Human Studies 13: 285-292, 1990.

Book Review David Kolb, The critique of pure modernity: Hegel, Heidegger, and after. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986. David Kolb wants to encourage a new perspective on modernity through a reading of two of its most important critics, Hegel and Heidegger. Each produced an analysis of the "empty subjectivity" and formal rationality that are central to modemity's "standard self-description." Each criticized this self-description by placing subjectivity in a non-subjective context that is more fundamental than subjectivity. Kolb presents a rich analysis of their views and puts them in an illuminating dialogue with each other. He endorses their approach but goes further. Kolb criticizes Hegel and Heidegger for imputing too much unity to modernity and to the ultimate context in which they place it. He proposes a pluralistic approach that has no need of attributing unity to the self or making recourse to an ultimate context. He regards this approach as an alternative to modern subjectivism, Hegelian dialectical unity and Heideggerian epochs of Being. Kolb's work on Hegel and Heidegger is excellent; it is thorough, rich and well-presented. Much of his critique of modernity - his rejection of subjectobject categories, purely formalist notions of rationality, and that modern tendency which, by equating freedom with estrangement from cultural traditions, threatens to equate it with emptiness - is congenial to myself, as I expect it will be to others. 1 Beyond this, however, his chapters on modernity (chapters one, eleven, and twelve) betray some basic confusions, as we will see. The bulk of the book (nine of its twelve chapters) is devoted to Hegel and Heidegger. Kolb begins with Hegel's analysis of civil society (biirgerliche Gesellschaft). Civil society, the type of social organization characteristic of modern market economies, is for Hegel an association of free individuals oriented towards the pursuit of self-interest. In it, personal identity excludes social role, and communal coherence is provided by formal, universal rules (rules that ignore the social role or "particular content" of the individual). For Hegel civil society is superior in freedom and self-consciousness to traditional societies, in which personal identity had been fused with social role and conformity to substantive tradition maintained the community. Civil society is not, however, a complete, stable or independent social form. Its notion of freedom, based on false dichotomies, is a partial, incomplete freedom. Civil society's existence presupposes a type of community which it has not recognized as necessary to itself: the state. Kolb makes the interesting argument that civil society's incompleteness vis-a-vis the state in Hegel's Philosophy of Right must be seen in relation to Hegel's Science of Logic, in particular, in relation to his analysis of the three moments of das Begriff, the concept (universal, particular, and

286 individual). Kolb's point is a good one, and his discussion of the connections between Hegel's logical and political works enriches the study of each. For Kolb, the key to Hegel's critique of modernity is a logical or conceptual claim about the proper and improper ways to conceive of form and content, universal and particular. Whereas in traditional society, the community (universal), the individual, and the individual's particularity (e.g., social role), stand in an immediate unity; and in civil society, a purely formal conception of the community and the individual makes for a formal unity of negatively related moments; in the "rationality structured community" of the state, a self-mediated unity is achieved in which freedom is participation in the universal through the individual's particular role. While hesitant to criticize Hegel, Kolb rightly keeps this Hegelian solution at arms length. Hegel's intent is to carve out an alternative to either an impossible return to oppressive traditions or a complete identification with the goals of market individualism. This intent is certainly shared by many, including Kolb. But Hegel's solution is another matter; even Kolb admits that it "does involve limiting freedom as it is understood in civil society" (p. 104). 2 Kolb presents Heidegger's critique of modernity with equal erudition and care. Like Hegel, Heidegger rejects m o d e m "empty subjectivity", but his real focus is the characteristically calculative, technological approach to the world that he finds embedded in this subjectivity. For Heidegger the subject's ability to bring things to presence before itself is inseparable from its ability to represent the world as a collection of objects open for manipulation. (p. 141) Technology is the essence of the m o d e m and the essence of technology is das Gestell, translated by Kolb as "universal imposition." For Heidegger the m o d e m way of unconcealing the world is characterized by "mutual total availability," the complete availability of everything to manipulation. Kolb correctly sees that Heidegger's objection to modernity is not a simple objection to universal imposition: it is to its totalization that he objects. Universal imposition has become the sole mode of experience, entities are seen as nothing but their availability and functionality. For Heidegger, universal imposition is a mode in which things are revealed, but only one mode. It is openness to other and older ways of disclosure that he wants to encourage (insofar as Heidegger wants to encourage anything.) Heidegger insists that, "The most important thing...is the insight that man is not a being who makes himself...". (p. 180) What determines the nature of modernity as universal imposition is not humanity, it is das Ereignis, the originary "propriative event" (Kolb's translation) which establishes the "open region" of unconcealedness and the mode in which that unconcealedness will occur. The ultimate origin or context for what we subsequently objectify through universal imposition is that which establishes disclosure, presence, appearance. That which establishes disclosure is not intelligible, not appropriable. We experience only its "withdrawal," its "character as not an entity" (p. 106). Our m o d e m mode of disclosure - universal imposition - is given to us by this propriative event. The import of the recognition of this is "deconstructive living," Kolb' s term for approaching experience without the presupposition of its complete

