Integr Psych Behav (2009) 43:185–213 DOI 10.1007/s12124-009-9089-8 R E G U L A R A RT I C L E

Is Psychology Based on a Methodological Error? Michael Schwarz

Published online: 31 March 2009 # Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2009

Abstract It is believed a proven fact that variables in social and personality psychology match to normal distribution with its single peak. Multiple peaks are explained by independent variables. However, after a comprehensive data analysis of more than 8.000 patients and on the basis of a bio-psycho-social model with 27 scales, we arrived at the conclusion that normal distribution and the psychometric error theory cannot withstand critical analysis in large samples. Beyond the “truth” that is proved by distribution-dependent statistical inferences, there exists another “truth” that is denied by the empirical doctrine. This “truth” is influenced by compensatory belief systems and explains paradoxes in quality of life research. We hypothesize that items, referred to life risks are micro-stressors, triggering selfregulatory processes as a humanly inherent response, deeply anchored in human evolution. Especially when exposed to threatening experiences, self-focused attention generates amplified multimodal distributions and subverts the methodological premises by an ambivalence-bias between thrill and threat, hopes and fears, pleasure and pain, success and failure, etc. In this article we want to focus attention to the incommensurability between test theoretical axioms and the way people usually respond to self-focused items. We discuss basic distribution patterns and approach to an evolutionary theory of fluctuation of validity. Keywords Fluctuation of validity . Quality of life . Bio-psycho-social model . Subjective health . Normal distribution . Distribution anomaly . Axiomatics . Test theory . Error theory . Evolution . Gene-culture coevolution . Incommensurability . Judgment . Crisis . Empirical science . Weltanschauung . Wissenschaft In the last two decades psychological factors more and more are regarded as essential for outcome assessment in health care industry. Evidence-based therapeutic M. Schwarz (*) Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund, Reha-Zentrum Bad Brückenau – Klinik Hartwald, Schlüchterner Straße 4, 97769 Bad Brückenau, Germany e-mail: [email protected]

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concepts have to conform to bio-psycho-social standards, and quality management systems require empirical evaluations of psychological factors. An exponentially growing literature refers to ad hoc constructed measures that do not have much more in common than the test theoretical quality criteria reliability and validity. Quality of life is adopted as a key term in a globalized justification terminology, but there exists neither a scientifically based theory of life, nor any operationalized bio-psycho-social model of human judgment. The ubiquity of personal computers fosters the belief that statistical inferences guarantee to convert hypothesis into facts and that the use of statistical software packages assures quality in empirical science. Widely ignored is the fact that the psychometric methodology is grounded in test theoretical axioms, and there exists not at all any evidence that these are natural laws. Axioms are mere conventions, not reality. They are shared by a majority and its belief of what reality should be like. In this article we do not discuss these premises in detail; what we do is to outline, why psychometric scores are ambiguous, and why empirical quality criteria underlie a systematic flaw. To understand the indeterminableness of human judgment, we propose an evolutionary theory that is derived from homologous principles, we have in common with other species. Here we present evidence, based on a large heterogeneous sample of patients (n= 8156) and a sample of psychometric scales (n=27) that originally targeted at the development of a conventional evaluation system in health care science (Hünerfauth and Schwarz 1997; Schwarz 2007). Although we successfully used it in a rehabilitation-facility for several years, in many interviews and therapeutic sessions we learned to understand its weaknesses, as well. These, however, could not be compensated by improvements of the instrument, because they resulted from a conflict between psychometric methodology and the particularities of human introspection. With it, we were confronted with an old and unsolved psychological crisis, and we were forced to focus attention on an issue of high scientific and practical importance.

Why Question Empirical Science?

The game of science is, in principle, without end. He who decides one day that scientific statements do not call for any further test, and that they can be regarded as finally verified, retires from the game. (Popper 1935, 1989, p. 26; 1959, 2004, p. 32) Applied psychology is strongly influenced by a hybrid of two independent mainstream worlds: First, the traditional empirical science and second, traditional psychotherapeutic approaches. To integrate both, one first has to enter a tabooed noman’s-land between historically and institutionally fixed frontlines. In this article we try to answer the question, why empirical science, as the mother of all sciences, obviously flopped in providing a bio-psycho-social model of personality, and how the crisis in psychology (Bühler 1927; Toomela 2007, 2008; Valsiner 2009; Yurevich 2009; Zittoun et al. 2009) could sustain more than a whole century without approaching to a solution.

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The starting point of our investigation was an observed discrepancy between psychometric measures and psychotherapeutic interviews. In trying to understand what was wrong, discrepancies between normal distribution and real distributions gave us helpful indications, not only to substantiate our doubts, but to answer some paradoxes in quality of life research, as well. In the course of the development of our bio-psycho-social scale structure, step by step we began to understand that there was a significant mismatch between the statistical premises of the “measuring-apparatus ‘questionnaire’” and the judgment-forming processes of the “measuring-apparatus ‘man’”. By systematically improving the psychometric properties of the scales, and adapting them to daily routine demands, we gradually recognized fundamental methodological weaknesses. This decided us to cross the line beyond mainstream empirical science (see “Crossing the Line beyond Normal Science”). With this, the question came up, to what extend the axiomatics of test theories can be considered as valid? This, however, is not provable by statistical inferences, because it focuses on the preconditions of inferential statistics as a closed axiomatic system. Hence, to avoid an infinite regress, we substantiate the existential hypothesis that distribution anomalies prove an error in the axiomatics of classical test theory, and thus, in the positivistic origin of empirical science (see “The Error of Test theory”). We continue our argumentation with an evolutionary explanation of the incommensurability of human judgment, and define the mismatch of data and inherent multivalent meanings as fluctuation of validity (see “Evolution of Judgment — Towards a new (old) Theory”). Finally we ask: “Is Gene-Culture Coevolution Governed by a Metaphysical Semantics?” We hypothesize that human judgment follows an inherent categorial system, equivalent to the embeddedness of psychology within the tripartite term of Wissenschaft.1 To approach to an understanding of self-referential judgment, we propose a continual improvement process that enables to overcome the flaws of empirical-axiomatic routines by a psychology, open for intellectual challenges to hominization and emergence of culture. Crossing the Line beyond Normal Science Before we understood the importance of anomalies, we developed a bio-psychosocial model for evaluation purposes in a gastroenterological rehabilitation facility of the German Federal Pension Fund (Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund), where we worked as clinical psychologists and psychotherapists (Hünerfauth and Schwarz 1997; Schwarz 2007). Our intention was, to improve the diagnostic process; first, by identifying patients with psychological co-morbidity and place them to appropriate treatments; and second, to visualize the transition between healthy and sick as a performance benchmark for quality assurance purposes. We began to construct scales rationally, derived from existing instruments, psychological theories, and the demands of applied psychology; and we successively improved them by repeated item-analyses in a multiple-step optimizing process. 1

Just as Valsiner (2009), we use the German notion Wissenschaft in contrast to science, because it addresses basic generalized knowledge and its construction.

