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Perspectives f o r Change in Communist Societies, ed. by Teresa Rakowska-

Harmstone, Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1979. xii, 194 pp. The volume under review is, in part, a collection of revised and updated papers presented to the 1976 annual conference of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies. Several case studies supplement the original articles. The purpose of the book is to examine the dynamics of social change and the constraints imposed on change by Communist political systems, specifically Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Studying change in Communist systems, Professor Rakowska-Harmstone contends, should "provide insights into the broad, complex question of the relationship between social change and political system" (ix). Carl Linden's article 'Marxism-Leninism: Systemic Legitimacy and Political Culture' is, in the opinion of this reviewer, the most thought-provoking piece in the book. For Linden, Marxist-Leninist ideology is a crucial foundation for consensus among political authorities. But Soviet political culture is dichotomous. An ideology, Party and state designed to abolish coercion ultimately become institutionalized as coercive structures. The current political leadership in the USSR, ideologically committed to 'progress' yet fearful of autonomous social change, relies on a 'hybrid' of Leninist internationalism and Russian patriotism to preserve its rule. Linden persuasively argues that such a policy stultifies the development of a genuine civic culture. Few students of Soviet affairs would challenge the assertion that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) is the supreme political force in Soviet society. Unfortunately, Sidney Ploss does little more than reiterate the assertion in his article 'The Leading Role of the Party: Is There a Change?'. Changes are apparent neither in the functioning of Soviet leadership circles nor in the method of analysis used by Ploss. His 'conflict school' approach successfully ignores the question of political control over broad social currents or the technological imperatives of a highly industrialized Communist system. Studies in Soviet Thought 23 (1982) 141-144. 0039-3797/82/0232-0141 $00.40. Copyright © 1982 by D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.S.A.

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Technology transfer from Western industrialized nations to the less sophisticated Communist systems has been a major component of East-West relations. John P. Hardt's brief analysis of this process contributes significantly more to our understanding of change than does the approach adopted by Ploss. Hardt posits a bifurcation in CPSU control over economic administration, with the central Party leadership intervening directly to assure effective 'active system' (that is, comprehensive and long-term) transfers of technology. He adds that "it is equally important that the lower level party and industrial managers committed to traditional methods not be allowed to control or intervene in the operation of the transplanted Western systems" (p. 77), since this would emasculate the potential benefits to be realized from the systemic active transfer relationship. Increased flexibility necessary in accommodating Western technologies, Hardt indicates, may have a long-term impact on political and ideological structures. The case studies of the East European systems analyze three separate factors affecting change. Arpad Arbonyi and Ivan J. Sylvain contend that economic reform in Eastern Europe is restricted by a supranational organization - the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). Using Hungary's New Economic Mechanism as a case study, the authors argue that the asymmetrical nature of Soviet-East European economic relations limits developmental patterns in the weaker systems. Thus, "greater integration will restrict economic reform alternatives in CMEA in a way that favors the conservative administrative type and seriously impedes the emergence or evolution of the hybrid and market-socialism reforms that call for decentralization" (p. 92). In Hungary, CMEA integration has forced a reversal of several NEM reforms. Arbonyi and Sylvain foresee the possibility of increasingly strident demands on the political system if reformist efforts are frustrated. In Poland, internal rather than external factors are primarily responsible for restricting change, as Jan Gross cogently argues. Gross identifies contradictions in the Polish system similar to those Linden found in his analysis of the Soviet system. But Polish pluralism, formalized in such groups as the Workers' Defense Committee and the Catholic Church, has evolved into a significantly higher stage than has the incipient pluralism of Soviet society. In its Marxist-Leninist form the Polish Workers' Party cannot adequately respond to these societal demands. By denying groups legitimacy, the Party deprives itself of a valuable source of information and must resort

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to coercion to maintain stability. The result, as Gross perceptively demonstrates, is political immobilism. Yugoslavia's political system is unique in its responsiveness to social demands. Gary Bertsch contends that decentralized market socialism has pushed Yugoslavia "further along the mobilization to reconciliation continuum than any other ruling Communist state" (p. 137), although the Communist League of Yugoslavia has yet to relinquish its dominant political position. By granting formal recognition to societal demands, the Party has committed itself to political development, risking civil strife should democratization be reversed. Yugoslavia's ethnic diversity, however, limits the scope of decentralization by threatening to fragment the country. The nine-member collective presidency is designed to surmount these ethnic problems. Some discussion of the probable success of this institution in maintaining stability after Tito's passing would have been much appreciated by this reviewer. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone's initial essay synthesizes the major findings of the contributors. Economic modernization and ethnic nationalism emerge from this volume as the two dominant factors effecting political change in Communist systems. Economic development, a basic goal of Marxist-Leninist systems, produces socio-occupational complexity and unacceptable pressures for political adaptation. Interests receive articulation through ethnic groups, Party and state bureaucracies, and through tightly controlled mass organizations such as trade unions and youth groups. I agree with Rakowska-Harmstone's contention that bureaucratizing interests through co-optation into political structures has been largely successful. I cannot find fault with her prediction of increasing ethnic turmoil in the Soviet Union. However, the assertion that controlled participation of broad social groups "has failed to serve as an adequate substitute for true participation and has instead contributed further to political frustration and the sense of alienation between the rulers and the ruled" (p. 21) needs qualification. While this statement may hold for Polish workers or the Czechoslovak intelligentsia, it would not appear to be valid for Soviet workers. Professor Rakowska-Harmstone does seem to be aware of these variations. She observes that conflict is minimized when the political culture is congruent with the system (as it is in the USSR, Bulgaria and the GDR), and magnified in systems where modernization reinforces existing democratic forces. Perspectives for Change in Communist Societies is a significant contribution to understanding change in Marxist-Leninist systems. The central thesis

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of the volume is the inability of Communist systems to respond adequately to pressures for political change; the leaders of these systems are accumulating explosive capital over time. Institutional pluralism, touted by Hough, Lane and others as evidence of basic systemic response to social demands, is viewed by the contributors as a palliative rather than a genuine long-term solution. The book is surprisingly well-integrated for a conference volume and should be of value to specialists and advanced students.

University of Louisville

CHARLES E. ZIEGLER

REVIEWS Karl Ryavec (ed.), Soviet Society and the Communist Party, Amherst, Mass., University of Massachusetts Press, 1978. Sovietologists are divided on the question of political change in the Soviet Union. Some argue that the Soviet political system is characterized by 'immobilisme' - a sluggish response of the leadership and state bureaucracy to new demands. Others see in the Soviet political system signs of stability and maturity, with incremental change replacing previous policy upheavals. To assess the relative merits of these arguments, it is first necessary to scrutinize the track record of the Communist Party, particularly during the Brezhnev era. How successfully has the CPSU met challenges and managed social tensions to date? The book under review provides at least a preliminary answer to this question. Ryavec asserts at the outset that incremental change is the appropriate and predicted modus operandi of the Soviet political system. He is interested in investigating the problem of political adaptation and, in particular, the question of how socio-cultural forces affect changes in the structure and strategies of the CPSU. Consequently, he rejects the common approach of assigning an "unqualifiedly determining role" for the CPSU (p. ix, Introduction) in favor of an approach which analyzes the Party as the dependent variable. If the evidence indicates that the Party successfully reacts and adapts to social change, then the charge of 'immobilisme' or stagnation is open to serious question. Ryavec's approach is a salutary one and the book as a whole addresses issues of contemporary interest and relevance. Two important questions, however, are sidestepped: (1) What are the indicators of successful or sufficient incremental change? While Ryavec insists that "survival-oriented change . . . is the only possibility in the short term" (p. x~ii, Introduction), he offers no means of evaluating the effectiveness of the reforms undertaken by the CPSU. Even 'survival' is a slippery concept - survival of the political system as a whole? of the CPSU as presently constituted? Is survival the opposite of crisis or are there important gradations along the spectrum of political adaptation and political change? What is the relationship between survival-effectiveness and crisis? It would be helpful if analytical tools were suggested for examining these problems. (2) What are the sources and dimensions of social change? If Ryavec's Studies in Soviet Thought 23 (1982) 145-147. 0039-3797/82/0232-0145 $00.30. Copyright © 1982 by D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.S.A.

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thesis is that the Party adapts to social change and responds to socio-cultural forces, then some discussion establishing the sources of change is indispensable. What is changing and who is espousing the changes? Are the changes spontaneous (e.g. demographic shifts, manpower shortages) or purposely initiated (e.g. by specialists, dissidents, or nationality groups)? If the sources of change were differentiated and weighted in terms of relative importance to the functioning of the political system, we would be in a better position to evaluate the Party's adaptive behavior. The separate essays in the book suggest answers to some of these questions, although by no means is there a consensus of opinion. Campbell and Powell conclude that the Party has proved reluctant to tackle economicmanagerial problems and problems of alcoholic abuse, respectively. Kelley, on the other hand, sees at least some evidence of adaptive behavior in the Party's recognition of environmental issues as a new policy area. Taking a test-case in extremis, i.e. the CPSU during World War II, Lieberman also f'mds that the Party achieved a "fair level of success" in responding to the war effort (p. 133). Solomon and Hoffmann are generally more impressed with the Party's ability to adapt in the areas of criminal law and information processing, respectively. Due to the expanded role of specialists in the policymaking process, Party decisions are better informed and less capricious. At the same time, Hoffmann concedes that the "'scientific-technological revolution' does not yet appear to have had a considerable impact on the CPSU's policymaking procedures or on the management of its internal affairs" (p. 86). Indeed, another analyst, Cocks, reasserts the primacy of politics and projects a continued activist role for the CPSU as the necessary counterpoint to predictable procedures or routine state administration. In one of the theoretically more ambitious essays, Breslauer develops a framework for analyzing within-system change, which he calls "welfare-state authoritarianism". Breslauer's conceptual framework is partic~darly interesting in its attempt to establish the parameters of change and to offer a means of evaluating the system's adaptability. The general tenor of Breslauer's argument supports the case for incremental change, although Breslauer cautions that changes during the Brezhnev succession "cannot be predicted", and extends the range of possible future scenarios to include within-system shifts, disorder, elitist liberalism, and a fundamentalist reaction (p. 25). Breslauer's analysis would be more complete if he clarified the relationship between within-system change and systemic change - under what conditions does one

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lead to the other? In addition, are there elements of continuity as well as discontinuity between welfare-state authoritarianism and totalitarianism? If welfare-state authoritarianism is equated with the Breztmev regime, and totalitarianism with the Stalinist regime, when did "systemic change" occur - after Stalin's death or after Khrushchev's overthrow? ls the Khrushchev regime relegated to a conceptual way-station? Given the diverse responses to Ryavec's initial questions, a concluding essay by Ryavec would have been helpful to draw together the separate strands and to make some general assessments. As it stands, the Ryavec book provides some evidence of incremental change but no ready answer to the question whether political adaptation by the CPSU is sufficient to secure effective maintenance of the system and to forestall potential crises.