287 availability or univocal interpretability. (p. 184) In some of the book's most effective passages, Kolb concludes his discussion of Hegel and Heidegger with two first person critiques: what Heidegger should have said to Hegel, and what Hegel would have said to Heidegger. They would agree, Kolb suggests, in their criticism of modernity's "empty subjectivity," and in the "need to get beyond the modern contentless self" (p. 206). Each attempts to locate the self of modernity in the context of an originary "happening of difference and negation." They differ in their construal of this happening. For Hegel it is a dialectical process, for Heidegger the propriative event. Kolb offers an insightful account of their mutual criticisms. Heidegger must reject Hegel's attempt to sublate subjectivity through a new totality of which we can become conscious. He would replace self-transparent totality with finitude grounded in the unintelligible. Hegel, on the other hand, would regard Heidegger's "epoch" which grants one mode of unconcealment - universal imposition as immediate, non-dialectical. For Hegel, every epoch is a unity of many modes in tension. While sympathetic with their aims, Kolb remains critical of Hegel and Heidegger. They mistakenly attribute a unitary meaning to modernity. For Kolb there is no such meaning: we inhabit multiple contexts of meaning, not a single epochal horizon nor one grand dialectical process. We must think of multiplicity, Kolb says, "all the way down," meaning that there is no ground or ultimate context for experience or thought. For Kolb, the self is not the modernist empty self, but neither does it have the unity of selfconsciousness or context that Hegel and Heidegger respectively give to it. We must not only reject the "impossible" aspects of the modern selfdescription - pure formalist rationality, contentless self, subject-object dichotomy, self-sufficient individualism - but any attempt to find a unitary meaning in the modern era or a single answer to its dilemmas. As an examination of Hegel and Heidegger on modernity, Kolb's book is a welcome addition. Its potential contribution to the inquiry into the nature of modernity, however, is in doubt, due to an apparent lack of clarity as to the nature of that inquiry. Four points must be made about the contemporary discussion of modernity. First, leaving the question of historical parameters aside, the subject matter of the discussion of modernity involves at least three different kinds of phenomena. Social reality (or "society") refers to the living and working arrangements of modern societies. Cultural perspectives (or "culture") refers to the views, beliefs or patterns of interpretation held by social members. Theoretical perspectives (or "theory") refers to the views, beliefs or patterns of interpretation held by professional inquirers, scientists, or intellectuals. Accounts of modernity may focus on any one or any combination of these three areas. Second, theories of modernity differ as to the strength and character of the relation they posit as holding between social, cultural, and theoretical phenomena in modemity. If a sociologist considers certain beliefs common among social members part and parcel of the economic changes in modern society, then a strong relation, which may or may not be causal, is posited