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Finally, we had a collection of 27 scales (Fig. 1) with satisfactory to good teststatistical properties. To validate these scales (each 4 to 10 items), we added some independent variables (e. g. gender, age, diagnoses, begin and end of treatment [t1 and t2], life events [recently and in childhood], additional test-results [SCL-90 and Beck Depression Inventory], therapeutic ratings, etc.). Finally, after revising our

Fig. 1 Bio-psycho-social model

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scales in several steps, evidence for satisfying test-characteristics (e. g. Cronbach α=.72 to α=.94) seemed to confirm that all in all we did a good job. But in the development process it also became evident that distribution patterns considerably differed from normal distribution, and it was impossible to compensate this difficulty by improvements in item selection, item reformulation, or by any other scale-optimizing process. Testing the distributions for normality (KolmogorovSmirnov-Test) revealed anomalies in 96% out of 216 distributions. Attempts to explain these by independent variables (gender, age, diagnoses, t1–t2, etc.) revealed varying means in only a narrow range. However, the most significant peaks of our real distributions where located outside, and thus, they couldn’t be explained by the independent variables. Although anomalies are often reported in literature, further investigations normally stop at this point, because most samples are too small, to analyze real distributions beyond statistically normalized idealizations, or beyond asymmetries attributed to sample biases. However, the large number of cases allowed us to compare the totals of each single score, and we found varying distribution patterns and even varying numbers of peaks for different subsamples. Thus, the question came up for the causes behind these anomalies. We had the opportunity to feedback discrepancies between observations in therapeutic sessions and test-scores to our patients. Mostly they were not at all surprised and explained them highly plausible. It became evident that references on which they based their judgment varied systematically, but there were hardly any indications of serious errors like misconceptions, distortion tendencies, or lies. Thus, in an early stage of our data collection, we became aware that something seems to be wrong with the basic premises of test theories. Although reliability, validity, item and scale-characteristics confirmed that our scales were well constructed, our data analysis revealed serious evidence that there must be an inherent error in the empirical methodology, and this couldn’t be compensated substantially by any further optimization of our test-battery. Thus, our idea to improve the scales by a continual improvement process, turned out to be limited by the method, and we began to doubt our belief in basic principles of test theories. But the flaws of classical test theory were only one difficulty. Faced with the normative power of scientific mainstream opinion, we arrived at the conclusion that scientific conventionalism is a more serious barrier. Whenever the ‘classical’ system [...] is threatened by the results of new experiments which might be interpreted as falsifications [...], the system will appear unshaken to the conventionalist. He will explain away the inconsistencies which may have arise; perhaps by blaming our inadequate mastery of the system. Or he will eliminate them by suggesting ad hoc the adoption of certain auxiliary hypotheses, or perhaps of certain corrections to our measuring instruments. (Popper 1935, 1989, p. 49; 1959, 2004, p. 59) We realized that independent variables couldn’t explain the anomalies, and the distributions we found were real-distributions that differ from a mere collection of interfering normal distributions. This led us hypothesize that anomalies are inherent to each single individual, and the “measuring-apparatus ‘man’” reports something different than what the “measuring-apparatus ‘questionnaire’” records. From now on we began to understand that item-contents not only thematize selfreferential cognitions, but also cause compensatory regulations within a humanly

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inherent judgmental process. To us, however, this insight was anything but a highlight, because at that time, we were methodologists by conviction, and now the toy within our playpen was broken. The consequence was that the publication of our empirical data was impossible, without justifying our doubts in an argumentation that conclusively demonstrates, why methodological principles in empirical measuring are wrong. This, however, seemed unreasonable and hopeless in a climate of a predominant positivistic tradition, deeply rooted in scientific structures. But what we learned from our patients was that unrealistic beliefs are often used options, to respond to threatening or even hopeless situations, and sometimes it is reasonable to rely on hopes, even if empirical probabilities militate against them. For example patients with cancer (curatively treated) report a very high quality of life (provable by “empirical” data), although these patients obviously suffer from their fears. (But those fears are NOT provable by “empirical” data!) These findings coincide with Herschbach (2002), who could demonstrate that quality of life of cancer patients seems even higher than the quality of life of a healthy normal population. Consequently, there are different focuses of attention, and it seems that the selection depends on its suitability to cope efficiently with threatening experiences. But instead of the coping-oriented focus, the other one is falsely held for the only one by the scientific observer and his “empirical” feelings of evidence. What happens is the following paradox: A threatening situation triggers fears and these fears trigger a compensatory process. In the end the (“fear”-) score even may decrease, because it mirrors the result of this process, and not a value on a continuum, i. e. a measure of an empirical scale based on normative standards. Therefore, by excluding the introspective selection of inherent references, methodologically assigning them an error, undesired results are categorized as paradoxes (or as sampling artifacts). That is, we try to explain, why our data don’t mirror the reality we believe in, instead to take into consideration that the error lies in our belief of what reality should be like. Or, to say it pointedly: Because empiricism is based on the belief that individual’s subjectivity is nothing real, scientific psychology excludes it, and thus shrinks itself to an ideological “ism”. The Error of Test Theory The classical test theory is based on the assumption that the psychometric “measuring-apparatus ‘questionnaire’” can be considered as a set of linear, homogeneous, and one-dimensional scales. Based on an error theory, giving scores the appearance of exactness, its axiomatics seems to provide a solution for the empiric-scientific truth problem, and to approach psychology to a natural science. Formula (1) describes the basic test theoretical axiom - the premise for distribution dependent inferences and reliability calculations. Here empirical variances are defined as the sum of true and error variances. Vtrue þ Verror ¼ Vempirical

ð1Þ

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But what is defined here is only one type of error (random error) and it is important to consider that there also exists a second one. In dealing with errors of measurement, it is necessary to recognize that there are two basic types of error. They are termed random or chance error, on the one hand, and constant or systematic errors, on the other. If measurements are consistently larger than they should be or are consistently smaller than they should be we have what is termed “constant error”...The basic assumptions of test theory deal with the definition and the estimation of chance errors. (Gulliksen 1950, p. 6) While formula (1) considers only the random (chance) error (Verror), the constant (systematic) error is regarded as correctable by linear transformation. With this, all issues concerning commensurability are attributed to the “correct” norm that allows comparing a score with a suitable social standard. In parallel, any independent psychological systematics is denied, silenced, or even defamed, by attributing other errors to rare single cases, explained away by the unwilling, incompetent, or opportunistic test person. With this trick the “measuring-apparatus ‘man’” as a judgment-forming instance is excluded, and fundamental test theoretical weaknesses disappear from the screen of scientific consideration. This biased definition of error masks the fact that psychometric methodology is based only on the fragile foundations of an arbitrary speculative system. Test theoretical deficiencies are concealed by... ...attaining, for [the] axiomatic system, what is called its “correspondence with reality”; and this can be done by a number of ways [...]. Thus we may introduce ad hoc hypotheses. Or we may modify the so-called ‘ostensive definitions’ [...]. Or we may adopt a sceptical attitude as to the reliability of the experimenter whose observations, which threaten our system, we may exclude from science on the ground that they are insufficiently supported, unscientific, or not objective, or even on the ground that the experimenter was a liar. (Popper 1935, 1989, p. 49; 1959, 2004, p. 60) Distribution anomalies, which cannot be explained by independent variables, give right to doubts in psychometric methodology. As we said above, the analysis of our data forced us to take into consideration that items, focusing attention to conflicts, may trigger compensatory mechanisms, which may even result in an inversion of what an observer would expect as response. Therefore, inherent processes contradict to the validity of classical test theory and unmask its axioms as a scientific myth. To approach the nature of human judgment, and for a better understanding of what is wrong, it is essential to interpret psychometric data in areas of applied psychology. To illuminate the systematics of the “measuring-apparatus ‘man’”, and to take into consideration that systematically biased judgments are an empirical reality, we have to incorporate humanly inherent theories (t1 ... tn) in formula (1). Consequently, we have to extend the first axiom as follows: Vtrue þ V ðt1 . . . tn Þ þ Verror ¼ Vempirical

