Synthese DOI 10.1007/s11229-015-1006-8

Plain truth and the incoherence of alethic functionalism Jay Newhard1

Received: 31 March 2014 / Accepted: 24 December 2015 © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Abstract According to alethic functionalism, truth is a generic alethic property related to lower level alethic properties through the manifestation relation. The manifestation relation is reflexive; thus, a proposition’s truth-manifesting property may be a lower level property or truth itself, depending on the subject matter properties of the proposition. A true proposition whose truth-manifesting property is truth itself, rather than a lower level alethic property, is plainly true. Alethic functionalism relies on plain truth to account for the truth of propositions with challenging subject matter properties, such as logically complex propositions and truth attributions. In this paper, it is argued that plain truth leads to a number of serious problems for alethic functionalism. First: Shapiro (in Analysis 71:38–44, 2011) argues that plain truth threatens alethic functionalism with collapse to strong alethic monism; it is argued here that collapse is not merely threatened, but that, on pain of contradiction, collapse is immediate. Second, alethic functionalism’s commitment to alethic pluralism requires lower level alethic properties to be ways of being truth, where one property’s being a way of being the other property is irreflexive; thus, alethic functionalism is incoherent due to the conflicting commitments to a manifestation relation which is both reflexive and irreflexive. Third, it is argued that a reflexive manifestation relation leads to the contradiction that a lower level alethic property which manifests truth is both identical to and distinct from truth itself. Fourth, careful examination of the notion of a core truism shows that Objectivity and the correspondence intuition are the only core truisms. Finally, it is argued that the first and fourth problems jointly entail a collapse of alethic functionalism to strong correspondence monism.

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Jay Newhard [email protected]; [email protected] Philosophy Department, East Carolina University, Brewster Building, A-327, Mail Stop 562, Greenville, NC 27858, USA

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Keywords Alethic functionalism · Alethic monism · Alethic pluralism · Correspondence intuition · Correspondence monism · Manifestation · Manifestation functionalism · Plain truth · Truth

1 Alethic functionalism and plain truth In recent work, Michael Lynch has proposed an updated version of alethic functionalism, sometimes called “manifestation functionalism,” a sophisticated version of alethic pluralism according to which truth is a functional property manifested by lower level alethic properties (Lynch 2009, 2012, 2013). The functional roles of truth and the lower level alethic properties are specified by core truisms, which are folk beliefs about truth, such as Objectivity, Norm of Belief, and End of Inquiry.1 Objectivity: The belief that p is true if, and only if, with respect to the belief that p, things are as they are believed to be. Norm of Belief: It is prima facie correct to believe that p if and only if the proposition that p is true. End of Inquiry: Other things being equal, true beliefs are a worthy goal of inquiry. If a proposition has an alethic property appropriate for its subject matter, then that property satisfies the core truisms and manifests truth.2 “The property being true (or the property of truth) is the property that has the truish features essentially or which plays the truth role as such” (Lynch 2009, p. 74; Lynch’s italics). It is important to note that Lynch’s use of the terms ‘essentially’ and ‘accidentally’ here is somewhat unorthodox. For a functional property to play a functional role (e.g., the truth role) essentially is for every instance of that property to play that role; for a functional property to play a functional role (e.g., the truth role) accidentally is for some but not every instance of that property to play the truth role. The term ‘essentially’ here means in every instance, and the term ‘accidentally’ means in some but not every instance.3 Alethic functionalism is motivated primarily by what Lynch calls “the scope problem:” “for any sufficiently robustly characterized truth property F, there appears to be some kind of propositions K which lack F but which are intuitively true (or capable of being true).”4 Thus, according to alethic functionalism, truth is one in that truth is a generic alethic property had by all true propositions; and truth is many in that there are numerous lower level alethic properties, had by some but not all true propo1 See Lynch (2009, Chap. 1) for discussion of the truisms. See also Lynch (2012, p. 255) for a slightly

different formulation of the core truisms. 2 For some propositions, the appropriate property is truth itself; such propositions are plainly true. See Lynch (2013, Sect. 5; 2009, pp. 90–91, 97). 3 Thus, for example, Lynch writes: “But such properties [as superwarrant] play the truth-role, if at all, only accidentally. That is, they may have the truish features, but only when they are possessed by atomic propositions of a certain domain” (Lynch 2009, p. 78). 4 Lynch (2009, p. 49). Cf. also Pedersen and Wright (2013a, Sect. 2) and Pedersen (2012, p. 589). Gila

Sher describes this as the problem of finding the “substantive common denominator of all truths.” (Sher 1998, p. 133; Sher’s italics).

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sitions, depending on their subject matter properties. For example, for a proposition about the physical world, such as the tallest tree in the front yard is a spruce, truth is manifested by a representational alethic property such as causal correspondence, while for a proposition about morality, such as torturing human beings is morally wrong, truth is manifested by some other property, perhaps coherence, or a kin property such as concordance, since there is nothing for a moral proposition to represent.5 For some propositions, however, the property which manifests truth is not a lower level alethic property, but truth itself. “When a proposition is true only by virtue of self-manifesting truth, we can say that the relevant proposition is plainly true” (Lynch 2009, p. 90; Lynch’s italics). A true proposition is unplainly true if a lower level alethic property manifests truth for that proposition. Lynch develops plain truth as a possibility for manifesting truth in order to handle certain propositions for which there is no clearly appropriate lower level alethic property to manifest truth, especially propositions with multiple subject matter properties, such as logically complex propositions and truth attributions.6 Employing the nomenclature of Pedersen and Wright (2013a), alethic functionalism as formulated by Lynch endorses moderate alethic pluralism, the thesis that there is more than one truth property, some of which are had by all true propositions. According to alethic functionalism, there are numerous alethic properties (e.g., truth, correspondence, concordance) and one of those, sc. truth, is had by all true propositions. Pedersen and Wright point out that moderate alethic pluralism is compatible with moderate alethic monism, the thesis that there is one truth property, which is had by all true propositions. Alethic functionalism as formulated by Lynch endorses moderate alethic monism, since all true propositions bear truth. This distinguishes alethic functionalism from other forms of alethic pluralism which endorse strong alethic pluralism, the thesis that there is more than one truth property, none of which is had by all true propositions. Moderate alethic monism is also incompatible with strong alethic monism, the thesis that there is exactly one truth property, which is had by all true propositions.7 In this paper, it is argued that plain truth leads to a number of serious problems for alethic functionalism. First: Shapiro (2011) argues that plain truth threatens alethic functionalism with collapse to strong alethic monism; it is argued in Section 2 that collapse is not merely threatened, but that, on pain of contradiction, collapse is immediate.

