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E. Kamenka and M. Krygier (eds.), Bureaucracy: The Career o f a Concept, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1979, $19.95. Introducing this addition to the Ideas and Ideologies series, Kamenka identifies various uses of the concept of bureaucracy in social scientific and popular journals. Bureaucracy has been perceived as the essence of socialism but also as the integral feature of both oriental despotism and capitalism. "The concept of bureaucracy, in brief, works as a Jack-of-alltrades", says Kamenka, "and today it works overtime" (p. vii). Consequently, attention is given to "the emergence and development of the concept of bureaucracy as a conceptual tool for large-scale, macro-sociological, discussions of society, as a tool in the armoury of social criticism, as an idea that betrays and carries with it an ideology" (p. viii). The problems posed for Marxism by the growth of the bureaucracy in post-revolutionary society occupy a central place in this discussion. Krygier, for example, focuses on Trotsky because the concept of bureaucracy "stands at the core of his post-1923 writings - historical, theoretical, polemical - in a way, and to an extent, that it never did for Marx and that it has rarely done for Marxists" (p. 89). Trotsky's work is seen as an advance on earlier Marxist theories in treating bureaucratism as a social phenomenon, grounding its causes in the fundamental differences of interest between groups rather than in the "bad habits of officeholders". The conflict of interests of workers and intellectuals within Marxism and socialism is taken up by Kamenka and Erh-Soon Tay in their contribution, "Freedom, Law and the Bureaucratic State", where they consider Machajski's view of this conflict as "fundamental and irreconcilable". However, they also extend their analysis to capitalist societies which they see as characterised by considerable hostility to the growing strength of bureaucratic-administrative structures: "much of what used to be the everpresent resentment of the rich, first of landlords, aristocrats and merchants, then of capitalists as employers of labour, has become resentment of the Studies in Soviet Thought 29 (1985) 151.
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state, of the 'system' and of private and public "experts", managers and 'bureaucrats'" (p. 113). Associated with this widespread antagonism is a fear of depersonalisation and loss of autonomy which has led to a confusion between the roles of bureaucrats and intellectuals and between the administrative and political spheres, engendering a disproportionate concern with the self-interest of bureaucrats which has had the effect of drawing attention away from political forces. "For many, as a result, the term 'bureaucracy' ", argue Kamenka and Erh-Soon Tay, "has become a general (and confused) way of expressing these fears" (p. 113) but used indiscriminately, as a term of abuse, it has lost much of its utility. Noting that the "fear of bureaucracy . . . creates strange bedfellows" (p. 112), uniting both supporters of private enterprise and socialists, they point to the paradox of the fear of depersonalisation being paralleled by the need and desire for greater state intervention. The aversion to bureaucracy, they claim, is accompanied by increasing demands for state assistance in the form of support for industry from liberal critics and the form of welfare functions from socialist critics: "People still want from the state as much as they ever did - in fact, far more - but its moral authority, its claim to obedience and respect, have been greatly undermined, and the respect for its servants - the bureaucracy - has suffered the same fate" (p. 125). However, it could be argued that Kamenka and Erh-Soon Tay overestimate the need for the state on the part of European radical socialist critics, as ways of developing community-based means of satisfying social and economic needs outside the framework of welfare capitalism are being explored. This development has been stimulated partly by an ideological impetus as the state has been seen as an institution which stifles autonomy, but also, perhaps more significantly, because it no longer 'delivers the goods' but rather has failed to deal with the problems of housing and unemployment. It is the failure rather than the success of the state that has generated this discussion of alternatives. Moreover, these critics, following Trotsky and Machajski, have considered the social and political causes and effects of bureaucratization instead of focusing merely on the self-interested bureaucrat. Given the survival of this strand of libertarian socialism, Kamenka is perhaps premature in asserting that the drama of the problem of bureaucracy in socialist thought is 'to some extent played out' (p. viii) and that current discussions are simply 'echoes' of that debate. In contrast to Kamenka and Erh-Soon Tay, Robert Brown in his paper
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'Bureaucracy: the Utility of a Concept' seems to see bureaucratic structures as losing rather than gaining strength. Pointing out that the apparent indestructibility of bureaucratic organisations has rested on their self-persisting devices which enable them to neutralise disruptive forces, Brown considers the effects~of socio-technological developments, particularly automation, on decision-making hierarchies in advanced industrial societies. With the increasing use of temporary teams of specialists pursuing their own professional goals and the execution of routine tasks by automated machines, he anticipates a possible elimination of impersonal work relations within the teams and considers the effects of this on the maintenance of the organisations. However, he shares Kamenka and Erh-Soon Tay's concern to distinguish the political power of the state from its administrative structures. This collection of papers, with its combination of conceptual analysis and surveys of recent empirical work, does go some way towards clarifying this distinction.