ð2Þ

Unfortunately it is not possible to transform formula (2) to a reliability calculation. But this shouldn’t be a reason, to deny the inherent nature of human judgment,

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defining it as an error, or over-estimating the reliability and validity of scales and measures. The consequences of individual inherent processes we can demonstrate with the following thought experiment: If we could exclude the memory effect of a single person, who answers a questionnaire hundreds of times under the same (externally observable) conditions, there would be a considerable variation of data anyway. Because humans toggle between different inherent references, depending on the selected answer guiding theory in the moment of inquiry, they produce variances and distributions with discrete frequencies. The difference between measurement and humanly inherent influences may be visualized with another thought experiment (Fig. 2): Imagine you are watching the falling sand in an hourglass. Normally sand grains fall on one pile, forming a single cone. However, if you observe a second cone, there are two different explanations: First, the hourglass was moved between two positions outside the vertical (A). This external influence is independent from the measuring apparatus in the sense of an independent variable. Second, the sand grains “decided” to jump to one or to the other pile, for any reason (B). In this case a “decision mechanism” exists within each single grain that is not directly observable. To understand it, we need an appropriate theory that may explain anomalies by the existence of causes, governing the ambiguous behavior. Only if we know how individuals (sand grains) judge, decide and act, we are able to approach to the real inherent processes within the psychological experiment (“magic” hourglass), independently from the dictate of axiomatic dogmas. The duplicity of both, the “observable” response behavior and the driving force behind it, lies in the nature of the “measuring apparatus ‘man’”. It includes two judgmental references. The first relates to the content of the construct, and the second, to the selected reference within the inherent decision process. Therefore, the reduction of both to a single score, in practice, often raises more questions than it answers. Historically the origins of this methodological difficulty can be traced back to two opposing Weltanschauungen, standing at the beginning of scientific psychology. In the 19th century, the secession of natural science from philosophy caused an

Fig. 2 The “magic” hourglass - thought experiment to inherent causes of distribution anomalies

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epistemological crisis, accompanying psychology since its emergence. In the 20th century it reached from the controversy between the First Leipzig School (Wundt 1907) and the Würzburg School (Bühler 1907, 1908); the crisis of scientific psychology and psychoanalysis (Bühler 1927); the opposition of behaviorism and cognitivism; till to today’s gap between empirical science and psychotherapeutic doctrines. Because this crisis is methodologically silenced rather than understood as a challenge, psychology is characterized by fragmentations, ruptures, and postmodern arbitrariness (Toomela 2007, 2008; Valsiner 2009; Yurevich 2009; Zittoun et al. 2009). The epistemological core of this crisis came to a head in the 20s and early 30s. To delimit science from metaphysics, the advocates of the logical positivism (Vienna Circle) tried to develop a unified science, based on laws of logic and empirical uniformity. In contrast to the Vienna Circle, Popper, who completed his doctorate about methodological issues in psychology under the supervision of Bühler2, was a pronounced opponent of positivism. Instead of universal principles of truth, dominating closed and totalitarian systems, he proposed critical rationalism as a scientific method, comparable to the advanced method of continuous improvement process in quality management. It implies that progress never ends, and it is always possible to make even good things better. To improve the quality of theories, he rejected the absoluteness of scientific truths and proposed refutation instead of verification. Although Popper was far ahead of his time, today it is debatable, if he really prevailed. In his autobiography he reported that especially in the Anglo-Saxon language area - even from philosophers - he mistakenly was held for a logical positivist (Popper 1995, pp. 120–121). He guessed, the reason for that was that “Logik der Forschung” (1935) was translated and published as recently as 1959 (“The Logic of Scientific Discovery”), and before, his ideas have not been clearly understood. After, the dice were cast for the rest of the 20th century. To understand the scientific significance of this historical incident, it is helpful to consider the scientific and political context of those years. Toomela (2007, 2008) emphasized that in the pre-world war II era, there were two psychological mainstreams: The German-Austrian (focused to the qualitative, the theory, the person, to Gestalt psychology, etc.) and the North American (focused to objective scores, to data, to the physical, to abilities, to behaviorism, etc.). However in the 30s the first vanished as a consequence of the Nazi regime. Therefore... ... modern mainstream psychology can be understood as a direct continuation of the pre-WWII North American psychology. It can also be concluded that in certain sense modern mainstream psychology is more concerned with accumulation of facts than with elaborations of the theoretical meaning of these facts. (Toomela 2007, p. 10) Further Toomela concludes: Fragmentary theories do not allow us to create complex hypotheses about relationships between interacting aspects of the human personality. We have too many facts published in “leading” journals that may simply be 2

In 1928

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inappropriate or irrelevant for theory-building. Overall, modern mainstream psychology, indeed, is satisfied with accumulation of facts instead of thinking. Last 60 years of research in psychology seems to have gone astray. (Toomela 2007, p. 19) The predominance of mainstream empirical science fostered the faith in the absoluteness of its premises. Axiomatic principles were mistaken for facts, with the consequence that the continuous improvement process stopped, and the empirical methodology became part of a positivistic ideology. Guilford declared the error theory to “the law of error” (Guilford 1936, p. 86), and with it, he supported a doctrine that sanctified normal distribution in statistical textbooks as a divinely truth (“God loves the normal curve” [Hopkins and Glass 1978, p. 78]). Thus, in the end, Popper’s critical rationalism was ignored; and it bears some irony that the positivistic endeavor to overcome metaphysics is hindered by the metaphysical belief in a methodology, initially supposed to protect science against it. Now it is time to remember the following warning: If [...] we characterize empirical science merely by the formal or logical structure of its statements, we shall not be able to exclude from it that prevalent form of metaphysics which results from elevating an obsolete scientific theory into an incontrovertible truth. (Popper 1935, 1989, p. 23; 1959, 2004, p.28) Hence, scientific tradition in psychology is based on an old but unsolved methodologically flaw, widely ignored by recent mainstream research. Intensified by the availability of statistical software packages, “...hyper-empiricism, lack of theoretical rigor, and [the] exclusion of the role of the researchers’ minds from the dynamic constitution of our knowledge” (Wagoner and Valsiner 2005, p. 198), made empirical conventionalism to a mass phenomenon, with serious consequences. The axiomatic exclusion of the inherent nature of human judgment not only hardened the old crisis; it also intensified the difficulties for an improved intercultural understanding of diversity, as a requirement for a scientific psychology in a globalizing world (Valsiner 2009). Evolution of Judgment — Towards a new (old) Theory In the distant future I see open fields for far more important researches. Psychology will be based on a new foundation, that of the necessary acquirement of each mental power and capacity by gradation. Light will be thrown on the origin of man and his history (Darwin 1859, 2003, p. 488). The idea of a universal and beneficent Creator does not seem to arise in the mind of man, until he has been elevated by long-continued culture. He who believes in the advancement of man from some low organised form will naturally ask, how does this bear on the belief in the immortality of the soul? (Darwin 1871, 1874, p. 637). The distribution-anomalies in our study varied considerably between different subpopulations and scales, and gave indications for multiple peaks and a more or less