Clark University, Worcester, MA

ZENOVIA A. SOCHOR

REVIEWS John Holloway and Sol Picciotto (eds.), State and Capital: A Marxist Debate, University of Texas Press, Austin, Texas, 1978, 220 pp. For more than a quarter of a century, Marx inveighed against capitalism and struggled for Communism. Viewing capitalism as a transitory, historical form based on exploitation and riddled with contradictions, he had undaunted confidence in an imminent proletarian revolution. However, nearly a century has passed since his death and capitalism, though unable to avoid cyclic crises, persists. In an endeavor to explain the resiliency of capitalism, many Marxist theoreticians have stressed such phenomena as the growth of monopolies and the proliferation of welfare. Nevertheless, incentives for capital and palliatives for labor increasingly require state intervention. As a result, a contemporary Marxist critique of capitalism cannot dispense with a coherent theory of the state. While for several years the Habermas-Luhmann and MilibandPoulantzas debates concerning the state have received considerable attention in British and American journals, the multifaceted Staatsableitung (statederivation) debate has until recently been confined largely to the German journals, Probleme des Klassenkampfs and Gesellschaft. With the publication of State and Capital, in which John Holloway and Sol Picciotto have collected and translated articles representing most of the key positions, the state-derivation debate has become accessible to the English-speaking world. Its significance lies, in part, in denying the common assumption in the HabermasLuhmann and Miliband-Poulantzas debates - as well as in most bourgeois theory - of the relative autonomy of the state and in forging a framework within which both the economic and political structure of bourgeois society can be derived from the character of capitalist commodity production. Persons familiar with Soviet thought may recognize the consonance between the view of the state-derivation group and the work done by Eugene Pashukanis earlier this century in the Soviet Union, especially his 1923 essay 'The General Theory of Law and Marxism'. In fact, several contributors to this volume explicitly note their indebtedness to him. Since, for Pashukanis, both the law and the state arise from the nature of capitalist commodity production, a Marxist critique must address not only the content but also the form of the law and the state. While this critique led Pashukanis to deny the propriety of developing a 'socialist law' and a 'socialist state', the statederivation group has concentrated on articulating more fully how the form of the state is shaped by capitalist production. This general thesis is the basis Studies in Soviet Thought 23 (1982) 148-150. 0039-3797/82/0232-0148 $00.30. Copyright © 1982 by D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.S.A.

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as well for a critique of 'revisionism', i.e., the attempt to convert the state to socialism by means of legal reforms. The article by Wolfgang Milller and Christel Neustiss, originally published in Sozialistische Politik in 1970, initiated the debate and articulated the group's basic position relative to the work of Marx and Lenin on the state. On the one hand, the group develops various perspectives on Marx's comment in the German Ideology that the state is "a particular entity, alongside and outside civil society". On the other hand, rather than pursuing Lenin's strategies for destroying the state apparatus, they theoretically explore the limits and effectiveness of the state's aid to capital. In the position of Mttller and Neustiss, the necessity of the state as a separate institution follows from the need for an 'ideal' or 'fictitious collective capitalist' not only to orchestrate the otherwise anarchic activities of individual capitalists but also to compensate for the neglect by individual capitalists of insufficiently profitable yet socially indispensable services. This position is echoed in the article by Elmar Altvater, who stresses the inadequacy of mere competition for capitalist social reproduction and the unavoidability of state-intervention, and in the article by Bernhard Blanke, Ulrich Jtirgens and Hans Kastendiek, who emphasize, following Pashukanis, the manner in which the state, though established on a juridical base, arose from economic requirements. As the editors note in their useful introduction, while the first position is more closely associated with Berlin and Probleme des Klassenkampfs, the second is more closely tied to Frankfurt and Gesellschaft and stresses the exploitation of labor by capital. In this regard, Joachim Itirsch's article - excerpted from his book, Staatsapparat und Reproduktion des Kapitals stands as perhaps the most solid contribution. Denying the state fully functions in the general interest of capital (as the first position assumes), Hirsch stresses historical investigation of the state as a separate sphere of force and traces how the state initially helped form bourgeois society by suppressing feudal remnants and now protects a territorially homogeneous market by repelling external interference. For Hirsch, although logical derivation of the state only secures its basic form, the details of historical analysis need to be situated within a theory of the capitalist process of accumulation and crisis. Regarding the latter, he emphasizes the tendency of the rate of profit to fall and such concomitant counter-tendencies as increased labor productivity. The third major position, associated with Sybille yon Flatow and Freek -

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Huisken, is not directly represented, as they withdrew permission to include their key article and the editors substituted only Helmut Reichelt's extended criticism, rather than soliciting an essay in defense of the thesis. At any rate, this approach -- the most criticized in the volume - begins with the "forms of appearance of capitalist relations on the surface of society". On this level, laborers as well as capitalists are possessors of a revenue source - a point taken from the Trinity Formula in Capital. Hence, the state becomes possible because at the surface of society a common interest in high revenues is present. Although the editors note only these three basic positions in the debate, one could construe Claudia von Braunmilhl's essay as indicative of a fourth position, since she shifts the focus to the global scale. Only after arguing for the conceptual primacy of the world market for comprehending capitalist accumulation does she proceed to differentiate national capitals and national states. Moreover, as an antidote to the entire debate, Heide Gerstenberger's article addresses the paucity of historical analysis in most of the positions. The reader desiring a fuller understanding of the debate might consult Flatow and Huisken's Zum Problem der Ableitung des biirgerlichen Staates, • published in Prokla 7 (1973), and the responses by Habermas and Offe to the criticisms of Miiller and Neus0ss, published in Telos 25 (1975). For many readers, State and Capital will present some problems. Beyond the uneven character of the contributions is the level of rhetoric. While a high frequency of Marxist terminology is to be expected, it too often is substituted for argumentation. Also, the authority of Marx is largely axiomatic for the group. A further difficulty concerns the degree to which the volume records an 'insiders' debate. As a result, the 'outsider' is exposed primarily to refinements and extensions on general assumptions. Finally, as several contributors realize, even if the group succeeds in deriving the form of the state from some aspect o f capitalist production requirement, the content remains virtually untouched. Nevertheless, despite these problems, the volume provides a thought-provoking alternative to not only bourgeois state theory but also such Marxist theorists as Habermas. For these reasons, persons seeking to learn about a fresh and provocative, if not altogether conclusive and comprehensive, approach to a Marxist theory of the state will find State and Capital a book well worth pondering.

University of North Carolina at Charlotte

WILLIAM C. GAY

REVIEWS Maxime Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1978, 308 pp. Originally published in French under the title Islam et le Capitalisme in 1966, this book is an attempt to understand the economic and political situation in those countries of the Third World that belong to the Muslim faith and civilization. The author is a Marxist sociologist specializing in Islamic studies, presently professor at the Sorbonne, who for many years lived and worked in the societies he is studying. The central question which the book addresses concerns the relations between economic, political activity and the ideological aspects of Muslim society, in particular, that of religion. The issue which provokes this question is the fact that up until the nineteenth century the initial stages of capitalistic development in the Muslim world were not succeeded by the same pattern of economic evolution towards a capitalist socio-economic formation as was witnessed, for example, in Western Europe. The book seeks an explanation for this fact; more specifically, it seeks to assess whether the religious tradition of Islam is responsible for this difference in economic development. Does the Muslim religion have the effect of hindering, neutralizing, favoring, or forbidding those practices which make up the capitalistic system of production and distribution of goods? Rodinson's response to this question is set against the background of traditional explanations for the contrast in economic development towards capitalism between Western Europe and the Muslim world. He opposes, for instance, Max Weber's assumption that capitalism required Western Protestantism to foster it and that capitalism did not develop in the Islamic world for such a long period of time because the religious ideology of Islam was inimical to the conditions required for such development. Rodinson tries to show in great detail that there is no compelling basis for asserting that the Muslim religion prevented the Muslim world from developing along the road to modem capitalism. The first chapter of the book is devoted to clarifying that there is nothing in the sacred texts of Islam, the Koran and Sunnah, which prescribes a specific economic orientation. It points out that the Koran says nothing against the private ownership of property, since it lays down specific rules for inheritance. The Koran neither discourages economic activity in general, nor does it look askance at any striving for profit. Although clear evidence can be found in Islamic teachings Studies in Soviet Thought 23 (1982) 151-155. 0039-3797/82/0232-0151 $00.50. Copyright © 1982 by D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.S.A.

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for restrictions concerning the use of whatever is owned, involving the prohibition of usury and the legal obligation to give alms, Rodinson argues that such restrictions are reformist rather than revolutionary remedies. In forbidding excessive profit and in prescribing a responsibility for the wealthy to aid the poor, Islam addresses the need to rectify certain gross inequalities of possessions within the community, but (for Rodinson, this is an all-important 'but') the Koran does not offer prescriptions against privileges based on the ownership of certain things, such as the means of production and the sources of material used for production, that confer enormous power over the whole of social life. The calls to justice and charity found in the sacred writings of Islam were adequate to give rise to a substantial number of acts of beneficience, both public and private, but inadequate to make the ruling elite feel obliged to ensure a decent standard of living for the majority of the people. Cosmetic welfare rather than fundamental economic change is the result. For this reason, according to Rodinson, the traditional Muslim states offer throughout history the spectacle of a poignant contrast between the astonishing luxury prevailing at the courts and among the rich, and the most abject misery in which the mass of the people are sunk. Rodinson's thesis is that the alleged opposition of Islam to capitalism is a myth. Capitalism did not develop in the Islamic world until quite recently, not because the religious ideology was inherently against a rational orientation of thought (on the contrary, it is stressed that the Koran accords a much larger place to reason than do the sacred books of Judaism and Christianity), nor because of a fatalism that Islamic religion is believed to foster. The cause, according to Rodinson, is rather the historical socio-economic factors underlying the religious ideology. The slow development of capitalism should be ascribed much more to economic distress and political declassing than to religious precepts. Economic bondage to foreign powers, colonialism, economic concessions granted to foreigners by virtue of their political and military might, the relative density of population providing a supply of plentiful and cheap labor-power (thus giving little incentive to the making of technical innovations): these forces had the net effect of insuring regional economic underdevelopment. Throughout his analysis, Rodinson advances a familiar Marxist theme, namely, that the economic base of a society largely determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of that society. Priority is clearly given to economics in shaping the reality of social life.

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However, Rodinson does not argue that the economic element is the only determining factor or that influence only proceeds in a univocal direction from economic forces to ideological ones. He admits that the functioning of economic systems can be affected by the psychology of individuals and groups, even though it is the structure of these economic systems that plays a great part, at least, in determining the broad characteristics of this psychology. The importance of the Marxist analysis, according to the author, lies in the fact that it forces men to face up to the reality of the powerful economic relations that are in practice in Muslim societies, relations that are obscured by the traditional explanations for the delayed economic development in this area. Rodinson is correct, I think, in recognizing that the states of the Muslim world are today at precisely one of those decisive moments when it is open to them to choose the economic path they will take. General decolonization, abandonment by the great powers of methods of direct domination, the nationalization of oil production, and competition between the two great economic systems of socialism and capitalism have brought about a revolutionary situation. Recent history in the Mid-East tends to support this judgment. Rodinson foresees the possibility that Islam can serve as a very necessary, useful ideological banner around which to mobilize individuals towards the construction of a socialist system. Nevertheless, it is, in his opinion, a dim possibility. It is far more likely that the Islamic religion will be used, as it has been used in the past, to sanctify the squalor and poverty in which many people live, to guarantee the social and material advantage of the ruling class and the clergy; in short, to re-enforce a social and economic oppression that has remained fixed for thousands of years. One of the obvious limitations of this book lies in the fact that it is a translation of a work published fourteen years ago. No analysis is provided of events which have taken place in the Muslim world since that time. The afterword added in 1973 seems a half-hearted apology for this lack. The rapid change of events in the Mid-East is not kind to a book of this sort. One wants to know, for instance, whether the newly-created Islamic Republic in Iran sheds light on whether and how Islam will be used to construct a new social system. Another key issue, not analyzed in any depth in Islam and Capitalism, is the tension between modern techno!ogy and religion. The Third World is pulled in seemingly opposite directions; first, by the desire to draw level as

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soon as possible with the industrialized, technologized word, and second, by the desire to preserve those values, particularly religious values, which constitute the uniqueness and identity of the Islamic community. Much contemporary thought in the Mid-East is concerned with how to reconcile these two divergent tendencies. Rodinson, however, barely touches upon the question whether there are suggestive possibilities within the Islamic community for overcoming this schizophrenia. Can technology be understood, appropriated, and controlled within Islamic society without sacrificing the religious values which are the inheritance of the people?

