POPULATION POLICIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND AUSTRALIA The International Relevance of Domestic Affairs Gavin W. Jones

Introduction The underlying themes of this paper are that (i)

national perceptions of population circumstances at home and abroad are the crucial determinants of population policies adopted; differences in perceptions help explain why national reactions differ to circumstances which on the face of it are similar,

(2)

population policy, though an internal affair, has international repercussions and therefore can become a sensitive issue in international relations.

Until recently, ASEAN countries were united with Vietnam on at least one matter: attitudes to the growth and changing distribution of their populations. Stated briefly, the objectives were slower growth through lowered fertility, resistance to immigration from abroad except in very special circumstances, resettlement of population to undeveloped areas with potential for agriculture, and slowing the growth of the big cities. The Australian situation was somewhat different. As a high income country populated mainly through immigration, set in a region of far more populous and densely settled nations, Australia followed a policy favouring population growth and using an immigration program as a tool towards this end; even so, population growth in most postwar years was slower than that of all Southeast Asian nations. And although immigration was encouraged, the resistance to immigration that characterized Southeast Asian countries was shared by Australia with respect to all but North Western Europeans, an "acceptable" category progressively widened by dint of circumstances to include Eastern Europeans, then Southern Europeans, then certain Middle Eastern peoples and finally Asians and Latin Americans. Australia shared with Southeast Asian nations the concern with big-city growth and, like them, searched for appropriate policies to contain this growth and promote that of smaller cities and towns. This search ran out of steam in the 1970s when the report of the National Population Inquiry showed that accepted projections of the populations of Sydney and Melbourne had been unrealistically high. As for resettlement of population to underdeveloped agricultural areas, this highlighted an earlier phase of Australia's development, but after the overexpansion of the wheat belt in the 1920s and the disastrous Humpty Doo rice project in the Northern Territory, interest in such expansion notably waned. In the north, potential for further settlement of agricultural land still exists, as demonstrated by the Ord River project. The French demographer, Sauvy, has warned that, 109

given the pressure on land in countries to Australia's north, access to Australia's under-utilized land would inevitably be sought 'One day or another' (Sauvy, 1973: 159-60). Chandrasekhar (1961), in fact, argued that the monsoon areas of Australia's far north should be opened to peasant farmers from Asia, an argument not unreasonable in one respect - the undoubted capacity of, say, Indonesian paddy farmers to sustain themselves on relatively small farms in such areas at a level of living equal to or better than their present level. Needless to say, from an Australian point of view the argument is nonsensical in presuming that in order to make a very slight contribution to the alleviation of population pressures in Asia, Australia should accept large numbers of migrants from one region in circumstances that would ensure not only their geographical separation from but also a much lower level of living than the rest of the Australian population.

Policies

on P o p u l a t i o n Growth and F e r t i l i t y

As noted above, Southeast Asia has until recently presented a fairly united front on population policy matters. Since the late 1960s, the ASEAN countries and Vietnam, though they could agree on little else, could agree on the goal of lowering the rate of population growth and on the role of a national family planning program as a key programmatic measure. Certainly, Burma, Laos and Kampuchea remained ambivalent and adopted no clear policy stance, but they were hardly the high-profile countries of the region. The world took more notice of Singapore, which single-mindedly pursued its fertility reduction goals to the point at which the net reproduction rate had sunk below 0.9 and new projections showed that population was likely to fall steadily after peaking at 3.1 million early in the 21st century (Saw, 1984: 152-4). No other nation in human history had ever pursued strongly anti-natalist policies in such circumstances, and that Singapore did so in a context in which it was surrounded by much more populous neighbours is especially paradoxical. Recently, Singapore has modified these goals, at least to the extent of encouraging highly educated women to marry and have children. But since strong disincentives are still applied to less educated women, it is unlikely that the new policy signals a determination to push the net reproduction rate back up to l; rather, it is predicated on some dubious genetic arguments. Even so, it may signal a new-found awareness on the part of the Singapore government that there is no longer a need for such strenuous efforts to lower fertility, and it could even foreshadow further policy changes to avoid some of the longer-term problems associated with population decline. A committee appointed by the Singapore government reported earlier this year on problems of ageing in Singapore; its report showed that the proportion of Singapore's population aged 65 and over would climb from 4.7 per cent in 1980 to 14.1 per cent in 2020 and 18.9 per cent in 2030. This trend was seen to raise numerous issues for employment and retirement policy, financial security of the elderly, health and recreational needs, social services and institutional care, and family relations (Ministry of Health, 1984).