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flat section in the central area. The attempt, to describe precisely a general systematics of the curves, was limited by the difficulty that human judgment unconsciously seems to follow overlapping meta-theories, which are not directly accessible by psychometric assessment. To understand the interdependencies of these meta-theories, we searched for a “navigation chart” that encompassed the spectrum of basic references, usually used. In numerous interviews and therapeutic sessions, we observed that discrepancies between scores and personal reports could be explained; first, by a category strongly influenced by the quality of social support and integration (affiliation); second, by an ambivalently varying category (approach - avoidance); and third, by a category with a changing focus of attention along a timeline (past – present – future). On the basis of these three categories we could define a varying space of meanings, we had to consider, to understand the bio-psycho-social model beyond the formal contents of its constructs. Now, to formulate a theoretical approach, and to define the systematics of fluctuation of validity, it was not far, to assign these judgmental categories to basic evolutionary principles. We draw the conclusion that human judgment follows universal behaviors, closely centered around Darwin’s evolutionary principles of reproduction, variation, and selection. Accordingly, we hypothesized that psychological evolution has its equivalents in three homologous judgmental patterns, higher animals share in common; and these patterns were evolutionarily transformed into culturally overlaid human variants. These are: 1. affiliation (reproduction, partnership, group behavior, herd instinct), 2. approach (appetence, promotion focus, resilience) vs. avoidance (fear, prevention focus, vulnerability) and 3. life history (past, ancestors) — present state (cognition, interaction) — anticipation (future, offspring). We assume that human mind is still imprisoned within these behavioral categories, and even language and cultural development are interrelated to these basic subject areas. Further we assume that the different existential meanings of the item content, especially in the Physical Deficiency scales, trigger discrete response patterns that mirror these basic principles in distribution anomalies. Initially these principles have nothing to do with consciousness, or what an individual thinks or believes. They only describe basic behaviors to ensure reproduction, to live and survive in a specific environment, and to take possession of natural resources for safeguarding species’ future. Nevertheless, we regard them as homologous prototypes for higher mental performances as language, culture, tool construction, social construction, consciousness, free will, and all, we usually claim as specific human abilities. We can regard these homologous behaviors as vestiges from the beginning of life and as still living psycho-paleontological fossils, dominating our minds and cultures. Or with other words: Mankind’s natural place is in culture, and culture is a part of human biology because it is our biology that gives us the ability to enter into culture. (Plotkin 2007, p. 11) Based on this hypothesis, we assume that distribution anomalies may give crucial information about the linkage between biology, psychology, and culture. To

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understand this linkage, it is important, to find and specify judgment and decisionforming mechanisms, people have in common, despite all differences between cultures, individuals, and times. The complexity of these three behavior categories increases from 1 to 3. In category 3 we anticipate death as the long-term perspective only accessible to the consciousness of humans. Present tense, as the separator between past and future, covers past and future within certain limits. While animals’ awareness of time seems closely spaced to this separator, human’s conception of time reaches far beyond, and is, in principle, endless to both directions. The extended awareness of time enabled to reflect possibilities, and to predict the availability of resources by observing the nature, or even to anticipate future beyond individual lifetime. In parallel to this functionality, the question about the “where from” and “whither” came to the fore. As a consequence the limitations of the own existence appeared at the horizon and pushed into the focus of attention. Observations of the course of nature promoted insights about rules, analogies, and meanings. In parallel, mental constructions emerged, requiring abstraction, linguistic signs, and articulation. With the advent of language, theorizing about the world opened the gate to an accelerating genecultural coevolution. In human evolution, language, abstraction, and cultural development seem strongly associated with the experience of hardship and finiteness. Social construction (Gergen 1999, 2001; Searl 1995, 1998) as an important characteristic of culture, not only improved quality of life by division of labor. As well, social construction fostered imagination, and humans’ ability, to imagine a paradise, even it was an unattainable goal in lifetime. The belief that it may exist in an afterlife, or at least in an after-world, available for offspring, motivated to improve cultural processes in two directions: First, towards a rational understanding of observable natural phenomena, to improve the conditions of life; and second, towards a metaphysical interpretation of these phenomena, to answer questions about the meaning of life. With that, in hominization, the omnipresence of deprivation, scarcity, and misery, combined with the ability to look ahead, formed a basis to imagine possibilities beyond concrete experience. So humans’ awareness stimulated hopes, visions, aspirations, and ideas as abstract subject areas. The power of imagination, beyond the limitations of observable reality, became the animating spirit to advance genecultural duality. To attain security, predictability, justice, meaning, and to approach to the promised lands of our days and beyond, culture was enriched by collectively shared visions, communicated and articulated by language. This enabled the brain of the Stone Age man to form complex societies, build sacred buildings, and achieve scientific progresses. In this striving, humans succeeded to overcome natural limitations and ecological niches, but the basic dilemma remained - they couldn’t succeed to overcome finality. This insurmountable barrier, on the way to the Garden of Eden, seems to be the prime mover of human endeavor. Accordingly, we regard the following statement as a fundamental theorem of human evolution: Man is the animal who has to live with his knowledge of finiteness, and culture is the world man establishes to live with this knowledge. (Assmann 2003, book cover) [translated]

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The ability, to communicate time-referenced events by language and culture, made time to a guiding principle of observation, and to an evolutionary force. However, this time concept is not only based on a physical axis “t”, it is also a construct impelled by the observation of cyclic processes in nature, and moreover by a metaphysical construct of eternity, enabling to transcend beyond time, space, and observable facts. An extended childhood and youth enabled to build a knowledge base accumulating in biography. But when looking ahead, the contrast between experience and the products of imagination became the hypothesis forming mechanisms of the ability, actively designing the future. These varying manifestations of time seem to be a governing principle behind self-referential assessment and an important driving force behind gene-culture coevolution. Therefore, to understand distribution anomalies, we need to understand response behavior as a result of human judgment, based on gene-culture coevolution beyond positivistic dogmas. To progress in psychology it is necessary, not to convey the impression of scientific objectivity by excluding the subject and its biological nature. Only then we are able to understand inherent human processes, and to approach to the causes of irrationality that involves the positivistic illusion of rationality, and the risk to destroy even the resources of the paradise, humans try to establish. The following chapters interlink the upper three categories to the distribution anomalies in our bio-psycho-social scales. According to our theory, these anomalies mirror humanly inherent judgment biases. Because they more or less overlap, depending on scale-content and intrapsychic states, the prototypical distributions (Figs. 3, 4 and 5) are idealizations, and they do not only exist in their pure form. Inherent Judgment Bias: Affiliation (Type 1) Affiliation theories deal with the conditions under which we seek close social relations. Schachter (1959) established the theory that anxiety would produce an increase of affiliative tendencies. Sauerland and Hammerl (2008) emphasized the evolutionary meaning of affiliation in view of interpersonal balance. Especially in higher mammals group behavior provides survival benefit (Effective defense strategies, to keep away competitors from the group’s territory, larger groups can