N. N. Shneidman, Soviet Literature in the 1970s. Artistic Diversity and Ideological Conformity, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1979, 128 pp. The stated aim of this book is to redress the current imbalance in the Western world between the considerable attention given to 'dissident' Soviet literature and the virtual silence concerning 'official' Soviet literature, that is, works appearing in non-clandestine Soviet publications and written by members of the Soviet Union of Writers. Neglect of official Soviet literature is unfortunate; first, because this literature is an invaluable key towards understanding the present intellectual, ideological and political atmosphere of the Soviet Union; second, because this literature documents the various ways in which Soviet writers have managed to cope with the long-standing Soviet emphasis on 'socialist realism' as a criterion for artistic excellence. In this book Shneidman attempts to draw a general picture of the most important aspects of Soviet literature in the last decade, with special attention given to the relationship between literary theory and literary practice. Analysis is confined to contemporary Russian prose, in particular, the work of Chingiz Aitmatov, Iurii Bondarev, Vasil Bykov, Valentin Rasputin, Iufii Trifonov and Sergei Zalygin. The central thesis of this book is that there has been thematic evolution in Soviet prose during the past decade, prompted by changes in Soviet life. In stark contrast to the works appearing in the heyday of socialist realism, contemporary Russian prose concentrates on the negative aspects of Soviet society and writers tend to avoid suggesting solutions to the problems posed in their works. What is absent from these contemporary pieces of literature is the assumption that in the background of personal and societal problems

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lies a force, namely, the principles of Marxism-Leninism, which is able to rectify them. Moreover, a number of the imperfections of Soviet society, as depicted on the pages of Soviet literature, can be attributed to the shortcomings of a system which has failed to change man in a positive sense. Shneidman stresses the dichotomy between the official, Soviet ideological commitment to the assumption that there is an objectively truthful analysis of social phenomena in Marxism-Leninism and the distinctly 'non-class' approach to problems which is evidenced in numerous works of Soviet literature. This tension has had, according to Shneidman, a profound and disquieting effect on literary theory in the Soviet Union. In the past decade, Soviet literary theory has reached a virtual impasse, in which it is unable to reconcile the demand that Soviet literature be a vehicle of ideology with the demands of actual literary diversity. Strict adherence to the demand that Soviet literature manifest a consistent application of Marxist-Leninist principles and that this application be unequivocally conveyed would result in a sharp limitation of the number of works accepted for publication. Gifted writers would burrow further undergound. Yet relaxation of the guidelines of socialist realism, as witnessed in the Soviet literature of the past decade, threatens to blur and undermine the ideological foundations of socialist art. In the absence of a deeper theoretical conception of socialist realism, which could encompass the current variety of Soviet literature without abandoning an ideological base, the Soviet literary establishment seems to grant artists complete freedom in selecting any artistic form, style, or method of presentation suitable for his art - provided that the work of literature does not question the political and ideological foundations of the Soviet state. Shneidman's book is, in my opinion, a refutation of the adage that a book would be better if it were not so long, In this case, the brevity of the work is a distinct drawback. Given the interesting subject matter and the numerous interlocking themes of ethics, technological progress and nature, city life, and the relationship between art and the community, it was a disappointment to find a conclusion two pages in length.

University of Southern Maine

JEREMIAH P. CONWAY

REVIEWS Antisovetizm na slu~be imperializma [Anti-Sovietism in the Service of Im-

perialism], ed. by V. V. Midcev and E. D. Modr~inskaja, Mysl', 1976. This book, written by a team of Soviet, Czechoslovakian and Bulgarian philosophers, is a useful guide to both the general features that characterize all forms of anti-Sovietism and the specific characteristics of individual varieties of it. Also, an indication of the concept of anti-Sovietism, its place and role in the ideological struggle, its social and political functions, is given. What are the common features of anti-Sovietism? The author of the first chapter, Modr~inskaja, says that the distortion of the historical development of Soviet society and its international significance, the dissemination of different sorts of slander and lies in relation to the domestic and foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state, the falsification of the theory of Marxism-Leninism and the splitting of socialism by the promotion of nationalism, are functions common to all forms of anti-Sovietism (pp. 14-15). The specific approaches of the bourgeois, social-reformist, Trotskyist, revisionist, Maoist and Zionist varieties of anti-Sovietism consist in the following. Bourgeois anti-Sovietism plays a negative role: it tries to establish the inferiority of socialism to capitalism, specializes in the distortion of Soviet foreign policy, the misinterpretation of the problems of the technological and economic development of the USSR and also distorts socialist democracy. The reformist varieties of anti-Sovietism employ pseudo-socialist phraseology in striving for the same goals as bourgeois anti-Sovietism. They claim that the social crises of capitalism can be averted through reforms and that a socialist revolution (like the one in the Soviet Union) is not the answer. They call for a 'democratic socialism' (interpreted by Modr~.inskaja as a prettified version of state-monopoly capitalism). The main features of Trotskyist anti-Sovietism are" the conception of the impossibility of building socialism in one country; the denial of the socialist nature of the Soviet state and social system; the distortion of Lenin's views on the construction of socialism; the attack on the .policy of peaceful coexistence; the demagogic depiction of the struggle of Trotskyism against the Soviet Union as a struggle against 'Stalinism' and 'bureaucracy'; the combination of left phraseology with reactionary conceptions (p. 147). Maoism, according to Modr~inskaja, strives to undermine the anti-imperialist front from within by directing its main politicai and ideological efforts above all against the Soviet Union. Like Trotskyism, Maoism advertizes its Studies in Soviet Thought 23 (1982) 156-167. 0039-3797/82/0232-0156 $01.20. Copyright © 1982 by D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.S.A.

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'revolutionary' concern about the interests of all peoples but contradicts its words by its deeds. Moreover, Maoists are ready to inflame a new world war and constantly attack the Soviet peace policy. Maoism also passes itself off as the leader of the 'third world' against the two 'superpowers' (pp. 18-19). Zionism, according to E. S. Evseev, is characterized by its falsification of the position of Jews living in the Soviet Union. Evseev includes statistics showing the favourable position of Jews vis-a-vis other nationalities in the Soviet Union in education, professions, the arts, politics, etc. Zionism is considered as a form of racism since it proclaims the "unity of the national interests of all Jews, independent of their class membership and the countries in which they live" (p. 223). The history of Zionist anti-Sovietism is traced as well as J. I. Kaufman's and others' notion of 'Jewish anti-Semitism', which is directed against Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality who identify themselves with the country in which they live (p. 237). The chapter on Trotskyism is the most outstanding. M. I. Basmanov, who has written a definitive work on the history of Trotskyism, documents here very well the basic differences between the views of Lenin and Trotsky. He shows, for example, that the idea of the possibility of buildidg socialism in one country was a central part of Lenin's theory and that Lenin put forth this idea on several occasions (p. 133). Basmanov shows that Trotsky did not agree with Lenin's view of the uneven development of imperialism, that Trotsky overestimated the unity and strength of world capitalism. This line of argument by Basmanov is particularly effective, since Trotskyists maintain that Trotskyism and Leninism are in agreement. He also indicates that contemporary Trotskyists (following Trotsky himself) cite passages from Lenin about the disappearance of the state and then argue that the Soviet Union cannot therefore be following a Leninist path since the state is maintained. Basmanov claims that such arguments are based on a lack of familiarity with the context of Lenin's writings: Lenin in his works pointed to the necessity of the withering away of the state under Communism. At the same time he always stressed the great significance of the workerpeasant state and the system of Soviets for the creation and strengthening of socialist society, and pointed to the necessity of perfecting the socialist state structure. (p. 151). Another one of the ablest writers among the group, M. L. Altajskij, in the chapter on Maoist anti-Sovietism, puts forth the hypothesis that the Maoist doctrine of the Soviet Union as the "main enemy of China" was borrowed

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from the Chang Kai Shek regime. He indicates that this was a favourite theme of Chang Kai Shek and that the leading Chinese newspapers of the 1920's, 1930's and 1940's bear this out. The Maoists merely continue this tradition (p. 185). Perhaps, the most important section of this book, politically speaking, is the discussion of the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968-1969 (pp. 1 1 2 127). Ja. Kvasni~ka (Czechoslovakia) does a very weak job in this brief treatment. It is argued that Czechoslovakia was the weak link in the socialist chain. The failure fully to solve the national question (the "state-legal position of the Slovaks within the Czechoslakian state") plus the susceptibility of certain non-proletarian strata of the population to nationalism and to antiSovietism made it possible for imperialist forces to exploit possibilities for counter-revolution and the restoration of capitalism. The 'liberalization' under Dub~ek is interpreted as a synonym for the liquidation of socialism. She does not explain, however, the dissatisfaction of the masses with the Party's leadership prior to Dub~ek. But the main failure of this account is the lack of explanation provided for the "timely international aid given by the Soviet Union and other states of the socialist community, which responded to the persistent requests of Czechoslovakian patriots . . . and thereby saved socialism in Czechoslovakia." (pp. 125-126). Kvasni~ka does not say who the patriots referred to were, whether government officials or part of the Communist Party or just citizens, and whether or not they had a legal right to request foreign assistance. There is also no discussion of how the actions of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries in Czechoslovakia correlate with the doctrine of the non-interference in the internal affairs of another country. That is, it is not even specified, for example, whether the affairs in Czechoslakia during this period were purely internal matters. If it was a case of an internal matter, an explanation would be that in exceptional cases (when the survival of socialism is at stake) the general norms of international relations are subordinate to the international moral and political responsibilities of Communists to tender assistance to the workers of a particular country. Nor does the author pursue the line of argument that the events in Czechoslovakia leading up to 1968 were not a purely internal matter, but affected the socialist community. Involved in this interpretation is the claim that anti-socialist forces were receiving arms from capitalist countries and that therefore it was only just that Czechoslovakian patriots received military aid from the socialist countries. These sorts of issues

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and interpretations, which are standard aspects of sophisticated MarxistLeninist discussions of the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968-1969, are missing from Kvasni~ka's presentation. This failure weakens the account severely. A general deficiency of this book is the lack of a positive approach to the problems that the varieties of anti-Sovietism raise. Key questions that are involved in the disputes with anti-Sovietism, such as the nature of the socialist state and the relation of national to international interests, are not dealt with by the authors in a well-developed manner. The ideological disputes often revolve around the Soviet experience in building socialism and to what extent that experience has international applicability. If the authors of this volume had laid out systematically those features of the Soviet Union's experience that they considered as necessary and essential for the building of socialism in any country as opposed to those aspects that are merely national peculiarities in the history of socialism in the Soviet Union, they would have improved the book considerably. This would have helped overcome the one-sidedness of the concentration on the cataloguing and exposure of the ideological currents within anti-Sovietism.