5 Following recent convention, ‘p’ abbreviates ‘The proposition that p’. The cases as well as the examples for each case are Lynch’s; see Lynch (2009). Lynch argues that true moral propositions have their truth manifested by a non-representational alethic property and proposes that concordance, a coherence-like property, is the truth-manifesting property for moral propositions; see Lynch (2009, Chap. 8). 6 Lynch (2009, pp. 90–91; 2013, Sect. 6). The problems posed to alethic functionalism by mixed com-

pound propositions, i.e., logically complex propositions with multiple subject matter properties, and mixed inferences, i.e., inferences involving propositions with different subject matter properties, have received a fair amount of discussion; see Beall (2000), Connolly (2012), Cotnoir (2009), Edwards (2008, 2009), Lynch (2001, 2004, 2006, 2013), Pedersen (2006), Sher (2004, 2005, 2013), Tappolet (1997, 2000), and Wright (2005). 7 Pedersen and Wright formulate these theses in terms of sentences, rather than propositions. I formulate

these theses in terms of propositions in order to accommodate Lynch, who takes propositions to be the primary bearers of truth; otherwise, I retain the formulations in Pedersen and Wright (2013a).

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Second, alethic functionalism’s commitment to moderate alethic pluralism requires lower level alethic properties to be ways of being truth, where one property’s being a way of being the other property is irreflexive. In Section 3, it is argued that alethic functionalism is incoherent due to the conflicting commitments to a manifestation relation which is both reflexive and irreflexive. Third, it is argued (in Section 4) that a reflexive manifestation relation leads to the contradiction that a lower level alethic property which manifests truth is both identical to and distinct from truth itself. In Section 5, the notion of a core truism is carefully examined, and it is argued that Objectivity and the correspondence intuition are the only core truisms. Finally, it is argued (also in Section 5) that the first and fourth problems jointly entail a collapse of alethic functionalism to strong correspondence monism. The conclusions are summarized in Section 6.

2 Plain truth and an immediate collapse to a functionalist version of strong alethic monism An important objection to plain truth has been raised by Stewart Shapiro, who points out that “Once this move is made available, however, the whole project is in danger of collapsing. Presumably, truth itself satisfies the truth-role for all of discourse—for all propositions whatsoever. After all, the core truisms were chosen, in part, because they are truisms. So why not just say that truth is always self-realized, and leave it at that?” (2011, p. 40; Shapiro’s italics) Shapiro points out that plain truth conflicts with one of the main ideas underwriting alethic functionalism, that truth is manifested by a plurality of other alethic properties, depending on the subject matter properties of the true proposition. This conflict leads to two problems. One problem is that if there are certain propositions for which truth itself is the truth-manifesting property, there seems to be no reason not to have truth be the truth-manifesting property for all propositions, especially since, of course, truth satisfies the truth role for all propositions. But if truth is the truth-manifesting property for all propositions, then the lower level alethic properties are not needed to manifest truth; hence, alethic functionalism is in danger of collapsing to strong alethic monism. This is especially so given the second problem, which is that allowing that there is a single property which manifests truth for all true propositions defies the scope problem, which is the primary motivation for alethic functionalism. The lesson of the scope problem is supposed to be that there is no single sufficiently robust alethic property which can manifest truth for all true propositions, because the subject matter properties among all true propositions vary too greatly. But if truth is allowed to manifest itself, then truth manifests itself for all true propositions regardless of a proposition’s subject matter properties, and there is a single property which manifests truth for all true propositions; therefore, the lesson of the scope problem is flouted, and the motivation for alethic functionalism is undermined.8 Thus, 8 As above (Sect. 1), Lynch presents the scope problem as follows: “for any sufficiently robustly characterized truth property F, there appears to be some kind of propositions K which lack F but which are intuitively true (or capable of being true)” (Lynch 2009, p. 49). It may be pointed out (and I thank an anonymous referee for doing so) that Lynch may reply that the characterization of truth given by alethic functionalism is merely that truth is the property which has the truish features essentially, which is not sufficiently robust to flout

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if certain propositions are allowed to be plainly true, alethic functionalism loses its primary motivation and is in danger of collapsing to strong alethic monism.9 The collapse of alethic functionalism to a version of strong alethic monism is immediate if two conditions are met. One condition is that the manifestation relation be reflexive:10 if the manifestation relation is reflexive, truth bears the manifestation relation to itself; therefore, every instance of truth manifests itself, and there is a single property which manifests every instance of truth. The second condition is that there are no other properties bearing the manifestation relation to truth. Regarding the first condition, Lynch defines the manifestation relation as follows: “M manifests an immanent property F just when it is a priori that F’s conceptually essential features are a subset of M’s features. Again, a conceptually essential feature of F is an essential feature of F that (a) is part of the nominal essence of F; (b) holds as a matter of conceptual necessity; and so, (c) helps to distinguish F from other properties.”11 The Footnote 8 continued the lesson of the scope problem. It is important to keep in mind that the essence of the scope problem is not the robustness of the alethic property or its characterization, but that no (sufficiently robustly characterized) alethic property seems suited to manifest truth for the complete range of true propositions, due to the wide variation in their subject matter properties. According to alethic functionalism, truth is manifested by a plurality of lower level alethic properties; and the lesson of the scope problem is that there is no single property bearing the manifestation relation to truth for all true propositions. Thus, if truth manifests truth for every true proposition, there is a single alethic property bearing the manifestation relation to truth for all true propositions, which flouts the lesson of the scope problem. 9

Shapiro also writes that “This would be to give up on functionalism” (Shapiro 2011, p. 40). As I understand it, this would not require giving up on functionalism about truth, though it would require giving up on pluralism about truth, as Shapiro points out.

10 A reflexive relation is a relation, R, on a set, S, such that every element, x, of S bears R to itself (Cf. Gamut 1991, p. 110). It is still possible for elements in the set to bear R to other objects. For example, the relation of being less than or equal to (≤) is a reflexive relation on the set of real numbers (as well as any set of numbers). The having-the-same-height-as relation is reflexive on the set of objects, H, which are exactly 200 cm tall. Each element of H is such that it bears R to itself and to the other elements of H. (The having-the-same-height-as relation is also symmetric.) Plain truth requires that manifestation be a reflexive relation so that both truth and lower level alethic properties may manifest truth. It may be wondered whether alethic functionalism could instead include a manifestation relation for which truth manifests itself but which is such that not all other properties self-manifest. That is, it might be wondered whether alethic functionalism might adopt a non-reflexive manifestation relation. Note that since a reflexive relation is a relation, R, on a set, S, such that every element of S bears R to itself, and an irreflexive relation is a relation such that no element of S bears R to itself, reflexive and irreflexive relations are not jointly exhaustive. For example, the relation of liking is a non-reflexive relation on the set of people. The manifestation relation is a formalization of the is-a-way-of-being relation, and is the basis for maintaining that lower level properties which manifest truth are genuine alethic properties. As formulated by Lynch, the manifestation relation justifies the claim that properties manifesting truth are alethic properties, since the manifesting properties have the conceptually essential features of the immanent property. Although it may be technically feasible for alethic functionalism to include a non-reflexive manifestation relation, such a relation would very likely not justify the claim that properties manifesting truth are alethic properties. I thank an anonymous referee for calling this option to my attention. 11 Lynch (2013, p. 31). This is a clarification of the definition in Lynch (2009), where the manifestation

relation is introduced as follows: “Let us say that where property F is immanent in or manifested by property M, it is a priori that F’s essential features are a subset of M’s features” (Lynch 2009, p. 74; Lynch’s italics). Also, it should be pointed out that ‘just when’ may be read as ‘only if’, rather than ‘if and only if’, in which case the quoted sentence gives a necessary condition for manifestation, rather than a definition. In fact, since a lower level alethic property is supposed to manifest truth only for propositions having an appropriate subject matter property, there is a good reason to read the quoted sentence as giving only a