Fig. 3 Frequency distribution: Affiliation

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capture larger prey, groups can practice work sharing, and groups can help species’ offspring to survive). In our bio-psycho-social model an indicator for affiliation is social support. It refers to partnership, family, friends, social participation and integration. In contrast to animals it also means relationships, to realize individual targets within a cultural context. During the development of four scales to social support3, we passed through serious methodological difficulties, because these scales tend to an extreme asymmetry not compensable by reformulating or replacing items. Furthermore, correlations with other subjective-health-dimensions were very low, and construct validity could not mirror the vital importance of social support. The characteristic frequency distribution of this scale type is visualized in Fig. 3. Here we see that most people use high or highest ratings. In comparison to other diagnostic groups cancer patients have the highest scores. Interviews reveal that social support is not only improved by the supportive behaviors of others; social support items seem to stimulate a tendency to an increased willingness to comprise in existing relationships, as well. This coincides with Schachter’s theory that threatening experiences would produce an increase of affiliative tendencies, but it also underlines that answer-behavior in social support scales has an important selfprotecting function. Therefore distribution anomalies of this type rather seem to mirror an important aim of life, whereas the content itself undermines the endeavor to construct methodologically validatable scales. Hence, what is measured is not primarily a psychological feature, but the result of a compensatory process within the “measuring-apparatus ‘man’” and his values, hopes, and ideals. Since all scales to social support get out of line in the same sense, we assume that an over-compensatory process also mirrors an important evolutionary principle. Items to social support not only trigger a central aspect of group behavior as a requirement for reproduction, as well they trigger self-evaluations to give life meaning. Because the construct of social support widely eludes from empirical measurement, its functional significance is empirically undeterminable. If we analyze, however, distribution anomalies from an evolutionary view, we have to reject inferences drawn from statistical methods. Only if we take into consideration that traditional psychometric methodology is inappropriate to answer some essential psychological questions, we understand that distribution anomalies make visible a deep rooted tendency, not only for reproduction, but for social construction, as well. Inherent Judgment Bias: Approach vs. Avoidance (Type 2) “Anyone who doesn’t believe in miracles is not a realist.” (David Ben-Gurion)4 The second type (Fig. 4) is characterized by a distribution with a flat section in the central area and with two bordering peaks. We deduced this bimodal prototype from a visual comparison of 216 different patterns. The lower peak is in the 3

Deficient Social Support, Deficient Social Network (Physical Deficiencies), and Social Support, Social Isolation (Psychological Health). 4 First Prime Minister of Israel.

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Fig. 4 Frequency distribution: Approach vs. Avoidance

avoidance-area, the higher in the approach-area. Because of the overlapping effect and the variations between scales and groups, it is often not possible to delimit pure bimodality from anomalies of higher order. Bimodal anomaly visualizes a swapping between inherent antagonistic emotions, impulses, theories, and references. An ambivalence bias between thrill and threat, hopes and fears, pleasure and pain, resilience and vulnerability, dominates the judgmental process and subverts the requirement of homogeneity and one-dimensionality. A favourable tendency towards the high end of the range explains contentment paradoxes and visualizes an optimistic and hopeful nature of human judgment. In contrast to the widespread belief in a risk-focused self-evaluation, the tendency to unrealistic optimism and other positive biases is well documented in literature (Csikszentmihalyi 1990; Gilovich et al. 2002; Higgins 1997; Higgins and Spiegel 2004; Kahneman 2002, 2003a, b; Kahneman et al. 2003; Kahneman and Frederick 2002; Kahneman and Tversky 2000; Miller and Taylor 2002; Taylor 1989; Taylor and Armor 1996; Taylor and Brown 1998; Tversky and Kahneman 1974, 1986; Weinstein 1982, 1984, 1987; Weinstein and Klein 2002). The regulatory focus theory (Higgins 1997) explains a parallelism of two different processes of self-regulation. The prevention focus directs attention on survival- and security-related states. This regulatory focus is dominated by so-called ought self-guides, resulting from necessities, responsibilities, and obligations. Here agitation contrasts with quiescence. In the foreground are fears, and with it thoughts how to avoid an undesired end-state. On the other side the promotion focus is dominated by so-called ideal self-guides, influenced by cheerfulness in contrast with dejection. In the foreground are personal interests, aspiration, enthusiasm, and personal growth. Both focuses are a plausible explanation for bimodal distributions. The minor peak represents individuals, whose judgment was guided by the prevention focus, whereas the major peak represents those individuals, whose judgment was guided by the promotion focus (in each case at the moment of inquiry). This explanatory approach is supported by the dichotomy of collectivism and individualism. Without discussing here the complex culturally overlaid pros and

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cons (e. g. Ratner and Hui 2003), these concepts imply a dichotomy with some affinity to Higgins’ regulatory focus theory. Similar to individualism, the promotion focus stands for new ideas, creativity, egoism, breaking traditions, dogmas, and taboos. In this way, both contrast to social demands, social control, social standards and social compromises as the domains of collectivism, and to constraints, causing suffering when ought self-guide and prevention focus predominate. Both, collectivism and individualism, seem to be essential for the development of the social mind and the dialogical self (Valsiner 2007; Valsiner and van der Veer 2000), and we regard these concepts as integral elements of regulatory focus theory. There is an obvious interdependence between type 1 (Affiliation) and type 2 (Approach - Avoidance). To gain affiliation and social support, the individual searches the collective. But this requires to compromise and to accept restrictions to individualistic ambitions. On the other hand, individualism supports the collective as a source of progress and change, and thus, individuals may receive affirmative feedback from the community. Although, in history, individualism often died on the funeral piles of social control, on long term perspective, it prevailed as Bloch’s principle of hope (Bloch 1959, 1985), and with this, the illusion of the paradise became the allegory of an ideal, individuals share in common as a global project of gene-culture coevolution. Individualism is not an idea of the Age of Enlightenment. At best, it was discovered as a forceful mental resource, enabling tremendous developments in as little as a few hundred years, after it was unknowingly suppressed in the Middle Ages and before. In its evolutionary function, however, it is one side of an antagonism, inherent to each individual, since hundreds of thousands of years and earlier. It is part of a controller, enabling to set limits, defend living space, and solve problems to survive. First written evidence of the inherent antagonism is known from an old Egyptian papyrus as the debate between a man tired of life and his soul (Barta 1969; Brunner-Traut 1967; Faulkner 1956). This 4000 year old poem describes two souls within a man. He (ka-soul) represents internalized social conventions and suffers under the burden of social demands, crisis, and ethical dilemmas. Hence, he asks his ba-soul (individual part of the soul) to agree to commit suicide. But the ba-soul disagrees and argues that he suffers only, due to his internalized social status and superficial religious rites that hinder him to be free and independent. The ba-soul advocates that it makes no difference, if one is entombed in a pyramid, or one passes away at the bank of the river. After an anticipated controversy at the tribunal of the dead, both souls compromise to continue life in balance of their differences, until the time will have come. Both are advocates of humanly inherent but self-contradictory world views. They represent intellectual antagonists, potentially available to all individuals. Therefore this poem can be considered as a timeless document for human ability to mediate between conflicting perspectives. It vividly illustrates an insight with striking similarities to the prevention focus or collectivism (ka-soul) and to promotion focus or individualism (ba-soul). Thus, it amazingly coincides with recent social psychological theories. Further empirical evidence points in a similar direction. The dichotomous concepts of realistic pessimism and unrealistic optimism (Weinstein 1982, 1984, 1987) indicate that the exclusive belief in the benefit of realism is questionable.