V.I. Strepetov, Pros~ety ideologi~eskix diversantov [The Miscalculations of Ideological Saboteurs], Lenizdat, 1976. This work is a very ambitious effort to generalize the course of the ideological struggle from the cold war period to the present period of d~tente. The emphasis by the author, however, is entirely on the basic shifts that have taken place in the ideological approaches of the opponents of MarxismLeninism. He does not discuss the development of Marxism-Leninism as an ideology during the same period of time. This one-sidedness, as we shall see, is the cause of the main deficiencies of this book. The general theme of this book is that bourgeois ideology has had radically to shift its form of anti-Communism from a cold war approach to a more sophisticated and realistic form of anti-Communism and anti-Marxism. This is due to the fact that the ideological supporters of capitalism miscalculated the strength of the Soviet Union and the vitality of Marxism-Leninism as an ideology. Therefore, in place of the total opposition to socialist society and Marxism and the open support for capitalism that characterized the cold war period, bourgeois ideologists are now borrowing many of the ideas of

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Marxism (though in a distorted way) to describe contemporary society and also hiding their support for capitalism by substituting ideological concepts such as 'industrial society' for the concept of 'capitalist society'. Strepetov describes how bourgeois, anti-Communist ideology has evolved and why it has undergone a basic shift. His description consists of the analysis of the basic ideas of the Western (especially American) foreign policy makers and ideologists during the late 1940's and 1950's (Kennan's 'containment' policy, Burnham's views on the 'liberation' of Communist countries, and the views of A. Dulles and the CIA) and comparing them with the dominant ideas of the 1960's and 1970's (Brzezinski's 'building bridges' doctrine, Bell's and Galbraith's ideas about the 'convergence' of capitalism and socialism, and the concept of the 'free exchange of ideas'). Strepetov says that the demands of the cold warriors for the abolition of socialism, or for the 'liberation' of it from the outside by the USA or NATO, were based on the assessment that the socialist system was weak militarily. He says that the development of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union by the end of the 1940's frustrated the Western foreign policies based on the military superiority of the West. The contemporary imperialist strategy, he writes, is to undermine socialism from within by intensifying the ideological struggle and taking advantage of any and all possibilities to penetrate socialist societies with bourgeois ideas and values. Strepetov's arguments in support of his points are effective in some instances. He often quotes the ideological enemies of Marxism to show that even they concede certain points. For example, he quotes Raymond Aron to the effect that twenty-five years ago it was a scandal to be anti-capitalist whereas today it is a scandal not to be anti-capitalist (p. 109). By relating in some detail the arguments of D. Bell (p. 110-116), W. Rostow, and others, he shows that not only have these thinkers given up the idea of the triumph of capitalism over socialism, but have also tried to change their general framework of social analysis to include some ideas that resemble Marxist ideas (e.g., the idea of the dominant role of technology, the notion of contradictions in social life, etc.). Of course, Strepetov believes that this trend is still bourgeois, but that these contemporary varieties of capitalist ideology are more ambiguous about and masked in their support of capitalism. His explanation for this shift is that the socio-economic and political crises of capitalism are so apparent that it is not possible even for the supporters of capitalism to ignore them.

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The discussion of the bourgeois defense o f 'freedom' and the advocacy o f the 'free exchange o f ideas' under dbtente is especially interesting. Strepetov cites facts to show that many of the organizations whose purpose is the 'defense of liberty' (i.e., anti-Communism) have had links with intelligence services (receiving of financial support, for example) (pp. 171-196). He tries to establish the point that organizations with such links are tainted and cannot be genuine supporters of freedom. But while the facts he cites are not suspect, it would be an exaggeration to say that he shows in a systematic way that this connection exists between these organizations and Western intelligence services. Strepetov then argues that those who advocate the opening of the Soviet Union to Western ideas are not interested in genuine cultural exchange. He quotes various Western politicians and organs of the mass media to the effect that cultural exchanges will be useful as a means to influence Soviet society with a Western (which he interprets as anti-Soviet) set of values. He also points out statistics that indicate the lack of reciprocity in the cultural exchange. That is, according to his figures, the West is not showing as many Soviet films, translating as many Soviet books, holding as many concerts by Soviet performers, etc., as the Soviets are doing of the American and Western counterparts (p. 180). Therefore, he reasons, it is hypocritical for bourgeois politicians to call for a 'free exchange of ideas'. But it is on this point o f the exchange o f ideas that Strepetov leaves questions unanswered. When he tries to explain the reason for the exclusion of subversive, anti-Soviet ideas from Soviet society, and his legitimation of 'ideological struggle', on the other hand, he uses the ideas of the impermissibility of 'psychological warfare' and the inevitability of ideological struggle under the existence o f opposed social systems. Despite the fact that this distinction between psychological warfare, on the one hand, and ideological warfare, on the other, is central to his analysis, he only explains it on one page. The passage is worth citing: What is ideological struggle? It is the struggle of ideas, the disputes of classes, the debates of parties who adhere to different or directly opposed views and conceptions of social development. The cold war by no means is only an ideological struggle; in the sphere of ideology it represents an ideal, psychological preparation for war. The acuteness and depth of the ideological struggle as such by no means signify that this struggle must become a psychological preparation for war. The ideological struggle becomes a psychological preparation for war when in this struggle ideological means are considered insufficient,

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when in it the inevitability of military conflict is founded, when the ideologists of capitalism begin to promote the slogan: guns in place of ideas. The representatives of the contemporary bourgeoisie identify ideological struggle with the arbitrary manipulation of ideas and equate ideological struggle with psycholog~ ical warfare, which is actually a component part of the cold war. For psychological warfare includes lying, misinformation, the slander of socialism, and is conducted by methods of sabotage and the violation of the generally accepted norms of international law. (pp. 178-179). Thus, Marxist-Leninist ideological struggle differs from psychological warfare in the sense that it relies on well-known facts about capitalism (not inventions or lies) and does not adhere to the idea of the inevitability of war between socialism and capitalism. But Strepetov does not explain how it is that some bourgeois ideology is legitimate, being part of the ideological struggle but not involving psychological warfare. That is, bourgeois ideology by definition gives a distorted picture of socialism. This would not mean, presumably, that it is identical with psychological warfare against socialism. Yet, this sort of anti-Soviet ideology would not be acceptable to MarxismLeninism as part of the proper exchange of ideas. The author should have specified what constitutes a reason for the exclusion of bourgeois ideology by the Soviet side, and yet the expectancy that the bourgeoisie has to permit the dissemination of Marxism (whose central political ideal involves the abolition of the capitalist class). He does not say, for example, whether it is a question in the latter case simply of the bourgeoisie being unable to prevent Marxism-Leninism from being disseminated due to the strength of the working class, or whether it is a matter of Marxism not involving any threat to the national interests of the capitalist countries (whereas anti-Communism would be interpreted by the Soviets as a threat to their national interests). In any case, Strepetov's failure to explain the origin of this distinction between ideological and psychological warfare and to elucidate it in connection with concrete problems leaves the problem mentioned above up in the air. While this work is much more factual and informative than other works in this field, the main weakness of the work is its tendency to be superficial. Key ideas are treated all too briefly. He passes over very quickly, for example, the idea that the working class is the leading revolutionary class (p. 183). He claims to have substantiated this idea simply by referring to the frequency of strikes and political demonstrations by masses of workers in the West. But he does not account for the reformist tendencies in the workers of the advanced

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capitalist countries, or discuss the role of workers in any recent revolutions, or mention other manifestations of class consciousness (besides the participation of workers in political demonstrations). When the author does decide to go into detail on certain points, his argumentation is often far from conclusive. For example, when he wishes to show that the dissident historian, Amalrik, is a tool of anti-Sovietism and has no talent as a scholar, he argues that Amalrik's incompetence is evident from the fact that he had been truant and failed in his exams at Moscow University (19. 208). It is a natural question, however, to ask whether Amalrik was failed for his political views. If Strepetov chose to make a point out of this case, he would have done better to indicate the specific details of Amalrik's failure as a student of history (citing the evaluations of teachers, etc.). The author has given a general narrative of the basic turns of the ideology of anti-Communism and the connections of it with government organizations. While some of the points he has made are well put, he often hurries over fundamental ideas and leaves unanswered many questions that logically follow from his presentation.

Madan Sarup, Marxism and Education, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978. Madan Sarup's latest book is a stimulating study of Marxist and phenomenological influences upon English sociologists of education and the implications of these influences for radical changes in education. Sarup examines broad but practical problems in education - the aims of schooling and its connection with the capitalist social system, the student/ teacher relationship and the reasons for the failure of working class children in school, and several other issues - through the prism of key philosophical issues, including the issues of materialism versus idealism and freedom versus determinism. In his own philosophical orientation, Sarup tries to unite the libertarian, humanistic aspects of phenomenology with the dialectical and historical materialist aspects of Marxism to develop a 'phenomenological' of 'libertarian' or 'humanistic' Marxism. He recognizes the existence of some degree of social determinism as well as the possibilities for people to liberate themselves from alienating living conditions. On the one hand, he criticizes orthodox Marxism for over-emphasizing the objective, economic

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factors in the determination of history and, on the other hand, criticizes phenomenology for overlooking the social structure's determination or constraint upon the possibilities for changing the schooling system. In spite of his criticisms of what he considers these one-sided tendencies in Marxist and phenomenological theorists, Sarup himself does not sufficiently explain his own conception of how freedom and determinism actually do relate to each other. His concluding pronouncement that the simple dichotomies of materialism and idealism and freedom and determinism are inadequate conceptual frameworks (even though he employs them) does not advance Marxist philosophy. Clearly, Marx, Engels, and Lenin all recognized the deficiencies of mechanical materialism and the view of determinism associated with a mechanistic view of the world. None of these founders of Marxism wrote as if the concepts of materialism, determinism and freedom were self-sufficient categories in need of no further development. Sarup discusses throughout the book the work of the 'new sociologists of education' (Michael Young, Nell Keddy, and others) and how their position differs from the liberal, 'positivist', traditional sociologists of education. Unlike the 'positivists', who take the observer's position as the valid standpoint, who take meaning as given by the objects, and who view knowledge as a neutral picturing of fact, the new phenomenological sociologists urge that we do not take anything for granted (Husserlian pre-suppositionlessness), that reality and knowledge are constituted by the meaning of our experiences and that the actor's or participant's viewpoint is as valid as the observer who is external to the situation being studied. Phenomenology, writes Sarup, wants: to free people from the illusion of objectivity and the tendency to generalize, predict and explain. They regard objectivity, the acceptance of the views of the observers, as an obstacle to understanding, and have admired the method of Socratic enquiry which shatters accepted presuppositions (p. 35). Sarup values this phenomenological orientation to the comprehension of others' experiences as central to understanding alienation and the ways in which people make sense of their own 'life world'. According to Sarup, the phenomenological epoch6 or suspension of one's normal conceptual framework within which experience is interpreted allows one to approach the comprehension of the 'pure experience' of others. Utilizing the studies of anthropologists and ethnologists to support the claims of phenomenologists,

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Sarup likens a positivistic approach to education to the ethnocentrism of early anthropologists: Just as the native is made to feel ashamed of his wodd and is prescribed a new way of seeing the world by the western anthropologist, so children are prescribed reified forms of knowledge which produce a view of social reality that is mechanistic and deterministic (p. 25). One of the main contributions o f the new sociologists is their concentration on classroom studies. The traditional sociology o f education has emphasized the role o f social class or family upbringing to explain why working class children fail. Individuals were seen as inactive, their response being predetermined, their identities being fixed by early childhood experiences (p. 69). The new sociology shifted attention from the home to the classroom. Sarup summarizes the philosophical background to the classroom studies: Most of the classroom studies are based on the symbolic interactionism of George Herbert Mead . . . Interactionism postulates the view that people and objects have no inherent characteristics, no intrinsic qualities; these are constructed through mutual definition, negociation. Some draw on the social phenomenology of Alfred Schutz. This perspective stresses that the world is created by consciousness; realiW is socially constructed. Reality is a situated, on-going and negotiable process, and language is a f'flter system for the construction of meaning (p. 71). These classroom studies show that the teacher, by favoring middle class values such as material success, individual striving, thrift and social mobility and by expecting children to share these values, often cannot understand the behaviour of poor children who fail to display these virtues (p. 72). Moreover, the system of streaming children in school, which also favors the same values, imposes an identity on pupils and conditions the expectations o f the teachers. Thus, Sarup argues that the teacher and the schooling system itself bear some responsibility for the failure o f the working class child. Sarup is aware of the idealist weaknesses o f phenomenology. The subjective idealist tendencies in phenomenology are expressed in its relativism and mentalism, according to Sarup. In connection with the weakness of relativism, Sarup argues that the phenomenological perspective requires the viewpoint of everyone to be taken seriously: And ftf there are many groups of actors, many different ways of living, then, within their own social context, they are all equally valid (p. 88).