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conceptually essential features of a property, F, are the essential features of F which also belong to the concept of F; hence, all conceptually essential features of F are essential features of F. The conceptually essential features of truth are described by the core truisms (Cf. Lynch 2013, pp. 25, 31). It follows from the definition of the manifestation relation that every property having conceptually essential features is a property which manifests itself, since for every property, it is a priori that its conceptually essential features are among its features. Thus, the manifestation relation is reflexive for the set of properties having conceptually essential features.12 Lynch acknowledges this explicitly: “According to the theory that truth is an immanent functional property, a property M manifests truth just when it is a priori that the truish features are a subset of the features and relations of M. Manifestation, so described, is a reflexive relation, since every set is a subset of itself. Thus, all properties, including truth, self-manifest” (Lynch 2009, p. 90). Thus, the manifestation relation is reflexive, and the first condition for a collapse of alethic functionalism to a version of strong alethic monism is met. As above, the second condition is that there are no other properties bearing the manifestation relation to truth. It may seem harmless for alethic functionalism to maintain that there are lower level alethic properties which manifest truth for some but not all propositions in addition to truth manifesting itself for all propositions, but, in fact, it is quite problematic. Note that, according to the definition of the manifestation relation, whether a property, M, manifests F depends only on whether it is a priori that F’s conceptually essential features are a subset of M’s features, and not on any other property of the object having M. In particular, whether a property manifests truth does not depend on the subject matter properties of the proposition which has it. Suppose that there are propositions which have one or more lower level alethic properties bearing the manifestation relation to truth. Since manifestation does not depend on the subject matter properties of the proposition, every instance of a lower level alethic property manifests truth. Therefore, every lower level alethic property has the truish features essentially, and, according to the definition of truth given by alethic functionalism, is identical to truth. Yet each lower level alethic property is also distinct from truth by Leibniz’s Law, provided that there are propositions which have truth but not the lower level alethic property. In order to avoid this contradiction, alethic functionalism must maintain that lower level alethic properties do not manifest truth.13 If so, then the second condition is met. Therefore, on pain of conFootnote 11 continued necessary condition of manifestation. The definition of the manifestation relation including these two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions is discussed and argued to be problematic below, in Sect. 4. 12 Strictly speaking, the definition of ‘manifestation’ is ambiguous; that is, it may also be read such that

if F has no conceptually essential features, it follows trivially that every property manifests F. Given that the manifestation relation is the relation through which truth is one and many, it seems to suit alethic functionalism better that manifestation requires that the immanent property have conceptually essential features. Because truth has conceptually essential features, and also because manifestation is reflexive on either reading, this ambiguity does not affect this discussion. 13 One alternative is to redefine the manifestation relation as follows: M manifests an immanent property F just when (i) it is a priori that F’s conceptually essential features are a subset of M’s features; and (ii) the subject matter properties (including logical complexity) of the proposition which has M are the appropriate

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tradiction, alethic functionalism collapses immediately to a version of strong alethic monism. These results suggest a response which is in fact quite promising: embrace the collapse. Specifically, if truth is the property which “has the truish features essentially” (Lynch 2009, p. 74) and therefore fulfills the functional roles of truth for all true propositions, and each instance of truth manifests itself, then truth defies the scope problem, and there is no need for lower level alethic properties. There is also no need for a manifestation relation. Consequently, alethic functionalism could become a version of strong alethic monism according to which truth is a functional property, truth is the only alethic property, truth is not manifested by other properties, and truth “has the truish features essentially”14 (Lynch 2009, p. 74). There are no immediate objections to this response to the collapse, other than the potential objection of abandoning the scope problem as motivation. But if alethic functionalism successfully accounts for how propositions having different subject matter properties and logical complexity can share the same property, truth, it would have solved the scope problem. It need not rely on the scope problem for motivation if it otherwise proves to be a viable theory of truth. For the sake of completeness, there are two other potential responses to the collapse of alethic functionalism to a functionalist version of strong alethic monism which should be discussed.15 One other potential response is to redefine the manifestation relation as an irreflexive relation, and abandon plain truth. For example, the manifestation relation might be defined as follows: M manifests an immanent property F just when it is a priori that F’s conceptually essential features are a proper subset of M’s features. However, without the resource of plain truth, alethic functionalism appears simply to be unable to account for the truth of several challenging cases, such as logically complex propositions and truth attributions. A second potential response is to replace the manifestation relation with some other relation holding between truth and lower level properties. For example, Douglas Edwards (2011, 2013) proposes a view he calls “simple determination pluralism” according to which lower level properties determine truth for propositions in a given domain of discourse. Taking seriously Dummett’s (1959) famous analogy between truth and winning, Edwards suggests that, much as “for each game, there will be a winning-determining property, the possession of which by a player will determine possession of the general winning property” (Edwards 2013, p. 114; Edwards’ italics),

Footnote 13 continued subject matter properties for M. However, this redefinition of the manifestation relation is problematic for several reasons, discussed below, in Sect. 4. 14 The resulting theory is similar in some respects to Lynch’s earlier functionalist theories of truth, e.g., Lynch 2001, but there are some significant differences. For instance, Lynch’s earlier view is a version of identity functionalism, while the resulting theory is a version of specifier functionalism; cf. David (2011, p. 746; 2013, pp. 43, 61). 15 Another option is to redefine the manifestation relation as follows: M manifests an immanent property

F just when (i) it is a priori that F’s conceptually essential features are a subset of M’s features; and (ii) the subject matter properties (including logical complexity) of the proposition which has M are the appropriate subject matter properties for M. This redefinition of the manifestation relation is problematic for several reasons, discussed below, in Sect. 4.