University of Sussex
SUSAN M. EASTON
George M/trkus, Marxism and Anthropology (The concept of "human essence" in the philosophy of Marx), Van Gorcum, Assen, the Netherlands, 1978, 86 pp. This book is an attempt to interpret in a sympathetic and positive way Marx's texts from the early period of his life. It focuses its attention mainly on those aspects of the Marxian philosophical conception which are opposed to the Stalinist interpretation. Such a book certainly could not have been published in any Communist country during the period of Stalinism. I doubt that it could be published in the Soviet Union today. Analyzed are mainly the following works: Grundrisse, Foundations of the Critique of Political
Economy; Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts; The German Ideology. At the beginning, Mfirkus formulates two major questions: (1) Is there a Marxian 'philosophical anthropology'? (2) If so, what is the relationship between it and the materialistic conception of history? The author closely and carefully interprets Marxian texts. The problematic is divided into three parts. The first part examines the conception of man as a universal natural being. The second part describes views on man as a
Studies in Soviet Thought 29 (I 985).
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social and conscious natural being. The third part interprets views on human essence a n d history. All interpretations and arguments are based on the presupposition of the continuity between 'young' and 'mature' Marx. In his introductory remarks, M~rkus suggests that Marxian theory is sometimes interpreted as derived anthropologically from the 'true nature' of man, and sometimes accusations are raised that Marx has radically dissolved man in history, and history in the simple succession of strictly determined events. M~rkus ?efuses to consider these explanations as contradictions. Rather, he sees them as a form of unity. Communist society appears to be, then, the historical-practical solution of the objective and subjective conditions brought about by capitalist development. The first part analyses man as a universal natural being. M~irkus raises the question: What is man? Man is a part of nature, he is a sensuous, material, finite, natural-biological being living in a social-historical development. There is a fundamental opposition between man and animal. While an animal coincides with the process of need-fulfilment, man produces. Work is a specifically human activity. Marx mentions Benjamin Franklin's definition of man as a "tool-making animal". Work as an objectification of human essence creates the possib,~ity of history. Thus, men have history, because they produce their lives. Work represents the material activity of human transformation. The historical process of human universalization has a dual character. First, it appears as the naturalization of man. Secondly, it appears as the humanization of man. Secondly, it appears as the humanization of nature, as the transformation of nature by human activity. Naturalization of man and humanization of nature are two aspects of the same process. Human productive activity is thus a process that has both natural-evolutionary and anthropological-sociological character. In the second part, Mfirkus examines views on man as a social and conscious natural being. Man is a social being. Man creates human community. Man cannot be truly human unless he maintains contacts with other men. M~rkus develops a polemic concerning Marxian determinism. He refuses explanations of the Marxian conception which maintain that a concrete human personality can be fully resolved into and reduced to a multitude of sociological determinations. Man is not a tabula rasa which simply registers impressions made upon him by his social milieu. Man appropriates, man has a capacity to select. Human personality evolves in a concrete dialogue
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between man and the world, between subjective activity and objective social reality. This is how man becomes a universal natural being and a universal social being. Consciousness is an important characteristic of human essence. Consciousness distinguishes human activity from the activity of an animal. An animal has no consciousness. Man has both consciousness and self-consciousness. In describing consciousness, Mfirkus repeats, Marx emphasizes its intentionality. Consciousness is always consciousness of something, it is objectdirected. Consciousness is the "mental reproduction" of reality as well as the "mental reproduction" of aims, ideas and values. However, the Marxian conception of consciousness is opposed to the idealist hypostasis of mental phenomena. It is also opposed to the old materialistic conception of consciousness that was adapted by the Stafinist interpretation. Consciousness, Mfirkus stresses, is a creative and formative factor in all activities of man. Perception and conceptualization are not passive reflexes, but constitutive factors and co-determinants in the reproduction and transformation of social existence. Seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling, thinking, perceiving, sensing, wishing, acting, loving are appropriations of the object. Even human sensuous activity is practical. In the course of it, man selects out of the continuous flow of stimulations from reality those stimuli with the help of which he can recognize the object. Moreover, the sense impressions of man are not merely anthropological determinations, but truly ontological affirmations of being. The third part is devoted to the examination of human essence and history. The essence of man is characterized by work, sociality and consciousness. Universality embraces all these three moments. Many interpretors of Marxian views explain man's essence as the ensemble of these fundamental traits. They maintain that these traits are untouched by historical development. However, Mfirkus says, this common and widespread interpretation cannot be reconciled with Marx's texts. As concerns human essence, work, sociality and consciousness, M~irkus argues in the following manner. In the Manuscripts, Marx deals with human essence and alienation. He maintains that human essence is alienated away from the proletariat. Human essence is no abstraction inherent in each individual. Human essence is the ensemble of social relations. As concerns work, Mfirkus also uses alienation. The work of the individual under conditions of alienation is a forced and externally imposed activity resulting in an increasing one-sidedness and
