifying systematic theme for human evolution, effective measures for evaluating data and proposed hypotheses are lacking. Comparative study of parts, or their interrelations with other parts, implements understanding but cannot substitute for evaluative or predictive functions which an integratively synthesized model of the whole provides. Although Corballis emphasizes exaptive derivations ana alscounts the significance of environmental adaptations in human and language evolution, he closes his work on,,an environmental note. His last paragraph expresses foreboding that the enormous power of GAD currently employed in human life is destroying our environment. His concern for humanity and its environment can well be appreciated. But human and protohuman life were never independent of environment, although in his work, and most other conjectural reconstructions, the ecological role of the ancestral line through evolutionary time is unclear or simply omitted. As a species-specific role, it must not be restricted to only male activities of the ancestral populationTIt must include females and the young of both sexes, whose ecological roles and adaptations to environment are not, as too often presumed, identical with those of adult males. Constraining p ~ e s of temporal, cyclical and maturational processes act upon mothers, infants and juveniles, which also result in species-specific selective adaptations. Ecological relationships are poorly defined or ignored in many evolution scenarios, including those that Corballis presents. The ancestral environments described are devoid of insect life, although arthropods have been ubiquitous since the Permian as an important food source and strong influence on bio-behavioral adaptations in animal life. Mammalian survivors of the great extinctions at the K-T boundary were small insectivores, and the first primates were insectivorous. Insectivory was retained as an important protein source among all primate families, including the human one. Insects must have been at least as important in human evolution. Uncritical acceptance of adult male big-game hunting, scavenging and flesh-eating as the determining factors in human evolution obstruct more productive research into our origins, not only for what is uniquely human, but also why, as a result of our unbounded, time-free expansions, we are destroying the world which gave us birth. In spite of the above reservations, The Lopsided Ape provides an excellent overview of many current key issues in human and language origin theory, presents them in highly readable, jargonfree prose and in a well-organized, logical format. The book should be of value not only to human and language evolution theorists but to specialists and nonspecialists concerned with understanding human 'nature' and behavior.

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References AnnenM., 1985. Left, Right, Hand and Brain: The Right-shift Theory, London: Erlbaum. Ciochon R.L. and A.B. Chiarelli., 1985. "Paleobiogeographical perspectives on the origin of the Platyrrhini". In:Primate Evolution and Human Oiigins (R.L. Ciochon and J.G. Fleagle, eds.). Menlo Park, CA: Benjamin/ Cummings. Morgan E., 1985. The Descent of Woman. London: Souvenir Press.

Yves Christen: Sex Differences. Modern Biology and the Unisex Fallacy (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1991, pp 141, ISBN 0-88738-,896-8). English translation of L'6galit6 des sexes (Paris: Edition du Rocher, 1987). reviewed by Weiert Velle, Department of Physiology and Nutrition, Norwegian College of Veterinary Medicine, Oslo, Norway.

Debate on the relative importance of heredity and environment as determinants for human behaviour (the nature/nurture controversy) is no new phenomenon, but its intensity has varied with time. During the last 25 years it has attracted increasing interest, not at least due to the concomitant increase in the activity of the feminist movement in the Western world. Many of its leading theorists have claimed that no real sex differences exist between men and women, except for the reproductive functions. According to them, both sexes are supplied with the same basic potential for all types of activity. Observed sex differences inabilities, fields of interest, behavioural patterns etc. are products of the socialization process from the time of birth. This theory excludes the influence of genetic factors on behavi our, and fits well with the feminists' dream of equal functions for the two sexes in society. If the two sexes are born with the same potentials in the different fields, changes in the social conditions brought about by political means should lead to equality in functions. The similarity with marxist theory is striking: Man is a product of the social conditions and by changing the social conditions it would be possible to change human nature. History does not support the last contention, and both experience and research contradict the former. During the last decennia the contributions to this debate have been dominated by environmentalists with a background in the social sciences, apparently with little or no basic knowledge of biology. Proponents of the view that human behaviour is influenced by both biological and social factors have been far less numerous. Yves Chfisten's book on sex differences, originally published in French in 1987, is an important contribution in the attempt to correct this imbalance. His background is tailor-made to the task. He holds degrees in biological sciences as well as Jn psychology, and throughout the book he documents balanced views on the many controversial questions raised. As indicated already in the book's title, Christen takes exception against the feminist unisex theory. To deny that men and women differ may damage the female cause. His aim with the book is to advocate a different kind of feminism (what he calls feminitude), a feminism built upon the fact that the female is not a near-equal of the male, but a sex in its own right.