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for each domain of discourse, there is a lower level property, the possession of which by a proposition determines truth. The domain-specific properties are related to truth through biconditionals of the form: In domain of discourse x, p is true (has the property truth) iff p has property F. For example: In material world discourse, p is true iff p corresponds to the facts. Although the lower level properties determine truth, “they are not identical to the truth property itself, nor do they manifest the truth property” (Edwards 2011, p. 45). Edwards sees this as an advantage of simple determination pluralism, since “it requires no complex metaphysics” (Edwards 2013, p. 121). By contrast, “For manifestation functionalism to succeed, it is crucial that the complex metaphysics of manifestation works” (Edwards 2013, p. 121). However, there are two serious problems with such a response. First, like the previous response, this response lacks the resources to account for the truth of several challenging cases posed by propositions belonging to multiple domains of discourse, such as logically complex propositions and truth attributions.16 Second, strictly speaking, and in spite of its name, simple determination pluralism is committed to strong alethic monism. According to simple determination pluralism, “the truth property is just the property that necessarily has the truth features”17 (Edwards 2011, p. 41). That is, according to Edwards, truth satisfies unrestricted platitudes about the functions of truth. By contrast, the lower level properties satisfy versions of the platitudes which are restricted to 16 In other work on the problem of mixed compound propositions, Edwards proposes as an independent

solution that logically complex propositions are subsumed by the domain of discourse which has logic as its subject matter property, and that the logical domain has its own lower level truth-determining property: “When we talk about the relationship between a compound and its components, it is plausible to think that we are operating within the domain of logical discourse: it is the appropriate logical rules which dictate the correct relationships. Thinking along alethic pluralist lines, the truth property here will be whatever property it is that is identified with truth in the logical domain. It is this property that a conjunction has when both of its conjuncts are true, and that a disjunction has when one or more of its disjuncts are true” (Edwards 2009, p. 686). As above, the domain-specific properties, F, are related to truth through biconditionals of the form: In domain of discourse x, p is true (has the property truth) iff p has property F. Here, simple determination pluralism faces a dilemma as to whether there is an explanation as to why a truth-determining property determines truth for propositions in a given domain. If there is no explanation at all as to why a truth-determining property determines truth for propositions in a given domain, then the assignment of a truth-determining property is arbitrary, and the theory is unsatisfactory. In this respect, truth seems to be disanalogous to winning, if what constitutes winning may be stipulated arbitrarily. On the other hand, suppose that there is an explanation as to why a certain truth-determining property determines truth for propositions in a given domain, and that domains of discourse are distinguished according to subject matter properties, as Edwards holds. This option is not unfriendly to simple determination pluralism. For example, Edwards writes, “if a domain is deemed to deal in genuinely representational content, it is likely that a property like correspondence will be the truth-determining property for that domain” (Edwards 2013, p. 117). However, this strategy raises the very same problems which plain truth raises for Lynch. Since the component propositions of a logically complex proposition may have any subject matter property and may themselves be logically complex, stipulating that there is a lower level property which determines truth for propositions in the logical domain identifies a lower level property which determines truth for propositions of every subject matter property and logical form, and therefore poses the same threat of collapse to strong alethic monism which alethic functionalism faces by adopting plain truth. That is, since that property determines truth for the logical domain, and the logical domain contains logically complex propositions whose component propositions belong to every domain of discourse, the truth-determining property for the logical domain is an excellent candidate for determining truth in all domains of discourse, which threatens a collapse to strong alethic monism. 17 In a later paper on simple determination pluralism, Edwards writes, “Truth is given as the property that is exhaustively described by the truth platitudes” (Edwards 2013, p. 118).

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a domain of discourse and do not satisfy the unrestricted platitudes. Consequently, “these properties should not be identified as truth properties, as they satisfy only the restricted platitudes, not the unrestricted platitudes” (Edwards 2011, p. 45; Edwards’ italics). Although the lower level properties explain why a proposition has truth, they are not alethic properties, strictly speaking. Put another way, simple determination pluralism cannot account for how the lower level properties are alethic properties, and not merely non-alethic properties which determine truth.18 For both of these reasons, this response is unsuccessful.19 The objection raised in this section is that problems arise from plain truth, since plain truth requires a reflexive manifestation relation, from which it follows that every instance of truth manifests itself. On pain of contradiction, alethic functionalism cannot allow that other properties manifest truth. Consequently, alethic functionalism collapses immediately to a version of strong alethic monism. Although there are a couple of options for alethic functionalism to avoid a reflexive manifestation relation and a collapse to strong alethic monism, the two options examined here are problematic. While there may be other options available, the structure of the problem suggests that they will not succeed. Specifically, the challenging cases of logically complex propositions and truth attributions are cases where the component propositions or their constituents have subject matter properties which may vary among all subject matter properties. Thus, a promising strategy for handling these cases with a single alethic property will both undermine the scope problem and precipitate a collapse to strong alethic monism.20 In order to avoid this collapse, the strategy must not succeed. On the other hand, the result of alethic functionalism’s collapse to a functionalist version of strong alethic monism, i.e., the variety of alethic functionalism according to which there is exactly one functional truth property had by all true propositions, does not face any obvious objections, especially insofar as it solves the scope problem.

18 Following the passage quoted just above, Edwards writes, “While, according to simple determination

pluralism, these properties are essential in the story about why a proposition is true, they are not identical to the truth property itself, nor do they manifest the truth property” (Edwards 2011, p. 45). Here Edwards seems to recognize this point; yet he also presents simple determination pluralism as a version of alethic pluralism. This is an equivocation on ‘alethic’. For Lynch, the manifestation relation is designed to justify the claim that truth is both one and many, i.e., that the lower level properties are alethic properties, since the truth-manifesting properties have the conceptually essential features of the immanent property, truth. However, it is not sufficient to support this claim that there be some relation holding between truth and the lower level properties. If the relation holding between truth and the lower level properties is merely a resemblance or similarity relation, then the lower level properties are not alethic properties in this same sense of ‘alethic’. On simple determination pluralism, a lower level property determines truth for propositions in a suitable domain of discourse, but the lower level properties are not themselves alethic properties. It may be suggested that the lower level properties are alethic properties, since they satisfy restricted versions of the unrestricted platitudes satisfied by truth for their domains of discourse (Cf. Pedersen and Wright 2013b, p. 92). However, this yields only resemblance or similarity relations. 19 I thank an anonymous referee for pressing me to discuss this option. 20 Two additional strategies are available, but very unpromising. One is to allow that there are as many

lower level alethic properties as there are combinations of subject matter properties. See Lynch (2013, Sect. 6), Cotnoir (2013), and Shapiro (2011) for discussion. Another is to assign truth-manifesting properties based upon some property of a proposition other than subject matter properties.