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There are some indications that realistic pessimism is closely attached to internalized (social or empirical) standards, whereas unrealistic optimism supports self-esteem, self-efficacy, and finally boosts the probability to succeed in the attainment of personal goals. In sum, the perception of the self that most individuals hold is not as wellbalanced as traditional models of mental health suggest. Rather than being attentive to both the favorable and the unfavorable aspects of self, normal individuals appear to be very cognizant of their strengths and assets and considerably less aware of their weaknesses and faults. Evidence that these flattering self-portrayals are illusory comes from studies in which researchers have found that (a) most individuals see themselves as better than the average person and (b) most individuals see themselves as better than others see them. (Taylor and Brown 1998, p. 195) Thus, self-referential human judgment is not calibrated to a single, objective, realistic, and normative reference. Instead of the universal validity of collective social standards, the individual relies on biased heuristics, and in many situations there are good reasons, not to be too realistic. Especially if we cannot influence the situation by our behavior, we sometimes do better to dissociate from reality, even if we seek refuge in an illusion. This thesis may contrast to a general consent in the importance to face reality. However, the courage to face life, first needs to accept life risks by hope and confidence, and only in second place needs target-oriented and hard-headed realism. Dreams and visions prevail over cold-blooded rationalism. Although both are necessary conditions for motivation, the first is inconsistent with positivism, because it seems to contradict common sense. Hence, social and scientific conventionalism is prone to ignore the meaning of this inherent paradox, and with it, ignores the importance of a basic controlling mechanism of human motivation. Risk taking and reasoning power, seems the essence of a hopeful inherent ambivalence in human nature, enabling to decide and act, despite the formal indeterminateness of many real life situations. The awareness of mortality as the driving force behind hominization promoted abilities closely associated with illusions. As the reverse side, of course, this implies fundamental risks, concerning the ability to predict reliably developments in the future. A difficulty here is that predictions are guided by simplifications and... ...people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex task of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations. In general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors. (Tversky and Kahneman 1974, p. 1124) One systematic error is the collective illusion that humans’ behavior is rational. Therefore, if we look ahead, the probability is low that this heuristic principle enables mankind to survive on the long run. A hope, however, is in humans’ ability to reflect heuristics in long-term consequences, and thus, to control the direction of cultural development in a growing and globalizing world. This time-related view is subject of the following chapters.

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Inherent Judgment Bias: Life History - Present State - Anticipation (Type 3) What does it mean to be? — Why is something, why is not nothing? — Who am I? — What do I really want? — Hence, with such questions I am never at the beginning. I ask them out of a situation in which I stand, coming from the past. Awakening to the consciousness of myself, I see myself in a world, in which I seek orientation. I picked things up and again abandoned them. Undoubtedly all this was self-evident and absolutely at present. But, here and now, surprised I ask again, what in fact is; because everything is only transient. I was not at the beginning, and not at the end. Even between beginning and end I ask to the beginning and the end. (Jaspers 1932, p. 1–2) [translated] The third type (Fig. 5) is characterized by a distribution with three peaks (one peak in the central area and one bordering peak on each side). Because the triadic distribution predominates in the scale-group Physical Deficiencies (Fig. 1), we herein see an indication that diseases not only cause a toggling between hopes and fears (type 2: approach vs. avoidance). They also enhance a comparison of different states, asking for causes and consequences by looking back and ahead from now (type 3). Uncertainty, as to the further course, may focus attention to the normally repressed awareness of mortality. An uncontrollable threat is avoided by directing attention to the present or past. On the other hand, unpleasant situations in the present seek refuge in hopes or in beneficial memories. And as a third, the recall of painful life conflicts is avoided, by directing attention to present or future. Hence, self-evaluation is guided by the selection of an appropriate reference along a timeline, or within the individual cycle of life. With this, central response tendencies represent the here and now as a semantic standard, framed by relieving and burdening experiences or beliefs, concerning biography and future. Whereas type 2 is anchored in evolutionary processes of emotions, type 3 is crucial in regard to experiences and anticipations as time-referenced premises of self-

Fig. 5 Frequency distribution: Life history - Present state-anticipation

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evaluation. We hypothesize that the references of type 3 are categories of an inherent human epistemology and of a bio-psycho-social semantics, crucial for gene-culture coevolution. Type 3 has the function of an internal validating system and enables to direct attention to different categories and multiple meanings, beyond social comparison and normative standards. All three types overmodulate psychometric measurements by a humanly inherent self-regulating controller. Because this sharply contrasts to methodological premises, following we deepen the issue of the incommensurability of human judgment by specifiying the contradiction of empirical reality and axiomatic fiction, and by defining the concept of fluctuation of validity. Fluctuation of Validity — a Challenge (not only) for Philosophy of Science To ask whether the human individual is best understood as a multiplicity or as a unity is unprofitable, not because the answer is impossible but because the answer is obvious. The humanity of the individual implies a plurality of functions, and the individuality of the man implies a focus of movement and of utterance. (Buchler 1951, p. 3) The validity of a psychometric scale is defined as the degree to which it measures what it was designed to measure. This requires evidence that, first, the axiomatic of measurement is “true”, and second, the operationalized construct is based on a theoretical model. In contrast, our existential hypothesis is based on the assumption that human judgment implies a homolog validation system as a consequence of the gene-culture coevolution. It variegates references and leads to the methodological dilemma that there exists an inherent judgment forming mechanism that thwarts measurement by the nature of introspection and self-evaluation. The resulting phenomenon we define as fluctuation of validity (Fig. 6). Accordingly, the unknown calibration of the “measuring apparatus ‘man’” makes validity studies, without considering inherent processes, to a doubtful procedure with serious long-term effects on scientific progress. In the practice of scientific mainstream, validity studies are reduced to correlations of a measure with already existing measures. Like a ship watching out for lighthouses on solid bedrock, the content has to be confirmed by marker scales. However, in the fog of axiomatically biased validity, these lighthouses indeed are ships, searching for orientation for their part. Thus, instead searching the horizon for new theoretical ports, the inferential statistical truth-system generates illusions of evidence, while groping about in the dark. Imprisoned in a closed axiomatic system, this kind of “empirical” science imperceptibly reproduces its errors and impedes innovation permanently. This not only causes difficulties for a psychotherapist, who has to interpret individual data in view of the severity of a disorder, it also causes difficulties when statistical parameters are used as benchmarks to prove outcomes of specific treatments for individuals and groups. In both cases, the unknown response guiding conditions behind the data raise more questions than being answered by the low

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Empirical Reality

Axiomatic Fiction

Measuring Apparatus “Man”

Measuring Apparatus “Questionnaire”

categorial references as basis for intra-individual judgment

social standards as basis for inter-individual comparison homogeneous and linear scales (e.g. quality of life)

type 1

type 2

affiliation

approach avoidance approach avoidance approach avoidance

type 3 life history

bad ….…..……………….. good

present state anticipation

1. Self-evaluation by introspection, considering resources and/or deficits, and making reference to type 1 to 3 at time of inquiry.

2. Self-regulation by compensatory contentment bias Type 1: Social support, participation, Integration. Type 2: Promotion focus, challenge, self-efficacy, self-esteem. Type 3: Anticipation: optimism, hope, faith, God.

Fluctuation of Validity The concept of Fluctuation of Validity we define as a data mismatch resulting from the incommensurability of self-referential human judgment. It refers to the psychometrically denied phenomenon that identical scores may represent multiple and varying meanings. Fluctuation of Validity is observable on individual and group level, and explains distribution anomalies by humanly inherent processes. Its empirical evidence refutes fundamental axioms of classical test theory.

Fig. 6 The phenomenon of fluctuation of validity

practical relevance of many validated data. Thus, the normative power of mainstream science inadvertently hinders scientific progress and necessary development of appropriate criteria for quality assessment. Figure 6 demonstrates the methodological difficulty of inherent judgment biases. Empirical real-distributions, influenced by evolutionary categories of judgment, contradict to the axiomatic fiction of normal distribution. Fluctuation of validity is defined as a phenomenon, caused by a mismatch between inherent categorial references (type 1 to type 3) and homogeneous linear data. The conversion of the categories type 1 to type 3 into a homogeneous and standardized measure, results in a loss of essential information and in an error, silenced by the faith in the axiomatic dogma. Accordingly, psychometric methodology defines empiricism in a closed system, excluding experience and human nature from science.