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The book is organized in 12 chapters, and also contains 400 references, of which the most recent ones are from the mid-eighties. In a short review it is not possible to do the book due justice. But some highlights will be mentioned. In the brief first chapter the author gives his reason for writing about sex differences rather than sex similarities: when dealing with the two sexes, the similarities are a reality, but an insignificant reality, a sort of back ground noise without consequences. It is the differences alone that carry meaning. In Chapter 2, examples from the history of feminism are given to illustrate the difficulties involved in obtaining equal rights for women. He raises the question not only why such discrimination persists, but also how it came about in the first place. Christen criticizes the feminism of the 1960s for having rejected all inquiry concerning the last point. Data from medical statistics, genetics, and sports illustrating important biological sex differences (susceptibility to disease, longevity, achievements in sports etc), are given in Chapter 3. It is pointed out that men's physical advantage, unlike women's, is found in the fields useful for success in competition. This is in turn related to the possibility of domination which is obviously more attractive to males than to females. Chapter 4 deals with the two sexual strategies, due to the obvious dissymmetry of the sexual organs. For one partner more than the other, copulation is a conquest. Even the pioneer feminist Simone de Beanvoir admits so much: "Even when she is willing, or provocative, it is unquestionably the male who takes the female - she is taken...". But dissymmetry goes further. Due to his continuous and enormous production of gametes, the male can, without major investment, inseminate many females, while the female's contribution of gametes is strictly limited. As phrased by the author, the male opts for quantity, the female for quality. Thus the female has the privilege of choice. The author also agrees with the idea originally put forward by Donald Symons that homosexuality allows one to observe male and female sexuality in their purest form. What he emphasizes here is, again, the fundamental differences between the sexes. One example is the highly developed market for homo sexual pornography, while nothing similar exists for lesbians. Another is the existence of specialized establishments (baths etc.) where homosexuals may engage in multiple anonymous encounters, while lesbians typically attempt to establish more lasting personal ties. Chapter 5 is concerned with evolution and natural selection, dealing with themes like male aggression, female competitiveness, infanticide, monogamy and nymphomania. Hierarchy and gender is the main theme of Chapter 6. Everybody agrees that male dominance is a fact of life, but as to the ultimate cause behind the hierarchial relationship opinions diverge. Other things being equal, there is an 80% chance that a man will be selected to a leader position, and in many cases it is a result of women pushing for this solution. Moreover, many women prefer to be led by men. Behaviourists believe rules and regulations will change the situation. The author is more pessimistic, and ascribes male dominance to a large extent to sex differences in hormone production, the male producing large amounts of testosterone which he names "the power hormone". Chapter 7 is devoted to a discussion of the claim that masculinity and femininity are something artificial imposed by a sexist upbringing. The author points out that differentiating practices of child-rearing do not create the initial difference, but they exacerbate it. They assist every individual to reinforce his or her identity. This is psychologically important. Lack of identity is often associated with psychiatric problems. Changes in the methods of upbringing which have proved their value during millennia could therefore lead to an increase in mental problems.