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3 Plain truth and the incoherence of alethic functionalism The collapse to strong alethic monism points to a deeper problem with plain truth. There is a tension in alethic functionalism’s commitments to a manifestation relation which is both reflexive and irreflexive. The commitment to a reflexive manifestation relation derives from alethic functionalism’s commitment to plain truth, which is necessary to handle propositions for which there is no clearly appropriate lower level alethic property to manifest truth, and which requires a reflexive manifestation relation. The commitment to an irreflexive manifestation relation derives from alethic functionalism’s pluralistic, anti-traditional move of “rejecting an assumption that gets the puzzle going: namely, that if a belief or its content is true, it must be true in the same way—for example, by corresponding to reality” (Lynch 2009, pp. 2–3). That is, one of the basic ideas underwriting alethic functionalism is that truth is both one and many, where each of the many lower level alethic properties is a way of being truth, and the lower level alethic properties manifest truth for propositions with appropriate subject matter properties.21 The manifestation relation introduced by Lynch is a technical relation modeled on the determinable-determinate relation as analyzed by Funkhouser (2006) (Cf. Lynch 2009, p. 75, fn 4). A standard example of a determinable property is redness, whose determinate properties are more specific colors such as scarlet and crimson. On Funkhouser’s analysis, a determinate property is a specific way of being a determinable property (e.g., scarlet is a way of being red) because the property space of the determinate property is a strictly smaller region of the property space of the determinable property. For example, suppose colors differ from one another in hue, brightness, and saturation. Then there are three dimensions of a color’s property space: hue, brightness, and saturation. The region of this three-dimensional space over which a color is red is the property space of redness. A determinate of a determinable property is modeled by a strictly smaller region of property space wholly contained by the determinable property’s property space, where at least one dimension of that region is less than the full dimension of the determinable property’s property space.22 Other determinates of that determinable are modeled by other, nonoverlapping regions wholly contained by the determinable property’s property space. A determinable property may have any finite number of determinates. Thus, the isa-way-of-being relation holding between a determinate property and a determinable property is an irreflexive relation, such that a determinable property is not a way of being itself.23 21 As above, Lynch claims that a lower level alethic property manifests truth only for propositions having appropriate subject matter properties, though this condition is not included in the definition of the manifestation relation. A redefined manifestation relation is discussed below, in Sect. 4, according to which M manifests an immanent property F just when (i) it is a priori that F’s conceptually essential features are a subset of M’s features; and (ii) the subject matter properties (including logical complexity) of the proposition which has M are the appropriate subject matter properties for M. 22 Generally, a property space may have any integral number of dimensions, n, and a determinate may occupy k dimensions, 1 ≤ k ≤ n. 23 In fact, the irreflexivity of the determinable-determinate relation is one of the goals of Funkhouser’s

analysis, and is a stated criterion of its success; cf. Funkhouser (2006, p. 549). There is a broader sense of

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As above, the lower level alethic properties are ways of being truth, and while truth is had by all true propositions, lower level alethic properties are had by some but not all true propositions, depending on their subject matter properties. Since the manifestation relation is the relation holding between truth and ways of being truth, and alethic functionalism maintains that there is no way of being truth had by all true propositions, alethic functionalism is committed to the manifestation relation being an irreflexive relation; otherwise, it is not the pertinent relation holding between truth and a way of being truth. Recall that “M manifests an immanent property F just when it is a priori that F’s conceptually essential features are a subset of M’s features” (Lynch 2013, p. 31). That is, the manifesting property, M, may have any number of features, but whatever features M has, those features must include F’s conceptually essential features. What distinguishes a lower level manifesting property from an immanent property is that whereas F has its conceptually essential features essentially, M has F’s conceptually essential features accidentally. As above (Section 1, paragraph 1), the term ‘essentially’ here means in every instance, and the term ‘accidentally’ means in some but not every instance. This difference is the primary basis for the ontological distinction between truth and a lower level alethic property. If this difference is also used to characterize what it is for a property to be a way of being another property, then it provides another commitment to an irreflexive manifestation relation, since the manifestation relation obtains between a property which has the immanent property’s features essentially and a property which has the immanent property’s features accidentally, which is an irreflexive relation. Insofar as alethic functionalism is committed to a reflexive manifestation relation in order to accommodate plainly true propositions, and is also committed to an irreflexive manifestation relation so that manifesting properties are ways of being an immanent property, alethic functionalism is incoherent.

4 Plain truth and contradiction A reflexive manifestation relation introduces a third problem as well. As argued in Section 2, manifestation does not depend at all on the subject matter properties of the proposition having the manifesting property. Careful reflection on the scope problem shows that it is intuitively plausible that manifestation does not depend on the subject matter properties of the proposition having the manifesting property. Although Lynch argues that the scope problem shows that a lower level alethic property manifests truth only for propositions having appropriate subject matter properties, the requirement that a lower level alethic property be had by a proposition with appropriate subject matter properties is counterintuitive. After all, if a proposition, P, really does have a lower level alethic property, M, and M satisfies the core truisms, then M has the truish features, plays the functional roles of truth, and therefore manifests truth. What is Footnote 23 continued ‘way’ in which an object or property or any thing is a way of being itself. The sense of ‘way’ employed here is narrower, such that the is-a-way-of-being relation is irreflexive.

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suggested by the scope problem is that a proposition, P, could not have M unless P has certain subject matter properties. Incorporating this suggestion of the scope problem means eliminating the requirement that a proposition with a lower level alethic property also have an appropriate subject matter property in order for the lower level alethic property to manifest truth. Further, careful reflection on the manifestation relation confirms that, on technical grounds, manifestation does not depend on the subject matter properties of the proposition having the manifesting property. Again, “M manifests an immanent property F just when it is a priori that F’s conceptually essential features are a subset of M’s features” (Lynch 2013, p. 31). However, what the conceptually essential features of a property are is not an a priori matter, since a conceptually essential feature of F is an essential feature of F which “is part of the nominal essence of F” (Lynch 2013, p. 31); “[t]he nominal essence of something, in the sense I intend here, is the set of largely tacit beliefs we folk have about it”24 ; and determining the folk concept of F is not an a priori matter. What is an a priori matter is whether the elements of one set of features belongs to another set of features.25 That is, specifying M’s features is not an a priori matter if M has a nominal essence; similarly, specifying F’s conceptually essential features is not an a priori matter. Assessing whether the set of the latter is a subset of the former presumably is an a priori matter. This is how the definition that “M manifests an immanent property F just when it is a priori that F’s conceptually essential features are a subset of M’s features” (Lynch 2013, p. 31) is to be understood. Note that this assessment does not depend on the subject matter properties of the proposition having M. As above, every instance of truth manifests itself. Also, as above, what it is for a property to have the truish features essentially is for every instance of that property to have those features, and what it is for a property to have the truish features accidentally is for some but not every instance of that property to have those features. It is on this basis that Lynch distinguishes truth, “the property that has the truish features essentially” (Lynch 2009, p. 74), from the lower level alethic properties, which have the truish features accidentally. If manifestation does not depend on subject matter properties, then every instance of a lower level alethic property manifests truth. Consequently, it is both identical to truth according to alethic functionalism’s definition of truth as “the property that has the truish features essentially”26 and distinct from truth by Leibniz’s Law, since, as shown by the scope problem according to alethic functionalism, there are propositions which have truth, but not the lower level alethic property. According to alethic functionalism, then, truth really is both one and many! One measure for avoiding this contradiction is to redefine manifestation as follows: M manifests an immanent property F just when (i) it is a priori that F’s conceptually essential features are a subset of M’s features; and (ii) the subject matter properties (including logical complexity) of the proposition which has M are the appropriate

24 Lynch (2013, p. 23). See also Lynch (2009, p. 7). 25 For some related discussion, see Wright (2013, pp. 141–145). 26 Lynch (2009, p. 74). Cf. also Lynch (2013, p. 31).