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If Singapore bids fair to be the economic powerhouse of Southeast Asia at the opening of the 21st century (probably overtaking Australia in per capita income levels by then), it will certainly be the demographic midget, surrounded by Indonesia, with over 200 million at that time, and Malaysia, working hard on reaching 70 million (though not until almost the end of the 21st century). Given Singapore's tiny land area and reliance on imported food and even water to supply its population, it would clearly be unrealistic to aim for military strength through increasing the population size, and Singapore has instead concentrated on economic strength and a small but highly trained defence force. It is perhaps not surprising that Singapore has looked to Israel, another demographic midget, for inspiration and technical co-operation on matters of national defence. The momentous break in the cohesion of Southeast Asian population policies came in 1983, when the Malaysian Prime Minister announced to his current 15 million people a target of 70 million for Malaysia's population and followed this up with pro-natalist policies in support of this goal. It would be interesting indeed to know fully the perceptions and motivations underlying this policy switch. We do know that the target is very much the brainchild of the Prime Minister himself, and that in his public statements on the subject he has emphasized the value of a larger domestic market in Malaysia's industrialization drive, the Showpiece of which is to be the Malaysian car. (Australians who remember the 1950s and the excitement over "Australia's own car" - albeit one produced by an American company will understand the symbolic importance attached to the Malaysian motor car industry.) Dr Mahathir is certainly influenced by the example of Japan, a densely populated, highly industrialized nation with an automobile industry that is the envy not only of Malaysia but of the whole world. Dr Mahathir's "look East" policy attempts to capture the best of Japan's experience, and he is at pains to stress that a 70 million population will be beneficial to Malaysia only if accompanied by hard work and rising productivity. His vision stands on its head the colonial view of the Malays as happy but idle, and one element of the "look East" policy (as of the "buy British last" policy given prominence in 1981-3) appears to have been a desire to thumb his nose at the former colonial power which is generally considered in Malaysia to be in a state of decline - lacking agreed national goals, unable to control its unions and still arrogant in its attitude towards Malaysia, whose economic growth rate in recent years has been so much more impressive. Whether other, unspoken motivations for the 70 million policy lie beneath the surface is impossible to tell from public statements. Malaysia's international power and prestige might be seen to suffer from her having a much smaller population than her main neighbours Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam (Singapore would hardly count in this comparison as everybody knows it is a city state). As far as the touchy issue of ethnic balance is concerned, the Malays' share of Peninsular Malaysia's population has been rising steadily in recent years and will continue to do so. The number of Chinese and Indian children did not increase at all in the 1970s, whereas the number of Malay children rose by 16 per cent. Fertility rates are

iii

Peninsular Malaysia: Trends in Total Fertility Rates by Ethnic Group, 1957-1982

FIG.I

T.F.R. 8000 -

"..

,,

7000 -

\

9.

%

6000

'.......

5000

\\ Malays

4000

'....~ --~.

Indians "',...

3000

Chinese

R e p l a c e m e n t level fertility 2000

I

1960 6'2

6'4

I

66

i

68

,9'7o 7'2

I

74

7'6

7'8

1980 '

8'2 Year

diverging; Chinese and Indian rates are approaching replacement level, but Malay rates have actually risen since 1978 (see Fig.l). The continuing rise in the Malay proportion of those entering the reproductive ages, and the widening divergence in fertility rates means that Malay nationalists can rest easy, but it is not clear to what extent the recent demographic facts of life have permeated the thinking of national leaders. Pro-natalist policies adopted in support of the 70 million population target can certainly be expected to favour Malay population growth more than Chinese and Indian, both because Malays, being poorer on average, will be more influenced by economic incentives of given dollar value; and because Chinese and Indian fertility has fallen so low and so fast that international experience offers no likelihood of a reversal taking place. In terms of its centrality to Malaysian developmental and strategic thinking, however, one is not sure how seriously to take the Malaysian government target of a 70 million population. After a period