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In Chapters 8 and 9 reference is made to recent advances in neuroanatomy and neurophysiology. In animals, and now also in man, conspicuous sex differences have been detected in brain structure and function. Not only does the brain influence sexuality, but sex just as much influences brain structure and function. These findings are discussed in relation to observed sex differences in mathematical ability, in intellectual strategies to apprehend reality, in perceiving the physical world and social relations etc. An important statement is that sex differences in intellectual strategies do not lend themselves to value judgements in terms of superiority and inferiority. Conspicuous sex differences in psychiatry is the main theme of Chapter 10. Greater male fragility, aggression and crime are documented. Female violence in connection with the premenstrual tension syndrome and the higher susceptibility to depression in women are also discussed. Few if any of these sex differences can be explained as a result of sexist upbringing. In Chapter 11 we are reminded that between men and women there are points in common as well as elements of difference. Nevertheless, when it comes to ways of conducting oneself in relation to others and the world at large, there is one more male and one more female, illustrating different strategies. In this context the question is raised whether science is a male enterprise. The history of science documents an overwhelming number of males among those who have made major impact in the various fields. Only recently has the number of outstanding female contributors increased, and then preferably "in research areas that call for relatively little of an extreme spirit of dissection or conceptualization, but rather a taste for direct observation". Examples of such areas are botany, ethology, ethnography. The author's contention is that these facts stem from the possibility to apprehend the world according to different modalities, one of which is more male and another more female. It is also claimed that a closer connection between mind and body exists in women than in man, due to the rhythms imposed by menstruation and to maternity. Both phenomena cause her belly to remain closer to the emotions, and even to the intellect, than in males. Furthermore, the existence of the mother-child bond is beyond discussion.Thus the woman is by nature submitted to the imperatives of her hormonal and maternal lives. This may be the reason why woman has a greater tendency than man to merge her personality with that of her loved one. She is more submissive and imitative. As a telling example Yves Christen again refers to Simone de Beauvoir, the author of The Second Sex. Her entire life was, in the view of the author, "a manifestation of the submissive and imitative behaviour of the woman in love towards the loved one, who is also the admired one." This represents "the very confession, if not of male superiority, then at least the superiority of the male model." He takes exception against this type of attitude. In the last chapter, Christen outlines another approach, one he believes will promote a development toward what he calls feminitude. He indicates that feminism is an insult to women, and asks why she must deny her sex to affirm herself as an individual: "Why must she cut out part of herself in order to become herself?." This seems to have been the approach applied by feminism. But woman realizes herself as a woman in the presence of a man who plays the role of a man. It is therefore necessary to go beyond feminism and accept the existence of some fundamental physical and mental sex differences. The values proper to each sex must be acknowledged. The study of the differences between the sexes, and their differing relationships, is important. Bringing these differences into daylight means validating them for both sexes. It is to be hoped that Christen's book will be widely read, not least among the many who still maintain the biased view that the development of the human brain has passed beyond the stage where biological determinants influence behaviour. Total agreement on such controversial questions as those dealt with in the book will probably never be obtained. But hopefully there will be

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agreement that when dealing with nature/nurture, it is never a question of either/or. Both physical and behavioural traits are results of an interplay between genes and environment. This is also an important conclusion in this book.

Mary Maxwell (Ed.): The Sociobiological Imagination (Albany, N.Y.: Suny Press, pp. 378, ISBN 0-7914-0768-3, $ 44.50; paper $14.95). Reviewed by Sally Waiters, Department of Psychology, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby BC, Canada V5A 1S6

This book offers a brief yet exciting view into the breadth of influence of sociobiology on a number of diverse disciplines. The view is necessarily brief (since eighteen distinct disciplines are covered) yet exciting because the influence of sociobiology extends far beyond the biological sciences. The purpose of the book, according to Maxwell, is to acknowledge the significance of the proliferation of sociobiological thought, to demonstrate by providing examples from various fields how widespread the influence of sociobiology has been outside biology, and to generally introduce the field of sociobiology. These objectives are well met. The disciplines that are frequently associated with sociobiology are represented: for example, anthropology, primatology, history, the study of conflict and psychology. Researchers in these fields may be surprised to find, among others, chapters using sociobiology to discuss management theory, economics, political science, ethical philosophy, religion, Marxist thought, and aesthetics. While each chapter represents only a fragment of the work in that particular field, the impact of the book as a whole suggests that sociobiology has a major influence on the social sciences. Although readers from various disciplines might wish that a more comprehensive overview of their particular areas had been provided, the insight gained into the application of sociobiological theory in addressing diverse and often complex questions associated with human nature and behavior from a variety of perspectives more than compensates. Indeed, this volume provides a much-needed introduction to the possible uses of sociobiological thinking outside one's own field of expertise. While researchers using sociobiological theories in their work will want to own this book, it will also appeal to readers less experienced in the area. Although the hardcover price may be a bit steep ($44.50), the book is also available in paperback at $14.95. The glossary provided in the introduction is particularly useful to the uninitiated reader, as are the suggestions for further reading. The lay reader will be pleased with the frequent use of definitions and non-technical language. The bibliography is at the end of the book; there are no separate references for each chapter. An index including both terms and names is provided. Biographical information about the authors rounds out the volume. The book is not without typographical errors; the use in the glossary of the term "intersexual" competition for what should be "intra-sexual" competition is a more glaring example. The contributors vary in their approach to evolutionary theory in discussing their areas of expertise; some of the contributors, such as Galdikas and Vasey, van den Berghe, Nesse and Crawford, emphasize the importance of building predictions based on conditions in the ancestral environment. These contributors stress the genetic basis for traits while allowing that current environmental circumstances affect the expression and usefulness of that trait. Other contributors,