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subject matter properties for M. Adopting the second condition in addition to the first would block the contradiction, since, together with other principles specifying truth-manifesting properties for subject matter properties, it restricts manifestation to properties appropriately matched to propositions having certain subject matter properties. For instance, truth would manifest itself only for plainly true propositions, and not for unplainly true propositions. However, this redefinition of the manifestation relation is problematic, for several reasons. First, it is a problematic result for some instances of truth to manifest truth while others do not. Although the manifestation relation is a technical relation, it is the relation alethic functionalism employs to formalize the is-a-way-of-being relation. While it is coherent for one property to manifest a distinct property conditionally, e.g., a lower level alethic property manifests truth depending on the subject matter properties of the proposition having it, it is not coherent for one property to manifest itself contingently, given that self-manifestation is possible. Also, there are two other, closely related problems with this redefinition of the manifestation relation, which have been argued for earlier. First, although the second condition is supposed to have been recommended by the scope problem, it was shown above that it is not. Second, although manifestation is a technical notion, and an alethic functionalist is free to tailor it to meet the needs of the theory, it seems that whether M manifests F, or whether F is immanent in M, does not depend on the subject matter properties of the proposition having M. In other words, assuming that M’s having the conceptually essential features of F is sufficient for M’s being a way of being F, then M’s being a way of being F seems not to depend on the subject matter properties of the proposition bearing M. Thus, if alethic functionalism maintains that some propositions are plainly true, it issues in contradiction. Alethic functionalism may avoid contradiction by redefining the manifestation relation so that M manifests an immanent property F just when (i) it is a priori that F’s conceptually essential features are a subset of M’s features; and (ii) the subject matter properties (including logical complexity) of the proposition which has M are the appropriate subject matter properties for M; however, this measure renders the manifestation relation incoherent, conflicts with the real lesson of the scope problem, and is counterintuitive. In summary of the results so far, plain truth gives rise to three related problems. First, incorporating a reflexive manifestation relation leads alethic functionalism to collapse to a functionalist version of strong alethic monism. Second, insofar as alethic functionalism is committed to a manifestation relation which is reflexive as well as irreflexive, alethic functionalism is incoherent. Third, a reflexive manifestation relation leads to contradiction, sc., that lower level alethic properties both are and are not identical to truth. To avoid these problems, alethic functionalism must either adopt an irreflexive manifestation relation or redefine the manifestation relation so that M manifests an immanent property F just when (i) it is a priori that F’s conceptually essential features are a subset of M’s features; and (ii) the subject matter properties (including logical complexity) of the proposition which has M are the appropriate subject matter properties for M. However, alethic functionalism faces other serious problems on either option. If the manifestation relation is irreflexive, there is no self-manifestation, and there is no resource of

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plain truth for alethic functionalism to handle logically complex propositions and truth attributions. There are several problems which result from the redefined manifestation relation. Specifically, on this redefinition, the manifestation relation is incoherent, conflicts with the real lesson of the scope problem, and is counterintuitive.

5 The collapse of the core truisms to Objectivity and the correspondence intuition, and of alethic functionalism to strong correspondence monism Another problem with alethic functionalism due to plain truth is evident in the account of the truth of true truth attributions provided by alethic functionalism. For example, consider the propositions expressed by (1) and (2): (1) The proposition that grass is green is true. (2) Grass is green. Lynch explains how alethic functionalism handles cases of truth attributions as follows: “Truth attributions are plainly true. This seems particularly sensible in the case of a proposition like (1). For it is intuitive that (1) is true because (2) is true. While (1) and (2) are both atomic, (1) is clearly true because of (2), and (2)’s truth will be manifested by correspondence. The plain truth of (1) is founded on the unplain truth of (2)” (2013, pp. 35–36; Lynch’s italics). That is, according to Lynch, the proposition expressed by (1) is plainly true; and, the proposition expressed by (1) is true because the proposition expressed by (2) is true; and, in turn, the proposition expressed by (2) is true because grass is green.27 Although this account given by Lynch is plausible, it is not clear that alethic functionalism has the resources to provide it. According to alethic functionalism, the explanation as to why an atomic proposition is true is that the appropriate truthmanifesting property for that proposition satisfies the core truisms. For example, the proposition expressed by (2) is true because correspondence plays the truth role for the proposition expressed by (2) by satisfying the core truisms, and correspondence is the appropriate property to satisfy the core truisms for the proposition expressed by (2), given its subject matter properties. Similarly, the proposition expressed by (1) is true because truth plays the truth role for the proposition expressed by (1) by satisfying the core truisms, and truth is the appropriate property to satisfy the core truisms for the proposition expressed by (1), given its subject matter properties. Thus, the explanation as to why a truth attribution is true makes no direct appeal to any other proposition, and so there is no direct explanation provided by alethic functionalism that the proposition expressed by (1) is true because the proposition expressed by (2) is true, or

27 As a quick aside, it should be pointed out that if Lynch’s argument is that truth is the appropriate truth-manifesting property for a truth attribution because a truth attribution is a predication of truth, his reasoning contains a non sequitur.