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Sarup indicates that from a Marxist standpoint an 'actor' can be misguided; e.g., he may have .a false consciousness in that he believes he is free and equal with everyone else, when the opposite is the case. Thus, to define his activity as he understands it will lead us to misconstrue his act (p. 87). He points to the influence o f external factors upon the individuals' understanding: . . . there may be macro-features which have an independent reality of which actors or participants are not aware. There may be forces that influence, or determine, the thoughts and actions of participants, and produce consequences which they did not intend. Indeed it has been argued that the construction of realities may be more influenced by power relations, socialization processes and class structures (p. 88). The second main weakness of phenomenology, its mentalism, is its belief that no social reality exists independently of the individuals' actions and interpretations that confirm it as existing: the idea of an independent social reality is suspended or abandoned• : . . Generally speaking, phenomenologists believe that phenomena do not 'speak for themselves', but have to be given a character. They are produced by our consciousness• It is argued that in describing phenomena we constitute them. Social life, then, is a construction of, and constituted by, the activities of people's minds (p. 89). •

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This leads to two difficulties: (1) a naive belief that educational change can be brought about through the consciousness of teachers, which disregards the structural constraints of capitalist society; (2) the new sociologist cannot claim that their account of social reality is superior to a positivist account, because the social world would itself be a feature o f their method. Sarup views Marxism as complementing phenomenology in the sense that Marxism both provides a perspective to understand the roots of alienation and links the struggle to liberate education with the struggle to democratize economic life. Sarup provides an introduction to the views o f Marx, and summarizes the theories of contemporary writers such as Harry Braverman, Louis Althusser and Bertell Ollman on the nature o f present-day capitalism. In contrast to the dominant assumption in the 1950's and 1960's that education is a social 'good', Sarup agrees with the thesis of Bowles and Gintis (authors of Schooling in Capitalist America), Ivan Illich (author of Deschooling Society) and others, that schooling has become an oppressive means of controlling the working class. Under capitalism, schooling prepares the masses for a life of submission to exploitation. Sarup employs in the chapter, 'Alienation and Schooling', a Marxist model of commodity relations to

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describe the social relations that prevail in the school. This analysis by Sarup of alienation is insightful, but it is one-sided. Even from a radical standpoint, it seems obvious that learning how to read and write, to be disciplined, and to assimilate certain social values and modes of communication, are all educational activities that help rather than hinder an individual to struggle for major social change. Since Sarup follows a Marxist (dialectical) view of the schooling system as an expression of capitalist commodity relations, one expects a statement by him not only about the dehumanizing aspects of schools, but also about those tendencies in the schools leading to the abolition of alienation. In Sarup's exposition of classical Marxism, there are a few errors. Sarup considers production relations "as pertaining to the realm of human consciousness for Marx" (p. 114). He ignores here Marx's famous distinction of the base (the production relations) from the superstructure and Marx's view that production relations are material, existing independently of human consciousness. Sarup also assumes Lenin had a mechanistic materialist view that consciousness is a mere reflection of the objective world (p. 113). As David-Hillel Ruben has recently shown in his book, Marxism and Materialism, this standard criticism of Lenin has not been well founded. Finally, Sarup tries to oppose Marx to Engels, arguing that Engels believed in laws of history, whereas Marx did not (p. 127). Sarup here does not take into account Marx's famous thesis that antagonisms under capitalism are inevitable, that it is a matter of "the natural laws of capitalist production . . . working with iron necessity towards inevitable results". (Marx's Preface to the First German edition of Capital.) On the whole, Sarup's book is valuable both for its clear and usually accurate summaries of many difficult philosophers and for its informative presentation of the current developments in the sociology of education and in Marxism.

Buffalo

PHILIP MORAN

REVIEWS Lennard D. Gerson, The Secret Police in Lenin's Russia, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1976. 332 pp. In this book, Gerson provides a history of the organizational development and activities of the revolutionary police apparatus, the Vserossijskaja ~rezvy~a]naja kommissija, or VCheka, during its first ten years, from the appointment of Felix E. Dzer~inskij as its chief, from the October days at Smolny in Petrograd, through its reorganization and constitutional formalization as OGPU (Obedinennoe gosudarstvennoe politi~eskoe upravlenie). The rationale behind the creation of VCheka was provided by Lenin. In defense of the revolution, he expounded, a repression of the enemies of the people was absolutely requisite. VCheka was to be the sword and shield of the revolution. Its task was originally envisioned to be the extirpation of counterrevolutionaries; this included as well guardianship of transportation (especially railways) and food stores, control of smuggling and economic speculation and black market profiteering, suppression of banditry, pogroms and peasant uprisings. Tsarist bureaucrats, many of whom had remained at their posts following the October Revolution, and the clergy, were a prime target, and equally as suspect as Mensheviks, Social Revolutionaries, landowners and kulaks, peasants of the Black Hundreds hue, and such bourgeois as merchants and factory owners - all were included among the White Guard. Also to be watched were the former Tsarist officers, recruited by Trotsky for the Red Army, and whose loyalties were questionable at best. Thus, VCheka served as a home guard while the Red Guard engaged in the military struggle against the armies of Deniken, Kolchak, and Wrangle and their non-Russian allies. 'To make an omlette, you must first break some eggs', we have often heard. Or again, in the words of Lenin, "there can be no revolution without blood". And Trotsky: "He who would make a revolution must not be afraid to get his boots muddy". Violence is the major theme. The victory of October came with barely a shot fired. But it was followed by the counterrevolution and the civil war, the White Guard having survived the October Revolution virtually intact. In defense of the revolution the Bolsheviks met resistance with force. Lenin frankly acknowledged that the only proper tool for dealing with enemies of the revolution was repression, just as the proper tool for dealing with white armies was the Krasnaja gvardija. The details of Chekist activities during the years of the civil war and Red

Studies in Soviet Thought 23 (1982) 168-186. 0039-3797/82/0232-0168 $01.90.

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Terror are not terribly exciting: number of arrests, final disposition of cases, investigations of the white underground, investigations of corruption and inefficiency in district and provincial Chekas, and the bureaucratic structuring of the apparatus, including the question of organizational control (it was finally resolved by Lenin, against the view of Dzer~.inskij, that the Central Committee of CPSU, and not the Commissariat for Internal Affairs, should exercise direct control over VCheka). It is not a very good spy tale, but Gerson tells it well. Gerson is a good historian. He is not, however, without his bias, which shows clearly through his writing. We hear about the (alleged) atrocities perpetrated on innocent civilians by Chekist agents, especially at the provincial and district levels. We do not hear much about the incidents which may have provoked this behavior (though admittedly, we do once hear about attacks on Cheka headquarters in the Ukraine). We hear about the barbarities committed by Chekists on captured Whites, but we never hear of the cruelties inflicted on Red guards by desperate White armymen (though admittedly we are made aware of units of armed Chekists destroying bands of Green guerillas and cossacks, such as those of Hetman Petlura, and other bandit gangs, and thereby liberating villages or even whole districts from outlaw terror). We are told of the incivility, disdain and discourtesy with which the occasional Chekist official will treat a petitioner coming to Cheka for help in solving a problem, while top-level efforts to clean up the Cheka and Chekist efforts for relief of orphans and other victims of war, foreign intervention, and famine are belittled. As if to reinforce the validity of his one-sided account, Gerson tells us that many a staunch and idealistic old guard Communist, reflecting in horror at the Tsarist Okhrana and his own encounters with spies and Butyrki jailers, nauseated at the thought of a Cheka and Lubianka, and, in his inherent decency and humanity, refused Lenin's call for upright souls to serve, and in fact contested with Lenin over the probity of creating such an organization, extraordinary and temporary or not. As both Lenin and Dzer~inskij admitted, the refusal of many of the jailed to become jailers in their turn opened the way to the staffing of local Chekas by many undesirable elements. But it is equally true that Lenin and Dzer~inskij stressed the need for, and Dzer~inskij tirelessly carried out, the punishment, and the expulsion from the organization, of as many unclean souls as could be laid hands on. It is also true that Lenin sympathized and empathized with those Old Guard Bolsheviks who, after experiencing the Tsarist Okhrana, had no stomach for the Cheka. On

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the other hand, he felt that they failed to appreciate the exigencies, nature, and dialectics of revolution, that revolutions which fail fully to extirpate the ancien r~gime against which they are fought, particularly when still the whole of the industrial world is bourgeois, the whole of the remainder still feudal, thus all enemies of the revolutionary proletariat and his peasant allies, will in the end themselves be lost. There is also the suspicion that those opposing the Chekists could have Menshevik leanings, perhaps without fully being conscious of such sentiments, or perhaps being simply muddled by sentimentality or revolutionary zeal. 'To make an omlette, you must first break some eggs'. Any weapon in the struggle for pravda-spravedlivnost' is justified; the VCheka and its local cells, then, are simply the arms of revolutionary self-defense. Da stravstviyete revol/uci/a!

