Sociological Forum, VoL 6, No. 2, 1991

Review Essays

In Pursuit of Rational Action J a m e s B. Rule 1

Foundations of Social Theory.

James S. Coleman. Cambridge MA: Harvard

University Press, 1990.

What living sociologist has been celebrated for such diverse intellectual achievements as James Coleman? His works include an institutional study of union politics and multivariate analyses of school achievement, theoretical accounts of corporate action and typologies of community conflict, analyses of primary groups and historical investigations of macroorganizational change. When someone with these accomplishments behind him, at the climax of his career, produces a wide-ranging, synthetic theoretical statement, people are bound to take heed. Foundations of Social Theory is a weighty book in every sense. At nearly a thousand pages, it impresses first of all with its extraordinary range of scholarly reference, drawing on economics, legal history, game theory, educational research, ethnography, small-group studies, political theory, and to be sure, a variety of more strictly sociological literatures. The book is above all extremely rich-filled with a diversity of intellectual offerings, overflowing with enough intriguing leads to supply scores of researchers with challenging agenda. The theoretical core of the book is Coleman's version of rational choice theory--I specify his version, because of the author's readiness to reconsider and extend that genre of theory. From a spare set of assumptions drawn from that tradition, Coleman spins ingenious implications for the most diverse sorts of social behavior-ranging from premarital sexual behavior to the action systems of modern corporations to the nature of legitimacy and collective behavior. About everything that he considers, he has something original and provocative to say. 1Department of Sociology, State University of New York, Stony Brook, New York 11794. 413 0884-8971/91/0600-0413506.50/0© 1991PlenumPublishingCorporation

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Rule Is this a good-news-only review, then? Not exactly. For one thing,

Foundations of Social Theory is editorially out of control. Even for very good ideas, more is not always better. But Coleman, with the wind behind him, does not know when to stop. As with many a Very Big Book, one wishes that the author had taken the time to write less. P a r e t o - t h a t other distinguished sociologist with roots in e c o n o m i c s - w o u l d undoubtedly be more appreciated by sociologists today had he gotten his four-volume magnum opus down to a succinct, hard-hitting statement. For similar reasons, I fear, Coleman may fail to reach some readers, especially those not initially a t t r a c t e d to r a t i o n a l choice theory. This would be as r e g r e t t a b l e in Coleman's case as in Pareto's. Indeed, Foundations of Social Theory is several books, coexisting within a single binding. O n e - p e r h a p s of greatest interest to those outside the rational choice t r a d i t i o n - i s a statement of Coleman's key theoretical ideas, leading into applications for specific forms of data. Another quasib o o k (Part I V of the larger volume) is an excursus on "new corporate act o r s " - c o m p l e x organizations like m o d e r n c o r p o r a t i o n s that C o l e m a n considers more or less insulated from "the traditional mechanisms of social control for natural persons" (575-576). The mathematical formalizations in the final part of the volume constitute virtually another book in their own right. In attempting a unified treatment of these subjects, Coleman is obviously engaging in an effort at general theory. His starting point is atomistic, self-interested actors, pursuing their interests in complex interrelationships with others. Other individual characteristics, in his view, must be regarded as social creations. To begin with persons not endowed with altruism or unselfishness and lacking a shared normative system does not mean that in every part of the theory the persons who are actors are assumed to be without these added components of the self. (32) Describing himself as a proponent of methodological individualism (5), he makes it his task to show how social system characteristics arise from the interactions of self-interested strivings. The elements are actors and things over which they have control and in which they have some interest. I will call these things resources or events, depending on their character. The relations between actors and resources are, as just implied, control and interest. (28) One of the most impressive things about the book is Coleman's knack of moving from such austere first principles to intriguing, empicially relevant expectations for specific subject matters; for example,