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that a truth attribution is true because the proposition to which truth is attributed is true.28 Still, an indirect explanation that the proposition expressed by (1) is true because the proposition expressed by (2) is true is available to alethic functionalism by appealing to the correspondence intuition, perhaps via the Objectivity truism. Lynch writes that “what is truly platitudinous about the correspondence intuition is captured by Objectivity, or the thought that The belief that p is true if and only if, with respect to the belief that p, things are as they are believed to be.” (2009, p. 110) Lynch formulates the correspondence intuition as “the thought that beliefs are true because of the way the world is.” (2009, p. 110) While ‘if and only if’ in Objectivity is presumably a material biconditional, the correspondence intuition is explanatory; thus, strictly speaking, it is false that Objectivity captures the correspondence intuition.29 For the sake of alethic functionalism’s providing this explanation, the correspondence intuition may be formulated as CI and added to the core truisms.30 CI

S is true because S

Consequently, alethic functionalism may offer the explanation that “The plain truth of (1) is founded on the unplain truth of (2)” (Lynch 2013, p. 36) insofar as the proposition expressed by (1) has a property (sc., truth) which satisfies the core truisms; and, since CI is one of the core truisms, the proposition expressed by (1) is true because the proposition that grass is green is true, which is to say that the proposition expressed by (1) is true because the proposition expressed by (2) is true. This explanation appeals to the truth of the proposition expressed by (2) indirectly, through an appeal to CI; 28 Note that Lynch’s weak grounding principle (Lynch 2009, p. 90; 2013, p. 34) applies only to compound

propositions, and so does not explain the truth of true truth attributions, which are atomic propositions. Note also that it is not feasible to adopt what Lynch calls “the inheritance view” according to which “Truth attributions are true in the same way as the proposition to which truth is ascribed” (Lynch 2013, p. 35). Lynch gives two reasons there why not. In my estimation, the more important reason is that “the inheritance view is hopeless in the [sic] generalizations like (3) Everything Stewart says is true.” (Lynch 2013, p. 35) since Stewart may express propositions having many different subject matter properties. 29 I also presume that a material biconditional cannot be explanatory, since a material biconditional is

symmetric, while explanation is asymmetric. Even if there are exceptions to this presumption, Objectivity seems not to be one of them. 30 Since the truisms are supposed to be folk beliefs, which need only be tacit beliefs or rational commitments, Lynch’s formulation of the correspondence intuition, quoted above, may better capture a folk belief; but for the sake of providing an explanation as to why true truth attributions are true, CI better serves the purposes of alethic functionalism. Also, note that CI is a schema; it should be instantiated only for sentences expressing a proposition which is true with respect to the context of utterance. If it is important that the truisms be propositions, CI should be replaced with CI*,

CI∗

∀S [If Sis true, S is true because S.]

where ‘S’ is a substitutional variable.

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but since CI is a core truism, it seems that alethic functionalism is able to provide the intuitive explanation that the proposition expressed by (1) is true because the proposition expressed by (2) is true. Yet something is amiss. That CI plays a role in explaining the truth of the proposition expressed by (1) seems fairly innocent for a truth attribution to a proposition for which correspondence is the appropriate truth-manifesting property, such as the proposition expressed by (2). But consider the propositions expressed by (3) and (4). (3) The proposition that torturing human beings is morally wrong is true. (4) Torturing human beings is morally wrong. Lynch (2009) argues that true propositions about morality have a property other than correspondence which manifests truth, since there is nothing for a moral proposition to represent.31 Suppose that the proposition expressed by (4) is true, and that its truthmanifesting property is concordance, as Lynch proposes. The explanation provided by alethic functionalism as to why the proposition expressed by (3) is true is as follows: since the proposition expressed by (3) is a truth attribution, it is plainly true; thus, truth manifests itself for the proposition expressed by (3) and satisfies the core truisms, including CI; hence, from the relevant instance of CI, the proposition expressed by (3) is true because the proposition that torturing human beings is morally wrong is true, which is to say that the proposition expressed by (3) is true because the proposition expressed by (4) is true. Note that what allows alethic functionalism to provide the explanation that the truth attribution, the proposition expressed by (3), is true because the proposition expressed by (4) is true is the appeal to CI. While the explanation appeals to the noncorrespondence property, concordance, manifesting truth for the proposition expressed by (4), the appeal to concordance is superfluous to the explanation that the proposition expressed by (3) is true because the proposition expressed by (4) is true. An adequate explanation of the truth of the proposition expressed by (3) need only appeal to the relevant instance of CI. In fact, since the correspondence intuition explains the truth of the proposition expressed by (3), then the correspondence intuition explains the truth of any proposition, regardless of its subject matter properties, including moral propositions such as the proposition expressed by (4). The truisms are folk beliefs about truth which describe its functional roles. Folk beliefs may not exhaust all of the facts about truth, and some folk beliefs may be false, but the folk beliefs about truth constitute its nominal essence: “The nominal essence of something, in the sense I intend here, is the set of largely tacit beliefs we folk have about it. By appealing to those folk beliefs, or truisms, we won’t learn everything about the object or property in which we are interested. And our later discoveries may force us to revise our preconceptions of it. But however these questions play out, keeping one eye on our folk beliefs about the thing about which we are curious will hopefully tell us whether our subsequent theories of its nature address the topic we were concerned 31 Lynch argues that true moral propositions have their truth manifested by a non-representational alethic property and proposes that concordance, a coherence-like property, is the truth-manifesting property for moral propositions; see Lynch (2009, Chap. 8).

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with when our theorizing began” (Lynch 2013, p. 23; Lynch’s italics). Yet the most important work done by the truisms for alethic functionalism is done not by all of the truisms but by the core truisms. Truth is defined as the property which has the truish features essentially, and the truish features are described by the core truisms.32 Also, M manifests truth when M fills the functional roles of truth described by the core truisms. This raises the question as to which truisms are core truisms and which are regular truisms.33 According to Lynch, these matters are details of the theory to be worked out, and are open to debate.34 Lynch gives some characterization of the core truisms as guidance, in two passages. One is this: “Core truisms about truth cannot be denied without significant theoretical consequence and loss of plausibility. If you do deny any one of them, you must be prepared to explain how this can be so in the face of intuitive opposition. And denying many or all would mean that, at the very least, other users of the concept would be justified in taking you to be changing the subject” (Lynch 2013, pp. 24–25, Lynch’s italics; cf. also Lynch 2009, p. 13). Unfortunately, this characterization is not very helpful in distinguishing core truisms from regular truisms. To point out that denying many or all core truisms would justify others in taking the denier to be changing the subject is to make a point about truisms generally.35 And to point out that a core truism cannot be denied without significant theoretical consequence or loss of plausibility says only that they are more significant than the other truisms, but not anything about what makes a truism more significant than another. The other passage is more helpful: “This means treating the truish features as features of truth’s nominal essence that are conceptually essential—essential by way of the very concept of truth” (Lynch 2013, p. 26). Since the truish features just are the features described by the core truisms, the core truisms are those truisms which describe the conceptually essential features of truth.36 As above, the conceptually essential features of a property, F, are the essential features of F which also belong to the concept of F. Lynch takes Objectivity, Norm of Belief, and End of Inquiry to be 32 Lynch writes, “Such a property will have the features described by the core truisms. Features of this sort could obviously be called core features. But in the present case we might as well call them the ‘truish features”’ (Lynch 2013, p. 25). 33 This may also raise the question as to why there is a special group of truisms: why aren’t all of the truisms involved in the definition of truth and the manifestation relation? Very briefly, there is the risk that truisms may vary among people or over time, in which case there is no single concept or property of truth. Appeal to a set of truisms which do not vary, i.e., the core truisms, avoids this problem. See Wright (2005, especially Sect. 4.3) and Lynch (2005) for an exchange on this and a few other pertinent issues. 34 Lynch writes that “It is worth emphasizing that one can grant that there are core truisms about truth