112

in which no target year was announced, the Prime Minister settled on ll5 years hence, a time frame which would require, not that the fertility decline be halted or reversed, but merely that fertility should sink but slowly. Few governments in the world can ever have talked seriously of a target to be met only when they and their children as well would all be dead. Clearly, the target is important only insofar as it signals changed attitudes and policies here and now. Changes there have certainly been, including extension of maternity benefits up to the fifth child and tax rebates of MS 800 for the fourth and fifth children in the recent budget. But these are relatively mild changes, and the National Family Planning Board (though its name has been changed to the National Population and Family Development Board) has not been ordered to stop providing family planning services and information, although the Prime Minister announced in April 1984 that the government was "de-emphasizing family planning and limitation on childbirth" (New Straits Times 7/4/84). In the context of the present paper, the key point to emphasize is that perceptions of national self-interest have led to the adoption of widely divergent policies in neighbouring Malaysia and Singapore: Singapore is offering strong financial incentives for its socioeconomically disadvantaged groups to have fewer children; Malaysia's incentives for people to have more children will have most impact on the disadvantaged groups. As noted earlier, there is little difference between Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam on fertility goals, and their perceptions of the problem appear very similar. Performance is another matter; in recent years Thailand has achieved one of the most rapid fertility declines in world demographic history (see Knodel et. al, 1982), and Indonesia's fertility decline is probably accelerating although the evidence is not all in. If current contraceptive prevalence is any guide, however (see Table 1), fertility decline in the Philippines may have stalled at moderately high levels, partly due to fragmented efforts and management problems in its family planning program (Jones, 1984a). Recent data on fertility and family planning achievements in Vietnam suggest a slackening in the fertility decline, and problems caused by lack of contraceptive supplies (Jones, 1984b: Ch.9).

Migration and Ethnic Policies Nations in Southeast Asia, as elsewhere, jealously preserve the principle that population matters are their own domestic affair and not subject to interference from other nations. Yet nobody could deny that the repercussions for other nations may be great. Vietnam caused considerable destabilization in Malaysia, in particular, by encouraging the "boat people" exodus in 1978-79; in turn, the refusal by ASEAN countries to accept any Vietnamese refugees for permanent settlement, but to act instead as "countries of first asylum" put great pressure on Western nations to accept large numbers of these refugees. When the Western response was considered inadequate, Malaysia adopted shock tactics i n towing refugee boats out to sea again and, in fact, threatening to shoot refugees. These had the desired result as increased numbers were accepted in Australia and elsewhere.

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Current Contraceptive Prevalence Rates Among Women of Reproductive Age (MWRA), Various Years (Z of MWRA(15-44) currently using contraception)

TABLE 1

YearI

Indonesia* Java-Bali*

Malaysia,+ Peninsular

1971

2

3(10) 4+

162

1975

15

22(28) 6+

355

1979

29

38

36

1982

47

53

428(579 )

1983

59

67

Source:

Philip- Singapore+ Thailand* 9 + plnes 83

37

452

lO

604

33

717

39

74

598

33

*

Public sector only

+

Public and private sector

1

For Indonesia and Java-Bali, years are fiscal year beginning in the calendar year stated.

2

1970

3

1972

4

1973

5

1974

6

1976

7

1978

8

1981

9

Figure of 57 per cent refers to states of Johore and Perak only. Includes 37 per cent practising modern methods, 15 per cent conventional methods and 6 per cent folk methods.