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such as Reynolds and Irons, use evolutionary theory in discussing contemporary behavior and its relationship to reproductive success. Both approaches are needed for a complete account; differences in them are akin to applying different levels of analysis. Since it would be impossible in this review to address each of the eighteen chapters and thus the eighteen disciplines in which sociobiological theory is used, I will limit my discussion to some of the volume's chapters. My own area of interest is evolutionary psychology; I have therefore chosen for further discussion chapters I find particularly interesting outside of this area. In his chapter on the socioecology of religion, Reynolds presents aprovocative discussion of some of the world's major religions with respect to their precepts about sex, marriage, and reproduction. He defines religious precepts as either pro-natalist (favoring disapproval of infanticide, abortion, and celibacy, early marriage and reproduction) or anti-natalist (favoring approval of infanticide, abortion and celibacy, delayed reproduction and late marriage). Reynolds attempts initially to account for this division using the theory of Land K selection (MacArthur and Wilson, 1967) and contrasts GNP with reproductive rates such as Total Fertility Rate. He later discounts for good reasons the use of r and K selection in this context, although once again the question is raised regarding the relationship of cultural to genetic evolution. The evolutionary significance of religion poses a fascinating challenge to sociobiologists investigating the association between religious beliefs and reproductive success; Reynolds uses the notion of gene-culture coevolution and explores the possibility that ecological circumstances motivate both pro- and anti-natalist religious precepts. What is lacking in his discussion, however, is a distinction between, on the one hand, contemporary religious beliefs and practices and, on the other, any possible relationship these have to ecological circumstances that existed during the initial spread of such beliefs. Any discussion of sociobiology must avoid circular reasoning, i.e. explaining that what exists in the contemporary world must be adaptive; reference must be made to ancestral ecological conditions that affected selection as well as to the contemporary circumstances that are served by possession of that trait. This point is further explicated by Crawford in his chapter on psychology. Reynold's chapter raises interesting questions about delineating the evolution of psychological mechanisms mediating the predisposition to acquire religious beliefs from the evolution of specific beliefs per se. Of all the disciplines informed by evolutionary theory and sociobiotogical thinking, linguistics is a discipline where it perhaps makes the most sense to use this information not merely as an interesting sideline but as an overall, unifying theory from which to do research. Since language is functional in that it allows us to convey and receive information very efficiently in a variety of circumscribed social situations as well as in more general instances, it makes sense to predict certain universal and naturally selected rules encoded in some "language acquisition device." Conceptually, rules for language acquisition and use might be viewed as being similar t ~ Darwinian algorithms (Cosmides and Tooby, 1987). Hurford, in his chapter on linguistics, provides a coherent and reasonable account of how sociobiology might be used to elucidate the evolution of a language acquisition device with respect to the functional importance of social communication via speech. Frank, in his chapter on economics presents a somewhat disappointing discussion of reciprocity theory as a model for economics. There are many interesting possibilities for using sociobiology in explaining economic behavior, for example, in investigating the evolutionary origins of trade and exchange. Unfortunately, Frank's chapter falls short of fully demonstrating these possibilities. He fails to explain in his commitment model how the use of various emotions in negotiating personal, social and reciprocal relationships contributed to the evolution of an innate disposition to fairness. Nesse, in his chapter on psychiatry, applies a more plausible reason for the existence of emotions; that is, that various emotions were an integral and predictable

