BRUCE R. REICHENBACH
MAVRODES
ON O M N I P O T E N C E
(Received 15 June, 1979) In a recent article George Mavrodes develops a definition of omnipotence which he tenders as adequate to meet the difficulties advanced against the possibility of defining 'omnipotence'. For any agent, n, n is omnipotent IFF for any proposition, p, which meets conditions (C1) and (C2) below, n is able to bring about some state of affairs which satisfies p. The two conditions on p are: (C1) there is some possible state of affairs which would satisfy p, and such that it is not a necessary truth that no agent has brought it about that this state of affairs obtains, and (C2) if p entails that some proposition, q, is satisfied, and if it is not a necessary truth that no agent can have brought about the satisfaction of q, then p does not exclude any agent, or class of agent, from among those which may have brought about the satisfaction ofq. 1 Is this general definition of 'omnipotence' adequate? Consider the case, introduced by Plantinga, of an individual (call him McEar) who is capable only of scratching his ear. 2 Then consider the proposition (1)
McEar performs action A,
where A is any act other than scratching his ear. Is there a state of affairs which an agent could bring about which would make this proposition true? The answer depends on the way in which McEar possesses the property of only being able to scratch his ear. If he possesses the property contingently then it would be possible for some being to bring it about that (1) is true e.g. by corrective surgery. However, if he possesses the property of being able only to scratch his ear necessarily, i.e. if it is true in all possible worlds that the only thing he can do is scratch his ear, there is no state of affairs which an agent could bring about which would make this proposition true, for there is no possible state of affairs which would satisfy (1). As such, the inability of McEar or any other being to satisfy (1) will be irrelevant to determining whether they are omnipotent in that (1) fails to meet C 1. On the other hand, PhilosophicalStudies 37 (1980) 211 214. 0031-8116/80/0372-0211500.40 Copyright 9 1980 by D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.S.A.
212 (2)
BRUCE
R. R E I C H E N B A C H
McEar performs action B,
where B is any action distinct from those actions ranged over by A, can be satisfied by McEar. But then it would seem to follow that McEar is omnipotent, for McEar can bring about some state of affairs which satisfies any proposition meeting conditions C1 and C2. Put another way, McEar can perform the only action he is logically capable of performing. Thus it would seem that Mavrodes' attempt, like others before his, falls on bad times: it is too broad. However, Mavrodes might reply that McEar is not omnipotent because there are some states of affairs that it is logically possible for an agent to bring about which McEar cannot bring about. Consider one of Mavrodes' examples: (3)
Hidden Valley is flooded.
(3) meets C1 [in that some agent would satisfy (3) (e.g. by building (3) meet C2? Since a contingent tions, it follows that (3) entails the (4)
could bring about a state of affairs which a dam at the end of the valley)], but does proposition entails all necessary proposinecessary proposition
McEar does not bring it about that valleys are flooded.
(3) also entails that (5)
Some valley is flooded
is satisfied. There is a logically possible state of affairs which would satisfy (5), but (3) by virtue of entailing (4) excludes McEar from bringing about a state of affairs which would satisfy (5). Therefore (3) fails to meet criterion C2. Hence McEar's inability to bring about a state of affairs that would satisfy (3) does not count against his omnipotence. It would seem that Mavrodes' only alternative would be to deny that it is possible that there be a being like McEar, i.e. a being who possesses each of his limited number of properties necessarily. But first of all, this approach would leave unjustified his claim that his definition of "omnipotence' "'does not entail that some clearly impotent being (such as LaCroix's McEar) is omnipotent "3. Indeed, to the contrary, we have shown that it does entail this. Secondly, it is difficult to see why the case of McEar should be denied as a logical possibility. True, an unfortunate being like McEar is an unlikely in-
MAVRODES
ON OMNIPOTENCE
213
habitant of our world; yet it seems that there is a possible world in which his essence is exemplified. However, even if this be denied - perhaps on the ground that he would have to possess other abilities to be a living being one could conceive of a more fortunate but still limited being which possesses all properties relating to its limited abilities necessarily, or if it had some additional contingent ability-properties, was such as to be able to actualize states of affairs so as to make all logically consistent propositions entailed by those contingent propositions about its contingent ability-properties true. Instances of both will still be able to satisfy Mavrodes' definition of 'omnipotence', and yet seem not to be adequate candidates for the title. Obviously what is bothersome avout assigning omnipotence to McEar and his cohorts is the fact that they possess such limited abilities. That is, we can conceive of beings with far greater abilities. Thus, an omnipotent being must not only be able to (have the power to) consistently implement each of its abilities, but its abilities must be such that a being with none greater can be conceived. It is this latter which enables us to eliminate McEar and any like him as inappropriate candidates for omnipotence. How one is to incorporate this into Mavrodes' definition of 'omnipotence' in terms of an agent bringing about states of affairs which satisfy propositions is another matter, not readily apparent. For one thing, this last feature makes omnipotence a term of comparison. But this creates the difficulty of specifying what it would mean for one being to be more powerful than another in general or overall. Geach, for example, incorporates this into his doctrine of God's almightiness; as almighty "God is not just more powerful than any creature; no creature can complete with God in power, even unsuccessfully ''4 . Unfortunately Geach fails to proceed to clarify how 'powerful' interpreted comparatively is to be understood; indeed, the second clause seems to recind the very comparison suggested by the first, leaving hints of an equivocation on 'more powerful'. In any case, it is clear that, applied to omnipotence, some comparison between the power or abilities of actual or potential beings is called for. This leads to the second difficulty of specifying what it would mean for there to be a being than which none with greater power could be conceived. One way of developing this again is suggested by Geach's statement that God is the "source of all power"S, though it is not obvious how this would be worked out in terms of Mavrodes' definition. These difficulties, however, do not yield LaCroix's conclusion that a
214
B R U C E R. R E I C H E N B A C H
general d e f i n i t i o n o f ' o m n i p o t e n c e ' is i m p o s s i b l e ; t h e y o n l y s h o w t h a t Mavrodes' a t t e m p t to provide a general d e f i n i t i o n o f ' o m n i p o t e n c e ' fails b y b e i n g t o o b r o a d . Were M a v r o d e s ' d e f i n i t i o n restricted to t h e task o f p r o v i d i n g an analysis o f w h a t it m e a n s to say t h a t
God is omnipotent it w o u l d a p p e a r t h a t
his d e f i n i t i o n is a d e q u a t e .
Augsburg College
NOTES 1 George Mavrodes, 'Defining omnipotence', Philosophical Studies 32 (1977), pp. 199-200. 2 Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1967), p. 170; Richard LaCroix, 'The impossibility of defining "omnipotence" ', Philosophical Studies 32 (1977), p. 183. I use 'McEar' as an abbreviation for 'the individual who can only scratch his ear'. 3 Mavrodes, p. 200. 4 p.T. Geach, 'Omnipotence', Philosophy 48 (1973), p. 8. s Ibid. 6 LaCroix, p. 189. 7 This paper was written under a 1978 Summer Seminar Stipend from the National Endowment for the Humanities. Thanks are in order to Alvin Plantinga and Robert Burch for their helpful suggestions.