Leo Okinshevich, U.S. History and Historiography in Post-War Soviet Writings, 1945-1970: A Bibliography, Santa Barbara, Clio Press, 1976.431 pp. This is a useful reference tool for anyone with a reading knowledge of Russian, an interest in the Soviet view of American history, and access to a wide range of Soviet literature. It is also useful for anyone having an interest in the Soviet interpretation of American history but lacking either a knowledge of Russian or access to Soviet journals, since the compiler has translated all Russian-language entries and many of the titles wear their author's feelings on their sleeves. The works referenced cover the entire range of U.S. history, from the Pre-Columbian era to the Vietnam era, with special attention given, as a result of the interests and attitudes of Soviet historians, to the American Revolution and Federalist and Jacksonian eras as a period for the growth of an American bourgeois class, to the Civil War as a struggle for democracy and against racism, the era of populism, the Gilded Age, and the New Deal as a struggle between an expanding capitalism and an incipient socialism and emerging proletarian consciousness, and especially to World War II, in which, from the Soviet perspective, the American role was a half-hearted attempt by American capitalistic imperialists to challenge the dominance, on a global scale, of Hitlerite and fascist imperialism with minimal risk. (The apparent hesitancy and lugubriousness with which the Anglo-American allies established a second, Western - rather than Balkan - front, for example, is viewed as a deliberate tactic and premeditated collusion with Germany to

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foster the destruction of Russian existence and concomitant defeat of the proletarian revolution, while weakening fascist Germany so that AngloAmerican imperialism could emerge triumphant and unchallenged.) The sources documented in this quite thorough bibliography include both primary and secondary works, including, for example, writings of such participants in recent history as General Eisenhower and Marshall Konev. There is also a liberal sprinkling of translations from English into Russian, for example excerpts from John Reed's Ten Days That Shook the World and Arthur Schlesinger's A Thousand Days. Articles listed are to be found in journals popular and obscure: in Komrnunist and Kommunist Uzbekistana, Artillerijskij ~urnal and Zvezda Vostoka, dating from 1945 to 1970. No aspect of American history is ignored. Within each major historical period, attention is devoted to labor history, economic history, foreign relations, and foreign economic relations. The reader is directed to the history of American race relations in a prodigious and assiduous way, especially as exemplified by the history of slavery, the American Negro, the American Indian, and the ethnic history of the (primarily Eastern European) immigrant experience. Not unnaturally, in the field of foreign affairs, the overwhelming center of attention are American-Russian relations. Unsurprisingly, Soviet historians find American history to be an exercise in conservativism, aggressive colonial imperialism, and capitalistic repression of labor, and the writings of American historians to be panegyrics in defense of bourgeois socio-political dominance and elegies to monopolistic capitalism, imbued with middle-class propaganda and a distortion of the concept of democracy. We come to understand from these writings that the Soviet understands democracy to be an economic condition in which the proletariat is unconditionally owed, and in full possession of, the economic benefits of his labor, including the right to a job, a decent wage and standard of living, (theoretical) control over the means of production, and the right to such benefits as unemployment compensation and health insurance. The Soviet historian is concerned with the battle of the American socialist movements and the struggle for existence of the American Communist Party and its uphill battle for the social, political, and economic rights of American and international labor and against fascism. In this comprehensive bibliography, we find writings on American historiography and philosophy of history, and commentaries on a number of American

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writings on world history. Quite naturally, there is also a sizable literature on American studies of Russian history, and their tenor is predictable. The Soviet historian, as a simple perusal of the titles of the articles catalogued would inform the interested observer of Soviet thought, like his pre-revolutionary counterpart, views himself as a personal partisan in the ideological struggle between truth (pravda-spravedlivnost ~) and falsehood and falsification. He is in the vanguard of the historiographic battle between histomat and bourgeois idealism, defending the thesis, by calling upon examples of the past, that there are inevitable and inexorable historical movements, guided by the class struggle and economic necessity, and attacking the bourgeois interpretation of history. He is anxious to excoriate and expose the falsifications which he finds in the writings of American historians, particularly those in defense of the capitalistic repression of the American proletariat and those which extoll the self-congratulatory idealism of American politics and foreign relations. His whole attitude and perspective is perhaps best summarized by reference to the title of a specific article (on the Spanish-American War) by V. V. Petra~: 'Istori]a obvin]aet S.~.A.' On a more personal note, we find a bitter attack on the Harvard Center for Russian Studies in Ju. I. Igritskij and E. G. Plimak's lstori]a S.S.S.R. article: 'Pitomnik klevetnikov', in which we can, no doubt, detect the reference to such Kerenskyite Kadet historians as Michael Florinsky, whose political philosophy so closely coincides with the Lockean-Jeffersonian liberalism of Anglo-American democracy and Adam Smithite laissez-faire capitalism, as well as to those American historians who, whether at Harvard or elsewhere, serve as spokesmen for the American bourgeois-democratic establishment and its ruling class. Proletarii] vsex stran',

sojedinajetes !

Xenia Gasiorowska, The Image o f Peter the Great in Russian Fiction, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1979. In this turgid piece of literary criticism, the author presents a composite picture of Peter the Great, based upon the fictional characterization of the Tsar in Russian literature. This characterization is drawn from both historical documentation and anecdote, from fact and from gossip. Wherever we look, we find some central traits which typify Pjotr veliki], and make him recognizable in any setting; his overpowering presence is felt in and through his great

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physical stature, with the bodily strength which it denotes, and his official stature as unequivocal master of all the Russias, blago~estivyj, pravoslavnyj, russkij Tsar. Under the friendliest treatment, he reminds one of the bogatyr', the gigantic and powerful heroic soldier. His personality, his behavior, in short his personal characteristics, however, do not meet with either unanimous approval or unanimous disapproval. He is portrayed sympathetically, or regally, or disparagingly, disgustingly, depending upon the personal attitudes and political philosophies of the particular individual author. To sychophants, he is imperial; to opponents, -especially traditionalists, such as the boyars aligned with the tsarevna Sofija or the tsarevi6 Alexei Petrovi~, he is the Antichrist; to admirers, the Tsar Reformer; to Soviet writers, who picture him among the rabotnie ljudi~ki, he is the Crowned Carpenter. He is an affable Russian bear, who angers only in the face of betrayal or injustice, his palsy a result of assassination plots led by Sofija and the Streltsi. Or he is a grotesque, devilish fiend, burning with apoplectic rage. Each writer portrays to the fullest those aspects of his personality which best enhance their vision of him, either ignoring or explaining away those aspects of his multifaceted and complex personality which might distort that image. But no one is neutral to his powerful personality. In a desultory tract, Gasiorowska guides us to the understated conclusion that each fiction writer presents an image of Peter which reflects his own attitude towards the Tsar, and that that image is molded by each author's political philosophy. In effect, we gather slowly from Gasiorowska what we knew before, and what she herself leaves implicit, that Russian fiction is an author's political testament. As a motto for a chapter of her book, Gasiorowska takes the statement of F. V. Bulgarin (source not indicated), worth quoting in extenso, which might well serve as a motto for the whole of Gasiorowska's book, or even for the whole of Russian literary history: A novel should serve the author either as a means of developing some philosophical ideas, or of helping him shed light on the mysteries of the human heart, or of leading to a better understanding of the character of an historical personage. Literature, too, then, is a battleground for partisans ofpravda-spravedlivnost'. This is as true for Boyan and Nestor as for Soxolov and Sol~enitsyn. The popularity of Peter as a character of fiction does not result from his having been an heroic figure. He is not heroic, even in the fiction created by his admirers (neither was Prince Igor of Slovo o polkovu Igor'eve). He

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does not fight. Surrounded by the Turkish army, he buys his escape (Igor flees the Polovsti by stealth). His tsaritsa Katherine is represented as the savior of the Russian army when she surrenders her jewelry to buy off the Turkish Sultan. The Slavic god of war is unknown; instead we have the feudal bogatyri: thus the mystique of the peaceful Slavic soul. The Petrine fascination results rather from the heroic representation in Peter of the Russian character itself. While the attitude of each writer towards Peter is formed by the writer's political stance, on a social level, Peter is the heroic figure of Russia herself, and of the Russian soul, the Russian national character. In him, we find an expression of the syndrome of Perun's Revenge. The Perun's Revenge syndrome is an expression of the strange duality of the Russian personality. It is symptomized by the self-chastisement which is a favorite of Russian fiction, of course epitomized by Dostoevsky's Underground Man. It is a kind of masochism based upon the Orthodox theology of suffering. 'God sees the truth but waits', runs a mu~ik proverb. Patient suffering, under Tsar or commissar, has its eventual reward. Hence, it is a masochism borne of self-love, a desire for salvation achieved through suffering. On the other hand there is a passionate reformism, a search for the New Jerusalem, pictured by Slavophile and Narodnik as an agrarian, all-Russian Zemski Sobor, and to the rabotny]e l]udt?~ki as freedom to go about one's daily life in peace and comfort ('A bowl of soup, a spoon, and myself my own master', the krestTanin say). The Russian is a master of self-criticism, then; but at the same time that he complains and endures, he is capable of violent outbursts. The traditionalists par excellence, the old Russian boyars, of whom the Streltisi are brothers, are the most active opponents of Petrine reforms. While court intrigue was not unique to the Muscovy court, one would expect these people, among all others, to respect the will of blago?estivy], pravoslavny], russki] Tsar. The Mazepa revolt and others expressed the popular sentiment of revolt against the most revered, the anointed, most pious, most orthodox Tsar. Perun's Revenge has a religious quality to it, as does Russian Messianism. When Vladimir the Great, later Saint, forcefully baptized his druSina in the tenth century, he ordered also the destruction of the great statue of the ancient Slavic thunder-god, Perun, which has toppled into the Dniepr. In Povest' vremenik let', we read that, somewhere downstream, at a place known as Perun's Shore, the idol grounded on the banks. The 'baptism' of Perun represents the fusion of Orthodoxy and paganism in the folk mind. This

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dualism, called by ancient writers the 'double faith', is portrayed in nearly all Petrine fiction. The Tsar never fails in great solemnity to attend Church. Yet the convocation of his 'all-crazy, all-drunken council' (vseJutejJi], vsepTanei~ij sobor), a Dionysian orgy, highly reminiscent of the marriage feasts and pagan rites of the ancient Slavs, was a caustic and contumelious mocking mimicry of Orthodox ritual. His many enemies viewed him as the Antichrist. He tolerated the existence of the heretical Raskol'niki or Staroverej, over the protests of the high clergy, and, after refusing to permit the appointment of a successor to the Patriarch in 1700, abolished the Patriarchate and established in its stead a Holy Synod, with a lay Procurator at its head. This act effectively realized the Byzantine Caesaropapism which Ivan the Great had envisaged. Thus, Peter the Tsar Antichrist, whose own words were characterized as bogoprotivny slovo, himself became the highest official and literal and virtual head of the Orthodox Church. This worshipful Tsar was supposed by some to have been a victim of witchcraft, or even to have been, if not the Antichrist, the devil's familiar. He is macabre and evil. He advocates the use of tobacco, though its use was considered by the religious to be offensive to God; his branding of recruits (to prevent military desertions), the mark of the Antichrist; worst of all, his shaving of the beards of the boyars, was taken as blasphemy, since it altered their appearance, and God made man in His own image. In the face of all this, Peter remained the anointed Tsar, and now, the supreme Church authority. His behavior is described as frenzied, or unseemly (neistovnoe povedenie); thus, depending upon one's interpretation, he is either vulgar or God-possessed. He abhors the possessed (besnovat/i), though his behavior is often indistinguishable from theirs, and seldom fails to evoke a mystical 'unearthly fear' (nezdeJni] u~as) among the pious. Still the starers, the Holy Man is revered, howbeit he closely resembles the ancient Slavic volxvi, while the regular clergy (especially the white clergy) enjoys a popular reputation of gross impiety, and we hear of the village priest that he is a most unclean soul. The jester (~ut) and the priest are inseparable and nearly indistinguishable folk characters. Peter's own jesters held exalted roles in the 'allcrazy, all-drunken council'. For all the overt and coerced religiosity, then, there is in the folk character a strong cynicism with respect to religious institutions. In non-Petrine fiction, Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor would torture and destroy Christ for His lack of (Church-defined) Christianity. There is, too, in the most inner sanctum of the church, virtually behind