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If actors control all those resources that interest them, then their actions are straightforward: They merely exercise their control in a way that satisfies their interests. . . . What makes a social system, in contrast to a set of individuals independently exercising their control over activities that satisfy their interests, is a simple structural fact: Actors are not fully in control of the activities that can satisfy their interests, but find some of those activities partially or whotly under the control of other actors. Thus pursuit of one's interests in such a structure necessarily requires that one engage in transactions of some type with other actors. Those transactions include not only what is normally thought of as exchange, but also a variety of other actions which fit under a broader conception of exchange. These include bribes, threats, promises, and resource investments. It is through these transactions, or social interactions, that persons are able to use the resources they control that have little interest for them to realize their interests that lie in resources controlled by other actors. (29) F r o m h e r e , C o l e m a n spins a variety o f m o r e specific analyses, C o n s i d e r his t r e a t m e n t o f a c h i e v e m e n t in high school. T e a c h e r s , he r e a s o n s , are endowed with a resource (grades) that they may bestow on students; s t u d e n t s also possess a r e s o u r c e , time, t h a t they m a y a p p l y to s c h o o l w o r k , o r withhold. B o t h p a r t i e s have an i n t e r e s t in eliciting e x p e n d i t u r e s o f t h e r e l e v a n t r e s o u r c e f r o m t h o s e o n t h e o t h e r side, a n d b o t h sides n a t u r a l l y s e e k t h e b e s t b a r g a i n . A s t h e r e s o u r c e s a r e r e a d i l y q u a n t i f i a b l e , t h e stage is set for m a t h e m a t i c a l m o d e l s o f school a c h i e v e m e n t , r e l a t i n g h o u r s s p e n t o n h o m e w o r k , a b s e n c e s f r o m class, a n d grades. C o l e m a n o b s e r v e s , tn a system like this a common rate of exchange develops between student effort and grades. This common rate of exchange is precisely what is meant by relative price in an economic system. (137) C o l e m a n a p p l i e s t h e s a m e s p a r e set o f g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s to m o d e l s o f collective b e h a v i o r - - i n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e p r o c e s s e s involved in c r o w d s ' exits f r o m d a n g e r o u s situations. H e c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h e s e as a f o r m o f P r i s o n e r ' s D i l e m m a . W h e t h e r c o o p e r a t i o n ( o r d e r l y m o v e m e n t o n t h e p a r t o f all) o r conflict ( e v e r y o n e - f o r - o n e s e l f p a n i c ) will prevail clearly d e p e n d s o n m u t u a l p e r c e p t i o n s o f o t h e r s ' a c t i o n s . B u t this p a r t i c u l a r genre o f s i t u a t i o n s , C o l e m a n says, is asymmetrical T h a t is, o r d e r l y d e p a r t u r e s c a n r e a d i l y devolve into panics, w h e r e a s p a n i c s a r e u n l i k e l y to shift into o r d e r l y exists. C o l e m a n a r g u e s t h a t t h e s e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s follow f r o m a s s u m p t i o n s o f rat i o n a l c h o i c e u n d e r v a r i o u s c i r c u m s t a n c e s (203-215). O r c o n s i d e r C o l e m a n ' s t r e a t m e n t o f a still q u i t e d i f f e r e n t d o m a i n - m a r r i a g e . I n a m u c h b r i e f e r discussion t h a n t h e two above, h e notes, It is clear that marriage can be seen as taking place in a kind of market, but one that is quite special, with each actor having only one commodity--himself or herself-to barter and with exchange rates governed by the constraint of monogamy, which prevents variations in quantity to achieve equal value in exchange. (22)

Basing his discussion on work by Guttentag and Secord, Coleman speculates that sharp rises in birth rates may result in relaxation of strictures

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against promiscuity a generation l a t e r - - a s a relatively large cohort of marriage-age females compete for the attentions of a smaller cohort of marriage-age males approximately two years older than themselves. These are just three of the many ingenious applications that Coleman develops for his position. Given that Foundations of Social Theory pursues dozens if not scores of such explanatory possibilities, it is difficult to convey in any review a sense of the whole. I suspect that every reader willing to look, even those temperamentally antipathetic to rational choice thinking, will find among these excursus at least some that seem both provocative and persuasive. The trouble is that, with example piled on example and theoretical distinctions multiplying like rabbits, the organization of the work does not lend itself to easy access. But most readers will, quite properly, insist on some summary verdict on the thesis of the work as a whole. Does Coleman make his case for rational choice analysis? The answer is, it depends on how broadly you understand his case. Consider Coleman's lengthy discussion of the origins and workings of norms. This commands special interest, because for many critics a key failing of rational choice theory is its inability to account for action oriented to principles beyond immediate self interest. As Coleman puts it, In the parsimonious conception of a system of action that I want to establish, the types of action available to the actor are severely limited. All are carried out with a single p u r p o s e - t o increase the actor's realization of interests. (32)

Yet Coleman is quite prepared to acknowledge, and to construct explanations for, adherence to norms that seem to contravene at least shortterm self-interest. He begins by arguing that norms arise when one party's actions impose externalities-that is, when what might appear as self-regarding actions impose some sort of cost on others. Thus, true to his theoretical colors, Coleman accounts for normative behavior in terms of a calculus of interest, including the interests of the immediate parties to a particular form of actions, and of those subject to second-, third- and nth-order consequences. Yet Coleman's theoretical principles also dictate that the mere existence of human interests in a particular outcome do not suffice to explain the outcome. Required is an account of how interests in normative confortuity are given real force over the behavior of those in question. Effective norms emerge, Coleman holds, when beneficiaries of a norm, acting rationally, either will be able to share appropriately the costs of sanctioning the target actors or wilt be able to generate second-order sanctions a m o n g the set of beneficiaries that are sufficient to induce effective sanc.