Jones, forthcoming

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Malaysian population and ethnic policies have a number of direct effects on Australia. It was ethnic politics that determined Malaysia's hard-line attitude to Vietnamese refugees. Malaysia had, in fact, accepted large numbers of refugees from the Southern Philippines into Sabah and small numbers of Khmer refugees into the Peninsula; in both cases these refugees were Muslims. The Vietnamese, by contrast, were not Muslims; worse still, in Malaysian political terms, they were mainly ethnic Chinese. An additional dilemma was that, by agreeing to accept any for permanent settlement, the exodus from Vietnam would be encouraged. In any event, Australia's acceptance of large numbers of Vietnamese refugees probably resulted as much from the strong pressure put on us to do so by our ASEAN neighbours as from humanitarian grounds. Australia can, of course, argue that we have just as much right as do the ASEAN nations to decide on who we will let in and who we will keep out. And the ASEAN countries do, in fact, firmly exercise this right. But should we suddenly put a stop to accepting refugees from Vietnam and elsewhere while still maintaining an immigration inflow, we would certainly face strong protest from ASEAN countries of first asylum on the grounds that we have the capacity to accept and absorb refugees while they do not. The other aspect of Malaysian ethnic politics which has had direct repercussions on Australia is the discrimination against non-Malay students for places in Malaysian universities. Originally adopted on grounds of positive discrimination because Malays were grossly underrepresented in universities in relation to their share of the population, the ethnic quotas (administered by setting a requirement of higher entry marks for Chinese and Indians) have now achieved a situation in which Malays are strongly overrepresented in institutions of higher learning (in 1980 degree level enrolments were 66 per cent Malay, 28 per cent Chinese and 6 per cent Indian) (Ahmat, 1983: Table 3). The High Court in 1982 rejected an application to establish a private Chinese University in Malaysia, but the following year announced the establishment of an International Islamic University. Meanwhile, Australia has been considered a major "safety valve" by the Malaysian government, providing as it did places in tertiary institutions for almost as many Chinese Malaysians as were enrolled in Malaysia itself. This "safety valve" role of Australia in enabling discriminatory educational policies to be practised in Malaysia received less attention than it might have in the recent Jackson Committee and Goldring Review Committee reports. One curious feature of Australia's role in Malaysian tertiary education might be noted. Malaysia provides for fewer places in tertiary educational institutions for the relevant age groups than its role as the wealthiest Southeast Asian country apart from Singapore would have led us to expect (3 per cent of 20-24 year olds in higher education in 1980 compared with 25 per cent in the Philippines and 13 per cent in Thailand, though the latter figure is inflated by enrolments in the open university). Similarly, Australia provides relatively few places by the standards of its main "reference group" the OECD countries. Of all 19-24 year olds, Australia has 7 per cent in higher education compared with 27 per cent in the United States, 16 per cent in Canada, and 15 per cent in Japan and Sweden. Without wishing to argue that the high rates of tertiary enrolment in the United States and the Philippines are necessarily optimal, the figures 115

(despite problems >f comparability) do indicate that both Malaysia and Australia need to expand their tertiary education if such education is to be provided to all those capable of benefiting from it. Australia can hardly afford to keep educating large numbers of Malaysians, let alone tap the large tertiary education market in Asia more agressively, along the lines proposed by the Jackson Committee Report, unless the capacity of Australia's tertiary educational institutions is expanded. Australia is fortunate in being an island continent and having no border to facilitate the easy passage of illegal immigrants. Even so, illegal immigration has been a problem and two amnesties have been declared since 1975, neither of them especially successful in bringing into the open more than a small proportion of those believed to be in the country illegally. Within Southeast Asia, the close proximity of populous neighbours ensures that border violations and illegal immigration will continue to raise difficulties. Singapore has benefited from the closely monitored inflow of Indonesian and Malaysian labour to meet the shortage of unskilled labour occasioned by falling birthrates and higher education among its own young people. But Malaysia has in recent years experienced a large influx of illegal Indonesian immigrants. Numbers are uncertain, but unofficial estimates range as high as 700,000 (Lim, 1984: 3). There has been a tendency to turn a blind official eye to this movement, because it helps resolve labour shortages that have led to upward pressure on wages; perhaps, also, because it is believed that Indonesians will merge into the Malay population and so boost Malay numbers. However, local reactions have been far from favourable, with Indonesians being blamed for a high share of break-ins and robberies, unions worried about depressed wage rates and general concern that the movement could get out of hand. On May 12, 1984, a Supply of Workers Agreement was signed between Indonesia and Malaysia, whereby Indonesia would supply six specific categories of workers whenever requested by Malaysia. The interpretations placed on this agreement by officials in the two countries, however, appear to differ in important ways. The Malaysian position is that the Agreement is only for short-term contract workers. But immediately after signing the agreement, the Indonesian Manpower Minister announced that the status of some 130,000 Indonesians who have worked in Malaysia for "a long time" had been cleared and legalized and advised Indonesian workers employed in Malaysia for more than lO years to acquire Malaysian citizenship. He also announced that Malaysia had agreed to give Indonesian workers the opportunity to become shareholders in the companies where they work. Clearly "Indonesia is gladly encouraging its workers to leave the country as a means of alleviating its own unemployment and poverty problems" (Lim, 1984: 7). Immigration is a sensitive matter in Malaysia. The Chinese and Indians note the Khmer Muslim immigration, the Philippine Muslim immigration to Sabah and the Indonesian migration to Sabah and the Peninsula, and the generous treatment of these immigrants in terms of naturalization. They contrast this with the hostile reception accorded to Vietnamese refugees in 1978-79 and the refusal to accept any of them for permanent settlement, and the great difficulties faced by Malaysian Indians and Chinese of long standing who failed to secure citizenship status at the time of independence (the holders of red