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the very icons, the presence of the evil sprite Vii, in Gogol's story of the same name. And it is a most devilish kikimora, thimble-headed, straw-skinny, black banshee, that rattles in the belfry of the Troitsa church to denote the evil that is St. Petersburg and its Tsar-builder and warn of the approaching calamity to this eerie fortress of fog in the evil Finnish fens. This mixture of Slavic folklore and Orthodoxy does not produce a harmonious blend. Rather, the ancient demons invade Orthodoxy and create a continual spiritual struggle. Tsar Peter does not merely look like a cat. He is a cat. Only the pressure of a clergy battling ancient Slavic hylozoistic pantheism (even into the fifteenth century) forced an interpretation upon the people in which the cat becomes a symbol, the devil's familiar. Only the pressure of Orthodoxy could find in the monstra of Peter's Kunstkamera a vile affront to Christian sensibilities, rather than a seventeenth-century equivalent to Slavic mythology, inundated with Rusalki, kikimora, and the ugly, mischievous, but harmless, forest gnomes and water sprites. Does not the waxen effigy of Peter express in modem guise the pre-Christian Trizna or Radunica of Dzaidi], the ancient funeral banquet at which the dead ancesters of the rod participated in person? Does not the Orthodox Church yet today provide for the Radunica in its liturgy? Ancient clerical writers spoke of the 'double faith' of the Russian populace, mixing pagan elements with Christian celebrations. This dualism is but one aspect of Perun's revenge. Another is the kenoticism of self-love, hopeful of salvation. The kenotic is also a socio-political phenomenon. Legendary is the total subservience of many a narodnik or bolshevik to the search for a secular 'heaven on earth'. The very notions of sobornost' and partijnost' connote the eschatological sacrifice of one's personal identity (li?nost') for the organic communion of the sacred Rod (the people). Sobornost' in particular blends elements of Christian social conscience with the pre-Christian divinity of the Rod and deity of Rod~anici]. There is the psychic antagonism exemplified by Dostoevsky's Raskotnikov, between the innocent and vibrant self-expression as a master and slave of Fate (ro~anica) and the gloomy burden of guilt and Christian love of the Church; the former is celebrated and condemned, the latter is repressive and liberating. On the socio-political level, particularly for the peasant, this antagonism is witnessed by periodic alternations between respectful submission to authority and passive endurance of hardship and injustice, and wild bursts of self-righteous indignation and orgies of mutiny. The Russian soul cannot endure half-measures or compromise. He will

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have it all or not at all. No wonder political ideologies take on for the intelligentsia the proportions of religious crusades, for literatori the dimensions of a moral crusade. Yet the Russian soul is divided - divided between paganism and Christianity, between spiritualism and materialism, between Orient and Occident, betweerl passive fate (sud, Rozanica) and active, even violent, Messianism. The modern Russian sees no conflict between the concepts of Trinity and unity of God, between the dual nature of Christ (man and God) and monophysitism. Nor does he see lllogic or inconsistency in the dialectical method, or in the fusion of Marxist Communism and traditional Messianism (itself fusing elements of Caesaropapism and the communal mir of the Rod) in Marxism-Leninism (Bolshevism). Rather, he remains dedicated to Perun, nihilistic and traditionalistic, democratic and authoritarian, thunderous in his plaints and effusive in his complaints and self-recriminations, and thunderous too in his joy and his dedication to his vision of the New Jerusalem, the 'heaven on earth' of Mat' Rodna/a, Holy Russia. Admittedly, we find no such appraisal of the folk character in Gasiorowska's book, and such a psychic physiognomy is well beyond the scope of her work and intent. Still, I expect that my development of the theme of Perun offers some explanations for the features of Petrine fiction which Gasiorowska surveys. Slava bogu, slava! Perunu, slava!

B.V. Birjukov and A.G. Spirkin (eds.). Kibernetika i Logika: Matematikologi?eskie aspekty stanovlenija idei kibernetiki i razvitija vy~islitel'no] texniki, Moskva, Izdatel'stvo 'Nauka'. 1978.1 ruble, 30 kop. 333 str.

Kibernetika i Logika, under the general editorship of B. V. Birjukov, known for his studies of Frege, and A.G. Spirkin, is an anthology devoted to the study of the development of logical and algebraic calculi, and their use for formalization of languages suitable for use in algorithmic structures for computing machinery. Some attention is also paid to the development of calculating machines themselves, from the abacus to the primitive engines of Pascal, Leibniz, and Babbage, and the modern electronic digital processors of the mid-twentieth century era of Turing, von Neumann and Birkhoff, with attention paid to Russian contributions of the pre- and post- revolutionary generations (ca. 1880-1925). The great concentration of interest of all contributors to this volume, however, lies with the work of the mathematicians

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who made possible the modern calculating machines by the mathematization of logic, and, in the work of Ernst Schr6der particularly, the algebraization of logic. Birjukov provides an introduction to this anthology in which the work of each contributor to the volume is summarized and set in relation to the organic whole. This introduction is far more useful and successful than the facile one paragraph English 'Summary' and German 'Annotation' inserted at the end of the volume. In the first selection, 'The Interdependent Characteristics of Calculating Machines With Their Development', L. I. Maistrov sees the primary function of the calculating engine as interaction with its mathematical or cybernetic environment through a more or less formalized language (algebraic logic as it grew more sophisticated, simple numeric computation at the outset). That means that such machines can contribute to the development of increasingly sophisticated machines. This function is traced from the basic abacus or premechanical apparatus to the mechanical calculating engines of Pascal, Leibniz, and Babbage, among others, to the electromechanical machines of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and concluding with the electronic computers of the mid-twentieth century produced by I.B.M. and other electronics firms. R. S. Guter (senior author) and Ju. L. Polunov, in 'History of Different Machines', focus their attention on the period in which Charles Babbage was the foremost contributor to the development of calculating devices (1830-1930) and discuss the construction of such apparatus. In the selection 'August Ada Lovelace and the Origins of Programming', these same authors relate the work of Lovelace to the mathematical constructions of Boole and DeMorgan, the mechanical contributions of Babbage to Byronic philosophy, and discuss the development of analytic methods whereby algorithms may be presented for calculating engines and utilized for the programming of these engines, relating these developments to work in arithmetic, algebraic, and trigonometric functions. We are also given a preview into the use of electronic switching as a development of Boolean algebra. In a final joint paper by these writers, 'The Mathematical Work of Charles Babbage', the discussion reverts from the mechanical inventions of Babbage to his work as a mathematician, with some attention to his work in trigonometry, but especially to his work in analysis, calculus of functions, theory of equations, and number theory, as well as questions in game theory. Babbage's work is shown to have especial interest for a

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study of the history of cybernetics inasmuch as Babbage himself had worked on the construction of calculating engines utilizing much of his own mathematical contributions. An important and slightly known side of the history of the development of calculating engines is presented by G.N. Povarov and A.E. Petrov in 'Russian Logic Machines'. This is the least mathematical of all of the contributions, a purely historical account of the earliest work of Russians (from ca. 1880-1925) to "artificially enhance human reason" ("iskusstvennyx 'usilitelei' ?elove~eskogo razuma"). These early attempts to build thinking machines began with the stimulation of Jan Sleszynski (Ivan VladislavoviE Sle~inskij), who translated into Russian the crucial Algebraic Logic of Louis Couturat. Of most importance are Pavel DmitirieviE Khru~Eov (1849-1909) and Alexandr NikotaieviE ~Eukarev (1864-1936), two physical chemists around whom the history of the construction of logic machines in Russia center, and who modified and refined the machines described by the British logician Stanley Jevons. It was said of Khru~Eov's machine that it was a prime exemplar of logical apparatus, a fine specimen of a calculating engine. This little known aspect of the history of the building of logic machines deafly deserves greater attention, and the interested reader may wish to turn to the article 'K istorii sozdanija logi~eskix matin v Rossii' of V. A. Belig~anin and G. N. Povarov in the journal Voprosi Filosofii of 1971. (Apparently this same lesson must be relearned, since computer scientists are only just now learning of the results of L. G. Kha~ijan, who has found an efficient procedure for solving linear programming problems involving thousands of inequalities.) With this, we are returned to the mainstream of thought by Birjukov himself, and his coauthor A. Ja. Turovceva, in a monumental (hundred-page) essay on ~fhe Logical-Gnoseological Views of. Ernst Schr6der'. The work of Schr6der is of course extremely influential, and the immense Forlesungen fiber die Algebra der Logik is a crucial contribution in the history of mathematics, presenting logic as having an algebraic structure. As such, it has a strong affinity for the algebraic logic of Boole, DeMorgan, Babbage, and Jevons. But the Schr6derian 'algebraic form of logic' played a role not merely in the history of the algebraic approach to logic, and thereby in the development of machine methods of calculation, but in the process of the development of mathematical logic as well. It continues to have an influence, as can be seen by reference to works of A. I. Mal'cev, e.g. his Algebraideskie sistemy

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(posthumous, 1970). Briefly setting forth the impact of Schr6der's work and its relevance, the authors discuss specifically the work of Schr6der, speaking for example of his work on algebra of sets, with focus concentrated naturally on the Vorlesungen, Schr6der's magnum opus. Next, attention is turned to the philosophical views of Schr6der. His interest, not unlike that of Frege, centers on the meaning and characterization of meaning. We are given the algebra of classes, which serves as a mathematical language, the syntactic elements of the calculus being signs (zankom) which designate 'things-in-themselves' ('veJ?ei v sebe'), usually physical entities. Sections on the objectivity of logic and modality, semiotics, the theory of signs, the problem of the realization of the logical program of Leibniz, and a concluding section on Schr6der's algebraico-logical calculus follow. This extensive discussion of the work of Schr6der is followed by a paper by S. G. Ibragimov. 'On the Logico-Algebraic Work of Ernst Schr6der, Anticipating the Theory of Quasi-Groups', a mathematical excursus on the recursive structure of algebraic groups, equal to or greater than modulo-2, and algorithms for proving theorems in group theory. The work of Church, Turing, Kleene, Markov, and Mal'cev, among others, followed from the algebraic foundations initially set forth by Schr6der in the Vorlesungen and 'Ober Algorithmen und Kalkulen'. Today, Soviet mathematicians in particular pursue studies of the recursive characteristics of groups in Sibirski] Matemati~eski] Zurnal, and, especially, Algebra i Logika. The purpose of this study is twofold. First, algebraic structures can best be discovered in the study of groups, and thus work in group theory is particularly valuable for the understanding of mathematics; and second, as should be seen even from our brief references to the articles in Kibernetika i Logika, the algebraic structures of logical systems, especially the Schr6derian algebra (or Boole-Schr6der algebra), provide the syntactical apparatus for the construction of algorithms for the programming of modern calculating machines, and therefore has strong practical application. In the final selection, 'On the Dynamics of the Interrelations of Various Aspects of the Idea of Infinity', N. N. Nucubudze traces the history of the concepts of the infinite, from the philosophical concepts of the ancients (e.g. Zeno) and the early moderns on the borderline between mathematics and philosophy (e.g. Bolzano), to the mathematical concepts of transfinite arithmetic developed by Dirichlet and Dedekind, Weierstrass and Cantor, Kroenecker's antifinitistic response to Cantor's transfinite set theory to the effect that "God made the numbers; all the rest is the work of man", and

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including contemporary work by A.A. Fraenkel and Yehoshuah Bar-Hillel, in which the infinite is considered set-theoretically, as it was for Cantor, and the constructivist A. N. Kolmogorov. The set-theoretic approach to transfinite numbers allows the infinite to be understood arithmetically, and a search is under way to determine whether functions on transfinite numbers are effectively computable. If such functions are decidable, we can construct algorithms such as will permit computers to generate values for large-cardinal arguments of these arithmetic functions. This, however, carries us into current work in recursive function theory (e.g.N.V. Beljakin, 'Iterirovannaja Klinievskaja vy~islimost' i superdzamp' (Iterated Kleene Computability and the Superjump), Matemati?esk# Sbornik, 1976) and related areas of proof theory (e.g. the 1972 results of G. E. Minc, 'Finite Analysis of Transfinite Proofs'), and is well beyond the scope of topics included in Kibernetika i Logika. The papers in this book do not touch upon developments, either mathematical or computer scientific, much beyond approximately the first third of this century, and therefore recursive function theory, particularly in its latest research, is left untouched. And it is appropriate that the book should end with a discussion of the problems of the infinite, since, even with the developments of this past decade in Infinitary Logics, much remains unsettled, and computers cannot effectively decide for transfinite arguments of arithmetic functions, whether a value of that function is computable or not. The editors do present us, however, with a good history of the mathematics and logic of machine computation, albeit one which, in its heavy emphasis on Schr6der and his work, is somewhat unbalanced and disjointed.