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deformation of its subjects. The case is similar with sociality. The individual is a social being. As a consequence of the atomization and depersonalization characteristic of commodity production, the society of the afienated man is a charicature of his real community. Finally, the situation is analogous in the case of consciousness. Consciousness is an attribute belonging to every human individual. But since the emergence of the division of labour, there has been a separation between mental and physical labour. As a consequence, consciousness of individuals has become increasingly divorced from the generic development of social consciousness and self-consciousness. It has become divorced from the progress made in the social spheres of intellectual production, in sciences and arts. It has become fetishistic. It has become a prisoner of socially conditioned appearances distorting reafity and thereby perpetuating the existing order of things. Correspondingly, on the level of intellectual production, 'ideologies' have evolved," distorted alienated expressions of the separation and alienation of thought from praxis, from reality. All this Marx analyzed in the problematic of "false consciousness". Thus, M~irkus concludes, the concepts of work, sociafity and consciousness, regarded as a constant characteristic of every human individual, are not identical with the respective concepts used by Marx in the characterization of the constituent parts of human essence. Under the conditions of alienation, these three determinants, as applied to the individual, are only partially valid. Toward the end of this part, M~irkus turns his attention to the relation between man and history. Man has history. M~rkus interprets Marxian views on history differently than the majority of Marxists. He explains history as the process of self-creation. History is a continuous process whereby man forms and transforms himself through his own activity, through his work, in the direction of freedom and universality. M~rkus now approaches the question, raised at the beginning of his book, concerning the "philosophical anthropology" in the philosophy of Marx. He argues that, if by "philosophical anthropology" we mean some supra-historical characterization of human traits, then Marx has no anthropology. If, on the other hand, we understand by anthropology an answer given to the question about human essence, about the question: What is man, then there is a Marxian anthropology. Such an anthropology is not an abstraction from history, but rather an abstraction of history itself.
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In this context, M~irkus criticizes Carl Popper and his contention that Marx makes society a supra-individual, independent entity and that his views thus represent a justification of totalitarianism. M&kus calls Popper's charge unjust. Mfirkus maintains that Marx explains society as a totality of actual relations of real, concrete, historical individuals. It could not, therefore, exist external to or above these individuals. The Marxian conception is just as much opposed to the nominalist-reductionist view of society as to its essentialistic hypostazation. Mfirkus's argumentation sounds empty, null and void, especially if we consider concrete forms of the leading role of the Communist Parties during the contemporary periods of Stalinism and neoStalinism, when both the Party and the State have become all-powerful. Popper's criticism has beenvalid both for Marxian theory and Marxist political practice until today. Mfirkus seems to forget the complexity of the fierce fight for human rights and for limitations on the all-powerful organizations that have had the monopoly of political power. In this context, Mfirkus describes Marxian views on alienation, summarizes the analysis of historical determinism, and characterizes the concept of freedom. Alienation is described in a standard manner as starting from products and labour. In capitalist society, the producer is controlled by the product, the subject by the object. Mfirkus stresses that alienation does not characterize only the economic sphere, but the totality of social life. Self-afienation is analyzed as the separation of man's essence and existence. Along with Marx, Mfirkus sees in Communism the positive overcoming of alienation. Marxian historical determinism, M~irkus stresses again, should not be understood as the mechanical dependence of social activity on ready-made external conditions. Mfirkus sharply criticizes the vulgar, mechanistic understanding of historical determinism as it was explained in Stalin's works. Marx opposed all schools of thought which subject history to some lawfulness. Rather, Marx based his understanding of "historical necessity" on the concrete analysis of capitalist social relations. Also this interpretation represents a significant departure from the usual explanations of Marx's and Engels's understanding of the laws in history. Mfirkus does not explain the concept of freedom as the 'recognition of necessity'. Rather, he characterizes freedom as abstract-negative and concretepositive. Abstract-negative freedom is the capacity of man to liberate himself. It is freedom from something. Concrete-positive freedom is the power which
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man procures for himself. Freedom is the development of man's control over the forces of nature and his own nature. In Communism, Mfirkus sees the conditions for truly free human development. Communism is the elimination of the antagonism between human essence and existence, social and individual development, objectification and self-realization. The book is a thorough and meticulous interpretation of the texts of 'young' Marx. It represents a new viewpoint on the problematics of man. It develops a view, for a long time absent from Marxist works, that Marx elaborates the problems of man and offers a philosophical anthropology. It is critical toward the expulsion of this area from philosophy, social and political thought, as was done by Stalin and dogmatic Stalinist interpretations of Marxist philosophy. It is an attempt to humanize Marxist philosophy. (See my study: 'Is it possible to humanize Marxism', Studies in Soviet Thought, 1971, pp. 276-293.) This attempt can be seen especially in the new understanding of Marxian historical determinism (explained by the Stalinists as the operation of iron laws in history), freedom (understood as the 'recognition of necessity'), consciousness (characterized as the 'reflection of reality'), and history (understood only according to the class struggle schema). Important is the positive answer to the question whether there is Marxian 'philosophical anthropology'. At some places of his work, Mfirkus is inspired by existentialist and phenomenological themes. Existentialist inspiration can be seen in the recognition of the human self and its epistemological and ontological activity (as against the passivity of the vulgar materialistic conception). Phenomenological inspiration is reflected in the understanding of consciousness as consciousness of something, as object-directed. However, Mfirkus stops at the very beginning of the problem-area. One might conclude that where M~irkus stops, there is the very beginning of philosophy. However, his work is an interesting example of the break-away from the dogmatism of Stalinism as well as of the influence of modern western philosophic thought upon the development of contemporary Marxist philosophy. Northeastern University
Studies in Soviet Thought 29 (1985).