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Because it is threatening, to substantiate the axiomatic limitations, fluctuation of validity is methodological denied by the reliance on a normative methodological standard that is considered self-evidently as “true”. This, however, obscures a historical crisis in psychology and makes solutions difficult. To use this crisis as an opportunity for innovation requires an integrated scientific view, bringing back philosophy of science on the agenda of psychology, and make it to a permanent feature of health care science. Is Gene-Culture Coevolution Governed by a Metaphysical Semantics?

It may be granted at once that the final aim of science, including psychology, is explanation. It cannot be admitted, however, that for this reason psychologists should not be interested in phenomenal data. It seems natural to acquire at least some knowledge of those data which we intend to explain, which our constructs are expected to fit, before we begin the construction. Otherwise, why should the constructs fit? And it is not true that we know those data sufficiently. If I were a Positivist I should, for this reason, insist upon phenomenology as the genuine basis of all explanatory construction. (Köhler 1938, p. 68) [...] It is perfectly admissible, it is even necessary that those who do research often think far ahead of actual knowledge. I regret that in psychology this is not yet a truism. (Köhler 1938, p. 239) Concepts like quality of life, well-being, subjective health, or the bio-psycho-social model aim for elementary aspects of life and therefore touch essential semantic keyconcepts in human self-assessment. To understand the internal references and mechanisms that are triggered by psychometric items, we need a dynamic model of personality beyond mere traits. This model has to be flexible enough to explain functional states and conditions, inherently can be activated in all individuals. Archetypal subject areas and their linguistic and cultural transmissions, passed down for countless generations in perpetual repetitions, formed a categorial system and a universal semantics, still governing human myths, traditions, and ideas. Thus, we understand fluctuation of validity as an incommensurability, caused by evolutionary transitions of the cycle of life and its homologue inherent representations. Consequently, hominization did not liberate from the constraints of nature, it only mirrors a reiterating natural principle, enriched by the mask of culture, enabling to both: First, to veil nature by imagination, and second, to make species itself to an object of observation. The duality of avoidance and approach culturally transmuted to the driving force for delusion and insight as varying and competing principles (type 2). Self-assessment corresponds with considerations about restrictions, relations, and possibilities and directs attention to past, present, or future (type 3). All these homolog systems are guiding principles of introspection and make metaphysics to a cause of error and a source of knowledge. In numerous cultural manifestations and ontological explanations we find varying derivates of a tripartite structure of human judgment. Therefore we hypothesize that the permanent observation of astronomical cycles, climate cycles, and biological

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cycles of life evolutionary formed two basic systems: First, an inherent validating system, and second, an inherent semantics. Both are still visible in religion, literature, philosophy, and science. Following, we list some examples: Philosophy: – – – – – – – – – – – – –

third dimension as metaphysical projection (tumuli, sun, pyramids, sacred buildings, heaven, universe, ...) the trilogical structure of the Epic of Gilgamesh, the triangle as a fundamental unit in trigonometry and as a metaphysical symbol in the ancient world (e.g. the tripod as the symbol of three universal virtues), distinction of virtues (outer virtues, bodily virtues, spiritual virtues) (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1098 b 3, 2006, p. 118) reflection about causes (nature, necessity and coincidence, intellect and human achievement) (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1112 a 18, 2006, p. 156) the Trinity of Christian theology, firstness, secondness, thirdness (Peirce [1867–1913], 1992, 1998), phenomenology, normative science, metaphysics (Peirce [1867–1913], 1992, 1998), paradoxes of failing: world orientation, illumination of existence, metaphysics (Jaspers 1932), three interacting worlds (World 1: physical universe, biology. World 2: Mental procedures, consciousness. World 3: products of the human mind, theories.) (Popper 1978, 1995, 1996), prevalence & alescence, ordinality & relation, possibility & actuality (Buchler 1966), nature, power and prospect: Justus Buchler’s system (Gelber and Wallace 1990), subjective, intersubjective, objective, or, first, second, and third person (Davidson 2001), Psychology:

– – – – – – –

validity of psychometric methodology (content validity, criterion validity and construct validity, [Lienert 1969; Lienert and Raatz 1998]), scientific psychology as natural science, social science, humane discipline, three fields of Wissenschaft: Naturwissenschaft, Sozialwissenschaft, and Geisteswissenschaft (Humanwissenschaft), quality of life based on a bio-psycho-social model, the cognitive triad as the core problem in depression (negative thoughts, about the self, the world, and the future) (Beck 1970), heuristic principles (anchoring, availability, representativeness) (Tversky and Kahneman 1974), dialogues on social construction (societal practice, social theory, meta-theory) (Gergen 2001, p. 2), Evolution:

– –

evolutionary principles (reproduction, variation and selection) (Darwin 1859), gene-culture coevolution: Transmission factors, selection factors, mutation factors (Mameli 2007, p. 30),

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social construction: Collective intentionality, functional assignment, constitutive rules (Searl 1995, 1998).

Although these tripartite conceptions may differ in some respect, they have much more in common than only three categories. If we compare them, we recognize different semantically validating systems to approach to truths in regard to core areas of life. And what is more, there is a striking affinity with two elementary scientific conceptions in psychology, as a science: – –

First, the embeddedness of psychology within the tripartite concept of Wissenschaft as Naturwissenschaft, Sozialwissenschaft, and Geisteswissenschaft, and second, the three validity-criteria for psychometric parameters (Lienert 1969; Lienert and Raatz 1998).

If we try to embed these different views on science and validity in culture, we can roughly outline a humanly inherent three categorial, meta-theoretical or metaphysical truth system: 1. Psychology as Naturwissenschaft. This first category shows an affinity with content or face validity. It describes the origin or the coming into existence of an individual as a physical fact as well as a product of culture. It asks for rules of emergence, to answer origin and causality. In an existentialistic view this category contrasts to the nothingness. It aims to anchor the individual in the world, and to the existence of mankind in nature and animal ancestors. The ability to recognize oneself as an object (e. g. in a mirror or as biographical memory) made the first category to a matter of the subject. Concepts of affinity are: birth, identity, childhood, biography, past tense, first person, transmissionfactors, world orientation, nature, etc. 2. Psychology as Sozialwissenschaft. This second category shows an affinity with criterion validity. It defines the specific relationships between the individual and others. It comprises the demands of actual life situations within an environmental context, and is governed by intersubjective processes. Identity is defined by social comparison and by referring to others. Thus meaning of life is a result of social integration and interaction, social functions, and internalized sociocultural beliefs and values. Concepts of affinity are: procreation and breeding of offspring, adulthood, present tense, second person, interaction within social rolls, existence, life, present tense, selection factors, collective intentionality, illumination of existence, power, social theory, etc. 3. Psychology as Geisteswissenschaft. This third category, shows an affinity with construct validity. It is guided by intellectually defined categories or operationalized constructs, and the endeavor to give life meaning by creativity, individual aspirations, and ethics. It is associated with life-time achievement and asks how to improve contentment with life. A humanly inherent tension between cultural values and individual ambitions motivates to approach to ideas, ideals, inventions, theories, or to a paradise which can be realized within family or society. Here parenthood, contentment in profession, in leisure-time interests, in social or religious activities are in the center of attention. It is this category which stands for human striving to progresses in art, science, society, and in the