288 between social and cultural phenomena. If a philosopher considers Hegel's philosophy a characteristic expression of or influence on early nineteenth century cultural and social life, then a strong relation is posited between theoretical, cultural and social phenomena. Third, accounts of modernity may be either descriptive or evaluative (critical) or both. Descriptive accounts seek to determine what is or has happened in the m o d e m world, while the critical accounts make claims about what is or was right or wrong in modernity. Fourth, and most importantly for the present case, theories of modernity may focus on either first-order or second-order (reflexive) phenomena, or both. First-order phenomena are the social, cultural, and theoretical phenomena of a given period of modernity. Reflexive or second-order phenomena constitute a far more narrow topic: they are the accounts of modernity indigenous to the culture or theory of a given period of modernity. A reflexive account of modernity is an account of the reflexive serfdescription found in modernity. Of course the two can be combined. A theory of modernity may examine reflexive phenomena as part of its examination of first-order phenomena. Hegel's and Heidegger's analyses of modernity concern social, cultural, and theoretical phenomena; they assert strong connections among all three; they are explicitly critical as well as descriptive; and they are primarily first-order accounts. The last point is the key. The two Germans distilled cultural and theoretical perspectives, ways of encountering and thinking about the world, that they regarded as characteristically modem. These perspectives were, in their view, diffused throughout culture and were strongly related to the social realities of the m o d e m world, as both cause and effect (e.g., the market economy, republican government, bureaucracy, technology, industrial production, etc.) For Hegel and Heidegger the m o d e m perspective (characterized by "empty subjectivity," "universal imposition," "merely formal-legal community," etc.) is a mistaken or limited perspective, but it is a real and effective perspective; it has shaped the m o d e m world and is inseparable from that world's most serious problems. In contrast, Kolb explicitly and repeatedly asserts that his book is concerned with reflexive phenomena. His aim is to reject the "standard serfdescription" of modernity, which he associates with Peter Berger and Max Weber. The problem, according to Kolb, is "our self-images" and our "way of thinking" about modernity. He presents a series of "commonplaces" about modernity, and ultimately the "typical sociological descriptions" of Berger and Weber, which describe the m o d e m self as shorn of tradition and social roles (hence "content"), freedom as ultimately empty, rationality as formal or procedural, and community as a matter of rules. 3 Kolb wants to show that this description is a false description of modernity. Perhaps it is, but this makes his book a critique of theories about modernity, not a critique of modernity. It invites the conclusion that, save for this selfmisunderstanding, all is well with m o d e m society and culture. Much of Kolb's book, however, seems to violate these narrow, secondorder statements of purpose, and to treat modernity as a first-order phenomenon that needs reform. Here, inconsistency is a virtue, since it is from the first-order level that the book draws its interest and significance.

289 Unfortunately, once we set aside Kolb's descriptions of his task and turn to his analysis of modernity and his proposed alternative, new difficulties emerge. The book's main target, as may be obvious, is "empty subjectivity," the conception of the self as externally and indifferently related to tradition, social role and even characteriological content. It is the notion of the self as a pure, formally free "chooser." Kolb is right that something like this notion has played a part in modem theory, culture, and society. But we must carefully specify the sense in which this holds true. Human beings, as Kolb knows, are not empty subjects. Neither have ordinary persons thought of themselves as such. The idea of the "empty subject" must be regarded as an ideal philosophical asymptote approached but never reached by some strains of modem culture under the pressure of modem social changes that rendered such an idea reasonable. Certain traits of modem society (e.g., a consumer-oriented market society, careers "open to talent," legal equality, etc.) have implied to many participants a certain way of interpreting themselves, and various forms of cultural expression have made this way of interpreting explicit: that individuals are not bound or defined by tradition and social function, that ideally everything in life ought to be the object of free choice, etc. I concur with Kolb that, to the degree that people interiorize this mode of interpretation they will, whatever the gains, also experience difficulties. But it is far from clear to what degree, and in what sense, it has been interiorized. The expression of a theme in cultural media does n o t necessitate its interiorization by cultural members. The fact that people read the literature of individualism does not mean that they are, or wish to be, individualists, any more than the fact that people read science fiction means that they are, or wish to be, spacepersons (or aliens). While there is a relation between society, culture, and theory, it is a complex and mediated one. Insofar as Kolb intends a critique of modem culture and society, and not just modem theory, more is needed to make the charges of formalism and empty subjectivity effective. Kolb's proposed alternative to modem ways of thinking amounts to a plea for non-foundational pluralism. The justification for this approach seems to be the denial that unity or ultimacy may be attributed to anything. The doctrine's main target is the self. For Kolb the self is multiple, due to its inseparability from or internal relatedness to the diverse contexts it inhabits. But, Kolb writes, this pluralism applies to our conception of just about everything, In the matters we are speaking of nothing is self-enclosed and selfcoincident .... There is multicplicity, contingency, and context all the way down, and no totality. (p. 249) Whatever its merits might be, this approach pushes Kolb into a highly problematic comer. Is modernity a phenomenon sufficiently "unified" that it means or refers to anything at all? In his final chapter Kolb does not hesitate to the draw the conclusion. If what I have been suggesting [were accepted then] .... The modem age