PAVEL KOVALY
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Mario L. Rybarczyk, Die materialistischen Entwieklungstheorien im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert: Darstellung und Kritik, (Monographien zur philosophischen Forschung, begrtindet yon Georgi Schischkoff, Band 171), K6nigstein/Ts. (Forum Academicum) 1979, XIV and 235 p. This is a broad historical survey of materialist theories of evolution. Starting with a short exposition of materiafist philosophers in antiquity, the author turns to the French materialists of the 18th century and to the biological theories leading to Darwinism. The book covers virtually all of the subsequent discussion (the left Hegelians, the positivists, scientific materialism of the 19th century, dialectical materialism, Neo-Darwinism, and modern biology), with a special accent on Engels, Spencer, Lenin, and Monod. As necessitated by the extraordinarily wide scope of the trends and thinkers dealt with, the presentation is concise and descriptive and does not go into great detail. Also, the chapters aiming at a critical evaluation of materialist dialectics, Darwinism and process philosophy consist mainly of a condensed report of the crucial arguments to be found in the literature. This encyclopedic survey is a mine of information and a serviceable guide to the original texts. A subject and a name index would have facilitated its use.
Technische Universitdt Berlin
FRIEDRICH RAPP
Alex Kozulin, Psychology in Utopia: Toward a Social History o f Soviet Psychology, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1984, 180 pp., $17.50. This is a concise and expert overview of the history of Soviet psychology, written by a scholar with the passion of the former insider and the detachment of the serious analyst. The author is able to show how Soviet psychology is both the heir of developments in the Russian tradition and something quite specific - not just because of Marxism-Leninism but also precisely because the Russian tradition was emerging just as the October Revolution happened. The first chapter introduces 'Four Generations of Psychologists' (pp. 5-39), showing the evolution, mentioning the main events, and putting the main actors into context. Chapter 2 (pp. 4 0 - 6 1 ) is a fascinating account of the respective roles of Bekhterev and Pavlov in the tentative beginnings of
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Soviet psychology. Bernstein's attempt to react to Pavlovism is the subject of Chapter 3. Chapters 4 through 6 touch on themes that are of great importance today. Chapter 4 (pp. 8 3 - 1 0 1 ) is an account of the problematic career in the Soviet Union of the unconscious, with indications as to how this theme is now re-emerging in the Soviet Union. Chapter 5 (pp. 102-120), on Vygotsky, ties in with much of the work being done in artificial intelligence, and Chapter 6 (pp. 121-136) on Blonsky and education reminds us of the parallelism of developments in Soviet and US education. The conclusion (Chapter 7, pp. 137-154) situates problems of Soviet psychology in the more general context of the Soviet effort to gear their education system up to meet the demands of modern technology. Psychology is seen here as one of the central concerns in the periodic Soviet efforts at educational reform. The strongest feature of this book is that it manages to be clear and brief on complex issues, the salient details of which have often been hidden within dreary narrations of events. For example, the whole question of the place of Pavlov in Soviet psychology and of the importance of the "Pavlov discussion" are clearly delineated and made intelligible against the background of Bekhterev's influence on Russian and Soviet psychology. The interaction of Vygotsky's ideas with those of Piaget makes fascinating reading, especially in view of the increasing Western interest in Vygotsky. It goes without saying that the book is too short to provide all the details one would want. It is, therefore, best seen as providing a capstone to the work of Bauer, Rahmani, Payne and others. It plays this role well, leaving the reader with a clear image of how psychology has fared and suffered under Soviet conditions.
Boston College
THOMAS J. BLAKELEY