and still hold that there can be some debate amongst philosophers about which principles those are. The fact that the folk have a—largely implicit—conception of some property does not imply that there will be universal agreement amongst theoreticians as to how best to characterize or capture that conception. Thus in order to accept the general picture, whether a principle counts as a core truism needn’t be settled (nor, given the amount of folk beliefs we have about truth, can we reasonably expect it to be always settled)” (Lynch 2009, p. 16; Lynch’s italics). 35 See Lynch (2005, Sect. 3) for some related discussion. 36 Note that this understanding of the core truisms captures Lynch’s remark that to deny many or all of the

core truisms would justify others in taking the denier to be changing the subject. In fact, if the core truisms describe conceptually essential features of truth, denying any one of them would justify others in taking the denier to be changing the subject.

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three prime candidates for core truisms. He argues as follows: “with Norm of Belief: someone who says that it is not even prima facie right to believe what is true is using “truth” (and probably “belief”) to talk about something other than what the rest of us use those words to talk about. The same holds, plausibly, for End of Inquiry” (Lynch 2009, p. 14). However, the relevant test for a truism being conceptually essential is not based on denial, but on the lack of belief: would someone who did not believe Norm of Belief have the concept of truth? Although such a person might not understand the connection between truth and belief, it seems that she might nevertheless have the concept of truth. The same holds, plausibly, for End of Inquiry. It may be that both Norm of Belief and End of Inquiry are essential to truth, but neither is conceptually essential.37 On the other hand, it seems that a person who did not believe Objectivity would lack the concept of truth. If so, then Objectivity is conceptually essential to truth. Lynch himself writes that Objectivity is “arguably the most central truism” (Lynch 2009, p. 13). As above, Lynch writes that Objectivity captures the correspondence intuition. I have argued that it does not. Nevertheless, CI is a core truism as well because it explains why true propositions bear truth. Surely the most central truisms are the truisms which explain why the things having the functional property have it. As argued above, that is CI. Both CI and Objectivity relate truth had by a proposition to its explanans, a truthmaker. By contrast, Norm of Belief and End of Inquiry each relate truth to a non-explanans. Therefore, the only core truisms are Objectivity and CI. Still, there should be no doubt that Norm of Belief and End of Inquiry are truisms, since they are folk beliefs describing the functional roles of truth.38 In Section 2, it was argued that alethic functionalism collapses to a functionalist version of strong alethic monism. That is, according to monistic alethic functionalism, there is one alethic property which has the truish features essentially. If the only core truisms are Objectivity and CI, the alethic property satisfying the truisms is bound to be some sort of correspondence property described by these two truisms. Disquotationalism is sometimes taken to capture the correspondence intuition through the disquotational schema, ‘S’ is true if and only if S.39 At most, the disquotational schema captures Objectivity; but the disquotational schema does not capture CI, since CI is an asymmetric, explanatory schema, while the disquotational schema is not explanatory and is a biconditional. More importantly, there is no disquotational property which might satisfy these two truisms, since according to disquotationalism, the semantic role of the truth predicate is exhausted by its logical, abbreviatory, syncategorematic role in generalizations and other occasions of semantic ascent; therefore, the property of playing this role is a property had by the truth predicate; it is not expressed by it.40 Therefore, this property cannot be 37 It is worth noting that, depending on one’s view of propositions, it is possible for there to be true

propositions without there being beliefs or inquiry, in which case Norm of Belief and End of Inquiry are not conceptually essential because they are not essential. 38 I thank an anonymous referee for pressing me to discuss this point. 39 The locus classicus is Quine (1970, especially pp. 10–13). 40 This point is made by Devitt (1991, p. 276), McGrath (1997, p. 71, footnote1), and Newhard (2004,

p. 66).

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adduced to satisfy any of the truisms. There are versions of deflationism according to which truth is a simple, unanalyzable property, and others according to which it is a primitive, transparent property. Although such a property may be compatible with Objectivity and CI, a property described by these two truisms is a superior candidate to any such deflationary property. Because monistic alethic functionalism is a version of strong alethic monism and is committed to there being a single truth property, and a property described by Objectivity and CI is a superior candidate to any deflationary property, it is not plausible for truth to be a deflationary property. Similarly, concordance is compatible with Objectivity and CI, but a property described by these two truisms is a superior candidate.41 While additional work is in store for characterizing this correspondence property completely, taking these results together, alethic functionalism collapses from a functional theory to strong correspondence monism.42

6 Conclusions It has been argued here that plain truth undermines the scope problem, which is the primary motivation for alethic functionalism. Specifically, the challenging cases of logically complex propositions and truth attributions are cases where the component propositions or their constituents have subject matter properties which may vary among all subject matter properties. A promising strategy for handling these cases with a single alethic property, even truth itself, undermines the scope problem. Since the scope problem is the primary motivation for many versions of alethic pluralism, it seems to undermine the motivation for those theories as well. It was also argued that insofar as alethic functionalism is committed to a manifestation relation which is reflexive as well as irreflexive, it is incoherent; and that a reflexive manifestation relation leads to the contradiction that lower level alethic properties both are and are not identical to truth. It was also argued that, on pain of contradiction, alethic functionalism collapses immediately to a functionalist version of strong alethic monism, i.e., the variety of alethic functionalism according to which there is exactly one functional truth property had by all true propositions. This theory does not face any obvious objections, especially insofar as it solves the scope problem. Careful examination of the notion of a core truism led to the conclusion that Objectivity and the correspondence intuition are the only core truisms. Because alethic functionalism calls for a property which satisfies Objectivity and the correspondence intuition, which is bound to be some sort of correspondence property, alethic func41 A proposition, p, is concordant if and only if the belief of p is warranted without defeat at some stage of

inquiry, the belief of p would remain so at every stage of inquiry, and where the belief of p is warranted just when that belief is a member of a system of beliefs which exemplifies mutual relations of deductive and inductive support, simplicity, predictive power, completeness, and consistency, and where that system is grounded. Concordance without the requirement that the system be grounded is supercoherence; cf. Lynch (2009, Chap. 8). 42 See also Newhard (2013, Sect. 2).

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tionalism collapses from a functionalist version of strong alethic monism to strong correspondence monism. Acknowledgments I would like to thank Douglas Edwards for a helpful exchange, and Michael Lynch for several helpful and congenial conversations about the issues discussed in this paper. I would also like to thank the anonymous referees for this journal for many helpful suggestions which significantly improved the paper, especially one whose efforts were exceptionally conscientious.

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