116

identity cards). While fears that the poverty level of Indonesian immigrants will dictate the poverty levels of the Malaysian host community by holding down wages and causing additional pressure on infrastructure facilities are reasonable enough, discussion of the pros and cons of Indonesian labour migration will always have an ethnic undertone, which inhibits free and informed public discussion. The recent controversy over the Indonesian government's plan to step up the flow of transmigrants to West Irian is another example of the international ramifications of what is seen locally as a purely domestic matter. Opposition to Indonesian incorporation of West Irian has continued to exist since the United Nations-monitored "act of free choice" in 1969, and this opposition has taken the form of armed resistance with the activities of the 0PM (Free Papua Movement). To many Papua New Guineans, what is at stake is the colonization of a population of fellow Melanesians; to Indonesia, Irianese are just another of the many ethnic-linguistic groups which make up the Indonesian population. The settlement of large numbers of non-Irianese in Irian Jaya (the target is 600,000 transmigrants - equal to half the present population of Irian Jaya - during the course of the current five-year plan) is understandably seen by many as a Javanese attempt to "dilute" the Irianese population with groups whose loyalty to the central government is more secure, and perhaps to provide a "buffer" of non-Irianese between the Irianese and their supporters in Papua New Guinea. Certainly this view is common in Papua New Guinea. The official Indonesian position, however, is that Irian Jaya is just another province, and a sparsely settled one at that, and that in the same way that Indonesia has settled large numbers of transmigrants in Lampung and other parts of Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi (a flow frequently greeted less than enthusiastically by the populations of the settlement areas), so too will it arrange such settlement in Irian Jaya. This issue - linked as it is with the issue of border violations and PNG attitudes to OPM members - is likely to be a major irritant in Indonesian-Papua New Guinean-Australian relations for years to come. Questions of ethnic balance remain crucially important throughout the region, particularly in relation to migration and refugee movement. Malaysia's situation has already been discussed. Singapore's majority Chinese (2 million of them) are well aware of their minority status vis-A-vis the 160 million ethnic Malays of neighbouring Indonesia and Malaysia. Ethnic tensions, however, are far less apparent in Singapore than they are in Sri Lanka, where both major ethnic groups perceive themselves as threatened minorities: the Tamils in relation to the majority Sinhalese, and the Sinhalese in relation to the Tamils of neighbouring Tamil Nadu state in India. Thailand has a remarkably homogeneous population, except for the southern Thai moslems, the hill tribes in the north and the Vietnamese in the north east. Added to these in recent years have been the Khmer refugee settlements, which are acquiring the appearance of permanent settlements due to the stalemate in Kampuchea and the unwillingness of other nations to take many of the refugees off Thailand's hands, although this permanency, of course, is not accepted officially. Thai efforts to integrate these minority populations into the mainstream of Thai life have not yet met with a great deal of success. The one minority group who were successfully integrated were the Chinese, who by and large have become fused with the Central Thai through intermarriage and cultural adaptation. 117