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consequence of social relationships in the ancestral environment. Frank suggests that fairness rather than self-interest is a powerful source of human motivation; however, we are left wondering whether he has left out part of the reasoning for this theory, since reciprocity theory predicts that fairness is ultimately motivated by self-interest. Frank argues that cooperators could have evolved in greater number than defectors; however, his argument is based on arbitrary pay-offs in imaginary Prisoner's Dilemma Games and on implausible phenotypic differences between cooperators and defectors. His discussion of the evolution of cooperation is without reference to kinship theory, and a closer look at recent work by Cosmides and Tooby (1987) on social exchange could inform his discussion. His chapter raises further the issue of morality and natural selection; however, a more elaborate discussion of the concept of morality with respect to the evolution of, for instance, fairness, greed, envy, and honesty would have been interesting here. Finally, Frank should differentiate the evolution of pan-human characteristics, such as the ability to detect cheaters or the predisposition to reciprocate in certain circumstances from individual differences in, for instance, honesty and sense of fairness. The Sociobiological Imagination contains many insights into the potential of evolutionary theory to make hypotheses about and to explain much of what social scientists are interested in. This volume is well worth reading by anyone interested in sociobiology or the social sciences. It provides a good introductory account of some of the basic issues in sociobiology, and therefore would be a useful textbook in undergraduate courses having a sociobiological theme. Readers who are well versed in sociobiology will be interested in the cross-over of ideas among disciplines; it is also possible to read one or two chapters at a time, since they do not have to be read in any particular order. Hopefully this volume will provide an impetus for further cross-discipline works on sociobiology; it is time for researchers using sociobiology and evolutionary theory to find out how these ideas are being used in other areas.

References Cosmides L., and Tooby J., 1987. From evolution to behavior: Evolutionarypsychology as the missing link. In: J. Dupre (Ed.) The Latest on the Best:Essays on Evolution and Optimality, pp. 277-306. Cambridge, Mass.:MIT Press. MacArthur R.H., and Wilson E.O., 1967. The Theory of Island Biogeography. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Reviewed by V.S.E. Falger, Department of International Relations, University of Utrecht, The Netherlands.

In 1991 every ESS member received a flyer announcing the publication of The Sociobiological Imagination. I wonder how many members immediately filled in and mailed their slip to the publisher. I, for one, didn't. Why not? Well, most edited volumes appear to deal with quite specialised subjects and if one is really struck by the announcement of a new book in the field, one usually wants to update his or her private collection. So, direct mailing to specialised readers is quite profitable, as publishers know very well. The book under review, however, falls in another category - generfil readership, not for beginners but neither for specialists. I considered