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acceptance of finality. Striving for solutions and developing ideas beyond existing facts here not only fosters ego, it fosters speculation, hubris, and metaphysics, as well. Concepts of affinity are: finality, future, maturation, aspiration, third person, God, quality of life, aims of life, meaning of life, social construction, individuality, selection, constitutive rules, metaphysics, theoria, meta theory, etc. These categorial focuses stand for a humanly inherent semantics. They seem to govern self-referential evaluation of humans as bio-cultural systems, and to determine their judging, deciding and acting. Thus, individual responses are to be explained by varying internal references and by differentially emphasizing these archetypal categories. So we can understand self-referential evaluation as a process to cope with demands and conflicts by intuitively selecting an appropriate reference within the internal self-evaluating system. This requires an integrated consideration of biological, interindividual, and intraindividual factors and a more in depth approach of psychology in view of the bio-cultural nature of humans. Figure 7 outlines basic principles of the gene-cultural coevolution as a recursion on two homolog judgmentforming systems. While genetic evolution is determined by natural limitations, cultural evolution generates the delusion to liberate from these limitations. Nature and culture are homologously interrelated within a circularly interdependent process. Analogous to digital and analog data, data of human behavior are stored in genes and in culture. The fundamental difference, however, is that in human behavior exists an extremely high phenotypic plasticity and a potentially infinite variation of manifestations. So the conversion of this data is not possible without knowing the degrees of freedom of the homolog systems and their determining influence on behavior. The question, to what extend these systems allow scope for free will, lead to an old debate, we don’t want to continue here. Yet obviously we approach to a highly

Fig. 7 Model of homolog judgment-forming systems in the process of gene-culture coevolution

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complex question, we recursively try to answer within our homolog validating system in which we are imprisoned. This limitation may explain, why in psychology it is difficult to develop theories of wide scope, and why scientific community is prone to deny collectively the axiomatic difficulties of its methods. Complex tasks of assessing probabilities often are reduced to simpler judgmental operations (Tversky and Kahneman 1974, see above), and this seems to govern the use of psychological methodology in practice. So, to convey the impression of scientific accurateness, it seems more easy, to clutch at straws of positivistic myths, as to approach to a solution for the old psychological crisis. This solution, however, requires progresses beyond the traditionalized faith in empirical routines, and beyond collective feelings of evidence. What we need is to approach to an integrated understanding of the transition from homolog archetypal behaviors to cultural diversity. To be open for this, it is important to criticize the general practice that theories are basically used as “identity markers” rather than as “intellectual tools”. Valsiner and Rosa (2007) defined the first as markers, setting... ...mental (and socio-ideological) positions that are being followed for the reasons of “contributing to the literature”, or following a tradition, or getting tenure in an academic institution, or reaching many other socially and personally useful objectives. (Valsiner and Rosa 2007, p.26) On their way towards a new epistemology in socio-cultural sciences, Valsiner and Rosa (2007) described the dilemma in the way theories are used by the scientific community: Viewing the practice of dealing with theories in psychology in recent decades, one may think that many psychologists expect theories to be ready-made, finished, and supply immediately applicable “products” that can be linked with their particular empirical needs. If one of those does not fit, it is not repaired... What becomes lost in this is psychologists’ general orientation towards creating their own abstract tools to deal with their needs. The tools are habitually selected, not created. In that selection, major mismatches occur between theories’ implicit premises and the nature of the phenomena. As a result, many of psychology’s empirical data—especially those created by “standardized instruments”—reduce our understanding of the phenomena studied (or at least do not enhance it). (Valsiner and Rosa 2007, p.37) So, neither our bio-psycho-social model, nor our considerations about fluctuation of validity should be understood as tools ready-to-use. Yet they prove serious errors in empirical methodology, and demonstrate that there is a necessity for psychology being open for basic intellectual challenges and for “...tools for taking a new look at the phenomena we want to understand” Valsiner and Rosa (2007, p. 26).

Summary and Conclusions The positivism of the 20th century still dominates scientific mainstream. Psychometric scores, based on self-referential judgments, are believed to be “true” and applicable to normative standards. However, in the last three decades, there is a

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number of conclusive evidence that human judgment is by no means as rational and well balanced as psychometric methods imply. Nevertheless normal science is strongly influenced by the belief that statistical software packages come with an integrated scientific methodology. Thus, crucial errors in axiomatic premises are systematically ignored, with the consequence that necessary developments are hindered. The format of classical paper-and-pencil tests is still regarded as the obligatory standard. Especially in quality of life research this situation allows to produce scales with low theoretical rigor, and without considering recent developments. Ignored is the fact that the clarification of methodological flaws would be of considerable relevance, to overcome psychological stagnation, and to progress in accordance with practical needs, where a more scientific understanding of the “measuring-apparatus ‘man’” is still overdue. To this day, mainstream science militates against the insight that judgment forming processes, beyond psychometric axioms, are important to understand human nature. This not only explains the low practical relevance of empirical science, it also explains, why obsolete and congealed therapeutic dogmas still dominate psychological fields of activity. Due to economical, ethical, and scientific reasons, psychology has to prove itself, where humans undergo treatments to be evaluated in their effect. However, the duplicity of treatment and evaluation reveals a crucial scientific gap. Psychotherapeutic doctrines and empirical science are bordered by historical frontlines with a vast terra incognita in between. Hence, transparency requires knowledge about this unknown area. This, however, can be attained only by crossing the lines of solidified borders and by regarding this situation as a challenge for future research. To overcome the traditionalized psychological crisis, a more integrated view of practice and research is overdue. Therefore facilities in applied psychological areas have a special responsibility to support progress in the light of philosophy of science and recent scientific developments. Instead of to distant from scientific questions; or to wait passively for suggestions from mainstream research; or to adhere to obsolete therapeutic doctrines; or to classify psychological phenomena by systems derived from dying statistics, psychologists have to analyze and articulate the challenges in applied areas to stimulate scientific innovation. To enable the transition from deeply anchored fragmentations to an integrated view, a systematized continually developing process is necessary, supported by open minds and structures. In this article we pointed out the scientific limitations of the hybrid reality of psychology, and proposed an approach to fill the gap between empirical methods and application-oriented theoretical requirements. We tried to substantiate the difference between the “measuring apparatus ‘questionnaire’” and the “measuring apparatus ‘man’”, by introducing an evolutionary theory of judgment and of fluctuation of validity. Furthermore, we spotlighted on the consequences of the methodological crisis, systematically denied and ignored by scientific mainstream, for a whole century. To break the barriers of conventionalism and to approach the requirements of the 21th century, a change in attitudes towards psychometric methodology is essential. Especially in health care industry, psychometric scales should be replaced by theoryguided and computer-based adaptive evaluation, where theoretical in-depth analysis and expert based psychological exploration systems come into use. This, however,

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not only requires a continual integration of extending scientific knowledge, but a radical rethinking in scientific community and in institutions of practice. Necessary is the willingness to overcome the crisis of empiric and therapeutic Weltanschauungen, and their institutionalized thinking in stereotypes. This crisis is a chance to approach to an integrated view of psychology as Naturwissenschaft, Sozialwissenschaft and Geisteswissenschaft, and to an in depth understanding of humanly inherent validating systems. To support psychology on its long and stony way, there is a need to organize a two-way-process between science and practice by regarding psychology not primarily as a set of methods, but as an intellectual challenge to understand the bio-psychosocial interdependencies of human nature. Hence, we advocate for a psychology, being aware of the fruitful no-man’s-land between obstructive mental fixations, and being open-minded for new approaches towards the gene-cultural coevolution of human brain and behavior, beyond statistical inferences synthetically constructed in a sea of psychological arbitrariness. This requires a reappraisal of scientific observation and the insight that... “it must be possible for an empirical scientific system to be refuted by experience.” (Popper 1935, 1989, p. 15; 1959, 2004, p. 18)

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