The Philippines and Indonesia have great ethnic and language diversity, and this is a basic element in their developmental and political context. The Indonesian national motto "Bhinneka Tunggal Ika" (Unity in Diversity) long pre-dated Australia's multi-cultural policies. The outstanding difference between Indonesia's and the Philippines' ethnic diversity and that of Singapore, Malaysia and to a lesser extent Thailand must be stressed. With the exception of the Chinese, who are numerically unimportant albeit economically powerful, and small Sikh and Arab populations in Indonesia, the ethnic diversity in Indonesia and the Philippines is a diversity of sub-groups of the one major ethnic group, whose residence in all cases pre-dates historical times. In Malaysia, by contrast, the Chinese and Indian populations, though now overwhelmingly localborn, are mostly of less than one century's standing, and worse, were introduced at the behest of a colonial regime. Australia's pre-1966 exclusionary policy toward Asian immigration actually was consistent with Southeast Asian countries' own policies towards preservation of the status quo in ethnic composition. It received a bad press not so much because it was exclusivist as because it was selectively exclusivist: exclusivist on grounds of race or colour rather than education, culture and language (an Italian peasant at that time being favoured over an educated, English-speaking Hong Kong Chinese); and because the attitude of European superiority which underlay it struck a particularly discordant note in a region only newly emerging from colonialism. The irony of the liberalization of Australia's immigration policy is that the groups from Asia who have migrated in the largest numbers (Vietnamese and ethnic Chinese) are precisely those who are viewed with the greatest suspicion throughout the ASEAN region. The "Asianization" of Australia, then (if a gradual climb towards an Asian proportion of 5 per cent in the Australian population by the year 2000 must be referred to in this way), in constituting a "Sinization" more than anything else, is certainly not likely by itself to open doors to the hearts and minds of Australia's neighbours.

The F u t u r e The "nightmare" scenarios from Australia's point of view are those of economic collapse and civil war in the Philippines, race conflict in Malaysia, breakdown of government in Indonesia - in fact, anything that might trigger a refugee exodus to Australia from the region on a scale greatly exceeding that of the Vietnamese boat people. Although these scenarios appear far-fetched at present, they are certainly not outside the realm of possibility. Links (including family links) between all these countries and Australia are now very close, and the Australian government has demonstrated a humane attitude to refugees. Australia would therefore be a logical target for any refugee movement. Given the limited tolerance of Asian immigration which has surfaced among some sections of the Australian public in the past year, it is clearly almost as important for Australia as it is for the Southeast Asian countries concerned that these "nightmare" scenarios never occur,

118

Strong international adherence to the principles of national sovereignty ensure that there is little most countries can do, short of clandestine involvement with groups or movements with which they are sympathetic, to influence directly the course of political events within neighbouring countries. Yet these events can have a great impact on other countries. The same goes for population policies and economic policies. Australia will be affected by population policies followed in the region, just as our own policies will affect neighbouring countries and our relations with them. Foreign policy, aid policies and indeed our own population policies need to be informed by an understanding of where disagreements and misunderstandings are likely to arise. Fortunately, the overall picture is encouraging: the slowing of population growth rates in Southeast Asia and the strong economic growth in the region should make for stability, even if they require of Australia a more dynamic economic response than we have so far been able to muster. The problem areas are more likely to be those generated by migration policies, both internal and international, and policies towards particular ethnic and socio-economic groups which cannot, strictly speaking, be classified as population policies at all.

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REFEERF_~CES

AHMAT, S. (1983) "Critical Issues that face Tertiary Institutions and Administration in the 1980s: the Case of Malaysia". Journal of Tertiary Educational Administration: 5 (i). CHANDRASEKHAR, S. (1967) India's Policy. Manakshi Prakashan, Meerut.

Population:

Fact, Problem

and

COALE, A.J. and S. WATKINS (1985) The Decline of Fertility in Europe. Princeton University Press, Princeton. JONES, G.W. (1984a) "Family Planning Programs in ASEAN Countries". Chapter of forthcoming book on population and development in ASEAN countries. JONES, G.W. (ed.) (1984b) Asia, Singapore.

Demographic

Transition in Asia.

Maruzen

KNODEL, J., APICHAT CHAMRATRITHIRONG, MAPAPORN CHAYOVAN and NIBHON DEBAVALYA (1982) Fertility in Thailand: Trends~ Differentials and Proximate Determinants. National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C. LIM LIN LEAN (1984) "The Consequences of International Migration for Social Change: the Case of Malaysia". Paper presented to International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, Workshop on the Consequences of International Migration, Canberra. MINISTRY OF HEALTH, SINGAPORE (1984) Report of the Committee on the Problems of the Aged. Singapore. SAUVY, A. (1973) Croissance Z&ro. SAW SWEE-HOCK (1984)

Calmann-Levy, Paris.

"Singapore", mimeographed.

WORLD BANK (1984) World Development Report 1984. Oxford University Press, New York.

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