290 could no longer be thought of as different in one unified fundamental ways... The very division into ages would become questionable. (p. 262) Fair enough. But what, then, have we been discussing for two hundred pages? Kolb senses the problem. One page later he writes, Does this mean that modemity as the unified and unifying age in which we live is an illusion? No, modernity exists, but not quite as it described itself to be. If we want, we can still name our age 'modem' in honor of dominant features of our multiple inhabitation, but modernity is not the single, unifying meaning of our world... Modernity is no illusion, but neither is it unique in one deep way. (p. 263) Here Kolb, it seems to me, has enwrapped a sensible point in confusion. The continued use of qualifiers ("not quite as it describes itself," not "unique in one deep way," not "different in one unified f u n d a m e n t a l way") may indicate the author's awareness of the ambiguity. The validity of the attribution of unity to any particular phenomenon or to the world, and the validity of pluralism versus other approaches, are metaphysical or, if one prefers (regarding the concept of unity), linguistic questions. In either case they are systematic philosophical questions. This level of inquiry is entirely separate from the question of the nature of modernity and whether every aspect of, e.g., twentieth century, society is modem. It might be eminently reasonable to describe the process of modernization in such a way that, even in those societies where the most far-reaching modernization has occurred, many aspects of social life remain un-modem. But it is difficult to see how this claim would have any necessary relation to most positions taken on the systematic questions mentioned above. Western society, culture and theoretical life since, let us say, the seventeenth century are different from Western society, culture and theoretical life before the seventeenth century. They are not different in all respects, but the respects in which they are different are important. The term 'modernity' seeks to capture some of those respective differences. It is probably true that not all of those respective differences can be captured under a single theme or concept. In any case, it is an empirical question, one which can only be resolved by seeing which historical hypothesis makes the most sense. Any social theory which ascribes monolithic unity to an historical period is just bad social theory, but this is a far cry from denying the cogency of ascribing unity in any sense - of ascribing some dominant theme or problematic or even historical parameters - to an historical period. Kolb's pluralism constitutes either an uncontestable point against a straw person or a denial of the cogency of socio-historical inquiry. Kolb makes a related objection to foundationalism, the attempt to regress to ultimate grounds. "Philosophers of all persuasions," he writes, "like to play the game of 'I'm furthest back! My regress gets behind your regress.'" When Kolb asks whether he himself is playing this game, he answers, Yes, of course. To never play the game of standing furthest back would be, in effect, to claim that from where I was standing it was clear the

291 game should not be played, thus claiming I was furthest back. There is no way to avoid making or implying such claims; what matters is how they are claimed and lived with. There can be a sidelong awareness that the game itself is located so we don't take it perfectly seriously (which is not to say we are really above it all). Universal claims are themselves local performances. (p. 251) It is quite true that philosophic inquiry need not understand itself through unfortunate directional metaphors like "who is furthest back." But Kolb is dangerously close to denying the validity of claims of normative validity (e.g., claims about which view is more true, right, rational, etc.), since such claims always assert the superiority of one perspective over another. He admits that such claims cannot be avoided and suggests that the recognition of their context-locatedness will cause us to not take them "perfectly seriously." Kolb seems to imply that the locatedness of any theorizing in a context - including theorizings which attempt to address all thought, all inquiry, as does Kolb's own plea for pluralism - constitutes a dilemma which can only be handled by recourse to a kind of irony. This is wrong. An awareness of the hypothetical, contextual, and provisional nature of human judgment is not tantamount to an inhibition of seriousness, just an inhibition of ignorance. Fallibilism is not new, and need not inspire such subtle responses. Neither is there any intellectual posture that will allow us to avoid the necessity of cognitive choice and its inevitable errors, or render the process ego-alien. The conditions of human life have always condemned individuals to normative commitment, and thus to the search for the best context for judgment. Kolb's recourse to irony is ironic. His attempt to create an ironic distance between chooser and choice would appear to be an example of the kind of formalism that he finds so troublesome in modernity. Indeed, under some interpretations, nothing could be more modem. Lawrence Cahoone Department of Philosophy Boston University Boston, MA 02215

Notes

1. My treatment of subjectivism appears in The Dilemma of Modernity: Philosophy, Culture, and Anti-Culture (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988). 2. All page references are to David Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity: Hegel, Heidegger, and After (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986). 3. Kolb's use of Weber (and derivatively, of Berger) seems unnecessarily negative. He criticizes Weber for accepting the dichotomies of modernity as true of reality. This is, I believe, a false charge, based on reading far more into Weber's "methodological individualism" than is warranted. (p. 9) This Weberian doctrine is tantamount to a denial of collective mind, an insistence

292 that the subjects or locations of meanings are human individuals, not groups. It is not the claim that "the creator of all meaning is the individual self." (p. 9) In an endnote Kolb admits to manhandling Weber, but he does not entirely repent. (p. 272, n. 2)