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myself as having acquired enough knowledge about sociobiology to learn much of a book aimed at a general, educated audience. Hence, I decided not to order a copy in spite of the attractive price of its paperback edition. So, when one of the contributors to this book - someone whom I know to be rarely enthusiastic about other people's work - informed me that this was'really a very nice book' which I should read, I took the risk and ordered as yet. And, admittedly, now I must confess that it is worth possessing this book with its 18 chapters about quite different subjects, preceded by a short introduction about the roots of sociobiology and a useful glossary which fortunately is more than a one or two liner explanation of some 35 frequently used concepts. The main purpose of this volume is to show how, since the seventies, sociobiology has won the minds of people in an amazingly wide variety of human disciplines (except one, primatology). In other words, was Edward Wilson right when in 1975 he somewhat recklessly claimed that the human social sciences would be 'biologicized' automatically sooner or later? The answer in the seventies was much more fiercely negative than today, but Pierre van den Berghe in his contribution appears quite convinced that his discipline, sociology, still keeps deaf to the Sirens of sociobiology. He explains with lethal directness and uncompromising eloquence why sociology no longer can fool itself and the rest of the world by pretending to be 'scientific'. I think he hit the nail on the head when he stated "The myopia of anthropocentrism is generic to our species, but doubly acute among social scientists who base their livelihood on claims of human uniqueness." (p. 272) But that myopia itself is a consequence of the essence of evolutionary thinking which reads like a molotov cocktail, thrown by the other most eloquent contributor, Michael Ruse: "To the Darwinian, there is randomness built into the evolutionary process. There was no inevitable climb up to humans - they evolved purely by chance..." (p. 202). Everyone, then, will agree with Van den Berghe's diagnosis that "Properly understood, evolutionary theory is intellectually repugnant to most of us." He is a good comforter: "It is not easy to accept that evolution is a meaningless tale told by an idiot ..." (p. 272). Maybe that is also the reason why the first chapter is written by a psychiatrist who, somewhat more diplomatically, warns that "it will be difficult to dispassionately assess the possibility that objective self-knowledge is sometimes toxic." (p. 32) I wonder how many ex-creationists and anxious social scientists who have lost their faith in the dogma of human flexibility are among Randolph Nesse's patients. This urging force to reconsider basic axioms in the established social sciences is somewhat less clearly present in the other contributions, but it should not be absent anywhere where sociobiology does indeed provoke the imagination. In this respect, the volume is not disappointing, though not all chapters are equally informative, well written and convincing. In her Introduction, the editor informs the reader that the master plan by which the chapters were arranged, was: the theory of altruism in the first half of the book and the gene-culture theory in the second half. Although one certainly retraces elements of these two sociobiological axioms, they are insufficiently outspoken in every chapter to make your reviewer happy with this organisational choice. I presume that the coherence of the volume would have been much stronger if the traditional clustering of disciplines had been used as a basis. Now, the first chapter is on psychiatry, and the last one on psychology, while the transition from psychiatry to law (Ch. 2), to management theory (Ch. 3), to anthropology (Ch. 4), etc., is not clearly enough based in a uniformly presented theory of altruism. The result is rather chaotic, certainly to lay readers who, made curious for some reason, may be left dissatisfied having picked out only the chapter treating their own discipline. Even so, there is, of course, no objection to organising one's own order of reading because every chapter indeed stands on its own feet. Therefore, I take the liberty to suggest my order of reading, touching shortly on what has struck me and keeping in mind that this book has been published first of all to show that sociobiology is relevant to other disciplines. As sociobiology is

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rooted in evolutionary thinking about individual reproductive success, it would be my choice to start with the very good contribution of Galdikas and Vasey on primatology (Ch. 6). Kin altruism, parent-offspring conflict, adoption and allomothering, infanticide, and reciprocal altruism are dealt with in such a way that it is clear for everyone that sociobiology does indeed contribute in a very substantial way to a field of study that has always been important in biology and ethology. It also illustrates the usefulness of looking over the species border and to discover that many problems are apparently not exclusively human. My second chapter would be Crawford's interesting one on psychology (Ch. 18) which points to the importance of adaptation, proximate and ultimate causation, and the costs and benefits of learning which is so important in psychology. Why not put Kenrich and Hogan's chapter on cognitive psychology next (Ch. 10)? These authors not only deal with the same problems (such as the often neglected significance of ultimate theorizing), but also with the important theme of sex or gender differences, here with regard to cognition. Of course, Randy Nesse's chapter on psychiatry would form a valuable conclusion of the group of chapters accentuating the relevance of sociobiology for research on individual behaviour. The cluster of studies of group-based behaviour could, according to my choice, best be opened by Iron's elegant plea for using biology as a main focus for the study of human culture (anthropology). His discussion of the negative and positive response on Wilson's name-giving volume introduces the reader in the sensitive area of social scientific dogmas. But the subsequent condensation of the author's own, meanwhile recognised authoritative, research on nepotism and strategies in mating and parenting shows that sociobiology has also definitively entered the empirical practice in the human social sciences. Accentuating the reproductive point of view cross-culturally could be done by the intriguing chapter summarising Reynolds' (and Tanner's) work on what they call the socioecology of religion. The concept of 'socioecology' is preferred by Reynolds because it accentuates somewhat more the environment as a determining factor of behavioural interrelationships (and less the supposed genetic basis of human behaviour and culture). This chapter is a surprising example o f how innovative biology can be in a domain which hitherto was usually reserved for theologians and historians of ideas. Orthodox Christians will have difficulties with accepting Reynolds' comparative, ecologically based study of religion; and orthodox social scientists will experience the same with part 2 of this chapter on the relationship between genes and culture, where the exclusive autonomy of culture is disputed. The 7th chapter to be read in my edition is my favourite one: Laura Betzig's Darwinian reinterpretation of history, which has won already support, though not in orthodox history as we all know it. Condensing Darwin's theories to one maxim - all life, including human life, evolved to reproduce - she argues that it is worth looking to human politics as following, in substantial part, from sexual competition. The correlation between power and reproduction is illustrated with examples from human prehistory to modem history, and the change from despotic to democratic dominance relations suggest a shift toward reproductive equality. Even if one is not convinced by her concluding hypothesis) "we are more monogamous, less sex biased, and more democratic now than we once were simply because we need each other more than we did" (p. 140) ) I think Betzig's chapter is the very best illustration in this volume of how imaginative (socio)biology can be for the social sciences. After this chapter, I would recommend to read van der Dennen's review of studies of conflict which, of course, has very much to do with politics. Now the scope is widened to group performance (discussing, among others, the group selection thesis) in which four different theories of the origin and evolution of primitive war are discussed: the hunting hypothesis, the balances-of-power hypothesis, the ethnocentrism hypothesis, and the materialist hypothesis. In part 2 of this chapter, we are fed back by a review of chimpanzee 'warfare' to answer the chicken-or-egg question whether group hunting preceded or followed the ability to