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tions of the target actors by one or more of the beneficiaries. This condition depends on the existence of social relationships among the beneficiaries. (273) But C o l e m a n ultimately acknowledges that m a n y forms o f compliance c a n n o t be explained by recourse to actors' interests in their unsocialized form. T h u s he e x t e n d s the t h e o r y in a way that m a n y analysts in the rational-choice tradition would no d o u b t be loath to do: he posits processes o f internalization. W h e n is it rational for those seeking normative compliance to a t t e m p t to impose internalization o n those f r o m w h o m compliance is sought? Deciding whether internalization of a norm in another actor is rational must involve balancing the cost of bringing about the internalization to a given degree of effectiveness against the discounted future cost of policing to bring about the same degree of compliance. (294) But this observation poses problems of its own: parents (or other actors) who are in a position to establish an internal sanctioning system do not reap all the benefits from it. Parents must pay the costs of internalization, but others will experience some of the future benefits. It is true that parents experience some benefits during the period the child is at home. Since these are only a fraction of the benefits, however, there is an expected underinvestment in internalization from the perspective of the total set of benefits to others that internalization will bring about . . . . This underinvestment should be especially great for internalization of norms which have least to do with a child's actions in the home and are primarily concerned with action toward others later in life. (297) This line o f a r g u m e n t d e m o n s t r a t e s the consistency and the lucidity with which C o l e m a n pursues the implications o f his theoretical p r i n c i p l e s - - a s well as the ability o f these principles, when so pursued, to g e n e r a t e intriguing and nonintuitive empirical implications. It also demonstrates, I believe, the limits o f these principles as bases for a general theory o f normative action. Is the motive for p a r e n t s ' attempts to inculcate normative sensibilities in their children the desire (conscious o r u n c o n s c i o u s ) to r e d u c e the p a r e n t s ' o w n costs o f c o n t r o l l i n g the children's behavior in future years? Sometimes, certainly. But always? Surely not. Indeed, some o f o u r strongest efforts to form the character of o u r children surely stem f r o m desires that their behavior should be something that we wouM be p r o u d of, even when we are not present to calculate the benefits to anyone. Similarly, what are we to m a k e o f C o l e m a n ' s a c c o u n t o f normative action as resulting f r o m shared interest in a particular o u t c o m e ? Is the role o f such interests empirically falsifiable, and do they f o r m the bases for logically satisfactory explanations? It would be easy to show that m a n y n o r m s arise and are p e r p e t u a t e d just as C o l e m a n s u g g e s t s - t h r o u g h direct or indirect pressure f r o m parties with some sort of d e m o n s t r a b l e interest in particular forms o f compliance, as in c o m m u n i t y pressures for trustworthiness

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among diamond dealers and investment bankers. But what about the perpetuation of norms that seem to serve no one's objective interests? Consider the powerful and destructive norms governing customs like the vendetta, where family members are expected to continue a never-ending pattern of revenge and counterrevenge, even when the cause of the original aggression has been forgotten by all concerned. In many such cases, those who comply with the norms of vengeance surely would seem to have every objective i n t e r e s t in seeing the whole destructive set o f obligations suspended. Coleman's response, I imagine, might resemble the account he gives of norms like dress codes held by religious or status groups. True, failure to observe such norms may not seem to entail objective externalities, he allows. But, Each member's obeying the norm strengthens the expression of group solidarity and the differentiation from others.... Observance by fellow members aids and supports each member, and failure to observe constitutes a threat to the solidarity of the group. (258) But such a rationale threatens to make the argument circular, at least in some cases. Why do p e o p l e have an " i n t e r e s t " in group s o l i d a r i t y especially in forms of group "solidarity" like the vendetta that often seem to leave everyone worse off than they would be, if the normative system in question could simply be abandoned? One might argue that the parties concerned, all things considered, really maximize their utility by pursuing such apparently painful and destructive social expectations. But would such an argument really constitute an explanation of people's propensity to adhere to n o r m s - o r simply a restatement of it? O n e can raise similar q u e s t i o n s a b o u t the t h e o r y u n d e r l y i n g Coleman's explanations at any number of points. What conclusions should we draw from such unanswered questions? Not, I hope, that he has argued in vain. For the fact that not all kinds" of social outcomes seem susceptible to pure rational choice explanations should hardly blunt our interest in those explanations that succeed. I have grown convinced that one of the greatest millstones of theoretical sociology is the determination that ever), genre of social phenomena, or indeed all social phenomena, must be accounted for by a single theory-and that the pursuit of such general theories is the only worthwhile occupation for the theoretically minded sociologist. What Coleman has done in this wide-ranging and thoughtful book is to take a distinctive, spare set of theoretical assumptions, and to pursue their empirical implications with rare consistency and clarity. The most fruitful response we can make is to

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inquire where these implications are persuasive and where they fail--and above all, to exert ourselves to account for the difference.