Angelina Vasil'evna Vasil'eva, Evoljuci]a panteizma i ego rol' v sovremennyx religiozno-filosofskix koncepci]ax, Kiev, Naukova Dumka, 1978. 126 str. 90 kopecks. If "religion is the opiate of the people", Vasil'eva takes it as her duty as a philosopher to break this addiction. Apparently, it is to be done by showing that religious belief is pantheistic and (therefore) unscientific. Vasil'eva shows that there are two sorts of pantheism, the naturalistic and the mystical varieties. A distinction between the two brands can be made as early as the most ancient of records. The mystical variety, in which man

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has an encounter with the gods, can be traced back to India. Here, man is absorbed into the physical presence of the deities. On the other side, in Ionia, we have the foundations for naturalistic pantheism, as developed by Thales and the pre-Socratic philosophers. Here, there is a multiplicity of natural forces, each of which has a crucial role to play in the existence of the world and in the actions of the cosmos and men. The least pantheistic is of course represented as a unified archd. There is nevertheless a close tie between the mythology of the ancient Greeks and the first principles of the Pre-Socratics, insofar as the elements of nature (earth, air, fire, water, e.g.) are very nearly personified, or in the case of the Herachtican flux and similar arch,, at least given the character of the divine. The closest we come to a unification of mystical and naturalistic brands of pantheism, in which philosophical theology reverts to mythology, is found in the neo-Platonism of Plotinus, whose One is both spiritual and physical, a monotheistic, albeit trinitarian, person. Vasil'eva next discusses the religious mysticism of the western Middle Ages and Renaissance, with special attention to Meister Eckhard, but not ignoring Peter Abelard, both of whom come in for comments from Marx, nor ignoring Nicholas Cusanus nor Scotus Eriugena. Bruno and Cusanus are also considered for the naturalistic tendencies of their pantheism. This historical discussion is topped by a large section on Spinoza and the influence of his pantheism on later pantheistic ideas. The next major section considers the development of the philosophical concepts of religious thought, especially as they relate to the role of the pantheistic idea. Here, Vasil'eva discusses the religious philosophy of Hegelian idealism, not ignoring the peculiar variety of Josiah Royce, and emphasizing also the psychological relation to idealism of investigations on religious consciousness by James and Fechner. Of special interest would be James' study The Will to Believe, in which James makes no commitment to the existence of deity, but only to the existence of mystical experiences, the types of which are traced in Varieties of Religious Experience. The idealist Whitehead also comes in for his share of criticism for his speculative and somewhat abstract concept of God as a metaphysical being present in all existence. But the most interesting interlocutor for Vasil'eva in this philosophical - or metaphysical - representation of a multipresent divine Absolute is Wittgenstein. Quoting from the Notebooks, 1914-1916 to the effect that "God is all that there is" and simultaneously from the Tractatus that "the World is all that is the case, that what there is are facts - what

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exist are atomic facts" (p. 59), Vasil'eva concludes that Wittgenstein was inclined towards pantheism. The constant reference is to the Tractatus. The remainder of the argument is equally tortuous. But we must recall that 'bourgeois' means 'idealistic' in Soviet philosophical slang, and that Wittgenstein may therefore be lumped together with Hegel as an exemplar of idealistic, hence theistic, thinking. It is hardly clear, even from Wittgenstein's claim in the Tractatus that ethics is somehow mystical, and even coupled with his admiration of Tolstoy, that Wittgenstein was ever a mystic, never mind held that the transcendent realm was real. Following this absurd argument, Vasil'eva goes on to study the mystical spiritualism of modern 'pantheistic' thinkers: Barth, Schweitzer, Tillich, Bonhoffer, Buber, and Watts. It is hardly credible that the oriental mysticism of Watts should be conflated with the existentialist theology of such establishment thinkers as Barth, Bonhoffer, or Buber, and even less that any of these should be placed in the same category as the rationalist Tillich. Nevertheless, it is their religiosity, and hence mystical pantheism that places a transcendent deity in the world and in relation to mortals, in Buber's terminology, in an I-Thou relation, that leads Vasil'eva to insert these disparate minds into the same fundamental category. More to the point, Vasil'eva regards Wittgenstein, Buber, Tillich, and the rest as exemplars of the newest trend in religious philosophy, the deterioration of the theistic idea and of the significance of modern religion. This serves as an introduction to a section on the religious views of scientists such as Planck and Einstein, particularly the latter. The cosmic religion of Einstein is considered in strictly human terms. What is mystical in Einstein's thought is the intellectual capacity of man, not the presence of cosmic forces of divine character. On the other hand, these physicists, particularly Einstein, are seen as embracing physical categories and empirical concepts of 'harmony', 'world order', 'cosmic structure', 'cosmic intellect' as endowed with a divine mystery. It is in this sense that we are to interpret Einstein's oft-quoted aphorism, "God does not play dice with the universe". Hence, according to Vasil'eva, for the modern scientist, the universe itself becomes imbued with a religious aura, to replace the prescientific, falling God: it is much in the spirit, we might add, of the naturalistic pantheism of the pre-Soeratics. Finally, Vasil'eva presents a quasi-sociological statement on the pantheistic ideas in the religious perception of the ordinary believer, which seems out of place in this otherwise philosophical study.

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Vasil'eva's philosophical critique of the evolution of pantheism in contemporary religious philosophy is often outlandish, but not impossible, and seems to be an outgrowth of a crude oversimplification of non-Marxist philosophy as pre-bourgeois (feudal), i.e. as mythological, or as bourgeois, i.e. idealistic and theistic. It is an interpretation which fails to distinguish carefully even the scientism of Einstein, Planck, Weyl and others, for whom the physical universe was an esthetic experience, akin to the mathematicians' rapture for a particularly elegant proof, from the prescientism of earlier historical periods, whose thinkers found the ecstatic in a personal deity or deifies (mythological theology) or cosmic purpose in rationally comprehensive and comprehensible natural forces (teleological theology). This is the major shortcoming of Vasil'eva's study. She could have carried her point on the unscientific character of religion without violating Marxist principles but without blurring real and significant distinctions. The reader should note some typographical errors and peculiarities that, while obvious, do not materially detract from Vasil'eva's arguments. By the vagaries of transliteration, Abelard and Teilhard de Chardin are represented as 'Abeljar' and ~eujar de Charden'. Once, the journal Idealistic Studies appears as "Ibealistic studies' (p. 59). Etienne Gilson's name occurs as 'Giison' (p. 77), and Peter Bertocci's name is rendered 'Betrocci' (p. 98). And each reader may wish to adjust the author's quotations/translations according to his own best judgment or interpretations.

Vladimir Ivanovi6 Vernadskij, ~ivoe Ve~estvo, Moskva, 1978. 358 pp. 3 Rubles. Vernadskij has achieved in this book the rare accomplishment of blending philosophical and scientific world-views, and well deserves the title, as few since Leibniz has, of natural philosopher. He presents a unified description of the development and growth of natural phenomena, particularly of living organisms. His understanding of nature is materialistic, as is to be expected, and thus he can be seen as taking the side of the scientists who claim, not merely that life is an accident, but one which, in a universe (cosmos) as large as ours, must be capable ofoccurring many-fold. Vemadskij does not present us with a history of the development of life, but rather with a systematic study of the structure of life. The presentation

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is on three distinct but closely interwoven levels: the physical, the biological, and the methodological. The physical level is treated from the standpoint of cosmology, and especially cosmogony. It is, in short, a characterization of the geochemical prerequisites for the possibility of organic matter. We trace the cosmic processes in the synthesis of geological existence, and thus are brought to a consideration of geochemistry, the development of inert matter and thus of inorganic elements. A further synthesis places us at the level of organic matter, and thus at a point in which accidental chemical reactions or processes may occur which have the potential for the beginning of life. The evidence of Martian life is as yet slim. However, we are led to the conviction that life, insofar as it is the result of serendipitous chemical reactions of inorganic and organic elements, is not a unique or isolated cosmological phenomenon, but a mechanical process. (A reading of Jacques Monod's Chance and Necessity convinces one, at another level, that life is accidental, and re-enforces the notion of life as a mechanical process.) At the biological level, Vernadskij discusses the concept of life as organic, and relates biological structures to the physical environment. He does not allow this treatment, however, to reiterate the Lysenkoist doctrine that structural mutations of life forms are developed, in a single generation, through environment, rather than, through several generations, genetically. Vernadaskij's materialism allows a physical process to account for genetic mutations. The basic substance of life is protoplasm; and it is thanks to the mechanical processes of physical chemistry that a multiplicity of organic types occurs. As a biologist, Vernadskij is concerned precisely with this basic substance of life, that which undifferentiated living matter has in common. Hence, he is a student of the structure (morphology) of organisms and mentions few organisms by name for a detailed discussion (homo sapiens is mentioned but twice). The biological aspect, then, tends to be reduced to a discussion of either the physical or the structural level. We find in the discussion at the biological level only those considerations which are necessary to the dynamic processes (the morphogenesis and morphology) of living organisms. Vernadskij, more than a biologist, is an earth scientist. His concern for living matter is a concern for the biosphere as an integral and dynamic, if serendipitous, feature of earth history in general. He is even more interested in the role of the biosphere in relation to cosmological features, and makes references as frequently to astronomers as to biologists. This fits in with his

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conception of life as a geochemical process. For Vernadskij, then, there is no differentiation to be made between organic chemistry (as accounted for in terms of physical chemistry) and what he calls, then, 'geochemistry'; and it is geochemistry that establishes the link between cosmology and biology, between the cosmos, the physical universe, and living organisms. Vernadskij does not ignore man. He does have some insights into the human organism, including human culture and intelligence, into which he injects a few words about Christ and the apostle Paul. But this discussion is part of a wider consideration of classical cosmology and attempts to consider the nature of life and death. Hence, religion, if not human intelligence and culture, is reduced to the role of speculative cosmology. Intelligence is a mechanical process adopted by a particular organism for the purpose of organized behavior for preservation of the species. It is reducible to physiology. Culture is the cumulative codification of intelligent behavior. Vernadskij's primary concern is best evidenced at the structural level. Here we see writ large the geochemical I~asis of life, through considerations of morphology, the structure of organisms, and with attention paid even to questions such as the minimal size required for functioning organisms. Vernadskij's approach to life science is via physical science, but it is philosophical nevertheless, and represents a wide scholarship evidenced by references to outstanding figures from Anaximander to Eddington and Planck, from Aristotle to Linnaeus and Lamarck. However, this scholarship is never stale or stolid, and hardly intrudes upon the development of the discourse, and never hinders the progress of the thesis. Vernadskij is clearly a great intellect who ranks with the natural philosophers such as Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, and Einstein, whose works he considers. Mount St. Clare College

IRVING H. ANELLIS