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band with each other for hostile action. However intriguing this may be, van der Dennen himself remains skeptical about the usefulness of evolutionary studies of conflict, but that conclusion does not follow logically from his preceding argumentation. A more 'modern' chapter on human politics, Masters' presentation of the so-called biopolitics, shows how a social science may look like when it has developed a (modest) tradition of some 20 years in using biology as an integrative basis for the analysis of political behaviour ('human nature and political theory', 'somatic correlates of political behaviour', 'ethology of politics in the television age', to mention only three of the discussed topics). However, modern political science still is very far from accepting biology and evolution as 'normal' entries. The basis of biopolitics' relative success is its very efficient organisation (the Association for Politics and the Life Sciences) and its attractive journal (Politics and the Life Sciences). One other unexpected discipline, law, is dealt with in Beckstrom's chapter (second in the actual volume). It discusses the practical, immediate use of sociobiology in legal systems, illuminated by American tort law and the disqualification of lineal relatives as witnesses in certain lawsuits in the Netherlands. As far as lawmakers are concerned with'typical behaviour' of humans, social scientists could found or correct their usually undisciplined own observations, reflective intuition or plain gut feeling. However, judges, lawyers and lawmakers are probably - with politicians - the most devoted 'analysts' of human behaviour using malleability axiomatically. Two chapters which also deal with human behaviour on its macro level, viz. treating management theory and economics (Ch. 3 and 5 in the book under review), would not have passed my editorial desk. Bernhard and Glantz' essay on management has really nothing to do with biology) let alone with sociobiology) and Frank's contribution on economics is, in my view, a priggish and useless chapter which promotes mainly the ideas of the author himself, instead of showing whether or not sociobiology could be of use in a discussion of 'bargaining'. But someone who, for example, discusses the implication of the Prisoners' Dilemma for his field without even referring to Axelrod's The Evolution of Cooperation, is just reinventing the wheel. With regard to the moralistic undertone of this chapter, one wonders whether the deep interest in morality of the editor herself has prevented her from demanding a really substantial contribution on such an important aspect of human behaviour. A missed chance! In my capacity of imaginary editor, I still have six chapters to deal with. One of them, Karpinskaya's essay on Marxist thought, would not have come through either. If this essay does illustrate anything, it is, I am afraid, not much more than the state of confusion in which many exmarxists have found themselves since 1989. The mixing-up of traditional marxist knowing what is best for humanity with the exercise of illogic demonstrated in this chapter is enough to recommend the author for a number of sessions with Randolph Nesse. If this sounds too bluntly, we should not forget that the aim of this book is to illustrate the impact of sociobiology on various disciplines (and their authors); this impact is certainly not always a guaranteed positive one! Besides, shouldn't we stop having intellectual pity for people who have been educated in systems where science and scientists had to serve the interests of party or state in the first place? Three chapters, on linguistics (by Hufford), aesthetics (Lumsden), and ethical philosophy (Chandler), have in common that they are difficult to properly place in my table of contents. Hufford wrote an interesting contribution about the need - and the possibility - to put together Chomsky's 'innate language device' and Fodor's communication serving capacity of language. Here we enter one of the old battlefields of the nature-nurture dichotomy and Hurford thinks linguistics can profit from the Lumsden-Wilson theory of epigenetic rules. By far the most speculative chapter is the one on aesthetics. 'Speculation' is not used here as a pejorative, but as an expression for intellectual creativity in a domain that is usually closed for others than art historians. In this case, however, aesthetics is presented as a normative enterprise that should

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break through the tyranny of function. Although I would prefer to treat normativity with respect to content in books about (socio)biology with the greatest reserve (still better would be not to discuss it at all), in this chapter about questions such as 'what is beauty' and 'what significance should art, beauty, and creative expression have in the life of rational beings' it is 'functional'. I hope that Charles Lumsden will be one of the speakers on the 1993 ESS conference on Sociobiology and the Arts (Amsterdam, 19-21 August; see elsewhere in this News letter for more information ). Chandler's essay on ethical philosophy is both speculative and useful. On the one hand, he thinks that sociobiology throws light on the evolutionary origins of human morality, but, on the other hand, that far-reaching claims for the 'biologization of ethics' cannot be sustained. As long as the distinction between the (supposed) function of rules, norms, codes, judgements, etc., and their content in terms of right or wrong is maintained strictly, it pays to discuss 'morality' from an evolutionary perspective. Fortunately, Chandler keeps free from suggesting that the logical gap between is and ought, is bridgeable. In this respect his and Reynolds' chapter on religion belong together, and then it once more becomes evident how much unificatory power the evolutionary paradigm has. That theme, the unification of the theoretical basis of the apparently very different human social sciences, is also the essence of the two last chapters of 'my' book: Ruse on epistemology and van den Berghe on sociology. One could argue with me why I didn't put Ruse's chapter on the origin and nature of knowledge right at the beginning of my imaginary book. Well, I think that one has to develop a 'predisposition' to evolutionary reasoning to really understand and appreciate the very fundamental issues that are raised in this chapter. I am afraid that fresh readers with only a vague notion of what a biobehavioural approach is implying, may be deterred by Ruse's radical evolutionism. The reader is better served, in my opinion, when after having read the aforementio -ned chapters, s/he is more or less used to rather shocking expressions such as the ones which I quoted earlier in this review. No one should disregard reading this chapter which not only clarifies the coevolution of human mind and culture, but also explains the essence of science itself. The discussion of Kant's and Hume's views of 'reality' is highly relevant for understanding why it is all too easy to ignore evolutionary biology on arguments derived from the philosophy of science exclusively. Besides, Ruse's true speculations about 'other intelligences' in the universe is not only entertaining, it also teaches a useful lesson on teleology and 'progression'. The same basic themes can be found in Pierre van den Berghe's chapter - 'my' last one - on sociology. At first sight, one would expect such a chapter somewhere located between anthropology and law, but the problem is that van den Berghe's essay does not deal with sociology, but with the stubborn denial by practically all other sociologists of the relevance of evolutionary biology. If van den Berghe only were an eccentric querulous person or even a quarrelmonger, we could ignore the very critical judgement about his own discipline, but that is not the case. Together with Nesse, Irons, Masters, and - indirectly - Ruse, van den Berghe is claiming that the shortcoming of the human social sciences is that they lack a unifying, basic theory. I am afraid that van den Berghe's diagnosis of contemporary sociology applies to the majority of disciplines discussed in this book, and even more so to the individual scientists who, consciously or not, defend their territorial imperatives erected on the old nature-nurture dichotomy. If my imagination has run wild by reconstructing the table of contents, this is only to show my critical support for The Sociobiological Imagination, a book which deserves a place in the book case of all ESS members - and to bere ad! - and certainly not only with them. Wilson was right after all, and editor Mary Maxwell is his Siren.